B.C. CHATURVEDIversusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

A                              B.C. CHATURVEDI
                                         v.
                         UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

                              NOVEMBER 1, 1995

B             fK. RAMASWAMY, B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND
                              B.L. HANSARIA, JJ]

          Administrative Law-Judicial Review-Scope of-Order of the discipli-
    nary autho1ity-On what grounds can be challenged.
c         Service Law-Civil Services (Classificatio11 and Control) Rules, 1965-
    Misconduct-Meaning of-Public officer found in possession of pecuniary
    resources/property in excess of his known source of income-Whether miscon-
    duct-Criminal misconduct-l'revemion of corruption Act, 1947--Section
    S(l)(e).
D
         Service Law-Delay in laying ch.arges-Effect of-Delay caused as CBI
    was conducting investigation for prosecution under section 5 (1) (e) of
    Prcve11tion of Corruption Act, 1947-Evidence collected not strong
    enough-Departmell/al proceedings recommended-Held, delay is not fatal.

E         Service Law-Promotion pending inquiry-Held, cannot act as impedi-
    ment in penalizing the delinquent officer after inquiry.

          Service Law-Penalty-When can be substituted/altered by
    Cowt/Tribunal-Disciplinary authority imposing penalty of dismissal from
    se1vice--Held, can be inte1j'ered with on~r wizen it shocks conscience of the
F   Court/Ttibuna/.

           Comtitution of India-Article 142-Whether power to do complete
    justice is available to the High CourtS-Constitution of Jndia-A1ticles 226
    and 227.
G         The appellant was an Income Tax Officer. An investigation was
    conducted against the appellant by the C.B.I. which disclosed that the
    appellant possessed assets disproportionate to his known source of in-
    come. As the evidence collected by the CBI was not found strong enough
    to lay prosecution under Section S(l)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption
H   Act, 1947(equivalent to Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption
                                         644
                       B.C. CHATURVEDI v. U.0.1.                        645

Act, 1988) it was suggested that a departmental enquiry may be initiated       A
against the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant was charged for violating
various conduct rules and for misconduct.

       On inquiry, the Inquiry Ollicer found the charges against the appel-
lant as having been proved. The appellant was thereafter dismissed from
service after consultation with the UPSC. The Administrative Tribunal          B
upheld the recording of the Inquiry Ollker that the charges had been
proved but converted the order of dismissal from service into that of
compulsory retirement keeping in view the length of service of the appel-
lant, the academic record of the appellant, the fact that he was promoted
even after the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated and that it would   c
be dillicult for the appellant to get a new job or take up a new profession
at his stage.

      Being aggrieved by that part of the order of Administrative Tribunal
which confirmed dismissal of the appellant from the service, the appellant
preferred appeal before this Court contending that :                           D
     (a) possession of assets disproportionate to the known source of
income is not "misconduct" under the Civil Services (Classification and
Control) Appeal Rules, 1965 :

      (b) there was abnormal delay in laying the charges;                      E

      (c) the appellant was promoted as Assistant C.ommissioner of In-
come of Tax pending enquiry and therefore, no departmental action could
be taken against him;

      (d) the order of dismissal is bad in view· of the judgment of the F
Supreme Court in Unioll of llldia & 01:1-. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khall, [1991] 1
sec 588; as admittedly the enquiry report was never supplied to the .
appellant; and

       (e) in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in ](Jislmanand v.     G
State of M.P., [1977] 1 SCC 816; ten percent of the disproportionate assets
ought to have been deducted.

      The Union of India also filed an appeal before this Court contending
that the Tribunal had erred in changing the punishment awarded to the
appellant from dismissal into compulsory retirement.                           H
    646                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A         Dismissing the appeal of the appellant and allowing the appeal of
    the Union of India, this Court

          HELD: Per Ramaswami J, (for himself mid Jeevan Reddy, J.)

          1.1. Judicial Review is not an.appeal fron1 a decision but a review of
B the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is
    meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to
    ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily
    correct in eye of the Court. [655-D]

C       1.2. When an inquiry is conducted on the charge of misconduct by a
  public servant, the Courtffribunal is concerned has to determine whether
  the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural
  justice are complied with. The Courtffribunal in its power of judicial
  review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence. The
  Courtffribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings
D against the delinquent officer in a. manner inconsistent with the rules of
  natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of
    Inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
    authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as
    no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court{fribunal may
    interfere with the conclusion or finding, and mould the relief so as to make
E
    it appropriate to the facts of the each case. [655-E-H]

          1.3. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts where appeal
    is presented, the appellate authority has co- extensive power to re-ap-
    preciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary
F   enquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are
    not relevant. Adequacy of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed
    before the Court/Tribunal. [656-A]

          Union of India v. H. C. Goel, [1964] 4 SCR 718; Union of India & Ors.
G v. SL Abbas, [1993] 4 SCC 357; Administrator of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v.
    H.P. Vora, [1993] Supp. 1 SCC 551 and State Bank of India & Ors. v.
    Samarendra Kishore Endow & Anr., [1994] 2 SCC 537, referred to and
    relied on.

          2. Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 defines
H   "criminal misconduct." Being a public servant, if at any time, during the
                       B.C. CHATURVEDI v. U.0.1.                         647

period of his otlice a person is proved to have been in possession, by          A
himself or any person on his behalf, of' pecuniary resourct's or property
disproportionate to his known source of income he is enj,)ined to satisfac-
torily account for the same. If he fails to account for it, he co1nmits
naisconduct. Therefore, as in a prosecution laid under section 5(1) (e) of
the Prevention of Corruption Ad, 1947 a public servant is liable to punish·
                                                                                B
men!, the need to make this misconduct expressly a part of enumerated
items of misconduct under Central Civil Services (Classification and
Control) Appeal Rules, 1965 is obviated. A public servant in possession of
assets disproportionate to his known source of income, when he had not
satisfactorily accounted for, commits a misconduct amenable to discipli·
nary action under the Civil Services (Classification and Control) Appeal        C
Rules, 1965. [653-F, 654-B-C, F]

     A.K. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Co1p., (1984] 3 SCC 316, distin-
guished.

      3.1. In a case of the present type, it is difficult to have evidence of D
disproportionate pecuniary resources or assets or property. To connect
the otlices with the resources or assets is a tardious journey, as the
Government has to do a lot to collect necessary material in this regard. In
normal circumstances, an investigation would be undertaken by the Police
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to collect and collate the           E
entire evidence establishing the essential links between the public servant
and the property or pecuniary resources. Snap of any link may prove fatal
to the whole exercise. Care and dexterity are necessary. Delay thereby
necessarily entails. Therefore, delay by itself is not fatal in this type of
cases. (654-G-H, 655-A-B]
                                                                                F
      3.2. The C.B.I. had investigated the present case and recommended
that the evidence was not strong enough for successful prosecution of the
appellant under Section 5(1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
It had, however, recommended to take disciplinary action, which was
thereafter initiated. Much time elapsed in taking necessary decisions at        G
different levels. So, the delay by itself cannot be regarded to have violated
Article 14 or 21 of the Constitution of India. (655-C]

     4. It is true that pending disciplinary proceeding, the appellant was
promoted as Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax. Two courses in this
behalf are open to the competent authority, viz., sealed cover pro<..-edure     H
    648                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4S.C.R.

A   \\ hich is unusually followed, or promotion, subject to the result of pending
     1




    disciplinary acHon. Obviously, the appropriate authority adopted the latter
    rourse and gave the benefit of promotion to the appellant. Such an action
    \Vould not stand as an impediment to take pending disciplinary action to
    its logical conclusion. The advantage of promotion gained by the delint1uent
    officer would be no in1pedi1nent to take appropriate decision and to pass
B   an order consistent with the finding of proved misconduct. (653-D]

          5. The principle evolved in !0ishnanand's case by the Supreme Court
    was to give benefit of doubt, due to inflationary trend in the appreciation
    of the value of the assets. The benefit therefore, appears to be the maxi-
C   mum. It would, therefore, be inappropriate to extend the principle of
    deduction beyond 10% in calculating disproportionate assets of a delin-
    quent officer. (657-B, DJ

          K1ishnanand v. State of M.P., (1977] 1 SCC 816, explained and
    distinguished.
D
           6. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Managing Director
    ECIL Hyderabad v. B. Kanuzakar & 01s., held that the relief granted in
    Ranzzan Khan's case was erroneous and that the ratio in Rantzan Khan's
    case would apply to the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority
    after the date of the judgment in Ranizan Khan's case. Since the controver-
E
    sy is no long res integra, the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of
    Ran1zan Khan's ratio as admittedly he was dismissed from service on
    October 29, 1986 whereas judgment in Ramzan Khan's case was
    pronounced on November 20, 1990. (653-B]

F         Managing Director ECIL. Hyderabad v. B. Kmwzakar & On., JT (1993)
    6 SC I, relied on.

          Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991] 1 SCC 588, referred
    to.

G         7. The disciplinary authority, and on an appeal the appellate
    authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider
    the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the
    discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the .mag-
    nitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Courtffribunal, while
H   exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own
                       B.C. Cl-IATURVEDI ,._ U.OJ.                      649

conclusion or penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment         A
imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the
conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the
relief, either directing the disciplinary authority/appellate authority to
reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself,
in exceptional and rare cases, in1pose appropriate punishment with cogent      B
reasons in support thereof. [658-G-H, 659-A]

      State of 01issa & Ors. v. Bidyablwsa11 Mahapatra, [1963] Supp. l SCR
648, Union of flldia v. Sardar Bahadur, [1972] 2 SCR 218 Rangaswami v.
State of Tamil Nadu, [1989] Supp l SCC 686, and State Bank of India &
Ors. v. Samrendra Kislwre Endow & Anr., [1994] 2 SCC 537, referred to          C
and relied on.

      Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh & 01'., [1983] 2 SCC 442,
distinguished.

      7.2 In view of the gravity of the misconduct, namely appellant having    D
been found to be in possession of assets disproportionate to kno\\-n source
of his income, the interference with the imposition of punishment was
wholly unwarranted. [659-D]

      Per Hansaria, J. (concuning)
                                                                               E
      I. Although Article 142 of the Constitution of India has specifically
conferred the power of doing complete justice on the Supreme Court, to
achieve that result it may pass such decree or order as deemed necessary;
it would be wrong to think that other Courts are not to do complete justice
between the parties. If the power of modification of punishment/penalty        F
were to be available to the Supreme Court only under Article 142, a very
large percentage of litigants would be denied this small relief merely
because they are not in a position to approach the Supreme Court, which
may inter alia, because of the poverty of the concerned persons. The mere
fact that there is no provision parallel to Article 142 relating to the High
Court, can be no ground to think that they have not tu do complete justice,    G
and if the moulding of relief would do complete justice between the parties,
the same cannot be ordered. A High Court would be within its jurisdiction
to modily the punishment/penalty by moulding the relief in cases of the
present nature when the punishment/penalty award shocks the judicial
conscience. [659-F-G, 660-E-DJ                                               H
    650                  SUPREMb COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A         Shiv Dea Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1963) SC 1901, referred to
    and relied on.

          IVislma Chandra v. Union of India, AIR (1992) Orissa 261 (FB),
    approved.

B         2. In view of the inter de11endence of fundamental rights, 'which
    concept was first accepted in the Bank Nationalisation case which thinking
    was extended to cases attracting Article 21 of the Constitution of Maneka
    Gandhi v. Union of India the punishment/penalty awarded has to be
    reasonable, and if it be unreasonable, Article 14 of the Constitution of
    India would be violated. If Article 14 were to be violated, it cannot be
c   doubted that a High Court can take care of the same by substituting, in
    appropriate cases, a punishment deemed reasonable by it. However, while
    exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts
    have to bear in mind the restraints inherent in exercising power of judicial
    review. (661-A-C]
D
         Rustom Cavasjee Cooperv. Union of India, (1970] 3 SCR 530, Maneka
    Gandhi v Union of India, (1978] 2 SCR 621 and Bhagat Ram v. State of
    Himachal Pradesh, [1983] 2 SCC 442, relied on.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9830 of
E 1995 Etc.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 14-3-88 of the Central Ad-
    ministrative Tribunal in Calcutta in O.A. No. 609 of 1986.

          M.N. Krishnamani, Devcndra Singh, S.N. Terdol, Ms. Binu Tamta,
F   P. Parmeshwaran and Sudarsh Menon for the Appearing parties.

          The Judgments of the Court were delivered by.

          K. RAMASWAMY, J. Leave granted.

G          This appeal and the companion appeal filed by the Union of India
    arise from the order of the Administrative Tribunal in 0.A. No. 609 of 1986
    dated March 14, 1989. Appellant's integrity, while he was working as
    Income-tax Officer, had come under cloud. On an investigation made by
    the CB.I., it had stated to the respondent that though the evidence
H   collected during investigation disclosed that the appellant had assets dis-
            B.C. CHATURVEDI v. U.0.1. [K. RAMASWANY,.1.J                   651

proportionate to his known source of income, as the evidence \Vas not             A
strong enough to lay prosecution under Section 5 (l)(e) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Acl'), the competent authority
might proceed against the appellant in a departmental inquiry.

       In furtherance thereof on March 2, 1982, the appellant was served
                                                                                  B
\Vith the charge-sheet cont<Jining four specific charges for violating dif-
ferent conduct rules and misconduct of being in possession of property
Uisproportionate to his kno\\Tl source of income. After giving reasonable
opportunity and conducting inquiry, the Inquiry Officer submitted his
report on .I anuary 28, 1984 holding the charges to have been proved. After
consultation which the Union Public Service Commission on March 11,               c
1985, the appellant was dismissed from service by order dated October 29,
1986. The Tribunal after appreciating the evidence upheld all the charges
having been proved but converted the order of dismissal into one of
compulsory retirement. The appeal was filed by the delinquent officer
challenging the findings on merits, and the Union filed an appeal canvass-        D
ing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the punishment im-
posed by it.

      Shri Krishnamani, learned senior counsel for the appellant, raised
three-fold contention. It is firstly urged that a public servant's possession     E
of assets disproportionate to the known source of his income is not defined
to be a 'misconduct' under the Civil Services (Classification & Control)
Appeal Rules. There is abnormal delay in laying the charges. Despite the
pendency of inquiry, the appellant was promoted as Asstt. Commissioner
of Income-tax. In consequence, no departmental action could be taken to
                                                                                  F
dismiss him from service. It is also submitted that he was an intervener
when all the cases including the appeal filed against Union of India & Ors.
v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, JT [1990] 4 SCC 456 were argued before three-
Judge Bench. All of them had been given the benefit of the judgment.
Misfortune of the appellant that his appeal was directed to be posted after
the decision in Ramzan Klw;1 's case. Since the appellant was admittedly          G
not supplied with the inquiry report, the order of dismissal is invalid in law.
This Court in Klishnanand v. State of M.P., [1977] 1 SCC 816 had held that
10'/,, of the disproportionate assets need to be deducted in arriving at the
finding that the appellant had disproportionate assets. The appellant was
found to be in possession of Rs. l,04,585 \Vhi1e his incon1e fron1 known          H
    652                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A sources was Rs. 73,270. The disproportionate assets were only to the tune
    of about Rs. 30,000. It would not be axiomatic that 10% would be a cut-off
    deduction. In an appropriate case deduction could be extended upto 15%
    and if so extended, the appellant must be held to be not in possession of
    any disproportionate assets. The gifts made to his wife at the time of their
B   marriage and to his children al the time of their birthdays are not his assets.
    If these amounts are excluded, which indeed must be excluded, he is not
    in possession of disproportionate assets. The wife of the appellant is a
    teacher. The income from her salary and her gifts of the extent of Rs.
    21.000 require to be excluded from his assets. Therefore, the findings of
    the Tribunal on merits \Vere not valid in la\V.
c
          While resisting the contention, the learned counsel for the Union
    argued that the Tribunal was not empowered to appreciate the evidence
    nor to consider the evidence on merits to reach a finding whether the
    appellant was in possession of disproportionate assets. The Tribunal went
D   wrong in appreciating the evidence. The disciplinary authority had un-
    doubted power and authority lo impose punishment. On the facts found by
    the Inquiry Officer and disciplinary authority that the appellant was in
    possession of the assets disproportionate to the known source of his
    income, the Tribunal was unjustified in interfering with the punishment of
    dismissal from service, and ordering for compulsory retirement, instead.
E
           Having regard to the respective contentions, the first question that
    arises for consideration is whether the order dismissing the appellant from
    service is invalid in law for non-supply of the inquiry report. True, in
    Ramzan Khan's case a Bench of three Judges to which one of us (K.
F   Ramaswami, J.) was a member, had held that the delinquent is entitled to
    the supply of the inquiry report. It was contended for the appellant therein
    that after Amendment to Article 311(2) of the Constitution by Constitution
    (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, the need to supply the inquiry report was
    obviated. Rejecting the contention, it was held that the supply of the copy
    of the inquiry report is inconsistent with fair procedure and non-supply
G   thereof violates the principles of natural justice. Therefore, copy of the
    inquiry report is required to be supplied to the delinquent officer. How-
    ever, it was held that the said ratio was prospective in operation. The
    judgment therein was rendered on November 20, 1990.

H         A question thereafter had arisen whether the ratio would be ap-
               '
               B.C. CHATURVED!v. U.0.1. [K. RAMASWANY,J.]                    653

  plicable to the order passed earlier to the judgment. On reference to the         A
  Constitution Bench, to which two of us (K. Ramaswamy & B.P. Jecvan
  Reddy, JJ.) were members, it was held in Managing Direclm; ECIL,
• Hyderabad v. B. Kamnakar & Ors., .IT (1993) 6 SC 1 that the relief granted
  in Ranizan Khan's case was erroneous and that the ratio in Ranizan Khan ~'i
  case would apply to the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority          B
  after the date of the judgment. Since the controversy is no longer res integra,
  the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of Ramzan Khan's ratio as
  admittedly he was dismissed from service on October 29, 1986 and the
  order of dismissal from service is valid.

        It is true that pending disciplinary proceeding, the appellant was          c
  promoted as Asstt. Commissioner of Income-tax. Two courses in this
  behalf are open to competent authority, viz. sealed cover procedure which
  is usually followed, or promotion, subject to the result of pending discipli-
  nary action. Obviously, the appropriate authority adopted the latter course
  and gave the benefit of promotion to the appellant. Such an action would          D
  not stand as an impediment to take pending disciplinary action to its logical
  conclusion. The advantage of promotion gained by the delinquent officer
  would be no impediment to take appropriate decision and to pass an order
  consistent with the finding of proved misconduct.
                                                                                    E
         The next question is whether the charge of being in possession of
  assets disproportionate to his known source of income is a misconduct.
  Section 5(1)(e) of the Act (which is equivalent to Section 13(1){e) of the
  Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988) defines "criminal misconduct". A
  public servant is said to commit the offences of criminal misconduct if he
                                                                                F
  or any person on his behalf is in possession or has, at any time during ·the
  period of his office, been in possession, for which the public servant cannot
  satisfactorily account for. Thus, pecuniary resources or property dispropor-
  tionate to his known source of income is a criminal misconduct. In the 1988
  Act an explanation has been added to Section 13{l){e) to explain that
  ''known sources of income!! means income receiVed from any lawful source G
  and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of
  any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant.
  The charged officer must be a public servant. He must be found to be in
  possession of, by himself, or through any person on his behalf, at any time
  during the period of his office, pecuniary resources or property dispropor- H
    654                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A   tionate to his known source of income. If he cannot satisfactorily account
    thereof, he is said to have committed criminal misconduct. No doubt it is
    a presumptive finding but that finding is based on three facts. Being a
    public servant, if at any time, during the period of his office, he is proved•
    to have been in possession, by himself or through any person on his behalf,
B   of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known source
    of income, he is enjoined to satisfactorily account for the same. If he fails
    to account for, he commits misconduct. Therefore, as in a prosecution laid
    under Section 5(1)(e) of the Act (equivalent to Section 13(1)(e) of 1988
    Act), a public servant is liable to punishment. The need to make this
    misconduct expressly a part of enumerated items of misconduct under
c   Central Civil Services, CCA Rules is obviated.

           The ratio inA.L. Kalra v. Project & District Equipmellt Corpn. [1984]
    3 SCC 316 has no application to the facts in this case. Therein, the
    misconduct alleged was failure of the appellant to refund the advance taken
D   from the Corporation. His omission was charged to be a misconduct. The
    question therein was that when Rule 5 of the PEC Employees (Conduct,
    Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975, defined "specific misconduct", whether
    in the general norm of behaviour the omission to return advance amount,
    which was not specifically defined, would constitute a misconduct. This
E   Court held that in the gray area it is not amenable to disciplinary action
    unless the act is constituted to be misconduct under Rule 5 of the said
    Rules. We, therefore, hold that a public servant in possession of assets
    disproportionate to his known source of income, when he had not satisfac-
    torily accounted for, commits a misconduct amenable to disciplinary action
    under the CSCCA Rules and the Conduct Rules.
F
          The next question is whether the delay in initiating disciplinary
    proceeding is an unfair procedure depriving the livelihood of a public
    servant offending Article 14 or 21 of the Constitution. Each case depends
    upon its own facts. In a case of the type on hand, it is difficult to have
G   evidence of disproportionate pecuniary resources or assets or property.
    The public servant, during his tenure, may not be known to be in possession
    of disproportionate assets or pecuniary resources. He may hold either
    himself or through somebody on his behalf, properly or pecuniary resour-
    ces. To connect the officer with the resources or assets is a tardious
H   journey, as the Government has to do a lot to collect necessary material in
            B.C. CHATURVEDI v. U.0.1. [K. RAMASWANY,J.]                   655

this regard. In normal circumstances, an investigation would be undertaken A
by the police under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to. collect and·
collate the entire evidence establishing the essential links between the
public servant and the property or pecuniary resources. Snap of any link
may prove fatal to the whole exercise. Care and dexterity are necessary.
Delay thereby necessarily entails. Therefore, delay by itself is not fatal in B
this type of cases. It is seen that the C.B.I. had investigated and recom-
mended that the evidence was not strong enough for successful prosecution
of the appellant under Section 5 (l)(e) of the Act. It had, however,
recommended to take disciplinary action. No doubt, much time elapsed in
taking necessary decisions at different levels. So, the delay by itself cannot
be regarded to have violated Article 14 or 21 of the Constitution.
                                                                                c
       Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the
manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant
to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that
the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye D
of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of mis.conduct by
a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the
inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice
are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some
evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has E
jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion.
But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical
rules of Evidence Act nor of proof fact or evidence as defined therein,
apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence
and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is
                                                                                  F
entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The
Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate
authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent
findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held that proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules G
prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached
by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
finding be such as no reasonable person would have never reached, the
Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould
the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.                H
    656                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A         The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is
    presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to rcappreciatc
    the evidence or the nature of punishment. in a disciplinary inquiry the strict
    proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant
    Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be
    canvased before the Courtffribunal. In Union of lndia v. H.C. Goel, [1964[
B
    4 SCR 718, this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon
    consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is
    perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based
    on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.

c          In Union of India & Ors. v. S.L. Abbas, [1993] 4 SCC 357, when the
    order of transfer was interfered by the Tribunal, this Court held that the
    Tribunal was not an appellate authority which could substitute its own
    judgment to that bona fide. order of transfer. The Tribunal could not, in
    such circumstances, interfere with orders of transfer of a Government
D   servant. In Administrator of Dadra & Nagar Have/i v. H.P. Vora, [1993]
    Supp. l SCC 551, it was held that the Administrative Tribunal was not an
    appellate authority and it could not substitute the role of authorities to
    clear the efficiency bar of a public servant, Recently, in State Bank of India
    & Ors. v. Samare11dra Kislzore Endow & Anr., JT (1994) 1 SC 217, a Bench
E   of this Court to which two of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy & B.L. Hansaria, JJ.)
    were members, considered the order of the Tribunal, which quashed the
    charges as based on no evidence, went in detail into the question as to
    whether the Tribunal had power to appreciate the evidence while exercis-
    ing power of judicial review and held that a Tribunal could not appreciate
    the evidence and substitute its own conclusion to that of the disciplinary
F
    authority. It would, therefore, be clear that the Tribunal cannot embark
    upon appreciation of evidence to substitute its own findings of fact to that
    of a disciplinary/appellate authority.

          It is, therefore, difficult to go into the question whether the appellant
G   was in possession of property disproportionate to the known source of his
    income. The findings of the disciplinary authority and that of lnquiry
    Officer are based on evidence collected during the inquiry. They reached
    the findings that the appellant was in possession of Rs. 30,000 in excess of
    his satisfactorily accounted for assets fro1n his kno\vr._ source of income.
H The alleged gifts to his wife as stridhana and to his children on their
            B.C. CHATURVED!v. U.0.1. [K. RAMASWANY,.J.]                    657

birthdays were disbelieved. It is within the exclusive domain of the discipli~    A
nary authority to reach that conclusion. There is evidence in that behalf.

       It is true that a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Klishnanand's
case (supra) held in para 33, that if the excess was comparatively small (it
was less than 10% of the total income in that case), it would be right to
                                                                                  B
hold that the assets found in the possession of the accused were not
disproportionate to his known source of income raising the presumption
under sub-section (3) of Section 5. It is to be remembered that the said
principle was evolved by this Court to give benefit of doubt, due lo
inflationary trend in the appreciation of the'value of the assets. The benefit
thereof appears to be the maximum. The reason being that if the percent-          c
age begins to rise in each case, it gets extended till it reaches the level of
incredulity to give the benefit of doubt. It would, therefore, be inap-
propriate, indeed undesirable, to extend the principle of deduction beyond
10% in calculating disproportionate assets of a delinquent officer. The
salary of his wife was not include in the assets of the appellant. The alleged    D
stridhana of his wife and fixed deposits or gifts of his daughter, in apprecia-
tion of evidence, were held to be the property of the appellant. It is in the
domain of appreciation of evidence. The Courtffribunal has no power to
appreciate the evidence and reach its own contra conclusions.
                                                                                  E
      The next question is whether the Tribunal was justified in interfering
with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. A Constitution
Bench of this Court in State of 01issa & Ors. v. Bidyabhushan Mahapatra,
AIR (1963) SC 779 held that having regard to the gravity of the established
n1isconduct, the punishing authority had the power and jurisdiction to
impose punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court
                                                                             F
under Article 226. It the High Court reached a finding that there was some
evidence to reach the conclusion, it became unassessable. The order of
the Governor who had jurisdiction and unrestricted power to determine
the appropriate punishment was final. The High Court had no jurisdiction
to direct the Governor to review that penalty. It was further held that if G
the order was supported on any finding as to substantial misconduct for
which punishment "can lawfully be imposed", it was not for the Court to
consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority
in dismissing the public servant. The Court had no jurisdiction, if the
finding p1inta Jacie made out a case of misconduct, to direct the Governor H
    658                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A to reconsider the order of penalty. This view was reiterated in Union of
  India v.·Sardar Bahadur, [1972] 2 SCR 218. It is true that in Bhagat Ram
  v. Stale of Himaclwl Pradesh & Q,,·., AIR (1983) SC 454, a Bench of two
  .Judges of this Court, while holding that the High Court did not function
  as a Court of appeal, concluded that when the finding was utterly perverse,
B the High Court could always interfere with the same. In that case, the
  finding was that the appellant was to supervise felling of the trees which
  were not hammer marked. The Government had recovered from the
  contractor the loss caused to it by illicit felling of trees. Under those
  circumstances, this Court held that the finding of guilt was perverse and
  unsupported by evidence. The ratio, therefore, is not an authority to
c conclude that in every case the Courtffribunal is empowered to interfere
  with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. In Ra11gaswa111i
  v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR (1989) SC 1137, a Bench of three Judges of
  this Court, while considering the power to interfere with the order of
  punishment, held that this Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under
D Article 136 of the Constitution, is empowered to alter or interfere with the
  penalty; and the Tribunal had no power to substitute its own discretion for
  that of the authority. It would be seen that this Court did not appear to
  have intended to lay down that in no case, the High Courtffribunal has the
  power to alter the penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the appellate
E authority. The controversy was again canvassed in State Ba11k of llldia's
  case (supra), where the Court elaborately reviewed the case law on the
  scope of judicial review and powers of the Tribunal in disciplinary matters
  and nature of punishment. On the facts in that case, since the appellate
  authority had not adverted to the relevant facts, it was remitted to the
F appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment.

           A review of the above legal position would establish that the discipli-
    nary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding
    authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to·
    maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose ap-
G   propriate pup.ishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the
    misconduct. The High Court{fribunal, while exercising the power of judi-
    cial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and
    impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
    authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High
H   Court{fribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing
               B.C. CHATURVEDI v. U.0.1. [HANSARIA,J.)                     659

the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or        A
to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose
appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.

       The Tribunal in this case held that the appellant had put in 30 years
of service. He had brilliant academic record. He was successful in the
                                                                             B
competitive examination and was selected as a Class I Officer. He earned
promotion after the disciplinary proceeding was initiated. It would be
difficult to get a new job or to take a new profession after 50 years and he
is "no longer fit to continue in government service". Accordingly, it sub-
stituted the punishment of dismissal from service to one of compulsory
retirement imposed by the disciplinary authority. We find that the reason- C
ing is wholly unsupportable. The reasons are not relevant nor germane lo
modify the punishment. In view of the gravity of the misconduct, namely
the appellant having been found to be in possession of assets dispropor-
tionate to the known source of his income, the interference with the
imposition of punishment was wholly unwarranted. We find no merit in the D
main appeal which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

CA. No. 3604 of 1988

      Consequently, the appeal of the Union of India is allowed. The order        E
of the Tribunal modifying the punishment is set aside and that of the
disciplinary authority is maintained. In the circumstances parties to bear
their own costs.

      HANSARIA, J. I am in respectful agreement with all the conclusions
reached by learned brother Ramaswamy, J. This concurring note is to
                                                                          F
express my view on two facets the case. The first of these relates to the
power of the High Court to do "complete justice", which power has been
invoked in some cases by this Court to alter the punishment/penalty where
the one awarded has been regarded as disproportionate, but denied to the
High Courts. No doubt, Article 142 of the Constitution has specifically G
conferred the power of doing complete justice on this Court, to achieve
which result it may pass such decree or order as deemed necessary; it
would be wrong to think that other Courts are not to do complete justice
between the parties. If the power of modification of punishment/penalty
were to be available to this Court only under Article 142, a very large H
    660                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A   percentage of litigants would be denied this small relief merely because
    they are not in a position to approach this Court, which may, inter a/ia, be
    because of the poverty of the concerned person. It may be remembered
    that the framers of the Constitution permitted the High Courts to even
    strike down a Parliamentary enactment, on such a case being made out,
B   and we have hesitated to concede the power of even substituting a punish-
    ment/penalty, on such case being made out. What a difference? May it be
    pointed out that Service Tribunals too, set up with the aid of Article 323-A
    have the power of striking down a legislative act.

          2. The aforesaid has, therefore, to be avoided and I have no doubt
c that a High Court would be within its jurisdiction to modify the punish-
    ment/penalty by moulding the relief, which power it undoubtedly has, in
    view of long line of decision of this Court, to which reference is not deemed
    necessary, as the position is well settled in law. It may, however, be stated
    that this power of moulding relief in cases of the present nature can be
D   invoked by a High Court only when the punishment/penalty awarded
    shocks the judicial conscience.

           3. It deserves to be pointed out that the mere fact that there is no
    provision parallel to Article 142 relating to the High Courts, can be no
E   ground to think that they have not to do complete justice, and if moulding
    of relief would do complete justice between the parties, the same cannot
    be ordered. Absence of provision like Article 142 is not material, according
    to me. This may be illustrated by pointing out that despite there being no
    provision in the Constitution parallel to Article 137 conferring power of
    review on the High Court, this Court held as early as 1961 in Shivdeo
F   Singh's case, AIR (1963) SC 1909, that the High Courts too can exercise
    power of review, which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction. I
    would say that power to do complete justice also inheres in every Court,
    not to speak of a Court of plenary jurisdiction like a High Court. Of course,
    this power is not as wide which this Court has under Article 142. That,
G   however, is a different matter.

           4. What has been stated above may be buttressed by putting the
    matter a little differently. The _same is that in a case of dismissal, Article
    21 gets attracted. And, in view of the inter-dependence of fundamental
H   rights, which concept was first accepted in the case commonly known as
               B.C. CHATURVED!v. U.0.1. [HANSARIA,J.]                      661
  •
Bank Nationalisation case, [l970J 3 SCR 530, which thinking was extended          A
to cases -attracting Article 21 in !vfaneka Gandhi v. llnion of India, AIR
(1978) SC 597, the punishment/penalty awarded has to be reasonable; and
if it be unreasonable, Article 14 would be violated. That Article 14 gets
attracted in a case of disproportionate punishment was the vie\v of this
Court in Bhagat Ram v. State of Hinwchal Pradesh, [ 1983] 2 SCC 442 also.         B
Now if Article 14 were lo be violated, it cannot be doubted that a High
Court can take care of the same by substituting, in appropriate cases, a
punishment deemed reasonable by it.

       5. No doubt, while exercising power under Article 226 of"the Con-
stitution, the High Courts have to bear in mind the restraints inherent in        c
exercising power of judicial review. It is because of this that substitution of
High Court's view regarding appropriate punishment is not permissible.
But for this constraint, I would have thought that the law makers do desire
application of judicial mind to the question of even proportionality of
punishment/penalty. I have said so because the Industrial Disputes Act,           D
1947 was amended to insert section llA in it to confer this power even on
a Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. It may be that this power was con-
ferred on these adjudicating authorities because of the prevalence of unfair
labour practice or victimisation by the management. Even so, the power
Under section llA is available to be exercised, even if there be no victimisa-
tion or taking recourse to unfair labour practice. In this background, I do       E
not think if we would be justified in giving much weight to the decision of
the employer on the question of appropriate punishment in service matters
relating to Government employees or employees of the public corpora-
tions. I have said so because if need for maintenance of office discipline
be the reason of our adopting a strict attitude qua the public servants,          F
discipline has to be maintained in the industrial sector also. The availability
of appeal etc. to public servants does not make a real difference, as the
appellate/revisional authority is known to have taken a different view on
the question of sentence only rarely. l would, therefore, think that but for
the self-imposed limitation while exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution, there is no inherent reason to disallow application of judicial     G
mind to the question of proportionately of punishment/penalty. But then,
\vhile seized with this question as a writ court interference is permissible
only when the punishment/penalty is shockingly disproportionate.

      6. I had expressed my unhappiness qua the first facet of the case, as H
    662                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
                                                                              •
A   Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court in paras 20 and 21 of Krishna
    Chandra v. Union of India, AIR (1992) Orissa 261 (FB), by asking why the
    power of doing complete justice has been denied to the High Courts? l
    feel happy that I have been able to state, as a Judge of the Apex Court,
    that the High Courts too are to do complete justice. This is also the 'result
B   of what has been held in the leading judgment.

    B.K.M.                                    Appellant's appeal dismissed and
                                                    Appeal of U .0 .J. allowed.