ASHOK GULABRAO BONDREversusVILAS MADHUKARRAO DESHMUKH AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 724
- Decided
- 12 April 2023
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
Holding
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC is attracted only when the offence of forgery is committed after the document is in custodia legis, i.e., after it has been produced or filed as evidence, and therefore does not bar cognizance in the present case.
Summary
The appellant alleged that the respondents forged a personal recognizance bond and a surety bond before they were filed as evidence in a criminal case pending before a Judicial Magistrate. The lower courts dismissed the appellant's complaint and the revisional court directed a preliminary enquiry under Section 340 of the CrPC, a decision later upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC, which bars a court from taking cognizance of forgery offences concerning documents already in evidence, applied when the alleged forgery occurred before the documents were produced in court. Relying on the judgments in Iqbal Singh Marwa, Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh and Sachida Nand Singh, the Court held that the embargo under Section 195 is triggered only if the offence is committed while the document is in "custodia legis" (i.e., after it has been produced or filed in evidence). Since the alleged forgery pre‑dated the filing, the bar does not apply and the court may take cognizance based on the appellant's complaint. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the revisional and High Court orders and remitted the matter to the Judicial Magistrate to decide the complaint on its merits.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applies when the alleged forgery of a document was committed before the document was produced or filed as evidence in court.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 195, s. 340, s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 191, s. 192, s. 196, s. 34, s. 463, s. 464, s. 465, s. 467, s. 470, s. 471
Subjects
Judgment
820 [2023]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 3 S.C.R. 820 [2023] 3 S.C.R.
A ASHOK GULABRAO BONDRE
v.
VILAS MADHUKARRAO DESHMUKH AND OTHERS
(Criminal Appeal No. 1931 of 2011)
B APRIL 12, 2023
[B. R. GAVAI AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.195 – Documents
allegedly fabricated and forged prior to filing in evidence, embargo
u/s.195 if applicable – On appeal, held: s.195(1)(b)(ii) would be
C
attracted only when the offence enumerated in the said provision
was committed in respect of a document after it has been produced
or filed in evidence during proceedings before any Court, i.e. during
the time when the document is custodia legis – In such a case, the
Court will be entitled to take cognizance of the offence only on the
D basis of the complaint made by the complainant – Impugned
judgment and order passed by the Revisional Court and the High
Court set aside – Matter remitted back to JMFC for considering the
complaint of the appellant on its own merits.
Iqbal Singh Marwa and Another v. Meenakshi Marwah
E and Another (2005) 4 SCC 370 : [2005] 2 SCR 708 –
followed.
Surjit Singh and Others v. Balbir Singh (1996) 3 SCC
533 : [1996] 3 SCR 70; Sachida Nand Singh and
Another v. State of Bihar and Another (1998) 2 SCC
F 493 : [1998] 1 SCR 492 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2005] 2 SCR 708 followed Para 11
[1996] 3 SCR 70 referred to Para 16
G [1998] 1 SCR 492 referred to Para 17
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1931 of 2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.02.2010 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay Bench at Nagpur in CRLA No. 3121 of 2009.
H
820
ASHOK GULABRAO BONDRE v. VILAS MADHUKARRAO 821
DESHMUKH AND OTHERS
Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Sachin Patil, Satyajit A Desai, Siddharth A
Gautam, Gajanan N Tirthkar, Abhinav K. Mutyalwar, Yougant Dhillon,
Advs. for the Appellant.
Rahul Chitnis, Ms. Shwetal Shepal, Aditya Kumar, Chander
Shekhar Ashri, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari,
Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Advs. for the Respondents. B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B. R. GAVAI, J.
1. The appeal arises on a very narrow canvass.
2. The appellant had filed a complaint against the respondents C
alleging that the respondents had committed the offence punishable under
Sections 191, 192, 196, 463, 464, 465, 467, 470 and 471 read with Section
34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”).
3. The main allegation made by the appellant is that respondent
No.2 - Ramprasad Pancheshwar had prepared false and forged D
documents, namely, personal recognizance bond and surety bond in
Criminal Case No. 19 of 2003 and the rest of the respondents conspired
and actively helped respondent No.2 for forging the said documents.
4. It is the case of the appellant that those documents had been
eventually filed on record in Criminal Case No. 19 of 2003 pending against E
the appellant before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ramtek
(hereinafter referred to as the “JMFC”).
5. The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class vide order dated 6 th
November 2004 dismissed the complaint. Being aggrieved thereby, the
revision petition came to be filed. F
6. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur vide order dated
14th March 2005 has held that such a complaint could not have been
filed except in writing of the Court concerned or some other Court, that
too a subordinate one.
7. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, however, found that the G
allegations made by the revision petitioners were serious in nature, and
therefore, directed that if any application is filed by the appellant under
Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, “Cr.P.C.”),
the learned JMFC would make a suitable preliminary enquiry and
H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
A thereafter, record his finding to that effect as contemplated under Section
340 of the Cr.P.C.
8. The said order passed by the Revisional Court came to be
challenged by the appellant before the High Court in an application filed
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The same came to be rejected. Hence,
B the present appeal.
9. We have heard Mr. Sachin Patil, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant and Mr. Rahul Chitnis and Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande,
learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
10. Mr. Sachin Patil submits that the alleged forgery had not been
C committed during the pendency of the proceedings. It is submitted that it
is the contention of the appellant that the respondents had forged the
documents earlier and used them in the proceedings initiated against the
appellant. It is, therefore, submitted that the bar of Section 195 of the
Cr.P.C. would not be applicable.
D 11. Mr. Sachin Patil has relied on the judgment of the Constitution
Bench of this Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwa and Another v.
Meenakshi Marwah and Another1.
12. Mr. Sachin Patil further submits that though the judgment of
the Constitution Bench was cited before the learned Single Judge of the
E High Court, it did not consider the same in correct perspective.
13. Mr. Rahul Chitnis, on the contrary, submits that the appellant
has already accepted the order passed by the Revisional Court and filed
an application under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. before the learned
Magistrate. He further submits that, on account of the interim relief
F granted in the present appeal, the said application could not be proceeded
further. He submits that as such, the question that is involved in the
present matter is purely an academic question in which the Court should
not go.
14. Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, supports the submission made
G by Mr. Rahul Chitnis.
15. The narrow question that requires to be considered is as to
whether the embargo under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. would be
applicable when the allegation that the documents which are sought to
1
H (2005) 4 SCC 370
ASHOK GULABRAO BONDRE v. VILAS MADHUKARRAO 823
DESHMUKH AND OTHERS [B. R. GAVAI, J.]
be used as evidence were already fabricated and forged prior to filing in A
evidence.
16. This Court, in the case of Surjit Singh and Others v. Balbir
Singh2, had taken a view thus:
“10. It would thus be clear that for taking cognizance of an offence,
the document, the foundation of forgery, if produced before the B
court or given in evidence, the bar of taking cognizance under
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) gets attracted and the criminal court is
prohibited from taking cognizance of offence unless a complaint
in writing is filed as per the procedure prescribed under Section
340 of the Code by or on behalf of the Court. The object thereby C
is to preserve purity of the administration of justice and to allow
the parties to adduce evidence in proof of certain documents
without being compelled or intimidated to proceed with the judicial
process. The bar of Section 195 is to take cognizance of the
offence covered thereunder.”
D
17. Subsequently, this Court, in the case of Sachida Nand Singh
and Another v. State of Bihar and Another3, took the view thus:
“11. The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in Section
340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any offence affecting
administration of justice has been committed in respect of a E
document produced in court or given in evidence in a proceeding
in that Court. In other words, the offence should have been
committed during the time when the document was in custodia
legis.
12. It would be a strained thinking that any offence involving F
forgery of a document if committed far outside the precincts of
the Court and long before its production in the Court, could also
be treated as one affecting administration of justice merely because
that document later reached the court records.
* * *
G
23. The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar contained
in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not applicable to a case
where forgery of the document was committed before the
document was produced in a court.”
2
(1996) 3 SCC 533
3
H
(1998) 2 SCC 493
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
A 18. Finding the two conflicting views taken with regard to the
interpretation of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., the question was referred to
the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwa
(supra). It will be relevant to refer to paragraph 7 of the said judgment,
which is as under:
B “7. On a plain reading clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (1) of Section
195 is capable of two interpretations. One possible interpretation
is that when an offence described in Section 463 or punishable
under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 IPC is alleged to
have been committed in respect of a document which is
subsequently produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in
C any Court, a complaint by the Court would be necessary. The
other possible interpretation is that when a document has been
produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court and
thereafter an offence described as aforesaid is committed in
respect thereof, a complaint by the Court would be necessary.
D On this interpretation if the offence as described in the Section is
committed prior to production or giving in evidence of the document
in Court, no complaint by Court would be necessary and a private
complaint would be maintainable. The question which requires
consideration is which of the two interpretations should be accepted
having regard to the scheme of the Act and object sought to be
E achieved.”
19. After observing the aforesaid and considering the entire scheme
under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., so also under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C.,
this Court observed thus:
“33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion
F
that Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly decided and the view
taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C.
would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the
said provision have been committed with respect to a document
after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in
G any Court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia
legis.
34. In the present case, the will has been produced in the Court
subsequently. It is nobody’s case that any offence as enumerated
in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) was committed in respect to the said will
H after it had been produced or filed in the Court of District Judge.
ASHOK GULABRAO BONDRE v. VILAS MADHUKARRAO 825
DESHMUKH AND OTHERS [B. R. GAVAI, J.]
Therefore, the bar created by Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. would A
not come into play and there is no embargo on the power of the
Court to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the
complaint filed by the respondents. The view taken by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court is perfectly correct
and calls for no interference.”
B
20. It could thus clearly be seen that this Court, on unequal terms,
has held that the view taken in the case of Sachida Nand Singh (supra)
that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. would be attracted only when
the offence enumerated in the said provision was committed in respect
of a document after it has been produced or filed in evidence during
proceedings before any Court, i.e. during the time when the document is C
custodia legis. The Court has clearly held that, insofar as the Will which
is alleged to have been fabricated before it was produced in the Court,
the embargo created by Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Cr.P.C. would not come
into play.
21. It has been held that in such a case, the Court will be entitled D
to take cognizance of the offence only on the basis of the complaint
made by the complainant.
22. In that view of the matter, we find that the view taken by the
Revisional Court as well as the High Court is not sustainable.
23. The impugned judgment and order passed by the Revisional E
Court as well as the High Court are quashed and set aside.
24. The matter is remitted back forthwith to the learned JMFC,
Ramtek for considering the complaint of the appellant on its own merits.
25. Taking into consideration that the litigation is pending for almost
F
a decade, we request the learned JMFC to decide the complaint of the
appellant on merits as expeditiously as possible and in any case within a
period of one year from today.
26. We further make it clear that we may not be understood to
have expressed any opinion on merits and nothing observed herein should
be construed to have bearing on the merits of the matter. G
27. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
28. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
Divya Pandey Appeal disposed of. H
(Assisted by : Roopanshi Virang, LCRA)
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.