Holding

The appellant was guilty of murder under Sections 302 and 34 IPC, as he participated in a common intention to cause death and inflicted an injury sufficient to cause death.

Summary

The appellant, Ambaram, along with several others, was drinking near the house of Savitribai and, after being asked to desist, assaulted her and her brother Prem Singh. Prem Singh intervened, was struck on the head with the blunt side of Ambaram's axe, and later died from injuries that also included a punctured abdomen and lacerated occipital wounds. The trial court convicted Ambaram under Sections 302 and 149 of the IPC, and the High Court affirmed conviction under Sections 302/34 IPC. On appeal, Ambaram argued that his blow with the blunt side of the axe did not constitute a lethal injury and that the charge should be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Supreme Court held that at least one of the ante‑mortem injuries was attributable to Ambaram, that he actively participated in the assault, and that common intention to cause death was established, thereby upholding the murder conviction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the injuries inflicted by the appellant constitute murder under Section 300 IPC or merely culpable homicide under Section 304.
Whether the appellant shared a common intention under Section 34 IPC to cause the death of the deceased.
Whether the appellant's act of striking with the blunt side of an axe satisfies the requirement of 'bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' under clause (3) of Section 300.
Whether the conviction under Sections 302 and 149 IPC is sustainable on the facts.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 299, s. 300, s. 302, s. 304, s. 34

Subjects

murdercommon intentionSection 302 IPCSection 34 IPCculpable homicideIPC Section 300violent assaultcriminal law

Judgment

A AMB ARAM
v.
STA TE OF M.P.

APRIL 27, 2007

B [S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.]

)
Penal Code, 1860:

ss.302134-Murder-Common intention-Fi/thy language used by
C Appellant and other accused while taking drinks-Deceased's sister objected,
on which she was assaulted-At this stage deceased intervened but he was
also assaulted-Appellant assaulted deceased with axe-He acted on
exhortation made by others-At least one injury received by deceased
attributed to Appellant-Common intention may develop at the spot-
D Appellant rightly convicted under ss.302134.

According to the prosecution, Appellant and the other accused were
taking drinks near the house of PW9. They started hurling filthy abuses
and were creating nuisance when PW9 came out of her house and asked them
to behave themselves. But the accused started assaulting PW9. When one
E accused hurled a stone at PW9, her brother intervened but he was caught by
the accused. Appellant who was carrying an axe, inflicted a blow on his head
from its blunt side. Another accused shot an arrow at deceased. He fell down
unconscrous and lat~r succumbed to his injuries. Trial Court held Appellant
and other accused guilty under Section 302/149 IPC. High Court convicted
F Appellant and two other accused under Section 302 r/s 34 IPC. Hence the
present appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: l.1. At least one of the ante-mortem injuries received by deceased
G attributed to the appellant. The injuries found on the person of the deceased
both by the Doctor in his injury report as also in the post-mortem report, .,,
support the prosecution case. [Para 12) [869-D, E)

1.2. Appellant, took an active part in assaulting the deceased. From the

H 866
AMBARAM v. STATE OF M.P. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 867

materials on record, it appears that he actively associated himself in the entire A
episode. Appellant and a co-accused assaulted the deceased with axe whereas
another accused shot an arrow. They have been allegedly shouting 'kill-kill'.
Apart from that, it appears that the appellant has also assaulted another person
on his head. There was absolutely no reason as to why the appellant together
with others would assem hie for taking drinks in front of the house of the B
deceased and that too armed with such lethal weapons. They were merely asked
not to create a nuisance and to behave themselves as they had been hurling
abuses in filthy languages. It was not a case where PW-9 gave any provocation.
She was unarmed. She was a lady, still then she was assaulted. Intervention
by the deceased being her brother at that stage cannot be said to be unusual.
It is, therefore, not a case where injuries were caused on a sudden provocation C
or in a fit of angler. Appellant does not claim a right of private defence. He is
said to have been injured but no medical certificate was produced.
[Para 13) (869-E, F, G; 870-A)

1.3. In any event, appellant was carrying common intention. Common
intention may develop at the spot. Appellant acted on exhortation made by D
others. He participated in the entire occurrence. He was carrying a dangerous
weapon. He assaulted not only the deceased but also another person.
[Para 19) (872-C)

Shajahan & Ors. v. State of Kera/a and Anr., (2007) 7 SCALE 618 and E
Raj Pal and Ors. v. State of Haryana, [2006) 9 SCC 678, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 637 of
2007.

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 19.05.2006 of the High Court p
of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Criminal Appeal No. 1239 of 1998.

Anis Ahmed Khan and Shoaib Ahmed Khan for the Appellant.

Dr. N.M. Ghatate, C.D. Singh and Morusagar Samantaray for the
Respondent.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. I. Leave granted.

2. Appellant herein was convicted for commission of an offence under H
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 5 S.C.R.

A Sections 148, 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code alongwith several other persons
namely Hukum, Girdhari, Patiram, Narayan and Prahlad.

3. Prosecution case shortly stated is as under:-

Savitribai and other members of her family were sitting in the courtyard
B of the former's house at about 4 p.m. on 2.3.1991. Prahladsingh, Ambaram,
Patiram, Hukum, Narayan and Girdhari were drinking liquor. They started
hurling filthy abuses. Savitribai came out from her house and asked them to
behave themselves. They adopted a hostile stance. They started assaulting J
her, causing injuries inter alia by throwing stones. When Accused Hukum
C hurled a stone at her, Prem Singh, brother of Savitribai intervened. He was
caught by them. Hukum pelted a stone at him causing injury on his head.·
Ambaram, who was carrying an axe, inflicted a blow on his head from its blunt
side. Other accused persons entered her house. Patiram brought a bow and
arrow and shot an arrow at Premsingh. He fell down unconscious. One
Chandrakalabai pulled out that arrow. Others who were returning from the
D weekly market intervened. At least six of them namely Himmatsingh, Gendalal,
M.ansingh, Kamalasingh, Savitribai and Phool Singh were injured by the
appellants.

4. Some of the accused persons in the process also appeared to have
suffered injuries. It is alleged that not only the aforementioned persons
E suffered injuries at the hands of the accused, even the tiles of the roof of
Savitribai's house were also damaged.

5. Prem Singh succumbed to his injuries on 3.3.1991.

6. Homicidal nature of death of Prem Singh is not disputed. The learned
F Sessions Judge upon consideration of the materials brought on record by the , .,,
prosecution held the appellants guilty of commission of an offence under
Section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court, however, convicted
only Ambaram, Hukum and Prahlad under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal
Code. Appellant Girdhari was convicted under Section 324 of the Indian Penal
G Code.
7. Only appellant Ambaram is before us.

8. A limited notice was issued by this Court in regard to the nature of
offence.
H 9. Mr. Anis Ahmed Khan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
AMBARAM v. STATE OF M.P. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 869
-... y<
appellant would submit that keeping in view the fact that the appellant has A
assaulted merely with the blunt portion of the axe, whereby no vital injury was
caused; only an offence under part JI of the Section 304 of the Indian Penal
Code is made out.

10. Dr. N.M. Ghatate, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, on the other hand, would submit that the appellant and others B
having been armed with various lethal weapons and having not only caused
the death of one person but injuries to six others, it is not a case where clause
fourthly appended to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code would be applicable.

11. The deceased Prem Singh received the following ante-mortem
injuries;- c
"!. A punctured wound in his abdomen 2" below umbilical region
measuring l" x '!." x cavity deep. The wound has punctured the small
intestine and caused injury of the size '/." x 'h" x through and through.
Omentum and small intestine had also come out.
D
II. Two Lacerated wound on the occipital region measuring l "x Y:z x
V." and another wound l "x Yi" x Y.". "
~-

12. At least one of the injuries is attributed to the appellant. The injuries
found on the person of the deceased both by Dr. N.K. Pancholi in his injury
report as also in the post-mortem report, support the prosecution case. E

13. Appellant, took an active part in assaulting the deceased Prem
Singh. From the materials on record, it appears that he actively associated
himself in the entire episode. Ambaram and Prahlad assaulted the deceased
with axe whereas Patiram shot an arrow. They have been allegedly shouting
"y
F
'kill-kill'. Apart from that, it appears that Ambaram, the appellant had also
assaulted Himmat Singh on his head. There was absolutely no reason as to
why the appellant together with others would assemble for taking drinks in
front of the house of the deceased and that too armed with such lethal
weapons. They were merely asked not to create a nuisance and to behave
themselves as they had been hurling abuses in filthy languages. It was not G
a case where PW-9, Savitribai gave any provocation. She was unarmed. She
was a lady, still then she was assaulted. Intervention by the deceased being
her brother at that stage cannot be said to be unusual. It is, therefore, not
a case where injuries were caused on a sudden provocation or in a fit of anger.
Appellant does not claim a right of private defence. He is said to have been
H
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 5 S.C.R.

A injured but no medical certificate was produced.
14. We may, therefore, for the purpose of this case, notice the relevant
provisions of Section 299 and Section 300.

Section 299 Section 300
B
A person commits culpable Subject to certain exceptions
homicide if the act by which the culpable homicide is murder if the
death is caused is done - act by which the death is caused is
j
done -

c Intention

(a) with the intention of causing ( 1) with the intention of causing
death ; or death ; or

D
(b) with the intention of causing (2) with the intention of causing
such bodily injury as is likely to such bodily injury as the offender
cause death; or knows to be likely to cause the
death of the person to whom the
E harm is caused; or

(3) with the intention of causing
bodily injury to any person and
the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
F course of nature to cause death; or
Knowledge

(c) with the knowledge that the act (4) with the knowledge that the act
is likely to cause death is so imminently dangerous that it
must, in all probability, cause death
G
or such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death, and commits such act
without any excuse;/ for incurring
the risk of causing death or such ·
injury as is mentioned above.
H
AMBARAM v. STATE OF M.P. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 871
y' 15. Whereas Clause (b) of Section 299 refers to clauses secondly and A
" thirdly of Section 300, the distinctive feature of the said provisions are well-
known.

16. Mr. Anis Ahmed Khan, submitted that only one injury was inflicted
by the appellant. A similar question came up for consideration recently in
Shajahan & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & Anr.. (2007) 3 SCALE 618 wherein it B
was held that number of injuries is not decisive. How and in what manner
injuries have been caused would be a relevant factor.
't
\
17. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Anis Ahmed Khan on Raj Pal and
Ors. v. State of Haryana, [2006] 9 SCC 678. Jn that case, it was held;
c
"17. Clause (b) ofSectian 299 does not postulate any such knowledge
on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2)
of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist-blow
intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an
enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is
D
likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture
- of the liver or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be.
-f If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special
fraity of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence
will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was E
intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words
"likely to cause death" occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of
Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature"
have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily
injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the
'r' ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but
F
real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The
difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section
300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the
intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of
probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is G
of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word "likely" in
>'
clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probability as
distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury ....
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that
death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard
H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 5 S.C.R.

A to the ordinary course of nature.
'
18. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the
' "
offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from
the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature. Kalarimadathil Unni v. State of Kerala is
B an apt illustration of this point. "

(Emphasis Supplied)

18. The said decision does not support Mr. Ahmed's contention. It runs )
counter thereto.
c 19. In any event, appellant was held to be carrying common intention.
Common intention may develop at the spot. Appellant acted on exhortation
made by others. He participated in the entire occurrence. He was carrying a
dangerous weapon. He assaulted not only the deceased but also another.

D 20. We therefore, are of the opinion that no case has been made out for
interference with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.

B.B.B. Appeal dismissed. .t

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