Holding

Placement in a select list does not confer a legal right to appointment, and the bank's recruitment actions were not arbitrary, so no mandamus could be issued.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined a dispute over the appointment of Vijay Shankar Shukla, a general‑category candidate who was placed 47th in a select list for officer posts at Aryavrat Gramin Bank, a Regional Rural Bank governed by the Regional Rural Bank Act, 1976 and subject to NABARD and Central Government directives. Shukla filed a writ petition seeking a mandamus directing the bank to appoint him, arguing that the bank’s failure to fill the posts in accordance with the 33% promotion and 50% direct‑recruitment policy was arbitrary and violated Article 14. The High Court had granted the relief, but the bank appealed. The Supreme Court held that inclusion in a select list does not create a legal right to appointment and that the bank’s actions were not arbitrary; the expiry of the panel’s validity and the delay in filing the petition further precluded any mandamus. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court’s order set aside.

Issues considered

Does placement in a select list confer a legal right to appointment?
Whether the bank's recruitment process was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution?
Can a writ of mandamus be issued after the expiry of the panel’s validity?
Do delay and laches bar the relief sought by the petitioner?

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 12, s. Article 14, s. Article 226

Subjects

recruitmentappointmentselect listjudicial reviewArticle 14mandamusdelaylachesquotapromotiondirect recruitmentRegional Rural Bank

Judgment

._,_

ARYAVRAT GRAMIN BANK A
v.
VIJAY SHANKAR SHUKLA

SEPTEMBER 20, 2007
B
[S.B. SINHA AND H.S. BEDI, JJ.)

/
Service Law- Recruitment-As per a Circular, 33 % ofthe posts
ofofficers filled by promotion-Advertisementfor recruitment-Later
circular specifying filling up of the posts of officers 50% by direct c
recruitment and 50% by promotion-By an interim order of Court,
recruitment restricted to 50'Yo-Select Listfor filling 35 posts-26 posts
whereof meant for general categ01y-A general category candidate,
placed at 47th position in the List, filing Writ Petition, seeking
:appointment-Allowed by High Court, giving the relief to the ti
challenging candidate alone-On appeal, held : The candidate was
not entitled to the relief-Selection andfinding place in the Select List,
by itself does not confer legal right to be appointed-The act of the
Bank cannot be said to be arbitrary-Appointments were made in
confirmation with the policy ofCentral Government and NABARD- E
Bank as a State cannot be asked to appoint the candidate, ignoring
the candidates whose names appeared higher on the List-Constitution
ofIndia, 1950-Articles 12and14.
'J.
Judicial review-In the matter of appointment-Permissibility
of-Held: Court should not interfere with the right to make F
appointment by an employer, unless its action or inaction is wholly
arbitrary so as to offend Article 14 ofthe Constitution-Constitution
ofIndia, 1950-Articles 14 and 226.

.;...~ Appellant-Bank was governed by Regional Rural Bank Act, G
1976 and functioned under instructions and control of National Bank
for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) and Central
Government. Under a Circular dated 6.2.1984 by NABARD, 33%
staff bad been promoted for the post of officer. Thereafter
593 liI
~- -·
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

G

HELD: 1. It is now a trite law that only because a person has
been selected and his name finds place in the select list, the same
by itself does not confer any legal right on him to be appointed. It is
H also trite that ordinarily a Superior Court in exercise ofits power of
ARYAVRATGRAMINBANKv. VIJAYSHANKARSHUKLA 595

r- judicial review would not interfere with the right to make appointment A
by an employer unless its action or in-action is found to be wholly
arbitrary so as to offend Article 14 of the Constitution oflndia.
(Para 21] (601-G-H]

2. In this case despite certain confusions in regard to
B
percentage of the posts to be filled by direct recruitment as also by
the promotees, the appellant took steps to give effect to the,
,.> directives issued by the Central Government as also the NABARD.
It is not case that the employer had stopped the recruitment process,
mid-way and had arbitrarily picked up persons ofits preference. No
such case has been made out. For implementing the policy decision c
of the Central Government, the appellant proceeded on the basis .
that only 50% of the vacant posts be filled up by direct recruitment.
For the said purpose, the reservation policy of the state was also to
be given effect to. If the policy of the Central Government which
was to be implemented in terms of the provisions of the Act had been D
">t given effect to by the appellant, no exception thereto, could have
been taken. It is not the case of the respondent nor the High Court
arrived at a finding that the appellant had appointed any person front
the Select List arbitrarily ignoring the cases of those whose names
appeared higher on the list. The High Court, therefore, must be held E
to have misdirected itself in arriving at the aforementioned decision
as it posed un-to itself a wrong question.
[Paras 22, 23 and 24] (602-A, C, E, F]

3. High Court was wrong in its approach that despite expiry of
F
the life of the panel, appointment could/ should have been made.
Ordinarily, even without any statutory provision, the life of panel is
one year. In relation thereto the Central Government had issued two
Circular Letters. Only because the appellant-Bank had appointed
a few persons beyond the said period (presumably on the premise
j..., G
that its representation before the NABARD for extending the period
oflife of the panel would find favour with the authorities) the same
by itself did not confer any legal right on the respondent to seek for
issuance of a writ of Mandamus nor did it confer any jurisdiction on

H
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S:C.R.

A the High Court to issue the said Writ. 'i"
[Paras 25 and 27] [602-H; 603-E]
State ofRajasthan and Ors. v. Jagdish Chopra, (2007) 10 SCALE
4701, relied on.
B 4. So far as the ques~ion of delay and laches on the part of the
respondent is concerned , the High .Court committed a serious error
in so far as it failed to take into consideration that whereas the life
of the panel came to an end in June, 1986, the writ was filed in
September, 1993. For the aforementioned purpose what was relevant
C was the conduct of the respondent and not the conduct of the
appellant. [Para 28] [603-F]
5. The respondent in the Writ Petition had proceeded only on
the basis that the quota for the direct recruits would be 67% and
not 50% . If that was the case put forth by the respondent in his Writ
D Petition, it cannot be accepted that all the 70 posts were to be
appointed by direct recruitment which apparently runs counter to the
case of the appellant itself. [Para 29] [603-G-H; 604-A]
6. If in terms of the Select List the position of the respondent
E amongst the general category candidates was at serial number 47,
a large number of persons were evidently above him. They might
not have approached the High Court but it would not change the legal
position. If the appellant, which is a 'State' under Article 12 of the
Constitution of India, was to be asked by the High Court to act in
F terms of the Select List, it would have been obligated to appoint only
those persons whose names appear high on the said list. Other
candidates, advisedly, did not approach the High Court for such a
relief as the life of the panel ha.d come to an end and the appellant
had been enforcing the policy decision framed by the Central
G Government and NABARD to which it was bound to follow.·
[Para 30] [604-B-C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6672 of
2004.
From the Judgment & Order dated24.7.2003 of the High Court of
H
ARYAVRATGRAMINBANK v. VIJAYSHANKAR 597
SHUKLA [SINHA, J.]
Judicature at Allahabad in C.M.W.P. No. 34881/1993. A
Ramesh Singh, Akanksha, Swigin, Neha, Bina Gupta and Nina
Gupta for the Appellant.
Pramod Swarup and Goodwill Indeevar for the Respondent.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Respondent herein was a candidate for being
appointed in the post of Officer in the appellant Bank pursuant to or in
furtherance of an advertisement made on 21.8.1984.
2. Indisputably, Appellant Bank is governed under the provisions of
c
Regional Rural Bank Act, 1976 (The said Act); its sponsor Bank being
Bank oflndia. Indisputably, again its functions are under the control of
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD in
short). .. D
3. The rural banks in terms of the provisions of the said Act are
obligated to follow the instructions issued by NABARD as also by the
Central Government.
4. We may at the outset notice some office orders and circulars issued
by the Central Government as also by the NABARD so as to appreciate E
the rival contentions raised by the parties before us.
5. On or about 6.2.1984, a Circular was issued by NABARD in
"'-.!.. terms whereof 33% staff had been said to have been promoted to the
post of Officer. NAB ARD also issued a Circular on or about 31.12.1984 :F
i.:vhich was circulated amongst all the Chairmen of the Rural Regional Rural
Banks, inter alia, stating as under:
4.0fficers:
50% of the vacancies of the officers are to be filled by direct G
recruitment in the open market and the balance 50% by promotion
from amongst Field Supervisors. Promotions will be on the
principle of seniority-cum- merit. The other terms and conditions
are as given below:
H
--\"_
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A (a) Source of recruitment: (i) By promotion -50%
(ii) By direct
recruitment from open market
- 50%.
(b) Qualifications/ (i) For Direct Recruitment
B
Eligibili1y Graduate of a
recognised University.
Preference will be given to
Agri/Commerce/Econornics
Graduates.
c (ii) For Promotion
Five years service as
Field Supervisor.
6. To the same effect, the appellant Bank also issued a circular dated
D · 16.2.1985. We may notice that in the aforementioned advertisement dated
21.8.1984, the exact number of vacancies which were to be filled up by
reason of direct recruitment had not been specified. Written tests and
interviews for filling up the said posts of Officers were undertaken
sometime in April,1985. It appears that, in the meantime, the promotees
E had filed a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
which was marked as Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.5829/1985, inter alia,
questioning the recruitment process undertaken by the direct recruits
wherein an interim order dated 14.5.2005 was passed directing the
respondent not to fill up the posts of Officers contrary to the quota
reserved for promotees as contemplated by Clause(20) of the
F Administrative Instructions dated 6.2.1984, as referred to hereinbefore.
7. The said interim order came to be clarified by an order dated
2.8.1985 in terms whereof the appellant herein was given the liberty for
making appointment in proportion to the quota of direct recruits or also
G the promotees.
8. A select list was published by the appellant Bank on 23.6.1985.
Respondent herein who was a general category candidate and whose roll
number was 2405 occupied the 47th position in the category of the general
candidates. It is also not in dispute that out of the 35 vacancies which
H
ARYAVRATGRAMINBANK v. VIJAYSHANKAR 599
SHUKLA[SINHA,J.]
were sought to be filled up by direct recruits, 26 posts were filled up from A
amongst general category candidates, seven from the scheduled castes
candidates and two from the scheduled tribes candidates.
9. Appellant has contented before the High Court as also before us
that the life of the panel was only one year which was fixed by reason of
a circular dated 30.9.1980 issued by the Ministry of Finance which was B
reiterated in circular dated 19 .9 .1983.
>_! 10. Appellant Bank herein filed an application for extension of the
life of the said panel, which was otherwise expiring in June, 1986 upto
December, 1986, but the same was declined by the NABARD in terms C
of a letter dated 19.12.1986 stating as under:
" ... Please refer to your letter No. HO/PERS/11/6218 dated 1st
October, 1986 on the above subject. We observe therefromthat
your existing staff is adequate for the present. We, therefore, regret
our inability to accede to your request for extension of validity period D
of the panel. You may place your indent with BSRB, keeping in
view your future needs, in consultation with your sponsor bank."
11. It, however, stands accepted that the Bank in the meantime had
appointed a few candid~tes in the said _50% quota after one year. E
12. Respondent herein filed a Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.34881/
1993 before the High Court of Allahabad, inter alia- praying for issuance
of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus commanding the appellant Bank
to appoint him to the Officers' Cadre on the basis of his selectior.. made
through an open competitive written examination and interview. The said F
writ petition was filed on the premise that as the quota meant for the
promotees was 33 113%, the appellant Bank acted arbitrarily in not '
making appointments on the basis of the select list prepared therefor.
13. Appellant in his counter affidavit as also in the supplementary G
counter affidavit apart from bringing the aforementioned fact also stated
that in terms of a circular issued by the Government of India dated
26.12.1985, the entire recruitment process is to be conducted by the
Banking Service Recruitment Board. It was furthermore stated that as the
posts of the Field Supervisors were abolished on 1.9.1987, the posts of H
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A officers were filled up. On that premise it was contended that the Bank is -"'(
nQw over staffed.
14. The High Court in its impugned judgment proceeded on the basis
that in terms of the aforementioned circular letter dated 6.2.1984 only
B 33 1/3% of the posts of the Officers were filled up.
15. In regard to the contention raised by the appellant herein, the
High Court furthermore opined that although no legal right vested in the .........
candidate only beca,use his name figured in the select list as laid down in \

a decision of this Court Shankarsan Dash v. Union ofIndia, AIR (1991)
C SC 1612 as the law does not permit an employer to proceed with
selection process and then stop mid-way arbitrarily so as to enable it to
pick the persons of his preference and passion and on the other hand,
leave others in lurch for no justifiable cause.
16. In regard to the contention of the appellant that the writ petition
D suffered from delay and latches, the Court purported to have commented
upon the conduct of the appellant herein in not disclosing the full particulars
of the various writ petitions pending in the said Court as also the number
of actual vacancies. The High Court furthermore was of the opinion that
as the respondent did not get all the information, the delay occurred.
E
17. It appears that a query was made from the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant Bank as to whether any other
candidate had approached the Court and on being informed that there
was no such writ petition pending, it was observed as under:
F "The petitioner alone has approached this Court challenging
arbitrary action of the respondent Bank. the irrestible conclusion
is that others have not pursued their claim. the petitioner alone,
therefore, is entitled for the relief of appointment."

G 18. On the aforesaid premise a writ of mandamus was issued directing
the appellant-Bank herein to appoint the respondent herein to the post of
Officer cadre on the basis of the said select list.
19. Mr. Ramesh Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant Bank, inter alia, would submit that the High Court had
H
ARYAVRATGRAMIN BANK v. VIJAY SHANK.AR 601
SHUKLA [SINHA, J.]
>- committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as A
it failed to take into consideration;
(i) the select list did not create valid right in favour of the respondent
herein to be appointed;
(ii) the life of the select list having expired and NAB ARD having B
categorically refused to extend the life of the panel, no writ of
mandamus could be issued only on the ground that a few
~ candidates had been appointed after the said date;
(iii) the writ petition was barred under the principles of delay and
laches and particularly in view of the fact that the respondent had c
not offered any cogent explanation therefor.
(iv) Even it be assumed that 67% posts were to be filled up by
the direct recruits, the respondent could not have been appointed
therein as his position in the select list of general candidates being D
47.
20. Mr. Pramod Swamp, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent, on the other hand, has taken us through the judgment of
the High Court and would submit that all the 70 posts were meant to be
filled up only by direct recruitment. It was contended that the circular letter E
dated 6.2.1984 being valid and the posts of the Officer Grade meant to
be filled up from amongst the promotees having already been filled up,
all the vacancies were meant to be filled up from amongst the direct
~
recruits. Learned counsel would draw our attention to the comments made
by the High Court in regard to the purported conduct of the appellant to F
submit that in a situation of this nature, the High Court judgment is
unassailable.
21. It is now a trite law that only because a person has been selected
).., and his name finds place in the select list, the same by itself does not G
confer any legal right on him to be appointed. It is also trite that ordinarily
a Superior Court in exercise of its power of judicial review would not
interfere with the right to make appointment by an employer unless its
action or in-action is found to be wholly arbitrary so as to offend Article
14 of the Constitution of India.
t!
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A 22. In this case we have noticed that despite certain confusions in
regard to percentage of the posts to be filled by direct recruitment as also
by the promotees, the appellant took steps to give effect to the directives
issued by the Central Government as also the NABARD. It may be true
that some employees of the Bank filed a writ petition questioning the said
B move and obtained some interim orders but we may notice that ultimately
the said writ petition had been dismissed as having become infructuous.
23. It is not a case as was observed by the High Court that the
employer had stopped the recruitment process mid-way and had
arbitrarily picked up persons of its preference. No such case has been
C made out even in the writ petition. No such case has even been made
before us. For implementing the policy decision of the Central Government
the appellant proceeded on the basis that only 50% of the vacant posts
be filled up by direct recruitment. For the said purpose, the reservatioµ
policy of the State was also to be given effect to. If the policy of the Central /

D Government which was to be implemented in terms of the provisions of
the Act had been given effect to by the appellant, no exception thereto,
could have been taken. It is not the case of the respondent nor the High
Court arrived at a finding that the appellant had appointed any person
from the select list arbitrarily ignoring the cases of those whose names
E appeared higher on the list.
24. We fail to understand as to on what basis the High Court arrived
at the said finding that the appellant had picked up persons of its
preference. The High Court, therefore, must be held to have misdirected y
F itself in arriving at the aforementioned decision as it posed un-to itself a
wrong question. Nothing has been brought on record to show that in the
matter of implementation of the select list, the1ligh Court had acted
arbitrarily or malafide. In the absence of such a plea, in our opinion, the
High Court was bound to follow the decision of this Court in Shankarasan
Dash (Supra) and other decisions following the same.
G
25. We also fail to countenance the approach of the High Court that
despite expiry of the life of the panel, appointment could/should have been
made. Ordinarily, even without any statutory provision, the life of panel
is one year. We have noticed hereinbefore that in relation thereto the
H Central Government had issued two circular letters.
ARYAVRAT GRAMINBANK v. VIJA Y SHANKAR 603
SHUKLA [SINHA, J.]
26. In State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Jagdish Chopra, (2007) 10 A
SCALE 470, this Court held:
"7. Recruitment for teachers in the State of Rajasthan is
admittedly governed by the statutory rules. All recruitments,
therefore, are required to be made in terms thereof Although Rule
9(3) of the Rules does not not specifically provide for the period B
for which the merit list shall remain valid but the intent of the
>-1" legislature is absolutely clear as vacancies have to be determined
only once in a year. Vacancies which arose in the subsequent years
could be filled up from the select list prepared in the previous year
and not in other manner. Even otherwise; in absence of any rule, C
ordinary period of validity of select list should be one year.... "
It was further held :
"It is well settled principle oflawthat even selected candidates do
not have legal right in this behalf.." D
27. In that view of the matter, only because the appellant herein had
appointed a few persons beyond the said period(presumably on the
premise that its representation before the NABARD for extending the
period oflife of the panel would find favour with the authorities) the same E
by itself did not confer any legal right on the respondent to seek for
issuance of a writ of mandamus nor did it confer any jurisdiction on the
High Court to issue the said writ.
28. So far as the question of delay and laches on the part of the
respondent is concerned, in our opinion, the High Court again committed F
a serious error in so far as it failed to take into consideration that whereas
the life of the panel came to an end in June, 1986, the Writ was filed in
September, 1993. For the aforementioned purpose what was relevant was
the conduct of the respondent and not the conduct of the appellant.
G
29. We have noticed hereinbefore that the respondent in the writ
petition had proceeded only on the basis that the quota for the direct
recruits would be 67% and not 50%. If that was the case put forth by
the respondent in his writ petition, we are not in a position to accept the
submission of Mr. Swarup, learned counsel that all the 70 posts were to H
-->t..__
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A be appointed by direct recruitment which apparently runs counter to the
case of the appellant itself.
30. In any view of the matter if in terms of the select list the position
of the respondent amongst the general category candidates was at serial
number 47, a large number of persons were evidently above him. They
B might not have approached the High court but it would not change the
legal position. If the appellant which is a 'State' under Article 12 of the
Constitution of India was to be asked by the High Court to act in terms
c: .. of the select list, it would have been obligated to appoint only those persons
whose names appear high on the said list. Other candidates, advisedly,
C did not approach the High Court for such a relief as the life of the panel
had come to an end and the appellant had been enforcing the policy
decision framed by the Central Government and NABARD to which it
was bound to follow.
D 31. Whatever be the view, in our opinion, the respondent was not
entitled to get any relief in the writ petition far less a writ of or in the nature
of mandamus. The impugned judgment cannot be sustained and the same
is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel's fee
assessed at Rs. 10,000/-.
E K.K.T. Appeal allowed.