Supreme Court of India
ANAND SINGH & ANR.versusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 443
- Decided
- 28 July 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- R V RAVEENDRAN
Holding
The invocation of Section 17(4) to dispense with the Section 5A enquiry was not justified as the State failed to produce material evidencing urgency, rendering the dispensation invalid, though no relief was granted due to the completed acquisition.
Summary
The Gorakhpur Development Authority (GOA) sought to acquire land for a residential colony and, under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, invoked the urgency clause of Section 17(4) to dispense with the mandatory Section 5A enquiry. The appellants, land owners, challenged the validity of this dispensation, arguing that no material justified the urgency and that the delay between pre‑notification and declaration was excessive. The Supreme Court held that the State failed to demonstrate any material basis for invoking Section 17(4); therefore the dispensation of the Section 5A enquiry was legally infirm. However, because the acquisition and development had largely been completed and compensation paid to most owners, the Court declined to set aside the acquisition, granting the appellants only a liberty to make representations under Section 48(1) for release of their land. The appeals were dismissed.
Issues considered
- The validity of invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to dispense with the Section 5A enquiry.
- Whether pre‑notification and post‑notification delays affect the applicability of the urgency power.
- Whether the appellants are entitled to de‑acquisition or release of their land under Section 48(1).
- The burden on the State to produce material justifying the exercise of the extraordinary power under Section 17.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 300A
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 106
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 16, s. 17(1), s. 17(2), s. 17(4), s. 4, s. 48(1), s. 5A, s. 6, s. 9
Subjects
Land acquisitionUrgency clauseSection 17Section 5AEminent domainNatural justiceDe‑acquisitionCompensationPublic purposePlanned developmentJudicial review
Judgment
[2010] 9 S.C.R. 133
ANAND SINGH & ANR. A
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2523 of 2008)
JULY 28, 2010
B
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
ss. 17, 5A and 48(1) - Invocation of urgency clause and c
dispensation of enquiry u/s. 5A - Notification for land
acquisition for public purpose-development of residential
colony - Invocation of urgency clause and dispensation of
enquiry uls. 5A - Legality of- Challenge to, by appellant-land
owners - Held: Dispensation of enquiry u/s. 5A by invoking D
s. 17(4) not justified - No material placed by State
Government either before High Court or Supreme Court
warranting elimination of enquiry uls. 5A - There was pre-
notification and post-notification delay - Majority of other land
owners have received compensation - Development E
Authority has already spent Rs. 5,28,00,0001- fordflvelopment
of the acquired land, and more than 60% of work has been
completed - Thus, appellants not entitled to de-acquisition
of land - However, in view of the peculiar facts, appellants
granted liberty to make representation to State Authorities u/
s. 48(1) for release of their land. F
s. 5A - Scope of - Held: s. 5A confers a valuable right
on owner or person interested to file objections against the
proposed compulsory acquisition of the particular property for
public purpose - It also makes the provision for compulsory G
acquisition, just and in conformity with fundamental principles
of natural justice.
s. 17(4) - Urgency clause - Invocation of- Dispensation
133 H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A of enquiry u/s. 5A - Held: Is an exceptional and extra-ordinary
power- It should be invoked only when circumstances warrant
immediate possession - Government has to apply its mind
on the aspect whether urgency justifies elimination of
summary enquiry uls. 5A - Upon challenge being made to
B the use of power uls. 17, Government must produce
appropriate material before the court on basis of which
opinion was formed - Where opinion formed on the
considerations is not germane to the purpose, judicial review
of such administrative decision may become necessary -
c Judicial review - Administrative Law.
'Eminent domain' - Power of - Held: It is acquisition of
private property by the Government in the public interest,
general welfare or for public purpose - It is inherent in the
Government.
D
The Gorakhpur Development Authority issued
Notifications for acquiring certain land including land of
the appellants for public purpose-development of
residential colony. The urgency clause uls. 17 of the Land
E Acquisition Act, 1894 was invoked and the enquiry uls.
SA was dispensed with. The appellants and other tenure
holders filed writ petition challenging the Notifications on
the ground that the urgency clause was invoked
dispensing with enquiry uls. SA without any basis and that
F structures and buildings were existing on their respective
holdings, thus, they were entitled to release of their land
from acquisition. The High Court upheld the Notifications.
As regard the prayer for seeking release of their land from
acquisition uls. 48, the appellants and others were
G directed to approach the State Government. Therefore,
the appellants filed the instant appeals.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. In the instant case, the Government
H completely failed to justify the dispensation of an enquiry
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 135
PRADESH & ORS.
u/s. 5A by invoking s. 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, A
1894. The impugned notifications to the extent they state
that s. 5A of the Act shall not apply suffers from legal
infirmity. [Para 32] [174-8-D]
2. 'Eminent domain' is the right or power of a B
sovereign State to appropriate the private property within
the territorial sovereignty for public uses or purposes. It
is exercise of strong arm of government to take property
for public uses without owner's consent. It requires no
constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty C
and essential to the &overeign government. The power
of eminent domain, being inherent in the government, is
exercisable in the public interest, general welfare and for
public purpose. Acquisition of private property by the
State in the public interest or for public purpose is
nothing but an enforcement of the right of 'eminent D
domain'. [Paras 29, 30] [169-C-E]
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 14,
1952 (West Publishing Co. - referred to.
E
3.1 In India, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides
directly for acquisition of particular property for public
purpose. Though right to property is no longer
fundamental right but Article 300A of the Constitution
mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law. Thats. 5A of the Act confers a F
valuable right to an individual is beyond any doubt. It
confers an important right in favour of a person whose
land is sought to be acquired. When the government
proceeds for compulsory acquisition of particular
property for public purpose, the only right that the owner G
or the person interested in the property has, is to submit
his objections within the prescribed time u/s. 5A of the
Act and persuade the State Authorities to drop the
acquisition of that particular land by setting forth the
H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A reasons such as the unsuitability of the land for the
stated public purpose; the grave hardship that may be
caused to him by such expropriation, availability of
alternative land for achieving public purpose etc.
Moreover, right conferred on the owner or person
s interested to file objections to the proposed acquisition
is not only an important and valuable right but also
makes the provision for compulsory acquisition, just and
in conformity with the fundamental principles of natural
justice. [Para 30] [169-E-H; 170-A-B]
c 3.2 The exceptional and extra-ordinary power of
doing away with an enquiry u/s. 5A in a case where
possession of the land is required urgently or in
unforeseen emergency is provided in s. 17 of the Act.
Such power is not a routine power and save
D circumstances warranting immediate possession it
should not be lightly invoked. The guideline is inbuilt in
s. 17 itself for exercise of the exceptional power in
dispensing with enquiry u/s. 5A. Exceptional the power,
the more circumspect the Government must be in its
E exercise. Therefore, the Government has to apply its
mind before it dispenses with enquiry u/s. 5A on the
aspect whether the urgency is of such a nature that
justifies elimination of summary enquiry u/s. 5A. A
repetition of statutory phrase in the notification that the
F State Government is satisfied that the land specified in
the notification is urgently needed and the provision
contained in s. 5A shall not apply, though may initially
raise a presumption in favour of the government that pre-
requisite conditions for exercise of such power have
G been satisfied, but such presumption may be displaced
by the circumstances themselves having no reasonable
nexus with the purpose for which the power has been
exercised. Upon challenge being made to the use of
power u/s. 17, the government must produce appropriate
H
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 137
PRADESH & ORS.
material before the court that the opinion for dispensing A
with the enquiry u/s. SA has been formed by the
government after due application of mind on the material
placed before it. It is true that the power conferred upon
the government u/s. 17 is administrative and its opinion
is entitled to due weight, but in a case where the opinion B
is formed regarding the urgency based on
considerations not germane to the purpose, the judicial
review of such administrative decision may become
necessary. As to in what circumstances the power of
emergency can be invoked are specified in s. 17(2) but c
circumstances necessitating invocation of urgency
clause u/s. 17(1) are not stated in the provision itself. The
development of an area (for residential purposes) or a
planned development of city, takes many years if not
decades and, therefore, there is no reason why summary D
enquiry as contemplated u/s. SA may not be held and
objections of land owners/persons interested may not be
considered. In many cases on general assumption, likely
delay in completion of enquiry u/s. SA is set up as a
reason for invocation of extra-ordinary power in
E
dispensing with the enquiry little realizing that an
important and valuable right of the person interested in
the land is being taken away and with some effort enquiry
could always be completed expeditiously. The special
provision has been made ins. 17 to eliminate enquiry u/
s. SA in deserving and cases of real urgency. [Para 30] F
[170-B-H; 171-A-E]
3.3 The pre-notification and post-notification delay
will have material bearing on the question of invocation
of urgency power, particularly, in a situation where no G
material has been placed by the appropriate government
before the court justifying that urgency was of such
nature that necessitated elimination of enquiry u/s. SA of
the Act. [Para 30] [171-G-H; 172-A]
H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A 3.4 In a country as big as India, the roof over head is
a distant dream for large number of people. The urban
development continues to be haphazard. The planned
development and housing are matters of priority in
developing nation. In all cases of 'planned development
B of the city' or 'for the development of residential area', the
power of urgency may not be invoked by the Government
and even where such power is invoked, the enquiry
contemplated u/s. 5A should not be dispensed with
invariably. Ordinarily 'planned development of city' or
c 'development of residential area' can allow delay of few
months to complete the enquiry u/s. 5A. Therefore, the
Government must do a balancing act and resort to the
special power of urgency u/s. 17 in the matters of
acquisition of land for the public purpose viz.; 'planned
development. of city' or 'for development of residential
0
area' in exceptional situation. Use of the power by the
Government u/s. 17 for 'planned development of the city'
or 'the development of residential area' or for 'housing'
must not be as a rule but by way of an exception. Such
exceptional situation may be for the public purpose-
E rehabilitation of natural calamity affected persons;
rehabilitation of persons uprooted due to construction of
dam or housing for lower strata of the society urgently;
rehabilitation of persons affected by time bound projects,
etc. The list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In any
F case, without real urgency and need for immediate
possession of the land for carrying out the stated
purpose, heavy onus lies on the government to justify
exercise of such power. Therefore, the use of the power
of urgency and dispensation of enquiry u/s. 5A by the
G Government in a routine manner for the 'planned
development of city' or 'development of residential area'
and thereby depriving the owner or person interested of
a very valuable right u/s. 5A may not meet the statutory
test nor could it be readily sustained. [Para 31] [172-B-H;
H 173-A]
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 139
PRADESH & ORS.
4.1 In February, 2000, a Land Selection Committee A
was constituted to identify the availability of land for a
housing colony by the GOA. In April, 2001, the Committee
so constituted inspected. the site and proposed
acquisition of land in Village M and few other villages but
nothing further was done as the tenure holders opposed B
the. acquisition of their land and the Commissioner,
Gorakhpur in public interest stayed proposal for
acquisition. Abruptly the notifications for the proposed
acquisition were issued on November 22, 2003/February
20, 2004 u/s. 4 of the Act: In these notifications urgency c
clause was invoked and the enquiry u/s. SA was
dispensed with. Then, for more than one year nothing
was done. It was only on December 28, 2004 that a
declaration u/s. 6 was made. If the matter could hang on
from April, 2001 to November 22, 2003/February 20, 2004 D
before the notifications u/s. 4 were issued and for about
a year thereafter in issuance of declaration u/s. 6,
acquisition proceedings could have been arranged in a
manner so as to enable the land owners and/or the
interested persons to file their objections u/s. SA within E
the prescribed time and complete the enquiry
expeditiously. Insofar as Uttar Pradesh is concerned,
there is amendment in section 17. Sub-section (1 A)
enables the Government to take possession under sub-
section (1) of section 17 if the land is required for public
purpose viz.; 'planned development'. Nevertheless for F ·
forming an opinion that provisions of s. SA shall not
apply, the State Government must apply its mind that
urgency is of such nature warranting elimination of
enquiry u/s. SA. Although some correspondence
between the Authorities and the Government was placed G
before the High Court by the GOA, but no material was
placed on record by the State Government either before
the High Court or before this Court indicating the
application of mind that the urgency was of such nature
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A which warranted elimination of the enquiry u/s. 5A of the
Act. The GOA wanted the subject land to be acquired
because their land bank had no land and they wanted
land to keep the Authority running. If profit-making and
the sustenance of the Development Authority was the
B motive, surely urgency was not of such nature that it
could allow no delay whatsoever. [Para 32) [173-B-H;
174-A-B]
4.2 In the written submissions of the GOA, it is stated
that subsequent to the declaration made u/s. 6 of the Act
C in the month of December, 2004, award was passed and
out of the 400 land owners more than 370 have a:.~ady
received compensation. Out of the total cost of Rs.
8,85, 14,000/- for development of the acquired land, an
amount of Rs. 5,28,00,000/- has already been spent by the
D GOA and more than 60% of work has been completed. It
seems that barring the appellants and few others all other
tenure holders/land owners have accepted the 'takings'
of their land. It is too late in the day to undo what has
already been done. Therefore, in the peculiar f~cts and
E circumstances of the case, the appellants are not entitled
to any relief although dispensation of enquiry u/s. 5A was
not justified. Since the existence of houses/structures
and buildings as on November 22, 2003/February 20, 2004
over the apr>ellants' land has been seriously disputed, it
F may not be appropriate to issue any direction to the State
Government, as prayed for by the appellants, for release
of their land from acquisition. However, as the possession
has not been taken, the interest of justice would be
subserved if the appellants are given liberty to make
G representation to the State Authorities u/s. 48(1) of the Act
for release of their land. Therefore, the appellants are
granted liberty to make appropriat~ representation to the
State Government. [Paras 32 and 33) [174-C-E; 175-B-D]
Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
H
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 141
PRADESH & ORS.
Ors. (1967) 1 SCR 373; Jage Ram and Ors. v. State of A
Haryana and Ors (1971) 1 SCC 671; Narayan Govind
Gavate and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (1977) 1
SCC 133; State of Punjab and Anr. v. Gurdial Singh and Ors.
(1980) 2 SCC 471; Deepak Pahwa and Ors. v. Lt. Governor
of Delhi and Ors. (1984) 4 SCC 308; State of U.P. v. Smt. B
Pista Devi and Ors. (1986) 4 SCC 251; Rajasthan Housing
Board and Ors. v. Shri Kishan and Ors. (1993) 2 SCC 84;
Chameli Singh and Ors.v. State of U.P. and Anr (1996) 2 SCC
549; Meerut Development Authority and Ors. v. Satbir Singh
and Ors. (1996) 11 SCC 462; Om Prakash and Anr. v. State C
of U.P. and Ors. (1998) 6 sec 1; Union of India and Ors. v.
Mukesh Hans (2004) 8 SCC 14; Union of India and Ors. v.
Krishan Lal Arneja and Ors. (2004) 8 SCC 453; Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai and Ors.
(2005) 7 SCC 627; Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi and Ors. D
v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 418; Babu Ram
and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Anr. (2009) 10 SCC 115;
Tika Ram and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2009)
10 sec 689 - referred to.
Case Law Reference: E
(1967) 1 SCR 373 Referred to. Para 14
(1971) 1 sec 671 Referred to. Para 15
(1977) 1 sec 133 Referred to. Para 16 F
(1980) 2 sec 471 Referred to. Para 17
(1984) 4 sec 308 Referred to. Para 18
(1986) 4 sec 251 Referred to. Para 19
G
(1993) 2 sec 84 Referred to. Para 20
(1996) 2 sec 549 Referred to. Para 21
(1996) 11 sec 462 Referred to. Para 22
H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A (1998) 6 sec 1 Referred to. Para 23
(2004) 8 sec 14 Referred to. Para 24
(2004) 8 sec 453 Referred to. Para 25
(2005) 7 sec 627 Referred to. Para 26
8
(2008) 12 sec 418 Referred to. Para 27
(2009) 10 sec 115 Referred to. Para 28
(2009) 10 sec 689 Referred to. Para 28
c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2523 of 2008.
From the Judgment & Order dated 06.05.2005 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.
D 16842 of 2005.
With
C.A. Nos. 2517, 2518, 2519, 2524, 2525, 2561, 2703, 2724,
E 2731 of 2008.
K.8. Sinha, S.C. Paul, Roopa Paul, S.S. Muncie, Rekha
Pandey, Santosh Kumar Tripathi, Vikram, Sarika Singh,
Shailendra Mishra for the Appellants.
F Shail Kr. Dwivedi, Addi. A.G., P.V. Shetty, Sanjay Visen,
Vandana Mishra, Manoj Kr. Dwivedi, Ashutosh Kr. Sharma,
Manish Srivastava, Gunnam Venkateswara Rao, S.C. Birla,
Tulika Prakash, Sheela Khan, Parveen Rawal, lrshad Ahmad,
Amit Sharma, Anupam Lal Das, Arpit Gupta, Jatinder Kumar
G Bhatia, Kamlendra Mishra for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R.M. LODHA, J. Of this group of ten appeals, 7 arise from
the common judgment and order dated May 6, 2005 passed
H
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTIAR 143
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The remaining 3 A
appeals arise from separate judgments (dated January 18,
2007, March 22, 2007 and April 25, 2007) and in one of them,
the common judgment and order dated May 6, 2005 was
followed. As identical questions are involved, these appeals
were heard together and are being disposed of by this common B
judgment.
2. The appellants in these appeals have small holdings of
land in Manbela, Hamidpur and Jangal Sikri etc., Pargana
Haveli, District Gorakhpur in the State of Uttar Pradesh. About C
209.515 hectares of land including the land of the appellants
was sought to be acquired for the public purpose, namely, for
residential colony by the Gorakhpur Development Authority
(GOA), Gorakhpur. Vide public notices issued under sub-
section (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for
short, 'the Act') on November 22, 2003 and February 20, 2004 D
notifying for general information that the land mentioned in the
schedule appended thereto was needed for the said public
purpose. The provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the
Act were also invoked as in the opinion of the Governor, the
land proposed to be acquired was urgently required. By use E
of power under Section 17(4) of the Act, it was stated in the
notification that Section 5A of the Act shall not apply. These
public notices are said to have been published in the Official
Gazette as well as other modes as prescribed in Section 4.
F
3. On December 28, 2004, a declaration was made under
Section 6 of the Act that the land mentioned in the schedule
including the subject land was needed for public purpose,
namely, for the construction of residential colony under a
planned development scheme. By the said notification, the G
Collector, Gorakhpur was also directed that on expiration of 15
days from the publication of the notice under Section 9(1 ), the
possession of the !and mentioned in the schedule may be
taken, although no award under Section 11 has been made.
4. The present appellants and the other tenure holders H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A whose land was sought to be acquired pursuant to the
aforesaid notifications, approached the High Court by filing writ
petitions wherein. inter alia, a plea was raised that there was
no justification to invoke urgency clause and there was no
material before the Government for dispensing with the enquiry
B 11nder Section SA of the Act. They averred that structures and
buildings were existing on their respective holdings and even
otherwise they are entitled to release of their land from
acquisition.
S. The State Government as well as the GOA opposed the
C writ petitions and justified invocation of urgency clause and the
dispensation of summary enquiry under Section SA as the land
was required for providing residential and housing colony for
the lower income group, middle income group and higher
income group by the GOA.
0
6. The High Court by its common judgment and order
dated May 6, 200S held that none of the grounds raised by the
petitioners in the writ petitions was sustainable and
consequently upheld the notifications under challenge. While
E dealing with the aspect of existence of buildings on the subject
land and petitioners' prayer for direction to the State
Government to consider deacquisition by exercising its power
under Section 48 of the Act, the Court observed that the
petitioners may approach the State Government for the
F redressal of their grievance in accordance with law. As noticed
above, in one of the subsequent orders, the High Court has
followed the common judgment and order dated May 6, 200S.
7. Be it noticed here that prior to the issuance of the
notifications dated November 22, 2003/February 20, 2004
G under Section 4(1) read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the
Act, somewhere in the month of February, 2000, a Land
Selection Committee was constituted to identify the availabiiity
of land for a housing colony in or around Gorakhpur. The
Committee so constituted made spot inspection in April, 2001
H
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTIAR 145
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
and proposed acquisition of land in nine villages including A
Manbela, Jungle Sikri @ Khorabar, Khorabar@ Subba Bazar,
Salempur@ Mugalpur, Hamidpur etc. However, nothing further
was done as the tenure holders opposed the acquisition of their
land and the Commissioner, Gorakhpur by his order dated May
2, 2001 stayed proposal submitted by the Land Selection B
Committee in public interest.
8. Mr. K.B. Sinha, learned senior counsel for the appellants
principally raised two-fold submission before us. Firstly, learned
senior counsel submitted that invocation of urgency clause C
under Section.17(1) and dispensation of summary enquiry for
the public purpose, namely, 'development of residential colony'
were wholly unjustified. He contended that such an act of the
State was in colourable exercise of power. He would submit
that the development of residential colony takes sufficiently long
time and does not necessitate dispensation with the enquiry D
and no exceptional circumstances have been brought on record
by the Government that may justify exercise of such
extraordinary power. Secondly, learned senior counsel
£~t.mitted that in view of the fact that the appellants have
constructed their residential houses much before the issuance E
of impugned notifications, the State must exercise its power
under Section 48 and release their land from acquisition. He
would submit that the State Government has adopted a policy
of pick and choose inasmuch as some land has been released
from acquisition while the appellants' land has not been F
considered for being released.
9. Learned counsel for the other appellants adopted the
arguments of Mr. K.B. Sinha. Insofar as Civil Appeal No. 2703
of 2008 is concerned, learned counsel submitted that in G
respect of the land under consideration in this appeal, a
Degree College is in existence and this aspect has been
overlooked by the Government while issuing impugned
notifications.
H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A 10. Mr. Oinesh Owivedi, learned senior counsel for the
State of Uttar Pradesh as well as Mr. lrshad Ahmad, learned
counsel for the GOA justified the impugned notifications and
submitted that the State Government has acted within its
competence and power in invoking urgency clause and
8 dispensation of enquiry under Section SA for the public purpose
viz., development of residential colony since in Gorakhpur
housing was urgently required for various groups of the society.
They submitted that there is no impediment for the State
Government in invoking urgency clause for the public purpose
c of housing. On behalf of the GOA, it was contended that many
steps have been taken in developing the land acquired under
the impugned notifications inasmuch as water line, electric line,
sewerage line, drainage etc. have been laici and roads
constructed. In the written arguments submitted by the GOA, it
has been stated that the total cost of development of the
0
acquired land is Rs. 8,8S, 14,000/- and out of which S,28,00,000/
- have already been spent and about 60% work has already
been completed. It has also been submitted by the GOA that
after the award was made, compensation amount has been
E deposited and barring appellants and 6-7 other persons, all
land owners have accepted compensation. As regards
appellants' land, it is stated that structures have been put up
subsequent to the issuance of impugned notificati~ns.
11. Learned senior counsel and counsel for the parties
F cited some decisions of this Court in support of their respective
submissions. We shall refer to them appropriately a little later.
12. In the light of the contentions of the parties, the question
for our consideration is as to whether the impugned
G notifications dated November 22, 2003/February 20, 2004
invoking urgency clause and dispensation of enquiry under
Section SA for the public purpose viz., 'development of
residential colony' are legal and valid and if the answer is in
negative, whether on the facts and in the circumstances, the
appellants are entitled to any relief.
H
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 147
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
13. Before we advert to the aforesaid question, it is A
appropriate that we briefly notice the relevant provisions
contained in the Act. The Act was enacted for the acquisition
of land needed for public purposes and for companies and for
determining the amount of compensation to be made on such
acquisition. Section 4 makes a provision for publication of B
preliminary notification notifying that land mentioned therein is
needed for a public purpose. It provides for the mode of
publication of such notification and empowers the authorized
officers to make survey and set out the boundaries of the land
proposed to be taken amongst other acts as provided in the c
said Section. Section SA confers a right on the person
interested in any land which has been notified under Section
4(1) as being needed for a public purpose or likely to be
needed for public purpose to object to the acquisition of the
land. It provides that the objector shall be provided an D
opportunity of hearing and after hearing all such objections and
after making such further enquiry, the Collector may submit his
report to the appropriate government along with his
recommendations on the objections and the record of
proceedings. Section 6 provides for declaration of intended
acquisition in the mode prescribed thereunder. The declaration E
made under Section 6 is conclusive evidence that the land is
needed for a public purpose and after making such declaration,
the appropriate government may acquire the land in the manner
provided in subsequent provisions. Section 6 also prescribes
time limit in making such declaration. Section 9 provides a F
public notice to be given by the Collector stating that the
government intends to take possession of the land and that
claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be
made to him. As per Section 11, the Collector is.required to
enquire into the objections that may be receive'd from the G
persons interested pursuant to the notice issued under Section
9 and determine the award of compensation, inter alia by
enquiring into the value of the land and the respective interests
of the persons claiming compensation. Section 11-A
prescribes the limitation for making an award under Section 11. H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A Section 16 provides for taking possession of the land after the
Collector has made an award under Section 11. The special
powers in cases of urgency and unforeseen emergency are
conferred upon the government under Section 17. Sub-section
(1) thereof provides that in case of urgency the appropriate
B government may direct the Collector to take possession of any
land needed for public purpose on expiration of fifteen days
from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9,
although no award has been made. Sub-section (2) confers
power on the appropriate government to acquire the immediate
C possession of the land for the purposes specified thereunder
in the cases of unforeseen emergency. Sub-section (3A),
however mandates that before taking possession of any land
under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall
tender payment of 80% of the compensation as estimated by
him to the persons entitled thereto and pay the said
0
compensation to them unless prevented by the contingencies
under Section 31(2). Sub-section (4) empowers the government
to direct that the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply, on
its satisfaction that the provisions contained in sub-section (1)
or sub-section (2) are applicable and a declaration may be
E made under Section 6 after the publication of the notification
under Section 4(1 ). Insofar as Uttar Pradesh is concerned, sub-
section (1A) has been inserted after sub-section (1) of Section
17 which provides that the power to take possession under
sub-section (1) may also be exercised, inter alia, if the land is
F required for 'planned development'. Section 48 gives liberty to
the government to withdraw from acquisition of any land.
14. The matters involving invocation of urgency clause and
dispensation of the enquiry under Section 5A have come up
G for consideration before this Court from time to time. In Raja
Anand Brahma Shah v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., this
Court observed that the opinion of the government formed under
Section 17(4) of the Act can be challenged as ultra vires in a
court of law, if it could be shown that the government never
H applied its mind to the matter or that the action of the
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 149
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
government is mala fide. A
15. In case of Jage Ram and Ors. v. State of Haryana and
Ors. while considering the urgency provision contained in
Section 17, this Court held that merely because there was
some laxity at an earlier stage, it cannot be inferred that on the B
date the notification was issued there was no urgency. It was
held that the conclusion of the government in a given case that
there was urgency is entitled to weight, if not conclusive.
16. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Narayan Govind
Gavate and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. extensively C
considered Section 17 of the Act vis-a-vis extent of judicial
review. That was a case wherein the public purpose recited in
the notification was 'development and utilization of said land
as a residential and industrial area'. This Court stated the legal
position as follows : D
"37. We think that Section 17(4) cannot be read in isolation
from Section 4(1) and 5-A of the Act. The immediate
purpose of a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is
to enable those who may have any objections to make to E
lodge them for purposes of an enquiry under Section 5-A
of the Act. It is true that, although only 30 days from the
notification under Section 4(1) are given for the filing of
these objections under Section 5-A of the Act, yet,
sometimes the proceedings under Section 5-A are unduly
F
prolonged. But, considering the nature of the objections
which are capable of being successfully taken under
Section 5-A, it is difficult to see why the summary enquiry
should not be concluded quite expeditiously. In view of the
authorities of this Court, the existence of what are prima
facie public purposes, such as the one present in the G
cases before us, cannot be successfully challenged at all
by objectors. It is rare to find a case in which objections
to the validity of a public purpose of an acquisition can
even be stated in a form in which the challenge could
H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A succeed. Indeed, questions relating to validity of the
notification on the ground of mala tides do not seem to us
to be ordinarily open in a summary enquiry under Section
5-A of the Act. Hence, there seems to us to be little difficulty
in completing enquiries contemplated by Section 5-A of
B the Act very expeditiously.
38. Now, the purpose of Section 17(4) of the Act is,
obviously, not merely to confine action under it to waste
and arable land but also to situations in which an inquiry
under Section 5-A will serve no useful purpose, or, for
c some overriding reason, it should be dispensed with. The
mind of the officer or authority concerned has to be
applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such
a nature that even the summary proceedings under Section
5-A of the Act should be eliminated. It is not just the
D existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an
inquiry under Section 5-A which has to be considered.
39. Section 17(2) deals with a case in which an enquiry
under Section 5-A of the Act could not possibly serve any
E useful purpose. Sudden change of the course of a river
would leave no option if essential communications have
to be maintained. It results in more or less indicating, by
an operation of natural physical forces beyond human
control, what land should be urgently taken possession of.
F Hence, it offers no difficulty in applying Section 17(4) in
public interest. And, the particulars of what is obviously to
be done in public interest need not be concealed when its
validity is questioned in a Court of justice. Other cases may
raise questions involving consideration of facts which are
especially within the knowledge of the authorities
G
concerned. And, if they do not discharge their special
burden, imposed by Section 106, Evidence Act, without
even disclosing a sufficient reason for their abstention from
disclosure, they have to take the consequences which flow
from the non-production of the best evidence which could
H
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 151
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
be produced on behalf of the State if its stand was correct. A
40. In the case before us, the public purpose indicated is
the development of an area for industrial and residential
purposes. This, in itself, on the face of it, does not call for
any such action, barring exceptional circumstances, as to
B
make immediate possession, without holding even a
summary enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, imperative.
On the other hand, such schemes generally take sufficient
period of time to enable at least summary inquiries under
Section 5-A of the Act to be completed without any
impediment whatsoever to the execution of the scheme. C
Therefore, the very statement of the public purpose for
which the land was to be acquired indicated the absence
of such urge11cy, on the apparent facts of the case, as to
require the elimination of an enquiry under Section 5-A of
the Act. D
41. Again, the uniform and set recital of a formula, like a
ritual or mantra, apparently applied mechanically to every
case, itself indicated that the mind of the Commissioner
concerned was only applied to the question whether the E
land was waste or arable and whether its acquisition is
urgently needed. Nothing beyond that seems to have been
considered. The recital itself shows that the mind of the
Commissioner was not applied at all to the question
whether the urgency is of such a nature as to require F
elimination of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. If
it was, at least the notifications gave no inkling of it at all.
On the other hand, its literal meaning was that nothing
beyond matters stated there were considered.
42. All schemes relating to development of industrial and G
residential areas must be urgent in the context of the
country's need for increased production and more
residential accommodation. Yet, the very nature of such
schemes of development does not appear to demand
such emergent action as to eliminate summary enquiries H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A under Section 5-A of the Act. There is no indication
whatsoever in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State that
the mind of the Commissioner was applied at all to the
question whether it was a case necessitating the
elimination of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The
B recitals in the notifications, on the other hand, indicate that
elimination of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was
treated as an automatic consequence of the opinion
formed on other matters. The recital does not say at all that
any opinion was formed on the need to dispense with the
c enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. It is certainly a case
in which the recital was at least defective. The burden,
therefore, rested upon the State to remove the defect, if
possible, by evidence to show that some exceptional
circumstances which necessitated the elimination of an
enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and that the mind of
D
the Commissioner was applied to this essential question.
It seems to us that the High Court correctly applied the
provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act to place the
burden upon the State to prove those special
circumstances, although it also appears to us that the High
E Court was not quite correct in stating its view in such a
manner as to make it appear that some part of the initial
burden of the petitioners under Sections 101 and 102 of
the Evidence Act had been displaced by the failure of the
State to discharge its duty under Section 106 of the Act.
F The correct way of putting it would have been to say that
the failure of the State to produce the evidence of facts
especially within the knowledge of its officials, which rested
upon it under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, taken
together with the attendant facts and circumstances,
G including the contents of recitals, had enabled the
petitioners to discharge their burden under Sections 101
and 102 of the Evidence Act."
17. In State of Punjab and Anr. v. Gurdial Singh and Ors.
H while dealing with the invocation of Section 17 of the Act for
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 153
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
the public purpose, namely, grain market, this Court stated that A
compulsory taking of a man's property is a serious matter and
the smaller the man the more serious the matter. This Court
observed that hearing the owner before depriving him is both
reasonable and pre-emptive of arbitrariness and denial of this·
administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for B
good reasons. It was further observed that save in real urgency
where public interest does not brook even the minimum time
needed to give a !tearing land acquisition authorities should not,
having regard to Articles 14 (and 19), burke an enquiry under
Section 17 of the Act. c
18. In the case of Deepak Pahwa and Ors. v. Lt. Governor
of Delhi and Ors., a three-Judge Bench of this Court was
concerned with the challenge to the notification issued under
Sections 4 and 17 of the Act for the public purpose viz.;
'construction of a New Transmitting Station for the Delhi Airport'. D
While noticing the decision of this Court in Jage Ram2, the
Court observed that very often the delay makes the problem
more and more acute and increases the urgency of the
necessity for acquisition. It was further observed that pre-
notification delay would not render the invocation of the urgency E
provisions void.
19. In the case of State of UP. v. Smt. Pista Devi and Ors.,
this Court was concerned with the question of urgency in
acquisition of large tract of land by the Meerut Development F
Authority for its housing scheme with the object of providing
housing accommodation to the residents of Meerut city. The
notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and (4) was
published in the U.P. Gazette on July 12, 1980 and the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on May 1, G
1981. The possession of the land was taken and handed over
to the Meerut Development Authority in July 1982. Thereafter,
about 17 persons who owned in all about 40 acres of land out
of the total of about 412 acres acquired, filed writ petitions in
the High Court cha!lenging the aforesaid notifications on the
H
1S4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A ground that the action of the government in invoking Section
17(1) of the Act and dispensing with the enquiry under Section
SA of the Act was not called for in the circumstances of the
case. The High Court after hearing the parties held that the
dispensation with the enquiry under Section SA was invalid one
B and, accordingly, quashed the notifications. Aggrieved by the
judgment of the High Court, the State of U.P. as well as Meerut
Development Authority preferred appeal before this Court by
special leave. This Court set aside the judgment of the High
Court. While doing so, this Court held thus :
c "6. What was said by the learned Judge in the context of
provision of housing accommodation to Harijans is equally
true about the problem of providing housing
accommodation to all persons in the country today having
regard to the enormous growth of population in the country.
D The observation made in the above decision of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh is quoted with approval by this
Court in Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1984)
4 SCC 308, even though in the above decision the Court
found that it was not necessary to say anything about the
E post-notification delay. We are of the view that in the facts
and circumstances of this case the post-notification delay
of nearly one year is not by itself sufficient to hold that the
decision taken by the State Government under Section
17(1) and (4) of the Act at the time of the issue of the
F notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was either
improper or illegal.
7. It was next contended that in the large extent of land
acquired which was about 412 acres there were some
buildings here and there and so the acquisition of those
G
parts of the land on which buildings were situated was
unjustified since those portions were not either waste or
arable lands which could be dealt with under Section 17(1)
of the Act. This contention has not been considered by the
High Court. We do not, however, find any substance in it.
H
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 155
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
The government was not acquiring any property which was A
substantially covered by buildings. It acquired about 412
acres of land on the outskirts of Meerut city which was
described as arable land by the Collector. It may be true
that here and there were a few super-structures. In a case
of this nature where a large extent of land is being acquired B
for planned development of the urban area it would not be
proper to leave the small portions over which some super-
structures have been constructed out of the development
scheme. In such a situation where there is real urgency it
would be difficult to apply Section 5-A of the Act in the case C
of few bits of land on which some structures are standing
and to exempt the rest of the property from its application.
Whether the land in question is waste or arable land has
to be judged by looking at the general nature and condition
of the land. It is not necessary in this case to consider any
further the legality or the propriety of the application of D
Section 17( 1) of the Act to such portions of land proposed
to be acquired, on which super-structures were standing
because of the special provision which is inserted as sub-
section (1-A) of Section 17 of the Act by the Land
Acquisition (U.P. Amendment) Act (22 of 1954) which E
reads thus:
"(1-A) The power to take possession under sub-section (1)
may also be exercised in the case of land other than waste
or arable land, where the land is acquired for or in F
connection with sanitary improvements of any kind or
planned development."
8. It is no doubt true that in the notification issued under
Section 4 of the Act while exempting the application of
Section 5-A of the Act to the proceedings, the State G
Government had stated that the land in question was
arable land and it had not specifically referred to sub-
section (1-A) of Section 17 of the Act under which it could
take possession of land other than waste and arable land
H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A by applying the urgency clause. The mere omission to refer
expressly Section 17(1-A) of the Act in the notification
cannot be considered to be fatal in this case as long as
the government had the power in that sub-section to take
lands other than waste and arable lands also by invoking
B the urgency clause. Whenever power under Section 17(1)
is invoked the government automatically becomes entitled
to take possession of land other than waste and arable
lands by virtue of sub-section (1-A) of Section 17 without
further declaration where the acquisition is for sanitary
improvement or planned development. In the present case
c the acquisition is for planned development. We do not,
therefore find any substance in the above contention."
20. In Rajasthan Housing Board and Ors. v. Shri Kishan
and Ors., a large extent of land was acquired for the benefit of
D Rajasthan Housing Board. While dealing with the provisions
contained in Sections 17(4) and (1), 4 and 6 of Rajasthan Land
Acquisition Act, 1953 (the provisions being pari materia to the
provisions of the Act), this Court held that the satisfaction under
Section 17(4) is a subjective one and that so long as there is
E material upon which the Government could have formed the said
satisfaction fairly, the Court would not interfere nor would it
examine the material as an appellate authority. This Court
noticed that in view of the time bound programme stipulated
by the lender (HUDCO) and a large number of engineers and
F other subordinate staff for carrying out the said work having
already been appointed, the satisfaction of the State
Government that holding an enquiry under Section SA would
result in uncalled for delay endangering the entire scheme and
time schedule of the Housing Board could not be faulted.
G 21. In Chame/i Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr.
a three-Judge Bench of this Court was seized with a matter
wherein acquisition of the land was for the public purpose,
namely, for providing 'houses to Scheduled Castes'. Dealing
with a challenge to the opinion of urgency formed by the
H
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 157
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
appropriate government and its satisfaction to eliminate the A
enquiry under Section 5A, this Court observed that the opinion
of the government is entitled to great weight unless it is vitiated
by mala fides or colourable exercise of power. Noticing the
earlier judgments of this Court, particularly, Pista Devi6,
Deepak Pahwa5, Jage Ram2, Narayan Govind Gavate3 and B
Rajasthan Housing BoardB, this Court said:
"14. What was said by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in the context
of provisions of housing accommodation to Harijans is
equally applied to the problem of providing housing C
accommodation to all persons in the country in State of
U.P. v. Pista Devi, (1986) 4 SCC 251, holding that today
having regard to the enormous growth of population,
urgency clause for planned development in urban areas
was upheld by a two-Judge Bench. The ratio of Kasireddy
Papaiah case, AIR 1975 AP 269, was quoted with D
approval by a three-Judge Bench in Deepak Pahwa v. Lt.
Governor of Delhi, (1984) 4 SCC 308. The delay by the
officials was held to be not a ground to set at naught the
power to exercise urgency clause in both the above
decisions. It would thus be clear that housing E
accommodation to the Dalits and Tribes is in acute
shortage and the State has undertaken as its economic
policy under planned expenditure to provide shelter to them
on a war footing, in compliance with the constitutional
obligation undertaken as a member of the UNO to the F
resolutions referred to hereinbefore.
15. The question, therefore, is whether invocation of
urgency clause under Section 17(4) dispensing with inquiry
under Section 5-A is arbitrary or is unwarranted for G
providing housing construction for the poor. In Aflatoon v.
Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 285, a Constitution
Bench of this Court had upheld the exercise of the power
by the State under Section 17(4) dispensing with the
inquiry under Section 5-A for the planned development of H
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A Delhi. In Pista Devi case this Court while considering the
legality of the exercise of the power under Section 17(4)
exercised by the State Government dispensing with the
inquiry under Section 5-A for acquiring housing
accommodation for planned development of Meerut, had
B held that providing housing accommodation is national
urgency of which court should take judicial notice. The pre-
notification and post-notification delay caused by the
officer concerned does not create a cause to hold that
there is no urgency. Housing conditions of Dalits all over
c the country continue to be miserable even till date and is
a fact of which courts are bound to take judicial notice. The
ratio of Deepak Pahwa case was followed. In that case a
three-Judge Bench of this Court had upheld the notification
issued under Section 17(4), even though lapse of time of
8 years had occurred due to inter-departmental
D
discussions before receiving the notification. That itself was
considered to be a ground to invoke urgency clause. It was
further held that delay on the part of the lethargic officials
to take further action in the matter of acquisition was not
sufficient to nullify the urgency which existed at the time of
E
the issuance of the notification and to hold that there was
never any urgency. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana,
(1971) 1 SCC 671, this Court upheld the exercise of the
power of urgency under Section 17(4) and had held that
the lethargy on the part of the officers at an early stage was
F not relevant to decide whether on the day of the notification
there was urgency or not. Conclusion of the Government
that there was urgency, though not conclusive, is entitled
to create weight. In Deepak Pahwa case this Court had
held that very often persons interested in the land proposed
G to be acquired may make representations to the
authorities concerned against the proposed writ petition
that is bound to result in muitiplicity of enquiries,
communications and discussions leading invariably to
delay in the execution of even urgent projects. Very often
H delay makes the problem more and more acute and
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 159
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
increases urgency of the necessity for acquisition. In A
Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan, (1993) 2 SCC
84, this Court had held that it must be remembered that
the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one
and that so long as there is material upon which
Government could have formed the said satisfaction fairly, 8
the Court would not interfere nor would it examine the
material as an appellate authority. In State of UP. v.
Keshav Prasad Singh, (1995) 5 SCC 587, this Court had
held that the Government was entitled to exercise the
power under Section 17(4) invoking urgency clause and C
to dispense with inquiry under Section 5-A when the
urgency was noticed on the facts available on record. In
Narayan Govind Gavate case a three-Judge Bench of this
Court had held that Section 17(4) cannot be read in
isolation from Section 4(1) and Section 5-A of the Act.
Although 30 days from the notification under Section 4(1) D
are given for filing objections under Section 5-A, inquiry
thereunder unduly gets prolonged. It is difficult to see why
the summary inquiry could not be completed quite
expeditiously. Nonetheless, this Court held the existence
of prima facie public purpose such as the one present in E
those cases before the Court could not be successfully
challenged at all by the objectors. It further held that it was
open to the authority to take summary inquiry under
Section 5-A and to complete inquiry very expeditiously. It
was emphasised that: F
"... The mind of the officer or authority concerned has to
be applied to the question whether there is an urgency of
such a nature that even the summary proceedings under
Section 5-A of the Act should be eliminated. It is not just G
the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with
an inquiry under Section 5-A which has to be considered."
16. It would thus be seen that this Court emphasised the
holding of an inquiry on the facts peculiar to that case. Very
H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A often the officials, due to apathy in implementation of the
policy and programmes of the Government, themselves
adopt dilatory tactics to create cause for the owner of the
land to challenge the validity or legality of the exercise of
the power to defeat the urgency existing on the date of
taking decision under Section 17(4) to dispense with
B
Section 5-A inquiry.
17. It is true that there was pre-notification and post-
notification delay on the part of the officers to finalise and
publish the notification. But those facts were present
c before the Government when it invoked urgency clause
and dispensed with inquiry under Section 5-A. As held by
this Court, the delay by itself accelerates the urgency:
Larger the delay, greater be the urgency. So long as the
unhygienic conditions and deplorable housing needs of
D Dalits, Tribes and the poor are not solved or fulfilled, the
urgency continues to subsist. When the Government on the
basis of the material, constitutional and international
obligation, formed its opinion of urgency, the court, not
being an appellate forum, would not disturb the finding
E unless the court conclusively finds the exercise of the power
mala fide. Providing house sites to the 03lits, Tribes and
the poor itself is a national problem and a constitutional
obligation. So long as the problem is not solved and the
need is not fulfilled, the urgency continues to subsist. The
F State is expending money to relieve the deplorable
housing condition in which they live by providing decent
housing accommodation with better sanitary conditions.
The lethargy on the part of the officers for pre and po~t
notification delay would not render the exercise of the
power to invoke urgency clause invalid on that account."
G
22. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Meerut
Development Authority & Ors. v. Satbir Singh and Ors. held
that the acquisition for housing development is an urgent
purpose and exercise of power under Section 17(4) dispensing
H
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 161
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
with the enquiry under Section 5A is not invalid. A
23. In Om Prakash and Anr. v. State of UP. and Ors., the
question presented before this Court for consideration was,
inter alia, whether the State Government was justified in
invoking urgency clause under Section 17(1) and dispensing 8
with the enquiry under Section 5A for acquisition of the land for
residential and industrial purpose for the purposes of New
Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA). The argument
on behalf of the appellants therein was that there was no
relevant material with the appropriate government to enable it C
to arrive at its subjective satisfaction about dispensing with the
enquiry under Section 5A in connection with the subject
acquisition and there was delay of more than one year in
issuance of declaration under Section 6 after issuance and
publication of notification under Section 4 read with Section 17
of the Act. This Court observed : D
"....... Even that apart, if that was the urgency suggested
by NOIDA on 14-12-1989, we fail to appreciate as to how
the State authorities did not respond to that proposal
equally urgently and why they issued notification under E
Section 4 read with Section 17(4) after one year in January
1991. On this aspect, no explanation whatsoever was
furnished by the respondent-State authorities before the
High Court. It is also interestir.g to note that even after
dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A pursuant to the F
exercise of powers under Section 17(4) on 5-1-1991,
Section 6 notification saw the light of day only on 7-1-1992.
If the urgency was of such a nature that it could not brook
the delay on account of Section 5-A proceedings, it is
difficult to appreciate as to why Section 6 notification in G
the present case could be issued only after one year from
the issuance of Section 4 notification. No explanation for
this delay is forthcoming on record. This also shows that
according to the State authorities, there was no real
urgency underlying dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A despite NOIDA suggesting at the top of its voice about the
need for urgently acquiring the lands for the development
of Sector 43 and other sectors."
Noticing the conflict in the decisions of this Court in Narayan
B Govind Gavate3 and Pista Devi6, the Bench said :
"20. It is no doubt true that the aforesaid decision of the
three-Judge Bench of this Court was explained by a latter
two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in State of UP. v.
Pista Devi, (1986) 4 SCC 251, as being confined to the
C fact situation in those days when it was rendered. However,
it is trite to note that the latter Bench of two learned Judges
of this Court could not have laid down any legal proposition
by way of a ratio which was contrary to the earlier decision
of the three-Judge Bench in Narayan Govind Gavate. In
D fact, both these decisions referred to the fact situations in
the light of which they were rendered."
24. In the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Mukesh Hans,
a three-Judge Bench of this Court while dealing with the
E interpretation of Section 17(4) of the Act and the procedure to
be followed by the appropriate government while dispensing
with the enquiry contemplated under Section SA of the Act said:
31. Section 17(4) as noticed above, provides that in cases
where the appropriate Government has come to the
F conclusion that there exists an urgency or unforeseen
emergency as required under sub-section (1) or (2) of
Section 17, it may direct that the provisions of Section 5-
A shall not apply and if such direction is given then Section
5-A inquiry can be dispensed with and a declaration may
G be made under Section 6 on publication of Section 4(1)
notification and possession can be made.
32. A careful perusal of this provision which is an exception
to the normal mode of acquisition contemplated under the
Act shows that mere existence of urgency or unforeseen
H
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 163
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
emergency though is a condition precedent for invoking A
Section 17(4), that by itself is not sufficient to direct the
dispensation of the Section 5-A inquiry. It requires an
opinion to be formed by the Government concerned that
along with the existence of such urgency or unforeseen
emergency there is also a need for dispensing with Section B
5-A inquiry which indicates that the legislature intended the
appropriate Government to apply its mind before
dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry. It also indicates that
mere existence of an urgency under Section 17(1) or
unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) would not by c
itself be sufficient for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry.
If that was not the intention of the legislature then the latter
part of sub-section (4) of Section 17 would not have been
necessary and the legislature in Sections 17(1) and (2)
itself could have incorporated that in such situation of D
existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency
automatically Section 5-A inquiry will be dispensed with.
But then that is not the language of the section which in
our opinion requires the appropriate Government to further
consider the need for dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry E
in spite of the existence of unforeseen emergency. This
understanding of ours as to the requirement of an
application of mind by the appropriate Government while
dispensing with Section 5-A inquiry does not mean that in
each and every case when there is an urgency
contemplated under Section 17(1) and unforeseen F
emergency contemplated under Section 17(2) exists that
by itself would not contain the need for dispensing with
Section 5-A inquiry. It is possible in a given case the
urgency noticed by the appropriate Government under
Section 17(1) or the unforeseen emergency under Section G
17(2) itself may be of such degree that it could require the
appropriate Government on that very basis to dispense
with the inquiry under Section 5-A but then there is a need
for application of mind by the appropriate Government that
such an urgency for dispensation of the Section 5-A H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A inquiry is inherent in the two types of urgencies
contemplated under Sections 17(1) and (2) of the Act.
33. An argument was sought to be advanced on behalf of
the appellants that once the appropriate Government
comes to the conclusion that there is an urgency or
B
unforeseen emergency under Sections 17(1) and (2), the
dispensation with inquiry under Section 5-A becomes
automatic and the same can be done by a composite
order meaning thereby that there is no need for the
appropriate Government to separately apply its mind for
c any further emergency for dispensation with an inquiry
under Section 5-A. We are unable to agree with the above
argument because sub-section (4) of Section 17 itself
indicates that the "Government may direct that the
provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply" (emphasis
D supplied) which makes it clear that not in every case where
the appropriate Government has come to the conclusion
that there is urgency and under sub-section (1) or
unforeseen emergency under sub-section (2) of Section
17, the Government will ipso facto have to direct the
E dispensation of the inquiry. For this we do find support from
a judgment of this Court in the case of Nandeshwar Prasad
v. State of UP., (1964) 3 SCR 425, wherein considering
the language of Section 17 of the Act which was then
referable to waste or arable land and the U.P. Amendment
F to the said section, this Court held thus:
"It will be seen that Section 17(1) gives power to the
Government to direct the Collector, though no award has
been made under Section 11, to take possession of any
waste or arable land needed for public purpose and such
G
land thereupon vests absolutely in the Government free
from all encumbrances. If action is taken under Section
17(1), taking possession and vesting which are provided
in Section 16 after the award under Section 11 are
accelerated and can take place fifteen days after the
H
' ' ' ' '
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF lJTTAR 165
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
publication of the notice under Section 9. Then comes A
Section 17(4) which provides that in case of any land to
which the provisions of sub-section (1) are applicable, the
Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A
shall not apply and if it does so direct, a declaration may
be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time B
after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1 ).
It will be seen that it is not necessary even where the
Government makes a direction under Section 17(1) that
it should also make a direction under Section 17(4). If the
Government makes a direction only under Section 17(1) c
the procedure under Section 5-A would still have to be
followed before a notification under Section 6 is issued,
though after that procedure has been followed and a
notification under Section 6 is issued the Collector gets
the power to take possession of the land after the notice D
under Section 9 without waiting for the award and on such
taking possession the land shall vest absolutely in
Government free from all encumbrances. It is only when
the Government also makes a declaration under Section
17(4) that it becomes unnecessary to take action under E
Section 5-A and make a report thereunder. It may be that
generally where an order is made under Section 17(1), an
order under Section 17(4) is also passed; but in law it is
not necessary that this should be so. It will also be seen
that under the Land Acquisition Act an order under Section
17(1) or Section 17(4) can only be passed with respect F
to waste or arable land and it cannot be passed with
respect to land which is not waste or arable a,nd on which
buildings stand."
(emphasis supplied) G
34. A careful reading of the above judgment shows that
this Court in the said Nandeshwar Prasad case has also
held that there should be an application of mind to the facts
of the case with special reference to this concession of H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A Section 5-A inquiry under the Act.
35. At this stage, it is relevant to notice that the limited right
given to an owner/person interested under Section 5-A of
the Act to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an
B empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be
taken away for good and valid reason and within the
limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act. The
object and importance of Section 5-A inquiry was noticed
by this Court in the case of Munshi Singh v. Union of India,
(1973) 2 SCC 337, wherein this Court held thus:
c
"7. Section 5-A embodies a very just and
wholesome principle that a person whose property
is being or is intended to be acquired should have
a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading
D the authorities concerned that acquisition of the
property belonging to that person should not be
made .... The legislature has, therefore, made
complete provisions for the persons interested to
file objections against the proposed acquisition and
E for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases
of urgency that special powers have been conferred
on the appropriate Government to dispense with
the provisions of Section 5-A:"
36. It is clear from the above observation of this Court that
F right of representation and hearing contemplated under
Section 5-A of the Act is a very valuable right of a person
whose property is sought to be acquired and he should
have appropriate and reasonable opportunity of
persuading the authorities concerned that the acquisition
G of the property belonging to that person should not be
made. Therefore, in our opinion, if the appropriate
Government decides to take away this minima! right then
its decision to do so must be based on materials on record
to support the same and bearing in mind the object of
H Section 5-A."
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 167
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
25. In Union of India and Ors. v. Krishan Lal Ameja and A
Ors., the issue under consideration before this Court related
to the validity of notification for the acquisition of the land for a
public purpose, inter alia, 'housing of the government offices'
and 'residential use of government servants' invoking Section
17(1) and (4). This Court emphasized that failure to take timely B
action for acquisition by the authorities cannot be a ground to
invoke the urgency clause to the serious detriment to the right
of the land owner to raise objections to the acquisition under
Section 5A. It was observed that Gurdial Singh4 is not an
authority for the proposition that in the absence of material to c
justify urgency clause, long delay in issuing the notification could
be ignored or condoned to uphold the validity of such
notification.
26. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius
Shapur Chenai and Ors., this Court observed that Section 5A D
of the Act confers a valuable right in favour of a person whose
lands are sought to be acquired. It was further observed that
the Act is an expropriatory legislation and, therefore, its
provisions should be strictly construed as it deprives a person
of his land without consent. E
27. This Court in the case of Mahadevappa Lachappa
Kinagi and Ors. v. State of Kamataka and Ors. posited that
Section 17 of the Act confers extraordinary powers on the
authorities under which it can dispense with the normal F
procedure laid down under Section 5A of the Act in cases of
exceptional urgency and that such powers cannot be lightly
resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the
government to take immediate possession of the land proposed
to be acquired for public purpose. That case related to the
acquisition of land for the rehabilitation of 145 families uprooted G
because of commissioning of barrage of Bhima River. It was
held that the case indicated an exceptional case where
exceptional power under Section 17 could be invoked.
H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A 28. Now, two recent decisions of this Court need to be
noticed. In Babu Ram and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Anr.,
this Court was concerned with the legality of the notification for
acquisition of land for construction of sewage treatment plant.
The appropriate government invoked its power under Section
B 17(2)(c) and by invoking its power under Section 17(4) excluded
the application of Section SA of the Act. After referring to few
decisions of this Court, particularly, Gurdial Singh4 and Om
Prakash10, it was observed that these decisions assign a great
deal of importance to the right of a citizen to file objections
c under Section SA of the Act and the fact that such right was
elevated to the status of a fundamental right is in itself sufficient
to indicate that great care had to be taken by the authorities
before resorting to Section 17(4) of the Act and they have to
satisfy themselves that there was an urgency of such nature
which could brook no delay whatsoever. In another case, viz.;
0
Tika Ram and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.,
constitutional validity of the provisions of Sections 17(1 ), 17(1A),
17(3A), 17(4) and the proviso to Section 17(4) as amended
by U.P. Act S of 1991 was under challenge besides the various
other provisions of the Act. This Court overruled the challenge
E to the constitutionality of the aforenoticed provisions. As
regards invocation of power under Section 17 of the Act and
doing away with Section SA enquiry, it was held :
"115. While considering as to whether the Government
F was justified in doing away with the inquiry under Section
S-A, it must be noted that there are no allegations of mala
fides against the authority. No evidence has been brought
before the judgment and the High Court has also
commented on this. The housing development and the
G planned developments have been held to be the matters
of great urgency by the Court in Pista Devi case. In the
present case we have seen the judgment of the High Court
which has gone into the records and has recorded
categorical finding that there was sufficient material before
the State Government and the State Government has
H
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 169
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
objectively considered the issue of urgency. Even before A
this Court, there were no allegations of mala tides. A
notice can be taken of the fact that all the lands which were
acquired ultimately came to b.e utilised for the Scheme.
We, therefore, reject the argument that there was no
urgency to justify dispensation of Section 5-A inquiry by E
applying the urgency clause".
29. 'Eminent domain' is right or power of a sovereign State
to appropriate the private property within the territorial
sovereignty to public uses or purposes. It is exercise of strong C
arm of government to take property for public uses without
owner's consent. It requires no constitutional recognition; it is
an attribute of sovereignty and essential to the sovereign
government. (Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume
14, 1952 (West Publishing Co.,).
D
30. The power of eminent domain, being inherent in the
government, is exercisable in the public interest, general welfare
and for public purpose. Acquisition of private property by the
State in the public interest or TOr public purpose is nothing but
an enforcement of the right of eminent domain. In India, the Act E
provides directly for acquisition of particular property for public
purpose. Though right to property is no longer fundamental right
but Article 300A of the Constitution mandates that no person
shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. That
Section 5A of the Act confers a valuable right to an individual F
is beyond any doubt. As a matter of fact, this Court has time
and again reiterated that Section 5A confers an important right
in favour of a person whose land is sought to be acquired.
When the government proceeds for compulsory acquisition of
particular property for public purpose, the only right that the G
owner or the person interested in the property has, is to submit
his objections within the prescribed time under Section 5A of
the Act and persuade the State authorities to drop the
acquisition of that particular land by setting forth the reasons
such as the unsuitability of the land for the stated public H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A purpose; the grave hardship that may be caused to him by such
expropriation, availability of alternative land for achieving public
purpose etc. Moreover, right conferred on the owner or person
interested to file objections to the proposed acquisition is not
only an important and valuable right but also makes the
B provision for compulsory acquisition just and in conformity with
the fundamental principles of natural justice. The exceptional
and extraordinary power of doing away with an enquiry under
Section SA in a case where possession of the land is required
urgently or in unforeseen emergency is provided in Section 17
c of the Act. Such power is not a routine power and save
circumstances warranting immediate possession it should not
be lightly invoked. The guideline is inbuilt in Section 17 itself
for exercise of the exceptional power in dispensing with enquiry
under Section SA. Exceptional the power, the more circumspect
the government must be in its exercise. The government
0
obviously, therefore, has to apply its mind before it dispenses
with enquiry under Section 5A on the aspect whether the
urgency is of such a nature that justifies elimination of summary
enquiry under Section 5A. A repetition of statutory phrase in
E the notification that the state government is satisfied that the
land specified in the notification is urgently needed and
provision contained in Section SA shall not apply, though may
initially raise a presumption in favour of the government that
pre-requisite conditions for exercise of such power have been
satisfied, but such presumption may be displaced by the
F circumstances themselves having no reasonable nexus with the
purpose for which power has been exercised. Upon challenge
being made to the use of power under Section 17, the
government must produce appropriate material before the court
that the opinion for dispensing with the enquiry under Section
G 5A has been formed by the government after due application
of mind on the mate1 ial placed before it. It is true that power
conferred upon the government under Section 17 is
administrative and its opinion is entitled to due weight, but in a
case where the opinion is formed regarding the urgency based
H
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 171
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
on considerations not germane to the purpose, the judicial A
review of such administrative decision may become necessary.
As to in what circumstances the power of emergency can be
invoked are specified in Section 17(2) but circumstances
necessitating invocation of urgency under Section 17(1) are not
stated in the provision itself. Generally speaking, the B
development of an area (for residential purposes) or a planned
development of city, takes many years if not decades and,
therefore, there is no reason why summary enquiry as
contemplated under Section SA may not be held and objections
of land owners/persons interested may not be considered. In c
many cases on general assumption, likely delay in completion
of enquiry under Section SA is set up as a reason for invocation
of extraordinary power in dispensing with the enquiry little
realizing that an important and valuable right of the person
interested in the land is being taken away and with some effort D
enquiry could always be completed expeditiously. The special
provision has been made in Section 17 to eliminate enquiry
under Section SA in deserving and cases of real urgency. The
government has to apply its mind on the aspect that urgency is
of such nature that necessitates dispensation of enquiry under
E
Section SA. We have already noticed few decisions of this
Court. There is conflict of view in the two decisions of this Court
viz.; Narayan Govind Gavate3 and Pista Devi6. In Om
Prakash10 this Court held that decision in Pista Devi6 must
be confined to the fact situation in those days when it was
rendered and the two-Judge Bench could not have laid down F
a proposition contrary to the decision in Narayan Govind
Gavate3. We agree. As regards the issue whether pre-
notification and post-notification delay would render the
invocation of urgency power void, again the case law is not
consistent. The view of this Court has differed on this aspect G
due to different fact-situation prevailing in those cases. In our
opinion such delay will have material bearing on the question
of invocation of urgency power, particularly in a situation where
no material has been placed by the appropriate government
before the court justifying that urgency was of such nature that H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R.
A necessitated elimination of enquiry under Section 5A.
31. In a country as big as ours, the roof over head is a
distant dream for large number of people. The urban
development continues to be haphazard. There is no doubt that
planned development and housing are matters of priority in
8
developing nation. The question is as to whether in all cases
of 'planned development of the city' or 'for the development of
residential area', the power of urgency may be invoked by the
government and even where such power is invoked, should the
enquiry contemplated under Section 5A be dispensed with
C invariably. We do not think so. Whether "planned development
of city' or 'development of residential area' cannot bro0!-: delay
of few months to complete the enquiry under Section 5A't In
our opinion, ordinarily it can. The government must, therefore,
do a balancing act and resort to the special power of urgency
D under Section 17 in the matters of acquisition of land for the
public purpose viz.; 'planned development of city' or 'for
development of residential area' in exceptional situation. Use
of the power by the government under Section 17 for 'planned
development of the city' or 'the development of residential area'
E or for 'housing' must not be as a rule but by way of an exception.
Such exceptional situation may be for the public purpose viz.,
rehabilitation of natural calamity affected persons; rehabilitation
of persons uprooted due to commissioning of dam or housing
for lower strata of the society urgently; rehabilitation of persons
F affected by time bound projects, etc. The list is only illustrative
and not exhaustive. In any case, sans real urgency and need
for immediate possession of the land for carrying out the stated
purpose, heavy onus lies on the government to justify exercise
of such power. It must, therefore, be held that the use of the
G power of urgency and dispensation of enquiry under Section
5A ,by the government in a routine manner for the 'planned
development of city' or 'development of residential area' and
thereby depriving the owner or person interested a very
valuable right under Section 5A may not meet the statutory test
H nor could be readily sustained.
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 172
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
32. Adverting now to the facts of the present case, it would A
be seen that somewhere in February, 2000, a Land Selection
Committee was constituted to identify the availability of land for
a housing colony by the GOA. In April, 2001, the Committee
so constituted inspected the site and proposed acquisition of
land in Village Manbela and few other villages but nothing B
further was done as the tenure holders opposed the acquisition
of their land and the Commissioner, Gorakhpur in public interest
stayed proposal for acquisition. Abruptly the notifications for the
proposed acquisition were issued on November 22, 2003/
February 20, 2004 under Section 4 of the Act. In these c
notifications urgency clause was invoked and the enquiry under
Section SA was dispensed with. Then, for more than one year
nothing was done. It was only on December 28, 2004 that a
declaration under Section 6 was made. If the matter could hang
on from April, 2001 to November 22, 2003/February 20, 2004
0
before the notifications under Section 4 were issued and for
about a year thereafter in issuance of declaration under Section
6, acquisition proceedings could have been arranged in a
manner so as to enable the land owners and/or the interested
persons to file their objections under Section SA within the
E
prescribed time and complete the enquiry expeditiously. It is
true that insofar as Uttar Pradesh is concerned, there is
amendment in Section 17. Sub-section (1 A) enables the
Government to take possession under sub-section (1) of
Section 17 if the land is required for public purpose viz.;
'planned development'. Yet for forming an opinion that F
provisions of Section SA shall not apply, the state government
must apply its mind that urgency is of such nature warranting
elimination of enquiry under Section SA. Although some
correspondence between the authorities and the government
was placed before the High Court by the GOA, but no material G
has been placed on record by the State Government either
before the High Court or before this Court indicating the
application of mind that the urgency was of such nature which
warranted elimination of the enquiry under Section SA of the
H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R
A Act. It is interesting to note that GOA wanted the subject land
to be acquired because their land bank had no land and they
wanted land to keep the Authority running. If profit-making and
the sustenance of the Development Authority was the motive,
surely urgency was not of such nature that it could brook no
B delay whatsoever. In the facts and circumstances of the present
case, therefore, the Government has completely failed to justify
the dispensation of an enquiry under Section 5A by invoking
Section 17(4). For this reason, the impugned notifications to
the extent they state that Section 5A shall not apply suffer from
c legal infirmity. The question, then, arises whether at this distance
of time, the acquisition proceedings must be declared invalid
and illegal. In the written submissions of the GOA, it is stated
that subsequent to the declaration made under Section 6 of the
Act in the month of December, 2004, award has been made
0 and out of the 400 land owners more than 370 have already
received compensation. It is also stated that out of the total cost
of Rs. 8,85, 14,000/- for development of the acquired land, an
amount of Rs. 5,28,00,000/- has already been spent by the
GOA and more than 60% of work has been completed. It, thus,
E seems that barring the appellants and few others all other tenure
holders/land owners have accepted the 'takings' of their land.
It is too late in the day to undo what has already been done.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, the appellants are not entitled to any
relief although dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A was
F not justified.
33. On behalf of the appellants, it was vehemently argued
that the government may be directed to release their land from
proposed acquisition. It was submitted by the appellants that
G houses/structures and buildings (including educational building)
are existing on the subject land and as per the policy framed
by the State Government, the land dP.:;erves to be exempted
from acquisition. The submission of the appellants has been
countered by the respondents and in the written submissions
H filed by the GOA, it is stated that the houses/structures and
ANAND SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTAR 175
PRADESH & ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
buildings which are claimed to exist, have been raised by the A
appellants subsequent to the notification under Section 4(1) of
the Act and, therefore, they are not entitled to release of their
land from acquisition. In our view, since the existence of houses/
structures and buildings as on November 22, 2003/February
20, 2004 over the appellants' land has been seriously disputed, B
it may not be appropriate to issue any direction to the State
Government, as prayed for by the appellants, for release of their
land from acquisition. However, as the possession has not
been taken, the interest of justice would be subserved if the
appellants are given liberty to make representation to the State c
authorities under Section 48(1) of the Act for release of their
land. We, accordingly, grant liberty to the appellants to make
appropriate representation to the State Government and
observe that if such representation is made by the appellants
within two months from today, the State Government shall 0
consider such representation in accordance with law and in
conformity with the State policy for release of land under
Section 48(1) without any discrimination within three months
from receipt of such representation.
34. In the result, these appeals fail and are dismissed, E
subject to the liberty reserved to the appellants for making
representations under Section 48 (1) of the Act.
35. I.A. for impleadment is rejected and I.A. for discharge
of Advocate - Mr. S.C. Birla is allowed. F
36. No order as to costs.
N.J. Appeals dismised.
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