BALLU @ BALRAM @ BALMUKUND AND ANOTHERversusTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

                  [2024] 4 S.C.R. 48 : 2024 INSC 258

            Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and Another
                                 v.
                   The State of Madhya Pradesh
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 1167 of 2018)
                                 02 April 2024
                [B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

                           Issue for Consideration
       High Court whether justified in reversing the acquittal of the
       appellant Nos.1 and 2 and convicting them u/ss.302 and 201/34
       and ss.302/34 and 201, Penal Code, 1860 respectively and
       sentencing accordingly; whether the prosecution proved its case
       beyond reasonable doubt and whether the appellants were guilty
       of committing the crime.

                                  Headnotes
       Appeal against acquittal – Interference – When not sustainable:
       Held: Prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence – Trial
       Judge gave sound and cogent reasons for discarding the testimony
       of the IO and the other witnesses and by elaborately discussing
       the evidence found that the appellants were not guilty – Findings of
       the trial Judge were based on correct appreciation of the material
       placed on record – This elaborate exercise of the trial Judge was
       washed away by the Division Bench of the High Court in a totally
       cursory manner – Though the High Court referred to the law laid
       down by this Court with regard to the scope of interference in
       an appeal against acquittal, it totally misapplied the same and a
       very well-reasoned judgment based upon the correct appreciation
       of evidence by the trial Court was reversed only on the basis of
       conjectures and surmises – High Court could have interfered
       in the criminal appeal only if it came to the conclusion that the
       findings of the trial Judge were either perverse or impossible – No
       perversity or impossibility could be found in the approach adopted
       by the trial Judge – Furthermore, in any case, even if two views
       were possible and the trial Judge found the other view to be
       more probable, an interference would not have been warranted
       by the High Court, unless the view taken by the trial Judge was
       a perverse or impossible view – Prosecution failed to prove any


* Author
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              Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and Another v.
                     The State of Madhya Pradesh

     of the incriminating circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and
     in no case, the chain of circumstances, which was so interlinked
     to each other that led to no other conclusion, than the guilt of the
     accused persons – Judgment passed by the High Court being
     unsustainable is quashed and set aside – Appellants acquitted.
     [Paras 6, 12-14, 16, 19-23]
     Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Law as regards
     conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence – Discussed.

                              Case Law Cited
           Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
           [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 – relied on.
           Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P. [2016] 1 SCR
           913 : (2016) 4 SCC 397; Harljan Bhala Teja v. State
           of Gujarat [2016] 2 SCR 203 : (2016) 12 SCC 665 –
           referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Evidence
     Act, 1872.

                             List of Keywords
     Appeal against acquittal; Circumstantial evidence; Chain of
     circumstances not interlinked; Case not proved beyond reasonable
     doubt; Conjectures and surmises; Findings perverse or impossible;
     Two possible views; Perverse or impossible view.

                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1167
     of 2018
     From the Judgment and Order dated 06.04.2018 of the High Court of
     Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Cr. A. No.261 of 1995
                         Appearances for Parties
     Varun Thakur, Ramkaran, Ms. Shraddha Saran, Brajesh Pandey,
     Varinder Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellants.
     Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Vikas Bansal, Mirza Kayesh Begg, Ms.
     Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Astik Gupta, Ms. Akanksha Tomar, Argha Roy,
     Ms. Ojaswini Gupta, Ms. Ruby, Advs. for the Respondent.
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                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment
      B.R. Gavai, J.
1.    The present appeal challenges the judgment dated 6th April 2018
      passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal
      Appeal No. 261 of 1995, thereby allowing the appeal of the respondent-
      State which was filed challenging the judgment dated 26th March 1994
      passed in S.T. No. 160 of 1992, vide which the learned 2nd Class
      Sessions Judge, Damoh (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned trial
      Judge’) had acquitted the appellants of the charges under Sections
      302, 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred
      to as ‘IPC’). The High Court, reversing the judgment of the learned
      trial Judge, had convicted the appellant No. 1 (Ballu Chaurasiya @
      Balram @ Balmukund) under Sections 302 and 201/34 of IPC and
      appellant No. 2 (Halki Bahu @ Jamna Bai @ Jamuna Bai) under
      Sections 302/34 and 201 of IPC and awarded rigorous imprisonment
      for life under Sections 302 and 302/34 with fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default
      of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three
      months. Insofar as Sections 201 and 201/34 of IPC are concerned,
      the High Court further awarded sentence of rigorous imprisonment
      for seven years with a fine of Rs. 3000/-, in default of payment of fine
      to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 months.
2.    The prosecution story in brief is as under:
      2.1 The deceased-Mahesh Sahu was in a love relation with Anita,
          who is the daughter of respondent No.2-Jamna Bai (appellant
          No.2 herein) and sister of Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund
          (appellant No.1 herein). Anita and deceased Mahesh Sahu
          resided at Agra for about eight months and then returned to
          Damoh. Thereafter, the marriage of Anita was solemnized with
          another person. Even then, they were in contact with each other.
          Due to this enmity, on 7th June, 1992 at about 11:00 P.M., the
          appellants caused death of the deceased in furtherance of their
          common intention. The prosecution relies on the evidence of
          Govind (PW-7), who saw that appellant No. 1 was dragging
          a dead body from his house. He had also seen his mother,
          appellant No. 2, who was washing the blood stains at the door
          of their house.
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              Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and Another v.
                     The State of Madhya Pradesh

     2.2 After Beni Prasad @ Beri Prasad (PW-1) and Sumitra Bai (PW-
         6), who are the father and mother of the deceased, came to
         know about the incident, they came to the spot of the incident.
         On the basis of the oral report of PW-1, an FIR (Exh. P-1) came
         to be registered at Police Station, Damoh.
     2.3 Upon completion of the investigation, the chargesheet came
         to be filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class. Since
         the case was exclusively triable by the learned trial Judge, it
         was committed to the learned trial Judge.
     2.4 At the conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Judge has acquitted
         the accused persons since the prosecution has failed to prove
         the case beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent-State
         preferred an appeal before the High Court.
     2.5 The High Court, by the impugned judgment, reversed the finding
         of the learned trial Judge, as aforesaid.
     2.6 Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.
3.   We have heard Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel appearing on
     behalf of the appellants and Shri Pashupathi Nath Razdan, learned
     counsel for the respondent-State.
4.   Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel, submits that the High Court
     has grossly erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of
     acquittal. He submits that the learned trial Judge by giving elaborate
     reasonings, found that the prosecution has failed to prove the
     case beyond reasonable doubt. He submits that the High Court
     in a cursory manner interfered with the said finding. He submits
     that the present case is a case of circumstantial evidence and
     unless the prosecution is able to prove the chain of circumstances
     beyond reasonable doubt it is not permissible to interfere with the
     findings of the trial Judge and to record the finding of conviction.
     He further submits that, in an appeal arising from acquittal, the
     scope is limited. Unless the finding is shown to be perverse or
     impossible, it will not be permissible for the Appellate Court to
     interfere with the same.
5.   Shri Pashupathi Nath Razdan, learned counsel for the respondent-
     State, on the contrary, submits that the learned trial Judge has
     totally misread the evidence. He submits that the evidence of Beni
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       Prasad (PW-1) and Sumitra Bai (PW-6), coupled with the medical
       evidence, would show that the prosecution has proved the case
       beyond reasonable doubt.
6.     Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence.
       The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial
       evidence has very well been crystalized in the judgment of this Court
       in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1,
       wherein this Court held thus:
              “152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High
              Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature,
              character and essential proof required in a criminal case
              which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most
              fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant
              v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952
              SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]. This case
              has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in
              a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance,
              the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh
              [(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v.
              State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC
              656]. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid
              down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC
              343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :
                      “It is well to remember that in cases where
                      the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
                      circumstances from which the conclusion of
                      guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance
                      be fully established, and all the facts so
                      established should be consistent only with the
                      hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again,
                      the circumstances should be of a conclusive
                      nature and tendency and they should be such
                      as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
                      proposed to be proved. In other words, there
                      must be a chain of evidence so far complete
                      as not to leave any reasonable ground for a


1     [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 INSC 121
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              Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and Another v.
                     The State of Madhya Pradesh

                conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
                accused and it must be such as to show that
                within all human probability the act must have
                been done by the accused.”
           153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
           following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against
           an accused can be said to be fully established:
                (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion
                of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
           It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
           circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
           be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a
           legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be
           or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
           Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC
           793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where
           the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC
           (Cri) p. 1047]
                “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the
                accused must be and not merely may be guilty
                before a court can convict and the mental
                distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is
                long and divides vague conjectures from sure
                conclusions.”
                (2) the facts so established should be consistent
                only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
                accused, that is to say, they should not be
                explainable on any other hypothesis except that
                the accused is guilty,
                (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
                nature and tendency,
                (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
                except the one to be proved, and
                (5) there must be a chain of evidence so
                complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
                for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
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                 of the accused and must show that in all human
                 probability the act must have been done by the
                 accused.
           154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
           constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based
           on circumstantial evidence.”
7.    It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution
      that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be
      drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a primary
      principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved
      guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that
      there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may
      be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held that
      the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of
      the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any
      other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been
      held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every
      possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that
      there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
      reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
      of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act
      must have been done by the accused.
8.    It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot
      take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot
      be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is.
      An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond
      a reasonable doubt.
9.    Apart from that, it is to be noted that the present case is a case
      of reversal of acquittal. The law with regard to interference by the
      Appellate Court is very well crystallized. Unless the finding of acquittal
      is found to be perverse or impossible, interference with the same
      would not be warranted. Though, there are a catena of judgments
      on the issue, we will only refer to two judgments which the High
      Court itself has reproduced in the impugned judgment, which are
      as reproduced below:
           “13. In case of Sadhu Saran Singh vs. State of U.P.
           (2016) 4 SCC 397, the Supreme Court has held that:-
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              Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and Another v.
                     The State of Madhya Pradesh

                “In an appeal against acquittal where the
                presumption of innocence in favour of the
                accused is reinforced, the appellate Court would
                interfere with the order of acquittal only when
                there is perversity of fact and !aw. However,
                we believe that the paramount consideration
                of the Court is to do substantial justice and
                avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise
                by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an
                offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur
                by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from
                the conviction of an innocent. Appellate Court,
                while enunciating the principles with regard to
                the scope of powers of the appellate Court in
                an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute
                restriction in law to review and relook the entire
                evidence on which the order of acquittal is
                founded.”
           14. Similar, In case of Harljan Bhala Teja vs. State of
           Gujarat (2016) 12 SCC 665, the Supreme Court has
           held that:-
                “No doubt, where, on appreciation of evidence
                on record, two views are possible, and the
                trial court has taken a view of acquittal, the
                appellate court should not interfere with the
                same. However, this does not mean that in all
                the cases where the trial court has recorded
                acquittal, the same should not be interfered
                with, even if the view is perverse. Where the
                view taken by the trial court is against the
                weight of evidence on record, or perverse, it is
                always open far the appellate court to express
                the right conclusion after re-appreciating the
                evidence If the charge is proved beyond
                reasonable doubt on record, and convict the
                accused.”
10. In view of the above settled principles of law, we will have to examine
    the present case.
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11. It is not in dispute that the death of the deceased is a homicidal death
    and as such, it will not be necessary to refer to the medical evidence.
    The only question that remains is as to whether the prosecution has
    proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and as to whether the
    appellants are guilty of committing the crime.
12. Learned trial Judge, by elaborately discussing the evidence, had
    found that the appellants were not guilty. We crystallize the findings
    of the learned trial Judge, as under:
      12.1 Beni Prasad (PW-1), who is the father of the deceased, had
           deposed that when he went to call his son Mahesh Sahu for
           dinner then Mahesh Sahu was standing at the Chowk with
           Pappu Tamrakar and two boys. Mahesh Sahu told him that he
           would come later, then Beni Prasad (PW-1) went to his house
           and fell asleep and later at night around 11:45 P.M., one boy
           came to him and told him that Ballu Chaurasiya (appellant
           No. 1), Santosh Chaurasiya and other persons were beating
           Mahesh Sahu. On hearing this, he ran towards the house of
           Ballu Chaurasiya wearing chaddhi and baniyan. He saw that
           Ballu Charuasiya, Santosh Chaurasiya and his two brothers
           were dragging Mahesh Sahu in dead condition and put his body
           10 feet away from their house. After that the accused Ballu
           Chaurasiya went inside his house. Beni Prasad (PW-1) went
           near the place where Mahesh Sahu’s body was lying and he
           found him to be dead. At that point of time, Sumitra Bai (PW-
           6), the mother of the deceased also came there and she saw
           that Jamuna Bai (appellant No. 2), who is the mother of the
           accused Ballu Chaurasiya, was cleaning the blood on the door.
      12.2 Beni Prasad deposed that in the last month of the year 1991
           (December 1991) his son Mahesh Sahu went to Bhopal for
           an interview and there was no news about him for about eight
           months. Thereafter, a letter came to him from his son in the
           fourth month of the year 1992 (April 1992) informing him that
           he was working at Agra and that he had married a girl named
           Anita, who is the sister of the accused/appellant No. 1 Ballu
           Chaurasiya. Thereafter, the deceased Mahesh Sahu and Anita
           returned to Damoh (in the fourth month of the year 1992 i.e.,
           April 1992), and Anita started living in her house and thereafter
           Anita was married to another person in Ujjain by her brother
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              Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and Another v.
                     The State of Madhya Pradesh

           Ballu Chaurasiya (appellant No. 1). Thereafter, Anita left for
           her in-laws house and thereafter correspondence of letters
           started between Mahesh Sahu and Anita. He stated that this
           correspondence of letters was not liked by Ballu Chaurasiya
           (appellant No. 1) and he started to give death threats to
           Mahesh Sahu.
     12.3 The learned trial Judge found that the statement given by Beni
          Prasad (PW-1), before the trial Judge was totally contrary to his
          statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
          Procedure, 1973 (Exh. D/1). It was found that Beni Prasad
          (PW-1) had totally improved his story in his deposition before
          the Court. Learned trial Judge also found the behaviour of
          Beni Prasad (PW-1) to be abnormal. In his cross-examination,
          Beni Prasad (PW-1) admitted that when he saw four persons
          dragging the dead body, he said nothing because he was alone.
          However, he admitted that the dead body of Mahesh Sahu
          was lying in a dense basti and people have houses around
          the said place and there was also a dispensary of the (Nagar
          Palika) Municipality situated at Gauri Shankar Temple, about
          9 feet away from his house. Learned trial Judge also found
          that within the same dispensary itself, the Police Chowki was
          situated, manned by hawaldar and constables. The learned
          trial Judge found that the conduct of the Beni Prasad (PW-1)
          in not informing about the dead body of the deceased being
          dragged away to anyone and particularly at the Police Chowki
          which was hardly any distance from the place of occurrence
          to be absolutely unnatural. The learned trial judge found
          that when a panchnama of the dead body (Exh. P-2) was
          being conducted, he did not give the name of the killers. The
          explanation given by Beni Prasad (PW-1) was that the police
          did not ask him. The learned trial Judge also found that Beni
          Prasad (PW-1) admitted in his evidence that at the time of
          panchnama of dead body (Exh. P-2), there was a crowd of
          around 150 people.
     12.4 Ms. Sumitra Bai (PW-6), mother of the deceased, also stated
          about the relationship between the deceased Mahesh Sahu
          and Anita. She stated that the accused/appellant No. 1 Ballu
          Chaurasiya was threatening the deceased Mahesh Sahu on a
          day prior to the date of the incident. She also informed about
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            one boy coming at about 11:45 P.M./12 A.M. and informing
            her that a fight was going on between Mahesh Sahu and Ballu
            Chaurasiya. When she went to the house of the accused,
            she saw accused Ballu Chaurasiya, his elder brother, his
            manjhla brother and accused Jamuna Bai dragging her son
            and leaving her son in front of bade father’s house. Learned
            trial Judge found that the evidence of this witness was also
            totally improvised. Learned trial Judge also found that there
            was extreme exaggeration in the depositions given by this
            witness in the Court as compared to the statements under
            Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Exh. D-2). The learned trial Judge, as a
            result, disbelieved the evidence of these two witnesses, i.e.,
            the father and mother of the deceased.
      12.5 Learned trial Judge also found that the prosecution had relied
           on the evidence of Raju (PW-4), Dharmendra Singh (PW-5)
           and Govind (PW-7) to establish the circumstances regarding
           the accused being last seen with the deceased Mahesh Sahu.
           Further all these three witnesses had turned hostile and not
           supported the prosecution case.
      12.6 Learned trial Judge also discarded the circumstances relied
           on by the prosecution regarding cutting the nails of both the
           hands of the accused Ballu Chaurasiya and the said nails
           containing the blood of the deceased Mahesh Sahu. Learned
           trial Judge also found that the nails were cut after a period of
           six days from the date of the incident. The prosecution has also
           relied on the circumstances of recovery of the blood stained
           clothes and the knife. Learned trial Judge found that the said
           circumstances were also of no assistance in the case of the
           prosecution, inasmuch as there were no evidence to show that
           the blood found on these articles was a human blood.
      12.7 Insofar as the circumstances with regard to the mother of the
           appellant No. 1, Jamuna Bai (appellant No. 2), are concerned,
           the learned trial Judge found that the independent witnesses
           had turned hostile, and the only evidence in that regard was
           that of S.K. Banerjee @ S.K. Banerji @ Sukant Banerjee/
           Investigating Officer (PW-15).
      12.8 Learned trial Judge found that Rajesh Kumar (PW-14), who
           was a panch witness, in his evidence, had stated that the
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              Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and Another v.
                     The State of Madhya Pradesh

           deceased was his cousin brother and he has signed the
           documents on the directions of the S.K. Banerjee/Investigating
           Officer (PW-15). As such, the learned trial Judge found that
           the circumstances with regard to the memorandum under
           Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and subsequent recovery
           was also not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Learned trial
           Judge further found that though from the panchnama, it was
           shown that the blood was found at various places, he had not
           made any attempt to seize the samples nor had he provided
           an explanation as to why he had not seized the samples of
           the said blood.
     12.9 Learned trial Judge found that the knife was seized on
          a memorandum of the accused (Exh. P-14) on 14th June
          1992 from an open place in the same room as mentioned in
          panchnama (Exh. P-11). Learned trial Judge also found that
          if immediately on the next day of incident, the Investigating
          Officer had visited and searched the room but he did not see
          the knife, then the subsequent recovery of knife from the very
          same room appears to be planted.
     12.10 Learned trial Judge also found that though the incident was of
           7th June 1992 at around 12:00 A.M. and it had been reported
           to the Investigating Officer at 12:40 A.M., the arrest of the
           accused persons had been made only on 15th June 1992, which
           creates a doubt on the prosecution version. This is more so
           when the distance between the place of occurrence and the
           police station is hardly 1 to 1 ½ kms.
13. The above points, that we have culled out from the judgment of
    the learned trial Judge, make it clear that the learned trial Judge
    has done a very elaborate exercise of discussing the evidence in
    great detail. We therefore would not like to burden our judgment
    with more details. The aforesaid points are more than sufficient to
    come to a conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove any
    of the incriminating circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and in
    no case, the chain of circumstances, which was so interlinked to
    each other that leads to no other conclusion, than the guilt of the
    accused persons. We have no hesitation to hold that the findings
    of the learned trial Judge are based on correct appreciation of the
    material placed on record.
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14. This elaborate exercise of the learned trial Judge, has been washed
    away by the learned Division Bench of the High Court in a totally
    cursory manner. Insofar as the testimony of Beni Prasad (PW-1) and
    Sumitra Bai (PW-6) is concerned, the Division Bench of the High
    Court observed thus:
           “8.…...After considering the entire testimony of Beni
          Prasad (PW-1) and Sumitra Bai (PW-6) we come to the
          conclusion that there are improvements and exaggerations
          in their court statement. But on this ground their whole
          testimony cannot be brushed out as the principle “Falsus
          in uno, Falsus in Omnibus” is not applicable in criminal
          trial. Sometimes, the witnesses are in fear that if their
          testimony cannot be relied upon by the Court, the main
          culprit may be acquitted. Therefore, naturally they improve
          their statement to some extent.”
15. The testimony of S.K. Banerjee/Investigating Officer (PW-15), which
    has been disbelieved by the learned trial Judge, giving sound reasons,
    has been believed by the learned Division Bench of the High Court,
    by placing it in paragraph 12 as under:
          “12. We do not find any reason to disbelieve the testimony
          of Investigation Officer who impartially performed his duty
          with sincerity. He had no enmity with the respondents or
          relationship with the deceased. Therefore, we are inclined
          to rely upon his testimony. It cannot be brushed aside
          simply on the basis of conjectures and surmises in favour
          of the respondents.”
16. We find that the learned trial Judge had given sound and cogent
    reasons for discarding the testimony of the IO and the other witnesses.
    We are of the view that the High Court has totally erred in observing
    that the trial Judge had brushed aside the evidence of the IO simply
    on the basis of conjectures and surmises. Rather, it is the judgment
    of the High Court which is based on conjectures and surmises.
17. After reproducing the aforementioned two judgments of this Court,
    discussing the settled law on the scope of an appeal against acquittal,
    the Division Bench of the High Court observed thus:
          “15. As discussed above, we find that there is sufficient
          ground to reverse the impugned the judgment. Dr.
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              Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund and Another v.
                     The State of Madhya Pradesh

           J.P.Parsai (PW-8) examined respondent No. 1 Ballu. He
           found some injuries on the body of respondent no. 1 which
           also indicate that before the death, the deceased struggled
           to save himself from the respondents. Dr. J.P.Parsai took
           sample of nails of both the hands of the deceased and
           sent them for FSL examination.”
18. After discussing this, the High Court noted that the articles which
    were seized by S.K. Banerjee/Investigating Officer (PW-15) contained
    blood stains as per the FSL report. The High Court observed that the
    accused failed to offer any explanation with regard to the presence
    of blood on these articles. The High Court observed thus:
           “18...Respondent No. 1 did not offer any explanation with
           regard to presence of blood on these articles. This is a
           strong link along with the blood marks of dragging found
           from the house of the respondent to the spot where the
           body of the deceased was lying. This establishes that the
           respondents committed murder of the deceased Mahesh
           because he had love relation with Anita. After his death,
           six love letters of Anita were found in the pocket of the
           deceased which indicates that Anita also wanted to reside
           with the deceased against the will and consent of her
           family members.”
19. At the cost of repetition, we are compelled to say that the findings
    of the High Court are totally based on conjectures and surmises.
    Though the High Court has referred to the law laid down by this
    Court with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against
    acquittal, the High Court has totally misapplied the same and a
    very well-reasoned judgment based upon the correct appreciation
    of evidence by the trial Court has been reversed by the High Court,
    only on the basis of conjectures and surmises.
20. The High Court could have interfered in the criminal appeal only if
    it came to the conclusion that the findings of the trial Judge were
    either perverse or impossible. As already discussed hereinbefore, no
    perversity or impossibility could be found in the approach adopted
    by the learned trial Judge.
21. In any case, even if two views are possible and the trial Judge found
    the other view to be more probable, an interference would not have
62                                                         [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                      Digital Supreme Court Reports


      been warranted by the High Court, unless the view taken by the
      learned trial Judge was a perverse or impossible view.
22. In that view of the matter, we find that the judgment passed by the
    High Court is totally unsustainable in law.
23. In the result, we pass the following order:
      (i)    The appeal is allowed;
      (ii)   The impugned judgment dated 6th April 2018 passed by the
             High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal
             No. 261 of 1995 is quashed and set aside; and
      (iii) The accused persons (appellants herein) are acquitted of all the
            charges they were charged with. The appellants are already on
            bail. Hence, their bail bonds shall stand discharged.
24. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

      Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey                 Result of the case:
                                                             Appeal allowed.