Holding

Contempt petitions filed without the Advocate‑General’s written consent are not maintainable; the Duda directions apply only to suo motu actions, and therefore the High Court’s conviction was set aside.

Summary

Bal Thackrey was convicted by the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) for criminal contempt under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, based on two petitions filed by respondents alleging that his public speech scandalised the court. The petitions were filed without obtaining the mandatory written consent of the Advocate‑General, a requirement under Section 15. On appeal, the appellant contended that the High Court had failed to follow the directions in P.N. Duda’s case, which required that information leading to suo motu contempt action be placed before the Chief Justice. The Supreme Court held that the petitions were private, not suo motu, and that the Duda directions apply only to suo motu proceedings; consequently, the lack of Advocate‑General’s consent rendered the petitions non‑maintainable. The conviction was set aside, the fine refunded, and the appeals were allowed. The Court also directed High Courts to frame appropriate rules or practice directions in line with Duda’s case.

Issues considered

The nature of the contempt proceedings: whether they were initiated suo motu by the High Court or by private petitions.
Whether the mandatory requirement of obtaining the Advocate‑General’s written consent under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, applies to private contempt petitions.
The applicability of the directions issued in P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker (1988) to the present proceedings.
The validity of the High Court’s conviction of the appellant in view of non‑compliance with Section 15.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 129, s. Article 215
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 14, s. 15, s. 2(c)

Subjects

contempt of courtSection 15Advocate General consentsuo motu jurisdictionprocedural safeguardsHigh CourtSupreme Courtcriminal contemptDuda directionsrule framing

Judgment

BAL THACKREY A
v.
HARISH PIMPALKHUTE AND ANR.

NOVEMBER 29, 2004
B
[Y.K. SABHARWAL, D.M. DHARMADHIKARI
AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.]

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Section 15-Criminal Cohtempt-
Petition by a party-Without cons~nt of Advocate-General-Accused held
guilty of contempt by High Court-On appeal plea that directions of this C
Court in P.N. Duda's case* not followed hence exercise of contempt
jurisdiction by High Court was beyond legal sanctity-Doubting correctness
o/Duda's case matter referred to larger Bench for reconsideration-Held:
Present case is a proceeding initiated by a party and not suo-motu action
taken by Court-In absence of mandatory requirement of taking consent of D
Advocate-General petitions not maintainable-Since directions in Duda's
case applicable only to suo motu cases, in the present case non-compliance
of directions therein is of no consequence-The directions in the case have
no effect ofcurtailing or denuding the power ofHigh Court, hence are legal
and valid-Direction to High Courts to frame Rule and/or practice directions
on the line suggested in Duda's case. E

Respondents filed two contempt petitions in High Court against the
appellant u/s 15 of Contempt of Court Act, 1971 for having committed
contempt of Court as postulated u/s 2(c) of the Act in a public speech.
In one of the petitions consent of Advocate General was not sought at F
ail. In another petition application was made to the Advocate General
seeking permission to file the petition and stating therein that if no
answer is receive<f from Advocate-General it would be presumed that
permission had been granted. The petitions were filed without obtaining
the consent. High Court held the appellant guilty of contempt.
G
In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that directions given
in P.N. Duda 's case* were not followed by High Court inasmuch as the
informative papers styled as contempt petitions were not placed before
the Chief Justice of the High Court for suo motu action and therefore
the exercise was uncalled for and beyond legal sanctity. Division Bench H
477
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A of this Court opined that directions approved in P.N. Duda 's case were
of far reaching consequences as the power under Section 15 of the Act
to punish contemnors for contempt rests with the Court and in Duda 's
case, they seem to have been denuded to rest with Chief Justice on the
administrative side. Doubting the correctness of the observations in
B Duda 's case, and for reconsideration of the same, the appeal were
referred to large Bench.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The direction of Duda's case when seen and appreciated
~ in the light of object and nature of the power of the Court in contempt
jurisdiction and the powers of the Chief Justice, it would be clear that
the same prescribe the procedure to be followed by High Courts to
ensure smooth working and streamlining of such contempt actions which
are intended to be taken up by the Court suo motu on its own motion.
D These directions have not effect of curtailing or denuding the power of
the High Court. It is also to be borne in mind that the frequent use of
suo motu power on the basis of information furnished in a contempt
petition otherwise incompetent under Section 15 of the Act may render
the procedural safeguards of Advocate-General's consent nugatory.
The directions givt!n in Duda 's case are legal and valid. [486-C, D, Ej
E
*P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker and Ors., [1988) 3 SCC 167, affirmed.

Commissioner, Agra v. Rohtas Singh, [1988) 1 SCC 349; Superme
Court Bar Association v. Union of India and Anr., (1998) 4 SCC 409;
F Pritam Pal v. High Court ofMadhya Pradesh, Jaba/pur Through Registrar,
[1993) Supp. 1 SCC 529; Dr. L.P. Misra v. State of U.P., [1998) 7 SCC
379; S.K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow v. Vinay
Chandra Misra, [1981] 1 SCC 436 and J.R. Parashar, Advocate and Ors.
v. Prashant Bhushan, Advocate and Ors., [2004) 6 SCC 735, relied on.

G 2.1. The requirement of obtaining consent in writing of the Advocate-
General for making motion by any person is mandatory. A motion
under Section 15 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 not in conformity
with the requirements of that Section is not maintainable. [487-B)

State of Kera/a v. MS. Mani and Ors., [2001) 8 SCC 82, referred to.
H
BAL THACKREY v. HARISH PIMPALKHUTE 479

2.2. The procedure of Section 15 is required to be followed ev~n A
when petition is filed by a party under Article 215 of the Constitutioli,
though in these matters petitions filed were under Section 15 of the Act.
From the material on record, it is not possible to accept that the Court
had taken suo motu action. Of course, the Court had the power and
jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings suo motu and for that B
purpose consent of the Advocate-General was not necessary. At the
same time it is also to be borne in mind that the Courts normally take
suo motu action in rare cases. In the present case, it is evident that the
proceedings before the High Court were initiated by the respondents by
filing contempt petitions under Section 15. The petitions were vigorously
pursued and strenuously argued as private petitions. The same were C
never treated as suo motu petitions. In absence of compliance of
mandatory requirement of Section 15, the petitions were not
maintainable. (488-B, C, DJ

2.3. The direction issued and procedure laid down in Duda 's case is
applicable only to cases that are initiated suo motu by the Court when
D
some information is placed before it for suo motu action for contempt of
court. Hence, examination of the effect of non-compliance of the directions
issued in Duda 's case by placing the informative papers before the Chief
Justice of the High Court, is not required. (484-G; 488-E)
E
[The Court directed framing of necessary rule or practice direction
by the High Courts in terms of Duda's case.)

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
149-150 of 1997.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.2.97 of the Bombay High Court
at Nagpur Bench in C.P. Nos. 12 and 13 of 1996.

WITH

Cr!. A. Nos. 168 and 169 of 1997. G

Sunil V. Manohar, Sandeep Parekh, P.H. Parekh, Ms. Sweety
Manchanda and Ms. Shireen S.P. Singh for the Appellant.

Manish Pitale and A.K. Sanghi for the Respondent No. 1. H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A D.N. Goburdhan for the Respondent No. 2.

S.S. Shinde and Ravindra K. A. Adsure, Advocate General for State
of Maharashtra.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
Y.K. SABHARWAL, J. : Action for contempt is divisible into two
categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted
otherwise than on the court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each
case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu
C proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice,
in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application.
[Pal/av Sheth v. Custodian and Others, [lOOI] 7 SCC 549].

The main issue for determination in these appeals is whether contempt
proceedings were initiated against the appellant suo motu by the court or
D by respondents. First we may note the background under which these
matters were referred to a larger Bench.

Delhi High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Gupta v. K.Suba Rao &
Anr., ILR (1974) I Del. I issued following directions :

"The office is to take note that in future if any information is lodged
E
even in the form of a petition inviting this Court to take action under
the Contempt of Courts Act or Article 215 of the Constitution,
where the informant is not one of the persons named in Section 15
of the said Act, it should not be styled as a petition and should not
be placed for admission on the judicial side. Such a petition should
F be placed before the Chief Justice for orders in Chambers and the
Chief Justice may decide either by himself or in consultation with
the other judges of the Court whether to take any cognizance of the
information."

In P.N Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker & Ors., [1988] 3 SCC 167 this Court
G approving the aforesaid observation of Delhi High Court directed as under:

" ... the direction given by the Delhi High Court sets out the proper
procedure in such cases and may be adopted, at least in future, as
a practice direction or as a rule, by this Court and other High
Courts."
H
BAL THACKREYv. HARISH PIMPALKHUTE [SABHARWAL, J.] 481

Challenging the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section A
15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short 'the Act') it was, inter
a/ia, contended that the directions in P.N. Duda's case (supra) were not
followed by the High Court inasmuch as the informative papers styled as
contempt petitions were not placed before the Chief Justice of the High
Court for suo motu action and, therefore, the exercise was uncalled for and B
beyond legal sanctity. This aspect assumed significant importance because
admittedly the contempt petitions were filed in the High Court without the
consent of the Advocate-General and, therefore, not competent except when
the court finds that the contempt action was taken by the court on its own
motion. The two-judge bench hearing the appeals expressed the view that
the aforesaid directions approved by this Court in P.N.buda's case are of C
far-reaching consequences. The Bench observed that the power under
Section 15 of the Act to punish contemners for contempt rests with the court
and in Duda 's case, they seem to have been denuded to rest with the Chief
Justice on the administrative side. Expressing doubts about the correctness
of the observations made in Duda's case, and observing that the same D
require reconsideration, these appeals were directed to be referred for decision
by a larger Bench. Under this background, these matters have been placed
before us. . ~}

For determination of the main issue in these appeals including the
aforesaid aspect arising out of Duda 's case, it is necessary to briefly note E
the object of the power of the Court to punish a person for contempt.

Every High Court besides powers under the Act has also the power to
punish for contempt as provided in Article 215 of the Constitution oflndia.
Repealing the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, the Act was enacted, inter alia, 'F
providing definition of civil and criminal contempt and also providing for
filtering of criminal contempt petitions. The Act lays down 'contempt of
court' to mean civil contempt or criminal contempt. We are concerned with
criminal contempt. 'Criminal contempt' is defined in Section 2(c) of the Act.
It, inter a/ia, means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written,
or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the G

- doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalizes or tends to scandalize,
or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court. The procedure for
initiating a proceeding of contempt when it is committed in the face of the
Supreme Court or High Court has been prescribed in Section 14 of the Act.
In the case of criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in Section H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A 14 the manner of taking cognizance has been provided for in Section 15 of
the Act. This section, inter alia, provides that action for contempt may be
taken on court's own motion or on a motion made by-

(a) the Advocate-General, or
B
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate-
General.

The contempt jurisdiction enables the Court to ensure proper
administration of justice and maintenance of the rule of law. It is meant
C to ensure that the courts are able to discharge their functions properly,
unhampered and unsullied by wanton attacks on the system of administration
of justice or on officials who administer it, and to prevent willful defiance
of orders of the court or undertakings given to the court (Commissioner,
Agra v. Rohtas Singh, (1998] 1 SCC 349].
D
In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union ~of India & Anr., (1998]
4 SCC 409 it was held that "The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to
uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law. It is an unusual type
of jurisdiction combining "the jury, the judge and the hangman" and it is
so because the court is not adjudicating upon any claim between litigating
E parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an individual
judge but to protect the administration of justice from being maligned. In
the general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of
courts should not be imperiled and there should be no unjustifiable interference
in the administration of justice."
F
Dealing with the nature and character of the power of the courts to deal
with contempt in the case of Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
Jabalpur Through Registrar, [1993] Supp. l SCC 529, this Court observed:

"15. Prior to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it was held that
G ·the High Court has inherent power to deal with a contempt of itself
summarily and to adopt its own procedure, provided that it gives
a fair and reasonable opportunity to the contemn or to defend himself.
But the procedure has now been prescribed by Section 15 of the
Act in exercise of the powers conferred by Entry 14, List III of the
H Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Though the contempt
BAL THACKREYv. HARISH PIMPALKHUTE [SABHARWAL, J.] 483

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court can be A
regulated by legislation by appropriate legislature under Entry 77
of List I and Entry 14 of List III in exercise of which the Parliament
has enacted the Act of 1971, the contempt jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and the High Court is given a constitutional
foundation by declaring to be 'Courts of Record' under Articles B
129 and 215 of the Constitution and, therefore, the inherent power
of the Supreme Court and the High Court cannot be taken away by
any legislation short of constitutional amendment. In fact, Section
22 of the Act lays down that the provisions of this Act shall be in
addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law
relating to contempt of courts. It necessarily follows that the C
constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court
under Articles 129 and 215 cannot be curtailed by anything in the
Act of 1971"

The nature and power of the Court in contempt jurisdiction is a relevant D
factor for determining the correctness of observations made in Duda 's case
(supra). Dealing with the requirement to follow the procedure prescribed
by law while exercising powers under Article 215 of the Constitution to
punish for contempt, it was held by this Court in Dr. L.P. Misra v. State
of U.P., [1998] 7 SCC 379 that the High Court can invoke powers and
jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of India but E
such a jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 215 of the
Constitution is also governed by laws and the rules subject to the limitation
that if such laws/rules stultify or abrogate the constitutional power then such
laws/rules would not be valid. In L.P. Misra 's case (supra) it was observed F
that the procedure prescribed by the Rules has to be followed even in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 21.5 of the Constitution. To the same
effect are the observations in Pal/av Sheth 's case (supra).

For determination of the issues involved, it would also be useful to note
the observations made in the case of S. K. Sarkar, Member, Board ofRevenue, G
U.P., Lucknowv. Vinay Chandra Misra, [1981] 1 SCC 436 to the following
effect:

"Section 15 does not specify the basis or the source of information
on w~ich the High Court can act on its own motion. If the High H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
;-
·A Court acts on information derived from its own sources, such as
from a perusal of the records of a subordinate court or on reading
a report in a newspaper or hearing a public speech, without there
being any reference from the subordinate court or the Advocate
General, it can be said to have taken cognizance on its own motion.
B But if the High Court is directly moved by a petition by a private
person feeling aggrieved, not being the Advocate General, can the
High Court refuse to entertain the same on the ground that it has
been made without the consent in writing of the Advocate General?
It appears to us that the High Court, has, in such a situation, a
discretion to refuse to entertain the petition, or to take cognizance
c on its own motion on the basis of the information supplied to it in
that petition."

In P.N. Duda's case (supra), it was held that :-

D "54. A conjoint perusal of the Act and rules makes it clear that, so
far as this Court is concerned, action for contempt may be taken
by the court on its own motion or on the motion of the Attorney
General (or Solicitor General) or of any other person with his
consent in writing. There is no difficulty where the Court or the
Attorney General chooses to move in the matter. But when this is
E not done and a private person desires that such action should be
taken, one of three courses is open to him. He may place the
information in his possession before the court and request the court
to take action (vide C. K. Daphtary v. 0. P. Gupta and Sarkar v.
j
Misra); he may place the information before the Attorney General
F and request him to take action; or he may place the information
before the Attorney General and request him to permit him to move
to the court."

The direction issued and procedure laid down in Duda 's case is
applicable only to cases that are initiated suo motu by the Court when some
G information is placed before it for suo motu action for contempt of court.
~

A useful reference can also be made to some observations made in JR.
Parashar, Advocate, and Others v. Prasant Bhushan, Advocate and Others,
(2001] 6 SCC 735. In that case noticing the Rule 3 of the Rules to regulate
proceedings for contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975 which like Section
..•.
H 11.-
BAL THACKREY v. HARISH PIMPALKHUTE [SABHARWAL, J.] 485

15 of the Act provides that the Court may take action in cases of criminal A
contempt either (a) suo motu; or (b) on a petition made by Attorney-General
or Solicitor-General, or ( c) on a petition made by any person and in the case
of a criminal contempt with consent in writing of the Attorney-General or
the Solicitor-General as also Rule 5 which provides that only petitions under
Rules 3(b) and ( c) shall be posted before the Court for preliminary hearing B
and for orders as to issue of notice, it was observed that the matter could
have been listed before the Court by the Registry as a petition for admission
only if the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General had granted the consent.
In that case, it was noticed that the Attorney-General had specifically
declined to deal with the matter and no request had been made to the
Solicitor-General to give his consent. The inference, therefore, is that the C
Registry should not have posted the said petition before the Court for
preliminary hearing. Dealing with taking of suo motu cognizance in para
2S it was observed as under:-

"Of course, this Court could have taken suo motu cognizance had D
the petitioners prayed for it. They had not. Even if they had, it
is doubtful whether the Court would have acted on the statements
of the petitioners had the petitioners been candid enough to have
disclosed that the police had refused to take cognizance of their
complaint. In any event the power to act suo motu in matters which
otherwise require the Attorney-General to initiate proceedings or E
at least give his consent must be exercised rarely. Courts normally
reserve this exercise to cases where it either derives information
from its own sources, such as from a perusal of the records, or on
reading a report in a newspaper or hearing a public speech or a
documen't which would speak for itself. Otherwise sub-section (1) F
of Section 15 might be rendered otiose."

The whole object of prescribing procedural mode of taking cognizance
in Section 15 is to safeguard the valuable time of the court from being
wasted by frivolous contempt petition. In J.R. Parashar 's case (supra) it
was observed that underlying rational of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section G
15 appears to be that when the court is not itself directly aware of the
contumacious conduct, and the actions are alleged to have taken place
outside its precincts, it is necessary to have the allegations screened by the
prescribed authorities so that Court is not troubled with the frivolous matters.
To the similar effect is the decision in S.R. Sarkar's case (supra). H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A In the light of the aforesaid, the procedure !aid and directions issued
in Duda 's case are required to be appreciated also keeping in view the
additional factor of the Chief Justice being the master of the roster. In State
of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand and Others, [1998] l SCC l it was held
that it is the prerogative of the Chief Justice of the High Court to distribute
B business of the High Court both judicial and administrative. He alone has
the right and power to decide how the Benches of the High Court are to be
constituted; which Judge is to sit alone and which cases he can and is
required to hear as also to which Judges shall constitute a Division Bench
and what work those Benches shall do.

C The directions in Duda 's case when seen and appreciated in the light
of what we have noticed hereinbefore in respect of contempt action and the
powers of the Chief Justice, it would be clear that the same prescribe the
procedure to be followed by High Courts to ensure smooth working and
streamlining of such contempt actions which are intended to be taken up by
D the court suo motu on its own motion. These directions have no effect of
curtailing or denuding the power of the High Court. It is also to be borne .
.in mind that the frequent use of suo motu power on the basis of information
furnished in a contempt petition otherwise incompetent under Section 15 of
the Act may render the procedural safeguards of Advocate-General's consent
nugatory. We are of the view that the directions given in Duda 's case are
E legal and valid.

Now, the question is whether in these matters the High Court initiated
contempt action on its own motion or on motions made by the respondents.
It is not in dispute that the two contempt petitions (Contempt Petition No.12
F and Contempt Petition No.13 of 1996) were filed in the High Court against
the appellant under Section 15 of the Act for having committed contempt
of' court as postulated under Section 2(c) of the Act for having made a public
speech. According to the petitions, the appellant scandalised the court or
at least the offendiQg speech had the tendency to scandalise or lower the
authority of the Court. The contempt petitions were filed without obtaining
G the consent of the Advocate-General. In one of the petitions consent had
not even been sought for and besides the prayer for holding the appellant
guilty of contempt, further prayers were also made for suitable inquiry being
made in the allegations made by the appellant in the speech and for issue
of directions to him to appear before Court and reveal the truth and for
H .prosecuting him. The applicant before the High Court, it seems clear from
BAL THACKREYv. HARISH PIMPALKHUTE [SABHARWAL, J.] ~87

the averments made in the contempt petition was in an opposite political A
camp. The petition was based on utterances made by appellant in public
meetings held on 21st October, 1996.

It is well settled that the requirement of obtaining consent in writing
of the Advocate-General for making motion by any person is mandatory. B
A motion under Section 15 not in conformity with the requirements of that
Section is not maintainable. [State of Kera/a v. MS. Mani and Others,
[20011 8 sec 82].

In Contempt Petition No.12 an application dated 22nd October, 1996
was submitted to the Advocate-General along with proposed contempt C
petition stating that the applicant wanted to file petition by 2nd December,
1996 and, therefore, the permission may be granted before that date and
further stating that if no answer is received from the Advocate-General it
would be presumed that permission has been granted and the applicant will
proceed with the intended contempt proceedings. Such a course is not D
permissible under Section 15 of the Act. There is no question of any
presumption. In fact, Contempt Petition No.12 was filed on 2nd December,
without the consent of the Advocate-General. It further appears that the
application seeking permission of the Advocate-General was received by
him on 26th November, 1996. It also appears that the Advocate-General
appeared before the Court on 3rd February, 1997 and stated that he can E
decide the question of consent within a reasonable time. The impugned
judgment holding appellant guilty of contempt and inflicting simple
imprisonment for a period of one week and fine of Rs. 2000 was passed on
7th February, 1997.
F
A perusal of record including the notices issued to the appellant shows
that the Court had not taken suo motu action against the appellant. In
contempt petitions, there was no prayer for taking suo motu action for
contempt agai!Jst the appellant. The specific objection taken that though suo
motu action could be taken under Section 15 of the Act on any information
or newspaper but not on the basis of those contempt petitions which were G
filed in regular manner by private parties, was rejected by the High Court
observing that being Court of Record it can evolve its own procedure, which
means that the procedure should provide just and fair opportunity to the
contemner to defend effectively and that the contemn er has not expressed
any prejudice or canvassed any grievance that he could not understand the H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A charge involved in the proceeding which he had been called upon to defend.
It is, however, not in dispute that the charge against the appellant was not
framed.

In these matters, the question is not about compliance or non-compliance
of the principles of natural justice by granting adequate opportunity to the
B appellant but is about compliance of the mandatory requirements of Section
15 of the Act. As already noticed the procedure of Section 15 is required
to be followed even when petition is filed by a party under Article 215 of
the Constitution, though in these matters petitions filed were under Section
15 of the Act. From the material on record, it is not possible to accept the
c contention of the respondents that the Court had taken suo motu action. Of
course, the Court had the power and jurisdiction to initiate contempt
proceedings suo motu and for that purpose consent of the Advocate-General
was not necessary. At the same time, it is also to be borne in mind that the
Courts normally take suo motu action in rare cases. In the present case, it
D is evident that the proceedings before the High Court were initiated by the
respondents by filing contempt petitions under Section 15. The petitions
were vigorously pursued and strenuously argued as private petitions. The
same were never treated as suo motu petitions. In absence of compliance
of mandatory requirement of Section 15, the petitions were not maintainable.

E As a result of aforesaid view, it is unnecessary to examine in the present
case, the effect of non-compliance of the directions issued in Duda 's case
by placing the informative papers before the Chief Justice of the High Court.

For the foregoing reasons we set aside the 'impugned judgment and
allow the appeals. Fine, if deposited by the appellant shall be refunde,!l to
F him.

Before parting, it is necessary to direct framing of necessary rule or
practice direction by the High Courts in terms of Duda's case. Accordingly,
we direct Registrar-General to send a copy of this judgment to the Registrar-
G Generals of the High Courts so that wherever rule and/or practice direction
on the line suggested in Duda 's case has not been framed, the High Courts
may now frame the same at their ear!iest convenience.

K.K.T. Appeals allowed.