Holding

The non‑mention of the accused's caste in the FIR does not warrant quashing of the proceedings; the caste issue can be determined during investigation, and the High Court's order was set aside.

Summary

The appellant filed an FIR alleging an offence under Section 3(1)(ix) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The accused filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quash of the proceedings on the ground that the FIR did not mention his caste. The Bombay High Court allowed the petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that an FIR is not required to be an encyclopedia and the caste of the accused can be ascertained during investigation, charge‑sheet filing or trial. Consequently, the non‑mention of caste in the FIR is not a valid ground to invoke the inherent power under Section 482 to quash the case. The Court set aside the High Court order and allowed the appeal, emphasizing that the inherent jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and not to stifle a legitimate prosecution.

Issues considered

Whether the non‑mention of the accused's caste in an FIR under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act justifies quashing the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC.
Whether the High Court can examine the caste question at the FIR stage and exercise its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss the case.
What is the proper scope of the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC in cases involving the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 156(2), s. 482
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989s. 23(1), s. 3(1)(ix)
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995s. Rule 7

Subjects

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) ActSection 482 CrPCFIRCaste identificationInherent jurisdictionQuashing of criminal proceedingsInvestigation

Judgment

[2009] 2 S.C.R. 382

A ASHABAI MACHINDRA ADHAGALE
v
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
Criminal Appeal No. 287 of 2009
FEBRUARY 12, 2009
B
(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA
AND H.L. DATTU, JJ)
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:

c ss. 482, 154 and 156 (2) - Criminal proceedings u/s 3
(1) (ix) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act - Quashed by High Court for non-mentioning
of caste of accused in FIR - HELD: Question as to whether
accused belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribes
D can be gone into during investigation - Order of High Court
set aside - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes .. ,,_
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989- s. 3 (1) (ix) - 'Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules,
1995 - r.7.
E The appellant filed an F.l.R. against respondent no.3
complaining commission of offences punishable u/s 3 (1)
(ix) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
- (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Respondent no. 3 filed ~

a petition u/s 482 Cr. P.C. before the High Court primarily
F on the ground that the caste was not mentioned in the
FIR and, therefore, the proceedings deserved to be
quashed. The High Court allowed the petition.
In the appeal filed by the complainant, it was
contended for the appellant that non-mentioning of caste
G
of the accused in the FIR could not be a ground to quash ~
~
the proceedings.
Allowing the appeal, the Court

H 382
ASHABAI MACHINDRAADHAGALE V. STATE OF 383
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

HELD:· 1. The powers of by the High Court u/s 482 of A
the Code of Criminl Procedure, 1973 are very wide, and
the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in
its exercise. The High Court must be careful to see that
its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound
principles. The inherent power should not be exercised s
to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should
normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a
case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more
so, when the evidence has not been collected and
produced before the court and the issues involved, c
whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be
seen in their true perspective without sufficient material.
While exercising jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code, the High
Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry
whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or
0
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it, accusation
would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial
court. [para 13-12] [ 392-8, C, D; 390-C, D]
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335;
Superintendent of Police, CBI and Ors. V Tapan Kumar Singh E
2003 (6) SCC 175; State of Orissa v. Saro} Kumar Sahoo
(2005) 13 SCC 540; Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar AIR 2006
SC 1937; and R.P Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866
- referred to.

2. An FIR is not expected to be an encyclopedia. The F
question as to whether the accused belongs to scheduled
caste or scheduled tribe can be gone into during
investigation. Rule 7 of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995
prescribes that investigation has to be done by an officer G
not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.
After ascertaining the facts during the course of
investigation it is open to the investigating officer to record
that the accused either belong to or does not belong to
scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. After final opinion is H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 2 S.C.R.

A formed, it is open to the court to either accept the same or
take cognizance. Even if the charge sheet is filed, at the
time of consideration of the charge it is open to the
accused to bring to the notice of the court that the
materials do not show that he does not belong to
B scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. Even if charge is
framed, at the time of trial materials can be placed to show
that the accused either belongs or does not belong to
scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. [para 14-16] [492-E,
F, G, H; 493-A, B]
C Masumsha Hasanasha Musa/man v. State of
Maharashtra 2000 (3) SCC 557; and Dinesh @ Buddha v.
State of Rajasthan 2006 (3) SCC 771 - referred to.
Manohar S/o Martandrao Kulkarni and Anr. V State of
Maharashtra and Ors. 2005 (4) Mh.L.J. 588 - overruled.
D
Case Law Reference
2005 (4) Mh.L.J. 588 overruled para 5
1992 Supp (1) 335 referred to para 6
E 2003 (6) sec 115 referred to para 7
2000 (3) sec 557 referred to para 8
2006 (3) sec 111 referred to para 8
AIR 1960 SC 866 referred to para 11
F (2005) 13 sec 540 referred to para 13
AIR 2006 SC 1937 referred to para 13
CRIMJNALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 287 of 2009
G
From the final Judgement and Order dated 26.6.2006 of
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad
in Criminal Application No. 1534 of 2006.
Makrand D. Adkar, S.D. Singh, Vijay Kumar, Bhati Tyagi ·
H andVishwajit Singh, for the Appellant.
ASHABAI MACHINDRAADHAGALE V. 385
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

J Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, M.Y. Deshmukh and A
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, for the Respondent.
The Judgement of ~he Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
B
1. Leave granted.
2. An interesting question of law arises in this appeal.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Appellant filed First Information Report (in short the 'FIR')
under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in c
short the 'Code') at Newasa Police Station, District
Ahmednagar, alleging commission of offence punishable under
Section 3(1 )(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short the 'Act'). A petition
under Section 482 of Code was filed by respondent No.3 D
"" " (hereinafter referred to as the 'accused'). The basic stand was
that in the FIR the caste of accused was not mentioned and
therefore the proceedings cannot be continued and deserved
to be quashed. The High Court placing reliance on earlier
decisions of the High Court allowed the petition. E
3. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the view taken by the Bombay High Court is
~
contrary to one taken by the Orissa High Court. It is submitted
that the offence primarily relates to purported perpetration of
crime on the victim because of his or her caste. It is for the F
accused to show that he does not belong to higher caste and
that is a matter of evidence. It is not that in the instant case there
was no reference to the caste of an accused as it is clearly
mentioned in the FIR that the offence is relatable to Section
3(1 )(xi) of the Act. Therefore, there is a reference though G
......, ~
indirectly to the caste of the accused. Even otherwise it is
submitted that the non-mention of the caste of the accused cannot
be a ground to quash the proceedings. At the framing of charge
or in case the charge sheet is filed and/or during trial the accused
can establish that he does not belong to higher caste. It is H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 2 S.C.R.

A submitted that FIR is not an encyclopedia of all events and basic
ingredients of offence are clearly made out.
4. Learned counsel for respondent No.3, on the other hand,
submitted that Section 3(1) itself provides that the offence should
have been committed by a person who is not a member of the
B Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, unless that specific
mention is made no offence is disclosed.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to various
judgments of Bombay High Court in this regard supporting his
c stand. e.g. Manohar S/o Martandrao Kulkarni and Anr. v. State
of Maharashtra and Ors. (2005 (4) Mh.L.J. 588)
6. It is also submitted that the complainant i.e. the appellant
is harassing people by filing frivolous petitions taking shelter of
the fact that she belongs to scheduled caste. Therefore, placing
D strong reliance on the observations of this Court in State of
y ;
Harvana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335), it is submitted
that the proceedings deserved to be quashed which according
to him the High Court rightly did.
7. In Superintendent of Police. CBI and Ors. v. Tapan Kumar
E Singh (2003 (6) SCC 175) this Court elaborately dealt with the
need of an FIR. It was inter-alia observed as follows:
"20. It is well settled that a first information report is not an
encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details
F relating to .the offence reported. An informant may lodge
a report about the commission of an offence though he
may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He
may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first
informant need not necessarily be an eyewitness so as to
be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the offence
G
committed. What is of significance is that the information
given must disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence and: the information so lodged must provide a
basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of
a cognizable offence. At this sta~Q it is enough if the police
H
ASHABAI MACHINDRAADHAGALE V. STATE OF 387
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT J.]

officer on the basis of the information given suspects the A
commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must
be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has
been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the
basis of information received, that a cognizable offence
may have been committed, he is bound to record the B
information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it
is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the
truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete
investigation that he may be able to report on the truthfulness
or otherwise of the information. Similarly, even if the c
information does not furnish all the details he must find out
those details in the course of investigation and collect all
the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing
the commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion
the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all
'I' D
/
necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in
accordance with law. The true test is whether the
information furnished provides a reason to suspect the
commission of an offence, which the police officer
concerned is empowered under Section 156 of the Code
to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record the E
information and proceed to investigate the case either
himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct
the investigation. The question as to whether the report is
true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner
of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and whether F
there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are
all matters which are alien to the consideration of the
question whether the report discloses the commission of
a cognizable offence. Even if the information does not
.A _. give full details regarding these matters, the investigating G
officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate the case
and discover the true facts, if he can.

xx xx xx
22. The High Court has also quashed the GD entry and H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 2 S.C.R.

A the investigation on the ground that the information did not \_

disclose all the ingredients of the offence, as if the informant
is obliged to reproduce the language ofthe section, which
defines "criminal misconduct" in the Prevention of
Corruption Act. In our view the law does not require the
B mentioning of all the ingredients of the offence in the first
information report. It is only after a complete investigation
that it may be possible to say whether any offence is made
out on the basis of evidence collected by the investigating ~

agency."
c 8. Similarly, in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State
of Maharashtra (2000 (3) SCC 557), this Court noted that with
reference to Section 3(2)(v) of the Act that to attract the
provisions of said section the sine qua non is that the victim
should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a
D Scheduled Tribe and that the offence under the Indian Penal )'
''
Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC') is committed against him on the
basis that such a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a
Schedule Tribe. In the absence of-such ingredients no offence
under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act arises. The view in Masumsha's
E case (supra) was reported in Dinesh @ Buddha v. State of
Rajasthan (2006 (3) SCC 771 ).
9. The scope for interference on the basis of an application
under Section 482 of Code is well known.

F 10. Section 1482 does riot confer any new· powers on the
High Court. It only saves the_ inherent power which the Court
possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three
circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be
exercised, ·namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code
I

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise
G
secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to
lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of
.. A

inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with
procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise.
Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express
H
~
ASHABAI MACHINDRAADHAGALE V. STATE OF 389
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT J.)

provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of A
functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the
doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely
recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts.
All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of
any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such B
powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in
course of administration of justice on the principle "quando !ex
aliauid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine guo res
ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it
;
gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising c
powers under the section, the court does not function as a court
of appeal or- revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section
though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with
caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests

... specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised
ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court
D

exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to
abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has
power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the
... court, to allow any action which would result in injustice and E
prevent promotion of justice, on exercise of the powers court
would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/
continuance of it amounts to 'abuse of the process of court or
quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends
of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the court F
may examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to
be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess
what the report has alleged and whether any offence is made
out even if the allegations are accepted in tote.
_.._ G,
~· 11. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 this
\ Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent
power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings.

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 2 S.C.R.

A (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there
is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced
B clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
12. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear
in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal
evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent
c with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal
evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the
accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon
an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would
0
not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial
process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless
harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in
exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and
circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest
E it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant
to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the
same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an
accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden '
j-

death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of
F the Code. and the categories of cases where the High Court
may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences l,_
to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in
State of Harvana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) 335). A note of
G caution was, however, added that the power should be
exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The.
illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows: /

"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
H
ASHABAI MACHINDRAADHAGALE V. STATE OF 391
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT J.]

value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie A
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation B
by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the puNiew of Section
155 (2) of the Code.
I (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR c
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.

.. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable D
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155 (2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or "complaint E
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
-;""
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
. that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any F
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code. or Act concerned,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the G
.....-.. aggrieved party.
~

J "'
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
H
392 SUPREME-COURT REPORTS [2009] 2 S.C.R.

A. on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge."
13. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
Cou.rt under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the
very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.
B CourtJnust be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this
power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should
not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High
Court being the highest court oJ a State should normally refrain
from giving a prin'la facie decision in a case where th~ entire "I
c facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has '-
)
I
not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues
involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot
be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of
course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases
D in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction
of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See State of Orissa
v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540 and Minu Kumari v.
State of Bihar AIR 2006 SC 1937).\
14. It needs no reiteration that the FIR is not expected to
E be an encyclopedia. As .rightly contended by learned counsel
for the appellant whether the accused belongs to scheduled
caste or scheduled tribe can.be gone into when the matter is )
being investigated. It is to be noted that under Section 23(1) of ·-
the Act, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
F of Atrocities) Rules, 1995 (in short the 'Rules') have been
framed.·
\
·,
15. Rule 7 deals with the,,investigating officer. Under Rule
7 inve_stigation has to be done 'by an officer not below the rank
of Deputy Superintendent of Police.
G _....,..
16. After ascertaining the facts during the course of t J
investigation it is open to the investigating officer to record that ~
the accused either belongs to or does not belongs to scheduled
I
..
caste or scheduled tribe. After final opinion is formed, it is open
,. '
H to the Court to either accept the same or take cognizanc.e. Even ...
ASHABAI MACHINDRA ADHAGALE V. STATE OF 393
MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT J.]

if the charge sheet is filed at the time of consideration of the A
charge, it is open to the accused to bring to the notice of the
Court that the materials do not show that the accused does not
belong to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. Even if charge is
framed at the time of trial materials can be placed to show that
the accused either belongs or does not belong to scheduled B
caste or scheduled tribe.
17. So far as the scope for investigation is concerned it is
relevant to note that sub-Section (2) of Section 156 of the Code
provides that no proceedings of a police officer in any such case
shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the ' C
c~se was one which such officer was not empowered under the
section to investigate. (underlined for emphasis).
18. Above being the position, the view taken by the Bombay
High Court does not appear to be the correct view while that of , D
• the Orissa High Court is the correct view. Accordingly, we allow
this appeal. Needless to say during investigation or at the time
of framing of charge or at the time of trial itis open to respondent
No.3 to show that he either belongs to scheduled caste or
scheduled tribe so that applicability of Section 3(1 )(xi) of the E
Act is ruled out.

RP. Appeal allowed.