ANIL SARANversusTHE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR.
- Citation
- 1995 INSC 496
- Decided
- 24 August 1995
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
A magistrate may validly take cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint regardless of the manner of transfer, and no jurisdictional error was committed; criminal breach of trust under s.406 requires a special fiduciary entrustment which was not established in the partner’s capacity.
Summary
The appellant, a partner in a film‑exhibition partnership, was alleged to have colluded with another firm to misappropriate film prints and proceeds, leading the second respondent to file a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna. The Chief Judicial Magistrate examined the complainant and transferred the case to a Judicial Magistrate‑II, who took cognizance of the offences under IPC sections 406 and 420 and issued process. The appellant sought quashal of the complaint under CrPC s.482, but the High Court dismissed the application, holding that the complaint prima facie disclosed the offences. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the Chief Judicial Magistrate erred by transferring the case without first taking cognizance and whether a partner could be liable for criminal breach of trust. The Court held that cognizance is taken as soon as a magistrate applies his judicial mind to the offence, irrespective of how the complaint reaches him, so no jurisdictional error occurred. It further observed that criminal breach of trust under s.406 requires property specially entrusted in a fiduciary capacity, which was not shown in the partner’s capacity, but the trial could nevertheless proceed.
Issues considered
- Whether the Chief Judicial Magistrate committed a jurisdictional error by transferring the complaint without first taking cognizance, thereby invalidating the subsequent cognizance by the Judicial Magistrate.
- Whether a partner in a partnership firm can be held liable for criminal breach of trust under IPC s.406 for alleged misappropriation of partnership property.
- Whether the complaint disclosed a prima facie case sufficient to justify taking cognizance of the offences.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 190, s. 192, s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 406, s. 420
Subjects
Judgment
A ANIL SARAN
...
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR.
AUGUST 24, 1995
B [K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.)
Code of Oiminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 190 and 192.
Offence-Cognizance of-When takes place-Held cognizance takes
place as soon as the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the offence stated
C in the complaint.
Chief Judicial Magistrate-Complaint before-Transfer of case to Judi-
cial Magistrate without taking cognizance-Magistrate examining witnesses
and issuing proces~Held Magistrate committed no error of jurisdiction in
D taking cognizance of offence.
Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 406.
Partnership property-Climinal breach of tntst by partner-Held it must
be shown that property was entntsted under a special contract and he held
the property in a fiduciary capacity.
E
A partnership firm, consisting of three partners viz. the appellant,
the second respondent and one A, entered into an agreement with the first
accused (before the Trial Court) for exhibition of a film owned by the firm.
Under the terms of the agreement, the film along with the sale proceeds
F was to be returned after exhibition. On failure of the first accused to do
so, the second respondent filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Patna that the first accused in collusion with the appellant
and the other partner of the firm steathily and illegally misappropriated
the collections and dishonestly made wrongful gain for themselves and
caused wrongful loss to the complainant and the partnership firm. The
G Chief Judicial Magistrate examined the complainant and transferred the
c
case to Judicial Magistrate-II who examined witnesses and issued process
under sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant's
application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was
dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the complaint prim a f acie
H disclosed commission of the alleged offences.
58
ANILSARAN v. STATE 59
In appeal to this Court it was contended for the appellant that (i) A
without taking cognizance of the case the Chief Judicial magistrate com-
mitted manifest jurisdictional error in transferring the complaint to the
Magistrate who took further action therein; (ii) the appellant, being a
partner in the complainant finn, cannot be said to have committed
criminal breach of trust of his own funds and therefore, it is a case of civil
B
liability only.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court
HELD : 1. The word 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Code
of Criminal procedure. But it is now settled law that the court takes C
cognizance of the offence and not the offender. As soon as the Magistrate
applies his Judicial mind to the offence stated fo the complaint or the
police report etc. cognizance is said to be taken. Cognizance of the offence
takes place when the Magistrate takes Judicial notice of the. offence.
Whether the Magistrate has taken cognizance of offence on a complaint or
on a police report or upon information of a person other than the police D
officer, depends upon further steps taken pursuant thereto and the attend-
ing circumstances of the particular case including the mode in which case
is sought to be dealt with or the nature of the action taken by the
Magistrate. [61-H; 62-A-B]
E
2. The power to take cognizance has been conferred on a Magistrate
by section 190(1) of the Code, and he would not be denuded of this power
because the case has come to his filed pursuant to some illegal order of
the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The former would be exercising his power
of taking cognizance even in such a case, because of his having received a
complaint constituting the offence. It would not be material, for this F
purpose, as to how he came to receive the complaint - directly or on
transfer from the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Therefore, no error of juris-
diction was committed by the Judicial Magistrate in taking cognizance of
the offence. [62-E-G]
3. Partnership firm is not a legal entity but a legal mode of doing G
business by all the partners. Until the firm is dissolved as per law and the
accounts settled, all the partners have dominion in common over the
property and funds of the firm. Only after the settlement of accounts and
allotment of respective share, the partner becomes owner of his share.
However, criminal breach of trust under section 406 of Indian Penal Code H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A is not in respect of the property belonging to the partnership firm, but is
an offence committed by a person in respect of the property which has been ...
specially entrusted to such a person under a special contract and he holds
that property in fiduciary capacity under special contract. If he misap-
propriates the same, it is an offence. In the instant case, it is not the case
of the complainant that the appellant and the other accused were entrusted
B with the dominion of the property of the firm in their capacity as partners
of the complainant firm. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that
the imputations alleged against the appellant have been done in his
capacity as a partner of the firm. Whether the offence has been made out,
whether he is liable and what are the defences open to him are not matters
c at this stage for consideration. It is for the Magistrate to proceed with the
trial and to deal with a<;cording to law. [63-A-D; E-F]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1026 of 1995.
D From the Judgment and Order dated 28.11.90 of the Patna High
Court in Crl. M. No. 11250 of 1989.
S.K. Verma for the Appellant.
K.K. Gupta for the Respondents.
E
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
Leave granted.
-
The appellant was a partner in M/s. Agjevinath Films along with the
F second respondent, Shiv Prakash, and another person, Ajit .Tai Tilak. The
firm was constituted to distribute, exhibit and exploit the cinematography
films. The firm had entered into an agreement with producer, Bhojpuri film
for distribution of 'Hamari Dulhaniya' and had two prints of the films
obtained from the laboratory at Bombay and were arranged for exhibition
in Roopak Cinema, Patna. It is the case of Shiv Prakash, the complainant
G on behalf of M/s. Ajgevinath Films, that the first accused, namely, M/s.
Sapna Enterprises, had contracted on June 22, 1988 to take the film, exhibit
...._
the same and account for the proceeds in terms of the contract. Pursuant
'--'
thereto, M/s. Sapna Enterprises was entrusted with the second copy of the
film for exhibition and they exhibited the film from July, 1, 1988. But the
H first accused had not returned the print to the complainant- second respon-
ANIL SARAN v. STATE 61
dent with ulterior and dishonest intention to make wrongful gain and to A
cause wrongful loss to the second respondent. Subsequently, it came to the
knowledge of Shiv Prakash that the first accused colluded and conspired
with the appellant and Ajit with an intention to defraud the second
respondent; and the firm exploited the second copy of the film in the said
cinema and "they stealthily and illegally misappropriated collections and B
dishonestly made wrongful gain for themselves and caused wrongful loss
to the complainant and the said concern." It was also alleged that the
appellant and Ajit induced the first accused by conspiracy to illegally
obtain the films prepared for themselves and fabricated the documents and
thereby Ajit, the first accused firm and the appellant, in collusion and
conspiracy with common intention to do mischief, committed the offence C
referred to earlier. Admittedly, the complaint was filed before the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Patna who, after examining the complainant, trans-
ferred the case to .Judicial Magistrate-II, patna whose Presiding Officer
then was Mr. AK. Srivastava. The learned Magistrate examined three
witnesses and thereafter issued process to the appellant and third respon- D
dent under ss.406 and 420 IPC. The appellant thereafter filed an applica-
tion under s.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the
Code') before the High Court, Patna to quash the complaint.
The High Court in the impugned order dismissed the application
holding that the complaint plima facie discloses the offence punishable E
under the sections for which cognizance was taken and process was issued
to the appellant and another. The question, therefore, is whether the
complainant-second respondent made a prima facie case to take cog-
nizance of the offence and issued process to the appellant and others.
F
It is contended for the appellant that the Chief .Judicial Magistrate,
having entertained the complaint, was required to examine other witnesses,
take cognizance and then could have transferred the case, if he so desired,
to a competent Magistrate subordinate to hiin as envisaged by s.192(1) of
the Code. But, in this case without taking cognizance, the Chief .Judicial
Magistrate committed manifest jurisdictional error in transferring the com- G
plaint to the Magistrate who took further action therein.
We find no force in the contention. Though the Code defines,
"cognizable offence" and "non-cognizable offence", the word "cognizance'
• has not been defined in the Code. But it is now settled law that the court H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A takes cognisance of the offence and not the offender. As soon as the
Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the offence stated in the complaint
or the police report etc. cognisance is said to to be taken. Cognizance of
the offence takes place when the Magistrate takes judicial notice of the
offence. Whether the Magistrate has taken cognizance of offence on a
complaint or on a police report or upon information of a person other than
B
the police officer, depends upon further steps taken pursuant thereto and
the attending circumstances of the particular case including the mode in
which case is sought to be dealt with or the nature of the action taken by
the Magistrate. Under sub-section (1) of section 190 of the code, any
Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence (a) upon receiving a com-
c plaint of facts which constitute such offence. (b) upon a police report of
such facts, and (c) upon information received from any person other than
a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been
committed.
Sub-section (1) of Section 192 has conferred a special power on the
D Chief Judicial Magistrate, as, normally, the Magistrate taking cognizance
of an offence, has himself to proceed further as enjoined by the Code. But,
an exception has been made in the case of Chief Judicial Magistrate, may
be because he has some administrative functions also to perform. A
Magistrate who receives the case on transfer and takes cognizance would
E not become incompetent to do so merely because the sanction of transfer
of the case to his file is not in accordance with law. The power to take
cognizance has been conferred on a Magistrate by s.190(1) of the Code,
and he would not be denuded of this power because the case has come to
his file pursuant to some illegal order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The
former would be exercising his power of taking cognizance even in such a
F
case, because of his having received a complaint constituting the offence.
It would not be material, for this purpose, as to how he came to receive
the complaint - directly or on transfer from the Chief Judicial Magistrate.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that no error of jurisdiction was
G committed by the Judicial Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence.
It is next contended that the appellant, being a partner in the ,...-
complainant firm, cannot be said to have committed criminal breach of
trust of his own funds and that, therefore, it is a case of civil liability only.
H The contention that one partner cannot commit criminal breach of trust •
ANIL SARAN v. STATE 63
against other partners, though p1inw f acie alluring, on facts of this case, it A
does not appear to be tenable. Partnership firm is not a legal entity but a
legal mode of doing business by all the partners. Until the firm is dissolved
as per law and the accounts settled, all the partners have dominion in
common over the property and funds of the firm. Only after the settlement
of accounts and allotment of respective share, the partner becomes owner
B
of his share. However, criminal breach of trust under s.406 is not in respect
of the property belonging to the partnership firm, but is an offence com-
mitted by a person in respect of the property which has been specially
entrusted to such a person under a special contract and he holds that
property in fiduciary capacity under special contract. If he misappropriates
the same, it is an offence. c
At this stage, we have only to see whether the allegations made in
the complaint make out the offence pTima facie. It is not the case of the
complaint that the appellant and the other accused Ajit were entrusted
with the dominion of the property of the firm in their capacity as partners
of the complainant firm. On the other hand, the complainant firm entered D
into a contract with the first accused firm-M/s. Sapna Enterprises.
entrusted the second film for exhibition and for accounting the sale
proceeds in terms of the contract and to return the film. They had neither
accounted for, not returned the film. The first accused, the appellant and
Ajit, therefore, were alleged to have committed the offences in question. E
Under these circumstances, we do not think that the imputations
alleged against the appellant have been done in his capacity as a partner
of the firm. Whether the offence has been made out, whether he is liable
and what are the defences open to him are not matters at this stage for
consideration. It is for the learned Magistrate to proceed with the trial and F
to deal with according to law.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.
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