Holding

The respondent's conduct constituted sexual harassment, justifying his removal from service, and the High Court's interference with the departmental findings and punishment was erroneous.

Summary

The Apparel Export Promotion Council dismissed A.K. Chopra, a private secretary, for repeatedly attempting to molest a junior female employee, Miss X, by making unwelcome sexual advances and trying to touch her despite her objections. A departmental enquiry found the conduct amounted to sexual harassment and ordered his removal from service, which was upheld by the staff committee. The Delhi High Court, however, reinstated Chopra, holding that because he did not achieve physical contact, the misconduct did not justify dismissal. The Supreme Court held that sexual harassment includes conduct that outrages a woman's modesty even without physical contact, and that the disciplinary authority's findings and punishment were proper. It further ruled that the High Court erred in exercising judicial review to substitute its own view on facts and penalty, and set aside the High Court order, restoring the removal. The Court emphasized the relevance of Articles 14, 15, 21 of the Constitution and international conventions such as CEDAW in protecting gender equality at the workplace.

Issues considered

Whether conduct amounting to unwelcome sexual advances without physical contact constitutes sexual harassment under law.
Whether physical contact is an essential element for a charge of sexual harassment and dismissal.
Whether the High Court can interfere with factual findings and quantum of punishment in departmental disciplinary proceedings under judicial review.
Whether the definition of sexual harassment should be interpreted in line with Vishaka guidelines and international conventions.
Whether removal from service is a proportionate punishment for the proven misconduct.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 15, s. Article 21, s. Article 226, s. Article 309, s. Article 32

Subjects

sexual harassmentdepartmental inquiryjudicial reviewgender equalityfundamental rightsremoval from servicemisconductsuperior-subordinate relationshipinternational conventionsCEDAWVishaka guidelines

Judgment

><- APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL A
• v.
AK. CHOPRA

JANUARY 20, 1999

[DR. AS. ANAND CJ. AND V.N. KHARE, J.) B
,.
Service Law:

Misconduct-Sexual harassment--Of female employee~At place of
work-Approach of cowt-ln such case~Held, Depmtmental disciplina1y
proceedings should not be dealt with like a criminal t1ial--Cowts are required
c
to examine the broader probability of a case and 11ot get swayed by insig-
nifica11t discrepancies or 11a1row tech11icalitie~T71ey must examine the e11tire
material to detem1i11e the genui11e11ess of the complai11t-Victim's statement
must be appreciated i11 the background of the e11tire cas~Such cases are
required to be dealt with great sensitivity-Sympathy or mercy towards the D
delinquent, wholly misplaced.
_..
Misco11duct-Sexual harassment-At place of work-Meaning of-Su-
pelior Officer harassed, pestered and subjected his junior female employee by
a co11duct which was agai11st moral sanctions a11d did not withsta11d test of
decency and modesty which projected unwelcome sexual advances-Held, E
Sexual harassment includes any action or gesture which, whether directly or
by implication, aims at or has the tendency to outrage the modesty of a female
employe~"Molestation" or ''physical assault" cannot be detennined with
reference to dictio11ary mea11i1115T71e objectio11able behaviour; does 1101 cease
to be outrageous, eve11 if there is 110 actual assault or touch by the deli11que11t
..,, superior officer---Objectio11able oveltllres with sexual oveltones ·sufficient. F
~
Departme11tal e11quiry-Punishme11t-Qua11tum-Judicial review
of-Sexual harassme11t-Cliarge of-Proved-Deli11que11t officer's removal
from se1vice upheld by appellate authority-Neither Single Judge 11or Division
Be11ch of High Cowt found fault with the conduct of enquiry-lloweve1; High
G
Coult reinstated the delinquent officer in se1vice by holding that he had not
"actually molested" the female employee but only "tried to molest" her and
-\'
had "not managed" to make physical contact with her-Held,s In such
circumstance, High Coult e1Ted in interfe1ing with the punishment-What
punishment is to be imposed is within the jurisdiction of the competent
authority and does not warrant interference by High Cowt lightly--Reduction H
117
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.K
A of punishment in a case like this is bound to have a demoralising effect on
women employees and is a retrograde step-ln the facts of the case, punish-
....
ment of removal from service is commensurate with the acts of the
delinquent's unbecoming of good conduct and behaviour expected from a
Superior offecer--Delinquent's repentance and unqualified ap'llogy at the final
stage of appeal does not call for any sympathy or mercy.
B
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 15 and 21. ,_

Sexual harassment-Of female employees-At place of work-Held:
Sexual harassment is a f onn of sex discrimination projected through unwel-
C come sexual advances, requests for sexual favours and other verbal or physical
conduct with sexual overtones when submission/rejection of which affects the
employment or work perfonnance of the female employee or has the effect of
creating an intimidating or hostile environment for her-Such incidents violate
her fundamental right to gender equality and right to the life and liberty Such
D sexual harassment is incompatible with the dignity and honour of a female
and there can be no compromise with such violations-Further, International
Instruments cast an obligation on India to gender sensitise its laws and its
Courts are obliged to follow such International Conventions-ILO Seminar
at Manila (1993)-'--convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Dis-
crimination Against Women, 1979 ("CEDAW')-Beijing Declaration on
E Women International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Article 226--Departmental enquiry-Findings of fact-interference
with-By High Court-Held, High Court should not nonnally interfere unless
the findings are based on no evidence or are perverse and/or legally un-
F tenable-High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority and substitute its
own conclusion regarding the guilt of the delinquent-Adequacy or inade-
quacy of evidence cannot be canvassed before the High ·Court-As regards
punishment/penalty imposed, High Court should not nonnally interfere unless
it is impennissible or shocks its conscience-fn the circumstance of the case,
High Court .e"ed in interfering with the findings of fact and punishment
G imposed which were upheld by appellate authority.

Articles 32 and 226-Violation of human rights-Cases of-Held,
Supreme Court and High Courts must apply International Conventions and
Nonns especially when there is no inconsistency between them and .the
H domestic law occupying the field.
APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v. AK CHOPRA 119
,;;. - Administrative Law: A
Judicial review-:-Nature and scope of-Held, Judicial review is 11ot an
appeal from a decision out review of the ma1111er of arriving at the decision-It
is 11ot co11cemed with the con-ect11ess of the decision but is confined to the
exami11ation of the decision-making process, namely, pri11ciples established
-·,. by law a11d mies of natural justice a11d fair play-Cowt ca1111ot substitute its
judgment for that of the admi11istrative authority.
B

Sexual harassme11t-Of female employee~At place of work-Defi11ed.

Words and Phrases:
c
"Sexual harassme11t" a11d "molestatio11"-Mea11i11g of.

The respondent was working as a Private Secretary to the Chairman
of the appellant-Council. It was alleged that the respondent tried to molest
a woman employee of the Council, Miss X who was at the relevant time D
,,, working as a Clerk- cum-Typist. She was not competent or trained to take
dictation. The respondent, however, insisted that she go with him to the
Busi"uess Centre at Taj Palace Hotel for taking dictation from the Chair-
man and type out the matter. Under pressure of the respondent, she went
to take the dictation from the Chairman. While Miss X was waiting for the
Director in the room, the respondent tried to sit too close to her' and E
despite her objection did not give up his objectionable behaviour. She later
on took dictation from the Director. The respondent told her to type it at
the Business Centre of the Taj Palace Hotel, which was located in the
Basement of the Hotel. The respondent offered to help her so that her
-.. typing was not found fault with by the Director. The respondent volun- F
I teered to show her the Business Centre for getting the matter typed and
taking advantage of the isolated place, again tried to sit close to her and
touch her despite her objections. The draft typed matter was corrected by
Director (Finance) who asked Miss X to retype the same. The respondent
again went with her to the Business Centre and repeated his overtures.
Miss X told the respondent that she would "leave the place if he co11tinued G
... to behave like that". The respondent did not stop. Though he went out from
the Business Centre for a while, he again came back and resumed his
objectionable acts. According to Miss X, the respondent had tried to molest
her physically in the lift also while coming to the basement but she saved
herself by pressing the emergency button, which made the door of the lift H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.

A to open. Miss X apart from narrating the whole incident to the Director .....
(Personnel) orally, submitted a written complaint also. The respondent
was placedi under suspension. A charge sheet was served on him. The
Enquiry OIIlcer after considering the documentary and oral evidence and
the circumstances of the case arrived at the conclusion that the respondent
had acted against moral sanctions and that his acts against Miss X did
B not withstand the test of decency and modesty. He, therefore, held the
charges levelled against the respondent as proved.
·-
_,

The departmental authorities keeping in view the fact that the ac-
tions of the respondent were considered to be subversive of good discipline
c and not conducive to proper working in the appellant Organization where
there were a number of female employees, took action against the respon-
dent and removed him from service.

Aggrieved by the order of removal from service the respondent filed
a departmental appeal before the Staff Committee of the appellant. The
D Staff Committee came to the conclusion that the order passed by the ...
Director General terminating the services of the respondent was legal, .,,
proper and valid. The appeal was dismissed and the removal of the
respondent for causing "sexual harassment" to Miss X was upheld.

The respondent, thereupon, filed a writ petition in the High Court,
E
challenging his removal from service as well as the decision of the Staff
Committee dismissing hi~ departmental appeal. Single Judge allowed the
writ petition and held "that..... the petitioner tried .to molest and not that
the petitioner had in fact molested the complainant." The Single Judge,
therefore, disposed of the writ petition with a direction that 'the respon-
F dent be reinstated in service' but that he would not be entitled to receive ,,..
any back wages. The Division Bench dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal ... -

filed by the appellant and agreed with the findings recorded by the Single
Judge that the respondent had "tried" to niolest and that he had not
"actually molested " Miss X and that he had "not managed" to make the
slightest physical contact with the lady and went on to hold that such an
G
act of the respondent was not a sulilcient ground for his dismissal from
service. Hence this appeal. ,,
The following questions arose before this Court:

H Does an action of the superior against a female employee, which is
APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v. A.K CHOPRA 121

against moral sancthms and d.oes not withstand test of decency and A
modesty not a111~unt to sexual· harassment' Is physical contact with the
female employee an essential ingredient of such a charge? Does the allega-
tion that the superior 'tri.ed to mol.est' a female employee at the "place of
work'', not constitute an act unbecoming of good c-0nduct and behavjour
expected from the superi-0r? This .Court iilso c<1nsidered the nature of ap-
proach expected fi:om the law courts to cases involving sexual harassment.
B

Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD: 1.1. Any .action or gesture which, whether directly or by im-
plication, aims at or has the tendency to outrage the modesty .of a female C
employee, must fall under the general concept of the definition of sexual
harassment. While dealing with cases of sexual harassment at the place of
work of female employees the Court should bear in mind that sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination projected through unwelcome
sexual advances, request for sexual favours and other verbal or physical
conduct with sexual overtones, whether directly or by implication, particularly D
when submission to or rejection of such a conduct by the female employee
was capable of being used for effecting the employment of the female
employee and unreasonably interferi11g With her work performance and
had the effect of creating an intimidati~g or hostile working environment
f11r her~ [138-F, 139-H, 140-AJ E
1.2. In a case involving a charge of sexual harassment or attempt to
sexually molest, the courts ·are required to examine the broader. prob-
abilities of a case and not get s\Vayed ·by insignificant discrepancies or
narrow technicalities or dictionary nieani11g of the expression "molesta-
tion". They must examine the entire. material to determine the genuineness . F
of the complaint. The statement ·lif the· victim must. be appreciated in the
background of the entire case. Where the evidence of the victim inspires
confidence, as is the position in the instant case; the courts are obliged to
rely on it. Such cases are required to be dealt with great sensitivity. Sym-
pathy in such cases in favour of the superior officer is wholly misplaced and G
mercy has. no relevance. [141-E-FJ

Vishaka v. State ofRajasthan, [1997) 6 SCC 241, followed.

2.1. Each incident of sexual harassment, at the. place of work, results
in violation of the Fundamental Right to Gender Equality and the Right to H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A Life and Liberty • the two most precious Fundamental Rights guaranteed ....
by the Constitution of India. The contents of the fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution are of sufficient amplitude to encompass
all, facets of gender equality, including prevention of sexual harassment
and abuse and the courts are under a constitutional obligation to protect
and preserve those fundamental rights. That sexual harassment of a female
B at the place of work is incompatible with the dignity and honour of a female
and needs to be eliminated and that there can be no compromise with such ·-
_,
violations, admits of no debate. The message of international instruments
such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 1979 ("CEDAW ") and the Beijing Declaration which
c directs all States to take appropriate measures to prevent discrimination
of all forms against women besides taking steps to protect the honour and
dignity of women is loud and clear. This is also in keeping with the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These inter-
national instruments cast an obligation on the Indian State to gender
sensitise its laws and the Courts are under an obligation to see that the
D message of the international instruments is not allowed to be drowned. The
Courts are under an obligation to give due regard to International Conven-
"",,.
tions and Norms for construing domestic laws more so when there is no
inconsistency between them and there is a void in domestic law. [140-B-H]

Prem Sankar v. Delhi Administration, AIR (1980) SC 1535; Macknin-
E non Mackenzie and Co. v.Audrey D' Costa, [1987) 1SCC469; Sheela Barse
v. Secretary, Children's Aid Society, [1987) 3 SCC 50; Vishaka v. state of
Rajasthan, JT (1997) 7 SC 392; People's Union for Civil Libe1ties v. Union
of India, JT (1997) 2 SC 311 and D.K Basu v. State of West Bengal, [1997)
1 sec 416, referred to.
F _.,
2.2. In the instant case, the High Court appears to have totally -· -.-
ignored the intent and content of the International Conventions and
Norms while dealing with the case. In cases involving violation of human
rights, the Courts must forever remain alive to the international instru-
ments and conventions and apply the same to a given case when there is
G no inconsistency between the international norms and the domestic law
occupying the field. [141-C]
'1

3.1. In the instant case, the High Court re-appreciated the evidence
while exercising power of judicial review and gave meaning to the expression
.,_
H "molestation" as if it was dealing with a finding in a criminal trial. It was not
APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v. AK. CHOPRA 123

;.~ the dictionary meaning of the word "molestation" or "physical assault" A
which was relevant. The statement of Miss X before the Enquiry Officer as
well as in her complaint unambiguously conveyed in no uncertain terms as
to what her complaint was. Repeatedly, did Miss X state before the Enquiry
Officer that the respondent tried to sit clo.~e to her and touch her and that
she reprimanded him by asking that he 'should not do these things'. The
_, material on the record, thus, clearly establishes an unwelcome sexually
B
,. determined behaviour on the part of the respondent against Miss X, which
was also an attempt to outrage her modesty. [137-E-G; G-H; 138-E-F]

3.2. The entire episode reveals that the respondent had harassed,
pestered and subjected Miss X, by a conduct which is against moral sane- c
tions and which did not withstand the test of decency and modesty and
which projected unwelcome sexual advances. Such an action on the part of
the respondent would be squarely covered by the term "sexual "harassment".
The evidence on the record clearly establishes that the respondent caused

.
-"''
sexual harassment to Miss X, taking advantage of his superior position in
the Council. [137-H; 138-A; G]
D

3.3. The observations made by the High Court to the effect that since
the respondent did not "actually molest" Miss 'X but only "tried to molest"
her and, therefore, his removal from service was not warranted, rebel
against realism and lose their sanctity and credibility. In the instant case, E
the behaviour of the respondent did not cease to be outrageous for want of
an actual assault or touch by the superior officer. [141-D]

4. Regarding the question of punishment the High Court overlooked
.... the ground realities and ignored the fact that the conduct of the re- spon· F
I
dent against his junior female employee, Miss X, was wholly against moral
sanctions, decency and was offensive to her modesty. Reduction of punish-
ment in a case like this is bound to have a demoralizing effect on the women
employees and is a retrograde step. There was no justification for the High
court to interfere with the punishment imposed by the departmental
G
. ;..'
authorities. The act of the respondent was unbecoming of good conduct and
behaviour expected from a superior officer and undoubtedly amounted to
sexual harassment of Miss X and the punishment imposed by the appellant,
was, thus, commensurate with the gravity of his objectionable behaviour
and did not warrant any interference by the High Court in exercise of its
power of judicial review. [141-F-H; 142-A] H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A 5.1. The High Court overlooked the settled position that in
departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole Judge of
facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the
Appellate Authority has also power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the
evidence and_ come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact.
finding authority. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence
B are recorded, _the High Court in Writ Jurisdiction may no_t normally
interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded ·-
findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly
perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the
evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since,
C the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual
findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the
power of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally speaking sub·
stitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for
that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty
D or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by
the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either imper-
missible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should
not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punish·
ment or penalty. [133-A-D]

E 5.2. It is a well-settled principle tnat even though Judicial Review of
administrativ_e action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed,
yet the Court in exercise of the power of judicial review is not concerned
with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders
are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence
p and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with
for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by
which the decision was arrived at. Judicial Review, it must be remembered,
is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of
the decision- making process. [133-E-FJ

G Chief Constable of the Nolth Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 All ER
141, referred to.

6.1. Judicial Review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a
review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court while
H exercising the power of Judicial Review must remain conscious of the fact

(\
APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCILv. AK CHOPRA 125

that if the decision has been arrived at by the Administrative Authority A
·after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural
justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case;
against him, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
Administrative Authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere
of jurisdiction of that authority. [134-B-C]
B
Union of India v. Sardar Bhadur, [1972] 4 SCC 618; Union of India
v. Panna Nanda, [1989] 2 SCC 177; B.C. Chatwvedi v. Union of India,
[1995] 6 SCC 749 and Govemment of Tamil Nadu v. A. Rajapandian,
[1995] 1 sec 216, relied on.
c
6.2. In the instant case both the Single Judge and the Division Bench
of the High Court fell into patent error in interfering with the-findings of
fact recorded by the departmental authorities and interfering with the
quantum of punishment, as if the High Court was sitting in appellate
jurisdiction. From the judgments of the Single Judge as well as the D
Division Bench, it is quite obvious that the findings with regard to an
"unbecoming act" committed by the respondent, as found by the
Departmental Authorities, were nut found fault with even on re-apprecia-
tion of evidence. The High Court did not find that the occurrence as alleged
by the complainant had not taken place. Neither the Single Judge nor the
Division Bench found that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer or E
G1e Departmental Appellate Authority were either arbitrary or even per-
verse. As a matter of fact, the High Court found no fault whatsoever with
the conduct of Enquiry. The High Court fell in error in interfering with
the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the departmental
authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. To hold that F
since the respondent had not "actually molested,' Miss X and that he had
only "tried to molest" her and had "not managed" to make physical contact
with her, the punishment of removal from service was not justified, was
erroneous. The High Court, should not have substituted its own discretion
for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed,
in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter, which fell G
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not
warrant any interference by the High Court. [136-D-G; 137-A-B]

7. At the conclusion of the hearing, the respondent submitted that
he was repentant of his actions and that he tenders an unqualified apology H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A and that he was willing to also go and to apologize to Miss X, Now, it is
too late in the day to show any sympathy to the respondent in such a case.
Any lenient action in such a case is bound to have a demoralizing effect
on working women. Sympathy in such cases is uncalled for and mercy is
misplaced. (142-B]

B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 226-227
of 1999.

From the Judgment and order dated 15.7.97 of the Delhi High Court
in L.P.A. Nos. 27 and 79 of 1997.

c P.P. Rao, A.P. Dhamija, Sushi! Jain and A. Mishra for the Appellant.

K.T.S. Tulsi and V.C. Mahajan, D.K. Garg, Vikas Pahwa and R.C.
Kaushik for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
DR. ANAND, CJ. Special Leave granted.

Does an action of the superior against a female employee which is
against moral sanctions and does not withstand test of decency and modes-
E ty not amount to sexual harassment? Is physical contact with the female
employee an essential ingredient of such a charge? Does the allegation that
the superior 'tried to molest' a female employee at the "place of work", not
constitute an act unbecoming of good conduct and behaviour expected
from the superior? These are some of the questions beside the nature of
approach expected from the law courts to cases involving sexual harass-
F ment which come to the forefront and require our consideration.

Reference to the facts giving rise to the filing of the present Appeal
by Special Leave at this stage is appropriate :

The respondent was working as a Private Secretary to the Chairman
G of the Apparel Export Promotion Council, the appellant herein. It was
alleged that on 12.8.1988, he tried to molest a woman employee of the
Council, Miss X (name withheld by us) who was at the relevant time
working as a Clerk-cum-Typist. She was not competent or trained to take
dictations. The respondent, however insisted that she go with him to the
H Business Centre at Taj Palace Hotel for taking dictation from the Chair-
.,

APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v. AK CHOPRA (DR. ANAND, CJ.] 127

man and type out the matter. Under the pressure of the respondent, she A
went to take the dictation from the Chairman. While Miss X was waiting
for the Director in the room, the respondent tried to sit too close to her
and despite her objection did not give up his objectionable behaviour. She
later on took dictation from the Director. The respondent told her to type
it at the Business Centre of the Taj Palace Hotel, which is located in the
Basement of the Hotel. He offered to help her so that her typing was not
B
found fault with by the Director. He volunteered to show her the Business
Centre for getting the matter typed and taking advantage of the isolated
place, again tried to sit close to her and touch her despite her objections.
The draft typed matter was corrected by Director (Finance) who asked
Miss X to retype the same. The respondent again went her to the Business c
Centre and repeated his overtures. Miss X told the respondent that she
would "leave the place if he co11ti11ued to behave like that". The respondent
did not stop. Though he went out from the Business Centre for a while, he
again came back and resumed his objectionable acts. According to Miss
X, the respondent had tried to molest her physically in the lift also while D
coming to the basement but she saved herself by pressing the emergency
button, which made the door of the lift to open. On the next day, that is
on 16th August, 1988 Miss X was unable to meet the Director (Personnel)
for lodging her complaint against the respondent as he was busy. She
succeeded in meeting him only on 17th August, 1988 and apart from
narrating the whole incident to him orally submitted a written complaint E
also. The respondent was placed under suspension vide an order dated
18th August, 1988. A charge-sheet was served on him to which he gave a
reply denying the allegations and asserting that "the allegations were im-
aginary and motivated". Shri J.D. Giri, a Director of the Council, was
appointed as an Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges framed against
F
the respondent. On behalf of the management with a view to prove the
charges as many as six witnesses were examined including Miss X. The
respondent also examined seven witnesses. The Enquiry Officer after
considering the documentary and oral evidence and the circumstances of
the case arrived at the conclusion that the respondent had acted against
moral sanctions and that his acts against Miss X did not withstand the test G
of decency and modesty. He, therefore, held the charges levelled against
the respondent as proved.

The Enquiry Officer in his report recorded the following, amongst
other, findings : • H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 1 S.C.R.

A "8.1. Intentions of Shri A.K. Chopra were ostensibly manifested in
his actions and behaviour; Despite reprimands from Miss X he
continued to act against moral sanctions;

8.2. Dictation and subsequent typing of the matter provided Shri
A.K. Chopra necessary opportunity to take Miss X to the Business
B Centre a secluded place. Privacy in the Business O:ntre room
made his ulterior motive explicit and clear; ••
-..
8.3. Any other conclusion on technical niceties which Shri A.K.
Chopra tried to purport did not withstand the test of decency and
modesty."
c
The Enquiry Officer concluded that Miss X was molested by the
respondent at Taj Palace Hotel on 12th August, 1988 and that the respon-
dent had tried to touch her person in the Business Centre with ulterior
motives despite reprimands by her. The Disciplinary Authority agreeing
D with the report of the Enquiry Officer, imposed the penalty of removing
him from service with immediate effect on 28th June, 1989.

Aggrieved, by an order of removal from service, the respondent filed
a departmental appeal before the Staff Committee of the appellant. It
appears that there was some difference of opinion between the Members
E of the Staff Committee and the Chairman of the Staff Committee during
the hearing, 'but before any decision could be arrived at by the Staff
Committee, the respondent, on the basis of some unconfirmed minutes of
the Staff Committee meeting, filed a Writ Petition in the High Court il!ter
alia challenging his removal from service. On January 30, 1992, the Writ
p Petition was allowed and respondent Nos. 1 and 3, therein, were directed
to act upon the decision of the Staff Committee, assuming as if the decision,
as alleged, had been taken at the 34th Meeting of the Staff Committee on
25th July, 1990. The appellant challenged the judgment and order of the
High Court dated 30th January, 1992, through Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 3204 of 1992 in this Court. While setting aside the judgment
G and order of the High Court dated 30th January, 1992, a Division Bench
of this Court opined:

"We have been taken through the proceedings of the meeting
starting from 33rd meeting upto 38th meeting by both the learned
H Counsel appearing for the respective parties. Considering the same
APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v. AK CHOPRA [DR ANAND, CJ.) 129

,.._ it appears to us that the alleged decision taken on the said Agenda A
No. 5 in the 33rd an-d 34th meeting is in dispute and final decision
on the same has not yet been taken and the alleged resolution on
the said Item No. 5 still awaits ratification. In that view of the
matter, the High Court was wrong in deciding the disputed ques-
tion of fact in favour of Respondent No. 1. We, therefore set aside B
-1 the impugned order of the Delhi High Court as according to us
~-
the final decision on the resolution taken on the said Agenda No.
5 has not yet been finally ratified. We are not inclined to consider
the other questions sought to be raised_ in this appeal and the said
questions sought are kept open. In view of the pendency of the
matter for a long time, we direct the appellant-company to convene
c
the meeting of Staff Committee as early as practicable but not
exceeding two months from today so that the question of ratifica-
tion of the resolution on the said Agenda No. 5 taken in the
meeting of the Staff Committee is finally decided."
D
...
Pursuant to the above directions, the Staff Committee met again and
'" considered the entire issue and came to the conclusion that the order
passed by the Director General terminating the services of the respon-
dent on 28th June, 1989 was legal, proper and valid. The appeal was
dismissed and the removal of the respondent for causing 'sexual E
harassment' to Miss X was upheld. The respondent, thereupon, filed
Writ Petition No. 352 of 1995 in the High Court, challenging his
removal from service as well as the decision of the Staff Committee
dismissing his departme~tal appeal.
F
'*
"' The learned Single Judge allowing the Writ Petition opined "that. ....
the petitioner tried to molest and not that the petitioner had infact molested
the complainant." The learned Single Judge, therefore, disposed of the Writ
Petition with a direction that 'the respondent be reinstated in service' but
that he would not be entitled to receive any back wages. The appellant was G
;. directed to consider the period between the date of removal of the respon-
·.,.! dent from service and the date of reinstatement as the period spent on duty
and to give him consequential promotion and all other benefits. It was,
:1 however, directed that the respondent be posted in any other office outside
--",
Delhi, at least for a period of two years. H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A The appellant being aggrieved by the order of reinstatement filed
·'4
Letters Patent Appeal No. 27 of 1997 before the Division Bench of the
High Court. The respondent also filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 79 of
1997 claiming "back wages and appropriate posting". Some of the lady
employees of the appellant on coming to know about the judgment of the
learned Single Judge, directing the reinstatement of the respondent, felt
B agitated and filed an application seeking intervention in the pending L.P .A.
The Division Bench vide judgment and order dated 15th July, 1997, dis- ••
missed the L.P.A. filed by the appellant against the reinstatement of the
respondent. The Division Bench agreed with the findings recorded by the
learned Single Judge that the respondent had "tried" to molest and that he
c had not "actually molested" Miss X and that he had "not managed" to make
the slightest physical contact with the lady and went on to hold that such
an act of the respondent was not a sufficient ground for his dismissal from
service. Commenting upon the evidence, the Division Bench observed :

"We have been taken in detail through the evidence/deposition of
D Miss X. No part of that evidence discloses that A.K Chopra even ....
managed to make the slightest physical contact with the lady. The )le
entire deposition relates that A.K. Chopra tried to touch her.

As we have said that no attempts made, allegedly by A.K.
E Chopra, succeeded in making physical contact with Miss X, even in
the narrow confines of a Hotel 'lift'.
•
To our mind, on such evidence as that was produced before
the Enquiry Officer, it is not even possible to come to a conclusion
that there is an "attempt to molest" as there have been no physical
F
contact. There being no physical contact between A.K. Chopra and .
Miss X, there cannot be any attempt to "t1ied to molest" on the part ~

of A.K. Chopra".
I-
'
(Emphasis ours)
G
Aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench,· the employer-
appellant has filed this appeal by special leave. ~

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused lhe
~
H record.
APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v. AK CHOPRA [DR. ANAND, CJ.] 131

j.,-
The Enquiry Officer has found the charges established against the A
;,.. respondent. He has concluded that the respondent was guilty of molesta-
tion and had llied to physically assault Miss X. The findings recorded by
the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority had been confirmed by
the Appellate Authority (the Staff Committee) which admittedly had co-ex-
tensive powers to re- appreciate the evidence as regards the guilt as well as
B
_, about the nature of punishment to be imposed on the respondent. The Staff
,. Committee while dealing with the question of punishment has observed:

"Shri Chopra has also mentioned in his appeal that the penalty on
him was harsh and disproportionate to the charge levelled against
him. On this, the Staff Committee observed that no lenient view c
~
would be justified in a case of molestation of a woman employee
~ when the charge was fully proved. Any lenient action in such a
case would have a demoralizing effect on the working women. The
Staff Committee, therefore, did not accept the plea of Shri Chopra
that a lenient view be taken in his case." D
_,,
-"'.'. The learned Single Judge, did not doubt the correctness of the
occurrence. He did not disbelieve the complainant. On a re- appreciation
of the evidence on the record, the learned Single Judge, however, drew his
own inference and found that the respondent had "tried to molest" but
"" since he had not "actually molested" the complainant, therefore, the action
of the respondent did not warrant removal from service. The learned Single
E

Judge whole directing the reinstatement of the respondent observed :

"15. In the totality of facts and circumstances, ends of justice would
_, meet if the petitioner is reinstated in service but he would not be F
I
j
. entitled to any back wages. The Council shall consider this period
as on duty and would give him consequential promotion to the
petitioner. He shall be entitled to all benefits except back wages.
The petitioner shall be posted in any other office outside Delhi, at
least for a period of two years."
G
(Emphasis ours)
"' ',,i

The Division Bench of the High Court also while dismissing the
-\
L.P .A. filed by the appellant did not doubt the correctness uf the occur-
i rence. It also concluded that since the respondent had not actually molested H
~·

'=l.
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999) 1 S.C.R.

A Miss X and had only tlied to assault her and had "not managed" to make
any physical contact with her, a case of his removal from service was not
made out. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench did not
·-..i,
..
doubt the correctness of the following facts:

1. That Miss X was a subordinate employee while the respon-
B dent was the superior officer in the organization ;
i•·

2. That Miss X was not qualified to take any dictation and had
so told the respondent;

c 3. That the respondent pressurized her to come with him to Taj
Palace Hotel to take dictation despite her protestation, with
an ulterior design;

4. That the respondent taking advantage of his position, tried to
molest Miss X and in spite of her protestation, continued with
D his activities which were against the moral sanctions and did
not withstand the test of decency and modesty; "·
":>.
5. That the respondent tried to sit too close to Miss X with
ulterior motives and all along Miss X kept reprimanding him
but to no avail;
E
6. That the respondent was repeating his implicit unwelcome
sexual advances and Miss X told him that if he continued to
behave in that fashion, she would leave that place;

F 7. That the respondent acted in a manner which demonstrated
unwelcome sexual advances, both directly and by implication; •_.
8. That action of the respondent created an intimidated and
hostile working environment in so far as Miss X is concerned.

G The above facts are borne out from the evidence on the record and
on the basis of these facts, the departmental authorities keeping in view
the fact that the actions of the respondent were considered to be subversive \~

of good discipline and not conducive to proper working in the appellant
Organization where there were a number of female employees, took action
H against the respondent and removed him from service.
APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNC!Lv. AK CHOPRA (DR. ANAND. CJ.) 133

The High Court appears to have over-looked the settled position that A
.. -,>-
in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge
of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the
Appellate Authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate
the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact
finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of
B
evidence are recorded, the High Court in Writ Jurisdiction may not nor-
~
>·· mally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded
findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly
perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the
evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since,
the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual
c
findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the
power of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally speaking sub-
stitute its· own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for
that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty

-
--.:
or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by D
the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either imper-
missible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should
not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment
or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the
High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though E
Judicial Review of administrative action must remain flexible and its
dimension not closed, yet the Court in exercise of the power of judicial
review is not concerned with the c01rectness of the findings of fact on the
basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably
supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which
F
·~ cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which
1- vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial Review,
it must be remembered, is 'directed not against the decision, but is
confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Lord Hal-
tom in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, [1982) 3 All ER
141, observed : G

~?

"The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual
receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after
according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.

A authorized by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct
in the eyes of the court."

Judicial Review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review
-
of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court while
exercising the power of Judicial Review must remain conscious of the fact
B that if the decision has been arrived at by the Administrative Authority
after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural I•

justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case
against him, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
Administrative Authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere
C of jurisdiction of that authority.

It is useful to note the following observations of this Court in Union
of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 :

"Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has
D accepted and which materials may reasonably support the con-
clusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High
Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the
materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials.
If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or
E reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High
Court."

After a detailed review of the law on the subject, this Court while
dealing with the jurisdiction of the High Court or Tribunal to interfere with
the disciplinary matters and punishment in Union of India v. Pamia Nanda,
F [1989) 2 sec 177, opined :
-l
"We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be
equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot inter-
G fere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer or Competent
Authorify where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is
appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a
delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either
by an Act of Legislature or Rule made under the proviso to Article
H 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent
APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v. AK CHOPRA [DR. ANAND, CJ.] 135

+- with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice A
,.... what punishment would meet the ends of justice is matter of
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the
penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposeU"o11/he proved
misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute it own discre-
tion for that of the authority". B
In B.C. Chatwvedi v. Union of India, [1995] 6 SCC 749, this Court
opined:

"The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal
is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to C
reappreciate them evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
Disciplinary Enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings
on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or
reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before
the Court!Tribunal." D
:><:· Further it was held :

"A review of the above legal position would establish that the
disciplinary authority, and 011 appeal the appellate authority, being
fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence E
with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discre-
tion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude
or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exer-
cising the power of judicial review, cannot nomtally substitute its own
conclusion 011 penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punish- p
ment imposed by the disciplinary authority oi the appellate
authority shocks the conscience of the High Court!Tribunal, it
would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the discipli-
nary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to
shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, G
impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support
thereof."

(Emphasis supplied)

Again in Government of Tamil Nadu and Another v. Rajapandian, H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A (1995] 1 SCC 216, this Court opined :
...
"It has been authoritatively settled by string of authorities of this
Court that the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a court of
appeal over a decision based on the findings of the inquiring auth01ity
in disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material
B which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material
reasonably supp01ts the conclusion reached by the disciplina1y
authority, it is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to
review the same and reach different finding than that of the
disciplinary authority. The Administrative Tribunal, in this case,
c ·has found no fault with the proceedings held by the inquiring
authority. It has quashed the dismissal order by re-appreciating
the evidence and reaching a finding different than that of the
. inquiring authority."

(Emphasis ours)
D
In. the established facts and circumstances of this case, we have no
hesitation to hold, at the outset, that both the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court fell into patent error in interfering with
findings of fact recorded by the departmental authorities and interfering
E with the quantum of punishment, as if the High Court was sitting in
appellate jurisdiction. From the judgments of the learned Single Judge as
well as the Division Bench, it is quite obvious that the findings with regard
to an "unbecoming act" committed by the respondent, as found by the
Departmental Authorities, were not found fault with even on re-apprecia-
F tion of evidence. The High Court did not find that the occurrence as ·•
alleged by the complainant had not taken place. Neither the learned Single
Judge nor the Division Bench found that findings recorded by the Enquiry
Officer or the Departmental Appellate Authority were either arbitrary or
even perverse. As a matter of fact, the High Court found no fault what-
soever with the conduct of Enquiry. The direction of the learned Single
G Judge to the effect that the respondent was not entitled to back wages and
was to be posted outside the city for at least two years, which was upheld
by the Division Bench, itself demonstrates that the High Court believed the
complainant's case fully for otherwise neither the withholding of back
wages nor a direction to post the respondent outside the city for at least
H two years was necessary. The High Court in our opinion fell in error in
APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v. AK CHOPRA [DR ANAND, CJ.] 137

- +-- interfering with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the
departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. To
hold that since the respondent had not "actually molested" Miss X and that
he had only "tried to molest" her and had "not managed".to make physical
contact with her, the punishment of removal from service was not justified
A

was erroneous. The High court should not have substituted its own discre-
tion for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be im-
B
posed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not
warrant any interference by the High Court. The entire approach of the
High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the High Court cannot
be sustained on this ground alone. But there is another aspect of the case c
which is fundamental and goes to the root of the case and concerns the
approach of the Court while dealing with cases of sexual harassment at the
place of work of female employees.

The High Court was examining disciplinary proceedings against the D
respondent and was not dealing with criminal trial of the respondent. The
High Court did not find that there was no evidence at all of any kind of
"molestation" or "assault" on the person of Miss X. It appears that the High
Court re-appreciated the evidence while exercising power of judicial review
and gave meaning to the expression "molestation" as if it was dealing with
a finding in a criminal trial. Miss X had used the expression "molestation" E
in her complaint in a general sense and during her evidence she has
explained what she meant. Assuming for the sake of argument that the
respondent did not manage to establish any "physical contact" with Miss X,
though the statement of management witness Suba Singh shows that the
respondent had put his hand on the hand of Miss X when he surprised
them in the Business Centre, it did not mean that the respondent had not F
. ~.
made any objectionable overtures with sexual overtones. From the entire
tenor of the cross-examination to which Miss X was subjected to by the
respondent, running into about 17 typed pages and containing more than
one hundred & forty questions and answers in cross-examinations, it
appears that the effort of respondent was only to play with the use of the G
expressions "molestation" and "physical assault" by her and confuse her. It
was not the dictionary meaning of the word "molestation" or "physical
assault" which was relevan( The statement of Miss X before the Enquiry
Officer as well as in her complaint unambiguously conveyed in no uncertain
terms as to what her complaint was. The entire episode reveals that the
respondent had harassed, pestered and subjected Miss X, by a conduct H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A which is against moral sanctions and which did not withstand the test of --+
decency and modesty and which projected unwelco:ne sexual advances. ..,.
Such an action on the part of the respondent would be squarely covered
by the term "sexual harassment". The following statement made by Miss X
at the enquiry.

B "When I was there in the Chairman's room I told Mr. Chopra that
this was wrong and he should not do such things. He tried to
persuade me by talking ........................... I tried to type the material
but there were so many mistakes. He helped me in tY]Jing. There
he tlied to blackmail me............ He tried to sit with me. In between
he tlied to touch me............................ Mr. Chopra again took me to
c the business Centre. Thereafter again he tried. I told him I will go
out if he does like this. Then he went out. Again he came back. In
between he tried."

(Emphasis supplied)
D
unmistakably shows that the conduct of the respondent constituted an act
unbecoming of good behaviour, expected from the superior officer.
Repeatedly, did Miss X state before the Enquiry Officer that the respon-
dent tried to sit close to her and touch her and that she reprimanded him
E by asking that he 'should not do these things'. The statement of Miss Rama
Kanwar, the management witness to the effect that when on 16th August
she saw Miss X and asked her the reason for being upset, Miss X kept on
weeping and told her "she could not tell being unmarried, she could not
explain what had happened to her". The material on the record, thus, clearly
establishes an unwelcome sexually determined behaviour on the part of the
F respondent against Miss X which was also an attempt to outrage her
modesty. Any action or gesture, whether directly or by implication, aims at
or has the tendency to outrage the modesty of a female employee, must fall
under the general concept of the definition of sexual harassment. The
evidence on the record clearly establishes that the respondent caused
G sexual harassment to Miss X, taking advantage of his superior position in
the Council.

Against the growing social menace of sexual harassment of women
at the work place, a three Judge Bench of this Court by a rather innovative
judicial law making process issued certain guidelines in Vishaka v. State of
H Rajasthan, [1997) 6 sec 241, after taking note of the fact that the present
APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v. AK CHOPRA [DR ANAND, CJ.) 139

+- civil and penal _laws in the country do not adequately provide for specific A
protection of woman from sexual harassment at places of work and that
enactment of such a legislation would take a considerable time. In
Vishaka's case (supra), a definition of sexual harassment was suggested.
Verma, J., (as the former Chief Justice then was), speaking for the three-
Judge Bench opined :
...
r "2. Definition:
B

For this purpose, sexual harassment includes such unwelcome
sexually determined behaviour (whether directly or by implication)
as:
c
(a) physical contact and advance;

(b) a demand or request for sexual favours;

(c) sexually-coloured remarks;
.,.I
D
~ (d) showing pornography;

(e) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct
of sexual nature.

Where any of these acts in committed in circumstances
E
whereunder the victim of such conduct has a reasonable apprehen-
sion that in relation to the victim's employment or work whether
she is drawing salary, or honorarium or voluntary, whether in
Government, public or private enterprise such conduct can be
humiliating and may constitute a health and safety problem. It is F
•
... discriminatory for instance when the woman has reasonable
grounds to believe that her objection would disadvantage her in
connection with her employment or work including recruiting or
promotion or when it creates a hostile work environment. Adverse
consequences might be visited if the victim does not consent to the
conduct in question or raises any objection thereto."
G
,, An analysis of the above definition, shows that sexual harassment is
a form of sex discrimination projected through unwelcome sexual advances,
request for sexual favours and other verbal or physical conduct with sexual
overtones, whether directly or by implication, particularly when submission H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A to or rejection of such a conduct by the female employee was capable of -+
being used for effecting the employment of the female employee and
unreasonably interfering with her work performance and had the effect of
creating an intimidating or hostile working environment for her.

B There is no gainsaying that each incident of sexual harassment, at the
place of work, results in violation of the Fundamental Right to Gender
Equality and the Right to Life and Liberty - the two most precious
Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. As early as
in 1993 at the ILO Seminar held at Manila, it was recognized that sexual
harassment of woman at the work place was a form of 'gender discrimina-
C tion against woman'. In our opinion, the contents of the fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution are of sufficient amplitude to encompass
all face ts of gender equality, including prevention of sexual harassment and
abuse and the courts are under a constitutional obligation to protect and
preserve those fundamental rights. That sexual harassment of a female at
D the place of work is incompatible with the dignity and honour of a female
and needs to be eliminated and that there can be no compromise with such
violations, admits of no debate. The message of international instruments
such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Woman, 1979("CEDAW") and the Beijing Declaration which
directs all State parties to take appropriate measures to prevent discrimina-
E tion of all forms ai;ainst women beside taking steps to protect the honour
and dignity of women is loud and clear. The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contains several provisions par-
ticularly important for woman. Article 7 recognises her right to fair condi-
tions of work and reflects that women shall not be subjected to sexual
F harassment at the place of work which may vitiate working environment.
These international instruments cast an obligation on the Indian State to
gender sensitise its laws and the Courts are under an obligation to see that
the message of the international instruments is not allowed to be drowned.
This Court has in numerous cases emphasised that while discussing con-
stitutional requirements, court and counsel must never forget the core
G principle embodied in the International Conventions and Instruments and
as far as possible give effect to the principles contained in those interna-
tional instruments. The Courts are under an obligation to give due regard
to International Conventions and Norms for construing domestic laws more
so when there is no inconsistency between them and there is a void in
H domestic law. (See with advantage - Prem Sankar v. Delhi Administration,

I

1
APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION ;::OUNCIL v. A.K CHOPRA (DR ANAND, CJ.) 141

7-"-- AIR (1980) SC 1535; Mackninnon Mackenzie and Co. v. Audrey D' Costa, A
(1987) 2 SCC 469 - JT 1987 (2) SC 34; Sheela Barse v. Secretary, Children's
Aid Society, [1987) 3 SCC 50 at p.54; Vishaka & Others v. State of Rajasthan
& Ors., JT (1997) 7 SC 392; People's Union for Civil Libe1ties v. Union of
India & Anr., JT (1997) 2 SC 311 and D.K. Basu & Anr. v. State of West

.,...
Bengal & Anr., [1997) 1 SCC 416 at p. 438.
B
..,..
In cases involving violation of human rights, the Courts must forever
remain alive to the international instruments and conventions and apply
the same to a given case when there is no inconsistency between the
international norms and the domestic law occupying the field. In the instant
case, the High Court appears to have totally ignored the intent and content c
of the International Conventi.ons and Norms while dealing with the case.

The observations made by the High Court to the effect that since the
respondent did not "actually molest" Miss X but only "tried to molest" her
and, therefore, his removal from service was not warranted rebel against
_.. D
realism and lose their sanctity and credibility. In the instant case, the
""' behaviour of respondent did not cease to be outrageous for want of an
actual assault or touch by the superior officer. In a case involving charge
of sexual harassment or attempt to sexually molest, the courts are required
to examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by
insignificant discrepancies or narrow technicalities or dictionary meaning E
of the expression "molestation''. They must examine the entire material to
deterrrine the genuineness of the complaint. The statement of the victim
must be appreciated in the background of the entire case. Where the
evidence of the victim inspires confidence, as is the position in the instant
case, the courts are obliged to rely on it. Such cases are required to be
" dealt with great sensitivity. Sympathy in such cases in favour of the superior F
-t·· officer is wholly misplaced and mercy has no relevance. The High Court
overlooked the ground realities and ignored the fact that the conduct of
the respondent against his junior female employee, Miss X, was wholly
against moral sanctions, decency and was offensive to her modesty. Reduc-
ti\)n of punishment in a case like this is bound to have demoralizing effect
G
ort the women employees and is a retrograde step. Thee was no justification
for the High Court to interfere with the punishment imposed by the
"' departmental authorities. The act of the respondent was unbecoming of
good conduct and behaviour expected frorn a superior officer and undoub-
tedly amounted to sexual harassment of Miss X and the punishment
imposed by the appellant, was, thus, commensurate with the gravity of his H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 1 S.C.R.

A objectionable behaviour and did not warrant any interference by the High -+
Court in exercise of its power of judicial review.

At the conclusion of the hearing, learned counsel for the respondent
submitted that the respondent was repentant of his actions and that he
tenders an unqualified apology and that he was willing to also go and to
B apologize to Miss X. We are afraid, it is too late in the day to show any
sympathy to the respondent in such a case. Any lenient action in such a
case is bound to have demoralizing effect on working women. Sympathy in
such cases is uncalled for and mercy is misplaced.

Thus, for what we have said above the impugned order of the High
C Court is set aside and the punishment as imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority and upheld by the Departmental Appellate Authority of removal
of the respondent from service is upheld and restored. The, appeals, thus
succeed and are allowed. We, however, make no order as to costs.

v.s.s. Appeals allowed.

r