Holding

The respondents willfully and deliberately violated the Supreme Court’s orders and are guilty of civil contempt.

Summary

The petitioners, laboratory assistants appointed in non‑government colleges in West Bengal, were treated as non‑teaching staff despite performing teaching functions and were denied the pay scale of physical instructors. After a series of writ petitions, the Supreme Court ordered that they be treated as teaching staff and paid the appropriate scale, with arrears. The State Government issued a circular that failed to implement the Court’s order, and subsequently ignored further directives, prompting contempt petitions. The Court examined whether the State’s refusal amounted to civil contempt, emphasizing that wilfulness is essential under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and rejected the State’s defence of ‘misunderstanding’. Finding the State officials’ conduct deliberate, willful and in contempt of the Court’s orders, the Court held them guilty of civil contempt and ordered their appearance for further proceedings.

Issues considered

Whether the State Government’s failure to implement the Supreme Court’s order amounts to civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Whether the element of wilfulness required for civil contempt is satisfied.
Whether the State’s claim of misunderstanding of the Court’s order is a valid defence.
Interpretation of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in the context of willful disobedience.
Whether the Court’s power under the Contempt of Courts Act should be exercised in this case.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 142
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 2(b)

Subjects

Contempt of CourtsCivil contemptWillful disobedienceJudicial ordersPay scale discriminationLaboratory instructorsState Government complianceArticle 142Section 2(b) Contempt Act

Judgment

A ANIL RATAN SARKAR AND ORS.
v. >--
HIRAK GHQSH AND ORS.

MARCH 8, 2002.

B [UMESH C. BANERJEE AND Y.K. SABHARWAL, JJ.]

Contempt of Courts Act, Jf!71: Section 2(b)-Power under the Act-
Exercise of-It should be exercised sparingly and in the larger interest of
Society with utmost care and caution-Wiful dis-obedience of order would .,,
c amount to contempt.

Civil Service Personnel-Liability to comply with the order ofthe Court-
It is not desirable to feign ignorance when the directions of the Court stands
crystal clear in the Judgment-Hence Respondents guilty of contempt.
D Petitioners were appointed as Laboratory Assistants in non-govt.
affiliated colleges in West Bengal. In addition to their normal duties, they have
been imparting instructions to the students and performing demonstration
work including preparation of the lesson units in the practical classes. They
were being treated as teaching staff and accordingly pay and allowances had
E been paid to them until the issuance of the State Government Order in the
Year 1969, according to which they were treated as non-teaching staff. Against
the said order of the Government, representations were made by the
petitioners but to no effect. Subsequently in 1983, the State Government
redesignated the post of Laboratory Assistants as 'Laboratory Instructors' .........

by issuing a notification wherein it was clarified that there would be no
F enhancement of pay and their status as non-teaching staff would remain
unchanged. However, the Laboratory Assistants working in Government
Colleges have been given the status and designation of Demonstrators and
treated as teaching staff.

Writ Petitions were filed for issuance of Writ of Mandamus to treat the
G -y
petitioners as teaching staff as defined in the University Act and to give them
scale of pay at par with Physical Instructions. Single Judge of.the High Court
allowed the writ petitions. In appeal by the State Government, Division Bench
confirmed the Judgment of Single Judge. Hence State Government preferred
special leave petition, and the Court by its order dated 26.7.1984 upheld the
H 346
ANIL RATAN SARKAR v. HIRAK GHOSH 347
finding of the Single Judge with slight modification regarding effective date A
-\ for implementation of revised pay scale and also for payment of arrears.

Subsequently, State Government in purported compliance with the
order of this Court issued a Circular conferring teaching status on the
Laboratory Instructors and their pay scale was also revised but not in
accordance with the order of the Court. Aggrieved, petitioners challenged the B
circular by filing a writ petition. Single Judge allowed it and quashed the
Circular. However, Division Bench upheld the Circular. On a Special Leave
Petition preferred by the petitioners, this Court restored the order of the Single
Judge. But the State Government did not comply with the order inspite of
repeated requests by the petitioners. Hence these contempt Petitions. C
It was contended for the Petitioners that fairness on the part of
respondent was totally absent inspite of three final rounds of litigation upto
this Court; and that the conduct of the respondents in not complying with
the order of the Court was deliberate, perverse and in grossest violation of
the order of this Court. Finding the Respondents guilty of Contempt, the D
Court.

HELD: I.I. Powers under the Contempt of Courts Act should be
exercised with utmost care and caution and that too rather sparingly and in
the larger interest of the society and for proper administration of the justice
delivery system in the country. Exercise of power within the meaning of the E
Act shall thus be a rarity and that too in a matter on which there exists no
doubt as regards the initiation of the action being bonafide. [354-E-F)

Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati and Anr., [2000] 7 SCC 530 and Mrityunjoy
Das Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and Ors., [2001] 3 SCC 739, relied on.

1.2. Mere disobedience of an order may llot be sufficient to amount to
F
a "Civil Contemptfl, the element of willingness is an indispensible requirement
to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act and when two
interpretations are possible and the action of the alleged contemnor pertains
to one such interpretation, the act or acts cannot be ascribed to be otherwise
contumacious in nature. (354-G-H) G
2.1. It is neither fair nor reasonable on the part of a senior Civil Service
Personnel to feign ignorance or plead lack of understanding when the direction
of this Court stands crystal clear in the judgment. Government employees
ought to be treated at par with another set of employees and this Court on a
earlier occasion lent concurrence to the view of the Single Judge that the H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A Circulars issued by the State Government cannot but be ascribed to be
arbitrary. Government is not a machinery for oppression and it is the people's )- _
welfare that the State is primarily concerned with. Avoidance of compliance
with a specific order of the Court cannot be termed to be a proper working
of a State body in terms of the wishes and aspirations of the founding fathers
B of the Constitution. [357-E-F-G)

2.2. A plain reading of the order negates the understanding of the
Respondents and the conduct in no uncertain terms be ascribed to be the
manifestation of an intent to deprive one seetion of the employees being equally
circumstanced. [358-B]
c 3.1. It is unbelievable state of affairs that the order of the Single Judges,
as early as in the first writ petition, has not been properly understood by the
senior most bureaucrat of the State Government; the same misunderstanding
continues even after the clarificatory order passed by this Court [358-C)

D 3.2. Defence of 'understanding' undoubtedly is an ingenious effort to
avoid the rigours of an order of Court but cannot obliterate the action. The
attempted avoidance through the introduction of the so-called concept of lack
of understanding cannot be a permanent avoidance, though there may be
temporary and short-lived gains. The order of this Court cannot possibly be
E interpreted as per the understanding of the Respondents, but as appears from
the plain language used therein. Neither the order is capable of two
interpretations nor there is any ambiguity and the same does not require
further clarity. The order is categorical and clear in its context and meaning.
And the' respondents have wilfully and deliberately violated the orders of this
Court in the guise of a totally non-acceptable and sham defence of
F understanding and thus rendered themselves punishable under the provisions
of Article 142 of the Constitution and also under the Contempt of Courts Act
[358-E-F-H; 359-D)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Contempt Petition (C) Nos.
260-261of 2001.
G
IN

Civil-Appeal Nos. 2906-2907 of 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.6.99 of the Kolkata High Court
H in M.A.T. No. 1368 and 1477 of 1998.
ANIL RATAN SARKAR v. HIRAK GHOSH [BANERJEE, J.] 349

Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, A.K. Ganguli, Bhaskar P. A
Gupta, Pradip Chatterjee, Bikas Bhattacharya, Sr. Advs., Rana Mukherjee,
Sumita Mukherjee, S. Gautam, Jaydeep Kar, D. Bharat Kumar, Abhijit
Sengupta, Tara Chandra Sharma, Ms. Neelam Sharma and Ajay Sharma for
the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B

BANERJEE, J: The most accepted methodology of governmental
working ought always to be fairness and in the event of its absence, law
Courts would be within its jurisdiction to deal with the matter appropriately.
This proposition is so well settled that we need not dilate further on to this. C
It is this concept of fairness which Mr.Ganguli, appearing in support of the
Petition for contempt very strongly contended, is totally absent in spite of
three final rounds of litigation upto this Court between the parties. Mr. Bhaskar
. Gupta, learned senior advocate appearing for the alleged contemnors, however,
contended that the condu~t of the respondents can neither be termed to be
unfair or in disregard to the orders of the Court on a true reading of the order D
- this stand of the respondents, however, stands negated by Mr.Ganguli. The
conduct, Mr.Ganguli, contended, is not only deliberate but utterly perverse
and in grossest violation of the orders of this Court and by reason therefor
the fruit of the litigation has not yet been made available and being decried
to the petitioner for one reason or the other for the last about 15 years. E
Incidentally, it would be convenient to note that the principal issue involved
in the matter pertains to the entitlement of the petitioners to the scale equivalent
to that of Physical Instructors in the scale of Rs. 700-1600 as on 2nd July,
1984 and Rs. 2200-4000 w .e.f. 1986.

Turning, however, on to the factual score, it appears that the petitioners F
are Science Graduates of different universities in the country and have been
appointed as Laboratory Assistants in colleges and in addition to their normal
duties, the petitioners were supposed to assist the teachers and help the students
in practical classes, impart instructio11s to the students in practical classes and
to perform demonstration work including preparation of the lesson units in G
the practical classes. According to the petitioners these Laboratory Assistants
were all along being treated as teaching staff and pay and allowances including
the Government share of Dearness Allowances were paid to them until the
issuance of the Government Order No. 288 - Education (CS) dated 21st
March, 1969 wherein Laboratory Assistants of non-government affiliated
colleges were treated as members of the non-teaching staff. The effect of H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A such re-designation had a direct impact as regards the payment of Dearness
Allowances and obviously the same being prejudicial to the interest of the
petitioners, representations followed against the Government Order, but,
however, to no effect. Representations were also made by reason of the
withdrawal of teaching status as the Graduate Laboratory Assistants had to
discharge teaching function as well, apart from the normal conduct of the
B Laboratory work.

The factual score depict that subsequently in August, 1983 the State
Government redesignated the Laboratory Assistants as Laboratory Instructors
- it is on this score that Mr. Ganguli, learned senior· counsel appearing in
C support of the petition very strongly criticised. The change of nomenclature ·~
according to him was otherwise meaningless as there was neither any
conferment of status of teachers or the grant of any pay scale consistent with
the teaching status. The Government notification was attributed to be a
mischievous deception and a "hoax" - a rather stron~criticism : the question,
therefore, arises whether there was any justification of such an attribute to the
D Government notification dated 10th August, 1983 : a short question
consequently, thus - what was the necessity for issuance of such an order -
would the change of nomenclature assist in any way the Graduate Laboratory
Assistants? A bare perusal of the notification does not howsoever give any
reason whatsoever as to the necessity of its issuance - the notification on the
E contrary makes it clear that there would be no enhancement of pay as also
the status as non-teaching staff would remain unchanged : It is only the word
"Assistant" was replaced by the word "Instructors" - but does that confer any
material benefit to the persons concerned? The answer cannot in the factual
context but be in the negative. It is on this bac~ground and upon perusal of
the notification, Mr. Ganguli< s criticism seems to be rather apposite though
F couched in a very strong language but by reason of the fact - situation of the
matter in issue and if we may say so, probably justifiably so.

Be it noted that Graduate Laboratory Assistants working in government
colleges have been given the status and designations of Demonstrators and
G have been accepted as members of teaching staff. According to the petitioners
they possess similar qualifications, experience etc. but even though being
similarly circumstanced, the Graduate Laboratory Assistants of sponsored
and non-government private colleges of West Bengal stand discriminated
againstthe Graduate Laboratory Assistants of Government colleges in West
Bengal. The earlier writ petition which stand concluded by this court's order
H dated 26th July, 1994 contained detailed list of University Acts and Statutes
ANIL RATAN SARKAR v. HIRAK GHOSH [BANERJEE, J.) 351

wherein "teachers" have been defined to "inch;de the Instructors". Needless A
to place on record that by reason of the act of discrimination and having
failed to obtain any redress from the State-respondents the petitioners moved
the learned Single Judge of the Kolcutta High Court in the earlier Writ
Petition for issuance of a writ of Mandamus to treat the Graduate Laboratory
Assistants as teaching staff as per the definition contained in different B
University Act and also to give them a scale of pay equivalent to that of
Physical Instructors. By a judgment and order dated 29th July, 1987 the
learned Single Judge issued a writ of Mandamus upon a detailed judgment
the operative portion whereof is set out herein below :-

" ..... The Rule accordingly is made absolute and the State Respondents C
are hereby commanded by the issuance of a Writ in the nature of
Mandamus to treat the Graduate Laboratoty Assistants who have
already been redesignated as "Laboratory Instructors" as teaching
staff and to pay them in accordance with the existing scale of pay
prescribed for the Physical Instructors with effect from 10th August,
1983 with all arrears." D

The appeal taken therefrom by the State Government resulted in
confirmation of the ordor by the judgment of the Appellate Bench dated May
15, 1992. The State of West Bengal, however, being aggrieved and dissatisfied
with the judgme11t and order of the Appellate Bench of the High Court E
moved a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution before
this Court and this Court finally on 26th July, 1994 refused to interfere with
the order and disposed of the matter with a speaking order. Relevant extracts
of the same however are set out herein below :-

" ..... the Division Bench of the High Court upheld the findings of the p
learned Single Judge.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We see no ground
to interfere with the reasoning and the conclusions reached by the
learned Single Judge as upheld by the Division Bench of the High
Court. We are, however, of the view that the respondents-petitioners G
be paid the revised scale of pay, as directed by the High Court, with
effect from August 1, 1987 instead of August 10,
1983 ............................................. .

The arrears shall be paid to the respondents in two instalments,
first by the end of February 1995 and the second instalment by August H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A 31, 1995. The appeal is dismissed with the above modifications. No 1

costs."

A bare perusal of the order of this Court dated 26th July, 1994
categorically depicts that apart from the change of date of entitlement from
August IO, 1983 to lst August, 1987, this Court in fact did in unequivocal
B langu~ge record its concurrence with the reasonings and conclusions of the
learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench.

In the order dated 26th July, 1994, as passed, this Court also was
pleased ·to record certain statements of Mr. Ganguli which reads as below:

c "Mr. A.K. Ganguli, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
has very fairly stated that his clients are not asking for the pay-scale
of Lecturer. According to ·him, the pay scale of Physical Instructors
is equivalent to that of Demonstrators i.e. pay scale to which his
clients are entitled to in terms of the judgment of the Hon 'ble High
Court."
D
It is however in terms of the order of this Court as noticed herein
above, the State Government on 26th December, 1994 has issued a circular
in purported compliance with the order of this Court. Let us however examine
the circular and assess the situation ourselves as to the compliance of the
E earlier order of this Court. The circular reads as below :-

"In the circumstances, the Governor is pleased to order that the scale
of pay in respect of all Graduate Laboratory Instructors of non-
Government colleges may be revised to Rs.1390..:45-1615-55-2055-
65-2445-75-2970 with effect from lst August, 1987 and the arrears
F involved on account of revision of their scale of pay paid in the
manner as indicated above.

The Governor is further pleased to order that the Graduate
Laboratory Instructors of Non-Government Colleges shall continue
to enjoy teaching status as given to them in GO No.1039-Edn. CS
G dated 27.7.1988."

The circular, however, not been able to put an end to the petitioners'
grievance by reason wherefor, the same was further challenged by way of a
writ petition under Article 226 before the learned Single Judge who, however,
was pleased to quash the same upon recording concurrence to the contentions
H as raised by the petitioners. The learned Single Judge categorically recorded
ANIL RAT AN SARKAR v. HIRAK GHOSH [BANERJEE, J.) 353
that the petitioners being Graduate Laboratory Instructors, question of further A
.... classifying them does not and cannot arise and upon reliance of the annual
report as noticed above quashed and set aside the circular. The State

-
Government however being aggrieved went before the Appellate Court and
the Appellate Bench however allowed the appeal and opined that the
Government Order dated 26th December, 1994 cannot be said to be arbitrary
or contrary to the decision of this Court. B

The further factual score depicts that as against the decision of the
Hon'ble High Court pertaining to the Government order dated 26th December,
1994, the petitioners herein moved this Court under Article 136 and this
Court upon a detailed judgment dealt with the issue and came to a conclusion
to the following effect :
c
"This Court at an earlier occasion unequivocally upheld the
reasonings of the learned Single Judge in the earlier writ petition as
accepted by the Appellate Bench and on the wake of such a finding
of this Court question of decrying a pay scale which is otherwise
D
available to another teacher (in this case the Physical Instructor) does
not and cannot arise more so by reason of the earlier order of this
Court. Administrative ipse dixit cannot infiltrate on to an arena which
stands covered by judicial orders."

It is on the basis of the aforesaid, the appeals were allowed and the
E
order of the Appellate Bench of the High Court of Calcutta stood set aside
and quashed and that of the learned Single Judge stood restored. This Court,
however, further directed that the entitlement by reason of the revision should
be made available from I st August, 1987 as directed by this Court in its
earlier judgment dated 26th July, 1994. The petitioners, however, consequent
upon the said judgment and order called upon the State officials being the F
alleged contemnor No. I to comply with the directions of this Court and
subsequently, the contemnor No.2 issued a notice requiring the petitioners to
attend the hearing before the Principal Secretary, Department of Higher
Education on 18th May, 2001. Some correspondence exchanged between the
parties - whereas the petitioners contended immediate compliance with the
order of this Court, the alleged contemn ors tried to feign ignorance about the
G
' earlier litigation and requested for supply of all copies of the relevant
documents which, as the record depicts, stand supplied immediately thereafter.
There has however been a total silence thereafter and the petitioners felt it
incumbent upon themselves to bring it to the notice of this Court by way of
a petition under the Contempt of Courts Act. H

•
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) 2 S.C.R.

A Before proceeding with the matter further, certain basic statutory features
ought to be noticed at this juncture. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has
been introduced in the Statute Book for the purposes of securing a feeling of
confidence of the people in general and for due and proper administration of

B
justice in the country - undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the hands of the
law Courts but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless thus
otherwise satisfied beyond doubt, it would neither be fair nor reasonable for
the law courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Statute. The observation as
-
above finds support from a decision of this Court in Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi
Gulati and Anr., [2001] 7 SCC 530), wherein one of us (Banerjee, J.) stated
as below :-
c "As regards the burden and standard of proof, the common legal
phraseology "he who asserts must prove" has its due application in
the matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act
of contempt. As regards the "standard of proof', be it noted that a
proceeding under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court in terms
D of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal,
and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal
proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond all
reasonable doubt." .- -
Similar is the situation in Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur
E Rahaman and Ors., (200 l] 3 SCC 73 9 and as such we need not dilate thereon
further as to the burden and standard of proof vis-a-vis the Contempt of
Courts Act - Suffice it to record that powers under the Act should be exercised
with utmost care and caution and that too rather sparingly and in the larger
interest of the society and for proper administration of the justice delivery
system in the country. Exercise of power within the meaning of the Act of
F 1971 shall thus be a rarity and that too in a .matter on which there exists no
doubt as regards the initiation of the action being bona fide.

It may also be noticed at this juncture that mere disobedience of an
order may not be sufficient to amount to a "civil contempt" within the meaning
of Section 2(b) of the Act of 1971 - the element of willingness is an
·G
indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of
the Act and lastly, in the event two interpretations are possible. and the action
of the alleged contemnor pertains to one such interpretation - the act or acts
cannot be ascribed to be otherwise
. contumacious in nature. A. doubt in the
matter as regards the wilful nature of the conduct if raised, question of success
H in a contempt petition would not arise .

•
ANIL RA TAN SARKAR v. HIRAK GHOSH [BANERJEE, J.] 355
It is on these broad features however let us analyse the action of the A
respondents for the purposes of ascribing it to be willful and contumacious:
whereas Mr. Ganguli answered by reference to the contextual facts as a

-
deliberate and willful act, both Mr. Altaf Ahmad, the learned Additional
Solicitor General and Mr. Bhaskar Gupta, learned senior advocate appearing
for the alleged contemnors, rather strongly ventilated their negation to the B
accusations of Mr. Ganguli.

It is at this stage that the earlier order passed by this Court may be of
some relevance and the same reads as below:
"A teacher cannot possibly be allowed a pay scale of a non-
teaching post. The same is a contradiction in terms and we need not C
dilate thereon. The criterion of fixation of pay scale is dependent
upon the placement of the person concerned - in the event the
placement is in a teaching post obviously one expects to get a pay
scale fixed for a teacher and not for a non-teaching member of the
staff. Apparently the High Court has not dealt with the issue in this D
perspective and thus clearly fell into an error in categorising a teacher
with a non·teaching pay scale. The circular clearly authorises the
Graduate Laboratory Instructors of non-government colleges to
continue to have the teaching status but decries the financial benefits
therefor! Would the same be not an arbitrary exercise of powers or
can it by any stretch be suggested to be otherwise rational and E
indiscriminatory. This Court at an earlier occasion unequivocally
upheld the reasoning of the learned Single Judge in the earlier writ
petition as accepted by the Appellate Bench and in the wake of such
a finding of this Court question of decrying a pay scale which is
otherwise available to another teacher (in this case the Physical F
Instructor) does not and cannot arise more so by reason of the earlier
order of this Court."

Significantly, the Secretary, Department of Finance, Government of
West Bengal, has with meticulous care recorded the statements dS in the
earlier affidavit filed before this Court though, however, with a preface that G
the statements in the counter affidavit stand out to be the outcome of his
understanding of the order of this Court dated 20th April, 2001 and it is on
the basis of the said understanding, the proposal for grant of scale of pay of
Rs. 1420 to Rs. 3130 stands concurred by him. Obviously, the notification
dated 2nd July, 1984 issued by the Government of West Bengal as regards
the revision of scale of pay of the Physical Instructors was also the resultant H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A effect of such an understanding. It is in this cont~xt, the Finance Secretary
of the State Government has stated as below :- >-
"Subsequently by a Notification dated 2nd July, 1984 issued by the

B
Government of West Bengal, the State Government on the
recommendation of the University Grants Commission and
Government of India revised the scale of pay of the Physical Instructors
-
to Rs. 700 - Rs. 1600 which was equal to the scale of pay of the
lecturer. At that point of time also the scale of pay of Demonstrators
continued to be Rs. 500 to Rs. 900."

c In the earlier judgment, this Court while noting down certain record of
proceedings observed as below :-

"On this score, a chart has· been produced in the Court on 20.3.2001
which however cannot by any stretch be said to be in support of the
contentions of the State that there were existing two different grades
D and scales of pay amongst Physical Instructors, one being qualified
Physical Instructors and the other being unqualified Physical
Instructors.

Significantly the annual report as published by the Education
Department of the State ·Government unmistakably records the
E
existence of one grade of Physical Instructors under para 8.16. The
annual report details out teachers of government colleges in the manner
as below:

"8.16. Teachers of government colleges
F SI. Category of teachers Pay Scale
No. (Basic) w.e.f.l.l.1986
5. Demonstrator Rs. 1740-3000
4. Physical Instructor Rs. 2200-40GO
G 3. Lecturer Rs. 2200-4000
2. ProfessorNice-Principal Rs. 3700-5700
(Grade II)
I. Principal Rs. 4500-7300"

H Para 8.2.1 also records the details of the administration of non-
ANIL RATAN SARKAR v. HIRAK GHOSH [BANERJEE, J.] 357

government colleges as below: A
The teachers of non-government colleges are of the following categories
(basic):
I. Laboratory Instructors Rs. 1390-2970
2. Demonstrators B
3. Physical Instructor as in government colleges
4. Lecturer.
5. Principal

This itself however negates the contentions as raised by the State.
c
Laboratory Instructors in non-government colleges are termed as teachers
with scale of pay Rs. 1390-2970 whereas PJtrsical Instructors were also
termed as teachers and scale of pay appears to be similar "as in government
colleges" i.e. Rs. 2200-4000. Secondly, in para 8.2.4 revised pay scale of the
non-teaching posts (Group B pay scale) has been noted to be Rs. 1390-2970. D
It thus leaves no manner of doubt that whereas the petitioners were shown
as teachers of non-government colleges they were in fact granted the scale of
pay applicable only to Group B employees belonging to non-teaching staff
and thus granted a non-teaching scale."

' E
Similar is the situation in the counter-affidavit filed presently in this
matter as well : Is this fair ? The answer having regard to the factual backdrop
cannot but be in the negative. It is neither fair nor reasonable on the part of
a senior Civil Service Personnel to feign ignorance or plead understanding
when the direction of this Court stands crystal clear in the judgment.
Government employees ought to be treated at par with another set of employees F
and this Court on an earlier occasion lent concurrence to the view of the.
learned Single Judge that the Circulars issued by the State Government cannot
but be ascribed to be arbitrary : Government is not a machinery for oppression
and ours being a welfare State as a matter of fact be opposed thereto. It is
the people's welfare that the State is primarily concerned with and avoidance G
of compliance with a specific order of the Court cannot be termed to be a
proper working of a State body in terms of the wishes and aspirations of the
founding fathers of our Constitution. Classless, non-discriminate and egalitarian
society - are not meaningless jargons so that they only remain as the basic
factors of our socialistic state on principles only and not to have any application
in the realities of every-day life : one section of the employees would stand H
.•

L

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A benefited but a similarly placed employee would not be so favoured - why
this attitude ? Obviously there is no answer. Surprisingly, this attitude persists )>-
even after six rounds of litigation travelling from Calcutta to Delhi more than
once - the answer as appears in the counter-affidavit is an expression of
sorrow by reason of the understanding cannot be countenanced in the facts
presently under consideration. A plain reading of the order negates the ·~

B understanding of the State Respondents and the conduct in no uncertain '
~-
terms be ascribed to be the manifestation of an intent to deprive one section ~

of the employees being equally circumstanced - come what may and this
state of mind is clearly expressed in the counter-affidavit though however in
temperate language. The question of bona fide understanding thus does not
c and cannot arise in the facts presently. Is it a believable state of affairs that '1
the order of the learned Single Judge as early as the first writ petition, has
not been properly understood by the senior most bureaucrat of the State
Government : the same miSunderstanding continues in terms of the appellate
Court's order and the third in the line of order is that of the apex Court. The
understanding again continues even after the second writ petition was filed
D before the leamedSingle Judge at the High Court and the similar understanding
continues even after the so to say clarificatory order by this Court, as appears
from the order dated 20th April, 200 I. Even in the counter-affidavit, filed in
Contempt Petition, the understanding still continues - we are at a loss as to
what is this understanding about : the defence of 'understanding' undoubtedly
E is an ingenious effort to avoid the rigours of an order of Court but cannot ·i

obliterate the action - the attempt~d avoidance through the introduction of
the so-called concept of lack of understanding cannot, however, be a permanent
avoidance, th<;>ugh there may be temporary and short-lived gains. The order
of this Court cannot possibly be interpreted as per the understanding of the _,J,.._
L
Respondents, but as appears from the plain language used therein. Neither
F the order is capable of two several interpretations nor there is any ambiguity
and the same does not require further clarity. The order is categorical and I-

clear in its context and meaning. The Court's orders are to be observed in its
observance, rather than in its breach. ~--
~

This matter is pending in Courts since more than last 15 years, but
G
unfortunately the litigatious spirit of the State-respondent have not minimised -;(

even to the slightest extent - the spirit continues and so is the deprivation.
The defence of understanding is not only moonshine but a deliberate attempt
to over-reach this Court's order and as such willfulness in the matter of
disregard of this Court's order is apparent on the face of it and we are not
H prepared to accept the same as a defence of an action for deliberate and
ANIL RATAN SARKAR v. HIRAK GHOSH [BANERJEE, J.] 359

willful disregard of •n order of Court. We find that the actions on the part A
of the respondent-authorities are not only unreasonable but deliberate and
spiteful and that too in spite of a specific direction in all the five judgments
so far obtained by the petitioners in their favour. Avoidance is written large
and it would be difficult for us to consume the same without any particular
rhyme or reason.
B
In the contextual facts there cannot be any laxity as otherwise the Law
Courts would render itself useless and its order to utter mockery. Feeling of
confidence and proper administration of justice cannot but the hall-mark of
Indian Jurisprudence and contra action by Courts will lose its efficacy.
Tolerance of Law Courts there is, but not without limits and only upto a C
certain point and not beyond the same.

On the wake of the aforesaid, we do find that the respondents have
willfully and deliberately violated the orders of this Court in the guise of a
totally non-acceptable and sham defence of understanding and thus rendered
themselves punishable under the provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution D
and also under the Act of 1971.

- Be it placed on record that by the order dated !st February, 2002, this
Court directed the presence of all the alleged contemnors on the next date,·
i.e. on 8th March, 2002 since the order was to be pronounced in the presence
of the respondents. The Office-Report, however, depicts that one of the E
respondents has filed an application for exemption from appearance. We do
feel it expedient to allow the application for exemption, though by reason
therefor the consequence of the findings as above cannot be pronounced as
of date. In that view of the matter, let this matter appear two weeks hence in
the list (22nd March, 2002) for further orders. The respondents are directed F
to be present in Court on the next date of hearing. No ftirther notice need be
served to the respondents excepting the applicant in I.A. No. 2 of 2002.

S.K.S. Petition Still Pending.