ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANY LTD.versusKESHVANAND

A                 ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANY LTD.
                                          v.
                                 KESHVANAND

                              DECEMBER 16, 1997

B               [M.K. MUKHERJEE AND K.T. THOMAS, JJ.]

          Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 :

          Section 2(yKomplainant-Meaning of-Not defined in the
C   Code-However, words and expressions defined in Pe11al Code can be used
    for the purposes of the Code-Penal Code defines "perso11s" to include a
    company-So a company can be a complainant as per the new Code-Penal
    Code, 1860, Section 11.

          SectiollS 200, 203, 256 and 249---Filing of complaint-Magistrate to
D examine the complainant on oath mandatorily before taking cog-
    nizance-Magistrate to dismiss the complaint only after considering the 'state-
    ments 011 oath-However, the examination of complainant can be dispensed
    with only when a public servant in exercise of his public duties files a
    complaillt or a complaint by a court-Magistrate has jurisdiction to dismiss
E   the Complaint when the complainant is absent.

          Section 256 and Chapter XV-Complaint filed by a company-Differellt
    persons authorized on behalf of company to represent die company in
    court-Held, different persons may represent such compa~zy at different

F
    stage-However, it is open to the complainant company to seek pennission
    of the court for sending any other person to represent the company in
    court-No Magistrate shall insist that the particular person whose statement
                                                                                     -
    was taken on oath at the first i11Stance alone can represent the com-
    pan~ os it ion under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 also
    same-Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, Sections 247 and 259.

G         Sections 249 and 256-Non-appearance of complai11ant on a particular
    date in court-Magistrate, held, not justified in acquitting the accused unless
    the presence of accused on that date was necessary-Discretion to acquit the
    accused must be exercised judicially and f airly-Wlzen the complainant and
    other witnesses had been examined, acquittal of accused not justified in the
H   guise of absence of the complainant-Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, Sec-
                                         500
          ASSOCIATED CEMENT CO. LTD. v. KESHVANAND                        501
lions 247 and 259.                                                               A
       Sections 386, 401 and 247-Distinction between appellate and
revisional jwisdictio11 of the cowt-Appellate cowt can reappraise the
evidence and is free to reach. its own co11clusion on evidence untrammeled by
any findings of the Ilia/ cowt-Revisional jurisdiction is supe1visory confined
to the legality and propriety of the findings-Revisional coult may also see      B
whether the subordinate cowt has kept within the bounds of its jwisdictio11
or has failed to exercise jwisdiction vested in it.

       The appellant company prosecuted the respondent in the court of
Judicial Magistrate for an offence committed under Section 138 of the C
Negotiable Instruments Act. After the examination of authorised person on -
behalf of the company and other witnesses, on a particular day of hearing,
the Magistrate dismissed the complaint and acquitted the accused on the
ground of absence of complainant. Appeal filed before the High Court with
leave, was also dismissed by it. Hence this appeal by the company.
                                                                                 D
      Allowing the appeal, this Court

       HELD : 1.1. The word "complainant" is not defined in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, whether old or new. Any person can set the law in
motion except in cases where the statute has specifically provided other·
wise. The word "person" is defined in the Indian Penal Code (Section 11) E
as including "any company or association of body of persons whether
incorporated or not". By virtue of Section 2(y) of the new Code words and
expressions used in that Code but not defined therein can have the same
meaning assigned to them in the Penal Code. Then when the word "person"
is specifically defined in the Penal Code as including a company that F
definition can normally be adopted for understanding the scope of the
word "complainant". However, the definition clauses subsumed in Section
2 of the new Code contains the opening key words that such definitions are
to be adopted "unless the context otherwise requires". Therefore to ascer-
tain whether a company or association of persons or body corporate can G
be a complainant as per the new Code as for all practical purpose, looking
at different contexts envisaged therein. (5111-C-F]

     1.2. Chapter XV of the new Code contains provisions for lodging
complaints with Magistrates. Section 200 as the starting provision of that
chapter enjoins 11n the Magistrate, who takes cognizance of an offence on H
    502                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A a complaint, to examine the complainant on oath. Such examination is
    mandatory as can be discerned from the words "shall examine on oath the
    complainant.... ". The Magistrate is further required to reduce the sub-
    stance of such examination to writing and it "shall be signed by the
    complainant". Under Section 203 the Magistrate is to dismiss the com-
    plaint if he is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceed-
B
    ings a~er considering the said statement o~ oath. Such examination of the
    complainant on oath can be dispensed with lmf,y under two situations, one
    if the complaint was filed by a public servant, acting or purporting to act
    in the discharge of his official duties and the other when a court has made
    the complaint. Except in the above understandable situations the com-
c   plainant has to make a physical presence for being examined by the
    Magistrate. Section 256 or Section 249 of ¢he new Code clothes the
    Magistrates with jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint when the com-
    plainant is absent, which means his physical absence. [510-G-H; 511-A-B]

          1.3. The scheme of Chapter XV of the new Code makes it clear that
D
    complainant must. be corporeal person who is capable of making physical
    presence in the court. Its corollary is that even if a complaint is .made in
    the name of an incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is
    necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the
    court and it is that natural person who is looked upon, for all practical
E   purposes, to be the complainant in the case. In other words, when the
    complainant is a body corporate it is the de jure complainant, and it must
    necessarily associate a human being as defacto complainant to represent
    the former in court proceedings. [511-C-D]


F       1.4. However, no Magistrate shall insist that the particular person,
  whose statement was taken on oath at the first in.stance, alone can continue
  to represent the company till the end of the proceedings. There may be
                                                                                     -
  occasions when a different person can represent the company e.g. the
  particular person who represents the company at the first instance may
  either retire from the company's services or may otherwise cease to as-
G sociate therewith or he would be transferred to a distant place. In such
  cases it would be practically difficult for the company to continue to make
  the same person represent the company in the court. In any such even-
  tuality it is open to the de jure complainant company to seek permission
  of the court for sending any other person to represent the company in the
H court. At any rate, absence of the complainant e11visaged in Section 249 or
          ASSOCIATED CEMENT CO. LTD. v. KESHVANAND                       503

Section 256 of the new Code would include absence of the corporeal person       A
representing the incorporeal complainant. (511-F-G]

        1.5. As the corresponding provision of the old Code are the same
for all practical purposes, the legal position discussed is applicable to the
complaint filed under the old Code as well. (511-E]
                                                                                B
      2.1. Section 247 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Section 256
of the new Code) affords some deterrence against dilatory tactics on the
part of a complainant who set the law in motion through his complaint.
An accused who is per force to attend the Court on all posting days can
be put to much harassment by a complainant if he does not turn up to the
Court on occasions when his presence is necessary. The section, therefore,
                                                                                c
affords protection to an accused against such tactics of the complainant.
But that does not mean if the complainant is absent, the court has a duty
to acquit the accused in invitum. (509-B-C]

       2.2. Reading Section 247 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 D
 (Section 256 of the new Code) in its entirety would reveal that two con-
 straints are imposed on the court for exercising the power under the
section. The first is, if the Court thinks that in a situation it is proper to
adjourn the hearing then the Magistrate shall not acquit the accused. The
second is, when the Magistrate considers that personal attendance of the
complainant is not necessary on that day the Magistrate has the power to E
 dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case. When the court
notices that the complainant is absent on a particular day the court must
consider whether personal attendance of the complainant is essential on
that day for the progress of the case and also whether the situation does
not justify the case being adjourned to another date due to any other F
reason. If the situation does not justify the case being adjourned the court
is free to dismiss the complaint and acquit the accused. But if the presence
of the complainant on that day was quite unnecessary then resorting to the
step of axing down the complaint may not be a proper exercise of the power
envisaged in the section. The discretion must therefore, be exercised G
judicially and fairly without impairing the cause of administration of
criminal justice. (509-D-F]

      3.1. Appellate jurisdiction is coextensive with original court's juris-
diction as for appraisal and appreciation of evidence and reaching find-
ings an facts and the appellate court is free to reach its own conclusion on H
    504                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   evidence untrammeled by any finding entered by the trial court. Revisional
    power on the other hand belong to supervisory jurisdiction of a superior
    court. While exercising revisional powers the court has to confine itself to
    the legality and propriety of the findings and also whether the court has
    failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it. Though the difference between
B   the two jurisdictions is subtle, it is quite real and has now become well
    recognised in legal provinces. [507-D-E]

          3.2. When a trial court had acquitted an accused due to non-ap-
    pearance of the complainant the appellate court has the same powers as
    the trial court to reach a fresh decision as to whether in the particular
C   situation the Magistrate shoulld have acquitted the accused. What the trial
    court did not then ascertain and consider could, perhaps, be known to the
    appellate court and a decision different from the trial court can be taken
    by the appellate court, whether the order of acquittal should have been
    passed in the particular situation. [508-C-D]

D         State of Kera/a v. KM. Cha1ia Abdulla & Co., AIR (1965) SC 1585
    and Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. J(Jislmaji Dattatreya Bapat, AIR
    (1970) SC 1, relied on.

         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
E   1239 of 1997.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 9.4.97 of the Jammu & Kashmir
    High Court in Cr!. R. No. 81 of 1996.

          Raju Ramachandran, Sudhanshu Tripathi, U.A. Rana and Ms. Arshi
p   Subail for the Appellant.

         M.L. Bhat, (Prakash Padiau) for Ms. Purnima Bhat Kak for the
    Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
          THOMAS, J. Leave granted.

          Appellant-company has been prosecuting the respondent in the court
    of Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Jammu, alleging the offence under
    Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, but learned Magistrate
H   acquitted the respondent on 24-8-1996 solely on the ground that the




                                                  •
                              •
  ASSOCIATED CEMENT CO. LTD. v. KESHVANAND [THOMAS, J.] 505

complainant was absent. Appellant - company filed an appeal in challenge       A
of the said order of acquittal before the High Court of Jammu &. Kashmir
with leave but that appeal was dismissed. This appeal is against the said
judgment of the High Court.

      The complaint was based on a cheque issued by the respondent
towards amounts allegedly due from him ranging to a little above eight lacs    B
of rupees. Facts, which are not disputed for the present appeal, show that
appellant-company was represented in the trial court by one Puneet Ag-
garwal with a power of attorney of the company. Learned Magistrate took
cognizance of the offence, and after examining Puneet Aggarwal on oath,
issued summons to the respondent pursuant to which he appeared in court.
As the trial proceeded, Puneet Aggarwal and another person were ex-            c
amined as prosecution witnesses and the case was posted for further
evidence to 23-8-1996. On that day the complainant was absent and the
counsel for the accused pressed for dismissal of the complaint. However,
the Magistrate posted the case to the next day, but on that day also the
complainant and his counsel were absent. Then the Magistrate recorded          D
the order of acquittal of the accused under Section 247 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 (which is applicable to the State of Jammu &
Kashmir even now. It will hereinafter be referred to as 'the old Code').

       In the appeal petition filed before the High Court it was stated that
Puneet Aggarwal was posted as an officer of the appellant company at           E
J ammu during the period when the complaint was filed, but subsequently
he was transferred to Jallandhar (in Punjab State), the advocate of the
complainant (Shri K.S. Johal) faced a misfortune in his family as his
brother was involved in a motor accident on 23-8-1996 and was subjected
to an operation, and due to such circumstances Shri J.S. Johal could not
attend the court for three days preceding 25.8.1996. It was also mentioned     F
in the appeal petition that the aforesaid Puneet Aggarwal had in fact left
J allandhar for attending the court at J ammu on 23-8-1996, but he could
not reach Jammu as motor traffic on the National Highway became
paralyzed due to incessant rains which lashed the region continuously for
2 days, and that Puneet Aggarwal never knew that the case was posted to        G
next day and hence his absence on 24-8-1996 was absolutely unintentional.

      Learned Single Judge of the High Court did not take into account
any of the above facts and was not persuaded to interfere with the acquittal
as he adopted a "grammatical construction" of Section 247 of the old Code
in the following words :                                                       H
    506                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A           "On a grammatical construction of Section 247 the intention of the
            legislature becomes clear. Non-appearance of the complainant,
            after summons are issued, according to that intention, may result
            in acquittal of the accused."

B         On the above premise learned Single Judge found that there was no
    legal errof'in the order passed by the Magistrate and hence dismissed the
    appeal.

          Before we proceed to consider the merits of this appeal we may refer
    to a strange averment made by the respondent in the counter affidavit
C   sworn to by him which he had filed in this court in answer to the special
    leave petition. After replying to various grounds, the respondent has stated,
    with reference to paragraph F of the special leave petition the following :

                "In reply to sub-para F it is submitted that a false complaint
D           was filed against the Respondent at the behest of one Mr. Kanwar
            Sein Anand, who is Forwarding and Clearing Agent of the
            petitioner company. The said gentleman claims to be a real brother
            of an Hon'ble Sitting Judge of the Supreme Court and is exploiting
            the name of the Hon'ble Judge without his knowledge."
E
          We could not fathom or even grasp the reason for making such a
    statement in the counter affidavit. So we asked Shri M.L. Bhat, learned
    senior counsel (who appeared for the respondent) as to the relevance or
    the raison d'etre for the said averment. Shri M .L. Bhat then submitted
    that he too concedes that the said averment is quite irrelevant for this
F   case and offered to withdraw it. Later an application has been filed f6r
    deleting that portion from the affidavit while we allow that application
    to delete the said portion we cannot but express our displeasure over
    and disapproval of the conduct in scribbling down such irrelevant and
    mischievous imputation in an affidavit filed in this Court, particularly
G   the unwholesome attempt to drag in a judge of this Court. It is sad that
    when such an unsavoury statement was scribed into an affidavit the idea
    of deleting it did not occur to him at least when the affidavit was
    authenticated by the advocate. Indeed, he decided to delete it only when
    we asked the senior counsel about its relevance. We do not wish to say
H   anything more about it.
   ASSOCIATED CEMENT CO. LTD. v. KESHV ANAND [THOMAS, J.] 507

     Learned Single Judge of the High Court apprised himself of the               A
width of the appellate powers of the High Court as follows, in the im-
pugned judgment:

         "In my opinion our law of precedent has developed out of this
         policy of the statutes. This is how time and again it has been held
         that Appellate/Revisional Courts should not ordinarily disturb the
                                                                                  B
         finding of the trial courts, if a different view also could be taken
         on same facts. The Court's concern only will be, as to whether or
         not the order impugned is fraught with illegality or impropriety."

       It appears that learned Single Judge has equated appellate powers          C
with revisional powers, and that the core difference between an appeal and
a revision has been overlooked. It is trite legal position that appellate
jurisdiction is coextensive with original court's jurisdiction as for appraisal
and appreciation of evidence and reaching findings on facts and appellate
court is free to reach its own conclusion on evidence untrammelled by any         D
finding entered by the trial court Revisional powers on the other hand
belong to supervisory jurisdiction of a superior court. While exercising
revisional powers the court has to confine to the legality and propriety of
the findings and also whether the subordinate court has kept itself within
the bounds of its jurisdiction including the question whether the court has
failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. Though ·the difference          E
between the two jurisdictions is subtle, it is quite real and has now become
well recognised in legal provinces.

      In State of Kera/a v. K.M. Charia Abdullah & Co., AIR (1965) SC
1585 this Court has highlighted the difference between the two jurisdictions      F
in the following words :

        There is an essential distinction between an appeal and a revision.
        The distinction is based on the differences implicit in the said two
        expressions. An appeal is a continuation of the proceedings; in
        effect the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority and G
        it has power to review the evidence subject to the statutory limita-
        tions prescribed. But in the case of a revision, whatever powers
        the revisional authority may or may not have, it has not the power
        to review the evidence unless the statute expressly confers on it
        that power."                                                         H
    508                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A         In Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Klishnaji Dattatraya Bapat,
    AIR (1970) SC 1 this Court has observed that the right of appeal is om:
    of entering a superior court and invoking its aid and interposition to
    redress the error of the court below.

          In this case when the High Court considered that its only concern
B was to chec~ whether the order of the magistrate "is fraught with any
    illegality or impropriety", the High Court has narrowed down its angle
    while dealing with an appeal.

          When a trial court had acquitted an accused due to non-appearance
C of the complainant the appellate court has the same powers as the trial
  court to reach a fresh decision as to whether on the particular situation the
  magistrate should have acquitted the accused. What the trial court did not
  then ascertain and consider could, perhaps, be known to the appellate
  court and a decision different from the trial court can be taken by the
  appellate court, whether the order of acquittal should have been passed in
D the particular situation.
             Section 247 of the old Code reads thus :

             "If the summons has been issued on complaint, and upon the day
             appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day sub-
E            sequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the com-
             plainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding
             anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for
             some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case
             to some other day :
F            Provided that where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal
             attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may
             dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case."

          Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the
G new Code') is the corresponding provision to Section 247 of the old Code.
    The main body of both provisions is identically worded, but there is a slight
    difference between the provisos under the two sections. The proviso to
    Section 256 of the new Code is reproduced here :

             "Provided that where the complainant is represented by a pleader
H            or by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the


                                  )
  ASSOCIATED CEMENT CO. LTD. v. KESHVANAND [THOMAS, J.] 509

         Magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the com-        A
         plainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his
         attendance and proceed with the case."

      What was the purpose of including a provision like Section 247 in
the old Code (or Section 256 in the new Code). It affords some deterrence
against dilatory tactics on the part of a complainant who set the law in          B
motion through-his complaint. An accused who is per force to attend the
court on all posting days can be put to much harassment by a complainant
if he does not turn up to the court on occasions when his presence is
necessary. The Section, therefore, affords a protection to an accused
against such tactics of the complainant. But that does not mean if the            C
complainant is absent, court has a duty to acquit the accused in invitum.

        Reading the Section in its entirety would reveal that two constraints
are imposed on the court for exercising the power under the Section. First
is, if the court thinks that in a situation it is proper to adjourn the hearing
then the Magistrate shall not acquit the accused. Second is, when the             D
Magistrate considers that personal attendance of the complainant is not
necessary on that day the magistrate has the power to dispense with his
attendance and proceed with the case. When the court notices that the
complainant is absent on a particular day the court must consider whether
personal attendance of the complainant is essential on that day for the           E
progress of the case and also whether the situation does not justify the case
being adjourned to another date due to any other reason. If the situation
does not justify the case being adjourned the court is free to dismiss the
complaint and acquit the accused. But if the presence of the complainant
on that day was quite unnecessary then resorting to the step of axing down
the complaint may not be a proper exercise of the power envisaged in the          F
Section. The discretion must, therefore, be exercised judicially and fairly
without impairing the cause of administration of criminal justice.

      When considering the situation of this case as on 24-8-1996, from the
facts narrated above, we have no manner of doubt that the Magistrate G
should not have resorted to the axing process, particularly since the com-
plainant was already examined as a witness in the case besides examining
yet another witness for the prosecution.

      Appellant has adopted an alternative contention that as the com-
plainant in this case is a company which is an incorporeal entity there is H
    510                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A no question of the complainant being absent in the court on any day fixed
    for hearing and hence Section 247 of the old Code (or Section 256 of the
    new Code) was inapplicable. Learned Single Judge repelled the said
    alternative contention when it was raised in the High Court.

          It is true that the complainant M/s Associated Cement Company Ltd.
B is not a natural person. We have no doubt that a complaint can be filed in
    the name of a juristic person because it is also a person in the eye of law.
    But then, who would be the complainant in the criminal court for certain
    practical purposes.

C         The word "complainant" 1s not defined m the Code of Criminal
    Procedure, whether old or new. Any person can set the law in motion
    except in cases '\\'here the statute has. specifically provided otherwise. The
    word "person" is defined in the Indian Penal Code (Section 11) as including
    "any company or association or body of persons whether incorporated or
    not". By virtue of Section 2(y) of the new Code words and expressions used
D   in that Code but not defined therein can have the same meaning assigned
    to them in the' Penal Code. Thus when the word "person" is specifically
    defined in the Penal Code as including a company that definition can
    normally be adopted for understanding the scope of the word "com-
    plainant". However, the definition clauses subsumed in Section 2 of the new
E   Code contains the opening key words that such definitions are to be
    adopted "unless the context otherwise requires". We have, therefore, to
    ascertain whether a company or association of persons or body corporate
    can be a complainant as per the new Code as for all practical purposes,
    looking at different contexts envisaged therein.

F       Chapter XV of the new Code contains provisions for lodging
  complaints with magistrates. Section 200 as the starting provision of that
  chapter enjoins on the Magistrate, who takes cognizance of an offence on
  a complaint, to examine the complainant on oath. Such examination is
  mandatory as can be discerned from the words "shall examine on oath the
G complainant.. ... ". The Magistrate is further required to reduce the
  substance of such examination to writing and it "shall be signed by the
  complainant". Under Section 203 the magistrate is to dismiss the complaint
  if he is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding after
  considering the said statement on oath. Such examination of the
H complainant on oath can be dispensed with only under two situations, one
  ASSOCIATED CEMENT CO. LTD. v. KESHV ANAND (THOMAS, J.) 511

if the complaint was filed by a public servant, acting or purporting to act   A
in the discharge of his official duties and the other when a court has made
the complaint. Except under the above understandable situations the
complainant has to make his physical presence for being examined by the
magistrate. Section 256 or Section 249 of the new Code clothes the
Magistrate with jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint when the complainant    B
is absent, which means his physical absence.

      The above scheme of the new Code makes it clear that complainant
must be a corporeal person who is capable of making physical presence in
the court. Its corollary is that even if a complaint is made in the name of
an incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary that C
a natural person represents such juristic person in the court and it is that
natural person who is looked upon, for all practical purposes, to be the
complainant in the case. In other words, when the complainant is a body
corporate it is the de jure complainant, and it must necessarily associate a
human being as de facto complainant to represent the former in court D
proceedings.

      As the corresponding provisions in the old Code are the same for all
practical purposes, the legal position discussed above is applicable to the
complaint filed under the old Code as well.                                   E

       Be that so, we suggest as a pragmatic proposition that no Magistrate
shall insist that the particular person, whose statement was taken on oath
at the fust instance, alone can continue to represent the company till the
end of the proceedings. There may be occasions when a different person
can represent the company e.g. the particular person who represents the F
company at the first instance may either retire from the company's services
or may otherwise cease to associate therewith or he would be transferred
to a distant place. In such cases it would be practically difficult for the
company to continue to make the same person represent the company in
the court. In any such eventuality it is open to the de jure complainant G
company to seek permission of the court for sending any other person to
represent the company in the court. At any rate, absence of the
complainant envisaged in Section 249 or 256 of the new Code would
include absence of the corporeal person representing the incorporeal
complainant. For those reasons we are not persuaded to uphold the H
    512                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A contention that Section 247 of the old Code (or Section 256 of the new
    Code) is not applicable in a case where the complainant is a company or
    any other juristic person.

          However, as we have taken the view that the Magistrate should not
    have acquitted the respondent under Section 247 of the old Code on the
B   facts of this case we allow the appeal and set aside the order of ai;;quittal
    as well as the impugned judgment of the High Court. The prosecution
    would now proceed from the stage where it reached before the order of
    acquittal was passed.

    R.K.S.                                                      Appeal allowed.




                                                                                    •