Supreme Court of India
ANGADI CHANDRANNAversusSHANKAR & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 532
- Decided
- 22 April 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B PARDIWALA
Holding
The suit property was self‑acquired by Defendant No.1, and the High Court erred in re‑appraising the factual findings of the First Appellate Court, so the First Appellate Court’s decree was restored.
Summary
The dispute concerned whether a 7‑acre suit property, purchased by Defendant No.1 from his brother after a 1986 partition of the joint Hindu family, was ancestral or self‑acquired. The plaintiffs (sons and daughters of Defendant No.1) sued for partition and possession, claiming the property remained ancestral because it was bought with joint family funds. The trial court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, but the First Appellate Court reversed that decision, holding the property to be self‑acquired. The High Court set aside the First Appellate Court’s judgment, treating the property as ancestral, but the Supreme Court held that the High Court improperly re‑appraised evidence without a substantial question of law under s.103 CPC. It affirmed that after partition each share becomes self‑acquired, and the sale by Defendant No.1 was funded by a loan, not joint family nucleus, making the property self‑acquired. Consequently, the Supreme Court restored the First Appellate Court’s decree and allowed the appeal.
Issues considered
- The suit property was ancestral or self‑acquired property of Defendant No.1.
- Whether the High Court could re‑appraise factual findings of the First Appellate Court under Section 103 of the CPC.
- Whether the doctrine of blending of self‑acquired property into joint family property applied to the suit property.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100, s. 103, s. 96
Headnote
Issue for Consideration The main dispute in the lis is, whether the suit property was ancestral or self-acquired property of defendant no.1. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – ss.96, 100, 103 – Defendant no.1 and his two brothers CT and CE divided the joint family – Subsequently, defendant no.1 purchased the suit property from his brother CT by way of registered sale deed dated 16.10.1989 – Thereafter, defendant no.1 sold the suit property to defendant no.2 by way of registered sale deed dated 11.03.1993 – Plaintiffs (sons and
Subjects
PropertyAncestral PropertySelf-acquired propertyJoint family propertySale deedPartition deedPartitionPossessionSubstantial questions of lawRe-appreciation of evidenceCrucial factIncome from nucleus fundJoint family fundsDoctrine of blending of self-acquired property with joint family
Judgment
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1417 : 2025 INSC 532
Angadi Chandranna
v.
Shankar & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 5401 of 2025)
22 April 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The main dispute in the lis is, whether the suit property was
ancestral or self-acquired property of defendant no.1.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – ss.96, 100, 103 – Defendant
no.1 and his two brothers CT and CE divided the joint
family properties under a registered partition deed dated
09.05.1986 – Subsequently, defendant no.1 purchased the
suit property from his brother CT by way of registered sale
deed dated 16.10.1989 – Thereafter, defendant no.1 sold the
suit property to defendant no.2 by way of registered sale
deed dated 11.03.1993 – Plaintiffs (sons and daughters of
defendant no.1) instituted suit seeking partition and separate
possession of suit property – Trial decreed suit in favour of
plaintiffs – Defendant no.2 moved a regular appeal – First
Appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial
Court – Aggrieved, plaintiffs filed second regular appeal – The
High Court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the
First Appellate Court – Correctness:
Held: The High Court can go into findings of facts u/s.103 CPC
only under certain circumstances – In the instant case, the so-called
substantial question of law framed by the High Court does not qualify
to be a substantial question of law, rather the exercise of the High
Court is a venture into the findings of the First Appellant Court by
re-appreciation of evidence – s.103 permits the High Court to go
into the facts only when the courts below have not determined or
rendered any finding on a crucial fact, despite evidence already
available on record or after deciding the substantial question of law,
* Author
1418 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the facts of a particular case demand re-determination – When the
First Appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction has considered
the entire evidence and rendered a finding, the High Court cannot
re-appreciate the evidence just because another view is possible,
when the view taken by the First Appellate Court is plausible and
does not suffer from vice in law – Therefore, the High Court erred
in setting aside the judgment and decree of the First Appellate
Court – On facts, the plaintiffs did not question the partition deed
effected among the brothers – After the joint family property has
been distributed in accordance with law, it ceases to be joint family
properties and the shares of the respective parties become their
self-acquired properties – Hence, the suit property acquired by
defendant no.1 became his self-acquired property, on being sold by
his brother to him, vide sale deed dated 16.10.1989 – No evidence
was let in by the plaintiffs to prove that the other properties allotted
to defendant no.1 yielded income and that it was only from that
entire income that the suit property was purchased – Taking note
of the facts and circumstances of the case and also the principles
enunciated in the earlier decisions, in considered opinion of this
Court, defendant no.1 acquired the suit property out of the loan
obtained from DW3 and not from the income derived from the
nucleus funds or joint family funds, and hence, the suit property
should be considered as his self-acquired property – Besides, the
High Court erroneously applied the doctrine of blending under
the Hindu joint family law by relying upon judgments that are not
applicable to the case on hand, re-appreciated evidence without
framing any substantial question of law and allowed the appeal
filed by the plaintiffs – Thus, the impugned judgment and order of
the High Court is set aside and the judgment and decree of the
First Appellate Court is restored. [Paras 12, 12.1, 18, 19, 19.2, 20]
Principles/Doctrines – Doctrine of blending of self-acquired
property with joint family – Discussed. [Para 20]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.103 – Discussed.
[Paras 12, 12.1]
Case Law Cited
Chandrabhan (Deceased) through L.Rs & Ors. v. Saraswati &
Ors., 2022 INSC 997 : [2022] 7 SCR 295 : MANU/SC/1224/2022;
Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel & Ors. v. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1419
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
[2019] 13 SCR 152 : (2020) 16 SCC 255; Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder
Singh & Ors. [2013] 7 SCR 897 : (2013) 9 SCC 419 – relied on.
Jaichand (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. Sahnulal & Anr. [2024] 12
SCR 719 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864; Gurnam Singh (Dead)
by LRs & Ors. v. Lehna Singh (Dead) by LRs [2019] 4 SCR
1084 : (2019) 7 SCC 641; Murugan & Ors. v. Kesava Gounder
(Dead) Through LRs. & Ors. [2019] 4 SCR 357 : (2019) 20 SCC
633; Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai & Anr. v. Desai Mallappa
alias Mallesappa & Anr. [1961] 3 SCR 779; Lakkireddi Chinna
Venkata Reddi & Ors. v. Lakkireddi Lakshmama [1964] 2 SCR
172; Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar [1987] 1 SCR 516 : (1987) 1
SCC 204; K.V. Narayanan v. K.V. Ranganandhan & Ors. [1976]
3 SCR 637 : (1977) 1 SCC 244 – referred to.
R. Deivanai Ammal (Died) v. G. Meenakshi Ammal, AIR 2004
MADRAS 529 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords
Property; Ancestral Property; Self-acquired property; Joint family
property; Sale deed; Partition deed; Partition; Possession;
Substantial questions of law; Re-appreciation of evidence; Crucial
fact; Income from nucleus fund; Joint family funds; Doctrine of
blending of self-acquired property with joint family.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5401 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.08.2021 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in RSA No. 1417 of 2006
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Haripriya Padmanabhan, Sr. Adv., Raghunatha Sethupathy B,
K. Paari Vendhan, Ms. Pariksha, Shreehare J.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Nishanth Patil, Ayush P Shah, Vignesh Adithiya S, Arijit Dey.
1420 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted.
2. The appellant is the purchaser of a property bearing Sy. No. 93
measuring 7 acres 20 guntas situated at Mahadevapura Village,
Parashurampura Hobli, Challakere Taluk1. He has come up with the
present appeal against the judgment and order dated 12.08.2021
passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru2 in Regular
Second Appeal No.1417 of 2006. By the impugned order, the High
Court allowed the Regular Second Appeal thereby setting aside the
judgment and decree dated 21.02.2006 passed by the Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Challakere3 in Regular Appeal No.291 of 2002
and affirming the judgment and decree dated 21.12.2001 passed by
the Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Challakere4, in O.S.No.169 of 1994.
3. The appellant herein is Defendant No.2 and the Respondent
Nos.1 to 4, who are the sons and daughters of Defendant No.1
(C. Jayaramappa), are the plaintiffs. For the sake of convenience,
the parties are referred to as per their rank in the aforesaid suit.
4. Defendant No.1 and his two brothers viz., C. Thippeswamy and
C. Eshwarappa, after the death of their father and uncle, who was
issueless, divided the joint family properties under a registered
partition deed dated 09.05.1986. Subsequently, Defendant No.1
purchased the suit property from his elder brother C. Thippeswamy
by way of a registered sale deed dated 16.10.1989. Thereafter,
Defendant No.1 sold the suit property to Defendant No.2 by a
registered sale deed dated 11.03.1993.
5. When the facts stood thus, the plaintiffs had instituted a suit bearing
O.S.No.169 of 1994 before the trial Court seeking partition and
1 For short, “the suit property”
2 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
3 Hereinafter referred to as “the First Appellate Court”
4 Hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1421
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
separate possession of the suit property. After due trial, the trial
Court vide judgment and decree dated 21.12.2001, decreed the suit
as prayed for, by holding that the plaintiffs are entitled for partition
and separate possession by metes and bounds through revenue
authorities. Challenging the same, Defendant No.2 moved Regular
Appeal bearing No.291 of 2002. The First Appellate Court vide
judgment and decree dated 21.02.2006, allowed the appeal and set
aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved
by the same, the plaintiffs filed Regular Second Appeal No.1417 of
2006 which was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by
the First Appellate Court was set aside by the High Court, by the
judgment and order dated 12.08.2021. Therefore, Defendant No.2
is before us with the present appeal.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant / Defendant No.2, at the outset,
contended that the question of law framed by the High Court for
adjudication, is a pure question of fact, which cannot be framed or
decided while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908. In this regard, reliance was placed on the
decision of this Court in Jaichand (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v.
Sahnulal & Anr.5 and Gurnam Singh (Dead) by LRs & Ors. v. Lehna
Singh (Dead) by LRs6.
6.1. According to the learned counsel, the joint family property was
partitioned in the year 1986; subsequently, one of the brothers,
Thippeswamy, sold his share i.e., the suit property to Defendant
No.1 vide registered sale deed dated 16.10.1989; and thereafter,
Defendant No.1 sold the suit property to Defendant No.2 vide
registered sale deed dated 11.03.1993. The evidence adduced
by Defendant No.2 would clearly show that the suit property
was purchased by Defendant No.1 using his own funds and
loan obtained from DW3 Narasimhamurthy and hence, the same
should be considered as self-acquired property of Defendant
No.1. As such, at the time of sale, the suit property was no longer
a part of joint family property. Considering the said aspect, the
First Appellate Court rightly arrived at the conclusion that the
suit property was a self-acquired property of Defendant No.1.
5 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864
6 (2019) 7 SCC 641
1422 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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6.2. It is further submitted that after the execution of the sale deed
dated 11.03.1993 by Defendant No.1 in favour of Defendant
No.2 in respect of the suit property, the plaintiffs, who are
the sons and daughters of Defendant No.1, had filed the suit
for partition and separate possession, without seeking the
relief of cancellation of the said sale deed. Though the trial
Court framed an issue, it decided that the said issue does not
arise for consideration, as in a suit for partition, there is no
necessity to seek a relief of declaration of sale deed executed
in favour of third parties as null and void. In this connection,
the learned counsel referred to a decision of this court in
Murugan & Ors. v. Kesava Gounder (Dead) Through LRs. &
Ors.7, wherein, it was held that a specific prayer for setting
aside the sale deed is mandatory in the suit for declaration
and separate possession.
6.3. It is also submitted that the High Court erred in arriving at the
finding that Defendant No.1 got the suit property under the will
dated 18.12.1978 and the same blended into the joint family
properties since then. Whereas, the property received by the
Defendant No.1 under the partition deed was different from
the suit property and that, the suit property was purchased
by him out of his own funds and the loan obtained from DW3
Narasimhamurthy. Hence, the doctrine of blending would not
apply to the present case. The legal position in this regard is
that the doctrine of blending of self-acquired property into joint
family pool would apply only when such self-acquired property
is voluntarily thrown into the common stock with intention to
abandon separate claim over the same [Refer: Mallesappa
Bandeppa Desai & Anr. v. Desai Mallappa alias Mallesappa &
Anr.8, and Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi & Ors. v. Lakkireddi
Lakshmama9].
6.4. Stating so, the learned counsel prayed to allow this appeal by
setting aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court.
7 (2019) 20 SCC 633
8 [1961] 3 SCR 779
9 [1964] 2 SCR 172
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1423
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
7. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondents / plaintiffs
submitted that the suit property was acquired by Defendant No.1
through a sale deed dated 16.10.1989, for a total consideration of
Rs.15,000/- from C. Thippeswamy, using nucleus funds or joint family
funds viz., income derived from the land allotted to the share of
Defendant No.1 through partition; income derived from doing coolie
work; cash of Rs.10,000/- given during partition; and cash given by
Mallamma (grandmother of the respondents) by selling her property
at Rayadurga and hence, the same should be treated as ancestral
property and not self-acquired property.
7.1. It is further submitted that when the partition among the
Defendant No.1 and his brothers, came into effect i.e., on
09.05.1986, the plaintiffs were minors and were co-parceners
with respect to the properties or amounts that were divided and
allotted to Defendant No.1’s share, as the family continued to
reside jointly. As such, the plaintiffs have a right over the suit
property.
7.2. Referring to Hindu Law by Mulla, the learned counsel submitted
that the character of the ancestral property does not change
with respect to the sons, even after partition, as it is a settled
principle of law that the share that a co-sharer obtains upon
the partition of ancestral property, continues to be ancestral for
his male issues, who acquire an interest in it by birth, whether
they exist at the time of partition or are born subsequently.
Therefore, the suit property, which was acquired/purchased by
Defendant No.1, remains ancestral property and the plaintiffs
have a right over the same. In this regard, the learned counsel
placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Yudhishter v.
Ashok Kumar10.
7.3. It is also submitted that even assuming but not admitting that
joint family property once divided through partition, no longer
remains as such and is considered self-acquired, the court must
examine the facts and evidence to determine how Defendant
No.1 acquired the suit property for Rs.15,000/- in 1989, either
using nucleus funds/joint family funds or with a loan obtained
from DW.3. According to the learned counsel, there was no
10 (1987) 1 SCC 204
1424 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
reasonable possibility that within a period of just three years, the
Defendant No.1 could have accumulated a sum of Rs.15,000/-
solely by doing coolie work or by cultivating the land allotted
to him by way of partition, and acquired the suit property.
Further, no convincing and reliable material was produced that
Defendant No.1 obtained loan from DW.3. That apart, there
were contradictions and inconsistencies in the defendants’ side’s
deposition only to suggest that the suit property was acquired
using joint family funds. On the other hand, the plaintiffs have
successfully discharged their burden by producing sufficient
material to establish that the suit property was acquired using
joint family funds, and the character of the suit property must
still be regarded as ancestral.
7.4. Ultimately, the learned counsel submitted that there is no
evidence to show that the suit property was sold for the benefit
of the estate. Rather, it shows that Defendant No.1 was in dire
need of money to continue his bad habits and not to look after
the estate. That apart, the amount received by Defendant No.1
after selling the suit property was never handed over to the
plaintiffs for their betterment. Therefore, it is submitted that the
suit property was sold without the consent of the plaintiffs and
without any legal necessity, making the sale deed void.
7.5. Pointing out the above, the learned counsel submitted that
considering all these aspects, both the trial Court and High
Court rightly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs and the
same do not call for any interference by this court.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for both sides and perused the
materials available on record.
9. As evident from the facts, there was a partition deed dated 09.05.1986,
among Defendant No.1 and his two brothers in respect of the ancestral
properties, after the death of their father, Channappa, who had two
wives and three sons through them. ‘A’ schedule property was allotted
to C. Thippeswamy (son through the first wife, Mallamma); ‘B’ schedule
property was allotted to C. Eshwarappa, (son through the second
wife, Parvathamma); ‘C’ schedule property was allotted to Defendant
No. 1, (another son through the second wife, Parvathamma); and ‘D’
schedule property was divided into equal shares among Defendant
No.1 and his brothers. Subsequently, Defendant No.1 purchased the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1425
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
suit property, which was allotted to the share of C. Thippeswamy
through partition deed dated 09.05.1986 (A-schedule property), by a
sale deed dated 16.10.1989 for Rs.15,000/-. Thereafter, he sold the
suit property to Defendant No.2 on 11.03.1993 for a sale consideration
of Rs.20,000/. It is pertinent to mention here that the suit property is
the property allotted to C. Thippeswamy, later purchased by Defendant
No.1 and not the property which was received by Defendant No.1
through will.
10. Contending that the suit property was acquired by Defendant No.1
using joint family funds and should therefore be treated as ancestral;
he cannot sell it without the consent of the plaintiffs; and plaintiffs
1 and 3, being coparceners of the joint family, have a share in the
suit property, while plaintiffs 2 and 4 have a right to maintenance
from it, the plaintiffs instituted the suit bearing O.S.No.169 of 1994
for partition and separate possession. The defence raised was that
the suit property was self-acquired property of Defendant No.1 and
hence, Defendant No.1 has the right to sell it to Defendant No.2.
Before the trial Court, on the side of the plaintiffs, PW1 to PW3
were examined and Exs.P1 to P3 were marked; and on the side of
the defendants, DW1 to DW4 were examined and Exs.D1 to D10
documents were marked. Upon analysing the same, the trial Court
decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs, which was reversed by
the First Appellate Court. However, the High Court set aside the
judgment passed by the First Appellate Court and restored the
judgment of the trial Court. Therefore, this appeal came to be filed
by the appellant / Defendant No.2.
11. On the basis of the pleadings and submissions made by the parties,
the main dispute in the lis is, whether the suit property was ancestral
or self-acquired property of Defendant No.1.
12. Before delving into the facts of the case, this court in Jaichand (supra)
expressed its anguish at the High Court for not understanding the
scope of Section 100 CPC, which limits intervention only to cases
where a substantial question of law exists, and clarified that the High
Court can go into the findings of facts under Section 103 CPC only
under certain circumstances, as stated in the following passages:
“23. We are thoroughly disappointed with the manner in
which the High Court framed the so-called substantial
question of law. By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be
1426 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
termed even a question of law far from being a substantial
question of law. How many times the Apex Court should
keep explaining the scope of a second appeal Under
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and how a
substantial question of law should be framed? We may
once again explain the well-settled principles governing
the scope of a second appeal Under Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
24. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty reported in MANU/
SC/2077/1996 : 1998: INSC: 349 : AIR 1996 S.C. 3521,
it was held by this Court that the High Court should not
reappreciate the evidence to reach another possible view
in order to set aside the findings of fact arrived at by the
first appellate Court.
25. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait
reported in MANU/SC/0647/1997 : 1997:INSC:487 : (1997)
5 S.C.C. 438), this Court held that in the Second Appeal,
the High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a
substantial question of law and not mere question of law.
26. In Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao
Marnor reported in MANU/SC/0058/1999 : 1999 (2) S.C.C.
471, this Court held:
Keeping in view the amendment made in 1976, the High
Court can exercise its jurisdiction Under Section 100,
Code of Civil Procedure only on the basis of substantial
questions of law which are to be framed at the time of
admission of the Second Appeal and the Second Appeal
has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such
duly framed substantial questions of law. A judgment
rendered by the High Court Under Section 100 Code of
Civil Procedure without following the aforesaid procedure
cannot be sustained.
27. This Court in Kondira Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan
Gujar reported in MANU/SC/0278/1999 : 1999:INSC:192 :
AIR 1999 S.C. 2213 held:
The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the
opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that
the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1427
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions
of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of
pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based
upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.
28. It is thus clear that Under Section 100, Code of Civil
Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the findings
of fact arrived at by the first Appellate Court which is the
final Court of facts except in such cases where such
findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory
provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the
pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon
inadmissible evidence or without evidence.
29. The High Court in the Second Appeal can interfere with
the findings of the trial Court on the ground of failure on
the part of the trial as well as the first appellate Court, as
the case may be, when such findings are either recorded
without proper construction of the documents or failure to
follow the decisions of this Court and acted on assumption
not supported by evidence. Under Section 103, Code of
Civil Procedure, the High Court has got power to determine
the issue of fact. The Section lays down:
Power of High Court to determine issue of fact: In any
Second Appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on
the record is sufficient to determine any issue necessary
for the disposal of the appeal,-
(a) Which has not been determined by the lower Appellate
Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower
Appellate Court, or
(b) Which has been wrongly determined by such Court or
Courts by reason of a decision on such question of law
as is referred to in Section 100.
30. In Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh reported in MANU/
SC/0094/1993 : AIR 1993 S.C. 398, this Court held:
The High Court was certainly entitled to go into the
question as to whether the findings of fact recorded by the
first appellate court which was the final court of fact were
vitiated in the eye of law on account of non-consideration
1428 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of admissible evidence of vital nature. But, after setting
aside the findings of fact on that ground the Court had
either to remand the matter to the first appellate Court for
a rehearing of the first appeal and decision in accordance
with law after taking into consideration the entire relevant
evidence on the records, or in the alternative to decide the
case finally in accordance with the provisions of Section
103(b). ...... If in an appropriate case the High Court
decides to follow the second course, it must hear the parties
fully with reference to the entire evidence on the records
relevant to the issue in question and this is possible if only
a proper paper book is prepared for hearing of facts and
notice is given to the parties. The grounds which may be
available in support of a plea that the finding of fact by the
court below is vitiated in law does not by itself lead to the
further conclusion that a contrary finding has to be finally
arrived at on the disputed issue. On a reappraisal of the
entire evidence the ultimate conclusion may go in favour
of either party and it cannot be prejudged.
31. In the case of Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal reported in
MANU/SC/2774/2006 : 2006:INSC:305 : (2006) 5 SCC 545
this Court explained the concept in the following words:
It must be tested whether the question is of general public
importance or whether it directly and substantially affects
the rights of the parties.
Or whether it is not finally decided, or not free from difficulty
or calls for discussion of alternative views.
If the question is settled by the highest court or the general
principles to be applied in determining the question are
well settled and there is a mere question of applying those
principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the
question would not be a substantial question of law.
32. It is not that the High Courts are not well-versed with
the principles governing Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. It is only the casual and callous approach on
the part of the courts to apply the correct principles of law
to the facts of the case that leads to passing of vulnerable
orders like the one on hand.”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1429
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
12.1. In the present case, in our view, the so-called substantial
question of law framed by the High Court does not qualify to
be a substantial question of law, rather the exercise of the
High Court is a venture into the findings of the First Appellant
Court by re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that the
High Court can go into the findings of facts only if the First
Appellate Court has failed to look into the law or evidence or
considered inadmissible evidence or without evidence. Section
103 permits the High Court to go into the facts only when the
courts below have not determined or rendered any finding on
a crucial fact, despite evidence already available on record or
after deciding the substantial question of law, the facts of a
particular case demand re-determination. For the second limb
of Section 103 to apply, there must first be a decision on the
substantial question of law, to which the facts must be applied,
to determine the issue in dispute. When the First Appellate
Court in exercise of its jurisdiction has considered the entire
evidence and rendered a finding, the High Court cannot re-
appreciate the evidence just because another view is possible,
when the view taken by the First Appellate Court is plausible
and does not suffer from vice in law. When the determination
of the High Court is only by way of re-appreciation of the
existing evidence, without there being any legal question to be
answered, it would be axiomatic that not even a question of
law is involved, much less a substantial one. It will be useful
to refer to another judgment of this Court in Chandrabhan
(Deceased) through L.Rs & Ors. v. Saraswati & Ors.11, wherein
it was held as follows:
“33. The principles relating to Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure relevant for this case may
be summarised thus:
(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents
of a document is a question of fact. But the legal
effect of the terms of a document is a question
of law. Construction of a document involving the
application of any principle of law, is also a question
11 2022 INSC 997 : MANU/SC/1224/2022
1430 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a
document or wrong application of a principle of law
in construing a document, it gives rise to a question
of law.
(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case
involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere
question of law. A question of law having a material
bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question,
answer to which affects the rights of parties to the
suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not
covered by any specific provisions of law or settled
legal principle emerging from binding precedents
and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial
question of law will also arise in a contrary situation,
where the legal position is clear, either on account
of express provisions of law or binding precedents,
but the court below has decided the matter, either
ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In
the second type of cases, the substantial question
of law arises not because the law is still debatable,
but because the decision rendered on a material
question, violates the settled position of law.
(iii) The general Rule is that the High Court will not
interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts
below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the
well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts
below have ignored material evidence or acted on no
evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences
from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or
(iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof.
When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it
not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth
of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the
evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable
of supporting the finding.
34. In this case, it cannot be said that the First Appellate
Court acted on no evidence. The Respondents in their
Second Appeal before the High Court did not advert
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1431
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
to any material evidence that had been ignored by
the First Appellate Court. The Respondents also
could not show that any wrong inference had been
drawn by the First Appellate Court from proved facts
by applying the law erroneously.
35. In this case, as observed above, evidence had
been adduced on behalf of the Original Plaintiff as
well as the Defendants. The First Appellate Court
analysed the evidence carefully and in effect found
that the Trial Court had erred in its analysis of evidence
and given undue importance to discrepancies and
inconsistencies, which were not really material,
overlooking the time gap of 34 years that had elapsed
since the date of the adoption. There was no such
infirmity in the reasoning of the First Appellate Court
which called for interference.
36. Right of appeal is not automatic. Right of appeal
is conferred by statute. When statute confers a limited
right of appeal restricted only to cases which involve
substantial questions of law, it is not open to this Court
to sit in appeal over the factual findings arrived at by
the First Appellate Court.”
12.2. In the present case, the First Appellate Court analyzed the
entire oral evidence adduced by both parties, as well as
the documentary evidence relied upon by either side, and
dismissed the suit. The authority to re-consider the evidence
is available only to the First Appellate Court under Section
96 and not to the High Court in exercise of its authority under
Section 100, unless the case falls under the exceptional
circumstances provided under Section 103. While so, the re-
appreciation of the entire evidence, including the contents of
the exhibits, reliance on and wrongful identification of a different
property and treating the same to be the suit property actually
in dispute to prescribe another view without any substantial
question of law, only illustrate the callousness of the High
Court in applying the settled principles. Therefore, the High
Court erred in setting aside the judgment and decree of the
First Appellate Court.
1432 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
13. Further, it is a settled principle of law that there is no presumption of
a property being joint family property only on account of existence
of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the
property is a joint family property. If, however, the person so asserting
proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property
could be acquired, then there would be presumption of the property
being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to
be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property
with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was
available. That apart, while considering the term ‘nucleus’ it should
always be borne in mind that such nucleus has to be established as
a matter of fact and the existence of such nucleus cannot normally
be presumed or assumed on probabilities. This Court in R.Deivanai
Ammal (Died) v. G. Meenakshi Ammal12, dealt with the concept of
Hindu Law, ancestral property and the nucleus existing therein. The
relevant paragraphs are extracted below for ready reference:
“13. First let us consider the nature of the suit properties,
namely, self-acquired properties of late Ganapathy
Moopanar or ancestral properties and whether any
nucleus was available to purchase the properties. Under
the Hindu Law it is only when a person alleging that the
property is ancestral property proves that there was a
nucleus by means of which other property may have
been acquired, that the burden is shifted on the party
alleging self-acquisitions to prove that the property was
acquired without any aid from the family estate. In other
words the mere existence of a nucleus however small or
insignificant is not enough. It should be shown to be of
such a character as could reasonably be expected to lead
to the acquisition of the property alleged to be part of the
joint family property. Where the doctrine of blending is
invoked against a person having income at his disposal and
acquiring property, the reasonable presumption to make
is that he had the income at his absolute disposal unless
there is evidence to the contrary. If a coparcener desires to
establish that a property in the name of a female member
of the family or in the name of the manager himself has
12 AIR 2004 MADRAS 529
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1433
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
to be accepted and treated as property acquired from the
joint family nucleus, it is absolutely essential that such a
coparcener should not only barely plead the same, but
also establish the existence of such a joint family fund or
nucleus. Even if the joint family nucleus is so established,
the prescription that the accretions made by the manager
or the purchases made by him should be deemed to be
from and out of such a nucleus does not arise, if there
is no proof that such nucleus of the joint family is not an
income-yielding apparatus. The proof required is very
strict and the burden is on the person who sets up a
case that the property in the name of a female member
of the family or in the name of the manager or any other
coparcener is to be treated as joint family property. There
should be proof of the availability of such surplus income
or joint family nucleus on the date of such acquisitions
or purchases. The same is the principle even in the
cases where moneys were advanced on mortgages over
immoveable properties. The onus is not on the acquirer
to prove that the property standing in his name was
purchased from joint family funds. That may be so, in
the case of a manager of a joint family, but not so in the
case of all coparceners. For a greater reason it is not so
in the case of female members.
14. The doctrine of blending of self-acquired property with
joint family has to be carefully applied with reference to
the facts of each case. No doubt it is settled that when
members of a joint family by their joint labour or in their
joint business acquired property, that property, in the
absence of a clear indication of a contrary intention, would
be owned by them as joint family property and their male
issues would necessarily acquire a right by birth in such
property. But the essential sine qua non is the absence of
a contrary intention. If there is satisfactory evidence of an
intention on the part of the acquirer such property to treat it
as his own, but not as joint family property, the presumption
which ordinarily arises, according to the personal law of
Hindus that such property would be regarded as joint
family property, will not arise.
1434 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
15. It is a well-established principle of law that where a
party claims that any particular item of property is joint
family property, the burden of proving that it is so rests on
the party asserting it. Where it is established or admitted
that the family possessed some joint property which
from its nature and relative value may have formed the
nucleus from which the property in question may have
been acquired, the presumption arises that it was joint
property and the burden shifts to the party alleging self-
acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was
acquired without the aid of the joint family. But no such
presumption would arise if the nucleus is such that with
its help the property claimed to be joint could not have
been acquired. In order to give rise to the presumption,
the nucleus should be such that with its help the property
claimed to be joint could have been acquired. A family
house in the occupation of the members and yielding no
income could not be nucleus out of which acquisitions could
be made even though it might be of considerable value.
16. In a Hindu joint family, if one member sues for partition
on the foot that the properties claimed by him are joint
family properties then three circumstances ordinarily arise.
The first is an admitted case when there is no dispute
about the existence of the joint family properties at all. The
second is a case where certain properties are admitted
to the joint family properties and the other properties in
which a share is claimed are alleged to be the accretions
or acquisitions from the income available from joint family
properties or in the alternative have been acquired by a
sale or conversion of such available properties. The third
head is that the properties standing in the names of female
members of the family are benami and that such a state
of affairs has been deliberately created by the manager
or the head of the family and that really the properties or
the amounts standing in the names of female members
are properties of the joint family. While considering the
term ‘nucleus’ it should always be borne in mind that
such nucleus has to be established as a matter of fact
and the existence of such nucleus cannot normally be
presumed or assumed on probabilities. The extent of the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1435
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
property, the income from the property, the normal liability
with which such income would be charged and the net
available surplus of such joint family property do all enter
into computation for the purpose of assessing the content
of the reservoir of such a nucleus from which alone it
could, with reasonable certainty, be said that the other joint
family properties have been purchased unless a strong
link or nexus is established between the available surplus
income and the alleged joint family properties. The person
who comes to Court with such bare allegations without
any substantial proof to back it up should fail.
17. It is also a well-established doctrine of Hindu Law
that property which was originally self-acquired may
become joint property if it has been voluntarily thrown by
the coparcener into the joint stock with the intention of
abandoning all separate claims upto it. But the question
whether the coparcener has done so or not is entirely
a question of fact to be decided in the light of all the
circumstances of the case. It must be established that
there was a clear intention on the part of the coparcener
to waive his separate rights and such an intention will not
be inferred from acts which may have been done from
kindness or affection. The important point to keep in mind
is that the separate property of a Hindu coparcener ceases
to be his separate property and acquires the characteristics
of his joint family or ancestral property, not by mere act of
physical mixing with his joint family or ancestral property,
but by his own volition and intention by his waiving or
surrendering his special right in it as separate property.
Such intention can be discovered only from his words or
from his acts and conduct.”
14. It is also to be noted that in Hindu law, for a property to be considered
as an ancestral property, it has to be inherited from any of the
paternal ancestors up to three generations. In this regard, it would
be appropriate to refer to the judgment of this Court in Govindbhai
Chhotabhai Patel & Ors. v. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai13, wherein
it has been held as under:
13 (2020) 16 SCC 255
1436 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“18. The learned counsel for the appellants has referred to
Shyam Narayan Prasad [Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna
Prasad, (2018) 7 SCC 646 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 702] .
That is a case in which the property in question was held
to be ancestral property by the trial court. The plaintiffs
therein being sons and grandson of one of the sons of
Gopal Prasad, the last male holder was found to have
equal share in the property. The question examined was
whether the property allotted to one of the sons of Gopal
Prasad in partition retains the character of coparcenary
property. It was the said finding which was affirmed by this
Court. This Court held as under: (SCC p. 651, para 12)
“12. It is settled that the property inherited by a male
Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s
father is an ancestral property. The essential feature of
ancestral property, according to Mitakshara law, is that
the sons, grandsons, and great grandsons of the person
who inherits it, acquire an interest and the rights attached
to such property at the moment of their birth. The share
which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral
property is ancestral property as regards his male issue.
After partition, the property in the hands of the son will
continue to be the ancestral property and the natural or
adopted son of that son will take interest in it and is entitled
to it by survivorship.”
... ... ... ...
20. In view of the undisputed fact, that Ashabhai Patel
purchased the property, therefore, he was competent
to execute the will in favour of any person. Since the
beneficiary of the will was his son and in the absence
of any intention in the will, beneficiary would acquire
the property as self-acquired property in terms of C.N.
Arunachala Mudaliar case [C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar v.
C.A. Muruganatha Mudaliar, (1953) 2 SCC 362 : 1954
SCR 243 : AIR 1953 SC 495]. The burden of proof that
the property was ancestral was on the plaintiffs alone. It
was for them to prove that the will of Ashabhai intended to
convey the property for the benefit of the family so as to be
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1437
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
treated as ancestral property. In the absence of any such
averment or proof, the property in the hands of donor has
to be treated as self-acquired property. Once the property
in the hands of donor is held to be self-acquired property,
he was competent to deal with his property in such a
manner he considers as proper including by executing a
gift deed in favour of a stranger to the family.”
15. With regard to coparcenary property, the principle laid down by this
Court in Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh & Ors.14 would be relevant
as follows:
“11. ….In our opinion coparcenary property means the
property which consists of ancestral property and a
coparcener would mean a person who shares equally with
others in inheritance in the estate of common ancestor.
Coparcenary is a narrower body than the joint Hindu family
and before the commencement of the Hindu Succession
(Amendment) Act, 2005, only male members of the family
used to acquire by birth an interest in the coparcenary
property. A coparcener has no definite share in the
coparcenary property but he has an undivided interest in
it and one has to bear in mind that it enlarges by deaths
and diminishes by births in the family. It is not static. We
are further of the opinion that so long, on partition an
ancestral property remains in the hand of a single person,
it has to be treated as a separate property and such a
person shall be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary
property treating it to be his separate property but if a son
is subsequently born, the alienation made before the birth
cannot be questioned. But, the moment a son is born, the
property becomes a coparcenary property and the son
would acquire interest in that and become a coparcener.
12. The view which we have taken finds support from a
judgment of this Court in M. Yogendra v. Leelamma N.
[(2009) 15 SCC 184 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 602] in which
it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 192, para 29)
14 (2013) 9 SCC 419
1438 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“29. It is now well settled in view of several decisions
of this Court that the property in the hands of a sole
coparcener allotted to him in partition shall be his
separate property for the same shall revive only when a
son is born to him. It is one thing to say that the property
remains a coparcenary property but it is another thing
to say that it revives. The distinction between the two is
absolutely clear and unambiguous. In the case of former
any sale or alienation which has been done by the sole
survivor coparcener shall be valid whereas in the case
of a coparcener any alienation made by the karta would
be valid.”
... ... ... ... ...
14.A person, who for the time being is the sole surviving
coparcener as in the present case Gulab Singh was,
before the birth of the plaintiff, was entitled to dispose
of the coparcenary property as if it were his separate
property. Gulab Singh, till the birth of plaintiff Rohit
Chauhan, was competent to sell, mortgage and deal with
the property as his property in the manner he liked. Had
he done so before the birth of plaintiff, Rohit Chauhan,
he was not competent to object to the alienation made
by his father before he was born or begotten. But, in
the present case, it is an admitted position that the
property which Defendant 2 got on partition was an
ancestral property and till the birth of the plaintiff he was
the sole surviving coparcener but the moment plaintiff
was born, he got a share in the father’s property and
became a coparcener. As observed earlier, in view of
the settled legal position, the property in the hands of
Defendant 2 allotted to him in partition was a separate
property till the birth of the plaintiff and, therefore, after
his birth Defendant 2 could have alienated the property
only as karta for legal necessity. It is nobody’s case that
Defendant 2 executed the sale deeds and release deed
as karta for any legal necessity. Hence, the sale deeds
and the release deed executed by Gulab Singh to the
extent of entire coparcenary property are illegal, null and
void. However, in respect of the property which would
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1439
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
have fallen in the share of Gulab Singh at the time of
execution of sale deeds and release deed, the parties
can work out their remedies in appropriate proceeding.”
16. In the instant case, the plaintiffs raised a specific plea throughout
the proceedings that the suit property was purchased by Defendant
No.1 using family nucleus viz., income derived from the lands allotted
to the share of Defendant No.1; income derived from doing coolie
work; cash of Rs.10,000/- received at the time of partition; and cash
received from Mallamma (grandmother of the respondents) who sold
her property at Rayadurga and therefore, the suit property should
be treated as ancestral and the plaintiffs, who were co-parceners,
have a right in it.
17. It cannot be disputed that the properties divided among Defendant
No.1 and his brothers through partition deed dated 09.05.1986, are
joint family properties. However, as per Hindu law, after partition,
each party gets a separate and distinct share and this share becomes
their self-acquired property and they have absolute rights over it and
they can sell, transfer, or bequeath it as they wish. Accordingly, the
properties bequeathed through partition, become the self-acquired
properties of the respective sharers.
18. Apparently, the plaintiffs did not question the partition deed (Ex. P1)
effected among the brothers. It states that the respective parties shall
hereinafter enjoy the properties allotted to their share with a right
to sell, lease, gift, encumber, etc. The partition deed further reveals
that the suit property was allotted to C. Thippeswamy, one of the
brothers of Defendant No.1; and Defendant No.1 was allotted 10
acres of land, which was different from the suit property measuring
7 acres 20 Guntas allotted to the said C. Thippeswamy. It also
proceeds to state that after the death of the father Channappa, the
joint family became unmanageable due to difference of opinion among
the members and therefore, they decided that it was not good to
stay together and partitioned the lands allotted to them. Thus, the
intention of the parties and the recitals in the partition deed establish
that the parties wanted to go their separate ways and did not want
the property to remain as joint family property.
19. As reiterated above, after the joint family property has been distributed
in accordance with law, it ceases to be joint family properties and the
shares of the respective parties become their self-acquired properties.
1440 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Hence, the suit property acquired by Defendant No.1 became his
self-acquired property, on being sold by his brother Thippeswamy
to him, vide sale deed dated 16.10.1989. It is the contention of the
plaintiffs that the suit property was purchased by Defendant No.1
using family nucleus and thus, should be considered as ancestral
property. Whereas, the defence raised was that Defendant No.1
acquired the suit property with the aid of his own funds and loan
obtained from DW3- Narasimhamurthy. DW1- Chandrashekar clearly
stated in his deposition that Defendant No.1 obtained a loan from
DW3, out of which, he purchased the suit property and that he repaid
the loan amount through a sale deed executed in respect of 4 acres
of land to DW3 and out of the balance amount, he performed his
daughter’s marriage. It was also stated by DW1 that apart from the
suit property, Defendant No.1 had various lands and a house as well.
DW2 Lakshmanappa stated in his evidence that he had signed the
partition deed (Ex. P1) executed among Defendant No.1 and his
brothers in 1986; and he denied the payment of Rs.10,000/- to the
share of Defendant No.1. He further deposed that Thippeswamy,
elder brother of Defendant No.1, residing in Bangalore, sold his
share to Defendant No.1 as he was unable to look after the same.
His evidence also establishes that Defendant No.1 obtained loan
from DW3 and he sold his land to him for repayment of the said
loan in 1993 by executing a sale deed (Ex. D1), in which, DW2 was
a witness; and at that time, the wife and children of Defendant No.1
were present. DW3 - Narasimhamurthy in his evidence, stated that
Defendant No.1 obtained loan from him for purchase of land of his
brother, in October 1989 and he repaid the same by selling his 4
acres of land to him in 1993; and at the time of execution of sale
deed by Defendant No.1 to DW3, his wife and children were present.
It is the evidence of DW4 - Linganna that Defendant No.1 executed
a sale deed in favour of DW3 in respect of 4 acres of land, for the
repayment of loan borrowed by him and DW4 was the witness to the
said document. He also categorically stated that Defendant No.1 had
purchased about 7 acres of land, after obtaining loan from DW3 and
prior to the execution of sale deed in favour of DW3. It is categorically
stated in the sale deed dated 11.03.1993 that the suit property was
a self-acquired property of Defendant No.1. The sale deed (Ex.P2)
does not anywhere disclose that the suit property purchased by
Defendant No.1 was ancestral property or was purchased from the
income received from the joint family property, except for a mere
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1441
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
reference to the partition deed (Ex. P1), which according to us, is
not sufficient to come to a conclusion that the properties allotted to
the share of Defendant No.1 should also be treated as joint family
properties, and no evidence was let in by the plaintiffs to prove that
the other properties allotted to Defendant No.1 yielded income and
that it was only from that entire income that the suit property was
purchased. No records have been produced in this regard. Though
PW2 stated that during the partition, all the three brothers were
allotted Rs.10,000/- each, there was no recital to that effect in the
partition deed (Ex. P1) and hence, it cannot be believed. It is well
established that the contents in a document would prevail over any
contrary oral evidence. Regarding the contention that Mallamma
had sold her property in order to help Defendant No.1 to purchase
the suit property, except the statement of PW2, there is no evidence
in this regard. Further, the said Mallamma was not examined and
the sale deed executed by her was not produced to substantiate
the same. It is also clear from the depositions on the defendants’
side that Defendant No.1 was not having any bad habits and his
wife and children were present, at the time of execution of the sale
deed. Whereas, there were inconsistencies in the statements of PW1
and PW2 in demonstrating that the suit property was an ancestral
property. The mere existence of sons and daughters in a joint Hindu
family does not make the father’s separate or self-acquired property
as joint family property. It was also the claim of the defendants that
Defendant No.1 performed the marriage of his daughter with the
funds received as sale consideration, which according to us, is the
role of a Kartha, and therefore, has to be treated as act of necessity
and duty. This fact has not been objected to by the plaintiffs.
19.1. It is also to be mentioned here that when the income derived
from the joint family property or when a joint family property is
sold and the sale consideration is utilised for maintenance and
education within the joint family, the same are to be treated
as out of necessity as it is the duty of every Kartha to do so.
Hence, it is sufficient to satisfy the legal necessity if the Kartha
had sold the property and used the funds for upbringing the
children. That apart, under the customary practices and tradition
in this country, it is the father who performs the marriage of
his children and therefore, the expenses incurred for that
purposes are also to be treated as expenses out of necessity.
1442 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
19.2. At the cost of repetition, the property in dispute is the property
purchased by Defendant No.1 from his brother C. Thippeswamy.
The High Court rather than ascertaining as to how this property
was acquired, it erroneously went into a fact- finding inquiry
in the Second Appeal regarding the property received by
Defendant No.1 under a Will, a narration of which is found in
the recital of the partition deed. The High Court even failed to
notice that the partition took place in 1986, whereas, the suit
property was purchased only in 1989. This deviation, in our
view, has further contributed to the miscarriage of justice. That
apart, the High Court ought not to have relied upon disproved
circumstances claimed by the plaintiffs against Defendant No.1
alleging that he alienated another property to presume that
the suit property was also sold under similar circumstances.
In fact, the said sales were not challenged by the plaintiffs.
Thus, taking note of the facts and circumstances of the case
and also the principles enunciated in the above decisions,
in our considered opinion, Defendant No.1 acquired the suit
property out of the loan obtained from DW3 and not from the
income derived from the nucleus funds or joint family funds,
and hence, the suit property should be considered as his self-
acquired property. As such, Defendant No.1 has the right to
sell the suit property and accordingly, the sale deed executed
by him in favour of Defendant No.2 is perfectly valid. That
apart, the evidence on record also displays that the object of
the sale of the suit property was for the benefit of the family
and therefore, we also disagree with the findings of the High
Court on this aspect.
20. Regarding the doctrine of blending of self-acquired property with joint
family, it is settled law that property separate or self- acquired of a
member of joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character
of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the
common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim
therein but to establish such abandonment a clear intention to waive
separate rights must be established. From the mere fact that other
members of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with
himself, or that the income of the separate property was utilized out
of generosity to support persons whom the holder was either bound
or not bound to support, or from the failure to maintain separate
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1443
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors.
accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an act of generosity
or kindness, will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal
obligation [See: Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddy & Ors. v. Lakkireddi
Lakshamama15 and K.V. Narayanan v. K.V.Ranganandhan & Ors.16].
In the present case, this question does not arise, as the suit property,
which was purchased from C. Thippeswamy by Defendant No.1, is
different from the property which is said to have been received by
Defendant No.1 through a Will that allegedly blended with the joint
family property. The plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence to show
that the property received through the Will, blended with the joint
family properties and that income was received from that property,
which was utilized to purchase the suit property. There is no finding
on this aspect by the High Court as well. On the other hand, as
stated above, we are satisfied with the evidence on record that the
suit property is a self-acquired property. However, the High Court
erroneously applied the doctrine of blending under the Hindu joint
family law by relying upon judgments that are not applicable to the
case on hand, re-appreciated evidence without framing any substantial
question of law and allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiffs. This,
according to us, is not sustainable for the aforesaid reasons.
21. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned judgment and
order of the High Court is set aside, and the judgment and decree of
the First Appellate Court is restored. Accordingly, this appeal stands
allowed. The parties shall bear their own costs.
22. Connected Miscellaneous Application(s) shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
15 [1964] 2 SCR 172
16 (1977) 1 SCC 244
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