AMIT VASHISTHAversusSURESH AND ANOTHER

                           [2017] 7 S.C.R. 736



A                         AMIT VASHISTHA
                                    v.
                       SURESH AND ANOTHER
                    (CriminalAppealNo.245 of 2010)
B                           AUGUST 31, 2017
             [RANJAN GOGOi AND NAVIN SINHA, JJ.f
         Penal Code, 1860 - s.228 - Jn an adjudication proceeding
  u/s. 7A of Employees Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions
C Act, 1952 with regard to provident fund claims of the respondent,
  the Provident Fund Commissioner filed a complaint u/s. 228 that
  respondent had obstructed and interfered with the proceedings by
  abusing and assaulting the Presiding Officer - Maintainability of
  complaint challenged - Held: s.2(i) of the Cr.P.C. defines a judicial
  proceeding to include any proceedings in the course of which
D evidence is or may be legally taken on oath - This power is
  indisputably statutorily vested in the authority holding proceedings
  u/s. 7A of the 1952 Act. - Therefore, the proceedings u/s. 7A are
  deemed to be judicial proceedings and complaint u/s.228
  maintainable - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.195(l)(b)(i)
E - Employees Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952
  -s.7A.
          Allowing the appeal, the Court
        HELD: The legislature, in its wisdom, considering the
  seriousness of the adjudicatory process under Section 7A of 1952
F Act vested it with the nature of a judicial proceeding within the
  meaning of Sections 193 and 228 IPC. If the proceedings under
  Section 7A are deemed to be a judicial proceeding by fiction, it
  must be carried to its logical conclusion. Therefore, such a judicial
  proceeding can well be equated for that purpose with a court
  under Section 195(1)(b)(i). The High Court failed to consider
G the effect of the judicial nature of the proceeding, simply by
  reference to Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C. to hold that the
  proceedings did not partake the nature of a court, and therefore,
  the complaint was not maintainable. (Para 6] [738-F-Hl

H
                                  736
         AMIT VASHISTHA v. SURESH AND ANOTHER                                      737


       Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra [1964) 6 SCR                          A
       700 - referred to.
                             Case Law Reference
          [1964) 6 SCR 700             referred to            Para 6

                                                                                   B
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 245 of 2010.
      From the final Judgment and Order dated 30.01.2009 passed by
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Cr. R.No.445
of2007.                                                                            C
      Keshav Mohan, Smarhar Singh, Piyush Choudhar, Advs. for the
Appellant.           ·
       Suresh (in-person), C.D. Singh, Ms. Sakshi Kakkar, Gaurav
 Shukla, Usman, Advs. for the Respondents.
                                                                                   D
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
         NAVIN SINHA, J. 1. The appellant is aggrieved by order dated
  30.01.2009 in Criminal Revisio:i No.445 of2007. By the impugned order,
  the respondent has been acquitted of the charge under Section 228 of
  the Indian Penal Code on the premise that the adjudication proceedings E
. under Section 7A of the Emplcyees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
  Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter for short the 'Act') not being before a
  court, the complaint itself was not maintainable.
          2. In an adjudication proceeding under Section 7A of the Act,
 with regard to provident fund claims of the respondent, the Assistant             F
 Provident Fund Commissioner filed a complaint on 22.06.2001 before
 the Judicial Magistrate First Class under Section 228 !PC, that the
 respondent had obstructed and interfered with the proceedings by abusing
 the Presiding Officer, and rushed to assault him, but the complainant
 was saved by the office staff. The Magistrate convicted the respondent
 till rising of the Court and imposed fine of Rs.500/- with default stipulation.   G
 In appeal, preferred by the respondent, the Sessions Judge while
 maintaining the conviction released him under the Probation of Offenders
 Act, 1958 on an undertaking of p;ood behavior for a period of one year.

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738             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 7 S.C.R.


A     Aggrieved, the respondent moved the High Court in a revision application
      leading to the impugned order, thus the present appeal.
             3. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the High Court
      erred in not appreciating that the proceedings under Section 7A were
      judicial proceedings, and misdirected itself in concluding that the office
 B    of the appellant was not a court, and therefore, the complaint itself was
      not maintainable under Section 195( 1)(b )(i) of the Code of Criminal
      Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Cr.P.C').
             4. The respondent appearing in person, supporting the impugned
      order submitted that the proceedings under Section 7A not being before
 c    a court, the High Court rightly held that no complaint could have been
      filed under Section 195(1 )(b )(i) of the Cr.P.C which was applicable only
      to proceedings before a court. It was next submitted that in any event
      the complaint could have been filed, if at all, before the appellate tribunal
      under Section 7J of the Act, and not before the magistrate directly.
 D          5. The facts are not in dispute, and neither is it in dispute that the
      appellant is a public servant. The only question for consideration is if the
      complaint under Section 228 IPC was maintainable in view of the
      proceeding under Section 7A deemed to be a judicial proceeding or
      whether the proceedings had to be before a court to invoke Section
      195(l)(b)(i) Cr.P.C.
 E
             6. Section 2(i) of the Cr.P.C defines a judicial proceeding to include
      any proceedings in the course of which evidence is or may be legally
      taken on oath. This power is indisputably statutorily vested in the authority
      holding proceedings under Section 7A of the Act. The legislature, in its
      wisdom, considering the seriousness of the adjudicatory process under
 F    the said provision, vested it with the nature of a judicial proceeding within
      the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 IPC. If the proceedings under
      Section 7A are deemed to be a judicial proceeding by fiction, it must be
      carried to its logical conclusion. Therefore, such a judicial proceeding
      can well be equated for that purpose with a court under Section
 G     195(l)(b)(i). Whether the proceedings under Section 7 A will partake
      the character of a court or not, is not relevant to the controversy. The
      High Court failed to consider the effect of the judicial nature of the
      proceeding, simply by reference to Section 195(l)(b)(i) Cr.P.C. to hold
      that the proceedings did not partake the nature of a court, and therefore,
      the complaint was not maintainable. A similar issue was considered in
       AMIT VASHISTHA v. SURESH AND ANOTHER                                       739
                   [NAVIN SINHA, J.]

La/ji Haridas vs. State ofMaharashtra, (1964) 6 SCR 700, observing                A
as follows:-
     " 14. It is somewhat remarkable that though Section 193 IPC, refers
     to a judicial proceeding, Section 195 CrPC refers to a proceeding
     in any court; it does not say a judicial proceeding in any court.
     Mr Desai contends that reading Section 193 IPC and Section B
      195(1)(b) CrPC together, it would not be unreasonable to hold
     that proceedings which are judicial under the former, should be
     taken to be proceedings in any court under the latter. The whole
     basis of providing for a higher sentence in regard to offences
     committed at any stage of a judicial proceeding appears to be that
     the legislature took the view that the said offences were more c
     serious in character, and so, it distinguished the said offences from
     similar offences committed at any stage of other proceeding. The
     argument is that while providing for a higher sentence in respect
     of this more serious class of offences committed at any stage of
     judicial proceedings, the legislature intended that there should be D
     a safeguard in respect of complaints as regards the said offences
     and that safeguard is provided by Section 195(l)(b) CrPC. In
     other words, an offence which is treated as more serious by the
     first paragraph of Section 193 lPC because it is an offence
     committed during the course of a judicial proceeding should be
     held to be an offence committed in any proceeding in any court E
     for the purpose of Section 195(l)(b) CrPC. On this argument, it
     is not necessary to consider whether the Income Tax Officer is a
     court or not, for, in substance, the contention is that as soon as
      Section 37(4) of the Act was enacted, the proceedings before an
     Income Tax Officer become judicial proceedings for the purpose F
     of Section 193 IPC, and since they are classed under the first
     paragraph of the said section, they attract the protection of Section
      195( I )(b) CrPC. In our opinion, there is considerable force in this
      argument, and, on the whole, we are inclined to prefer the
      construction suggested by Mr Desai to that pressed before us by
     the learned Additional Solicitor-General.                              G

                                    xxxxxxxxxx
      16 ...... There can be little doubt that if a person offers an insult to
      a public servant sitting in a judicial proceeding, or causes interrnption
      to him while he is so sitting at any stage of the judicial proceeding,
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740             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 7 S.C.R.


A            the complaint has to proceed from the public servant himself; that
             is the effect of Section 195(l)(b) CrPC."
            7. The argument that the complaint was required to be filed under
      Section 340 Cr.P.C. before the appellate tribunal and not before the
      magistrate havingjurisdiction is considered frivolous and is rejected.
 B          8. The order of the High Court is, therefore, held to be
      unsustainable and is set aside.
             9. The appeal is allowed.


      Devika Gujral                                               Appeal allowed.