Holding

The Court held that, given the substantial constitutional questions and their potential impact on society, the matters should be heard by a larger Bench.

Summary

Ashoka Kumar Thakur filed writ petitions challenging the 93rd Constitution Amendment (which inserted Article 15(5)) and the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006. The Union of India argued that the matters raised substantial questions of law and constitutional interpretation, invoking Article 145(3) and Order 35 of the Supreme Court Rules, and therefore required a Constitution Bench. The petitioners contended that the issues were covered by earlier decisions, particularly Indira Sawhney, and did not merit a larger bench. The Court examined the parties' submissions and, noting the far‑reaching social and constitutional implications, held that the questions were of sufficient importance and complexity to be heard by a larger bench. Consequently, the matter was referred to a larger Bench for determination of the constitutionality of the amendment, the scope of Articles 15(4) and 15(5), the validity of the reservation policy, and related issues.

Issues considered

Whether the 93rd Constitution Amendment Act, 2005 and the insertion of Article 15(5) violate the basic structure of the Constitution
Interpretation and scope of Articles 15(4) and 15(5) with respect to reservations in educational institutions
Whether the State's power to make special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes is unlimited or subject to constitutional limits
Whether the exclusion of minority institutions from Article 15(5) is consistent with Article 19(1)(g) and the principle of secularism
Whether a 27% reservation for SEBC/OBC in central educational institutions is constitutionally permissible
Applicability of the "creamy layer" concept to reservations in education under Article 15(5)
Extent of judicial review over statutes enacted under Article 15(5) and the reservation Act
Criteria for identification of socially and educationally backward classes and the role of caste in such identification

Legislation cited

Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006
Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 15(4), s. Article 15(5), s. Article 19(1)(g), s. Article 21, s. Article 29(2)
Supreme Court Rules, 1966s. Order 35

Subjects

reservationaffirmative actionArticle 15(5)93rd Constitution Amendmenthigher educationOBCSEBCcreamy layerbasic structure doctrinejudicial reviewconstitutional law

Judgment

-r ;\SHOKA KUMAR THAKUR A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ETC.

.' MAY 17, 2007
... B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND LOKESHWARSINGH PANTA, JJ.]
)
-f -(
Reference to Larger Bench-Constitutionality of 93rd Constitution
Amendment and Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission)
Act, 2006, challenged in Supreme Court-In view of importance of the issuf!S c
involved, questions framed and referred to Larger Bench-93rd Constitution
Amendment Act, 2005-Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in
Admission) Act, 2006-Constitution of India, 1950-Artic/es 15 (5) and
145(3)-Supreme Court Rules, 1966-0rder 35.

By 93rd Constitution Amendment Act, 2005, Article 15 (5) was inserted D
in Part III of the Constitution empowering the Government to make special
provisions providing for reservations in educational institutions. Central
Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 was enacted
thereafter. Present Writ Petitions were filed challenging the same. On behalf
Union of India it was submitted that in view of Article 145(3) of Constitution E
of India and Order 35 of Supreme Court Rules, 1966, the petitions should be
heard by Constitution Bench as the same not only raise substantial question
of law, but also interpretation of the Constitution.

Petitioners objected to the submission on the ground that the issues
j raised were covered by various decisions of this court especially Indra F
Sawhney v. Union of India and Ors., [1992) Suppl. 3 SCC 217 and no
substantial questions of law were involved as is evident from the counter
affidavit filed by Union oflndia.

Formulating the questions and referring the matter to Larger Bench,
G
the Court

HELD: 1. Untrammeled by the effect of Article 145(3) of the Constitution
.) of India and Order 35 of Supreme Court Rules, 1966, considering
considerable importance of the issues involved and its likely impact in the ·r
social life of the country as a whole and the complexities of the questions, it H
63
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 7 S.C.R.
,,'-

A is approprfate that the matter should be heard by a larger Bench. ..,..
(Para 7) (67-Fl l-

2. Matter referred to larger Bench for considering the validity of93rd
Constitution Amendment Act, 2005, scope of Articles 15(4) and 15(5) of the
Constitution, scope of Judicial Review, listing of socially and educationally ~
B backward classes in terms of units of caste/communities, justification of27%
""'-
reservation in socially and educationally backward classes/other backward
~
classes, concept of 'creamy layer' of SEBC/OBC and its applicability and
constitutionality I validity of Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in \,.._ f)
Admission) Act, 2006. (Para 8) (68-B, G; 69-E; 70-A, G; 71-A, D, G)

c CIVIL ORIGINA~ JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No. 265 of2006.

WITH

WP (Civil) Nos. 269/2006, 598/2006, 35/2007, 231/2007, 53/2007 and 29/
2007.
D
G.E. Vahanvati, Solicitor General, Gopal Subramanium, A.S.G., K.N.
Balagopal, AG. of Nagaland, P.P. Rao, K. Parasaran, R. Shunmugasundaram,
V. Kanakraj, Rakesh Dwivedi, Indra Jaisingh, Prof. Ravivarma Kumar, Ram
Jethmalani, F.S. Nariman, Mukul Rohtagi, Harish N. Salve, K.K. Veenugopal,
E Ravindra Shrivastava and Kailash Vasdev, Sr. Adv., Vivek K. Tankha, Pooja
Dhar, Rohan Thawani, Joseph Pookkatt, Prashant Kumar, M.L. Lahoty, D.S.
Chadha, Abishek Gupta, Anshuman Ashok, Purushottam Tripathi, Abhishek
Kumar, Subramonium Prasad, Anil Srivastav, Rituraj Biswas, Dr. Kailash Chand,
S. Vallinayagam, S. Prabhu Ramasubramanium, V.G. Pragasam, S. Wasim A.
Qadri, D.S. Mabra, K.N. Madhusodanan, R. Sathish, Janaranjan Das, Swetaketu
F Mishra, Vimla Sinha, Anukul Raj, Gopal Singh, G. Prakash, Dharmendra Kumar
Sinha, Manoj Saxena, Rajnish Kr. Singh, Rahul Shukla, T.V. George, Ansuman +
Kaushik (for Corporate Law Group), S.S. Shinde, V.N. Raghupathy, Manjit
Singh, Harikesh Singh, Ranjan Mukherjee, S.C. Ghose, Suparna Srivastava,
Pooja Mathani, Rajesh Srivastava, Atul Jha, D.K. Sinha, Aruneshwar Gupta,
G Naveen Kumar Singh, Mukul Sood, Shaswat Gupta, A. Subba Rao, Ajay.Pal,
Preeti Singh, Sukhda, S.K. Swamy, Vikas Rojipura, Batu, E.C. Vidyasagar,
Kumar Rajesh Singh, B.B. Singh, Ranbir Yadav, S. Balaji, Avijit Roy (for
Corporate Law Group) Kh. Nobin Singh, A. Mariaputham (for Arputham,
Aruna & Co. Prashant Bhushan, Vishwajit Singh, -M.L. Lahoty, Paban K.
')--
Sharma, Poonam Lahoty, Himanshu Shekhar, Mahalakshmi Pavani, Shashi M.
H
Kapila, Gopal Shankarnarayanan, Shilpi Kaushik, Indu Malhotra, Sushi! Kumar
ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. U.0.1. [PASA YAT, J.] 65

_,, Jain, Puneet Jain, H.D. Thanvi, Sarad Singhania, Christi Jain, Kiran Suri, S.J. A
Amith, Rameshwar Prasad, CBN Babu, Vinesh Solshe, Arjun Garg, M. Mamman,
~ Rajul Shrivastava, C.G. Solshe, V.K. Biju, D.K. Garg, Mahalakshmi Pawani, G.
Balaji, Subramonium Prasad, Sushma Suri, Ankit Singhal, Nikhil Nayyar and
E.C. Vaidya Sagar for the appearing parties, Ashok Kumar Thakur, Petitioner-
In-Person in W.P. (C) No. 265 of2006 and M.M. Mittal, Applicant-in-person
in I.A. No.8 . B

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. l. During the hearing of these petitions it w~
submitted by learned Solicitor General that in view of the mandate of Article
145(3) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution') and Order c
35 of Supreme Court Rules, 1966 (in short the 'Rules'), these cases should be
heard by a Bench of at least five Hon'ble Judges. It was submitted that not
only petitions raise subs!antial questions of law but also interpretation of the
Constitution is involved.
D
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners on the other hand submitted that
in the counter affidavit filed by the Union of India it has been specifically
stated that, according to it, there was no question of law much less of
substantial nature involved and the issues raised are covered by various
decisions of this Court, more particularly, Indra Sawhney v. Union of India
and Ors., [1992] Supp. 3 SCC 217. If that be so, learned counsel for the E
petitioners submitted, there is no substance in the present stand of learned
Solicitor General that substantial questions of law are involved. According to
him, the cases can be decided on the pleadings made and the acceptability
of stands.

3. Mr. K. Parasaran and Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned Senior counsel for F
one of the respondents, submitted that they support the stand of learned
Solicitor General that the matter should be heard by a Bench of at least five
Hon'ble Judges. They, however, stated that the stand taken in the counter
affidavit cannot be determinative. The interpretation of the provisions of the;
Constitution and/or the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in G 1

Admission) Act, 2006 (in short the 'Act') fall for interpretation in these cases.
,,.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, stated that the complex
)
issues relating to the scope and ambit of Article 15(5) of the Constitution and
the validity of 93rd Constitution Amendment Act, 2005 are involved. It is
pointed out that behind the so called anxiety which is nothing but a facade, H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 7 S.C.R.

A to provide better educational facilities for socially and educationally backward
classes, the objective is to play a political game and what is commonly
accepted as "Vote politics". The objective is not so much for social
empowerment as creating a vote bank. In the name of social empowerment,
what is intended to be done is to create a caste divide which shall have
B catastrophic implications. The· object is not social empowerment and/or to
extend help to the deprived. If that was really so, the stress should have been
on social and economic backwardness. If any class needs protection, it is the
socially and economically backward class of people. It is also pointed out that
the framers of the Constitutior. had indicated a specific period for reservation.
They had felt that the period is good enough to take care of any injustice
C they may have been hypothetically meted out to socially and educationally
backward castes. But with oblique motives the period· is being extended. It
is submitted that the same cannot be the objective of the Constitution. It has
also been submitted that there is no scope for reservation in higher education
and the Act empowers reservation in educational institutions imparting higher
education and that itself is unconstitutional. Further, the basic data for
D identifying the "backward classes" has not yet been placed before this Court
though at the threshold the inadequacy and non-availability of such data was
+
highlighted by this Court. It is submitted that this Court in Jagdish Negi,
President, Uttarakhand Jan Morcha and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Anr., [1997)
7 SCC 203 held that the State cannot be bound in perpetuity to treat some
E classes of citizens for all time as socially and educationally backward classes
of citizens. In these circumstances, it is submitted that the writ petitions
should be disposed of on the material as existing presently.

5. We shall first deal with the e'ffect of the counter affidavit filed by the
Union of India. In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Mis Bharat
F Coking Coal Ltd And Anr., [1983) l SCC 147 it was inter-alia held as follows: \-

"25. Shri Ashoke Sen drew pointed attention to the earlier affidavits
filed on behalf of Bharat Coking Coal Limited and commented severely
on the alleged contradictory reasons given therein for the exclusion
of certain coke oven plants from the Coking Coal Mines
G (Nationalisation) Act. But, in the ultimate analysis, we are not really
to concern ourselves with the hollowness or the self-condemnatory
nature of the statements made in the affidavits filed by the respondents
to justify and sustain the legislation. The deponents of the affidavits
filed into court may speak for the parties on whose behalf they swear
to the statements. They do not speak for the Parliament. No one may
H
... ASHOKAKUMAR THAKUR v. U.0.1. [PASAYAT,J.] 67

-r
speak for the Parliament and Parliament is never before the court. A
After Parliament has said what it intends to say, only the court may
..
....,..
say what the Parliament meant to say, None else. Once a statute
leaves Parliament House, the Court is the only authentic voice which
may echo (interpret) t~e Parliament. Thus the court will do with
reference to the language of the statute and other permissible aids.
The executive Government may place before the court their B
understanding of what Parliament has said or intended to say or what
they think was Parliament's object and all th.~fa~~s and circumstances
which in their view led to the legislation. Wher. they do so, they d<r
not speak for Parliament. No Act of Parliament may be struck down
because of the understanding or mis-understanding of parliamentary c
intention by the executive Government or because their (the
Government's) spokesmen do not bring out relevant circumstances
but indulge in empty .and self-defeating affidavits. They do not and
they cannot bind Parliament. Validity of legislation is not to be judged
merely by affidavits filed on behalf of the State, but by all the relevant
circumstances which the Court may ultimately find and more especially D
by what may be gathered from what the legislature has itself said. We
have mentioned the facts as found by us and we do not think that
there has been any infringement of the right guaranteed by Article
14."

6. To quote Justice Holmes: The life of law has not been logic; it has
E
been experience. The felt necessities of law, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed and unconscious, even the
prejudices which Judges share with their followmen have had a good dear
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which the men
should be governed. F
7. Untrammeled by the effect of Article 145(3) and Order 35 of the Rules,
considering considerable importance of the issues involved and its likely
impact in the social life of the country as a whole and the complexities of the
questions, it is appropriate that the matter should be heard by a larger Bench.
The pivotal challenges in the writ petitions are as follows: G
(1) Challenge to the Constitution 93rd Amendment Act, 2005 by which
-t ,
Article 15(5) has been inserted in Part III of the Constitution.

(2) Challenge to the policy of reservation as a form of "affirmative
action". H
A
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

(3) Challenge to the "caste based" reservation or the "caste based"
affrrmative action.
-
(4) Challenge to the Act.

8 .. The basic issues which need to be considered by the larger Bench,
B are as follows:
93rd Constitution Amendment Act, 2005

(I) Whethet the 93rd Constitution Amendment Act, 2005 and Article
15(5) are unconstitutional as being violative of the basic structure of
c the Constitution?

(2) If the Amendment is valid, how is it to be interpreted and
implemented?

(3)- Whether the 93rd Amendment insofar as it empowers the
government to make special provisions by _way of reservations in
D educational institutions (including private educational institutions) is
violative of the basic structure of the Constitution?

(4) Whether the 93rd Amendment confers on the State an unbridled
power to make special provisions for "socially and educationally
backward classes", without indicating the circumstances when such
E provision may be made, and without imposing any limit either on the
contents or duration of such special provisions and is, therefore,
wholly destructive of the right of equality of the citizens and thereby
violative of basic structure?

(5) Whether depriving the protection of Art. 19(l)(g) to non-minority
F institutions (while excluding minority institutions from Art. 15(5)},
after the decision in P.A. Inamdar v,. State of Mah(!rashtra, [2005] 6
sec 537 which held that non-minority institutions enjoyed a similar
protection, upsets the delicate balance of the Constitution, and is
inconsistent inter-alia with the principles of secularism and thereby is
G violative of the basic structure?

Scope of Articles 15(4) and 15(5)

(1) What is the true ambit and scope of Articles 15(4) and 15(5) of the -~
Constitution?
H
ASHOKAKUMAR THAKUR v. U.0.1. [PASAYAT, J.] 69
(2) If Article 15(5) is valid, what is its true scope and ambit? A
(3) What is the meaning of the term "special provisions11 in Articles
15(4) and 15(5) of the Constitution? Does it include 'quotas' by
reservation of seats especially in higher educational institutions and
professional and technical education (particularly those ·of national
stature or importance aud in courses categorized as speciality or l3
super speciality). Is it a permissible measure of advancement of socially
and educationally backward classes?

(4) If the answers to above questions are in the affirmative, then what
are the necessary ingredients of ariy "Affirmative Action" programme
of the State including the "nature and extent" of the benefits proposed C
and the limitations thereon, in order to balance the rights between
Articles, 14, 15, 29(2) and its "facet" in Articles 15(4) and 15(5)?
(5) Whether a rational policy of affirmative action that would ensure
imparting free and compulsory education to the illiterate sections
among all the citizens including the backward classes, is absent and D
if so, whether affrrmative action in favour of SEBCs is discriminatory
and unconstitutional?
(6) What is the meaning of the words "for the advancement of any
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens" in Articles
15(4) and 15(5)? What is the yardstick for measuring educational E
backwardness in Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 15?
(7) Whether substitution of the expression "socially and educationally
backward classes of citizen" by "socially and economically backward
classes" would result in fu!filling constitutional intentions and
objectives? F
Scope of Judicial Review

(1) Having regard to the fact that special provision by way of
reservation in Central Educational Institutions has been made by law
enacted by Parliament and the enabling provision of Article 15(5). 0
vesting the power in the State to make such provision by law, is the
scope of judicial review restricted or not?

(2) What are the parameters and limits of judicial review of a law
enacted by the Parliament providing for reservation in pursuance of H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 7 S.C.R,

A the mandate of Articles 15(4) and 15(5), having regard, inter-alia to the
order of reference to the Constitution Bench on Subramanian Swamy · ·
(Dr.) v. Director, CBI & Ors., [2005] 2 SCC 317.

Listing of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes in terms of
units of caste/communities
B
(I) Whether reservations based solely or principally upon the basis
of caste are impermissible under Article 15?

(2) Whether a reservation that relies significantly on "caste" to identify \.
its beneficiaries is inherently divisive and incompatible with the Unity
c and integrity of the Nation?

(3) If the answer to Questions (1) and (2) above is in the affirmative,
then how, in what way and on what basis are the beneficiaries of
"special provisions" to be identified, selected, included or excluded?

(4) Does the Union oflndia's method, manner and extent of identifying
D
and compensating beneficiaries of'special provisions' perpetuate caste
and backwardness?
4-
(5) Whether "caste based" reservations are a permissible form of
affirmative action under Article 15? If the answer to !he question
E above is in the affirmative, then what are the permissible criteria for
the identification of the "class" to whom the benefits under an
affirmative action programme are to be extended under Article 15?

(6) Whether the reservation policy of the State which lacks a
Continuous Review Mechanism is violative of Articles 14, 15, 21 and
p 29(2)?

(7) Whether, after the judgment in Indra Sawhney's case (supra), the
classification of backward classes on the basis of caste for the purposes
of Article 16(4) would equally apply to Articles 15(4) and Article 15(5)
of the Constitution?
G Whether 27% reservation in Socially Educational Backward Classes/
Other Backward Classes is justified

(I) Whether the Act insofar as it mandates reservation of 27% in all
educational institutions (including private aided institutions)
irrespective of and unrelated to the "compelling need" of the State
H
ASHOKA KUMAR THAKUR v. U.0.1. [PASAYAT, J.) 71
and without any limit of time and without any computable data for A
--r identification of persons as OBCs, is violative of Articles 14,15, 2 lA
1

, and 29(2) of the Constitution?

(2) Special provision by way ofreservation of27% for OBCs in Central
Educational Institutions being within the percentage authorized by
Indra Sawhney's case (supra) and it having been ensured that th¢re B
will be increase of seats so as not to dim.inish the number of seats
available for non reserved category, could such provision be held to
be unconstitutional?

(3) Whether the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation ,in
Admission) Act, 2006 (Act No.5 of2007) is violative of Articles 14, c
15(1), 19, 21 and 29(2) of the Constitution?

Socially Advanced Persons/Sections or creamy layer of SEBCIOBC

(1) Would at all the concept of "creamy layer" propounded in the
context of public employment in Indra Sawhney's case (supra) be D
applicable to special provision by way of reservation for education
provided for by law made by the State?
-<-
(2) Whether in balancing formal equality vis-a-vis defacto equality
under Article 14 and Article 15(5) "creamy layer" should or should not
E
be excluded?

(3) Whether the concept of Socially Advanced Persons/Sections or
creamy layer of SEBC castes/communities formulated in the Indra
Sawhney's case (supra) for the purpose of exclusion from reservation
of appointments or posts under Article 16(4) is applicable in relati9n F
to reservation in education including higher education and admission
to seats in educational institutions under Article 15(4) and Article
15(5)?

(4) Whether the provisions of the Act insofar as it does not exclu9e
or make provision for the identification and exclusion of the "creamy G
layer" from the beneficiaries of reservation fall foul of Articles 15 and
29(2)?

Constitutionality/Validity of the 2006 Act

(l) Whether the reasons given by the Union and the data furnished H
by it in order to justify and sustain Act No. 5 of 2007 satisfies the
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] .7 S.C.R.

A requirements of a valid exercise of affirmative action as laid down in
various judgments (e.g. M Nagarafand Ors. v. Union of India and
Ors., [2006] 8 SCC 212) and can provide a valid basis for reservation
of the kind sought to be attained by the impugned Act?

(2) Whether_ the Act is in violation of Article 26 of the Universal
B Declaration of Human Rights which postulates that technical and
professional education shall be made generally available and higher
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit?

9. It is needless to say that the larger Bench hearing the matter can ;...
C consider further issues or' questions involved.
l 0. Let records be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for
appropriate ·orders.

K.KT. Referred to Larger Bench.
D

t·