Holding

The detention order is valid; the two‑day delay is within the statutory period, the authority need not specify the detention period in the order, and the grounds pertain to public order.

Summary

Ashok Kumar challenged his preventive detention under the National Security Act, 1980, arguing that the two‑day delay in furnishing the grounds of detention violated Article 22(5) of the Constitution and that the detaining authority failed to specify the period of detention and to link the grounds to "public order". The Supreme Court held that Section 8 of the Act permits the grounds to be communicated within five to ten days, so a two‑day delay is permissible and does not invalidate the order. The Court also ruled that the statute does not require the authority to state the detention period in the order itself, and that the activities described in the grounds fall within the ambit of "public order". Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a two‑day delay in furnishing the grounds of detention violates Article 22(5) of the Constitution read with Section 8 of the National Security Act, 1980.
Whether the detaining authority is required to specify the period of detention at the time of making the detention order under the Act.
Whether the grounds of detention relate to "public order" or merely to "law and order" for the purpose of the Act.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 21, s. Article 22(5)
National Security Act, 1980s. 12, s. 13, s. 3(2), s. 8

Subjects

preventive detentionNational Security ActArticle 22(5)public orderlaw and orderperiod of detentiongrounds of detentionwrit of habeas corpus

Judgment

A
• ASHOK KUMAR
v.
DELHI ADMINSTRATION & ORS.
B
May 5, 1982

(A.P. SBN, E.S. VBNl:ATARAMIAH AND
R.B. MISRA, JJ .]
National Security Act 1980, S1. 3 lllld 8 and Con11itution of India 1950
Article 22(5).
c
Detention Ord1r-Period of detention-Specijkation of-Wheth<r mandatory.

, Ground• of detention-Furnishing of-Delay of two day1-Detention
order-Whether rendered Invalid.

"Public Order''-" Law and order''-Distinction betwun.
D

Words & Phrasea-"As 1001} as may be"-" As soon as practicable"-
Meaning of-National Socurity Act 1980; S. 8 ll1ld Constitution of India 1950,
Article 22(5).

The petitioner who was held at the Central Jail in connettion with some
of the offences committed by him, was served with an order of detention passed E
by the Gommissio'ner of Police, under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the National
Secu'rity Act 1980~ stating that his detention was necessary with a view to
preventing him from "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
public otder." Two days later he Was served with the grounds of detention and
copies' of documents and statelnents relied upon in the grounds of detention.
The Commissioner made a report to the Administrator about the passing of the
detention order· together with thC groutlds of detention. The Administrator F
approved the detention order and sent the report to the CentraJ Government, and
also informed the petitioner that the order of detention had b~en approved by
him and that he had a right to make a·representation. The case of the petitioner
was placed before ttte Advisory Board who wa~ of the opinion that there was
sufficient cause for his detention. The Administrator confirmed the detention
order under sub-section (I) of section 12 and further directed under section 13
of the Act thatlthe petitioner be detained for a period of 12 months from the date G
of his detention.
'
In his petition under Article 32 or the Constitution the petitioner eon-
tended that : (I) the unexplained delay of two days in furnishing the grounds or
detention was a denial of the constitutional imperatives of !Art. 22(5) read with ,
section 8 of the Act which cast a duty on the detaining authority to afford the ff
detenu "the earliett opportunity of making a representation against th• order of
I\'"'
detention", (2) there was a failure on tll~ ~rt qf \be Col'1'1!i~io~~r ~ ~s t~ •
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982) ~ S.C.R.

A Administrator to apply their minds and specify the period of detention while
making:tbe order of detention under SUb·section (2) of section 3 Of the Act, and
(3) th01"grounds of detention served were not connected with "maintenance of
public order'', but relate to "maintenance of law. and order''.

Dismissing the petition,

B HELD : !. (i) Sub-section (I) of oection 8 of tho Act which is in con-
formity with Article 22(5) provides that where a person is detained in pursuance,
of a detention order made under sub-section (I) or sub-section (2) of section 3 of
the Act, the authority making the Order Shall, "as soon as may be", but
ordinarily not later than five days and ·in exceptional circumstances and for
reasons to be recorded in writing not later tha'.n ten days from the date of

c detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made.
Parliament bas thus by Jaw defined the words uas soon as may be" occuring in
Art. 22(5) as meaning normally a period of five days. [711 F]

(ii) The law is that the detaining authority JllUSt, as soon as may ·be, i.e.
as soon· as practicable, communicate to the deteou the grounds on which the
order of detention has been made. That period bas been specified by section 8
of the Act to mean a period ranging from five to ten days depending upon the
D facts and circumstances of each case. [712 D]

In the instant case, the petitioner was served with the grounds ·of
detention within a perio~ of two days i.e. within the period allowed by section 8
of the Act and that was)'as 11soon as practicable.'' The order of detention is
therefdre not rendered invalid merely because the grounds of detention were
furnished two days latef. [712 E-F]
E
(iii) In A.K. Roy v. Union of India, [1982] I S.C.C. 271 this Court has
not laid down that the detaining authority making an order of detention under· ...;
sub-section (!) or sub-se"etion (2l of section 3 of the Act or the authority approv-
ing of the same, must specify the period of detention in the order. (714 BJ

F 2. Under the scheme of the Act, the period of detention must necessarily -
vary accordiiig to the exigencies of each c.ase i.e. the nature of tbe prejudicial · ~....,,~·
activity complained of. It is not that the. period of detention must in all_.........-
circumstances extend to the maximum period of 12 months as laid down in
section'13 of the Act. [714 E] ~

G 3. (i) The true distinc.tion between the areas of 'public.order' and''JaW and
order' lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent
?fits reach upon society .. The distinction between the two ~oncePts of'law and
order' and 'public order' is a fine one bu~ this does not mean that there can be
no overlapi)iog. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and
circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific
IJ individuals only and thcite'fore touch the problem of 'la~ and. order'. while in
.. another it might affect 'puMic order'. The act. by itself therefore is not deter-
minant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of tho act to· disturb the even
Asltok KUMAii. v. Dlitiil AbMINIStRATION (Sen, J.) 709

tempo of the life of the community which make it prejudicial to the 'maintenance , A
• of public order.' [71S C·Bl

(ii) Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The
object is not to punish a man for having done something but to. intercept before
he does it and to prevent him from doing. Justification for such detention is
• suspicion.-0r reasonable prpbability and'not criminal conviction which can only
be warranted by legal evi4ence. It follows that any preventive measures, ;.:.eveD.:
if they involve some restrain,t or ha'rdship upon individuals, do not partake in
any way of the nature of punishment, but are taken by way of precaution to
prevent mischief to the State. [71S F·G]

(iii) -The Executive can take recourse to its power of preventive detention
in thosercases whe're the CoUrt is genuinely satisfied that ·no prosecution could,
possibly'succeed against the detenu because he is a dangero.us person who has c
oveirrawed .witnesses or d.gainst whom no one is prepared to depose. [716 BJ ·

(iv) What essentially is a P.roblem relating to 'law and order' may due
to ·sudden sporadic and intermittent acts of physical violence on innocent ·victims
in a metropolitan city result in serious 'public' disorder'. It is the length,
magnitude ao.d ill tensity of the terror .wave l unleashed by .a particuiar act of
violence: creating disorder tl¥tt distinguishes it as an act affecting 'public order'
D
from that conCerning 'law and order'. Some offences primarily injure specific
indiyiduals and.only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure
tho public interest, and affect individuals only remotely. [717 D·B]

In the instaDt case the particular acts enumerat:d in the grounds of
detentiOn clearly shows that the activities of the detenu cover a wide field and
fall Within tho contours of the concept of 'public order'. [717 OJ E

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (CriminaQ No. 8061

-
ofl981. '
(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India.)
F
Dr. N.M. Ghatate for the PetitiQner.

0.P. Rana and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SEN, J. By this petitiop under Art. 32 of the ConsJitution, G
one Ashok Kumar seeks issuance of a writ of habeas corpus challeng-
ing the validity of the order of detention dated August 11, 1981, 1
passed by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi under sub·s. (2) of g, ;!, ·
of the National Security Act, 1980 (for short 'the Act') on be~'';
satisfied that his detention was necessary with a view to preventinf ·
him from "acting ·in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance rj
SUPRBMB totiat IUiPORfs [ t 9~2i 3 s.C:.k

A public order". The main issue is as to whether the activities of the
petitioner fall within the realm of 'public order' or .'law and order'. '

Ii appears that on August 12, 1981 while the detenu was held
at the Central Jail, Tihar in connection with some of the offences
.comlljitted by him, he was served with tbe aforesaid ..~rder of deten·
B tion passed a day earlier i.e. _on August II, 1981. Two days later
i.e. on August 14, 1981 he was furnished with the grounds of
detention as well as with copies of documents and statements relied
upon in the grounds of detention. , It seems that the CommissiOner
of Police forthwith made a report to the Ad.ministrator about
c the. passing of the detention order together with the grounds
of detention and all other particulars bearing 'On the same. The
said report and the other particulars were considered by the Adminis-
trator and he, by his order dated August 20, 1981, approved of the
detention order under sub'.s. (4) and sent a report to the Central
Government as required under sub-s, (5) of s. 3 of the Act. The Admi"
.D nistrator by bis order dated Atrgust 20, 1981 informed the petitioner
~bat his order of detention had been approved by him and that he
had a right to make a representation. The case of the p.etitioner
was placed before the Advisory Board who was of tb,e opinion t)lat
there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner and
accordingly the Administrator by his order dated September 15,
E 1981 confirmed the aforesaid detention order under sub-s. (I) of
s. 12 and further directed under s. 13 of the Apt that the petitioner
be detained for a period of 12 months from the date of his detention
i.e. w.e.f. August 12, 1981.

In support of the petition, four points are canvassed.
I

of Art. 22(5) read with s. 8 of the Act which cast a duty on the
First
.
of these is that there was a denial of the constitutional imperatives

detaining authority to afford the detenu "the earliest opportunity of
-
making a representation against the order of detention" inasmuch
as there was unexplained delay of two days in furnishing the ground's.
G of detention; secondly, there was a failure on the part of the Com·
mission of Police as well as the Administrator to apply their mind
and specify the peril)d · of detention while making the order of
detention under sub·s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act and therefore the
impugned order of deteption is invalid; thirdly, the grounds of
H detenti6n served on the detenu are not connected with "maintenance
of.public order", but they relate to "maintenance of law and order"
and fourthly, the facts as ~t out in the grounds of detention did not
Asili'.>K kuMAil. µ, bilLHi ADMINistRATION (Sen, J.) 711 ·

furnish sufficient nexus for forming the subjective satisfaction of A
the detaining authority and further .they were vague, irrelevant and
Jacking in particulars. We are afraid, none of these contentions
can prevail.

There is no substance in the contenti.on that there was denial
• of the constitutional imperatives of Art. 22(5) read with s. 8 of the 8
Act, because there was unexplained delay of two days in furnishing
the grounds of detention and it was imperative that the detenu
should be furnished with the ground's of detention along· with the
order of detention. It is said that delay even for a day, if it remains
..,. ,,,.: unexplained'. means deprivation of liberty guaranteed under Art. 21,.
and this is impermissible except according to procedure established c
by law. The contention that the constitutional safeguards in Art .
....._ 22(5) were not complied with merely because the detenu was not
'simultaneously' furnished with the grounds of detention along
with the order of detention and was thereby deprived of the right
of being afforded 'the earliest opportunity of making a representa-
tion against the order of detention' as enjoined by Art. 22(5) read D
with with s. 8 of the Act, cannot be accepted. T.l!.e language of Art
22(5).itself provides that where a person is detained in.pursuance
of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention,
the authority making the order · shall, "as soon as may be", com- ·
municate to such person the grounds on which the order has been
made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a E
representation against the o~der. Sub-s. (I) of s. 8 of the Act which
is in cdnformity with Art. 22(5) provides that when a person is · •
detained in pursuance of a detention ordet made under sub-s. (I) or
sub-s'. (2) of s. 3 of the Act, the authority making the order shall,
as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in
4
, exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, F
~•• ~t later than ten days from .the date of detention, communicate to
• him the grounds on which the order .bas l!een made. Parliament
~ bas thus by law defined the words "as soon as may be" occurring
in Art. 22(5) as meaning normally a period of five days.
G
The matter is no longer res integra. Cbandrachud, C.J. in
A.K. Roy 1v. Union of India(') observed :

"This argument overlooks that the primary require- •
men! of s. 8(1) is that the authority making the order of H .

(1) [1982) 1 s.c.c. 271.
I
sVPREMI! COVl!.t Rlll>oiti's (198~1 3 s.c.i.

detention shall communicate the grounds of detention to
the detenu "as soon as may be". The normal rule there-
fore is that-the grounds of detention must be communicated
to the detenu without avoidable delay. It is only in order
to meet the practical exigencies of adminislrative affairs
that the detaining authority is permitted to communicate
the grounds of detention not later than five days ordinarily
and not later than 10 days if there are exceptional circum-
stances. If there are any such ·circumstances, the detaining
authority is required by s. 8(1) to . record its reason in
· writing. We do not think that this provision is open to
any objection."
c
Under our constitutional system, therefore, it is not the law
1
that no person shall be detained in pursuance of an order made
under a law providing for preventive detention without being in-
formed of the grounds for such detention. The law is that the
D detaining authority ·must, as soon as may be, i.e. as soon as practi-
cable, communicate to the detenu the gfOUDdS OD Which the order
of detention has been made. That period has been specified by
s. 8 of the Act to mean a period ranging from five to ten days
depending upon the facts and circu111stances of each case. Admittedly,
the detenu here was served with the grounds of detention within a
period of two days i.e. within the period allowed by s. 8 of the Act
and that was "as soon as practic!lble".

This is not a case where the ~etenu alleges that his detention
was for non-existent grounds. Nor does he attribute any· mala ftdes
on the part of the]detaining authority in making the order. The -
F order of detention is therefore not .,rendered invalid merely because ,.. >
the grounds of detention were furi4shed two days later. ~_,.
.I '
I
We find it difficult to conceive of any discernible principle for
the second submission. It is submitted by learned counsel appearing
G for the detenu that the right to make a representation under Art.
22(5) 0f the Constitution read with s. 8 of the Act means what it
implies, "the right to make an effeQtive representation".· It is urged
tbft unless !\le period of detention is specified; there can be no
ifneaningful representation inasmuch as the detenu had not only the
H right of making a representation against the order for bis detention
but also the period of detention. On this hypothesis, the contention
is that the impugned order of detention is rendered invalid. ' The
ASilot tcUMAR v. bllLHiAbMiNISTRATION {Sen, J.\ 'I~

entire submission rests on the following observations of Chandrachud, A
' C.J. in A.K. Roys case, supra :

"We should have.thought that it would have been
wrong to fix a minimum period of detention, regardless of
the nature and ser.iousness of the grounds of detention.
The fact that a person can be detained· for the maximum B
period of 12 months do.es not 'place upon· the detaining
authority the obligation to direct that he shall be detained
for the maximum period. The detaining authority can
always exercise its discretion regarding the length of the
period of detention."
c
The majority decision in A.K. Roys case, supra, as pro-
nounced by Cbandrachud, C.J. is not an authqrity for the proposi-
tion that there is a duty cast on the detaining authority while making
an order of detention under sub-s. (I) or (2) to specify the period
of detention. The learned Chief Justice made the aforesaid obser-
vations while.repelling the contention advanced by. learned counsel D
for·tbe petitioner thats. 13 of the Act was violative of the funda-
mental right guaranteed under Art. 21 read ~with Art. 14 as it results
in arbitrariness in . governmental action in the matter of life ai;id
liberty of a citizen. The challenge to the validity of s. 13 of the
Act was that it provides for a uniform period of. detention of 12
· ' months in all cases, regardless of the nature and seriousness of the
grounds on the basis of which the order of detention is passed. In
••
repelling the contention, the learned Chief Justice obsel,'Ved that
• ·there was no substance in jthat grievance because, any law of pre-·
ventivt detention has to provide for the maximum period of deten-
tion, just as any punitive law like the Penal Code has to provide F
for the maximum sente'!ce which can be imposed for any offence.
In upholding the validity of s. 13 the learned Chief Justice observed :

"We should have thought that it would have been
wrong to fix a minimum. period of detention, r&gardfoss of
the grounds of detention';. G
And then went on to say :

"It must also be mentioned that under the proviso to
s. 13, the appropriate government bas the power to revoke H
or modify the order of c:)etention at any earlier point of
time." ,
114 StiPR~ME coukt il.Bl>Ok'tS [198~i 3 s.c.r..

A It would thus· be clear that the Court was there concerned ·
with the validity of s. 13 of the Act and it is not proper to build
up an argument or by reading out of context just a sentence or two.
There is no doubt in our mind that the Court has not laid down
/
that the detaining authority making an order of detention under
sub-s. (!) or sub,s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act or the authority approving
of the same, must specify the period of detention in the order;

It i.s plain from a t'eading of s. 3 of the Act that there is an
obvious fallacy underlying the submission that the detaining autho-
rity bad the duty to specify the period of detention. It will be
c • noticed that sub-s. (!) ofs .. 3 stops with the words "make an order
directing that such person be detained", and does not go further
and prescribe that the detainiQg authority shall also specify the
period of detention. Otherwise, there should have been the following
: .
wbrds added at the end of this ."sub-section "and shall specify the
'
period of such detention". What is true of sub-s. (!) of s. 3 is ·
-
D aho true of sub-s. (2) thereof. It is not permissible for the courts,
by a process of judicial construction, to· alter . or vary. the term~ of
a section. Under the scheme of the Act, the period of deten.tion
must necessarily v.ary according to the exigencies of each case i.e.
the nature of the prejudicial activity complained of. It is not that
the period of detention must in ,all circ.umstances extend to the
E maximum period of 12 months as laid down in s. 13 of the Act.

The most crucial question on which the decision must turn is
whether the activities of the .detenu fall within the d onlain of 'public >
order' or 'law and order'. The contention is that the grounds of
F detention, served on the de tenu are not connected with 'maintmance
of 'public order' but they relate to 'maintenance of Jaw and order'
and therefore the impugned order ·of de ten ti on purported to have
been' passed by the detaining authority in exercise of his powers
under sub-s. (2) of s; 3 of the Act is liable to be struck down. It
is urged that the facts alleged in the grounds of detention tend to.
show that he is engaged in criminal activities and it is an apparent
G
nullification of the judicial process if, in every. case where there is
a failure of the prosecution to proceed with. a trial or wbere the
case ends with an order of discharge or acquittal, the Executive
could fall back on its power of detention because the verdict of the
Court goes against it. Put differently, the contention is that resort
H
cannot be had to the Act to direct preventive detention of a person
under sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act for the Act is not a law for the
Asiloie ltUi.iAR v. bilLJti ADMINiStRATION (Seu, J.) 115
preventive ·detention of gangsters and notorious bad characters. The A
• detention here, it is said, is not so much for the "maintenance of
public order" but as a measure for the past criminal activities of
the detenu. It is further urged that the grounds of detention have
no rational connection with the object mentioned in the Act for
• whi~a person i;nay be detained. Further, that there is no sufficient
nexus between the preventive action and the past activities of the B
. detenu which are not proximate in point of time but are too re~ote.
There is no substance in any of these contentions aclvanced.

The true distinction between the areas of 'public order' and
'Jaw and order' lies not in the nature or quality of the Act, but in
the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction
c
between the two concepts of 'law and order' and 'public order' is
a fine. one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping.
Acts slmilar in nature hilt committed in different contexts and cir-
cumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might
affect specific individuals_cmly and therefore touch the problem of D
· law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The
act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is
the 'potentiality of the act to. disturb the even tempo of the life of
the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order. That test is clearly fulfilled in the facts and circum·
stances of the present case. E

Those who are responsible for the national security or for the
maintenance of public order. must be the sole judges of what the
• national security or public order requires. Preventive detention is
devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish F
............... a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it
, . . . . . and to prevent him ·from doing. J.ustification for such detention
i is suspicion or reasonable probability and not .criminal conviction
which can only be warranted by legal evidence. It follows that any
preventive measures, even if they involve some restraint or har<!ship
upon ipdividuals, do not partake in an¥ way of the nature of punish· G
meat, but are taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the
State. It is a matter pf grave concern that in urbanised areas like
cities and towns and particularly iµ the metropolitan city of Delhi
the law and order situation is wotseaing everyday and the use of
knives/and firearms haS given rise to a new violence. There is a H
constant struggle to control the criminal activities of the persons
engaged in such organised crimes for the maintenance of public
SUPREME cotm.t RE.POkts !19&2) 3 s.C.ft..
A order. It is difficult to appreciate the argument that the detention •
here is with a view to punish the detenu for a series of crimes that he
is alleged to have committed, but which the law enforcement agency
is not.able to substantiate. There is no reason why the Executive
cannot take recourse to its power of preventive dete.ntion in t1w,se
cases where the Court is genuinely satisfied that no prosecution
B
could possibly succeed against the detenu because he is a dangerous
person who has overawed witnesses or against whom no obe is
prepared to depose. ·

The prejudicial activities of the detcnu leading to public
c disorder, as revealed in the grounds of detention, consist of a con-
sistent course of criminal record. 'Although the criminal activities
of the detenu in the past pertained mostly to breaches of law and
order, they have now taken a turn for the worse. From the facts
alleged it appears that the detenu has taken to a life of crime and
a
become notorious character. His main activities are ,theft, robbery
D and snatching of ornaments by the use of knives and firearms. The
area of operation is limited to South Delhi, such as Greater Kailash,
Kalkaji and Lajpat Nagar.. A perusal of the F.I.Rs. shows that the
petitioner is a person of desperate and dangerous character. This is
not a case of a single activity directed against a single individuals.
There have been a series of criminal activities on the parCof the.
E detenu and his associates during a span of four years which have
made him a menace to the society. It is true that they are facing
trial or the matters are still nnder investigation. That only shows
that they are such dangerous · characters that peopie are afraid of •
giving evidence against them.
F
To bring out the gravity of the crimes committed by t!\e
deteou, we would just mention four instances. On November 19,
1979 Smt. Anupam Chander of B-5/10, Safdarjang Enclave reported
that she was robbed of her gold-chain near East·· of Kailasb and on
G investigation the petitioner along with bis associates was arrested
for this high-handed robbery am! . there is a case registered against
them which is pending trial. Just a month after i.e. on December
11, 1979, one Munna of Lajpat Nagar reported that he was robbed
of his wrist-watch and cash by three persons who were travelling
H 'in a three-wheeler. On investigation, the petitioner and his associate
Rajendra Kumar were arrested and the police recovered the stolen
property. They are facing trial in these cases. On July 18, 1981,
ASHOK KUMAR v. DELHI· ADMINISTRATION (Sen: J.) 717

Kumari G. Radha reported that she bad been robbed of her gold· A
• cbain and a pair of tops in Lajpat Nagar at the point of knife by
persons in the age group -Of 2(/22 years. On investigation, the
petitioner and his associate Rajendra ·Kumar were arrested and the
entire booty was recovered. The case is still under investigation.
It appears that the detenu was enlarged on bail and two days after
i.e. on July :W, 1981, he w~s again arrested on the. report of Smt.
Ozha that slie was robbed of her gold-chain near Shanti Bazar,
Khokha Market, Lajpat Nagar by two persons ill the age group of
21-25 years at the point of knife. On investigation, the petitioner
and his companign Rajendra Kumar were arrested and she identified
them to be the culprits and the booty was recovered from thein.
The case is under investigation. There have been similar incident¥
c,
of a like nature.

What essentially is a problem relating to law and order may
due to sudden sporadic and inlermittent acts of physical violence
on innocent victims in the metropolitan· city of Delhi result in D
serious public disorder. It is the length, magnitude and intensity
of the terror wave unleashed by a particular act of violence creating
disorder that distingui~hes it as an act affecting public order from
that concerning law and order. Some offences primarily 'injure
specific individuals and only secondarily the public interest, while
others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals E
only remotely. The question is of (the survival of the society
and the problem is the method of control. Whenever there is
an armed hold-up by gangsters in an exclusive residential area
like Greater Kailash, Kalkaji or Lajpat Nagar and persons are
• deprived of their belongings like a car, wrist-watch or cash, or
ladies relieved of their gold-chain.s or ornaments at the point of a
knife or revolver, they become victims of organised crime. There
is very little that the police can do about it except to keep a constant
• vigil over the movements of such persons. The particular acts
enumerated in the grounds of detention clearly show that the acti·
v1ties of the detenu cover a wide field and fall within the contours
of the concept of public order.
G

The contention that the facts alleged in the grounds of deten-
tion did not furnish sufficient nexus for forming the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority and further that they were H
vague, irrelevant or lacking in particulars, cannot be accepted. A
bare perusal .of the grounds of detention along, with the particulars
718 SURRBMB cOURT REPORTS (1882] 3 s.c.R.
'
A of the 36 cases furnished in the accompanying chart, shows that the
grounds furnished were not vague or irrelevant or Jacking in parti·
culars or were not adequate or sufficient for the subjective satis-
factipn of the detaining authority.
i
In the result, the petition must fail and is dismissed .
•
B
N.V.K.. Petition dlsmisied.

-
'

•