BABA NATARAJAN PRASADversusM. REVATHI

                  [2024] 7 S.C.R. 781 : 2024 INSC 523

                          Baba Natarajan Prasad
                                   v.
                               M. Revathi
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 2912 of 2024)
                                   15 July 2024
              [C.T. Ravikumar* and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.]

                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court had shown undeserving leniency
       and sympathy to accused Nos.1 and 2 by sentencing them to
       undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine
       of Rs.20,000/- each, even after finding that they committed the
       serious offence of bigamy punishable u/s. 494 IPC; and whether
       an enhancement of sentence is called for.

                                    Headnotes†
       Sentence/Sentencing – Enhancement of – High Court after
       restoring conviction for the offence of bigamy punishable
       u/s. 494 IPC, sentenced accused Nos.1 and 2 to undergo
       imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of
       Rs.20,000/- each – Correctness:
       Held: It is the solemn duty of the Court to strike a proper balance
       awarding sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offence
       committed by the accused concerned upon his conviction for
       serious offence – Reading of ss. 494 and 495, would reveal that
       the legislature viewed the offence of bigamy as a serious offence –
       Prescription of maximum corporeal sentence imposable u/ss. 494
       and 495, would suggest that the offence u/s. 494, has to be treated
       as a serious offence – Thus, the imposition of ‘imprisonment till the
       rising of the court’ not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule
       of proportionality in providing punishment – Imposition of sentence
       of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ upon conviction for an
       offence u/s. 494, on them was unconscionably lenient or a flea-bite
       sentence – It is evident that the first accused married the second
       accused while the marriage between the appellant and the first
       accused was subsisting and not only that, during its subsistence,
       she had also begotten a child through the second accused – Taking


* Author
782                                                             [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                        Digital Supreme Court Reports


       into account all the circumstances, it can be said that undeserving
       leniency was shown – However, taking note of the fact that the
       said child is now aged only about six years and the sentence for
       the conviction u/s. 494, can be of both descriptions – Using judicial
       discretion, the term of the sentence awarded to accused Nos.1
       and 2 for the conviction u/s. 494, is modified to six months each,
       making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the
       said period – Fine imposed is modified by reducing the same from
       Rs. 20,000/- each to Rs. 2,000/- each – Taking note of the fact
       that the child is now aged only about 6 years, firstly the second
       accused would serve its remaining sentence and upon his release,
       the first accused would serve her remaining period of sentence –
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 494, 495. [Paras 13-20]
       Sentence/Sentencing – Imposition of sentence of ‘imprisonment
       till the rising of the court’ – Permissibility:
       Held: It cannot be said that imposing a sentence of ‘imprisonment
       till the rising of the court’ is impermissible or an action amounting
       to evasion of statutory provision – Proviso to s. 418(1) CrPC,
       together with the penal provision u/s. 494 IPC, prescribing no
       minimum imprisonment, but only the maximum, would definitely
       make imposition of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ intra
       vires. [Paras 16, 17]
       Sentence/Sentencing – Imposition of punishment – Rule of
       proportionality – To be followed to promote and bring order
       and orderliness in society – Discussed. [Paras 1-4]

                                Case Law Cited
       Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan [1979] 2 SCR 1171 : (1979) 2
       SCC 170; State of Punjab v. Bawa Singh [2015] 1 SCR 709 :
       (2015) 3 SCC 441; Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar & Ors. [2013]
       5 SCR 979 : (2013) 9 SCC 516; Shailesh Jasvantbhai & Anr. v.
       State of Gujarat & Ors. [2006] 1 SCR 477 : (2006) 2 SCC 359;
       Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed & Anr. v. State of Gujarat
       [2009] 8 SCR 719 : (2009) 7 SCC 254; State of Madhya Pradesh
       v. Bablu [2014] 9 SCR 467 : (2014) 9 SCC 281; State of Madhya
       Pradesh v. Surendra Singh [2014] 13 SCR 554 : (2015) 1 SCC
       222; Dalbir Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab [1979] 3 SCR 1059 :
       (1979) 3 SCC 745; Shew Shankar Singh v. The State and Ors.
       MANU/WB/0349/1968; Assan Musaliarakath Kunhi Bava In Re.
       AIR 1929 Mad 226; The Public Prosecutor v. Kanniappan AIR
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                            783

                    Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi


     1955 Mad 424; Muthu Nadar, In Re. AIR 1945 Mad 313; Prahlad
     Dnyanoba Gajbhiye v. State of Maharashtra and Anr (1994) Cri
     LJ 2555; Raveendran v. Food Inspector, Pinarayi Panchayat 1977
     KLT 155; Adamji Umar Dalal v. State of Bombay [1952] 1 SCR
     172 : AIR 1952 SC 14; State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju
     [1987] 1 SCR 1103 : (1987) 1 SCC 538 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
                             List of Keywords
     Sentencing; Undeserving leniency and sympathy; Undergo
     imprisonment till the rising of the court; Serious offence of bigamy
     punishable u/s. 494 IPC; Enhancement of sentence; Rule of
     proportionality; Maximum corporeal sentence; Flea-bite sentence;
     Judicial discretion; Modification of sentence.
                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 2912
     of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 26.08.2022 of the High court of
     Judicature at Madras in CRLA No. 647 of 2021
     With
     Criminal Appeal No. 2913 of 2024
                         Appearances for Parties
     Basanth R, Sr. Adv., H.S. Mohamed Rafi, A. Lakshminarayanan,
     Akshay Sahay, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Ratnakar Das, G. Sivabalamurugan, Selvaraj Mahendran,
     C.Adhikesavan, P.V. Harikrishnan, Karunakar Mahalik, Advs. for the
     Respondent.
                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment
     C.T. Ravikumar, J.
1.   Leave granted.
2.   Salmond defined ‘crime’ as an act deemed by law to be harmful
     for society as a whole although its immediate victim may be an
784                                                               [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                           Digital Supreme Court Reports


       individual. Long-long ago, Kautilya said: “it is the power of punishment
       alone which when exercised impartially in proportion to guilt and
       irrespective of whether the person punished is the king’s son or
       the enemy, that protects this world and the next”. In the decision
       in State of Punjab v. Bawa Singh,1 this Court held that it is the
       duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the
       nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or
       committed. The sentencing courts are expected to consider all the
       relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence
       and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity
       of the offence. The court must not only keep in view the rights of the
       victim but also the society at large while considering the imposition
       of appropriate punishment. Meagre sentence imposed solely on
       account of lapse of time without considering the degree of the offence
       will be counterproductive in the long run and against the interest of
       the society, it was further held. In Bawa Singh’s case (supra), this
       Court referred to the earlier decisions in Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar
       & Ors.,2 and Shailesh Jasvantbhai & Anr. v. State of Gujarat &
       Ors.,3 with agreement, in paragraphs 13 and 14 thereof, as under:-
            “13. In Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar, this Court has observed
            that:
                    “10. … it is the duty of the courts to consider all the
                    relevant factors to impose an appropriate sentence.
                    The legislature has bestowed upon the judiciary this
                    enormous discretion in the sentencing policy, which
                    must be exercised with utmost care and caution. The
                    punishment awarded should be directly proportionate
                    to the nature and the magnitude of the offence. The
                    benchmark of proportionate sentencing can assist
                    the Judges in arriving at a fair and impartial verdict.”
            This Court further observed that:
                    “11. … The cardinal principle of sentencing policy is that
                    the sentence imposed on an offender should reflect the


1   [2015] 1 SCR 709 : (2015) 3 SCC 441
2   [2013] 5 SCR 979 : (2013) 9 SCC 516
3   [2006] 1 SCR 477 : (2006) 2 SCC 359
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                             785

                    Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi


                crime he has committed and it should be proportionate
                to the gravity of the offence. This Court has repeatedly
                stressed the central role of proportionality in sentencing
                of offenders in numerous cases.”
           14. In Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat, the Apex
           Court opined that:
                “7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates
                conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons
                and property of the people is an essential function of
                the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality
                of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural
                conflict where living law must find answer to the new
                challenges and the courts are required to mould
                the sentencing system to meet the challenges.
                The contagion of lawlessness would undermine
                social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society
                and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the
                object of law which must be achieved by imposing
                appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone
                of the edifice of ‘order’ should meet the challenges
                confronting the society. Friedman in his Law in
                Changing Society stated that: ‘State of criminal law
                continues to be–as it should be–a decisive reflection
                of social consciousness of society.’ Therefore, in
                operating the sentencing system, law should adopt
                the corrective machinery or deterrence based on
                factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process
                be stern where it should be, and tempered with
                mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given
                circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime,
                the manner in which it was planned and committed,
                the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct
                of the accused, the nature of weapons used and
                all other attending circumstances are relevant facts
                which would enter into the area of consideration.
                8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate
                sentence would do more harm to the justice system
                to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of
786                                                           [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                            Digital Supreme Court Reports


                     law and society could not long endure under such
                     serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every
                     court to award proper sentence having regard to the
                     nature of the offence and the manner in which it was
                     executed or committed, etc.”
3.     Besides the decisions in Hazara Singh and Shailesh Jasvantbhai’s
       cases (supra), this Court also referred to the decisions in Ahmed
       Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed & Anr. v. State of Gujarat,4 State
       of Madhya Pradesh v. Bablu,5 and State of Madhya Pradesh v.
       Surendra Singh,6 therein. Thereupon, in paragraph 17 of Bawa
       Singh’s case (supra) this Court held thus:-
             “17. Recently, in State of M.P. v. Bablu and State of M.P. v.
             Surendra Singh, after considering and following the earlier
             decisions, this Court reiterated the settled proposition of
             law that one of the prime objectives of criminal law is the
             imposition of adequate, just, proportionate punishment
             which commensurate with gravity, nature of crime and the
             manner in which the offence is committed. One should keep
             in mind the social interest and conscience of the society
             while considering the determinative factor of sentence
             with gravity of crime. The punishment should not be so
             lenient that it shocks the conscience of the society. It
             is, therefore, solemn duty of the court to strike a proper
             balance while awarding the sentence as awarding lesser
             sentence encourages any criminal and, as a result of the
             same, the society suffers.”
4.     Thus, the clamour or claim for comeuppance viz., deserved
       punishment proportionate to the gravity of the offence is a continuous
       and continuing demand based on civic sense and unfailing in
       categories of serious offences where more than individual interest is
       also involved, the above rule of proportionality in providing punishment
       is not failed as otherwise it will impact the society. At the same time,
       we may hasten to add that we shall not be understood to have held
       that imposition of sentence on such offenders shall be to satisfy


4    [2009] 8 SCR 719 : (2009) 7 SCC 254
5    [2014] 9 SCR 467 : (2014) 9 SCC 281
6    [2014] 13 SCR 554 : (2015) 1 SCC 222
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                        787

                    Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi


     the society and we are only on the point that following the rule of
     proportionality in imposing punishment would promote and bring
     order and orderliness in society.
5.   The case on hand unfolds as grievance of grave deviation of the
     principle of sentencing thus laid down by this Court and it carries a
     consequential prayer for enhancement of punishment for conviction
     for the offence under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
     (for short, ‘I.P.C.’). The appellant-complainant assails the common
     judgment passed in Crl. Appeal Nos.647/2021 and 635/2021
     respectively in the captioned appeals dated 26.08.2022 of the High
     Court of Judicature at Madras to the extent it imposed only a flea-
     bite sentence for the conviction of the respondent-accused for the
     offence under Section 494 I.P.C., and confirmed the acquittal of
     the co-accused of the said respondents. The fact is that despite
     the restoration of the conviction entered against them by the trial
     Court after reversing their acquittal by the First Appellate Court and
     the consequential imposition of sentence, the respondents in both
     the appeals who were accused Nos.1 and 2 have not chosen to
     challenge the common judgment dated 26.08.2022.
     Facts leading to the appeals
6.   The appellant herein is the husband of the respondent in the former
     appeal and he filed a private complaint under Section 200 of the
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short the ‘Cr.P.C.’) against the
     said respondent and the respondent in the latter appeal, for having
     committed offence punishable under Section 494 I.P.C. In fact, on
     the ground of abetting them for committing the said offence the
     parents of the respondent in the former appeal were also arraigned
     as accused. For the sake of convenience, hereafter in this judgment,
     the respondent in the former appeal and the respondent in the latter
     appeal are referred to only as accused No.1 and 2 respectively, viz.,
     their respective order of status before the trial Court.
7.   The allegation in the complaint was that the first accused who is
     his wife, pending the proceedings for dissolution of their marriage
     between them before the Family Court, Coimbatore, and during
     subsistence of their nuptial bond, married the second accused and
     that in the wedlock of the first accused with the second accused a
     child was born. Therefore, the appellant accused them of committing
788                                                           [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


       bigamous marriage and the parents of the first accused were accused
       of abetting them for committing the said offence. After the culmination
       of the trial, the trial Court acquitted the parents of the first accused
       who were accused Nos.3 and 4, and convicted the first and second
       accused, under Section 494 I.P.C., and sentenced them to undergo
       one-year rigorous imprisonment each and imposed a fine of Rs.
       2,000/- each. In default of payment of fine they were ordered to
       suffer three months simple imprisonment. Aggrieved by the conviction
       and the consequently imposed sentence, first and second accused
       filed Crl. Appeal Nos.249/2019 and 250/2019 respectively. The
       appellant herein filed appeal as Crl. Appeal No.273/2019 against the
       acquittal of the parents of the first accused, viz., accused Nos.3 and
       4 before the trial Court and filed Crl. Appeal No.304/2019 seeking
       enhancement of the sentence given to the first and second accused.
       As per common judgment dated 19.04.2021, the court of Additional
       District and Sessions Judge-III, Coimbatore, dismissed the Appeal
       Nos.273/2019 and 304/2019 filed by the appellant herein and allowed
       Crl. Appeal Nos.249/2019 and 250/2019 filed by the accused Nos.1
       and 2 and acquitted them. Aggrieved by the said common judgment,
       the appellant filed Crl. Appeal Nos.635/2021 and 647/2021 against
       the acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2 and a common appeal viz., Crl.
       Appeal No.648/2021 against the dismissal of his appeals viz., Crl.
       Appeal Nos.273/2019 and 304/2019. In and vide the said appeals the
       appellant prayed to set aside the common order dated 19.04.2021
       reversing the conviction of accused Nos.1 and 2 and confirming
       the acquittal of accused Nos.3 and 4. The appellant also sought for
       enhancement of the sentence of one-year rigorous imprisonment
       imposed on accused Nos.1 and 2 contending that it is too inadequate.
8.     We have already noted that despite the restoration of the conviction
       for the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., entered against accused
       Nos.1 and 2 they have not chosen to challenge the same and at
       the same time they preferred to undergo the sentence imposed
       therefor. Naturally, in the said circumstances, against the conviction
       no argument was advanced on behalf of accused Nos.1 and 2 and
       their contention was that no interference with the impugned order
       is invited in the captioned appeals.
9.     Heard Sh. R. Basanth, learned senior counsel appearing for the
       appellant, and Sh. Ratnakar Das, learned counsel appearing for
       the respondent.
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                       789

                      Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi


10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant herein would
    submit that a scanning of the judgment of the trial Court would reveal
    that the Court had appropriately appreciated the evidence on record
    and convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 upon satisfying itself that the
    ingredients to attract the offence punishable under Section 494 I.P.C.,
    have been made out by the appellant. Furthermore, it is submitted
    that a bare perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the
    High Court had rightly considered the contentions of the appellant
    herein against the reversal of their conviction by the First Appellate
    Court that it was founded on surmises and conjectures. We are of
    the considered view that no more narrative on the correctness of
    the reversal of the judgment of the First Appellate Court by the High
    Court under the impugned judgment is required as the indisputable
    and undisputed position is that its reversal was accepted by accused
    Nos.1 and 2 and they had undergone the sentence imposed by the
    High Court consequent to the reversal of the First Appellate Court’s
    judgment. We may note here that the learned senior counsel for
    the appellant would submit that the appellant had not accepted any
    compensation and in the same breath, would further submit that the
    appellant did not want any such compensation.
11. In the aforesaid circumstances, the sole question surviving for
    consideration is whether the High Court was right in not restoring
    the sentence imposed for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C.,
    by the trial Court when it accepted the contentions of the appellant
    and reversed the acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2 and restored
    the conviction entered on them by the trial Court. In other words,
    the question is whether the High Court had shown undeserving
    leniency and sympathy to accused Nos.1 and 2 even after finding
    that they have committed the serious offence of bigamy punishable
    under Section 494 I.P.C., and whether they were let off with a flea-
    bite sentence and whether an enhancement of sentence is invited?
12. In this context, we may say that we are not oblivious of the position
    of law laid down by this Court in Dalbir Singh & Ors. v. State of
    Punjab.7 In the said decision this Court held that decision on question
    of sentence could never be regarded as precedent. Bearing in mind



7   1979] 3 SCR 1059 : (1979) 3 SCC 745
790                                                         [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                           Digital Supreme Court Reports


       the said decision, we will proceed to consider the question based
       on the rule of proportionality in providing punishment followed by
       this Court. In this context, it is to be noted that under the impugned
       common judgment the High Court after restoring conviction for the
       offence under Section 494 I.P.C., sentenced accused Nos.1 and
       2 to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a
       fine of Rs.20,000/- each with default sentence to undergo simple
       imprisonment for a period of three months. It was also ordered that
       out of the total fine amount paid, a sum of Rs. 20,000/- shall be paid
       to the appellant as compensation.
13. We will consider the requirement or otherwise of enhancement of
    the corporeal sentence imposed on accused Nos.1 and 2 based on
    the settled principle of sentencing being followed by this Court that it
    is the solemn duty of the Court to strike a proper balance awarding
    sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed by the
    accused concerned upon his conviction for serious offence(s). For
    considering the said question, it is only appropriate to look into the
    question whether the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., is regarded
    as a serious offence. The appellant herein contended that a reading
    of Section 494 I.P.C., would reveal that the said offence, if proved to
    have been committed, the offender deserves no leniency as it is a
    serious offence. To buttress the said contention, the learned senior
    counsel relied on the decision of this Court in Gopal Lal v. State
    of Rajasthan,8 wherein this Court held that where the offence of
    bigamy is proved, the Court could not take a lenient view.
14. A reading of Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C., would reveal that the
    legislature viewed the offence of bigamy as a serious offence.
    Though no minimum sentence is prescribed under Section 494
    I.P.C., the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed thereunder
    for a conviction thereunder is seven years of imprisonment of
    either description. It is also to be noted that the said offence is
    compoundable only by the husband or wife of the person so marrying
    with the permission of the Court. The same offence under Section
    494 I.P.C., with concealment of former marriage from person with
    whom subsequent marriage is contracted would visit the offender



8   [1979] 2 SCR 1171 : (1979) 2 SCC 170
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                         791

                          Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi


      with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
      to ten years and with fine. This offence, which is an aggravated
      form of bigamy, is non-compoundable. The decision in Gopal Lal’s
      case (supra), and the prescription of maximum corporeal sentence
      imposable under Sections 494 and 495 I.P.C., would undoubtedly
      suggest that the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated
      as a serious offence.
15. When once it is found that an offence under Section 494 I.P.C., is
    a serious offence, the circumstances obtaining in this case would
    constrain us to hold that the imposition of ‘imprisonment till the rising
    of the court’ is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of
    proportionality in providing punishment as mentioned hereinbefore.
16. It is a fact that earlier certain High Courts maintained a view that
    sentencing an accused to undergo ‘imprisonment till the rising of
    the court’ would be no sentence at all, according to law. (See the
    decisions in Shew Shankar Singh v. The State and Ors.,9 Assan
    Musaliarakath Kunhi Bava In Re.,10 and The Public Prosecutor
    v. Kanniappan11). In the said decisions of the Madras High Court,
    it was held that a sentence of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the
    court’ is an evasion of the statutory provision. In this context, it is
    also to be noted that a contra view was taken by a Division Bench
    of the Madras High Court in Muthu Nadar, In Re..12 The Division
    Bench held that unless the penal provision provides any fixed term
    as the minimum, the court has full discretion to pass a sentence
    of imprisonment for any period if it would be fit. In the decision in
    Prahlad Dnyanoba Gajbhiye v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.,13
    the High Court of Bombay held that every confinement of person and
    every restraint of liberty of free men is imprisonment. It is to be noted
    that taking into account the proviso to Section 418(1), Cr.P.C., in the
    decision in Raveendran v. Food Inspector, Pinarayi Panchayat,14
    the High Court of Kerala held that the proviso to Section 418(1),


9    MANU/WB/0349/1968
10   AIR 1929 Mad 226
11   AIR 1955 Mad 424
12   AIR 1945 Mad 313
13   (1994) Cri LJ 2555
14   1977 KLT 155
792                                                             [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                           Digital Supreme Court Reports


       Cr.P.C., recognises sentence of detention till the rising of court is
       imprisonment of the description simple imprisonment. We refer to
       the aforesaid decisions and provisions to say that now it cannot be
       said that imposing a sentence of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the
       court’ is impermissible or an action amounting to evasion of statutory
       provision(s). The said provision viz., Section 418(1), Cr.P.C., and its
       proviso reads thus:-
             “418. Execution of sentence of imprisonment. — (1) Where
             the accused is sentenced to imprisonment for life or to
             imprisonment for a term in cases other than those provided
             for by section 413, the Court passing the sentence shall
             forthwith forward a warrant to the jail or other place in which
             he is, or is to be, confined, and, unless the accused is
             already confined in such jail or other place, shall forward
             him to such jail or other place, with the warrant:
             Provided that where the accused is sentenced to
             imprisonment till the rising of the Court, it shall not be
             necessary to prepare or forward a warrant to a jail, and
             the accused may be confined in such place as the Court
             may direct.”
17. The proviso to Section 418(1), Cr.P.C., together with the penal provision
    under Section 494 I.P.C., prescribing no minimum imprisonment, but
    only the maximum, would definitely make imposition of ‘imprisonment
    till the rising of the court’ intra vires.
18. This will take us to the next question as to whether such a flea-bite
    sentence is sufficient when a conviction is entered under Section 494
    I.P.C., only because no minimum sentence is prescribed thereunder.
    We have already noted that in the matter of awarding sentence
    for conviction of an offence which may impact the society, it is
    not advisable to let off an accused after conviction with a flea-bite
    sentence. We may hasten to add that we are not oblivious of the
    decision of this Court in Adamji Umar Dalal v. State of Bombay,15
    wherein this Court held that zeal to crush the evil should not carry
    the Court away from its judicial mind, and the sentence should not



15   [1952] 1 SCR 172 : AIR 1952 SC 14
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                         793

                        Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi


      be so unduly harsh as to defeat the ends of justice. But then, the
      decision in State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju16 is also equally
      relevant. This Court, while enhancing the sentence observed, after
      characterising the punishment as unconscionably lenient or a ‘flea-
      bite’ sentence, that consideration of undue sympathy in such cases
      will lead to miscarriage of justice and undermine confidence of the
      public in the efficacy of the criminal justice system. In short, there
      cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that in imposing
      sentence the Court is to take into consideration the nature of the
      offence, circumstances under which it was committed, degree of
      deliberation shown by the offender, antecedents of the offender upto
      the time of sentence, etc., and, in the absence of any exceptional
      circumstances, impose sentence in tune with the rule of proportionality
      in providing punishment though it falls within the realm of judicial
      discretion.
19. Now bearing in mind all the aforesaid provisions and decisions, if the
    question whether accused Nos.1 and 2 are granted a proper sentence
    or what was granted was only a flea-bite sentence, we have no
    option but to hold that imposition of sentence of ‘imprisonment till the
    rising of the court’ upon conviction for an offence under Section 494
    I.P.C., on them was unconscionably lenient or a flea-bite sentence.
20. Certain circumstances revealed from the evidence on record cannot
    go unnoticed while deciding the question of proper sentence. Earlier,
    the appellant herein filed HMOP 515/2012 before the Family Court,
    Coimbatore, seeking divorce. In the judgment of the trial Court, taking
    note of the evidence adduced, it was noted that the first accused
    had filed a petition seeking interim maintenance in the above HMOP
    and based on a petition in that regard the Court had ordered the
    appellant to pay Rs. 5,000/- per month to the first accused and she
    had received the maintenance till 13.07.2017. The evidence would
    further show that a child was born to the first and second accused
    in their wedlock in November, 2017. The evidence on record would
    reveal that on 22.01.2019, the first accused herself filed HMOP No.84
    of 2019 seeking dissolution of her marriage with the appellant. In
    such circumstances, it is evident that the first accused married the



16   [1987] 1 SCR 1103 : (1987) 1 SCC 538
794                                                          [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


       second accused while the marriage between the appellant and the
       first accused was subsisting and not only that, during its subsistence,
       she had also begotten a child through the second accused. Taking
       into account all the circumstances, it can be said that undeserving
       leniency was shown in the case on hand. But then, taking into
       account the fact that the child born to the first and second accused
       was aged less than two years when the trial Court passed the
       sentence and that no minimum term of imprisonment is prescribed
       for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., and that the maximum
       sentence imposable for conviction thereunder is seven years, we
       are of the considered view that the trial Court had virtually struck a
       balance in fixing the term of one year as the corporeal sentence.
       But then, taking note of the fact that the said child is now aged only
       about six years and the sentence for the conviction under Section
       494 I.P.C., can be of both descriptions. We think it appropriate to
       use our judicial discretion to modify the sentence imposed under
       the impugned judgment. Accordingly, we modify the term of the
       sentence awarded to accused Nos.1 and 2 for the conviction under
       Section 494 I.P.C., to six months each, making the nature of the
       sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period. We further
       modify the fine imposed by reducing the same from Rs. 20,000/-
       each to Rs. 2,000/- each, as originally awarded by the trial Court.
       Needless to say, that the default sentence therefor, awarded by the
       trial Court i.e., to undergo simple imprisonment for three months is
       also restored. If in terms of the impugned judgment, accused Nos.1
       and 2 had already deposited Rs. 20,000/-, after making deduction in
       terms of the sentence of fine mentioned hereinbefore, the balance
       amount shall be refunded to them in accordance with the law. In
       the said circumstances, accused Nos.1 and 2 shall surrender before
       the trial Court so as to serve out the unserved period of sentence
       imposed on them by this judgment. Taking note of the fact that the
       child of accused Nos.1 and 2 is now aged only about 6 years, we
       further order that firstly the second accused shall surrender before
       the trial Court, within a period of 3 weeks from today to serve out
       the rest of the sentence. Upon his release from the jail, on suffering
       the sentence, the first accused shall surrender before the Court to
       serve her remaining period of sentence and such surrender shall
       be made by the first accused within a period of 2 weeks from the
       release of the second accused from the jail. This arrangement shall
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                        795

                      Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi


     not be treated as a precedent as it was ordered in these special
     circumstances. In case the accused Nos.1 and 2 do not surrender
     in terms of this judgment on their own, the trial Court shall resort to
     appropriate steps in accordance with law to place them in custody
     and make them suffer the sentence as mentioned hereinbefore. The
     appeals are allowed as above.
21. Pending application(s) are disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeals allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain