ANDANUR KALAMMA AND ORS.versusGANGAMMA (DEAD) BY L.RS.

                          [2018] 3 S.C.R. 177                           177


               ANDANUR KALAMMA AND ORS.                                 A
                                  v.
                 GANGAMMA (DEAD) BY L.RS.
                 (Civil Appeal Nos. 423-424 of 2018)
                        MARCH 06, 2018                                  B
      [DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND
               DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]
      Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
       s.11 – Res judicata – Auction sale of property in question
                                                                        C
confirmed in favour of respondents – Challenged by appellants in
a writ petition – High Court dismissed the petition, however,
observed that Deputy Commissioner could exercise his suo motu power
to set aside the auction sale as provided in terms of s.177 of Mysore
Land Revenue Act – In writ appeal High Court held that the Court
could not have directed the Deputy Commissioner to exercise the         D
discretion – Thereafter, revision petition in respect of application
filed by appellants for invoking discretion of Deputy Commissioner
to set aside the auction, was made subject matter of another writ
petition – The issue of tenability of the application u/s. 177 was
negated by High Court and further affirmed in writ appeal –
                                                                        E
Subsequent thereto, present suit for declaration of ownership and
possession of the suit property – Dismissed by trial court as well as
High Court in appeal, on the ground of principles of res judicata –
On appeal, held: The entire issue with regard to the confirmation of
auction sale was the subject matter between the same parties in
respect of same land and including same cause of action – Therefore,    F
appellants were rightly non-suited being hit by the principles of res
judicata – Principles of res judicata.
      Dismissing the appeals, the Court
       HELD: The principle of res judicata as enshrined in Section
11 of CPC, is founded on the maxim “Nemo Debet Bis Vexari Pro           G
Una Et Eadem Causa”. In the present case, the entire issue with
regard to the confirmation of the auction sale and the sale
certificate issued in favour of the predecessor of the respondents,
was the subject matter before the High Court between the same
                                                                        H
                                177
178            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A     parties in respect of the same land and including the cause of
      action. On that finding, the Trial Court as well as the High Court
      rightly non-suited the appellants by dismissing the suit filed by
      them for declaration of ownership and possession, being hit by
      the principles of res judicata. The principle applies on all fours to
      the present case. [Paras 27 and 28] [193-B-D]
B
            Nagabhushanammal v.. C. Chandikeswaralingam
            (2016) 4 SCC 434 - relied on.
            Shirlakoppa Town Municipality v. Sree Sharada Rice
            Mill and Others 1982 (1) KLJ 137 ; U. Nilan v.
C           Kannayyan through LRs. AIR 1999 SC 3750 ; State
            Bank of Travancore v. Mytheen Kannu Mastan Kanju
            AIR 1980 Kerala 236 ; Madhavi Amma Bhavani Amma
            and others v. Kunjikutty Pillai Meenakshi Pillai and
            others 2000 AIR SCW 2432 ; Re: Forward
            Construction Co. and others v. Prabhat Mandal
D           (Regd.), Andheri and Others AIR 1986 SC 391 ; Ashok
            Kumar Srivastav v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR
            1998 SC 2046 ; and Re: Gulabchand Chotalal Parikh
            v. State of Gujarat AIR 1965 SC 1153 – referred to.

E
                             Case Law Reference


            1982 (1) KLJ 137         referred to             Para 19
            AIR 1999 SC 3750         referred to             Para 19
F
            AIR 1980 Kerala 236 referred to                  Para 19
            2000 AIR SCW 2432        referred to             Para 19
            AIR 1986 SC 391          referred to             Para 19

G           AIR 1998 SC 2046         referred to             Para 19
            AIR 1965 SC 1153         referred to             Para 19
            (2016) 4 SCC 434         relied on               Para 28


H
 ANDANUR KALAMMA AND ORS. v. GANGAMMA (DEAD)                                  179
                  BY L.RS.

                                                                              A
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 423-
424 of 2018.
      From the Judgment and Orders dated 04.01.2005 and 11.03.2005
of the High Court of Karnataka in RFA No. 410 of 1998 and R. P.
No. 124 of 2005 respectively.                                                 B

      Kashi Vishweshwar, Ms. A, Sumathi, Advs for the Appellants.
      E. C. Vidya Sagar, Adv for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                              C
       A. M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1. These appeals, by special leave,
are directed against the judgment and order dated 4th January, 2005 and
order dated 11th March, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge of the
High Court of Karnataka in RFA No.410/1998 and R.P. No.124/2005,
respectively, whereby the learned Single Judge confirmed the judgment
and decree passed by the Trial Court dismissing the suit filed by the         D
appellants on the ground of res judicata and also dismissed the review
petition.
      2. Appellants in the present appeals are the plaintiffs and the
respondents are defendants in the original suit.
                                                                              E
      3. Briefly stated, Appellant No.1 is the wife of one late Sri Andanur
Umapathiyappa and other appellants are his sons and daughter.
Respondent No.1 is the wife of one late Sri Belakerappa and the other
respondents are his sons and daughter.
       4. The father of late Sri Andanur Umapathiyappa (late Andanur
                                                                              F
Kotrappa) was a defaulter under the provisions of the Income Tax Act
to the extent of Rs.2,600/-. For recovery of arrears of tax, the Income
Tax Department had referred the matter to the Deputy Commissioner,
Chitradurga, under Section 158 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act,
1964 (for short, “the Act”). The land belonging to late Sri Andanur
Umapathiyappa bearing Sy. No. 63 of Bisaleri Village, Davanagere Taluk,       G
measuring an extent of 23 acres and 15 guntas, was brought to sale for
the recovery of tax dues. The sale was held on 7th January, 1966 and the
father of the respondents one Sri late Belekerappa was the highest
bidder at Rs.2,600/- and the Assistant Commissioner who had conducted
the auction sale recommended to the Deputy Commissioner Chitradurga,
                                                                              H
180             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A     for confirmation of the sale.
             5. The predecessor of the appellants had filed an application on
      3.2.1966 for setting aside the sale. The Deputy Commissioner, vide
      order dated 3rd May, 1966, however, confirmed the sale. Resultantly, a
      sale certificate was issued sometime in the month of June, 1966 in favour
B     of late Sri Belekerappa and he was also put in possession of the suit
      schedule property.
             6. Appellants’ predecessor late Sri Andanur Umapathiyappa S/o
      late Andanur Kotrappa then questioned the order dated 3rd May, 1966
      before the Mysore Appellate Tribunal by filing Appeal No.486/1967
C     (LR) under Section 49 of the Mysore Land Revenue Act, 1964. He
      asserted that without deciding his application for setting aside the sale
      dated 3rd February, 1966, the Deputy Commissioner was not justified in
      passing a final order to confirm the auction sale. The Tribunal by its
      order dated 27th September, 1967 allowed the appeal and set aside the
      sale, on the ground that under Section 177 of the Karnataka Land
D     Revenue Act, 1964, the Deputy Commissioner could confirm the sale
      only after the application for setting aside the sale is rejected.
      Accordingly, the Tribunal after setting aside the sale, remanded the
      matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga, to conduct fresh
      enquiry into the allegation made by the appellant in his application dated
E     3rd February,1966 and to dispose of the same in accordance with law.
            7. Pursuant to the remand order passed, the petition filed by the
      appellants’ predecessor was taken up for hearing on 8th June, 1969 by
      the Deputy Commissioner and since no one appeared, the Deputy
      Commissioner dismissed the same for non-prosecution. Restoration
F     application filed to restore the said application was also rejected by the
      Deputy Commissioner.
             8. Appellants’ predecessor then carried the matter to the Mysore
      Revenue Appellate Tribunal by filing an appeal against the orders passed
      by the Deputy Commissioner, being Appeal No.167/1971. The same
G     was also rejected by an order dated on 13th April, 1971 as time barred. A
      review petition filed to review the aforesaid order was also rejected by
      the Tribunal.
            9. Appellants’ predecessor being aggrieved, filed a writ petition
      being W.P. No.1810/1971 before the High Court of Karnataka. The
      High Court while rejecting the writ petition by its order dated 23rd October,
H
 ANDANUR KALAMMA AND ORS. v. GANGAMMA (DEAD)                                     181
         BY L.RS. [A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

1973, however, observed that if for any reason the sale was not yet              A
confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga, after the remand
order passed by the Tribunal in appeal No.486/1967 (LR) and if the writ
petitioner (predecessor in title of the appellants) deposited the sale amount,
then the Deputy Commissioner could exercise his suo-motu power to
set aside the sale as provided in proviso to Section 177 of Mysore Land
                                                                                 B
Revenue Act.
       10. The respondents in the petition challenged that decision by
filing an appeal before the High Court bearing number W.A. No.152/
1973, being aggrieved by certain observations and directions issued by
the learned Single Judge while rejecting the writ petition. The Division
Bench of the High Court after referring to the provisions of Section 177         C
of the Act observed that in view of the dismissal of the writ petition,
there was no application pending for setting aside the sale. Even so,
since the Deputy Commissioner was bestowed with discretion to set
aside the sale, he could do so on such conditions as he deemed proper,
on its own merits and in accordance with the law. The Division Bench             D
also observed that the learned Single Judge while rejecting the petition
could not have made any further observations or issued any directions in
the writ proceedings. With the aforesaid observations, the Division Bench
of the High Court by its order dated 7th January, 1975 allowed the
appeal.
                                                                                 E
       11. During the pendency of the writ appeal, the predecessor of
the appellants had made an application before the Deputy Commissioner
on 24th November, 1973 under Section 177 of the Act, inter alia,
requesting the authority to set aside the auction sale held on 7th January,
1966 as envisaged in the proviso to Section 177 of the Mysore Land
Revenue Act. At the first instance, by an order made on 9th June, 1975           F
the application was rejected and on an application filed for review of the
said order, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order on 29th September,
1975, holding that the review petition was maintainable.
      12. The respondents, aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the
Deputy Commissioner, filed a revision petition before the Karnataka              G
Appellate Tribunal being No.304/1973, inter alia, questioning the said
order on the ground that the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction
under Section 177 of the Act to exercise his suo-motu powers on an
application filed by a defaulter. The Tribunal initially allowed the petition
                                                                                 H
182             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A     by its order dated 4th August, 1978 and on a review petition filed by the
      appellants being No.27/1978, it allowed the review petition and set aside
      the order passed in revision petition No.304/1973. Further, vide order
      dated 24th March, 1980, the Tribunal directed that the revision petition
      be posted for hearing afresh on merits, and by subsequent order dated
      30th January, 1981 it rejected the revision petition filed by the respondents.
B
             13. The respondents thereafter filed a writ petition before the
      High Court being No.14012/1981, inter alia, questioning the orders passed
      by the Tribunal in revision petition No.304/1973 dated 4.8.1978, 24.3.1980
      and 30.1.1981, respectively. The learned Single Judge of the High Court
      by his order dated 31 st July, 1989 was pleased to set aside the
C     aforementioned orders passed by the Tribunal in the revision petition
      and made an observation that the auction sale had been confirmed long
      back.
            14. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants filed a writ appeal, being
      Appeal No.2176/1989. The Division Bench of the High Court by its
D     order dated 8th December, 1989 rejected the appeal, holding that the
      view taken by the learned Single Judge with regard to Section 177 of the
      Karnataka Land Revenue Act did not call for any interference.
             15. Appellants, thereafter, filed a suit being O.S. No.27/1990
      before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Davanagere, with a
E     prayer to declare that they are the owners of the suit schedule property
      and also for a direction to the respondents to re-deliver the possession of
      the property. After referring to the earlier proceedings before the Deputy
      Commissioner, Karnataka Revenue Appellate Tribunal and before the
      High Court, appellants asserted that after disposal of the appeal by the
F     Mysore Appellate Tribunal in appeal No.486/1967 (LR), wherein the
      confirmation of sale made by the Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga
      was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Deputy
      Commissioner, for fresh disposal in accordance with law, no steps have
      been taken for confirmation of sale and for issue of sale certificate by
      the Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga till date of the suit. Therefore,
G     various orders passed in different proceedings before the revenue
      authorities and the Tribunal will not and cannot affect the right, title and
      interest of the appellants in any way in respect of the suit schedule
      property. The appellants, therefore, asserted that they are the owners of
      the suit schedule property. Appellants also assert that their predecessor,
H     during the pendency of the various proceedings before various forums,
 ANDANUR KALAMMA AND ORS. v. GANGAMMA (DEAD)                                     183
         BY L.RS. [A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

had deposited the entire amount due to the Income Tax Department                 A
and, therefore, the confirmation of the sale subsequent to receipt of
income tax dues does not arise. Appellants would further assert that
though the respondents were put in possession of the suit schedule
property, under the guise of sale certificate issued by the Deputy
Commissioner and since the same had been set aside by the Tribunal in
                                                                                 B
Appeal No.486/1967 (LR), their possession is litigious possession and it
would not give them any right to continue in possession of the suit schedule
property. It is their further assertion in the suit that though the appellants
demanded the respondents to hand over the possession of the suit
schedule property, the respondents have refused to do the same and
therefore, appellants were constrained to file the suit for declaration and      C
possession of the suit schedule property. The cause of action for filing
the suit, according to the appellants, arose on or about 1st May, 1990 and
also in July, 1989, when the High Court dismissed the appellants’ Writ
Appeal No.2176/1989.
        16. The respondents resisted the suit. According to them, in view        D
of the proceedings and the order passed in W.P. No.14012/1981 dated
31st July, 1989, the averments in the plaint regarding the proceedings
before the Deputy Commissioner and before the revenue authorities
have no consequence at all and by virtue of those orders, the parties
have been restored to the original status quo as on 3rd May, 1966 i.e. the
date of confirmation of sale certificate by the Deputy Commissioner,             E
and there is no necessity to grant of fresh sale certificate. Apart from
the above defence, there is no other defence pleaded by the respondents
in the written statements filed before the trial Court.
        17. The Trial Court, based on the pleadings of the parties to the
suit, framed six issues for its consideration, as follows:-                      F
       “(i) Whether plaintiffs prove that they are the owners entitled for
       possession of the suit property?
       (ii) Do they further prove that they are entitled for possession of
       the suit property?
       (iii) Whether plaintiffs suit is hit by Sec. 11 of CPC as contended       G
       in the written statement?
       (iv) Whether defendants are entitled for compensatory costs?
       (v) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs as prayed
       for?
                                                                                 H
184             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A            (vi) What order or decree?”
              18. The Trial Court keeping in view the order passed by the High
      Court in Writ Petition No.14012/1981 and in Writ Appeal No.2176/1989,
      has held that the prayer made in the suit challenging the auction sale
      dated 3rd June, 1966 is hit by Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
B     To come to this conclusion, the Trial Court has traced the history of
      various proceedings that were initiated by the appellants’ predecessor
      before the revenue authorities and High Court and then observed that in
      view of the order passed by the High Court in W.P. No.14012/1981, the
      suit is hit by principles of res judicata.
C            19. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the
      learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), the appellants filed Regular First
      Appeal No.410 of 1998 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore.
      The High Court took notice of all the proceedings that culminated with
      the dismissal of writ appeal filed by the appellants against the decision of
      the learned Single Judge dated 31st July, 1989 in Writ Petition No.14012/
D     1981, whereby the correctness of all the orders passed by the Revenue
      Authorities including the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal were analysed
      and the plea of the appellants founded on their application dated 24th
      November, 1973 and 9th June, 1975 for setting aside the auction sale
      came to be negatived and which judgment was affirmed by the Division
E     Bench of the High Court by dismissing the writ appeal preferred by the
      appellants. The High Court, taking notice of the decisions in the cases of
      Shirlakoppa Town Municipality Vs. Sree Sharada Rice Mill and
      Others;1 U. Nilan Vs. Kannayyan through LRs. 2 State Bank of
      Travancore Vs. Mytheen Kannu Mastan Kanju;3 Madhavi Amma
      Bhavani Amma and others Vs. Kunjikutty Pillai Meenakshi Pillai
F     and others;4 Re: Forward Construction Co. and others Vs. Prabhat
      Mandal (Regd.), Andheri and others;5 Ashok Kumar Srivastav Vs.
      National Insurance Co. Ltd.;6 and Re: Gulabchand Chotalal Parikh
      Vs. State of Gujarat;7 summed up the legal position on the doctrine of
      res judicata of triple test requirement regarding the factum of identity
G     of the parties, cause of action and the subject matter. In other words,
      1
        1982 (1) KLJ 137
      2
        AIR 1999 SC 3750
      3
        AIR 1980 Kerala 236
      4
        2000 AIR SCW 2432
      5
        AIR 1986 SC 391
      6
        AIR 1998 SC 2046
H     7
        AIR 1965 SC 1153
 ANDANUR KALAMMA AND ORS. v. GANGAMMA (DEAD)                                 185
         BY L.RS. [A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

any issue that has been raised and decided and which was necessary           A
for determining the rights and duties of the parties by a final conclusive
judgment on the merits cannot be re-litigated by the same parties and a
party is precluded from re-litigating the issue that has already been
decided and also an issue which it could and should have brought forward
in the earlier proceedings but chose not to do so. Keeping in view those
                                                                             B
principles, the High Court went on to observe as follows:
      “31. The triple identity which I have referred to in the earlier
      paragraphs of my order assumes importance for deciding the
      issues which I have raised for my consideration. At the cost
      repetition, let me once again notice the triple requirement for
      the doctrine of res judicata to apply. They are, identity of the       C
      parties, cause of action and the subject matter. The identity
      of the parties is not in dispute nor it can be disputed by the
      plaintiffs. In fact, their father was agitating the auction sale
      held and its confirmation before various forums and after his
      death, the plaintiffs have stepped in to his shows (sic) to            D
      continue the proceedings till this stage. The second
      requirement is the cause of action. A cause of action comprises
      of all the facts and circumstances necessary to give rise to
      the relief. Before the revenue authorities, the Tribunal the
      primary grievance of the plaintiffs was the conformation of
      sale of their immovable property held in a public auction by           E
      the Deputy Commissioner and their illegal dispossession from
      the suit schedule property. Before all the forums, the plaintiffs
      have lost their case and those others have been confirmed by
      this court in the writ petitions and writ appeal filed. Thus the
      orders passed by the revenue authorities have become final,            F
      in the sense, auction of the immovable property by a public
      authority and delivery of the possession of the same is not
      disturbed by any of the revenue authorities or the Tribunal or
      by this Court; however the same is also not confirmed by the
      Tribunal pursuant to the remand order passed by the Mysore
      Revenue Tribunal in the appeal No.486/1967. Thirdly, the               G
      subject matter is the same in all the proceedings, namely, suit
      schedule property bearing No.63, measuring 23 acres and
      15 guntas situate at the Bisaleri village, Davanagere district.
      32. The doctrine of res judicata would apply in these
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186            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A           proceedings, for the reason, the claim in the earlier litigation
            was between the same parties, the cause of action and the
            subject matter was also the same or identical and by judicial
            pronouncement by a competent Court the possession of the
            defendants is not disturbed. Therefore, plaintiffs are precluded
            from re-litigating an issue that has already been decided.
B
            Even otherwise also, the plaintiffs father or at least the
            plaintiff’s could have brought forward an issue for possession
            of the suit schedule property, in the earlier proceedings but
            chose not to do so and therefore cannot subsequently re-agitate
            the issue, which they could have done in the earlier
C           proceedings. Therefore, in my view, the judgment and decree
            passed by the learned trial Judge requires to be sustained on
            the principles of res judicata, may not be on the ground that
            this Court while disposing of the writ petition No.14012/1989
            disposed off on 31.07.1989 has observed that the order passed
            by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal remanding the matter
D
            regarding the confirmation of sale has been set aside by this
            Court. The observations made by this Court is an apparent
            error on facts and that could not have been taken note of by
            the trial Court, while deciding the lis between the parties and
            that in my opinion, being an error on facts could have been
E           ignored by the trial Court.”
                                                          (emphasis supplied)
             20. On the aforementioned conclusion reached by the High Court,
      it proceeded to dismiss the first appeal preferred by the appellants. The
      appellants have approached this Court by way of special leave inter alia
F     contending that the issue regarding confirmation of auction sale was
      reopened in view of the decision of the Mysore Revenue Appellate
      Tribunal dated 27th September, 1967. In absence of confirmation of sale
      and non-issuance of fresh sale certificate to the respondents, no manner
      of right, title or interest or whatsoever over the suit schedule property
G     enured in favour of the respondents. The fact that the respondents’
      ancestor late Balakerappa was put in possession of the suit schedule
      property, on the basis of sale certificate and confirmation of sale on
      3rd May, 1966 will not impair the interest of the appellants in any manner
      nor denude them from pursuing their remedy of restoration of
      possession of the suit property, the ownership whereof remained with
H
 ANDANUR KALAMMA AND ORS. v. GANGAMMA (DEAD)                                   187
         BY L.RS. [A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the appellants. According to the appellants, the High Court as well as         A
the Trial Court committed manifest error in invoking the principle of res
judicata to non-suit the appellants and dismiss the suit for possession on
the basis of their title and to declare them as owners of the suit property.
       21. The respondents, on the other hand, would contend that the
Trial Court as well as the High Court had justly rejected the suit             B
preferred by the appellants as it was hit by the principles of res judicata.
The respondents have supported the analysis and conclusion reached by
the Trial Court as well as the High Court in this regard. They pray for
dismissal of the appeal being devoid of merits.
       22. We have heard Mr. Kashi Vishweshar, learned counsel                 C
appearing for the appellants land Mr. E.C. Vidya Sagar, learned counsel
for the respondents.
        23. The factual matrix noticed by the Trial Court and reiterated
by the High Court in the impugned judgment is indisputable. In that, the
predecessor in title of the appellants had committed default in paying tax     D
for which the suit property was put to auction in which the predecessor
in title of the respondents was the highest bidder. The auction sale was
confirmed by the competent authority. The correctness of the
confirmation of sale without deciding the application for setting aside the
sale, preferred by the predecessor of the appellants, was questioned by
him. The matter had reached the High Court by way of Writ Petition             E
No.1810/1971, filed by Andanur Umapathiyappa predecessor of the
appellants, which was dismissed with the observation that if the writ
petitioner was willing to deposit the sale amount, the Deputy
Commissioner could exercise his suo motu power to set aside the said
sale as provided in terms of Section 177 of the Mysore Land Revenue            F
Act. This observation, however was assailed by the respondents by way
of Writ Appeal No.152/1973 before the Division Bench. The Division
Bench allowed the said appeal. The relevant extract of the order passed
by the Division Bench dated 7th January, 1975, having some bearing on
the matter in issue, reads thus:
                                                                               G
      “The result of the dismissal of the writ petition is that there is
      no application now pending for setting aside the sale. However,
      under the proviso, the Deputy Commissioner has the power
      to exercise his discretion to set aside the sale subject to such
      conditions as he may deem proper, notwithstanding the fact
                                                                               H
188             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A           that the application made for setting aside the sale has been
            rejected. Whether it is a case for setting aside the sale and on
            what conditions the sale should be set-aside are matters which
            are within the exclusive discretion of the Deputy Commissioner.
            This court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, cannot direct the
            Deputy Commissioner to exercise the discretion if the
B
            conditions imposed by this Court are satisfied. It is not for
            this court to lay down any conditions. That matter should have
            been left open.
              Therefore, we allow this appeal and hold that the Writ Petition
            should have been dismissed without making any observation
C           as to how the discretion under the proviso to Section 177 of
            the Karnataka Land Revenue Act should be exercised. No
            costs.”
                                                           (emphasis supplied)
             With this decision, the issue regarding validity of auction sale
D     attained finality against the appellants.
             24. The matter did not rest at that as the revision petition filed by
      the respondents as well as the appellants in relation to application filed
      by the appellants for invoking the discretion of the Deputy
      Commissioner to set aside the auction were then made subject matter of
E     another writ petition filed by the respondents, being Writ Petition
      No.14012/1981. The learned Single Judge of the High Court of
      Karknataka at Bangalore by judgment dated 31st July, 1989 considered
      the tenability of the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities and the
      Appellate Tribunal, in particular, orders dated 4th August, 1978, 24th
F     March, 1980 and 31st January, 1981. The order dated 31st July, 1989
      passed by the learned Single Judge is, in our opinion, crucial to answer
      the issue that arises for our consideration. The order dated 31st July,
      1989 reads thus:
                                      “ORDER
G           This Writ Petition is of the year 1981. I hope by disposing it
            off I would have given quietus to a controversy which appears
            to have arisen in the year 1966 when the predecessor in
            interest of the respondents one Andanur Umapathiyappa lost
            26 acres of land for having defaulted in payment of income
            tax arrears for recovery of which sum, lands were sold by
H           public auction and purchased by the contesting respondent
ANDANUR KALAMMA AND ORS. v. GANGAMMA (DEAD)                             189
        BY L.RS. [A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

   who was also placed in possession immediately.                       A
   2. It is common ground that the lands have been in possession
   of the petitioner since the date of the auction sale and
   notwithstanding many endeavours made by the respondents
   to wrest it from the petitioner by reason of a charmed life they
   had managed to sustain their holding over the lands.                 B
   3. In this last ditch battle for recovery of these lands the point
   raised is of the tenability of an application made for setting
   aside the auction sale by moving the Deputy Commissioner to
   exercise his suo moto powers under Section 177 of the
   Karnataka Land Revenue Act, although auction sale having             C
   been affirmed long back. That application the Deputy
   Commissioner disposed off on 9.6.75, for some reasons he
   rejected the same. But the respondents filed another
   application on 17.06.1975 to the Deputy Commissioner
   seeking a review of the earlier order. The Deputy
   Commissioner having held application to be maintainable              D
   despite opposition by the petitioner a revision petition having
   been filed from that order before the Karnataka Appellate
   Tribunal, the Deputy Commissioner’s order was in the first
   instance upheld but retracted later on a review petition and
   an order made dismissing the revision petition. Petitioners          E
   challenge the sad or per (sic) as also the order of the Deputy
   Commissioner dated 29.09.1975 holding a review petition
   before him to be maintainable.
   4. Sri Gopal who appears for the auction purchaser who is
   aggrieved by these orders urges that respondents had any
                                                                        F
   right at all to seek interference by the Deputy Commissioner
   under the provisions of section 177 of the land Revenue Act.
   This Court in G.D. NAVAREKAR Vs. The Mysore Revenue
   Appellate Tribunal and others (1973 (1) MLJ 331) has settled
   the law on the question of exercising of suo moto power by a
   revenue authority under section 177 with particular reference        G
   to its modality, it says:
   ‘Suffice it to state that power is to be exercised in the interest
   of justice and subject to such conditions as the authority may
   deem proper and it does not confer a right on the petitioner
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190             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A           to ask the Assistant Commissioner to invoke the issue.’
            5. It was pointed out by this Court in the decision referred to
            supra, that no one has a right to move the Deputy
            Commissioner to exercise his suo moto powers under section
            177 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. In this case review
B           application having been disposed off by the Deputy
            Commissioner on 9.6.1975 may be even for wrong reasons
            as pointed out by Mr. Gopal for the petitioner, having become
            final it seems to me that it was wrong on the part of the
            appellate Tribunal to have lent support to the application made
            by the respondents demanding or seeking exercise of suo moto
C           powers by Deputy Commissioner acting under Section 177 of
            the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. Therefore, it seems to me
            on this short ground the writ petition has to succeed and hence
            it is I allow this writ petition and quash the impugned order
            of the Appellate Tribunal and that of the Deputy Commissioner
D           Annexure-C, E and F. No costs.”
                                                           (emphasis supplied)
            25. This decision was challenged by the appellants by way of writ
      appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court which, however,
      was summarily dismissed vide order dated 8th December, 1989, The
E     same reads thus:
                                         “O R D E R
             The view taken by the learned Single Judge with regard to
      Section 177 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act does not call for
F     interference. Hence, this Appeal is rejected.”
            With the rejection of this appeal, even the issue of tenability of
      application under Section 177 of the Act became final against the
      appellants.
             26. After all these proceedings, the appellants resorted to a civil
G     suit before the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Davanagere, being O.S.
      No.27/90, for declaration of ownership and possession. In the suit, the
      principal issue was that in absence of an order of the competent
      authority confirming the auction sale and without issuing fresh sale
      certificate in favour of the respondents, the respondents or for that matter
      their predecessor in title, had not acquired any right, title or interest or
H
 ANDANUR KALAMMA AND ORS. v. GANGAMMA (DEAD)                               191
         BY L.RS. [A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

whatsoever over the suit schedule property. Therefore, the                 A
possession of the suit property given to the predecessor of the
respondents was required to be restored in absence of a fresh order of
confirmation of sale. The argument though attractive at the first blush,
has received deep attention not only of the Trial Court but of the High
Court also, as can be noticed from the analysis in paragraphs 20 and 21
                                                                           B
of the impugned judgment, which reads thus:
      “20. Admittedly, in the present case, the Deputy Commissioner
      without considering the application filed by the defaulter on
      3.2.1966 had confirmed the auction sale of the immovable
      property on 7.1.1966 on the recommendation made by the
                                                                           C
      Assistant Commissioner in favour of the highest bidder in the
      auction namely, the father of the defendants late Sri
      belekerappa. This action of the Deputy Commissioner was
      taken exception to by the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal
      in the appeal filed by the plaintiffs father in appeal No.486/
      1967 (LR) and the Tribunal by its order had set aside the            D
      order of the confirmation of sale passed by the Deputy
      Commissioner vide his order dated 3.6.1966 and had
      remanded the matter to the Deputy Commissioner to pass fresh
      order in accordance with law after considering the application
      filed by the plaintiffs father. On such remand, since plaintiffs
                                                                           E
      father did not appear before the Deputy Commissioner on
      the date fixed for hearing, the Deputy Commissioner has
      rejected the application for non-prosecution. The order so
      made has reached the finality in view of the order made by
      this Court in W.P.No.1810/1971 and in W.A. No.152/1973.
      Even after disposal of all these proceedings, the Deputy             F
      Commissioner has not passed any fresh order in confirming
      the sale, pursuant to the remand order passed by the Mysore
      Revenue Appellate Tribunal made in appeal No.486/1967 (LR)
      dated 27.9.1967 and further has not issued fresh sale
      certificate. These factual aspects which is not disputed by the
                                                                           G
      learned Counsel for appellants would demonstrate that the
      defendants are in possession of the suit schedule property
      pursuant to order of confirmation of sale passed by the Deputy
      Commissioner, which had been set aside by the Revenue
      Appellate Tribunal.
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192      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A
      21. The other proceedings initiated by the father of the
      plaintiffs is to approach the Deputy Commissioner to set aside
      the sale by filing an application under Sec. 177 of the Act.
      Though, initially the Deputy Commissioner had rejected the
B     application as not maintainable before him, on an application
      filed for review of his order, he had entertained the application
      by observing in his order that an application filed by the
      defaulter to initiate suo-motu powers by him under proviso to
      Section 177 of the Act is maintainable. The correctness or
C     otherwise of this order was questioned by the legal
      representatives of the late Sri Belekerappa – the defendants
      before the Revenue Appellate Tribunal in Revision Petition
      No.304/1973 filed under Sec. 56 of the Karnataka Land
      Revenue Act. The Tribunal by its order dated 30.1.1981 holds
      that the Deputy Commissioner was justified in invoking his
D     powers under Sec. 177 of the Act on an application filed by
      the defaulter to set aside the sale and therefore, has rejected
      the revision petition and have directed the Deputy
      Commissioner to consider the petition/application filed by the
      father of the plaintiffs under Sec.177 of the Act in accordance
E     with law. It is the correctness or otherwise of this order was
      the subject matter before this Court in W.P. No.14012/1981
      and this Court while allowing the petition and setting aside
      the order passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in
      Revision Petition No.304/1973 has made a passing observation
      to the effect that ‘in this last ditch battle for recovery of these
F     lands, the point raised is of the tenability of an application
      made for setting aside the auction sale by moving the Deputy
      Commissioner to exercise his suo-motu powers under Sec.177
      of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, although the auction
      sale having been confirmed long back.’ It is this observation
      of the learned Single Judge, which has been confirmed in
G
      W.A. No.2176/1989 has weighed the mind of the learned trial
      Judge to hold that the suit is hit by principles of res judicata.”

                                                   (emphasis supplied)
      27. As is noticed from the judgment of the leaned Single Judge of
H
    ANDANUR KALAMMA AND ORS. v. GANGAMMA (DEAD)                                193
            BY L.RS. [A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the High Court in Writ Petition No.14102/1981 dated 31st July, 1989,           A
reproduced in its entirety in earlier part (paragraph 24) of this judgment,
the entire issue with regard to the confirmation of the auction sale and
the sale certificate issued in favour of the predecessor of the respondents,
was the subject matter before the High Court between the same parties
in respect of the same land and including the cause of action. On that
                                                                               B
finding, the Trial Court as well as the High Court non-suited the appellants
by dismissing the suit filed by them for declaration of ownership and
possession, being hit by the principles of res judicata, as can be discerned
from the discussion in paragraphs 31 and 32 of the impugned judgment,
which have been extracted in paragraph 19 of this judgment. We are in
complete agreement with the analysis of facts and the conclusion               C
arrived at by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court.
      28. For arriving at such conclusion, the Trial Court and High Court
have applied the settled legal position in reference to the decisions of
this Court as noticed by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The
principle of res judicata as enshrined in Section 11 of CPC, is founded        D
on the maxim “Nemo Debet Bis Vexari Pro Una Et Eadem Causa”.
In a recent decision in the case of Nagabhushanammal Vs. C.
Chandikeswaralingam,8 this Court observed thus:
       “15. ‘Res judicata’ literally means a ‘thing adjudicated’ or
       ‘an issue that has been definitively settled by judicial                E
       decision’.9 The principle operates as a bar to try the same
       issue once over. It aims to prevent multiplicity of proceedings
       and accords finality to an issue, which directly and
       substantially had arisen in the former suit between the same
       parties or their privies and was decided and has become final,
       so that the parties are not vexed twice over; vexatious litigation      F
       is put an end to and valuable time of the court is saved. (See
       Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair.10)
       16. In Jaswant Singh v. Custodian of Evacuee Property11 this
       Court has laid down a test for determining whether a
       subsequent suit is barred by res judicata: (SCC p. 657, para            G

7
  (2016) 4 SCC 434
8
  Black ’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edn. 1336-37.
9
   (1994) 2 SCC 14
10
    (1985) 3 SCC 648
11
    (2004) 3 SCC 277                                                           H
194           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 3 S.C.R.


A          14)
              ‘14. … In order that a defence of res judicata may succeed
              it is necessary to show that not only the cause of action
              was the same but also that the plaintiff had an opportunity
              of getting the relief which he is now seeking in the former
B             proceedings. The test is whether the claim in the subsequent
              suit or proceedings is in fact founded upon the same cause
              of action which was the foundation of the former suit or
              proceedings.’
            17. The expression ‘cause of action’ came to be interpreted
C     by this Court in Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair 31
      at para 16. To quote: (SCC p. 286)
              ‘16. The expression ‘cause of action’ has acquired a
              judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense, cause
              of action means the circumstances forming the infraction
D             of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In
              the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the
              maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction
              of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself.
              Compendiously the expression means every fact which
              would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed,
E             in order to support his right to the judgment of the court.
              Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished
              from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove
              each fact, comprises in ‘cause of action’.
           18. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.), the expression
F          has been defined as follows:
              ‘Cause of action’ has been defined as meaning simply a
              factual situation the existence of which entitles one person
              to obtain from the court a remedy against another person.
              The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every
G             fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to
              succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a
              right to traverse. ‘Cause of action’ has also been taken to
              mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which
              gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-
              matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the
H
 ANDANUR KALAMMA AND ORS. v. GANGAMMA (DEAD)                                     195
         BY L.RS. [A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

          technical cause of action.”                                            A
       29. The principle of res judicata applies on all fours to the present
case as has been rightly held by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High
Court in the impugned judgment, in particular, in paragraphs 31 and 32
thereof, which have been reproduced in paragraph 19 above.
      30. We, accordingly, affirm the judgment and orders under                  B
appeal and dismiss these appeals being devoid of merit.
       31. Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed with costs.


Kalpana K. Tripathy                                         Appeals dismissed.   C




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