ARUN KUMAR YADAVversusSTATE OF U.P. THRU DIST. JUDGE

                    [2013] 6 S.C.R. 263

                  ARUN KUMAR YADAV                              A
                              v.
           STATE OF U.P. THRU DIST. JUDGE
           (Criminal Appeal No. 1430 of 2010)
                       MAY 29, 2013
                                                                B
     [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

      Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - s. 12 - Contempt of Court
- Accused (a litigant) using loud threatening utterances and
using unparliamentary language for Judicial Officer, while he C
was conducting court - Complainf.-Charge-sheet framed by
High Court - Accused initially denying the charges, but later
tendered unconditional apology - High Court did not accept
the apology and convicted the accused u/s.12 and sentenced
him to suffer simple imprisonment for one month and D
imposed fine of Rs.2,0001- with default clause - Appeal -
Held: Judicial proceeding has its own solemnity and sanctity
- It is obligation of everyone to behave with propriety when a
judicial proceeding is conducted - The sanctity of Jaw, which
is sustained through dignity of courts cannot be marred by E
errant behaviour of any counsel or litigant or judge himself -
 The apology was rightly rejected as the same was neither
prompt nor genuine - A concept of mercy and compassion
is ordinarily attracted keeping in view the infirmities of man's
nature and the fragile conduct - Conviction and sentence
upheld - However, the court expressed its displeasure on the
                                                                 F
issue that High Court took a lenient view in sentencing the
accused.

    R.K. Garg, Advocate vs. State of Himachal Pradesh
(1981) 3 SCC 166: 1981 (3) SCR 536; Mahabir Prasad              G
Singh vs. Mis. Jacks Aviation Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 287:
1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 675; Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary vs. State
(Delhi Administration) AIR 1984 SC 618: 1984 (2) SCR 438;

                            263                                 H
    264       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A   M.B. Sanghi vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana (1991) 3
    sec 600: 1991 (3) SCR 312; LO. Jaikwat vs. State of U.P.
    (1984) 3 SCC 405: 1984 (3) SCR 833 - relied on.

         In Re: Sanjiv Datta, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of
    Information 1{3nd Broadcasting, New Delhi, Kai/ash Vasdev,
8   Advocate and Kitty Kumaramanglam (Smt.), Advocate 1995
    (3) SCC 619: 1995 (3) SCR 450 - referred to.

                          Case Law Reference:
          1981 ca> SCR 536            relied on           Para 6
c
          1998 (2) Suppl. SCR 675 relied on               Para7
          1984 (2) SCR 438            relied on           Para 7
          1995 (3) SCR 450            referred to         Para 9
D
          1991 (3) SCR 312            relied on           Para 9
          1984 (3) SCR 833            relied on           Para 11
        CRIMll'\IAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
E   No. 1430 of 2010.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 17.08.2007 of the
    High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Contempt No.
    13 of 2006.

F       T.N. Saxena, Jyoti Saxena, M.P. Shorawala for the
    Appellant.

          The fo'llowing Order of the Court was delivered

                                ORDER
G
         1. This appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the
    Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the
    Act") against the judgment and order dated 17.08.2007 passed
    by the HiQh Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal
H
ARUN KUMAR YADAV v. STATE OF U.P. THRU DIST. 265
                 JUDGE
Contempt No. 13 of 2006, by way of which the High Court has            A
convicted the appellant for committing the contempt of court
under Section 12 of the Act and sentenced him to suffer simple
imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs2,000/- in
default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of
two weeks.                                                             B

     2. On 5.9.2005 the appellant moved an application to
surrender Chhandra Pal @ Badara s/o Shri Mathura under
various sections of the Indian Penal Code in pursuance of the
order passed under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal                  C
Procedure (for short "the Code") by the learned Judicial
Magistrate. As the offences mentioned in the application and
the process issued under Section 82 of the Code were
different, the court asked a report from the police station
concerned fixing the next date for disposal. About 3.45 p.m.,
when the Presiding Officer of the Court was in the midst of            D
dictation of the order to his stenographer in another case, i.e.,
Original Suit No. 200/90 titled Balraj V. Rangpal, the appellant
came inside the Court and shouted loudly uttering as under: -

     "As to why you did not take my accused in judicial custody.       E
     You have passed arbitrary orders. Now, my accused would
     be arrested and he would be encountered. You have done
     injustice. I will see you. If you have your official force I am
     also having my own force."
                                                                       F
     3. Apart from the aforesaid loud threatening utterances the
appellant had also used unparliamentary language for the said
Judicial Officer. The Judicial Officer sent a complaint to the High
Court against the appellant through proper channel, the
cognizance of which was taken by the High Court, first on
administrative side and, thereafter, on judicial side. After           G
hearing the parties, the High Court framed the charges against
the contemnor on 6.10.2006 in respect of this incident dated
5.9.2005 at Khaga Court, District Fatehpur, using abusive
language to Abdul Qayum, learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division/
Judicial Magistrate, Khaga, District Fatehpur) and interrupted         H
    266        SURREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A him from working and shouting loudly while he was dictating the
  order to his stenographer in other case. To the said charge-
  sheet, the appellant filed the counter affidavit dated 20.7.2006
  denying all the allegations made in the report of the Presiding
  Officer. Howi;wer, at a later stage by filing an affidavit dated
B 14.11.2006 he tendered unconditional apology to the court. The
  matter was lleard at length. The High Court discussed the
  entire facts and law and came to the conclusion that it was not
  a fit case wherein unconditional apology tendered by the
  appellant should be accepted and, thus, considering the gravity
c of the charge against him, he had been convicted and
  sentenced as referred to hereinabove.

       4. We have heard Mr. T.N. Saxena, learned counsel
  appearing for the appellant in detail, who has argued all the
  legal and factual aspects before us. However, we can express
D our anxiety and displeasure only on the issue that we fail to
  understand how the High Court could afford to take such a
  lenient view sentencing the appellant for one month's simple
  imprisonment only.

E      5. It has been reiterated by this Court time and again that
  the Bar and the Bench are required to maintain the decorum
  of the Cour:t, for Court is the temple of justice for all. No one
  has the aut)lority to conduct in a manner which would demean
  and disgrace the majesty of justice which is dispensed by a
F court of law. The administration of justice is the paramount role
  of the court and both Bar and the Bench have an equal role in
  performance of the said sacrosanct duty.

      6. In this context, we may refer with profit to the
  pronouncement in R.K. Garg, Advocate v. State of Himachal
G Pradesh', wherein the Court has observed thus:-

          "The Bar and the Bench are an integral part of the same
          mech,anism which administers justice to the people. Many
          members of the Bench are drawn from the Bar and their
H   1.   (1981) 3 sec 166.
ARUN KUMAR YADAV v. STATE OF U.P. THRU DIST. 267
                 JUDGE
      past association is a source of inspiration and pride to         A
      them. It ought to be a matter of equal pride to the Bar. It is
      unquestionably true that courtesy breeds courtesy and just
      as charity has to begin at home, courtesy must begin with
      the Judge. A discourteous Judge is like an ill-tuned
      instrument in the setting of a court room. But members of        B
      the Bar will do well to remember that such flagrant
      violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct will
      only result in the ultimate destruction of a system without
      which no democracy can survive."

      7. In Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Mis. Jacks Aviation Pvt.           C
Ltd. 2, this Court has observed that judicial function cannot and
should not be permitted to be stonewalled by browbeating or
bullying methodology whether it is by litigants or by counsel. In
the said case the two learned Judges, after referring to a three-
Judge Bench decision in Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi        D
Administration), has opined thus: -

      "It was further reminded that "having accepted the brief, he
      will be committing a breach of his professional duty, if he
      so fails to attend".                                             E

            "A lawyer is under obligation to do nothing that shall
      detract from the dignity of the Court, of which he is himself
      a sworn officer and assistant. He should at all times pay
      deferential respect to the Judge, and scrupulously observe
      the decorum of the Court room."                                  F

             (Warevelle's Legal Ethics at p. 182)

            Of course, it is not a unilateral affair. There is a
      reciprocal duty for the Court also to be courteous to the        G
      members of the Bar and to make every endeavour for
      maintaining and protecting the respect which members of
      the Bar are entitled to have from their clients as well as
      from the litigant public. Both the Bench and the Bar are the
2.   AIR 1999 SC 287.                                                  H
     268        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 6 S.C.R.

A          two inextricable wings of the judicial forum and therefore
           the aforesaid mutual respect is sine qua non for the efficient
           function1ing of the solemn work carried on in Courts of law.
           But that does not mean that any advocate or group of them
           can boycott the courts or any particular Court and ask the
B          Court to desist from discharging judicial functions. At any
           rate, no advocate can ask the Court to avoid a case on
           the ground that he does not want to appear in that Court."

       8. In In Re: Sanjiv Datta, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of
  Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi, Kai/ash Vasdev,
C Advocate and Kitty Kumaramanglam (Smt.), Advocate•
  certain observations were made, though in different context, yet
  we think it apt to reproduce the same:-

           "The l~gal profession is a solemn and serious occupation.
D           It is a noble calling and all those who belong to it are its
            honou~able members. Although the entry to the profession
           can be had by acquiring merely the qualification of technical
           competence, the honour as a professional has to be
            maintained by its members by their exemplary conduct
E          both in and outside the court. The legal profession is
           different from other professions in that what the lawyers do,
           affect$ not only an individual but the administration of
           justice which is the foundation of the civilised society. Both
           as a leading member of the intelligentsia of the society and
           as a responsible citizen, the lawyer has to conduct himself
F
           as a model for others both in his professional and in his
           private and public life. The society has a right to expect of
           him such ideal behaviour."

           9. In M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana 5,
G it has been opined that


    3.   AIR 1984 SC 618.
    4.   1995 (3) sec 619
H   s.   (1991) 3 sec 600.
ARUN KUMAR YADAV v. STATE OF U.P. THRU DIST. 269
                 JUDGE

      "The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers   A
      by disgruntled elements who fail to secure the desired
      order is ever on the increase and it is high time it is nipped
      in the bud. And, when a member of the profession resorts
      to such cheap gimmicks with a view to browbeating the
      Judge into submission, it is all the more painful. When          B
      there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would
      shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system,
      the damage caused is not only to the reputation of the
      Judge concerned but also to the fair name of the judiciary."

      10. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is clear as         C
noon day that the judicial proceeding has its own solemnity and
sanctity. No one has any authority to sully the same. It is the
obligation of everyone to behave with propriety when a judicial
proceeding is conducted. Any kind of deviancy not only affects
the system but corrodes the faith of the collective at large.          D
Neither any counsel nor a litigant can afford to behave in this
manner. This being the position, it is really shocking that a
counsel who was in his mid fiftees could afford to behave like
that. Hence, we have expressed our displeasure.
                                                                       E
      11. The learned counsel for the appellant has endeavoured
had to impress us that when the appellant had offered
unconditional apology, the same should have been accepted.
In LO. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. 6 it has been observed as
follows: -                                                             F
      "We do not think that merely because the appellant has
      tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence
      and allow him to go unpunished. Otherwise, all that a
      person wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the
      grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go ahead       G
      and scandalize him, and later on tender a formal empty
      apology which costs him practically nothing. If such an
      apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an

a.   (1984) 3 sec 405.                                                 H
    270        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A         exception, we would in fact be virtually issuing a "licence"
          to scandalize courts and commit contempt of court with
          impunity. It will be rather difficult to persuade members of
          the Bar, who care for their self-respect, to join the judiciary
          if they are expected to pay such a price for it. And no
B         sitting Judge will feel free to decide any matter as per the
          dictates of his conscience on account of the fear of being
          scandalized and persecuted by an advocate who does not
          mind making reckless allegations if the Judge goes
          against his wishes. If this situation were to be
c         countenanced, advocates who can cow down the Judges,
          and make them fall in line with their wishes, by threats of
          character assassination and persecution, will be preferred
          by the litigants· to the advocates who are mindful of
          professional ethics and believe in maintaining the decorum
          of courts."
D
         12. In the case et hand, we are absolutely convinced that
    apology or for that matter the unconditional apology was neither
    prompt nor genuine. The concept of mercy and compassion is
    ordinarily attracted keeping in view the infirmities of man's
E   nature and the fragile conduct but in a court of law a counsel
    cannot always take shelter under the canopy of mercy, for the
    law has to reign supreme. The sanctity of law which is sustained
    through dignity of courts cannot be marred by errant behaviour
    by any <1:ounsel or litigant. Even a Judge is required to maintain
F   the decorum and dignity of the court.

       13.'ln view of the above, we do not find any force in the
  appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. The appellant is
  directed to surrender and deposit the fine within a period of
G thirty days from today, failing which the Chief Judicial
  Magistrate, Fatehpur, shall ensure to give effect to the judgment
  and order passed by the High Court.

    K.K.T.                                         Appeal dismissed.