Holding

The trial court and High Court’s pruning of the defence witness list is lawful; courts may limit witnesses to avoid delay and ensure speedy trial under Section 22 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Summary

Arivazhagan was charged under Section 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 109 of the IPC. He filed a defence list of 267 witnesses. The Special Judge examined the list and, on the ground of avoiding delay, allowed only a few witnesses from each division. The Madras High Court slightly increased the number permitted, but the appellant contended that once called to enter his defence, the trial court could not prune his witness list under Section 243(1) of the CrPC. The Supreme Court held that Section 22 of the PC Act amends Section 243(1) to give the court discretion to limit witnesses to ensure a speedy trial and to prevent procrastination, and that the trial court and High Court acted within their statutory powers. The Court further noted that the appellant could seek permission to examine additional witnesses later if justice required. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The extent of the trial court's discretion to prune a defence witness list in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Whether Section 22 of the PC Act overrides the plain language of Section 243(1) of the CrPC, thereby permitting the court to limit witnesses.
The accused’s right to examine all witnesses he lists versus the legislative intent of speedy trial in corruption cases.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 243(1), s. 243(2), s. 311
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 134
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 109
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(c), s. 22

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption Actdefence witness listcourt discretionspeedy trialSection 243 CrPCSection 22 PC Actcriminal procedurewitness pruning

Judgment

,'

ARIVAZHAGAN A
v.
STATE, REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

MARCH 8, 2000

[K.T. THOMAS AND M.B. SHAH, JJ.] B

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 :

Section 243( 1)-Scope of

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 : Sections 13( 1)(c) and 22. c·
Criminal Trial-Accused-Defence witnesses-Liberty to produce-Ex-
tent of-List of witnesses-Object and purpose of-Accused charged under
Section 13( 1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section
109 of the Indian Penal _Code-List of 267 Defence Witnesses submitted by D
accused-Number of witnesses short listed by Special Judge-Marginal en-
hancement by High Court-Appeal before Supreme Court-Held no interfer-
ence was called for with the impugned order-However, if interest of justice
required Special Judge may allow accused to examine additional witnesses.

The appellant was prosecuted under Section 13(1)(c) of the Preven- E
tion of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860. He submitted a list of 267 witnesses in his defence. The Special
Judge made a scrutiny of the list and pruned it down. As the appellant was
not willing to reduce the number of witnesses, he approached the High
Court which enhanced the number of witnesses marginally.
... F
In appeal to this Court it was contended on: behalf of the appellant
that the position envisaged in Section 243(1) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 without the interjection of Section 22 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 has a different perception, and therefore, once the
Court decided to call upon the accused to enter on his defence there is no G
discretion vested with the trial Judge to vivisect the list for the purpose of
eliminating certain names therefrom .

.Disposing the appeal, this Court

HELD: 1. The pruning exercise undertaken by the trial court and H.
155
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 2 S.C.R.
A the High Court was within the limits permitted by law. [164-B]

2. The purpose of furnishing a list of witnesses and documents to the
Court before the accused is called upon to enter on his defence, is to afford
an occasion to the court to peruse the list. On such perusal, if the court feels
that examination of at least some of the persons mentioned in the list is
B quite unnecessary to prove the defence plea and the time which would be
needed for completing the examination of such witnesses would only result
in procrastination, it is the duty of the court to short list such witnesses. H
the court feels that the list is intended only to delay the proceedings, the
court is well within its powers to disallow even the whole ofit. [163-D-E]
c 3. In the present case it was the ground of delay which the Special
Judge countenanced as the ground for pruning down the massive list of
witnesses presented by the appellant. Normally no court would mind if the
list contains only a handful of names because the court would not then
bother much about the delay factor. But when the list contains a crowd of
D names of witnesses the court will certainly make a serious exercise to
ascertain whether examination of all those witnesses is necessary in the
interest of justice even at the risk of procrastination. [160-D-EJ

4. The position of an accused is involved in a trial under the P.C. Act
is more cuµibered than an accused in other cases due to legislative curbs.
E One of them is envisaged in Section 22 of the P.C. Act. The court is ~10t
obliged to direct an accused involved under the P.C. Act to enter upon his
defence until the Special Court has the occasion to see the list of his
witnesses and also the list of his documents to be adduced in evidence on the
defence side. An accused in other cases has to be called upon to enter on his
F defence irrespective of whether he would propose to adduce defence evi-
-"\----
dence because it is a choice to be exercised by him only after he is called
upon to enter on his defence. But the accusecl under P .C. Act need be called
upon to enter on his defence only after the trial judge has occasion to peruse
the names of the witnesses as well as the purpose of examination of each one
of them, and also the nature of the documents which he proposed to adduce
G as his evidence. [161-F-H]

5. Section 22 of the P.C. Act has amended sub-section (1) of Section
243 of the Code in its applicationto the trial of offences under the P.C. Act.
Section 7-A was introduced in the erstwhile P.C. Act by Act 40 of 1964.
:H That section is pari materia with Section 22 of P.C. Act. One of the main
I'

I I•

ARNAZHAGAN v. STATE 157
!>bjects sou~t to be achieved through insertion of Section 7A was speedy A
trial for cases relating to the problems of corruption. While reading Section
22 of the P.C. Act which requires a particular procedure to be followed
relating to the filing of list of witnesses and documents for the defence, it
must be borne in mind that the legislative intent for the aforesaid change in
the procedure is mainly, for achieving expeditiousness of the trial. It is true B
that the concept of speedy trial must apply to all trials, but in the trials for
offences relating to corruption the pace must be accelerated with greater
momentum due to a variety of reasons. Parliament expressed grave con-
cern over the rampant ever-growing corruption among public servants
which has been a major cause for the demoralisatio'1 of the society. When
corrupt public servants are booked they try to take advantage of the delay
c
proned procedural trammels of our legal system by keeping the penal
consequences at bay for a considerable time. It was this reality which
impelled the Parliament to chalk out measures to curb procrastinating
procedural clues. Section 22 of the P.C. Act is one of the measures evolved
to curtail the delay in corruption cases. So the construction of Section D
243(1) of the Code as telescoped by Section 22 of the P.C. Act must be
consistent with the aforesaid legislative intent. [162-G-H; 163-A-C]

6. In the circumstances of the case no interference with the impugned
order is necessary. However, after the appellant completes his evidence in E
accordance \l'ith the permission now grnnted as per the impugned orders, it
is open to the appellant to convince the rriai court that some more persons
need be e~amined in the interest of justice. If the Court is so satisfied, the
Special Judge can permit the appellant to examine such additional wit-
nesses the examination of whom he considers essential for a just decision of F
the case or he can exercise the powers envisaged in Section 311 of the Code
in respect of such witnesses. [164-C-D]

Ronald Wood Mathams v. State of West Bengal, [1955) SCR 216, held
inapplicable.
G
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 272
of 2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.1.2000 of the Madras High
Court in Crl.R.C. No. 1435 of 1999. ll
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A Sushil Kumar, K.V. Vishwanathan, K.N. Jothi and K.V. Venkataraman
for the Appellant.

The Judgment of the Comt was delivered by

THOMAS J. Leave granted.
B
Has the accused a right to examine a myriad of witnesses and has the
court any power to prune down the list of such witnesses? Such a question
arose when the appellant submitted a list of 267 witnesses for the defence
when the trial reached that stage. The trial Comt was not disposed to allow
him to examine all the persons mentioned in the list and directed him to
limit the nrimber to the minimum necessary. As the appellant was not
willing to reduce the number of witnesses he approached the High court
to help him. But the advantage he got from the High Court was only
marginal and it did not satisfy him. Hence, he filed the Special Leave
Petition. After hearing Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel for the
'D appellant we felt that the appeal can be disposed of without the aid of
arguments of the respondents and so we did not issue notice to them.

The factual background in which the situation reached the above
stage is the following: Appellant and three persons are now being arraigned
before the Special Court at Chennai for facing a charge for the offence under
Section 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short 'the
PC Act') read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. Prosecution
examined a number of witnesses by summoning 41 persons. When
the case reached the stage envisaged in Section 243(1) of the Code
of Criminal Procedme (for short the 'Code') he submitted a list of defence
witnesses. As we mentioned earlier the number of witnesses shown in the
F
list was so much that even a marathon legal proceeding would not be
sufficient to exhaust the entire list.

The Special Judge made a scrutiny of the list and dissected the
names into four divisions. The first division consisted of names shown
G as No. 1 to 8. The second division consisted of names shown as No.
9 to 117 in the list. The third division consisted of names figming in the
list as No. 118 to 177. The fomth division consisted of names of 178 to
267 witnesses.

The Special Judge permitted persons shown as Nos. 4 and 8 in the
H first division to be examined as he found them alone in the said division
) '

ARIVAZHAGAN v. STATE [THOMAS, J.] 159
as necessary witnesses and the others were found unnecessary for the A
purpose of defence plea. Regarding the second division the Special Judge
stated thus:

"Witness Nos. 9 to 117 have been cited as witnesses to speak about
the masonry works, wood works, painting works etc. Instead of
examining the huge number of witnesses, examination of one or B
two engineers will be sufficient and it would save the time also."

About the third division learned Special Judge observed that since all
of them were cited only to speak about the "agriculture and business
income" of the accused the appellant can advisedly confine to ten
witnesses in that division. Regarding the last division in the list learned
c
sp_i::cial judge observed thus:

List of witness Nos.178 to 267 have been cited as witnesses to
speak about the loans, gifts, etc. Such a huge list may not be
necessary in view of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act D
However, the accused could examine any 10 witnesses from them.

Learned Single Judge of the High Court felt that from the first division
mentioned above the appellant can examine witnesses shown as Nos. 6 and
7 also and from the remaining divisions the appellant can choose ten more
persons. The petition filed in the High Court was disposed of in the E
following tenns:

"The Special court is directed to permit the petitioner to examine
witnesses 1,4 to 7 and also 10 more witnesses in the list of witnesses
118 to 267, in addition to the witnesses already permitted to be
examined. The order of the Special Court is modified as stated F
above. The criminal revision case is disposed of accordingly."

Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel contended that once the
trial court has proceeded from the stage envisaged in sub-section (1) of
Section 243 and passed over to the next stage contemplated in sub-section
G
(2) he has no power to sift and select witnesses from the list submitted
by accused. We may record, in fairness to learned senior counsel, that
he candidly conceded that no accused can claim a right to examine any
number of witnesses on the defence side. This was stated by the learned
counsel when we asked him - hypothetically- whether the accused can file
a list of ten thousand names as witnesses and ask the court to permit him H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 2 S.C.R.
A to examine all of them.

Section 5(1) of the P.C. Act requires the Special Judge to follow the
procedure prescribed by the court for trial of warrant cases by magistrates.
Chapter XIX of the Code contains the provisions for such trial and Section
243 falls within the said chapter. (The corresponding provisions in the old
B Criminal Procedure Code were sub-sections (8) to (10) of Section 251-A.)
It is not disputed before us that a court has the power to refuse to summon
any person as a witness on any of the three different grounds: (1) If any
witness is cited for the purpose of vexation; (2) If any witness is cited
for causing delay; (3) If any witness is cited for defeating the ends of
·C justice. In fact Section 243(2) of the Code incorporates such powers of the
court.

In the present case it was the ground of delay which the Special Judge
countenanced as the ground for pruning down the massive list of witnesses
presented by the appellant. No doubt the time which would consume
D _Jor completely examining all the 267 witnesses on the defence side would
be unimaginably long if a court is compelled by law to exhaust such a
whopping list in its full swing. The criminal trial would only limp badly
and procrastination would be the inevitable consequence. Normally no
court would mind if the list contains only a handful of names bl.':cause the
court would not then bother much about the delay factor. But when the list
E contains such a crowd of names of witnesses the court will certainly make
a serious exercise to ascertain whether examination of all those wiinesses
is necessary in the interest of justice even at the risk of such
procrastination.
Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel first contended that
F the position envisaged in Section 243(1) of the Code without the
interjection.of Section 22 of the P.C Act has a different perception, and
therefore, once the court decided to call upon the accused to enter on
his defence there is no discretion vested with the trial judge to vivisect
the list for the purpose of eliminating certain names therefrom. · In order to
·G understand the said contention we would extract Section 243 in its virgin
form as it is incorporated in the Code.

"243. Evidence for defence. -
(1) The accused shall then be called upon to enter upon his defence
and produce his evidence; and if the accused puts in any written
H statement, the Magistrate shall file it with the record.

. .·.:
ARNAZHAGAN v. STATE [THOMAS, J.] 161
(2) If the accused, after he had entered upon his defence, applies A
to the Magistrate to issue any process for compelling the ~ttendance
of any witness for the purpose of examination or cross-exm:nination,
or the production of any document or other thing, the Magistrate
shall issue such process unless he considers that such application
should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of
B
vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice and such ground
shall be recorded by him in writing.

Provided that, when the accused has cross-examined or had the
opportunity of cross-examining any witness before entering on his
defence, the attendance of such witness shall not be compelled C
under this section, unless the Magistrate is satisfied that it is
necessary for the ends of justice."

Section 22 of the P.C. Act has amended sub-section (1) of Section 243
of the Code in its application to the trial of offences under the P.C. Act.
When Section 243(1) of the Code is re-read with the aforesaid changes it D
would run as follows:

"The accused shall then be required to give in writing at once or
within such time as the court may allow, a list of persons (if any)
whom he proposes to examine as his witnesses and of the documents
(if any) on which he proposes to rely, and he shall then be called E
upon to enter upon his defence and produce his evidence, and if the
accused puts in any written statement the magistrate shall file it with
the record."

The position of an accused who is involved in a trial under the P.C.

- Act is more cumbered than an accused in other cases due to legislative curbs.
One of them is envisaged in Section 22 of the P.C. Act. The court is not
obliged to direct an accused involved under the P.C. Act to enter upon his
defence until the Special Court has the occasion to see the list of his
F

witnesses and also the list of his documents to be adduced in evidence on
the defence side. An accused in other cases has to be called upon to enter G
on his defence irrespective of whether he would propose to add~ce defence
evidence because it is a choice to be exercised by him only after he is called
upon to enter on his defence. But the accused under P.C. Act need be called
upon to enter on his defence only after the trial judge has occasion to peruse
the names of the witnesses as well as the pwpose of examination of each H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A one of them, and also the nature of the documents which he proposed to
adduce as ·his evidence.

In this context it would be pertinent to examine the purpose behind
it for the Parliament to make the aforesaid change as for the accused who
gets involved in offences under the P.C. Act. A glance at the short
B legislative history on this aspect would reveal the purpose when Section 7-
A was introduced in the erstwhile P.C. Act by Act 40 of 1964. That section
is pari materia with Section 22 of P.C. Act of 1988. Section 7-A was
intended to be absorbed in the corresponding provision (Section 251-A)
of the old Code whenever the trial was for offences under P.C. Act of 1947.
c But it must be remembered that Parliament enacted the present Code
in the year 1973 and even then the legislature did not incorporate the
wording in Section 7-A of the old P.C. Act of 1947 in Section 243(1) of
the Code but allowed that provision to be read in consonance with the
different procedure prescribed for offences under the erstwhile P.C. Act.
Now in the P.C. Act of 1988 also the legislature retained those alterations
D as indicated in Section 22 thereof.

Act 40 of 1964, through which Section 7A was introduced in the
erstwhile P.C. Act, was passed by the Parliament on the basis of Bill
No.67/64. It was· mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons
E of the said Bill, inter alia, thus:

"The Committee on Prevention of Corruption was appointed in
1962 to review the problem of corruption and to suggest measures
to combat it. The Committee has made various suggestions for
dealing with the problem and has, inter alia, recommended
F certain changes in the law to ensure speedy trial of cases of
bribery, corruption and criminal misconduct, and to make the law
otherwise more effective. The Bill is intended to give effect to
such of these recommendations that have been accepted.

It is thus noticeable that one of the main objects sought to be
G achieved through insertion of Section 7 A was speedy trial for cases relating
to the problem of corruption. When we read Section 22 of the PC Act
·which requires a particular procedure to be followed relating to the filing
of list of witnesses and documents for the defence, it must be borne
in mind that the legislative intent for the aforesaid change in the procedure
H is mainly for achieving expeditiousness of the trial. It is true that the
!'--

ARNAZHAGAN v. STATE [THOMAS, J.] 163
concept of speedy trial must apply to all trials, but in the trials for offences A
relating to corruption the pace must be accelerated with greater momentum
due to a variety of reasons. Parliament expressed grave concern over
the rampant ever-growing corruption among public servants which has been
a major cause for the demoralisation of the society. When corrupt public
servants are booked they try to take advantage of the delay proned
B
procedural trammels of our legal system by keeping the penal consequences
at bay for a considerable time. It was this reality which impelled the
Parliament to chalk out measures to curb procrastinating procedural clues.
Section 22 of the P.C. Act is one of the measures evolved to curtail the
delay in corruption cases. So the construction of Section 243(1) of the
Code as telescoped by Section 22 of the PC Act must be consistent with c
the aforesaid legislative intent.

The purpose of furnishing a list of witnesses and documents to
the Court before the accused is called upon to enter on his defence is to afford
an occasion to the court to peruse the list. On such perusal, if the court
fe~ls that examination of at least some of the persons mentioned in the list
D
is quite unnecessary to prove the defence plea and the time which would
be needed for completing the examination of such witnesses would only
result in procrastination, it is the duty of the court to short list such
witnesses. We may also add that if the court feels that the list is intended
only to delay the proceedings, the court is well within its powers to disallow E
even the whole of it.

Learned senior counsel made an endeavour to find support to his
contention from the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Ronald
Wood Mathams v. State of West Bengal, (1955] SCR 216. In that case an
accused filed a list of 15 witnesses to be examined for the defence. Though F
the trial court issued summons to those witnesses whose summons did not
return served, and the court passed an order that no further process need be
issued to those witnesses. The case ended in conviction of the accused
and hence it was contended before the Supreme Court that the trial of
the appellants had been vitiated by reason of the fact that they had no
G
reasonable opportunity to examine their witnesses and that their convictions
were accordingly bad. The fmding of the Supreme Court in this regard was
that "it is essential that rules of procedure designed to ensure justice should
be scrupulously followed and courts should be jealous in saying that there is
no breach of them." There is nothing in the decision to help the appellant
to have an interpretation in consonance with his contention. H
~(

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A In this case~ the High Court as per the impugned order has further
enlarged the number of witnesses to be examined on the defence side. As
it is, the appellant cannot complain now that he did not get the opportunity
to adduce his evidence. At any rate, we do not think it necessary to interfere
with the impugned orders as the pruning exercise undertaken by the trial
court and the High Court was within the limits permitted by law.
B
Nevertheless, we would add - after the appellant completes his
evidence in accordance with the permission now granted as per the
impugned orders, it is open to the appellant to convince the trial court that
some more persons need be examined in the interest of justice, if the
c appellant then thinks that such a course is necessary. The trial court will then
decide whether it is essential for a just. decision of the case to examine more
witnesses on the defence side. If the Court is so satisfied, the Special Judge
can permit the appellant to examine such additional witnesses the examina-
tion of whom he considers essential for a just decision of the case or he can
exercise the powers envisaged in Section 311 of the Code in respect of
D such witnesses. We cannot, at present, oversee the situation as to how the
trial court could then reach such a satisfaction. Hence ·we leave it to the trial
court to do the needful at the appropriate stage.

With the a1!ove observations we dispose of the appeal.
E T.N.A. Appeal disposed of.