Holding

Section 320 CrPC does not preclude the High Court’s inherent power under Section 482 to quash FIRs for non‑compoundable offences where, for the ends of justice, continuation of prosecution is untenable, especially in settled matrimonial disputes.

Summary

The husband and his relatives filed a petition to quash an FIR registered by the wife under Sections 498A, 323 and 406 IPC after the parties had settled their matrimonial dispute and were proceeding towards divorce. The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the offences were non‑compoundable and that Section 320 of the CrPC barred the use of the High Court’s inherent power under Section 482 to quash the FIR. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether Section 320 limits the exercise of inherent powers in cases where the chances of conviction are remote and the parties have amicably resolved their differences. Relying on earlier decisions, the Court held that for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, Section 320 does not restrict the High Court’s power under Section 482, even for non‑compoundable offences, particularly in matrimonial matters where settlement should be encouraged. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, allowed the appeal and quashed the FIR.

Issues considered

Whether Section 320 of the CrPC bars the High Court from exercising its inherent power under Section 482 to quash an FIR for non‑compoundable offences.
Whether an FIR under Sections 498A, 323 and 406 IPC can be quashed when the parties have settled their matrimonial dispute.
Whether the inherent power under Section 482 can be invoked to secure the ends of justice despite the non‑compoundable nature of the offences.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 320, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 323, s. 406, s. 498A

Subjects

Section 482 inherent powerquashing FIRnon‑compoundable offencesSection 320 CrPCSection 498A IPCmariage dispute settlementends of justiceSupreme Court interpretation

Judgment

A B.S. JOSHI AND ORS.
V.
--
STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR.

MARCH 13, 2003

B [Y.K. SABHARWAL AND H.K. SEMA, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Sections 482 and 320-Quashing
of criminal proceeding/FIR/complaint-Scope and ambit of in relation to
C matrimonial disputes-Held: When chances ofconviction of accused are bleak
and quashing of the proceedings is to secure justice, High Court in exercise
of its inherent powers can quash FIR for offences under section which are
non-compoundable and Section 320 does not limit or bar the powers of
quashing-Penal Code, 1860 Sections 498A, 323 and 406.

D Penal Code, 1860-Chapter Y.X-A, Section 498A-Object of-Discussed.

Respondent No.2 registered an FIR under Sections 498A/323 and 406
IPC against appellant No.4-her husband. Thereafter parties settled their
disputes. Appellants filed petition for quashing of FIR. High Court
dismissed the petition as the offences under Sections 498A and 406 IPC
E are non-compoundable and the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
cannot be invoked to by pass mandatory provision of Section 320 Cr.P.C.
. Hence the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

F HELD 1.1 If for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing
of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to_ the
exercise of power of quashing under Section 482 of the Code. Therefore
the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal
proceedings or FIR or complaint. It is, however, a different matter
G depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to
exercise or not such a power. ill09-D, E]

1.2. Where the chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak, and no
useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to
continue, the court may, while taking into consideration the special facts
H 1104
B.S. JOSHI v. STATE OF HARYANA 1105
of a case, also quash the proceedings. In the instant case, wife has filed an A
affidavit that the FIR was registered at h instance due to temperamental
differences and implied imputations. There niay be many reasons for not
supporting the imputations. It may be either for the reason that she has
resolved disputes with her husband and his other family members and as
a result thereof she has again started living with her husband with whom B
she earlier had difference or she has willingly parted company and is living
happily on her own or has married someone else or earlier marriage
having been dissolved by divorce on consent of parties or fails to support
the prosecution on some other similar grounds. In such eventuality, there
would almost be no chance of the accused being convicted of the offence.
Thus, it would not be proper to decline to exercise power of quashing on C
the ground that it would "be permitting the parties to compound non-
compoundable offences. It would, however, be a different matter if the
High Court on facts declines the prayer for quashing for any valid reasons
including lack of bona fides. 11110-D-H]

1.3. The special features in matrimonial mattes are evident. It D
becomes the duty of the Court to encourage genuine settlements of
matrimonial disputes. IJ 111-8]

1.4. The object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section
498A in the Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her E
husband or by relative of her husband. Section 498A was added with a
view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the
wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowr.y.
The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act
against interests of women and against the object for which this provision
was added. There is every likelihood· that non-exercise of inherent power F
to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women
from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of the Penal
Code. 11111-F, GI
- State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 119921Supp.1 SCC
335; Surandra Nath Mohanty and Anr. v. State ofOrissa, AIR (1999) SC G
2181; Pepsi Food Ltd and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors., 11998]
5 SCC 749; State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and Ors., 11977] 2 SCC
699; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandrajirao
Angre and Ors., 11988] l SCC 692; G.V. Rao v. L.H.V Prasad and Ors.,
12000] 3 SCC 693 and Madhu Limaya v. The State of Maharashtra, 119771 4 H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S. C.R.

A sec 551, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
383 of 2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.7.2002 of the Punjab and
B Haryana High Court in Cr!. M. No. 27450 of 2002.
Puneet Bali and S.S. Juhar, for the Appellants.

Praveen Kr. Pai for Ranbir Singh Yadav for State of Haryana for the
Respondent.
c
Amita Gupta for the Respondent No. 2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Y.K. SABHARWAL, J. Leave granted.
D
The question that falls for determination in the instant case is about the
ambit of the inherent powers of the High Courts under Section 482, Code 0f
Criminal Procedure (Code) read with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
of India to quash criminal proceedings. The scope and ambit of power under
E Section 482 has been examined by this Court in catena of earlier decisions
but in the present case that is required to be considered in relation to
matrimonial disputes. The matrimonial disputes of the kind in the present
case have been on considerable increase in recent times resulting in filing of
complaints by the wife under Sections 498A and 406, !PC not only against
the husband but his other family members also. When such matters are resolved
F either by wife agreeing to rejoin the matrimonial home or mutual separation
of husband and wife and also mutual settlement of other pending disputes as
a result whereof both sides approach the High Court and jointly pray for

G
quashing of the criminal proceedings or the First Information Report or
complaint filed by the wife under Sections 498A and 406, !PC, can the
prayer be declined on the ground that sin:e the offences are non-compoundable
-
under Section 320 of the Code and, therefore, it is not permissible for the
Court to quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint.

The facts here are not in dispute. Appellant No.4 is the husband.
Respondent No.2 is his wife. Their marriage had taken place on 21st July,
H 1999. They are living separately since 15th July, 2000. Appellant Nos. I to
B.S. JOSHI v. STATE OF HARYANA [SABHARWAL, J.] 1107
3 are father, mother and younger brother of appellant No.4. FIR No.8 of A
2002 was registered under Sections 498A/323 and 406 !PC at Police Station,
Central Faridabad at the instance of the wife on 2nd January, 2002. She has
filed an affidavit that the FIR was registered at her instance due to
temperamental differences and implied imputations. According to that affidavit,
her dispJtes with the appellants have been finally settled and she and Appellant B
No.4 have agreed for mutual divorce. The affidavit further states that on
filing of the petition for mutual divorce, statements on first motion were
recorded on 18th July, 2002 and 2nd September, 2002. Also that in second
motion filed by the parties to the marriage, their statements were recorded by
the Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi on 13th September, 2002. Counsel
for respondent No.2 supporting the appeal also prays for quashing of the FIR. C
There is, however, serious opposition on behalf of the State.

The High Court has, by the impugned judgment, dismissed the petition
filed by the appellants seeking quashing of the FIR for in view of the High
Court the offences under Sections 498A and 406 IPC are non-compoundable
and the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be invoked D
to bypass the mandatory provision of Section 320 of the Code. For its view,
the High Court has referred to and relied upon the decisions of this Court in
State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., [1992] Supp. I SCC 335;
Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra, [1977] 4 SCC 551; and Surendra
Nath Mohanty and Anr. v. State o/Orissa, AIR (1999) SC 2181. E
After reproducing the seven categories of cases as given in para I 02 of
Bhajan Lal's case, the High Court !\as held th&t the parameters, principles
-,· and guidelines for quashing of c.omplaints, first information report and criminal
·- proceedings have been settled in terms thereof and has concluded therefrom
that the instant case does not fall in any of the said categories. It is quite clear F
that the High Court has lost sight of the earlier part of para l 02 which made
1
\ it abundantly clear that the said categories of cases were being given by way
•
' of illustration. Neither the categories of cases given were exhaustive nor it
could be so. Before giving those categories, it was said in Bhajan Lal's case
that :
G
"In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions
t of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles oflaw enunciated
j
' by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
~.>ection 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.
•'
A above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though
i
it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and I

sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulate
and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
B power should be exercised."

In Pepsi Food Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors.
[1998] 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan La/'s case observed
that the guidelines laid therein as to where the court will exercise jurisdiction
C under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae
to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is
more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while
D invoking such powers.

The High Court has relied upon Madhu Limaye 's case for coming to
the conclusion that since the offences under Sections 498A and 406 !PC are
non-compoundable, it would be impermissible in law to quash the FIR on the
ground that there has been a settlement between the parties. The decision in
E Madhu Limaye 's case has been misread and misapplied by the High Court.
The question considered in that case was when there was a bar on the power
of revision in relation to any interlocut~ry order passed in an appeal, enquiry,
trial or other proceedings, what would be its effect on exercise of power
under Section 482 of the Code. Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of Cr.P.C
F providing that the power of revision conferred by sub-section (I) shall not be
exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry,
trial or other proceedings was noticed and it was held that on a plain reading
of Section 482, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include
sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, "shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court". The Court said that if we were to say
G that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all,
it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise
of the revisional powers but adopting a harmonious approach held that the
bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of
the revisionai power of the High Court meaning thereby that the High Court
H will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. It was

f-
i
B.S. JOSHI v. STATE OF HARYANA [SABHARWAL, J.] 1109

further held that, then, in accordance with one of the other principles enunciated A
above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision
in the Code for the redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In
Madhu limaye 's case, it was, inter alia, said that if for the purpose of securing
the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary,
then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of B
the inherent power by the High Court. By way of illustration, an example
was given where without jurisdiction the Court takes cognizance or issues
process and assumes it to be an interlocutory order, would it stand to reason
to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping
the criminal proceedings as early as possible, since being an interlocutory
order, it was not revisable and resultantly the accused had to be harassed up C

- to the end, though the order taking cognizance or issuing process was without
jurisdiction. It was held that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of
the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.

It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye 's case does not lay down any
general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or D
FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extra ordinary
power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of
the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of
FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of
power of quashing. It is; how~ver, a different matter depending upon the E
facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

The High Court has also relied upon the decision in case of Surendra
Nath Mohanty 's case (supra) for the proposition that offence declared to be
non-compoundable cannot be compounded at all even with the permission of
the Court. That is of course so. The offences which can be compounded are p
mentioned in Section 320. Those offences which are not mentioned therein
cannot be permitted to be compounded. In Mohanty's case, the appellants
..-- were convicted by the trial court for offence under Section 307. The High
Court altered the conviction of the appellants and convicted them for offence
under Section 326 and imposed sentence of six months. The trial court had
sentenced the appellants for a period of five years RI. The application for G
compounding was, however, dismissed by the High Court. This Court holding
that the offence for which the appellants had been convicted was non~
compoundable and, therefore, it could not be permitted to be compounded
but considering that the parties had settled their dispute outside the court, the
sentence was reduced to the period already undergone. It is, however, to be. H
1110

-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.

A borne in mind that in the present case the appellants had not sought
compounding of the offences. They had approached the Court seeking quashing
of FIR under the circumstance abovestated.

In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and Ors., (1977] 2 SCC 699,
considering the scope of inherent power of quashing under Section 482, this
B Court held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is
entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that ends of justice
so require. It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object behind
a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of
the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing .
C the proceeding in the interests of justice and that the ends of justice are
higher than the ends of mere law though justice had got to be administered
according to laws made by the legislature. This Court said that the compelling
necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realization
-
of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent
powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it
D would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient
jurisdiction. On f~cts, it was also noticed that there was no reasonable
likelihood of the accused being convicted of the offence. What would happen
to the trial of the case where the wife does not support the imputations made
in the FIR of the type in question. As earlier noticed, now she has filed an
E affidavit that the FIR was registered at her instance due to temperamental
differences and implied imputations. There may be many reasons for not
supporting the imputations. It may be either for the reason that she has
resolved disputes with her husband and his other family members and as a
result thereof she has again started living with her husband with whom she
earlier had differences or she has willingly parted company and is living
F happily on her own or has married someone else on earlier marriage having
been dissolved by divorce on consent of parties or fails to support the
prosecution on some other similar grounds. In such eventuality, there would
almost be no chance of conviction. Would it then be proper to decline to
exercise power of quashing on the ground that it would be permitting the
G parties to compound non-compoundable offences. Answer clearly has to be
- '

in 'negative'. It would, however, be a different matter if the High Court on
facts declines the prayer for quashing for any valid reasons including lack of
bona fides.ln Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Ors. v. Sambhajirao
Chandrajirao Angre and Ors., (1988] I SCC 692, it was hel~ that while
~ercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High
H Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a
B.S. JOSHI v. STATE OF HARYANA (SABHARWAL, J.] 1111

particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the inter.est of A
justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the
Court, chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful
purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue,
the court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also
quash the proceedings.
B
The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes
the duty of the Court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes.

The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different
context, in G. V Rao v. L.H. V Prasad and Ors., [2000] 3 SCC 693 are very C
apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in matrimonial
dispute by the courts, it was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial
disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of
which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully.
But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious
proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the D
family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled
and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed
as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not
be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the
parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably E
by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes
years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young"
days in chasing their "cases" in different courts.

There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing
Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman F
by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with
a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the
wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The

- hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against
interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added.
There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the
G

proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling
earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian Penal Code.

In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise
of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint H
1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S. C.R.

A and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section
482 of the Code.

For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment and
allow the appeal and quash the FIR above mentioned.

B N.J. Appeal allowed.

-