BABY SAKSHI GREOLAversusMANZOOR AHMAD SIMON AND ANOTHER

                 [2024] 12 S.C.R. 958 : 2024 INSC 963

                      Baby Sakshi Greola
                              v.
                Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another
                      (Civil Appeal No. 14290 of 2024)
                              11 December 2024
              [B.R. Gavai* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Appellant (a minor at the time of the accident) sustained grievous
       injuries and suffered disability and moderate mental retardation.
       MACT awarded compensation of Rs.5,90,750/- with interest at
       7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition. High
       Court granted a further amount of Rs.5,60,000/- with interest at 9%
       per annum from the date of filing till realization. Appellant sought
       further enhancement of the compensation.

                                  Headnotes†
       Motor Vehicle Accident – Appellant sustained grievous injuries
       in a road traffic accident when she was 7 years old and suffered
       disability and moderate mental retardation – Compensation
       awarded – Enhancement of:
       Held: Even though the Doctor (PW-3) on assessment of the
       appellant opined that the disability suffered by her was 75%,
       however, the disability of the appellant should be treated to be
       100% for all practical purposes – Taking notional income is not
       the correct approach – Instead, the minimum wages payable to
       a skilled workman in the concerned State has to be taken into
       consideration because, that would be the minimum amount which
       the appellant would have earned on becoming a major – The
       minimum wage payable to a skilled workman in the State of Delhi
       at the time of the accident, i.e. 02.06.2009, was Rs. 4,358/- per
       month – To arrive at the compensation to be awarded under the
       head of loss of income and earnings due to disability, 40% added
       for future prospects and a multiplier of 18 applied in view of the
       age of the appellant – Therefore, the compensation under loss of
       income/earning capacity would be Rs. [4,358 + (40% of 4,358)]
       x 12 x 18 = Rs.13,17,859/-, rounded off to Rs. 13,18,000/- –
       Further, the appellant will remain dependant on another person
* Author
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                           959

      Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another


     for the rest of her life even though the physical age will increase,
     but her mental age will be that of a child studying in the 2nd
     Standard/Class – High Court only enhanced the compensation
     under the head of pain and suffering from Rs.50,000/- as awarded
     by the Tribunal to Rs.1,00,000/- which is not commensurate to
     the impact the unfortunate accident has on the appellant and
     her family – In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
     compensation of Rs.15,00,000/- award under the head of pain
     and suffering – Also, the compensation awarded under the head
     of loss of marriage prospects by the High Court is inadequate and
     is enhanced to Rs. 5,00,000/- – Rs.9,42,000/- awarded under the
     head of attendant charges as the appellant would be dependent
     on a skilled attendant throughout her life and on a full-time
     basis – Compensation awarded under Future Medical Treatment
     enhanced to Rs.5,00,000/- as the appellant would be requiring
     medical assistance in the form of medicines, diapers, etc. to live
     a relatively comfortable life – Impugned judgment quashed and
     set aside – Total compensation of Rs. 50,87,000/- with 9% rate
     of interest awarded. [Paras 27, 29, 31, 33, 38, 40, 43, 46, 48,
     49, 51, 53]

                              Case Law Cited
     National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others
     2017 INSC 1068 : [2017] 13 SCR 100 : (2017) 16 SCC 680 –
     followed.
     Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Others, 2020 INSC 135 : [2020] 3
     SCR 622 : (2020) 4 SCC 413; Master Ayush v. Branch Manager,
     Reliance General Insurance Company Limited and Another,
     2022 INSC 363 : [2022] 1 SCR 831 : (2022) 7 SCC 738; K.S.
     Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi and Another, 2024 INSC 886 :
     2024 SCC OnLine SC 3385; General Manager, Kerala State Road
     Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.)
     and Others (1994) 2 SCC 176 – relied on.

                                 List of Acts
     Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

                             List of Keywords
     Motor vehicle accident; Road traffic accident; Compensation;
     Enhancement; Minor at the time of the accident; Grievous
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       injuries; Moderate mental retardation; Disability; 100% disability;
       Disability Certificate; Mental disability; Physical disability; Multiplier;
       Dependent; Minimum wages; Skilled worker; Notional income; Loss
       of income and earning capacity; Future prospects; Physical age;
       Mental age; Child studying in the 2nd Standard/Class; Pain and
       suffering; Loss of marriage prospects; Marriage/companionship;
       Non-pecuniary loss; Attendant charges; Skilled attendant; Unskilled
       attendant; Future Medical Treatment; Medical assistance; Jointly
       and severally liable; Driver-cum-owner; Insurance company;
       Guardian.

                                Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14290 of 2024
       From the Judgment and Order dated 07.11.2017 of the High Court
       of Delhi at New Delhi in MACA No. 1107 of 2011

                             Appearances for Parties
       Mrs. Aruna Mehta, Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Advs. for the Appellant.
       Ravi Bakshi, Manvendra Pr. Singh, Yash Pal Dhingra, Ms. Sayma,
       Advs. for the Respondents.

                   Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                     Judgment

       B.R. Gavai, J.
1.     Leave granted.
2.     The present appeal calls into question the correctness and validity
       of the final judgment and order passed by a learned Single Judge
       of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi dated 7th November 2017
       in MAC. APP. 1107/2011.
3.     The appellant had approached the High Court seeking enhancement
       of the compensation awarded on account of injuries suffered in
       a motor vehicle accident. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,
       Central District, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal”) had by
       a judgment and order dated 13th June 2011 awarded compensation
       of Rs. 5,90,750/- along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                       961

      Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another


     from the date of filing of the claim petition. The learned Single Judge
     of the High Court, vide impugned judgment and order, disposed of
     the appeal filed by the appellant seeking enhancement by granting a
     further amount of Rs. 5,60,000/- along with interest at the rate of 9%
     per annum from the date of filing till realization. Aggrieved thereby,
     the appellant has approached this Court.
4.   The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:
     4.1 On 2nd June, 2009, the appellant, aged seven years, was going
         on foot along with her mother and brother to her house from
         National Bal Bhawan, Kotla Road, New Delhi. At about 01:00
         PM, when they reached a red light on Deen Dayal Upadhyay
         Marg and Vishnu Digambar Marg, ITO, Delhi, and were crossing
         the road on a zebra crossing, a car bearing Registration No.
         DL-3C-AX-1502 being driven at a high speed, hit the appellant,
         as a result of which, she sustained grievous injuries.
     4.2 On 3rd September 2009, the appellant, through her father, filed a
         claim petition for grant of compensation under Section 166 of the
         Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “MV Act”),
         before the learned Tribunal against the driver-cum-owner of the
         offending vehicle and United India Insurance Company Limited,
         New Delhi arrayed as Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively.
     4.3 The learned Tribunal framed three issues for its consideration.
         First, whether the appellant had suffered grievous injuries on
         account of the road accident on 2nd June 2009, due to rash
         and negligent driving of vehicle by Respondent No. 1. Second,
         whether the appellant is entitled to any compensation, if so, to
         what amount and from whom. Third, as to what relief should
         be granted to the appellant.
     4.4 The appellant got examined five witnesses in support of
         her claim. Respondent No. 1 was proceeded ex-parte and
         Respondent No. 2 did not lead any evidence.
     4.5 The learned Tribunal, on appreciation of the evidence, decided
         the first two issues in favour of the appellant. The learned
         Tribunal held the respondents jointly and severally liable to
         make the payment of compensation to the appellant.
     4.6 The appellant was awarded the following compensation:
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             S. No.                 Head                   Amount (In ₹)
               1.     Medicines and Medical Treatment         32,000/-
               2.      Loss of Earning Capacity due to       1,68,750/-
                                  Disability
               3.            Pain and Suffering                50,000
               4.             Future Treatment                30,000/-
               5.            Attendant Charges                15,000/-
               6.         Loss of Amenities of Life          1,00,000/-
               7.          Loss of Future Prospect           1,00,000/-
               8.      Special Education Expenditure          75,000/-
               9.       Conveyance and Special Diet           20,000/-
                                    Total                    5,90,750/-

       4.7 Vide judgment and order dated 13th June 2011, the learned
           Tribunal, therefore, held that the appellant is entitled to a
           compensation of Rs. 5,90,750/-. The appellant was also held
           entitled to interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date
           of filing of the claim petition i.e. 3rd September 2009.
       4.8 Seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded by the
           learned Tribunal, the appellant approached the High Court.
       4.9 The learned Single Judge of the High Court, on appreciation
           of the material placed on record, enhanced the compensation
           as follows (in bold):

             S. No.             Head                   Amount (In ₹)
               1.      Medicines and Medical              32,000/-
                             Treatment
               2.     Loss of Earning Capacity           1,68,750/-
                          due to Disability
               3.        Pain and Suffering           50,000 + 50,000 =
                                                          1,00,000/-
               4.         Future Treatment                30,000/-
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                          963

      Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another



              5.        Attendant Charges             15,000 + 4,10,000 =
                                                           4,25,000/-
              6.      Loss of Amenities of Life            1,00,000/-
              7.      Loss of Future Prospect              1,00,000/-
              8.         Special Education                  75,000/-
                           Expenditure
              9.     Conveyance and Special                 20,000/-
                             Diet
             10.         Loss of Marriage                  1,00,000/-
                            Prospects
                                Total                5,90,750 + 5,60,000 =
                                                          11,51,000/-

     4.10 Vide impugned judgment and order dated 7th November 2017,
          the learned Single Judge of the High Court, therefore, enhanced
          the compensation by Rs.5,60,000/- to Rs.11,51,000/- along with
          interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of
          the claim petition till realization.

     4.11 Challenging the compensation awarded by the High Court, the
          appellant has filed the present appeal.
5.   We have heard Smt. Aruna Mehta, learned counsel appearing
     on behalf of the appellant and Shri Ravi Bakshi, learned counsel
     appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 2 (United India Insurance
     Company Limited).
6.   Smt. Mehta submitted that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal
     as enhanced by the High Court deserves reconsideration by this
     Court. Placing reliance on the evidence of Dr. Monica Juneja (PW-3)
     who examined the appellant, the learned counsel for the appellant
     submitted that the appellant has sustained 75% mental moderate
     retardation and has no control over the passage of her urine. Further,
     it is submitted that the disability of the appellant is in relation to the
     whole body and is non-progressive. She submitted that children with
     moderate mental retardation are generally able to learn skills up to
     the level of a child of 2nd standard/class as adults and can work under
     close supervision only. She further submitted that, the appellant will
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       require close supervision of an attendant for her day-to-day work.
       She further submitted that the appellant would need admission in
       a special school or training by a special education teacher and that
       due to her condition, the appellant’s marriage prospects may be
       severely affected.
7.     Smt. Mehta submitted that, taking into consideration the condition of
       the appellant, the High Court has erred in granting only Rs. 4,25,000/-
       towards the attendant charges by taking minimum wages of unskilled
       worker (Rs. 3,934/- per month) for a part time attendant. She further
       submitted that, the High Court has failed to award suitable amount
       of compensation under the head pain and suffering, as well as for
       future medical treatment of the appellant.
8.     The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on three
       judgments of this Court viz. Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Others,1
       Master Ayush v. Branch Manager, Reliance General Insurance
       Company Limited and Another 2 and K.S. Muralidhar v. R.
       Subbulakshmi and Another.3
9.     Per contra, Shri Bakshi, learned counsel appearing for Respondent
       No. 2 (Insurance Company) submitted that the High Court has rightly
       followed the settled principles of law and increased the compensation.
       He submitted that the High Court has been very liberal in awarding
       an additional sum of Rs.5,60,000/- over and above the amount
       awarded by the Tribunal.
10. Placing reliance on the Disability Certificate dated 10th January 2011,
    the learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 submitted that there is
    a likelihood of improvement in the condition of the appellant. He
    therefore, submitted that, this Court should not interfere with the
    amount awarded by the High Court.
11. To consider the present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the
    evidence of Smt. Prakashi Devi (PW-2), mother of the appellant, who
    had the misfortune to recount the incident before the Tribunal. It is
    stated by Smt. Prakashi Devi (PW-2) that on 2nd June 2009 when
    she was going back from National Bal Bhawan to her home, along


1    2020 INSC 135 : [2020] 3 SCR 622 : (2020) 4 SCC 413
2    2022 INSC 363 : [2022] 1 SCR 831 : (2022) 7 SCC 738
3    2024 INSC 886 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3385
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                       965

      Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another


     with her children on foot, they had to cross the road. When they were
     crossing the road, on a zebra crossing meant for pedestrians, a Tata
     Safari car bearing registration number DL-3C-AX-4502, driven by
     Respondent No.1, at a very high speed, hit her daughter (appellant/
     Baby Sakshi) with great force as a result of which her daughter
     sustained grievous injuries to her brain, sustained fracture over left
     side of femur and lacerated injuries all over her body.
12. Smt. Prakashi Devi (PW-2) stated that her daughter has become
    permanently partially disabled from her skull area. Further, her
    daughter cannot enjoy her life like a normal person and cannot walk
    properly. The prospect of her marriage has been ruined due to the
    unfortunate accident. Her daughter will not get any government job
    in her remaining life. Thus, life has become just like hell for her and
    her daughter will have to suffer trauma and loss of amenities of life.
13. It was also stated by the mother of the appellant (PW-2), that she
    wanted to make her daughter a badminton player but all her hopes
    have now vanished due to the unfortunate accident. It was stated
    by her that the appellant was a brilliant student and had she not met
    with the accident, she would have got a job of at least Rs. 25,000-
    30,000/- per month, but as a result of the accident she has become
    a dull student.
14. It would also be appropriate to refer to the evidence of Dr. Monica
    Juneja (PW-3), who proved the Disability Certificate dated 10 th
    January 2011. As per the said certificate, the appellant has suffered
    75% disability, which is permanent in nature on account of moderate
    mental retardation. This disability is in relation to the whole body,
    which is non-progressive. It is stated in the certificate that this is a
    case of road traffic accident with Subarachnoid Haemorrhage with
    healed fracture femur left with moderate mental retardation which
    means she has an Intelligence Quotient of 41 and social Quotient
    of 43.
15. It is recorded in the testimony of Dr. Monica Juneja (PW-3) that,
    children with moderate mental retardation are generally able to
    learn skills up to the level of 2nd Standard/Class as adults and
    can work under close supervision only. Further, the appellant also
    has severe apathy and has no control over passage of her urine.
    Because of severe apathy, the appellant has no interest in playing or
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       interacting with other children. The appellant would require very close
       supervision of an attendant for her day-to-day care. The appellant
       would also require admission in a special school or training by a
       special education teacher.
16. Dr. Monica Juneja (PW-3) has also stated that, due to all these
    problems, her marriage prospects may be affected. However,
    her possibility of procreation is not affected on account of mental
    retardation.
17. This Court, in the case of Kajal (supra), had an opportunity to consider
    a case with identical facts. In the said case, a girl (Kajal) aged 12
    sustained brain injuries on account of an accident. The accident
    had very serious consequences on her. Kajal was examined for an
    assessment of her disability. It was assessed that, because of the
    head injury, Kajal is left with very low IQ and severe weakness in all
    her four limbs, she suffers from severe hysteria and severe urinary
    incontinence. Her disability had been assessed as 100%.
18. This Court, in the said case, referred to a number of cases where
    the principles for grant of compensation have been enunciated.
    Cases from foreign jurisdiction as well as cases of this Court were
    relied upon to extract the principles to be applied while assessing
    compensation. It would be apposite to refer to the following paragraphs
    of the said case:
            “8. In Phillips v. London & South Western Railway Co.
            [Phillips v. London & South Western Railway Co. (1879)
            [L.R.] 5 Q.B.D. 78 (CA)], Field, J., while emphasising that
            damages must be full and adequate, held thus : (QBD p. 79)
                 “… You cannot put the plaintiff back again
                 into his original position, but you must bring
                 your reasonable common sense to bear, and
                 you must always recollect that this is the only
                 occasion on which compensation can be given.
                 The plaintiff can never sue again for it. You
                 have, therefore, now to give him compensation
                 once and for all. He has done no wrong, he has
                 suffered a wrong at the hands of the defendants
                 and you must take care to give him full fair
                 compensation for that which he has suffered.”
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                       967

      Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another


          Besides, the Tribunals should always remember that the
          measures of damages in all these cases “should be such
          as to enable even a tortfeasor to say that he had amply
          atoned for his misadventure”.
          9. In Mediana, In re [Mediana, In re, 1900 AC 113 (HL)],
          Lord Halsbury held : (AC pp. 116-17)
                “… Of course the whole region of inquiry into
                damages is one of extreme difficulty. You very
                often cannot even lay down any principle upon
                which you can give damages; nevertheless, it
                is remitted to the jury, or those who stand in
                place of the jury, to consider what compensation
                in money shall be given for what is a wrongful
                act. Take the most familiar and ordinary case :
                how is anybody to measure pain and suffering
                in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest that
                you can by any arithmetical calculation establish
                what is the exact amount of money which would
                represent such a thing as the pain and suffering
                which a person has undergone by reason of
                an accident. In truth, I think it would be very
                arguable to say that a person would be entitled
                to no damages for such things. What manly mind
                cares about pain and suffering that is past? But
                nevertheless the law recognises that as a topic
                upon which damages may be given.”
          10. The following observations of Lord Morris in his speech
          in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard [H. West & Son Ltd. v.
          Shephard, 1964 AC 326 : (1963) 2 WLR 1359 (HL)], are
          very pertinent : (AC p. 346)
                “… Money may be awarded so that something
                tangible may be procured to replace something
                else of the like nature which has been destroyed
                or lost. But money cannot renew a physical
                frame that has been battered and shattered. All
                that Judges and courts can do is to award sums
                which must be regarded as giving reasonable
                compensation. In the process there must be
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            the endeavour to secure some uniformity in
            the general method of approach. By common
            assent awards must be reasonable and must
            be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it
            is eminently desirable that so far as possible
            comparable injuries should be compensated by
            comparable awards.”
       In the same case, Lord Devlin observed (at p. 357) that
       the proper approach to the problem was to adopt a test
       as to what contemporary society would deem to be a fair
       sum, such as would allow the wrongdoer to “hold up his
       head among his neighbours and say with their approval
       that he has done the fair thing?”, which should be kept in
       mind by the court in determining compensation in personal
       injury cases.
       11. Lord Denning while speaking for the Court of Appeal in
       Ward v. James [Ward v. James (1966) 1 QB 273 : (1965)
       2 WLR 455 : (1965) 1 All ER 563 (CA)], laid down the
       following three basic principles to be followed in such like
       cases : (QB pp. 299-300)
            “First, assessibility : In cases of grave injury,
            where the body is wrecked or the brain destroyed,
            it is very difficult to assess a fair compensation in
            money, so difficult that the award must basically
            be a conventional figure, derived from experience
            or from awards in comparable cases. Secondly,
            uniformity : There should be some measure of
            uniformity in awards so that similar decisions are
            given in similar cases; otherwise there will be
            great dissatisfaction in the community, and much
            criticism of the administration of justice. Thirdly,
            predictability : Parties should be able to predict
            with some measure of accuracy the sum which
            is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for
            by this means cases can be settled peaceably
            and not brought to court, a thing very much to
            the public good.”
                                        (emphasis in original)
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      Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another


          12. The assessment of damages in personal injury cases
          raises great difficulties. It is not easy to convert the physical
          and mental loss into monetary terms. There has to be
          a measure of calculated guesswork and conjecture. An
          assessment, as best as can, in the circumstances, should
          be made.
          13. McGregor’s Treatise on Damages, 14th Edition, Para
          1157, referring to heads of damages in personal injury
          actions states:
                “The person physically injured may recover
                both for his pecuniary losses and his non-
                pecuniary losses. Of these the pecuniary losses
                themselves comprise two separate items viz.
                the loss of earnings and other gains which the
                plaintiff would have made had he not been
                injured and the medical and other expenses
                to which he is put as a result of the injury, and
                the courts have sub-divided the non-pecuniary
                losses into three categories viz. pain and
                suffering, loss of amenities of life and loss of
                expectation of life.”
          14. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala
          Devi [Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi
          (1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996 : 1980 ACJ 55],
          this Court held : (SCC p. 366, para 2)
                “2. … the determination of the quantum must
                be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life
                and limb in a free country in generous scales.”
          15. In R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd.
          [R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. (1995) 1
          SCC 551 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 250], dealing with the different
          heads of compensation in injury cases this Court held
          thus : (SCC p. 556, para 9)
                “9. Broadly speaking while fixing the amount of
                compensation payable to a victim of an accident,
                the damages have to be assessed separately
                as pecuniary damages and special damages.
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            Pecuniary damages are those which the victim
            has actually incurred and which are capable of
            being calculated in terms of money; whereas
            non-pecuniary damages are those which are
            incapable of being assessed by arithmetical
            calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts
            pecuniary damages may include expenses
            incurred by the claimant : (i) medical attendance;
            (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of
            trial; (iii) other material loss. So far as non-
            pecuniary damages are concerned, they may
            include : (i) damages for mental and physical
            shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or
            likely to be suffered in the future; (ii) damages
            to compensate for the loss of amenities of life
            which may include a variety of matters i.e.
            on account of injury the claimant may not be
            able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for loss
            of expectation of life i.e. on account of injury
            the normal longevity of the person concerned
            is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship,
            discomfort, disappointment, frustration and
            mental stress in life.”
       16. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar
       (2011) 1 SCC 343 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 164 : (2011) 1
       SCC (Cri) 1161], this Court laid down the heads under
       which compensation is to be awarded for personal injuries :
       (SCC p. 348, para 6)
            “6. The heads under which compensation
            is awarded in personal injury cases are the
            following:
            Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
            (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation,
            medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and
            miscellaneous expenditure.
            (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which
            the injured would have made had he not been
            injured, comprising:
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                               971

      Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another


                (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
                (b) Loss of future earnings on account of
                permanent disability.
                (iii) Future medical expenses.
                Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)
                (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as
                a consequence of the injuries.
                (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects
                of marriage).
                (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of
                normal longevity).
          In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be
          awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in
          serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical
          evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that
          compensation will be granted under any of the heads
          (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on
          account of permanent disability, future medical expenses,
          loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage)
          and loss of expectation of life.”
          17. In K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
          [K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2012) 12
          SCC 274 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 279 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri)
          638], this Court held as follows : (SCC p. 276, para 2)
                “2. … There cannot be actual compensation for
                anguish of the heart or for mental tribulations.
                The quintessentiality lies in the pragmatic
                computation of the loss sustained which has
                to be in the realm of realistic approximation.
                Therefore, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles
                Act, 1988 (for brevity “the Act”) stipulates that
                there should be grant of “just compensation”.
                Thus, it becomes a challenge for a court of law
                to determine “just compensation” which is neither
                a bonanza nor a windfall, and simultaneously,
                should not be a pittance.””
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19. This Court, in the said case, thereafter, formulated various heads
    such as loss of earnings, expenses related to treatment, attendant
    charges, pain and suffering and loss of amenities, loss of marriage
    prospects, future medical treatment. Ultimately, this Court enhanced
    the compensation awarded by the High Court from Rs. 25,78,501/-
    to Rs.62,27,000/-.
20. In another case titled Master Ayush (supra), this Court was called
    upon to adjudicate on an appeal filed by a 5-year-old victim of a
    road accident seeking enhancement of compensation awarded by
    the Tribunal.
21. In the said case, Ayush was left as a paraplegic patient as a result
    of the accident. He was examined by two doctors. He was not able
    to move both his legs and had complete sensory loss in the legs,
    urinary incontinence, bowel constipation and bed sore. Ayush was
    aged about 5 years on the date of the accident, hence, he lost his
    childhood and became dependant on other(s) for his routine work.
22. This Court, in the said case, relying on the decision of Kajal (supra)
    enhanced the compensation under the head of loss of future earnings
    due to permanent disability for life, medical expenses, future medical
    expenses, pain and suffering and loss of amenities, loss of marriage
    prospects, attendant charges and conveyance charges. This Court
    enhanced the compensation awarded to the appellant therein from
    Rs.13,46,805/- to Rs.49,93,000/-.
23. Recently, this Court in the case of K.S. Muralidhar (supra) on an
    elaborate consideration of certain authorities (scholarly as also
    judicial) on the aspect of “pain and suffering” set out the contours.
    It would be relevant to refer to the following paragraphs of the
    said case:
          “14. In respect of ‘pain and suffering’ in cases where
          disability suffered is at 100%, we may notice a few decisions
          of this Court:—
          14.1 In R.D Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. It
          was observed:
               “17. The claim under Sl. No. 16 for ‘pain and
               suffering’ and for loss of amenities of life under
               Sl. No. 17, are claims for non-pecuniary loss.
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                      973

      Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another


                The appellant has claimed lump sum amount
                of Rs. 3,00,000 each under the two heads. The
                High Court has allowed Rs. 1,00,000 against the
                claims of Rs. 6,00,000. When compensation is
                to be awarded for ‘pain and suffering’ and loss
                of amenity of life, the special circumstances
                of the claimant have to be taken into account
                including his age, the unusual deprivation he
                has suffered, the effect thereof on his future life.
                The amount of compensation for non-pecuniary
                loss is not easy to determine but the award
                must reflect that different circumstances have
                been taken into consideration. According to us,
                as the appellant was an advocate having good
                practice in different courts and as because of
                the accident he has been crippled and can move
                only on wheelchair, the High Court should have
                allowed an amount of Rs. 1,50,000 in respect of
                claim for ‘pain and suffering’ and Rs. 1,50,000
                in respect of loss of amenities of life. We direct
                payment of Rs. 3,00,000 (Rupees three lakhs
                only) against the claim of Rs. 6,00,000 under
                the heads “‘pain and suffering’” and “Loss of
                amenities of life”.
                                                        (Emphasis Supplied)

          14.2 This Judgment was recently referred to by this
          Court in Sidram v. United India Insurance Company
          Ltd. reference was also made to Karnataka SRTC v.
          Mahadeva Shetty (irrespective of the percentage of
          disability incurred, the observations are instructive),
          wherein it was observed:
                “18. A person not only suffers injuries on account
                of accident but also suffers in mind and body
                on account of the accident through out his life
                and a feeling is developed that his no more a
                normal man and cannot enjoy the amenities
                of life as another normal person can. While
974                                                       [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


               fixing compensation for pain and suffering as
               also for loss of amenities, features like his age,
               marital status and unusual deprivation he has
               undertaken in his life have to be reckoned.”
          14.3 In Kajal v. Jagdish Chand considering the facts of
          the case, i.e., 100% disability, child being bedridden for
          life, her mental age being that of a nine-month-old for
          life - a vegetative existence, held that “even after taking
          a conservative view of the matter an amount payable for
          the ‘pain and suffering’ of this child should be at least Rs.
          15,00,000/-.”
          14.4 In Ayush v. Reliance General Insurance relying on
          Kajal (supra) the amount awarded in ‘pain and suffering’
          was enhanced to Rs. 10,00,000. The child who had suffered
          the accident was five years old and the Court noted in
          paragraph 2 that:
               “As per the discharge certificate, the appellant
               is not able to move both his legs and had
               complete sensory loss in the legs, urinary
               incontinence, bowel constipation and bed
               sores. The appellant was aged about 5 years
               as on the date of the accident, hence has lost
               his childhood and is dependent on others for
               his routine work.”
          14.5 In Lalan (supra) cited by the claimant-appellant, the
          Tribunal awarded Rs. 30,000/- which was enhanced to
          Rs. 40,000/- by the High Court. Considering the fact that
          the appellant therein has suffered extensive brain injury
          awarded compensation under ‘pain and suffering’ to the
          tune of Rs. 3,00,000/-.”
24. Ultimately, this Court in the said case, in light of the authorities
    cited, the injuries suffered, the pain and suffering caused, and the
    lifelong nature of the disability afflicted upon the appellant therein
    (a workman who sustained multiple brain injuries which resulted in
    90% permanent disability) enhanced the compensation awarded
    under the head of pain and suffering to Rs. 15,00,000/-.
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                      975

       Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another


25. In the present case, therefore, we will have to consider the case of
    the appellant under various heads.

     a)     Loss of income/earning capacity
26. In this respect, it will be appropriate to refer to the evidence of Dr.
    Monica Juneja (PW-3). The Doctor proved the disability certificate.
    As per the said certificate, the appellant has suffered 75% disability.
    The appellant is suffering from moderate mental retardation. It was
    stated by the Doctor that the appellant would only be able to learn
    skills up-to the level of a child of 2nd Standard/Class. The appellant
    also has severe apathy and no control over passage of her urine.
27. Even though Dr. Monica Juneja (PW-3) on assessment of the
    appellant opined that the disability suffered by the appellant is 75%,
    however, on a complete overview of the situation, it is clear that
    for all practical purposes, the disability of the appellant should be
    treated to be 100%.
28. The learned Tribunal on appreciation of the medical evidence came
    to a conclusion that, since the appellant was only seven years at
    the time of the accident, it would be appropriate to take notional
    income as per the MV Act to be Rs. 15,000/- per annum. The learned
    Tribunal applied a multiplier of 15 which was taken up-to the age
    of fifteen years. Therefore, an amount of 15,000/- x 15 x 75/100 =
    Rs. 1,68,750/- was awarded by the learned Tribunal. The High Court
    did not enhance the amount awarded under this head.
29. This Court in the case of Kajal (supra) has held that taking notional
    income is not the correct approach. Instead, the minimum wages
    payable to a skilled workman in the concerned State has to be
    taken into consideration because, that would be the minimum
    amount which she would have earned on becoming a major. In
    this case, the minimum wage payable to a skilled workman in the
    State of Delhi at the time of the accident, i.e., 2nd June 2009, was
    Rs. 4,358/- per month.
30. Further, a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of National
    Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others4 in
    paragraph 59 recorded its conclusion as follows:


4   2017 INSC 1068 : [2017] 13 SCR 100 : (2017) 16 SCC 680
976                                                   [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                     Supreme Court Reports


       “59. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record
       our conclusions:
       59.1. The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi
       v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012)
       3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC
       (L&S) 167] should have been well advised to refer the
       matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view
       than what has been stated in Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v.
       DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009)
       2 SCC (Cri) 1002], a judgment by a coordinate Bench.
       It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength
       cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by
       another coordinate Bench.
       59.2. As Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh (2013) 9 SCC 54 :
       (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014)
       1 SCC (L&S) 149] has not taken note of the decision in
       Reshma Kumari [Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan (2013)
       9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri)
       826], which was delivered at earlier point of time, the
       decision in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh (2013) 9 SCC
       54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 :
       (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] is not a binding precedent.
       59.3. While determining the income, an addition of 50%
       of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards
       future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent
       job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made.
       The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased
       was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was
       between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should
       be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary
       less tax.
       59.4. In case the deceased was self-employed or on
       a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established
       income should be the warrant where the deceased
       was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25%
       where the deceased was between the age of 40 to
       50 years and 10% where the deceased was between
       the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                   977

      Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another


          necessary method of computation. The established
          income means the income minus the tax component.
          59.5. For determination of the multiplicand, the
          deduction for personal and living expenses, the
          tribunals and the courts shall be guided by paras
          30 to 32 of Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009)
          6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC
          (Cri) 1002] which we have reproduced hereinbefore.
          59.6. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated
          in the Table in Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009)
          6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC
          (Cri) 1002] read with para 42 of that judgment.
          59.7. The age of the deceased should be the basis for
          applying the multiplier.
          59.8. Reasonable figures on conventional heads,
          namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral
          expenses should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000
          respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced
          at the rate of 10% in every three years.”
                                              (emphasis supplied)

31. Accordingly, to arrive at the compensation to be awarded under the
    head of loss of income and earnings due to disability, 40% should
    be added for future prospects and a multiplier of 18 would have to
    be applied in view of the age of the appellant.
32. The same approach was adopted by this Court in the cases of Kajal
    (supra) and Master Ayush (supra).
33. Therefore, in the present case, the compensation under this head
    would be Rs. [4,358 + (40% of 4,358)] x 12 x 18 = Rs.13,17,859/-
    and rounded it off to Rs. 13,18,000/-.

     b)   Pain and Suffering
34. As has been referred to hereinabove, this Court recently in the
    case of K.S. Muralidhar (supra) relying inter-alia upon the previous
978                                                         [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       decisions of this Court in the cases of Kajal (supra) and Master
       Ayush (supra) awarded a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- under the head
       of pain and suffering to the appellant therein.
35. In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer to paragraphs 26
    and 27 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Kajal (supra),
    which read thus:
           “Pain, suffering and loss of amenities
           26. Coming to the non-pecuniary damages under the head
           of pain, suffering, loss of amenities, the High Court has
           awarded this girl only Rs 3,00,000. In Mallikarjun v. National
           Insurance Co. Ltd. [Mallikarjun v. National Insurance Co.
           Ltd. (2014) 14 SCC 396 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2015)
           1 SCC (Cri) 372 : (2013) 10 Scale 668], this Court while
           dealing with the issue of award under this head held that
           it should be at least Rs 6,00,000, if the disability is more
           than 90%. As far as the present case is concerned, in
           addition to the 100% physical disability, the young girl is
           suffering from severe incontinence, she is suffering from
           severe hysteria and above all she is left with a brain of
           a nine-month-old child. This is a case where departure
           has to be made from the normal rule and the pain and
           suffering suffered by this child is such that no amount of
           compensation can compensate.
           27. One factor which must be kept in mind while
           assessing the compensation in a case like the present
           one is that the claim can be awarded only once. The
           claimant cannot come back to court for enhancement
           of award at a later stage praying that something extra
           has been spent. Therefore, the courts or the Tribunals
           assessing the compensation in a case of 100%
           disability, especially where there is mental disability
           also, should take a liberal view of the matter when
           awarding the compensation. While awarding this amount,
           we are not only taking the physical disability but also the
           mental disability and various other factors. This child will
           remain bedridden for life. Her mental age will be that of
           a nine-month-old child. Effectively, while her body grows,
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                          979

      Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another


          she will remain a small baby. We are dealing with a girl
          who will physically become a woman but will mentally
          remain a 9-month-old child. This girl will miss out playing
          with her friends. She cannot communicate; she cannot
          enjoy the pleasures of life; she cannot even be amused
          by watching cartoons or films; she will miss out the fun
          of childhood, the excitement of youth; the pleasures of a
          marital life; she cannot have children who she can love,
          let alone grandchildren. She will have no pleasure. Her’s
          is a vegetable existence. Therefore, we feel in the peculiar
          facts and circumstances of the case even after taking a
          very conservative view of the matter an amount payable
          for the pain and suffering of this child should be at least
          Rs 15,00,000.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)

36. This Court has observed that it has to be borne in mind that while
    assessing compensation in a case like the present one, the claim
    can be awarded only once. It was observed that the claimant cannot
    come back to the court for enhancement at a later stage praying
    that something extra has been spent. This Court further observed
    that courts or tribunals assessing compensation in a case of 100%
    disability, especially where there is mental disability also, should
    take a liberal view of the mater when awarding compensation. It
    was observed that while awarding this amount, courts are not only
    taking into account physical disability but also mental disability and
    various other factors.
37. Similarly, in the case of Master Ayush (supra), this Court in paragraph
    14 observed as under:
          “14. The determination of damages in personal injury
          cases is not easy. The mental and physical loss cannot
          be computed in terms of money but there is no other
          way to compensate the victim except by payment of
          just compensation. Therefore, we find that in view of the
          physical condition, the appellant is entitled to one attendant
          for the rest of his life though he may be able to walk with
          the help of assistant device. The device also requires to
          be replaced every 5 years. Therefore, it is reasonable to
980                                                          [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


            award cost of 2 devices i.e. Rs 10 lakhs. The appellant has
            not only lost his childhood but also adult life. Therefore,
            loss of marriage prospects would also be required to be
            awarded. The learned Tribunal has rejected the claim of
            taxi expenses for the reason that the taxi driver has not
            been produced. It is impossible to produce the numerous
            taxi drivers. Still further, the Tribunal should have realised
            the condition of the child who had complete sensory loss in
            the legs. Therefore, if the parents of the child have taken
            him in a taxi, probably that was the only option available
            to them. Accordingly, we award a sum of Rs 2 lakhs as
            conveyance charges.”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)

38. In the present case also, the appellant will remain dependant on
    another person for the rest of her life. Even though the physical age
    will increase, but her mental age will be that of a child studying in
    the 2nd Standard/Class. Effectively, while her body grows, she will
    remain a small baby.
39. Similar to the case of Kajal (supra), the appellant in the present case
    will also miss out on partaking in activities which she would have
    normally done, if she had not met with this unfortunate accident.
40. The High Court, vide impugned judgment and order, only enhanced
    the compensation under the head of pain and suffering from Rs.
    50,000/- as awarded by the learned Tribunal to Rs.1,00,000/-. The
    same is not commensurate to the impact the unfortunate accident
    had and will have on the appellant as well as her family members
    for the rest of their lives. In our view, the compensation should be
    enhanced further. Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of
    this case, we are of the considered view that it would be appropriate
    to award compensation to the tune of Rs. 15,00,000/- to the present
    appellant under the head of pain and suffering.

       c)   Loss of marriage prospects
41. In this respect, we reiterate the evidence given by the Dr. Monica
    Juneja (PW-3) vide the disability certificate wherein she has opined
    that the mental status of the appellant would be the same as that
    of a child studying in the 2nd Standard/Class. Further, it was stated
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                     981

      Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another


     that the appellant would also have severe apathy and therefore,
     maintaining/forming marital/familial bonds with the aforementioned
     conditions for the appellant is very difficult.
42. The appellant, therefore, has not only lost her childhood but also
    her adult life. Marriage/companionship is an integral part of the
    natural life of a human being. Although, in the present case the
    appellant is capable of reproduction, it is near impossible for her
    to rear children and enjoy the simple pleasures of marital life and
    companionship. However, the learned Tribunal in the present case
    did not award any compensation to the appellant under this head
    and the High Court, in appeal, without appreciating the impact of
    the non-pecuniary loss suffered by the appellant only awarded
    compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- for the loss of marriage prospects.
43. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this a fit case where the
    compensation awarded under the head of loss marriage prospects
    by the High Court is inadequate and the same must be enhanced
    to Rs. 5,00,000/-.

     d)   Attendant Charges
44. In the present case, the learned Tribunal recorded the evidence of
    the appellant’s mother (PW-2). She stated that they had engaged
    a maid servant to do the household work whom they were paying
    Rs. 2,500/- per month for a period of 6 months. Considering the
    same, the learned Tribunal awarded Rs. 2,500 x 6 = Rs. 15,000/-
    under the head of attendant charges.
45. In appeal, the High Court, in paragraph 3 of the impugned judgment
    and order, observed that owing to the condition to which the appellant
    has been reduced, she would require the services of an attendant,
    though part-time. Accordingly, the High Court adopted the minimum
    wages of an unskilled worker in the State of Delhi at the time of the
    accident being Rs. 3,934/-, for a part time attendant, and applied
    the multiplier of 18. Considering the same, the High Court computed
    attendant charges to be awarded as Rs. (3,934/- ÷ 2) x 12 x 18 =
    Rs. 4,24,872/- and rounded it off to Rs. 4,25,000/-.
46. We find that, the approach of the High Court on appreciation of
    the evidence that the appellant would only be requiring a part time
    attendant is erroneous. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that
    the appellant, would be dependent on an attendant throughout her
982                                                       [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       life and on a full-time basis. Considering her medical situation, the
       attendant would have to be skilled and not unskilled. The appellant
       would be requiring special care and attention which can only be
       provided by a skilled attendant. It was, therefore, incorrect on the
       part of the High Court to proceed on the basis that the appellant
       could be taken care of by an unskilled attendant and that too on a
       part-time basis.
47. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to paragraphs 22, 23 and
    24 of Kajal (supra), which read thus:
            “Attendant charges
            22. The attendant charges have been awarded by the
            High Court @ Rs 2500 per month for 44 years, which
            works out to Rs 13,20,000. Unfortunately, this system
            is not a proper system. Multiplier system is used to
            balance out various factors. When compensation is
            awarded in lump sum, various factors are taken into
            consideration. When compensation is paid in lump
            sum, this Court has always followed the multiplier
            system. The multiplier system should be followed not
            only for determining the compensation on account of
            loss of income but also for determining the attendant
            charges, etc. This system was recognised by this Court
            in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami
            [Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami,
            AIR 1962 SC 1] . The multiplier system factors in the
            inflation rate, the rate of interest payable on the lump
            sum award, the longevity of the claimant, and also other
            issues such as the uncertainties of life. Out of all the
            various alternative methods, the multiplier method has
            been recognised as the most realistic and reasonable
            method. It ensures better justice between the parties
            and thus results in award of “just compensation”
            within the meaning of the Act.
            23. It would be apposite at this stage to refer to the
            observation of Lord Reid in Taylor v. O’Connor [Taylor v.
            O’Connor, 1971 AC 115 : (1970) 2 WLR 472 (HL)] : (AC
            p. 128)
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                       983

      Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another


                “Damages to make good the loss of dependency
                over a period of years must be awarded as a
                lump sum and that sum is generally calculated
                by applying a multiplier to the amount of one
                year’s dependency. That is a perfectly good
                method in the ordinary case but it conceals the
                fact that there are two quite separate matters
                involved — the present value of the series of
                future payments, and the discounting of that
                present value to allow for the fact that for
                one reason or another the person receiving
                the damages might never have enjoyed the
                whole of the benefit of the dependency. It is
                quite unnecessary in the ordinary case to deal
                with these matters separately. Judges and
                counsel have a wealth of experience which
                is an adequate guide to the selection of the
                multiplier and any expert evidence is rightly
                discouraged. But in a case where the facts are
                special I think that these matters must have
                separate consideration if even rough justice is to
                be done and expert evidence may be valuable
                or even almost essential. The special factor in
                the present case is the incidence of income tax
                and, it may be, surtax.”
          24. This Court has reaffirmed the multiplier method
          in various cases like MCD v. Subhagwanti [MCD v.
          Subhagwanti, AIR 1966 SC 1750 : 1966 ACJ 57], U.P.
          SRTC v. Trilok Chandra [U.P. SRTC v. Trilok Chandra
          (1996) 4 SCC 362], Sandeep Khanuja v. Atul Dande
          [Sandeep Khanuja v. Atul Dande (2017) 3 SCC 351 :
          (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 276 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 178] . This
          Court has also recognised that Schedule II of the Act can
          be used as a guide for the multiplier to be applied in each
          case. Keeping the claimant’s age in mind, the multiplier
          in this case should be 18 as opposed to 44 taken by the
          High Court.”
                                                  [emphasis supplied]
984                                                         [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


48. Consistent with the approach adopted by this Court in the cases of
    Kajal (supra) and Master Ayush (supra), we deem it appropriate
    to enhance the compensation to be awarded under this head.
    The minimum wages paid to a skilled worker on a full-time basis
    in the State of Delhi at the time of the accident was Rs. 4,358/-.
    Keeping the appellant’s age in mind, the multiplier in the present
    case should be 18. Accordingly, the compensation to be awarded
    to the appellant under this head shall be enhanced to Rs. 4,358
    x 12 x 18 = Rs. 9,41,328/- and rounded it off to Rs.9,42,000/-.

       e)    Future Medical Treatment
49. As has been referred to hereinabove, the appellant would have to
    be under the supervision of a full-time skilled attendant. Further, Dr.
    Monica Juneja (PW-3) has opined that the appellant suffers from
    severe apathy and has no control over the passage of her urine.
    Therefore, it is not difficult to see that the appellant would be requiring
    medical assistance in the form of medicines, diapers, etc., so as to
    live a relatively comfortable life.
50. It was also opined by Dr. Monica Juneja (PW-3) that in all cases
    of mental retardation there is an increased risk of developing
    convulsions. The Doctor, however, in her testimony before the
    learned Tribunal had stated that at that time, the appellant was not
    suffering from the same yet. The possibility of the same, however,
    cannot be ruled out.
51. Faced with such a situation, the family of the appellant must be
    financially equipped to deal with the medical conditions, current
    and potential. It would, therefore, be appropriate to enhance the
    compensation to be awarded under this head to Rs.5,00,000/-.
52. For ease of understanding and compliance, the revised compensation
    awarded to the appellant is as follows:

        S. No.                    Head                       Amount (In ₹)
            1.     Medicines and Medical Treatment              32,000/-
            2.     Loss of Earning Capacity due to             13,18,000/-
                              Disability
            3.             Pain and Suffering                  15,00,000/-
[2024] 12 S.C.R.                                                            985

       Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon and Another



          4.                 Future Treatment                   5,00,000/-
          5.                Attendant Charges                   9,42,000/-
          6.             Loss of Amenities of Life              1,00,000/-
          7.              Loss of Future Prospect               1,00,000/-
          8.           Special Education Expenditure             75,000/-
          9.           Conveyance and Special Diet               20,000/-
         10.            Loss of Marriage Prospects              5,00,000/-
                                   Total                        50,87,000/-

53. The High Court, vide impugned judgment and order, has enhanced
    the rate of interest awarded by the trial court to 9% per annum from
    the date of the filing of the claim petition till the actual realisation. We
    do not find any error with the same and maintain the rate of interest.
54. We direct the Insurance Company (Respondent No. 2) to disburse
    the compensation awarded to the appellant as above. Obviously, the
    Insurance Company shall be entitled to adjust the amount already
    paid, if any.
55. Needless to state, as the learned Tribunal has held the driver-cum-
    owner (Respondent No.1) and the insurance company (Respondent
    No.2) to be jointly and severally liable to make the payment of
    compensation to the appellant, the inter-se liability of the two
    respondents herein shall be decided in accordance with law. However,
    the Insurance Company is directed to make good the compensation
    awarded to the appellant as per this order so that the appellant and
    her family members are not put to any further agony.
56. Lastly, we find it appropriate to refer to the order of this Court in
    the case of General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport
    Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and Others5,
    wherein it has been reiterated that the claims tribunal should, in the
    case of minors, invariably order the amount of compensation awarded
    to the minor be invested in long term Fixed Deposits at least till the
    date of the minor attaining majority. However, the expenses incurred
    by guardian or next friend may be allowed to be withdrawn.


5   (1994) 2 SCC 176
986                                                     [2024] 12 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


57. We are cognizant of the fact that the appellant has attained majority,
    however, since the appellant was a minor at the time of the accident,
    we direct that at present an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- should be
    disbursed to the father of the appellant as her guardian. If, however,
    an amount more than Rs. 10,00,000/- has already been disbursed,
    the said amount shall not be adjusted. We further direct that the rest
    of the amount be invested in one or more Fixed Deposits Receipts so
    as to attract the maximum rate of interest. The interest amount shall
    be payable to the guardian of the appellant every month. Further, it
    shall be open to the guardian to seek orders from the Tribunal for
    withdrawal of the amount on the basis of medical opinion, if any
    major medical expenses are required to be incurred.
58. In the result, the impugned judgment and order dated 7th November
    2017 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in MAC. APP.
    1107/2011 is quashed and set aside. The appeal stands allowed in
    the above terms. Needless to state, that the Insurance Company
    (Respondent No. 2) shall comply with this order within a period of
    eight weeks from today.
59. We place on record our appreciation for the learned counsel appearing
    on behalf of the parties for their valuable assistance.
60. Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey