Supreme Court of India
ARJUN SINGHversusSTATE OF H.P.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 118
- Decided
- 6 February 2009
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The Supreme Court held that rape was not proved, only an attempt to rape, so the conviction under Section 376 IPC was set aside, while convictions under Sections 511, 365 and 366 IPC were upheld and Section 109 IPC was held inapplicable.
Summary
Arjun Singh, a bus conductor, was alleged to have forcibly sexually assaulted a girl under 16 years of age and kidnapped her. He was convicted by the trial court and the Himachal Pradesh High Court under IPC sections 376 (rape), 511 (attempt to commit rape), 365, 366 (kidnapping) and 109 (abetment). On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the evidence did not establish the offence of rape, only an attempt to rape, and therefore set aside the conviction under s.376 while upholding the conviction under s.511. The Court also affirmed the convictions under s.365 and s.366, finding no infirmity in the lower courts' findings, and ruled that section 109 was inapplicable as there was no abetment. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed, with the sentences for the upheld offences remaining in force.
Issues considered
- Whether the facts constitute the offence of rape under Section 376 IPC.
- Whether an attempt to commit rape under Section 511 IPC is proved.
- Whether the convictions under Sections 365 and 366 IPC for kidnapping are sustainable.
- Whether Section 109 IPC (abetment) is applicable to the facts.
- How the age of the victim should be ascertained and the evidentiary value of documentary proof.
Legislation cited
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 35
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 109, s. 1208, s. 120A, s. 365, s. 366, s. 376, s. 511
Subjects
rapeattempt to rapekidnappingabetmentIndian Penal Codeage of victimevidencecriminal conspiracy
Judgment
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 983
ARJUN SINGH A
" -+ v.
STATE OF H.P.
(Criminal Appeal No. 224 of 2009)
FEBRUARY 06, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.)
Penal Code, 1860:
c
ss.376, 511, 365, 366, 109 - Conviction under, by trial
Court - Affirmed by High Court - On appeal, Held:
Commission of rape was not established, however attempt to
rape was clearly established- Hence, conviction under s.376
is not proper- However, conviction under s.511 is made out
D
-) - Regarding offence under ss.365 and 366, courts below
analysed the evidence in detail - There was no infirmity in
its conclusion to warrant interference - In the background of
facts, s. 109 is also not applicable.
s. 109 - Applicability of. E
s.109 and s.120A - Distinction between.
Words and Phrases: 'abetment' and 'rape' - Meaning of.
Prosecution case was the appellant committed
forcible sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix against F
- her will and without her consent. He was charged for
offences under ss. 376, 511, 365, 366 and 109 IPC. The
trial Court held that the age of victim was less than 16
years by placing reliance on the documents produced
and held the appellant guilty. The High Court affirmed the G
same. Hence the present appeal.
;
-~
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. The offence of rape in its simplest term is
983 H
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A 'the ravishment of a woman, without her consent, by r .
force, fear or fraud', or as 'the carnal knowledge of a
woman by force against her will'. 'Rape' or 'Raptus' is
when a man hath carnal knowledge of a woman by force
and against her will; or as expressed more fully,' rape is
B the carnal knowledge of any woman, above the age of
particular years, against her will; or of a woman child,
under that age, with or against her will'. In the crime of
rape, 'carnal knowledge' means the penetration to any the
slightest degree of the organ alleged to have been
c carnally known by the male organ of generation (Para 9)
(989-C-F)
Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 1 SCC 283 and
State ofChhattisgarh v. Lekhram (2006) 5 SCC 736, relied
on.
D ~-
2. In the instant case, though the rape does not
appear to have been committed but the attempt to commit
the rape is clearly established. That being so the
conviction for offence punishable under Section 376 IPC
is not made out but the offence punishable under Section
E
511 IPC is clearly made out. So far as the offence under
Sections 365 and 366 IPC are concerned the Trial Court
and the High Court had analysed the evidence in great
detail. There is no infirmity in the conclusion to warrant
interference. [Para 10) (989-H; 990-A-B] ~
F
3.1. Under Section 109 IPC the abettor is liable to the
same punishment which may be inflicted on the principal
offender, if the act of the latter is committed in
-
consequence of the abetment and no express provision
G is made in the IPC for punishment for such an abetment.
Law does not require instigation to be in a particular form
or that it should only be in words. The instigation may be 1- ~
by conduct. Whether there was instigation or not is a
question to be decided on the facts of each case. It is not
H necessary in law for the prosecution to prove that the
ARJUN SINGH v. STATE OF H.P. 985
- ~ actual operative cause in the mind of the person abetting A
was instigation and nothing else, so long as there was
instigation and the offence has been committed or the
offence would have been committed if the person
committing the act had the same knowledge and
intention as the abettor. The instigation must be with B
reference to the thing that was done and not to the thing
that was likely to have been done by the person who is
instigated. It is only if this condition is fulfilled that a
person can be guilty. of abetment by instigation. Further
the act abetted should be committed in consequence of c
the abetment or in pursuance of the conspiracy as
provided in the Explanation to Section 109. Under the
Explanation an act or offence is said to be committed in
pursuance of abetment if it is done in consequence of
instigation, conspiracy or with the aid constituting D
abetment. Instigation may be in any form and the extent
of the influence which the instigation produced in the
mind of the accused would vary and depend upon facts
of each case. [Para 11) [990-C-H; 991-A]
3.2. The offence of conspiracy created under Section E
120A is bare agreement to commit an offence. It has been
made punishable under Section 1208. The offence of
abetment created under the second clause of Section 107
_._ requires that there must be something more than mere
conspiracy. There must be some act or illegal omission F
- in pursuance of that conspiracy. The punishment for
these two categories of crimes is also quite different.
Section 109 IPC is concerned only with the punishment
of abetment for which no express provision has been
made in the IPC. An offence of criminal conspiracy is, on G
the other hand, an independent offence. It is made
punishable under Section 120 B for which a charge under
Section 109 is unnecessary and inappropriate. In the
background of the facts, Section 109 IPC has no
application. [Paras 11 and 12) [991-A-F] H
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A 4. The conviction of the appellant for the offences
punishable under Sections 365, 366 and 511 IPC is
upheld with the corresponding sentence as imposed by
the trial court and sustained by the High Court. The
convictions in terms of Sections 109 and 376 IPC are set
B aside. [Para 13] (981-F] ·
Kehar Singh and Ors. v. The State (Delhi Admn.) AIR
(1988) SC 1883, relied on.
Case Law Reference:
c
(2006) 1 sec 283 relied on Para 6
(2006) 5 sec 736 relied on Para 7
AIR (1988) SC 1883 relied on Para 11
D CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 224 of 2009.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 1.5.2008 of the
High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Crl. Appeal No.
E 112of 2001.
Sanjay Jain for the Appellant.
Naresh K. Sharma for the Respondent.
F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.1. Leave granted. -
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned
Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court upholding
G the conviction of the appellant for offences punishable under
Sections 376, 511, 363 and 366 as well as Section 109 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). He was sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years, 3 years, 4 years,
5 years and 7 years for the aforesaid offences alongwith fine
H with default stipulation.
ARJUN SINGH v. STATE OF H.P. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] 987
3. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as A
~ ~
follows:
On 18.7.1999, the victim (PW10) boarded the bus to
Shimla from Solan. When the bus bearing registration No. HP-
12-4113 reached near petrol pump (HIMFED) situated near B
Nav Bahar towards Chotta Shimla, all the passengers got
down, except the prosecutrix and accused-appellant Arjun
Singh. Accused Arjun Singh committed forcible sexual
intercourse with the prosecutrix against her will and without her
consent. The victim was kidnapped by the accused who was
minor at the time of kidnapping in bus No.HP-12-4113 from
c
Solan. The accused had induced the prosecutrix that he would
marry her after reaching Nalagarh. The FIR was registered.
Thereafter the investigation was carried out and the challan was
put in the Court. The appellant was charged for offences
punishable under Sections 376, 511, 366 and 109 of the Indian D
Penal Code. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses to prove
its case. The appellant had examined Shri Arvind Sharma (DW
1) as defence witness. The learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Solan, convicted and sentenced the accused as stated above.
The sentences were directed to run concurrently. It is to be noted E
that two persons faced trial for the aforesaid offences i.e.
appellant who was the conductor of the vehicle, and one Daler
Singh who was the driver of the vehicle. Since accused persons
abjured guilt, trial was held. The trial court placed reliance on
_,\-
the evidence of the prosecutrix (PW1) and her mother (PW 3). F
~
As a plea relating to the age of the prosecutrix to show that she
was a consenting party was taken, the person who had issued
the date of birth certificate was examined as PW 4. According
to the said certificate the date of birth was 19th October, 1984.
She was admitted to the school on 1st April, 1997 and had left G
it on 24th October, 1998. The trial Court held that the age of
;
_)- the victim was less than 16 years and placed reliance on the
documents produced. It was also submitted by the accused
.., persons that no rape has been committed. This plea also was
rejected by the trial court. H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 1 S.C.R.
A Accordingly the trial court while holding the appellant guilty, ~ ~
acquitted co-accused. As noted above, appeal before the High
Court was dismissed.
4. In support of the appeal the stand taken before the trial
B court and the High Court were reiterated.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent-State supported the
judgment of the High Court.
6. So far as the age aspect is concerned in Vishnu v.
c State of Maharashtra [2006(1) SCC 283] it was inter alia tleld
as follows:
"20. It is urged before us by Mr Lalit that the
determination of the age of the prosecutrix by conducting
ossification test is scientifically proved and, therefore, the
D opinion of the doctor that the girl was of 18-19 years of
age should be accepted. We are unable to accept this
contention for the reasons that the expert medical evidence
is not binding on the ocular evidence. The opinion of the
Medical Officer is to assist the court as he is not a witness
E of fact and the evidence given by the Medical Officer is
really of an advisory character and not binding on the
witness of fact."
7. In State of Chhattisgarh v. Lekhram [2006(5) SCC 736]
...
F it was held that the register maintained in a school is
admissible evidence to prove the date of birth of the person
concerned in terms of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (in short 'Evidence Act'). It may be true that in the entry
-
of the school register is not conclusive but it has evidentiary
G value.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
~
evidence of the Doctor clearly rules out the commission of rape.
The Medical officer (PW 9) has stated that rape had not been v
committed and sexual intercourse had not taken place.
H
ARJUN SINGH v. STATE OF H.P. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] 989
9. The offence of rape occurs in Chapter XVI of IPC. It is A
-.+ an offence affecting the human body. In that Chapter,,there is
a separate heading for 'Sexual offence', which encompasses
Sections 375, 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C, and 376-D. 'Rape'
is defined in Section 375. Sections 375 and 376 have been
substantially changed by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983, B
and several new sections were introduced by the new Act, i.e.
376-A, 376-B, 376-C and 376-D. The fact that sweeping
changes were introduced reflects the legislative intent to curb
with iron hand, the offence of rape which affects the dignity of
a woman. The offence of rape in its simplest term is 'the c
ravishment of a woman, without her consent, by force, fear or
fraud', or as 'the carnal knowledge of a woman. by force against
her will'. 'Rape' or 'Raptus' is when a man hath carnal
knowledge of a woman by force and against her will (Co. Litt.
123-b ); or as expressed more fully,' rape is the carnal
D
knowledge of any woman, above the age of particular years,
against her will; or of a woman child, under that age, with or
against her will' (Hale PC 628). The essential words in an
indictment for rape are rapuit and carnaliter cognovit; but
carnaliter cognovit, nor any other circumlocution without the
E
word rapuit, are not sufficient in a legal sense to express rape;
1 Hon.6, 1a, 9 Edw. 4, 26 a (Hale PC 628). In the crime of rape,
'carnal knowledge' means the penetration to any the slightest
degree of the organ alleged to have been carnally known by
... the male organ of generation (Stephen's "Criminal Law" 9th Ed .
F
p.262). In 'Encyclopaedia of Crime and Justice' (Volume 4,
page 1356) it is stated " ... ,_,.even slight penetration is sufficient
and emission is unnecessary". In Halsbury's Statutes of
England and Wales (Fourth Edition) Volume 12, it is stated that
even the slightest degree of penetration is sufficient to prove
sexual intercourse. It is violation with violence of the private G
person of a woman-an-outrage by all means. By the very nature
of the offence it is an obnoxious act of the highest order.
10. In the instant case though the rape does not appear
to have been committed but the attempt to commit the rape is H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 1 S.C.R.
A clearly established. That being so the conviction for offence
punishable under Section 376 IPC is not made out but the
,. .
offence punishable under Section 511 IPC is clearly made out.
So far as the offence under Sections 365 and 366 IPC are
concerned the trial court and the high Court have analysed the
B evidence in great detail. We find no infirmity in the conclusion
to warrant interference.
11. Under Section 109 the abettor is liable to the same +
punishment which may be inflicted on the principal offender; (1)
if the act of the latter is committed in consequence of the
C abetment and (2) no express provision is made in the IPC for
punishment for such an abetment. This section lays down
nothing more than that if the IPC has not separately provided
for the punishment of abetment as such then it is punishable
with the punishment provided for the original offence. Law does
D not require instigation to be in a particular form or that it should
only be in words. The instigation may be by conduct. Whether
there was instigation or not is a question to be decided on the
facts of each case. It is not necessary in law for the prosecution
to prove that the actual operative cause in the mind of the
E person abetting was instigation and nothing else, so long as
there was instigation and the offence has been committed or
the offence would have been committed if the person
committing the act had the same knowledge and intention as
the abettor. The instigation must be with reference to the thing
F that was done and not to the thing that was likely to have been
done by the person who is instigated. It is only if this condition
is fulfilled that a person can be guilty of abetment by instigation.
Further the act abetted should be committed in consequence
of the abetment or in pursuance of the conspiracy as provided
G in the Explanation to Section 109. Under the Explanation an act
or offence is said to be committed in pursuance of abetment if
it is done in consequence of (1) instigation (b) conspiracy or
(c) with the aid constituting abetment. Instigation may be in any
form and the extent of the influence which the instigation
H produced in the mind of the accused would vary and depend
ARJUN SINGH v. STATE OF H.P. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] 991
upon facts of each case. The offence of conspiracy created A
under Section 120A is bare agreement to commit an offence.
It has been made punishable under Section 1208. The offence
of abetment created under the second clause of Section 107
requires that there must be something more than mere
conspiracy. There must be some act or illegal omission in 8
pursuance of that conspiracy. That would be evident by Section
107 (secondly), "engages in any conspiracy .... for the doing of
that thing, if an act or omission took place in pursuance of that
conspiracy". The punishment for these two categories of
crimes is also quite different. Section 109 IPC is concerned c
only with the punishment of abetment for which no express
provision has been made in the IPC. The charge under Section
109 should, therefore, be along with charge for murder which
is the offence committed in consequence of abetment. An
offence of criminal conspiracy is, on the other hand, an
0
independent offence. It is made punishable under Section 1208
for which a charge under Section 109 is unnecessary and
inappropriate. {See Kehar Singh and Ors. v. The State (Delhi
Admn.) AIR 1988 SC 1883]. Intentional aiding and active
complicity is the gist of offence of abetment.
E
12. In the background of the facts Section 109 IPC has no
application.
13. Above being the position, we uphold the conviction of
the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 365, F
366 and 511 IPC with the corresponding sentence as imposed
by the trial court and sustained by the High Court. The
convictions in terms of Sections 109 and 376 IPC are set aside.
The sentences would run concurrently.
14. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. G
D.G. Appeal partly allowed.
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