Holding

The petitioner’s contemptuous vilification of judges warranted imprisonment of two months under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Summary

Asharam M. Jain filed a Special Leave Petition under Art. 136, alleging that the Chief Justice of the Maharashtra High Court and another judge had acted with bias and prejudice. The petition contained vitriolic accusations that the judges had deliberately harmed the petitioner and obstructed justice. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and, after a notice under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, held Jain guilty of contempt for vilifying the judges. Despite an unconditional apology offered by his counsel, the Court rejected the plea for leniency, emphasizing that contempt must be punished to protect the public interest in the administration of justice. Consequently, Jain was sentenced to simple imprisonment for two months. The judgment underscored that judges are not hypersensitive but that lines must be drawn to prevent abuse of the judicial process.

Issues considered

Whether the petitioner’s allegations against the Chief Justice and another judge constitute contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Whether an unconditional apology can obviate the need for imprisonment in a contempt proceeding.
What is the appropriate punishment for contempt involving vilification of judges?

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Art. 136
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Subjects

contempt of courtjudicial criticismspecial leave petitionimprisonmentadministration of justicepublic interestjudicial dignity

Judgment

719

ASHARAM M. JAIN
A
v.

A. T. GUPTA AND OTHERS

August 25, 1983 8
[O. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A. P. SEN AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]

Conte1npt of Court-Strains and mortification of litigation cannot fle
allowed ta lead litigants to tarnish, terrorise and destroy the system of atlminis· C
tration of justice by vilification of judges.

In a petition for special leave to appeaJ file~- by him, the petitioner
indulged in wild and vicious diatribe against the Chief Justice of the High
Court who had passed the order sought to be appealed from. In answer to the
notice issued to him under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 he prayed for
two weeks' time to file an affidavit (which was granted) and stated that he was D
not prepared to withdraw th,e allegations but desired to make amends. When
the matter came up again'! his c.ounsel placed before the Court an affidavit
said to contain the sincere and unconditional apology of the petitioner and
pleaded that the Court should accept it and refrain from sending him to
prison. Counci1, relying on Jn re : Shri S. Mulgaonkat:. [1978] 3 S.C.R.162
suggested that "a normative guideline for the judges to observe in this juris-
diction" was "not to be hypersensitive where distortions and criticism over-
E
step the limts, but to deflate vulgar denunciation by dignified bearing,
condescending indifference and repudiation by judicial rectitude''.

Rejecting the plea and sentencing the contemner to suffer simple
imprisonmen.t for a .Pi:!iod of two months.
F
HELD : There is never any risk of judicial hypersensitivity. The very
nature of the judicial function makes ju9ges. sympathetic and responsive. Judges
more than others realise the foibles, the frustrations, the undercurrents and the
tensions of litigants and litigation. ·But, as elsewhere, lines have to be drawn.
The strains and mortification of litigation cannot be allowed to lead litigants
to tarnish, terrorise and destroy the system of administration of justice by
vilification of judges. It is not that judges ~eed be protected; judges may well
take care of themselves. Jt is the right and interest of the public in the due
administration of justice that has to be protected. The question has to be
approached not from the point of view of the judge whose honour and dignity
require to be vindicated, buffrom the point of view of the public who Jiave
entrusted to judges the task of due administration of justice. A contumacious H
disregard of all decencies, such as that exhibited by the contemner in this case
can only lead to a serious disturbance of the system of administration of justice.
unless duly repaired at once by iaJlicting an apJ?ro_prlate punishrrient on thc.:i
SUPREME COl.JRT REPORTS ·t19831 3 s.c.R •.
contemncr which must be to send ;tiJm tp ja_il to atone for his misconduct and
A thereafter to come out of prison a chasteried bllt a better citizen.
. [72i D-G; 723E-G]

Advocate General of Bihar v. M. P. Khair Industries, (1980] 2 S.C.R.
1172, referred to.

B CIVIL APPELLATE JU1tJSD,ICf!Ol1 : ::;pecial Leave Petition (Civil)
No. 6735 of 1983.

From the Judgment and Order dated the 14th April, 1983 of
.t.~e Bo,i;nbay ,f,lig\1 ,Coµrt i,n N<Jtic~ of f\1otion No. ~59 of 1982 in
J\.ppe11I N(): 295 of 1982.
c
R. K. Garg, U. R. La/it, R. V. Mehta and B. P. Maheshwari,
with them for the fetip()ners.

Dr. Y. S. Chita/e, Raju Ramchandran and D. C. Singhania
D for th~ R~spcindents.

The Order of the Court was deliv~r.ed by
)
{3.HINNAPPA REDDY, J. AsjJ.aram M. Jain sought special leave
of ~h;s r;ourt µnder Art. 136 of the Cons!itution to appeal against the
E or<!~r of the J:ligh Court of Maharashtra in Notice of ~otion No.
859 of 19.82. Th~ petition for special le.ave to appeal ran to 84
pages at the foot of the petition, it was stated "drawn and file.d by
B. P. Maheshwari & Co., Advocates for the petitioner". Asharam
M. Jain filed an affidavit along with the special leave petition affirm-
F ing that the statement of facts in paragraphs I to 61 in the petition
for special leave to appeal were true to his knowledge and belief and
based .On the. record Of the lower CO)lrl. In Several paragraphs of the
~p~jal· l~ave petiti~n, Ashara1fi M. Jain. indulged in· wild· and vicious
diatribe against the then Chief Justiye of the High Court of Maha·
rashtra. To illustrate the limits of the invective, we ·wish to refer to.
G but one paragraph of the petition. In paragraph 26 of the petition,
it. was stat~d. by Asharam
- ., ' .,.
' ~ . . M.
. Jain :
"
.

"The petitioner says that having found that they
would no longer be justified in continuing to hear the
H " Notice of Motion an4 appeal for the several true facts set
O\lt in t1ie Tr:;u;1sf~r Applj~ation and the affidavits made by
th.~ petitioner aµd brief).y h~reinabove set aboqt,the k~rl\ed
A.M. JAIN v. A.t. GUP~A ( Chimiappiz Reddy, J.) 72t
Chief Justice 'tried by tlie said Order to harm the peti-
tioner as much as he could and made totally false and A
wrong observations quite unworthy of the head of the
judiciilzy 'of the State •c)f Maharashtri, and His Lordship,
Mr. Justice'Pendse supported the learned Chief Justiee.
The said Order, it is clear, ha·s been made with the sole
~
·and 'dishonest object of causing prejudice in the miilils of B
\ the Judges of the ne\v Bench against the petitioner and
depriving the Judges of the new Bench of their right to
indeperideu!ly jiidiCially decide the Notice of Motion on
merits, and which is proved ·by subsequent events."

When the special leave petition ·was heard cu April 27, 1983 by this C
Court, the outrageous allegations made against . the Chief Justice and
the Other learned JUdge of the High Court of Maharash1ra were
noticed and two of us (A. P. Sen and E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ) made
the following order :

"The special leave petition is dismissed. Our attention
D
is drawn to paragraphs 6, 10, l 1, 13, 16, 19, 20, 26, 27, 28
30, 31, 34, 38, 39, 42, 50, 57, 60, 62 and ground§ 5(v),
Ix), 7 to 10, (z), (mm), (tt}, (uu) of the special leave
petition. The learned Judges have also in the course of
the order made reference to the conduct of the petitioner E
in casting aspersions on the former Chief Justice. Issue
notice for contempt to the petitioner why he should not
be committed. for contempt under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971".
I'
Iti answer to the notice issued to Asharam M. Jilin, he appeared
before the court on July 25 •. 1983 wlien the following 'order was
made:·

"Shri Garg, appears along with the coritemner. He
prays for tWo weeks' time to file an affidavit and states on G
instruction that his client is not prepared to withdraw the
allegations but wants to make amends. He is allowed
two weeks'· time to file an affidavit.

"Issue notice to the Attorney-General for India H
requesting him to appear ann assist the court in the case.
The Registry shall furnish a copy of the special leave
722 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1'>83) 3 s.c.R.

petition and the show ca·use notice to· the learned Attor·
A ney-General.

"The matter be listed on August 22, 1983 .. The
contemner shall remain present in the court on that date".

When the matter was taken up for hearing on August 22, 1982,
B
Shri R. K. Garg• placed before us an ·affidavit, said to contain t~
sincere and unconditional apology of Asharam M. Jai11 and stated
that the conte!llner was placing himself at the mercy of the court.
He submitted that the couri should be so gracious as to accept the
unqualified apology tendered by the contemner and refrain from
c sending the contemner to prison. He invited our attention ·to In Re:
Shri S. Mulgaonkar(') where Krishna Iyer, J. suggested that 'a nor-
mative guideline for the judges to observe in this jurisdiction' was
"not to he hypersensitive where distortions and criticism overstep
the limits, hut to deflate vulgar denunciation · by dignified bearfog,
condescending indifference and repudiation by judicial rectitude".
D
There is never any risk of judicial hypersensitivity. · The very
nature of the judicial function makes judges sympathetic and respon-
)
sive. Their very training blesses them with 'insensitivity', as opposed
to hypersensitivity. Judges are always seeking good reasons to explain
:·E wrong conduct. They know there are always two sides to a coin.
They neither give nor take offence because they deal with persons
and . situations impersonally, though. with understanding. Judges
more than others realise the foibles, the frustrations, the undercurrents
and the tensions of litigants and litigation. But, ·a:s elsewhere, lines
have to be drawn. The strains and mortification of litigation can·
·F not be allowed to lead litigants to tarnish, terrorise and destroy the
system of administration of justice by vilification of judges. It-is not
that judges need be protected ; judge's may well take care· of them·
selves' It is the right and interest of the public in the due adminis-
tration of justice that has to protected. We had occasion to point
G this out in Advocate General Bihar v. M. P. Khair Industries,(') where
we said:

"But, on the other hand, it may be necessary to
punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses

(1) [19781 3 S.C.R. 162.
\2/. p980j 2 S.C,R. 1172.
A.M. JAIN v. A.T. GUPTA (Chlnnappa Aeddy, l.) 723
and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which
thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to .A
the action and affects the interest of the publlc in the
administration of justice. The public have an interest, an
abiding and ·a ·real interest, and a. viial stake in the effec·
tive and orderly administration of justice, because, unless
justice is so administered, ·there is the peril of hll rights,
B
and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting
the interest of the public in the due administration of
justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to .commit
for Contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity
of the Court against insult or injury as the expression
"Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but, to protect c
and to vindicate the right of the public that the adminis·
tration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced,
obstructed or interfered with. "It is a mode of vindicating
the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against
obstruction and outrage.'' "The law should not be seen D
to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those
who seek its protection lose hope."
__._,
'i
So we approach the question not from the point of view of the judge
whose honour and dignity require to be vindicated, but from the point E
of view of the public who have entrusted to us the task of due
administration of justice. Having given our utmost consideration,
we have come to the conclusion that it is not open to us to accept
the easy and ready solution suggested by Mr. R. K. Garg of accept·
ing the ·apology and imposing a fine. We think that a contumacious
disregard of all decencies, such as, that exhibited by the contemner F
in this case can only lead to a serious disturbance of the system of
administration of justice, unless duly repaired atonce by inflicting an
appropriate ~unishment on the contemner which must be to send
him to jail to atone for his misconduct and thereafter to come out of
prison a chastened but a better citiz<:n. We accordingly sentence G
him to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two months.

Before we part with the case, we must express our sense of
shock at a sad-revelation made by Shri R. K. Garg during the course
H
of the hearing. Wheri we expressed our surprise and disgust that
the special leave petition should have been drawn and .settled by ·
advocates of this Court, he told us that special leave petitions are
?24 SUP~l\ME COURT REPORTS i1983l 3 s.c.ll.
often filed over the names of counsel, who receive the papers from
A counsel outside Delhi and file them fn the Registry of the Court as if
drawn and settled by them, though they may have never even looked
into the papers. This is harlily proper and surely discourteous to
the Court. We hope this is not a common practice.

B H.L.C. Petition dismissed.

I