Holding

Absence of sanction at the time of the initial hearing does not amount to an acquittal; once sanction is later granted, the trial may lawfully continue and no bar under Section 300 CrPC applies.

Summary

Balbir Singh and Paljit Kaur were charged under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) and Sections 25 and 26 of the Arms Act, 1959 for offences alleged to have occurred on 5 December 1992. The Designated TADA Court, on 19 April 1997, held the proceedings non est for lack of the required police sanction under Section 20‑A(2) of TADA, using the term "acquittal". After sanction was granted on 4 July 2001, the court resumed the trial and issued summons in March 2002. The appellants contended that the earlier order amounted to an acquittal and that the expiry of TADA’s currency barred further prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the lack of sanction did not constitute a valid acquittal; once sanction is later obtained, the trial may lawfully continue, and Section 300 of the CrPC does not bar continuation because no conviction or acquittal was recorded. The Court also rejected the argument that delay alone bars prosecution, emphasizing that no statutory limitation precludes continuation of criminal trials. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the trial court was directed to dispose of the matter within six months.

Issues considered

The effect of a Designated TADA Court's order of "acquittal" due to lack of police sanction under Section 20‑A(2) of TADA.
Whether the expiry of the TADA Act's currency bars continuation of the prosecution.
Whether Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to bar further proceedings when the court initially lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance.
Whether the delay in obtaining sanction and the overall trial delay violate the right to a speedy trial and constitute a bar to prosecution.

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 25, s. 26
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 300
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987s. 20-A(2), s. 3, s. 4, s. 5, s. 6

Subjects

TADAsanctionjurisdictionnon estacquittaldelayed trialright to speedy trialSection 300 CrPCArms Actcriminal procedure

Judgment

A BALBIR SINGH
v.
STATE OF DELHI

JUNE 21, 2007

B [DR. ARIJIT PASAYA T AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.]

Terrorist and Disruption Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987-ss. 3, 4, 5,
6 and 20A(2)-Absence of sanction of the Police Commissioner under
C s.20A(2)- Effect of-Held: Designated TADA Court consequently had no
jurisdiction to proceed in the matter and take cognizance of the offence-But
that did not lead to acquittal of the accused-On subsequent grant ofsanction,
proceedings could be legally continued against the accused-Arms Act,
1959-ss. 25 & 26--Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-s.300.

D By order dated 19.4.1997, the Designated TADA Court had held that in
absence of sanction of the Commissioner of Police as required under sub-
section (2) of Section 20-A of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1987, proceedings against Appellant-accused became non
est.

E Pursuant to the said order, sanction was accorded and the Designated
TADA Court issued summons on 2-3-2002 by the impugned order after over-
ruling objections raised by the Appellant that there was virtual infraction of
Section 300, CrPC. The Court held that proceedings could be legally continued
against the Appellant and accordingly took cognizance of offences punishable
under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the TADA Act and Sections 25 and 26 of the
F Arms Act, 1959.

In appeal to this Court, it is contended that the view expressed by the
Designated TADA court is unsustainable and that after a long passage of time
and the expiry of currency of Statute itself (i.e. TADA) the continuance of the
G proceedings would be sheer abuse of the process of the Court.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD:l.1. The position seems to be unexceptionable that the concerned
Court by judgment dated 19.4.1997 could not have directed acquittal In the
H 1102
,
BALBIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI 1103
absence of sanction the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter A
and take cogniz.ance of the offence. But the order passed in that regard cannot
- lead to acquittal of the accused. !Para 7111105-D)

1.2. Where a person has done something which is made punishable by
law he is liable to face a trial and this liability cannot come to an end merely
because the court before which he was placed for trial forms an opinion that B

,
it has not jurisdiction to try him or that it has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the offence alleged against him. IPara 12111106-C, DI

Mohd. Safi v. State of West Bengal, AIR (1966) SC 69, relied on.

Bas Deo Agarwala v. King Emperor, AIR (1945) FC 16 and Falli Mui/a C
Noor Bhoy v. The King, AIR (1949) PC 264, referred to.

2. So far as applicability of Section 300 (1), CrPC ir concerned,
·essentially the conditions for invoking the bar are : (i) the Court had
jurisdiction to take cognizance and try the accused and (ii) the Court has D
recorded an order of conviction of acquittal and such conviction/acquittal
. remains in force. [Para 121 (1106-E, F)

3. The question relating to delayed sanction needs to be noted in the
background of what this Court observed in an earlier case. It is neither
advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer E
limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The criminal courts are not
obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse
of time. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any
court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as
mandatorily obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge
the accused. A watchful and diligent trial Judge can prove to be a better F
protector of such right than any guidelines.
(Para 13) [1106-F; 1107-C, D, F, G]

P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, [20021 4 SCC 578, relied
on.
G
4. The impugneJ order passed by the Designated Court does not suffer
from any infirmity to warrant interference. However, the trial court is
requested to dispose of the matter as early as practicable preferably within 6
months from the date of communication of this order. (Para 141 (1108-B, CJ

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 844 of H
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 7 S.C.R.

A 2002.
From the Order dated 2.03.2002 of the Designated (TADA) Court II,
Delhi in Session Case No. 48 of2001.

Rajiv Dutta, H.S. Bhatti, Namata Chopra and R. Nedumaran for the
B Appellant.
Ashok Bhan and D.S Mehra for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

C DR. ARIJIT PASAYA T, J. I. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment
rendered by a learned Judge, Designated Court II, Delhi, in Sessions Case
No.48 of 200 I holding that the proceedings can be legally continued against
the appellant and took cognizance of offence punishable under Sections 3,
4, 5 and 6 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (in
short the 'TADA Act') and Sections 25 and 26 of the Arms Act, 1959 (in short
D the 'Arms Act').

2. The controversy lies within a very narrow compass and a brief
reference to the factual aspects would suffice.

The appellant and one Paljit Kaur @ Richpal Kaur @ Pali wife of
E Paramjit Singh had allegedly committed offence punishable under Sections 3,
4, 5 and 6 of TADA Act and Sections 25 and 26 of the Arms Act. Charge
sheet was filed on 20.8.1993. The allegations related to alleged commission
of offence on 5th December, 1992. By amendment to TADA Act, Section 20-
A(2) was introduced with effect from 22.5.1993 i.e. prior to filing of the charge
F sheet. Charges were framed on 16.12.1993. Bail was granted to the appellant
on 6.5.1994. Subsequently, on expiry of eight years' currency period, the term
of TADA Act expired on 23.5.1995. By order dated 19.4.1997 the Designated
Court held that in absence of sanction of the Commissioner of Police as
required under sub-section (2) of Section 20-A of TADA Act, the proceedings
were non est and the cognizance taken by the Court for offences µnder the
G TADA Act was bad in law.

3. The expression used by the concerned Court in the judgment dated
19.4.1997 was '.'acquittal of the accused persons for the want of sanction".
Subsequently, pursuant to the order by the concerned Court goods seized
were retained 3.2.1998. On 4.7.2001 sanction was accorded and the order in
H
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BALBIRSINGH v.STATEOFDELHI [PASAYAT.J.) 1105

that regard was passed and the charge sheet was filed on 18.7.2001 and A
summons were issued on 2.3.2002 by the impugned order.

4. The Court over-ruled the objections raised by the appellant that the
proceedings were non est as it virtually amounted to infraction of Section 300
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). The Designated
Court did not accept the plea and observed that though the expression a
"acquittal" was used, in essence it cannot be an order of acquittal on merits
of the case and could only operate as an order of discharge.

5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the view expressed by the lower court is unsustainable. According to C
him, after a long passage of time and the expiry of currency of Statute itself
the continuance of the proceedings would be sheer abuse of the process of
the Court.

6. Learned counsel for the respondent-State supported the order of the
lower court.
D.
7. The position seems to be unexceptionable that the concerned Court
by judgment dated 19.4.1997 could not have directed acquittal. In the absence
of sanction the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter and take
cognizance of the offence. But the order passed in that regard cannot lead
to acquittal of the accused. E
8. Section 20-A (2) of the Act reads as follows:

"No Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act without
the previous sanction of the Inspector General of Police, or as the
case may be, the Commissioner of Police." F
9. Section 20-A(2) operate as a bar on taking cognizance of the offence.

l 0. The effect of such an order has been considered by Federal Court
in Bas Deo Agarwala v. King Emperor, AIR (1945) FC 16. The relevant
portion of the judgment reads as under: G
"That the prosecution launched without valid sanction is invalid
and or that under the common law a plea of autrefois acquit or convict
can only be raised where the first trial was before a court competent
to pass a valid order of acquittal or conviction. Unless the earlier trial
was a lawful one which might have resulted in a conviction, the H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 7 S.C.R.

A accused was never in jeopardy."

11. The principles set out in Bas Deo Agarwala 's case (supra) were
followed in Falli Mui/a Noor Bhoy v. The King, AIR (1949) PC 264. The
factual scenario in that case was that after framing of the charge the Magistrate
acquitted the accused after coming to the conclusion that the sanction as
B required by law was not there and the trial was incompetent. It was held that
the order of acquittal was without jurisdiction and could only operate as an
order of discharge because the Magistrate in such a case ought to discharge
the accused on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to try him.

C 12. This Court in Mohd. Safi v. State of West Bengal, AIR ( 1966) SC 69
observed as follows:

"Where a Court comes to such a conclusion albeit erroneously it is
difficult to appreciate how that court can absolve the person arraigned
before it completely of the offence alleged against him. Where a
person has done something which is made punishable by law he is
D liable to face a trial and this liability cannot come to an end merely
because the court before which he was placed for trial forms an
opinion that it has not jurisdiction to try him or that it has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence alleged against him.
Where, therefore, a court says, though erroneously that it was not
E competent to take cognizance of the offence it has no power to acquit
that person of the offence."

So far as applicability of Section 300 ( 1) of the Code is concerned, essentially
the conditions for invoking the bar are: (i) the Court had jurisdiction to take
cognizance and try the accused and (ii) the Court has recorded an order of
F conviction or acquittal and such conviction/acquittal remains in force.

13. The question relating to delayed sanction needs to be noted in the
background of what this Court observed in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka, (2002] 4 SCC 578. In para 29 it was observed as follows:

G "29. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that in
Common Cause case (I) (1996] 4) SCC 33) (as modified in Common
Cause (II) [ 1996] 6 SCC 775) and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and (II) ( 1998(7)
SCC 507 and 1999 (7) SCC 604) the Court could not have prescribed
periods of limitation beyond which the trial of a criminal case or a
criminal proceeding cannot continue and must mandatorily be closed
H
I

t
BALBIRSINGUv.STATEOFDELHI (PASAYAT.J.) 1107

followed by an order acquitting or discharging the accused. In A
conclusion we hold:

( 1) The dictum in A. R. Antulay case is correct and still holds the field.

(2) The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and
expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in A.R. B
Antulay case adequately take care of right to speedy trial. We uphold
and reaffirm the said propositions.

(3) The guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay case are not exhaustive
but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard-and-
fast rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their applicability C
would depend on the fact situation of each case. It is difficult to
foresee all situations and no generalization can be made.

(4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to
draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal
proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the D
several directions made in Common Cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma (l)
and Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn
and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate
trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as
prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause case (I), Raj Deo
Sharma case (I) and (II). At the most the periods of time prescribed E
in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or
proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to
apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case
before them and determine by taking into consideration the several
relevant factors as pointed out in AR. Antulay case and decide whether F
the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be
called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will
not by themselves be treated by any court as a bar to further
continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging
the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused.
G
(5) The criminal courts should exercise their available powers, such as
those under Sections 309, 311and258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
to effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent trial
Judge can prove to be a better protector of such right than any
guidelines. In appropriate cases, jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can H

(
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 7 S.C.R.

A be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions.

(6) This is an. appropriate occasion to remind the Union of India and
the State Governments of their constitutional obligation to strengthen
the judiciary quantitatively and qualitatively by providing requisite
funds, manpower and infrastructure. We hope and trust that the
B Governments shall act.

We answer the questions posed in the orders of reference dated
19.9.2000 and 26.4.2001 in the abovesaid terms."

14. The impugned order passed by the Designated Court does not
C suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. However, the trial Court is
requested to dispose of the matter as early as practicable preferably within
6 months from the date of communication of this order.

15. The appeal is dismissed.

D B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.

';