Holding

Clauses ‘first’, ‘secondly’ and ‘thirdly’ of s.15(1)(a), (b), (c) and the whole of s.15(2) are ultra vires the Constitution, while the ‘fourthly’ (and ‘fifthly’) clauses are valid.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the constitutional validity of Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (as applied in Haryana), which gave a right of pre-emption based on consanguinity. Petitioners argued that the classification violated Articles 14, 15 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, while the State defended it on grounds of preserving village integrity, avoiding fragmentation of holdings, and upholding agnatic succession. The Court held that the classification favouring kinsfolk was an archaic, feudal relic inconsistent with the socialist ethos of the Constitution and therefore unreasonable. Consequently, clauses ‘first’, ‘secondly’ and ‘thirdly’ of s.15(1)(a), (b), (c) and the entire s.15(2) were declared ultra vires, whereas the ‘fourthly’ (and ‘fifthly’ where applicable) clauses were upheld as valid. The writ petitions were allowed, partially striking down the statute.

Issues considered

The constitutionality of Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 under Articles 14, 15 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution
Whether the classification based on consanguinity is a reasonable restriction in a socialist democratic state
Validity of specific clauses within Section 15 (first, second, third vs. fourth, fifth clauses)

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Art.14, s. Art.15, s. Art.19(1)(f)
Punjab Alienation of Land Act
Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920
Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913s. 10, s. 14, s. 15, s. 15(1)(a), s. 15(1)(b), s. 15(1)(c), s. 15(2), s. 16, s. 17, s. 4, s. 5(b), s. 6, s. 7, s. 8

Subjects

pre-emptionconsanguinityArticle 14Article 15Article 19equalityfeudal lawland reformHaryanaPunjab Pre-emption Actconstitutional validityclassificationsocialist republic

Judgment

399

A

v.
STATE OF BARYANA & ORS.

FEBRUARY 27, 1986
B
[P.N. BHAGWATI, C.J., 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, R.B. MISRA,
V. KHALID AND G.L. OZA, JJ.]

Punjab.Pre-emption Act 1913, as applicable in the State
of Haryana, s. 15 - Whether constitutionally void.

Interpretation of statutes - Provision of Conatitution C
· sought to be interpreted or a statute whose constitutional
validity is sought to be questioned - Interpretation that will
promote march & Progress towards - a Socialistic Democratic
State - To be given.

Section 15 of ·the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 as D
applicable in the State of Haryana, incorporates the right of
pre-emption based on conaanguinity. The petitioners challenged
this right of pre-emption based on consanguinity under Art.32
of the Conatitution on the ground that it offends Arts. 14 and
15 of the Conatitution. It was contended on behalf of the
respondent-State that the classification in f awur of the E
persona mentioned in section 15 has been made on reasonable
basis . in the interests of the public: (i) to preserve inte-
grity of village comamity; (ii) to avoid fragmentation of
holdings; (iii) to implement the agnatic theory of succession;
• (iv) to promote public and private decency; (v) to facilitate
tenants to acquire ownership rights; (vi) to reduce litigation F
consequent to introduction of an outsider on family property
or jointly owned property.

Allowing the writ petitions,

llKID; l(i) There is no justification for the G
classification contained in section 15 of the Punjab
Pre-emption Act of the kinafolk entitled to pre-emption •.The
, right of pre-emption based on conaanguinity is a relic of the
) •.feudal psst. It is totally inconsistent with modern ideas. The
reasons which justified its recognition quarter of a century
H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R.

A
ago, namely, the preservation of the integrity of rural
society, the unity of family life and the agnatic theory of )- '
succession are today irrelevant, It is difficult to uphold the
classification on the basis of unity and integrity of either
the village co-111ity or the family or on the basis of the
agnatic theory of succession which is again in a way connected
B with the integrity of the family. The list of kinsfolk
mentioned as entitled to pre-emption i~ intrinsically
defective and self-contradictory. There is, therefore, no
reasonable classification and clauses 'First', 'Secondly' and /
'Thirdly' of s. 15(l)(a), 'First', 'Secondly', and 'Thirdly' ·•
of s. 15(l)(b), clauses 'First', 'Secondly' and 'Thirdly' of
c s. 15(l)(c) and the whole of section 15(2) are, therefore,
declared ultravires the Constitution. (419 E-H]

1.2 Clause 'fourthly' of s. 15(l)(a), clauses 'fourthly
and fifthly' of s. 15(l)(b) and clause 'fourthly' o.f s. 15(1)~
(c) are valid and do not 'infringe either Art. 14 or 15 of the
D
Constitution. [416 H; 417 A]

2.1 Whether it is the Constitution that is expounded or
the constitutional validity of a statute.that is considered, a r
cardinal rule is to look to the Preamble to the Constitution
as the guiding light and to the Directive Pri~ciples of State
E Policy as the Book of interpretation. The Preamble embodies
and expresses the hopes and aspirations of the people. The
Directive Principles set out proximate goals. At the time of
examining statutes against the Constitution, it is through
these glasses that the court must look, 'distant vision' or
'near vision'. The Constitution being sui-generis, where
F constitutional issues are under consideration, narrow
interpretative rules which may have relevance when legislative
enactments are interpreted may be misplaced. (411 D-F]

2,2 In 1977 the 42nd amendment proclaimed India as a
Socialist Republic. The word 'socialist' was introduced into
G the Preamble to the Constitution. The implication of the
introduction of the word 'socialist' which has now become the
centre of the hopes and aspirations of the people - a beacon
to guide and inspire all that is enshrined in the articles of
the Constitution - is clearly to set up a "vibrant throbbing
socialist welfare society" in the place of a "Feudal exploited ,
H
society". When the Court considers the question whether irt
ATAM PRAKASH v. STATE 401

A
statute offends Article 14 of the Constitution it must
consider whether a classification that the 'legislature may
have made is consistent with the socialist goals set out in
the Preamble and the .Directive Principles enumerated in Part
IV of the Constitution. A classification which is not in tune
with the Constitution is per se unreasonable and cannot be B
permitted. [411 G-H; 412 A-C]

3.1 The right of pre-emption based on consanguinity is
antiquated and feudal in origin and in character. The right is
very 11111ch like another right of feUdal origin and character
which subsisted here and there in India until recently,
particularly S100ngst the princely families, namely, the right C·
of succession by primgeniture. It is a well-known
characteristic of feudalism that the control of the mat
important productive resource, land, should continue in the
hands of the same social and family group. The right of pre-
emption based on consanguinity is a consequence flowing out of
this characteristic. It is entirely inconsistent with our D
Constitutional scheme. Since the Forty-Second Amendment, India
is a socialist republic in which feudalism can obviously have
no place and 11111St go. [404 G-H; 405 A-Bl

3.2 Avoidance of fragmentation of holdings, promtion of

.
private and public decency and reduction of litigation do not E
seem to have any relevance to the right of pre-emption, vested
in the kinsfolk of the vendor. The real question is whether a

t
classification in favour of kinsfolk of the vendor can be
considered reasonable so as to justtfy a right of pre-emption
in their favour for the purpose of preserving the integrity of
, the village co11111Unity or implementing the agnatic theory of F
succession or preserving the unity and integrity of the
·'t' family. The classification cannot be considered reasonable in
the circumstances prevailing today whatever justification
there might have been for the classification in 1960 when the
legislature amended s. 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption ACt. A
scrutiny of the list of persons in whose favour the right of G
pre-emption is vested under s •. 15 reveals certain glaring
facts which appear to detract from the theory of preservation
of the integrity of the family and the theory of agnatic right
of succession. Neither the father nor the mther figures in
\~ the list though the father's brother does. The son's daughter
and the daughter's son do. The sister and sister's son are
H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19861 1 s.c.R.

A
excluded though the brother and the brother's son are includ- -~
ed. Thus relatives of the same degree are excluded either
because they are women or because they are related through
women. It is not as if wonien and those related through women
are altogether excluded because the daughter and daughter's
son are included. If the d<1ugll~er is to be treated on a par
B. with the son's son it does not appear logical why the
father's son (brother) should be included and not the father's
daughter (sister). These are but a few of the intrinsic
contradictions that appear in the list of relatives· mentioned !'11
in s.15 aa entitled to the right of pre-emption. [417 G-11;
418 A-B; H; 419 A-CJ
c
3. 3 There has been a green and a white revolution in
Haryana. This State is also in the process of an industrial
revolution. Industries have sprung up through out the State
and the population has been in a state of constant flux and
movement. The traditional integrity of the village and the
D family have now become old wives' tales. Tribal loyalties have
disappeared and family ties have weakened. Such is the effect
of the march of history and the consequence of r
industrialisation, mechanisation of agriculture, development
of marketing and trade, allurement of professions and office,
employment opportunity else-where and so on. The processes of
E history cannot be reversed and the court cannot hark back to
the traditional rural-family-oriented society. ~ite apart
from the break up of the integrity of village life and family
life, it is to be noticed that the property in respect of ~
which the right of. pre-emption is to be exercised is property
of which the vendor or the vendors, as the caae may be, have
F rights of full ownership and their kinsfolk have no present
right whatsoever. [418 C-F]
'f
3.4 The right of pre-emption is not to be confused with
the right to question the alienation of ancestral i1J1110vable
property which the nale lineal descendants of the vendor have
G under the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act 1920. The right
of pre-emption is now entirely a statutory right and
diHociated from custom or personal law. !418 G]

4,1 In Bb8ll llaa v. B, Baijnath SiDgh 1962 (Suppl.) 3
S,C,R, 724, the right of pre-emption given to co-shares waa ,, .•
H held to be a ·reasonable restriction on the right to hold, '
acquire or dispose of property conferred by Art. 19(l)(f) of
ATAM PRAKASH v. STATE 403

A
the Constitution. What has been said there to uphold the right
of pre-emption granted to a co-sharer as a reasonable restric-
tion on the right to property applies with the same force to
justify the classification of co-sharers as a class by them-
selves for the purpose of vesting in them the right of
pre-emption. [416 D-El B
4,2 The right of pre-emption vested in a tenant can also
be easily sustained. There can be no denying that the movement
of all land reform legislation has been towards enabling the
tiller of the soil to obtain proprietary right in the soil so
that he may not be disturbed from possession of the land and
deprived of his livelihood by a superior proprietor. The right c
of pre-emption in favour of a tenant granted by the Act is
only another instance of a legislation aimed at protecting the
tenant. There can be no doubt that tenants form a distinct
class by themselves and the right of pre-emption granted in
their favour is reasonable and in the public interest.

-- [416 G-H]

Jibau Ran v. B. Baijnath S:lngh, [19621 Supp. 3 s.c.R. 724
and Sant Ram v. Lahb S:lngh A.1.R. 1965 s.c. 314 referred to.
D

Ran Sarup v. Hanshi • Ors. [19631 3 s.c.R. 858
explained. E

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13227
of 1984 etc.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)
• Pankaj Kalra for the Petitioner in W.P.• No. 13227 of
F

"' 1984.

M/s. llarbans Lal, V.C. Mahajan, M,habir Singh,Avadh
Behar! Rohtagi, S.S. Banerjee, .M.S. Gujaral, K.G. Bhagat,·
Hardev Singh, Yog'.::shwar Prasad, Anil Dev Singh, Govind Das, G
and K.P. Bhandari, M/s. S.M. Ashri, G.K. Bansal, J.S.
Malhotra, Ali Ahmed, Jayashree Ahmed; C.K. Bansal, Narendra
Singh Malik, D.K. Garg, B.P. Maheshwari, Vidya Sagar Vashist,
S.N. Agarwal, S.K. Jain, S,K, Dhingra, M.L. Verma, S.K. Bagga,
'~Ranbir Singh Yadav, H.M. Singh, Kirpal Singh, Amlan Ghosh, M.
Qamaruddin, Mrs. M. Qamaruddin, R.K. Kapur, M.M. Kashyap, B.R. H
Kapur, Anil Katya!, O.P. Sharma, Amis Ahmad Khan, R.C. Kapoor,
Mrs. Laxmi Arvind, Suresh c. Gupta, S.S. Ray, An.il Bhatnagar,
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 S.C.R.

A
Praveen Kumar, Ashok Mathur, M.K. Dua, P.N. Puri, Gyan Singh, ~
I.S. Goel, S.N. Singh, C.V. Subba Rao, V.M. Issar, Khai~an &
Co., Brij Bhushan Sharma, P. Narasimhan, Ms. Madhu M:>ol
Chandani, K.K. Jain, Pramod Dayal, A.D. Sangar, A.K. Ganguli,
A. Mariaputam, Nafiz Ahmad Siddiqui, M.C. Dhingra, Avtar Singh '
Sonal, Shreepal Singh, S.R. Srivastava, Ashok K. Srivastava,
B
Balrukand Goel, S.K. Bhulakia, R.C. Bhatia, R.K. Agnihotri,
Dr. Meera Aggarwal, R.C. Misra, M.S. Dhillon, S.K. Ilholakia,
P. Narasimhan, R.K. Agarwal, T. Sridharan, S.C. Patel, N.M.
Popli, Brij Bhushan and Kailash Mehta for the appearing "'
parties.

c The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The archaic right of pre-emption
based on consanguinity is in question in the several thousand
writ petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The

D
constitutional validity of sec. 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption
Act, 1913 was applicable in the State of Haryana which
incorporates this right is challanged. The State of origin of
the Punjab Pre-emption Act, the State of Punjab, has repealed r
-
the Act in 1973. The Act, however, continues to be in force in
the State of Haryana which originally formed part of the State
of Punjab. The vires of sec.lS(l)(a) of the Act was questioned
E
in this Court.in Baa Sarup v. Munshi and Ors. [1963] 3 S.C.R.
858 on the ground that it offended the fundamental right
guaranteed by sec.19(l)(f) of the Constitution. It was ruled
by a Constitution Bench that there was no infringement of
Art.19(l)(f) and that the provision was valid. The validity of
sec.IS is now impugned primarily on the ground that it offends
F
Arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution.

The right of pre-emption based on consanguinity has been ~
variously described by learned judges as 'feudal',
'piratical', 'tribal', 'weak', 'easily defeated', etc. [Kalwa
v. Vasakha Singh A.I.R. 1983 Punjab & Haryana 480 (F.B.) at
G
490 and Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh [1959] S.C.R. 878.]
Fusing as it does the ties of blood and soil, it cannot be
doubted that the right is antiquated and feudal in origin and
in character. The right is very much like another right of
feudal origin and character which subsisted here and there in .
India until recently, particularly amongst the princel:t--f
II
families, namely, the right of succession by primogeniture. It

•
ATAM PRAKASH v. STATE [CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.] 405

A
----( is a well-known characteristic of feudalism that the control
of the most important productive resource, land, should
contitiue in the hands of the same social and family group. The
right of pre-emption based on consanguinity is a consequence
flowing out of this characteristic. It is entirely inconsis-
tent with our Constitutional scheme. Since• the Forty-Sec'ond B
Amendment, India is a socialist republic in which feudalism
can obviously have no place and must go. Our Constitution now
proclaims India as a sovereign, soc.ialist, secular democratiC
,. • republic in which the right to equality before the law and the
equal protection of the laws are guaranteed and all citizens
are assured that the State shall not discriminate on grounds
only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of c
them. The citizens are also assured of the right to move
freely through out the territory of India, to reside or settle
in any part of the territory of India and to practise any
profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or. business.
The State is further enjoined to direct its policy towards
securing that the operation of the economic system does not D
result in the concentration of wealth and means of production
___, to the common detriment. The right to property has also now
ceased to be a fundamental right since the Forty- Fourth
Amendment. Tiie question now is Whether this adjunct of the
right to property, perhaps perfectly reasonable in a feudal
society, can be constitutionally sustained in a society E
dedicated to socialistic principles. The question has to be
examined with reference to Arts. 14, 15 and 19(l)(d) and (g),
in the background of the Preamble to the Constitution and
Art.39(c) of the Directive Principles of State .Policy. We
think that the question has to be primarily answered with
reference to Art.14. F
•
'I' The Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 repealed the Punjab
Pre-emption Act of 1905. and sec.12 of the 1905 Act which
corresponded to sec.15 of the 1913 Act was as follows:-

"12. Subject to the provisions of section 11, the G
right - of pre-emption in respect of agricultural
land and village immovable property shall vest-

(a) in the case of the sale of such · land or
property by a sole owner or occupancy tenant, or
when such land or property is held jointly, by the H
co---sharers,
406 SUPREME COURT REPOUS (19861 l s.c.a.

A
in the persons who but for such sale liOUld be ,___
entitled to inherit the property in the event of
his or their decease, in order of succession; ·

(b) in the case of a sale of share of such land or
property held jointly-
B
first in the lineal descendants of the vendor 1n
the male line in order of succession; secondly, in
the co-shares, if any, who are agnates, in order of ,..
succession;

c thirdly, in the persons described in sub-clause (a)
of this sub1ect1on and not hereinbefore provided
for;

fourthly, in the co-sharers, (i) jointly, (ii)
severally;
D . .
(c) As section lS(c), Act of 1913, with the
addition of words (i) jointly, (ii) severally, in ,..
secondly, thirdly and fourthly.
,_..,
Explanation 1. - In the case of sale of a right of
E occupancy, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of this
sub1ection, with the exception of sub-clause
fourthly of clause (c), shall be applicable.

Explanation 2. - In the case of a sale by a female
of property to which she has succeeded through her
F husband, son, brother or father, the word 'agnates'
in this section shall mean the agnates of the'
person through whom she has so succeeded." "f

Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-.,mption Act, 1913 as it
originally stood, was as follows:-

"15. Subject to the provisions of section 14 the
right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural
land and village immovable property shall vest -

(a) where the sale is by a sole owner or occupancy+
H tenant or, in the case of land or property jointly
ATAM PRAKASH v. STATE [CHINNAPPA REDDY,. J, ] 407

A
owned or held, is by all the co-sharers jointly, in
the persons in order of succession, who but for
such sale would be entitled, on the death of the
vendor.or vendors, to inherit the land or property
sold:
B
(b) where the .sale is of a share out of joint land
or property, and is; not made by all the co-sharers
jointly, -
•
firstly, in the lineal decendants .of the vendor in
order of succession;

secondly, in the co-share rs , if any, who are
c
agnates, in order of succession;

thirdly in the persons, not included under firstly
or secondly, above, in order of succession, who but
for such sale would be entitled, on the death of
the vendor, to inherit the land or property sold;
D

fourthly, in the co-sharers:

(c) If no person having a right of pre-emption
under clause (a) or clause (b) seeks to exercise
E
it. -

firstly, when the sale affects the superior or
inferior proprietary right and the superior right
is sold, in the inferior proprietors, and when the
j inferior proprietors, and when the inferior right
F
is sale, in the superior proprietors;

secondly, in the owners of the patti or other
sub-division of the estate within the limits of
which such land or property is situate;
G
thirdly, in the owners of the estate;

fourthly, in the case of a sale of the proprietary
right in such land or property, in the tenants (if
any) having rights of occupancy in such land or
property; H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 S.C,R.

A
fifthly, in any tenant having a right of occupancy ~
in any agricultural land in the estate within the
limits of which the land or property is situated.

Explanation - In the case of sale by a female of
land or property to which she has succeeded on a
B life tenure through her husband, son, brother or
father, the word (agnates' in this section shall
mean the agnates of the person through whom she has
so succeeded." -"' "'

In 1960, there were substantial amendments to the Punjab
c Pre-emption Act and, after amendment, sec.15 was as follows:-

"15. Persons in whom right of pre-emption vests in
respect of sales of agricultural land and village
immovable property - (1) The right of pre-empt ion
in respect of agricultural land and village immov-
D able property shall vest -

(a) where the sale is by a sole owner - First, in 'r
the son or daughter or son's son or daughter's son
of the vendor;

E Secondly, in the brother or brother's son of the
vendor;

Thirdly, in the father's brother or father's
brother's son of the vendor;

F Forthly, in the tenant who holds under tenancy of ,
the vendor the land or property sold or a part
thereof;

(b) where the sale is of a share out of joint land
or property and is not made by all the co-shares
G jointly-

First, in the sons or daughters or sons' son or
daughters' sons of the vendor or vendors;

Secondly, in the brothers or brother's sons of the-·4
H vendor or vendors;
ATAM PRAKASH v. STATE [ CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. ] 409

Thirdly, in the father's brother or father's A
-i brother's sons of the vendor or vendors;

Fourthly, in the other co-sharers;

Fifthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy of
the vendor or vendors the land or property sold or B
a part thereof;

(c) where the sale is of land or property owned
jointly and is made by all the co-sharers jointly-

First, in the sons or daughters or sons' sons or
daughter's sons of the vendors; c
Secondly, in the brothers or brother's sons of the
vendors;

Thirdly, in the Father's or brother's or father's
D
brother's sons of the vendors;

Fourthly, in the tenants, who hold under tenancy of
the vendors or any one of them the land or .property
sold or a part thereof.
E
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained fo sub-
section (1) : -

(a) where the sale is by a female of land or
property to which she has succeeded through her
/ father or brother or the sale in respect of such
land or property is by the son or daughter of such F
female after inheritance, the right of pre-emption
shall vest:-

(i) if the sale is by such femN.e, in her brother
or brother's son;
G
(ii) if the sale is by the son or da(lghter of such
female, in the mother's brothers or the mother's
brother's sons of the vendor or vendors;

(b) where the sale is by a female of land or
H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [i986] 1 S.C.R.

A
property to which she has succeeded through her r'-
husband, or through her son in case the son has
inherited the land or property sold from his
father, the right of pre-emption shall vest,-

FIRST, in the son or daughter of such (husband of
L the) female;

SECONDLY, in the husband's brother or husband's
brother's son of such female." /'

Agricultural land has been defined in the Act to mean
c land as defined in the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, not
including the rights of a mortgagee, whether usufructuary or
not, in such land. 'Member of an agricultural tribe' and
'Group of agricultural tribes' are to have the same meanings
assigned to them respectively under the Punjab Alienation of
Land Act. The Punjab Alienation of Land Act has been repealed,
D but the definitions continue to have force for the purposes of
the Punjab Pre-emption Act. Section 4 of the Punjab Pre-
emption Act states what the right of Pre-emption is. It says : r
"4. Right of pre-emption application of - The right
of pre-emption shall mean the right of a person to
E acquire agricultural land or village immovable
property or urban immovable property in preference
to other persons, and it arises in respect of such
land only in the case of sales and in respect of
such property only in the case of sales or of
foreclosures of the right to redeem such property.
F
Nothing in this section shall prevent a Court from ' '

holding that an alienation purporting to be other
than a sale is in effect a sale."

Section 5(b) prescribes that there shall be no right of
G pre-emption in respect of the sale of agricultural land being
waste land reclaimed by the vendee. Section 6 provides that a
right of pre-emption shall exist in respect of village
immovable property and subject to the provisions of section
5(b}, in respect of agricultural land, but only subject to all
the provisions and limitations contained in the Act. Section 7
H refers' to the right of pre-emption in respect of urban
immovable property. Section 8 enables the Government to
ATAM PRAKASH v. STATE [CHINNAPPA REDDY, J,) 411

A
--i declare by a notification that there shall be no right of
pre-emption in any local area or with respect to any land or
property or class of land or property or with respect to any
sale or class of sales. Section 10 prevents a patt;y to a sale
along with other joint owners from claiming a right to
pre-emption. In respect of land sold by a member of an B
agricultural tribe, section 14 provides that no person who is
not a member of the same agricultural "tribe as the vendor
shall have a right of pre-emption. We have already extracted
', section 15. Section 16 refers to the vesting of the right of
pre-emption in the case of an urban imnovable property,
Section 17 prescribes how the right of . pre-emption nay be
exereised where several persons are entitled to such right. c
Other provisions deal with the procedure· to be followed for
· the exercise of the right of pre-emption.

Now, to the question at issue and first, a word about
interpretation. Whether it is the Constitution that is ex-
pounded or the constitutional validity of a sfatute that is D
considered, a cardinal rule is to look to the Preamble to the
-... Constitution as the guiding light and to the Directive Princi-
ples of State Policy as the Book of Interpretation. The
Preamble embodies and expresses the hopes and ~pirations of
the people. The Directive Principles set out proximate goals.
When we go about the task of examining statutes against the E
Constitution, it is through these glasses that we must look,
'distant vision' or 'near vision'. The Constitution being
sui-generis, where Constitutional issues are under consider-
ation, narrow iilterpretative rules which may have relevance
when legislative enactments are interpreted msy be misplaced.
Originally the Preamble to the Constitution proclaimed the· F
1
resolution of the people of India to constitute India into 'a
~ Sovereign Democratic Republic' and set forth 'Justice,
Liberty, Equality and Fraternity', the very rights mentioned
in the French Declarations of the Rights of Man as our hopes
and aspirations. That was in 1950 when we had just emerged
from the colonial-feudal rule. Time passed. The people's hopes G
and aspirations grew. In 1977 the 42nd amendment proclaimed
India as a Socialist Republic. The word 'socialist' was intro-
duced into the Preamble to the Constitution. The implication
of the introduction of the word 'socialist', which has now
f , become the centre of the hopes and aspirations of the people - ·
a beacon to guide and inspire all that is enshrined in the H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1986] 1 S.C.R.

A
articles of the Constitution -, is clearly to set up a t--
"vibrant throbbing socialist welfare society" in the place of
a "Feudal exploited society". Whatever article of the Consti-
tution it is that we seek to interpret, whatever statute it is
whose constitutional validity is sought to be questioned, we
must strive to give such an interpretation as will promote the
B march and progress towards a Socialistic Democratic State. For
example, when we consider the question whether a statute
offends Article 14 of the Constitution we must also consider
whether a classification that the legislature may have made is r'
consistent with the socialist goals set out in the Preamble
and the Directive Principles enumerated in Part IV of the
c Constitution. A classification which is not in tune with the
Constitution is per se · unreasonable and cannot be permitted.
With these general ennunciations we may now examine the
questions raised in these writ petitions.

We may first refer to two decisions of this court where
D the court had occasion to consider the question of the consti-
tutional validity of the right of pre-emption incorporated in
the .Rewa State Pre-emption Act and the Punjab Pre-emption Act ~
in relation to Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution.

In Bhau Ram v. B. Baijnath Singh [1962] Suppl. 3 S.C.R.
E 724, a Constitution Bench of this court had occasion to consi-
der the question whether a provision of the Rewa State Pre-
emption Act which gave a right of pre-emption based on
vicinage and the provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act,
1913 which gave a right of pre-emption to co-sharers offended
Art.19(l)(f) of the Constitution. It was held that a right of
F pre-emption by vicinage offended Art.19(l)(f) and that a right ,
of pre-emption in favour of co-sharers did not. While dealing
with the provision of the Rewa Act relating to pre-emption by ~
vicinage, the Constitution Bench not only held that the right
to pre-emption by vicinage offended Art. 19(1)(£), but also
appeared to indicate that the right might also offend the
G fundamental right guaranteed by Art.IS. Wanchoo, J., speaking
for the court said
11
Before the Con:stitution came into force, the
statutes if they were passed by competent
authority, could not be challenged; but we have now_ 1
H to judge the reason ableness of these statutes in
ATAM PRAKASH v. STATE [CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.] 413

A
the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed to
the citizens of this country by the Constitution.
In a society where certain classes were privileged
and preferred to live in groups and there were
discriminations, on grounds of religion, race and
caste, there may have been some utility in allowing B
persons to prevent a stranger from acquiring
property in an area which had been populated by a
particular fraternity of class of people and in
those times a right of pre-emption which would oust
a stranger from the neighbourhood may have been
tolerable or reasonable. But the constitution now
prohibits discrimination against any citizen on c
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place
of birth or any of them under Art. 15 and
guarantees a right to every citizen to acquire,
hold and dispose of property, subject only to
restrictions which may be reasonable and in the
interests of the general public. Though therefore D
the ostensible rMson for pre-emption may be
vicinage, the real r~ason behind the law was to
prevent a stranger from acquiring property in any
area which had been populated by a particular
fraternity or class of people. In effect,
therefore, the law of pre-emption based on vicinage E
was really meant to prevent strangers i.e. people
belonging to different religion, race or caste,
from acquiring property. Such division of society
now into groups and exclusion of strangers from any
locality cannot be considered reasonable, and the
t main reason therefore which sustained the law of F
pre-emption based on vicinage in previous times can
have no force now and the law must be held to
impose an unreasonable restriction on the right to
acquire, hold and dispose ·of property as now
guranteed under Art.19(l)(f), for it is impossible
to see such restrictions as reasonable and in the G
foterests of the general public in the state of
society in the present day."

Considering the question relating to the right of pre-emption
given to co'-sharers in the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, the
court observed : H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R.
A
"The question as to the constitutionality of a law·
of pre-emption in favour of a co-sharer has been
considered by a number of High Courts and the
constitutionality has been' uniformly upheld. We
have no doubt that a law giving such a right
imposes a reasonable restriction which is in the
B
interest of the general public. If an outsider is
introduced is a co-sharer in a property it will
make common management extremely difficult and
destroy the benefits of ownership in common. The
result of the law of pre-emption in favour of a
co-sharer is that if sales take place the property
c may eventually come into the hands of one co-sharer
as full owner and that would naturally be a great
advantage the advantage is all the greater in the
case of a residential house and s.16 is concerned
with urban property; for the introduction of an
outsider in a residential house would lead to all
D
kinds of complications. The advantages arising from
such a law of pre-emption are clear and in our
opinion outweight the disadvantages which the
vendor may suffer on account of his inability to
sell the property to whomsoeve~ he pleases. The
vendee also cannot be said to suffer llllch by such a
E
law because he is merely deprived of the right of
owning an undivided share of the property. On the
whole it seems to us that a right of pre-emption
based on co-sharership is a reasonable restriction
on the right to acquire, hold and dispose of
property and is in the interests of the general
F
public."

In Bhau Ram's case, there was also a question relating to the
right of pre-emption granted by s.174 of the Berar Land
Revenue Code in favour of occupants in a survey number in
respect of transfers of interests in that survey number.
G
Refer.ring to the provisions of the Berar Land Revenue Code, it
was held that the law of pre-emption in s,174 applied to those
who were co-sharers or akin to co-sharers and was not an
unreasonable restriction on the right guaranteed by
Art .19(1 )(f).
H
The question whether section lS(l)(a) of the Punjab
ATAM PRAKASH v. STATE [CHlNNAPPA REDDY, J,] 415
A
Pre-emption Act, 1913 (as amended in 1960) which granted a
right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land and
village immovable property (where the sale was by a sole
owner) to the son or daughter or son's son or daughter's son
of the vendor, offended the fundamental ·right guaranteed by
Art.19(l)(f) of the Constitution was considered by a B
Constitution Bench of the court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi and
Ors. (supra). Before the Constitution Bench, the following
five grounds were relied upon to vindicate the reasonableness
of sections 15 and 16 of the Act ·:

(i) to preserve theo integrity of the village and
the village community; · c
(ii) to avoid fragmentation of holdings;

I (iii) to implement the agnatic theory of the law of
succession;
D
(iv) to reduce the chances ·of litigation and
friction and to promote public order and domestic
confort; and

(v) to· promote private and public decency and
convenience. E

It was held that the ground of "promotion of public order and
domestic collifort" and "private and public decency and
convenience" had relevance to urban immovable property which
was dealt with in s.16 and not to agricultural .property which
was dealt with in s.15. It also held that the ground of F
avoidance of chances of litigation had no relevance and
further that the ground of avoidance of fragmentation of
holdings was of no assistance to suatain the claim of a son to
pre-empt in the event of a sale by a sole owner-,-father as
that criterion was of real relevance in the case of the right
of pre-emption given to co-sharers and the like. In regard to G
the ground relating to preservation of the integrity of the
village and the village community, the court held that it was
not a final and concluaive answer to the argument against the
reasonableness of the provision. The court however upheld
} '· s. lS(l)(a) as a reasonable restriction in the interest of the
general public on the basis of the third ground which was that H
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R.
A
the next in succession should have the chance of retaining the ,__
property in the family. It was observed that the son and other
members of the family though not entitled to a present
interest in the property or a right to prevent the alienation,
would nevertheless have a legitimate expectation founded on
and proroted by the consciousness of the collDlllnity, It was
B observed that if the social consciousness did engender such
feelings, and taking into account the very strong sentimental
value that was attached to the continued possession of family
property in the Punjab, it could not be said that the restric- I
tion on the right of free alienation imposed by s.15(1 ){a)
limited as it was to a small •class of near relations of the
c vendor was either unreasonable or not in the interest of the
general public.

In Sant llam v. Labh Singh, A.I.R. 1965 S.C, 314, it was
held that the reasons given by the court in Bhau Ram's case to
invalidate the right of pre-emption based on vicinage held
I
D good to invalidate such a custom also.

In the first case, (Bhau Ram's case), the right of pre-
emption given to co-sharers was held to be a reasonable
restriction on the right to held, acquire or dispose of
property conferred by Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution. What
E has been said there to uphold the right of pre-emption granted
to a co-sharer as a reasonable restriction on the right to
property applies with the same force to justify the classif i-
cation of co-sharers as a class by themselves for the purpose
of vesting in them the right of pre-emption. We do not think
that it is necessary to re-state what has been said in that
F case. We endorse the views expressed therein. The right of
pre-emption vested in a tenant can also be easily sustained.
There can be no denying that the movement of all land reform
legislations has been towards enabling the tiller of the soil
to obtain proprietary right in the soil so that he may not be
disturbed from possession of the land and deprived of his
G livelihood by a superior proprietor. The right of pre-emption
in favour of a tenant granted by the Act is only another ins-
tance of a legislation aimed at protecting the tenant. There
can be no doubt that tenants form a distinct class by them-
selves and the right of pre-emption granted in their favour is
reasonable and in the public interest. We are, therefore, of ·i
H the view that clause 'fourthly' of s.15(l)(a), clauses 'four-
ATAM PRAKASH v. STATE [CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.] 417

A
-·--i\ thly and fifthly' of s.15(1)(b) and clause 'fourthly' of
s.15(1)(c) are valid and do not infringe either Art. 14 or 15
of the Constitution.

We now come to the primary question whether the right of
pre-emption based on consanguinity and contained in the B
remaining clauses of sec.15(1)(a}, (b) and (c} and sec.
15(2}(a} and (b) can be sustained. Earlier we have briefly
indicated the character of the right of pre-emption based on
\ consaguinity. In the counter affidavit, the classification in
favour of the persons mentioned in s.15 is sought to be
justified in the following manner :-
c
"The classifications has been made on reasonable
basis in the interests of the public :-

I (i) to preserve in:egrity of village colDllllllity;

- (ii) to avoid fragmentation of holdings;

(Hi) to implement the agnatic theory of
D

succession;

(iv) to promote public snd private decency;
E
(v) to facilitate tenants to acquire ownership
rights;

(vi) to reduce litigation consequent to
introduction of an outsider on family property or
jointly owned property. F

~ These were the very factors which were put forward to support
the plea in Ram Sarup's case that s.15(1)(a) was a reasonable
restriction on the right to hold acquire or dispose of
property ~onferred by Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. As
pointed out in Ram Sarup•s case, avoidanc~ of fragmentation of G
holdings, promotion of private and public decency snd
reduction of litigation do not seem to have any relevance to
the right of pre-emption, vested in the kinsfolk of the
vendor. The real question is whether a classifkation in
t~ favour of the kinsfolk of the vendor can be considered
reasonable so as to justify a right of pre-emption in their H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R.
.A
favour for the purpose of preserving the integrity of .the ~-·
village community or implementing the agnatic theory of
succession or preserving the unity and integrity of the
family, We do not think that the classification can be consi-
dered reasonable in the circumstances prevailing today what-
ever justification there might have been for the classif ica-
B tion in 1960 when the legislature amended s.15 of the Punjab
Pre-emption Act. Apart from the courts characterising the
right as 'archaic', 'feudal', 'piratical', 'outmoded' and so
on, the Punjab legislature .recognised the incongruity of the I ,
right in modern times and repealed it in 1972, We find it
difficult to uphold the classification on the basis of unity
c and integrity of either the village co11111JJnity or the family or
on the basis of the agnatic theory of succession which is
again in a way connected with the integrity of the family. It
is well known and, we may take judicial notice of it, that not
only has there been a green and a white revolution in Haryana,
this State is also in the process of an industrial revolution. I
D Industries have sprung up through out the State and the popu-
lation has been in a State of constant flux and movement. The
traditional integrity of the village and the family have now
-
become old wives' tales. Tribal loyalities have disappeared 'r
and family ties have weakened. Such is the effect of the march
of history and the consequence of industrialisation, mechani-
E sat'ion of agriculture, development of marketing and trade,
allurement of prof~ssions and office, employment opportunity
elsewhere and so on. The processes of history cannot be rever-
sed and we cannot hark back to the traditional rural-family-
oriented society. Quite apart from the break-up of the
integrity of village life and family life, it is to be noticed
F that the property in· respect of which the right of pre-emption
is to be exercised is property of which the vendor or the '
vendors,. as the case may be, have rights of full ownership and ~
their kinsfolk have no present right whatsoever. The right of
pre-emption is not to be confused with the right to question
the alienation of ancestral immovable property which the male
G lineal descendants of the vendor have under the Punjab Custom
(Power to Contest) Act, 1920. The right of pre-emption is now
entirely a statutory right and dissociated from custom or
personal law.
/ A scrutiny of the list of persons in whose favour the
H right of pre-emption is vested under s.15 reveals certain - i
ATAM PRAKAstt·v. STATE [CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.] 419

A
glaring facts which_ appear to detract from the theory of
preservation of the integrity of the family and the theory of
agnatic right of succession. First we notice that neither the
father nor the 100ther figures in the list though the father's
brother does. The son's daughter and the daughter's brother
does. The son's daughter and the daughter's daughter do not B
·appear though the son's son and daughter's son do. The sister
and the sister's son are excluded, though the brother and the
·,, brother's son are included. Thus relatives of the same degree
are excluded either because. they are women or because they are
related through women. It is not as if-women and those relatedt
through women are altogether· excluded because the daughter and
.daiigllEer' s son are fiiClildea7""Tftlie daughter ill to be treated .c
on a par wi~lfe son"ana the daughter's son is treated on a
par with the son's son it does not appear logical why the
father's son (brother) should be included and not the father's
daughter (sister). These are but a few of the intrins.ic
contradictions that appear in the list of relatives mentioned
in s .15 as entitled to the right of pre-emption. It is un- D
.. understanable why a son's daughter, a daughter's daughter, a
sister. or a sister's son should have no right of pre- emption
whereas a father's brother's son has that right. As s.15
stands, if the sole owner of a property sells it to his own
father, mother, sister, sister's son, daughter's daughter or
son's daughter, the sale can be defeated by the vendor's E
father's brother's son claiming a right of pre-emption.

We are thus unable to find any justification for the\
classification contained in section 15 of the Punjab Pre-
emption Ket of the kinsfolk entitled to pre-emption. The right
of pre-emption based on consanguinity is a relie of the feudal F
past. It is totally inconsistent with the Constitutional
scheme. It is inconsistent with modern ideas. The reasons
which justified its recognition quarter of a century ago,
namely, the preservation of the integrity of rural society,
the unity of family life and the agnatic theory of succession
·are today irrelevant. The list of kinsfolk mentioned as enti- G
tled to pre-emption is intrinsically defective and self-
contradictory. There is, therefore, no reasQnable classifica-
tion and cl~uses !First', 'Secondly', and 'Thirdly' of
s.15(l)(a), 'First', 'Secondly' and 'Thirdly', of s.15(l)(b),
Clauses 'First', 'Secondly' and 'thirdly' of s.lS(l)(c) and
the whole of section 15(2) are, therefore, declared ultravires H
the Constitution.
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 S.C.R. ~

A We are told that in some cases suits are pending in
various courts and, where decrees have been passed, appeals
are pending in appellate courts. Such suits and appeals will
now be disposed of in accordance with the declaration granted
by us. We are told that there are a few cases where suits have
B been decreed and the decrees have become final, no appeals
having been filed against those decrees. The decrees will be
binding inter-partes and the declaration .granted by us will be
of no .avail to the parties thereto.
c There will be no order regarding costs.

M.L.A,