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Supreme Court of India

BALU @ BALA SUBRAMANIAM & ANR.versusSTATE (U.T. OF PONDICHERRY)

Citation
2015 INSC 789
Decided
16 October 2015
Disposal
Case Partly allowed

Holding

The Court held that no common intention existed among the appellants, so convictions under Section 302/326/324 read with Section 34 IPC are set aside and liability is limited to the individual act under Section 325 IPC.

Summary

The appellants Balu@Balasubramaniam and Raja were convicted of murder and assault under Sections 302, 326 and 324 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Supreme Court examined whether the prosecution had proved a common intention among the accused as required by s.34. While eye‑witness testimony established that the appellants were present and struck the deceased with sticks, the Court found no evidence of a pre‑arranged plan or a shared conscious intent to commit murder. Consequently, the Court held that the acts of the appellants were random individual acts and could not attract constructive liability under s.34. The convictions under Sections 302, 326 and 324 read with s.34 were set aside and the conviction was reduced to Section 325 IPC, with the sentence adjusted to time already served. The appeal was partly allowed.

Issues considered

  • Whether the prosecution proved a common intention under Section 34 IPC among the appellants for the murder of Ramesh.
  • Whether convictions under Sections 326 and 324 read with Section 34 IPC are sustainable.
  • Whether the High Court erred in invoking Section 34 without a finding of shared intent.

Legislation cited

Subjects

common intentionSection 34 IPCjoint liabilitymurderassaultconviction modificationcriminal lawevidenceeye-witness testimonyindividual liability

Judgment

                        (2015] 11 S.C.R. 708


A             BALU@BALASUBRAMANIAM &ANR.
                                  v.
                 STATE (U.T. OF PONDICHERRY)
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 502 of 2007)
B
                        OCTOBER 16,2015
     [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.)

         Penal Code, 1860:
c       ss.325, 326 and 324- Conviction by trial courl, of the
  appellants-accused alongwith 3 other accused u/ss. 3021149
  and 148 - For killing one person and for causing injuries to
  the eye-witnesses- High Courl acquitted accused No.3 while
0 altering conviction of other accused to one under ss.302134,
  326134 and 324134 - On appeal, held: In view of the
  consistent version of eye-witnesses, the finding of the courls
  below that the accused were the assailants, cannot be faulted
  - However, in the facts of the case, High Courl was not right
E in invoking s.34 /PC as the facts do not give rise to an
  inference of pre-concerl - The acts of the accused are
  random individual acts done without meeting of minds -
  Therefore, the appellants-accused can be held liable only
  for their individual acts - Conviction u/s.302134 is modified
F as u/s.325 ~Convictions u/ss.324134 and 326134 is liable to
  be set aside.

        s.34 - Common intention - Applicability of - Held:
  Essence of liability u/s.34 is simultaneous conscious minds
G of persons parlicipating in criminal acts to bring about a
  parlicular result- Sharing of common intention gets satisfied
  when an overl act is established qua each of the accused.

        s. 34 - Common intention - Proof of - Held: Common
H intention is seldom capable of direct proof- It is to be inferred
                                 708
     BALU@ BALASUBRAMANIAM v. STATE (UT OF                    709
                 PONDICHERRY)

 from proved circumstances relating to the entire conduct of A
 all the persons and not only from the individual act actually
 performed- Such inference is to be drawn from the manner
 of origin of the occurrence; how the accused arrived at tfle
 scene; the concert with which attack was made; and from the
 injuries caused by one or some of them - The act actually B
 committed would be one of the important facts, but not the .
 sole factor -A pre-concert in the sense of a distinct previous
 plan is not necessary tO be proved.

      Partly allowing the appeal, the Court                   c
      HELD: 1. Consistent version of PWs 1 and 5 (eye-
 witnesses) establish presence of the appellants and that
 they attacked the deceased with sticks. These facts are
 also substantiated by the evidence of injured witness D
 PW2. Findings recorded by the courts below that the
 appellants attacked the deceased with sticks, is
 unassailable. [Para 8] [716-C]

         2.1 To invoke Section 34 IPC, it must be established· E
   that the criminal act was done by more than·one person
   in' furtherance of common intention of all. It must,
   therefore, be proved that:- (i) there was common
   intention on the part of several persons to commit a
   particular crime and.(ii) the crime was actually committed F
   by them in furtherance of that common intention. The
   essence of liability under Section 34 IPC is simultaneous
· conscious mfnd of persons participating in the criminal
   action to bring about a particular result. Minds regarding
   the sharing of common intention gets satisfied when an G
   overt act is established qua each of the accused .
 . Common intention implies pre-arranged plan and acting
   in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. Common
   intention is an intention to commit the crime actually.
   committed and each accused person can be convicted H
710        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 11 S.C.R.

A     of that crime, only if he has participated in that common
      intention. [Para 10] [716-F-H; 717-A]
           Mahbub Shah v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 118;
           Shanker/al Kacharabhai and Others vs. State of
B ·        Gujarat AIR 1965 SC 1260 : 1965 SCR 287;
           Ramesh Singh alias photti v. State of A.P. (2004)
           11 sec 305 - relied on.
        2.2 Common intention is seldom capable of direct
  proof, it is almost invariably to be inferred from proved
C circumstances relating to the entire conduct of all the
  persons and not only from the individual act actually
  performed. The inference to be drawn from the manner
  of the origin of the occurrence, the manner in which the
  accused arrived at the scene and the concert with. which
0
  attack was made and from the injuries caused by one or
  some of them. The criminal act actually committed would
  certainly be one of the important factor to be taken into
  consideration but should not be taken to be the sole
E factor. [Para 13] [79-C-D]

        2.3 Under Section 34 IPC, a pre-concert in the sense
  of a distinct previous plan is not necessary to be proved.
  The common intention to bring about a particular result
F may well develop on the spot as between a number of
  persons, with reference to the facts of the case and
  circumstances of the situation. The question whether
  there was any common intention or not depends upon
  the inference to be drawn from the proving facts and
G circumstances of each case. The totality of the.
  circumstances must be taken into consideration in
  arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a
  common inte·ntion to commit an offence with which they
  could be convicted. [Para 14] [719-E-G]
H
   BALU@ BALASUBRAMANIAM v. STATE (U.T. OF                    711
               PONDICHERRY)

      2.4 The facts and-circumstances of the present          A
case do not indicate that there was common intention
to commit murder of the deceased. The attack was not a
premeditated one nor was there a prior concert. · No
doubt, common intention could develop even at the spur
of the moment; but in _the present case, the way the          B
occurrence took place as depicted by the prosecution,
there could not have been common intention between
the accused. The totality of the circumstances must be
taken into consideration in order to arrive at a conclusion
that the appellants had a common intention to commit          C
the offence under which they were convicted .. The
appellants were not armed and admittedly they are said
to have removed sticks from the bullock cart standing
nearby and on the exhortation by accused No.1, the
                                                              0
appellants have attacked the deceased. There may be
similar intention in the minds of the assailants to attack;
but it cannot be said·that the appellants have acted in
furtherance of common intention to attract constructive
liability under Section 34 IPC. The facts and                 E
circumstances do not give rise to an inference of pre-
concert. (Paras 15 and 16) (719-H; 720-A, F-H; 721-A-C]

     2.5 The acts of the appellants are random individual
acts done without meeting of minds and the appellants F
can be held liable only for their individual acts.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, conviction
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is modified
as the conviction und~r Section 325 IPC and the
sentence is modified to the period of imprisonment G
already undergone. [Para 17) [721-F-G]

    2.6 No specific overt act is attributed to the
appellants in attacking the prosecution witnesses 2, 4
and 5. As the appellants have not shared or acted in H
712         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A furtherance of common intention in the attack of the
  witnesses and therefore the conviction of the appellants
  as modified by the High Court under Section 326 read
  with Section 34 IPC and under Section 324 read with
  Section 34 IPC cannot be sustained and the same is
B liable to be set aside. The appellants are acquitted of
  those charges. [Paras 18-19) [722-A-C, E]

                        Case Law Reference

c AIR 1945 PC 118                relied on.          Para 11
      1965 SCR 287               relied on.          Para 11
      (2004) 11 sec 305          relied on.          Para 12.
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                   :Criminal
D Appeal No. 502 of 2007

           From the Judgment and Order dated 15.07.2005 of the
      High Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal No.
      113of1999
E
           P. K. ·oey, A. Naqvi, Shreyasi, Chakrabarti, Vijay Pal
      Singh, Abha R. Sharma for the Appellants.

           V. Kanagaraj, V. G. Pragasam, Prabu Ramasubramanian
      for the Respondent.
F
           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       R. BANUMATHI, J. 1. This criminal appeal is filed
  against the judgment dated 15.07.2005 passed by the High
G Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal No.113 of
  1999, whereby the High Court, while maintaining the sentence,
  modified the conviction recorded by the trial court qua the
  accused namely Giri-accused No.1, Seenu @ Srinivasan-
  accused No.2, Balu@ Bala Subramaniam (Appellant No.1-
H Accused No.4) and Raja @ Kotti Raja (Appellant No.2-
     BALU@BALASUBRAMANIAM v. STATE(U.T. OF                        713
         PONDICHERRY) [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

 Accused No.5) as conviction under Section 302 read with A
 Section 34 IPC, Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and
 Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC. The High Court
 acquitted Partheeban-accused No.3 of all the charges.

        2. Briefly stated case of the prosecution is that one B
  Natarajan had a quarrel with Seenu @ Srinivasan-accused
   No.2 in respect of a chit transaction and Kannan-PW2
  supported Natarajan and fight ensued between Seenu-
  accused No.2 and Kannan-PW2 about a week prior to the
  date of incident i.e. 18.05.1997. In the forenoon, on the day of C
  the .incident i.e. on 18.05.1997, Kannan-PW2, Ramesh
  (deceased) and one Kamalakannan went. to the accused in
  order to settle the dispute amicably.· However, during
  settlement talks, fight ensued between PW-2 and Seenu and
  Balu attempted to beat PW-2 and Ramesh intervened and beat D
  Balu. Thereafter both parties left the place stating that they
  could resume settlement talks in the evening. On the evening
  at about 6. 30 P. M., Kannan-PW2, Saravanan-PW3, Suresh-
  PW5 and Arumugam-PW6 accompanied by Nagarajan went
  to Sakthi Nagar at Uruliyanpet and were having the settlement E
  talks with the accused. On the mid way, the accused persons
. were informed that their friend one Anand is being badly cut·
  by the complainant party and the accused questioned them
  as to how they could attack their man even when settlement F
  talks were going on. So saying, the accused ran towards the
  place and on seeing PW-1 and Ramesh coming. in the
  opposite direction, Giri-accused No.1 allegedly shouted that
  Ramesh supports Kannan and that he must be killed and
  accused No.1 and 2 cut Ramesh with knives or:i his head and G
 chased him. Partheeban and appellants beat Ramesh on the
 face with sticks, Giri-accused No.1 again cut Ramesh with
 knife and Ramesh fell down. When PW-2 intervened to save
 Ramesh, PW-2 was attacked and he sustained injury on his
 left hand and PW-2 ran away from the place. Accused No.1 H
714       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A and 3 chased PW-3 and accused No.2 assaulted and inflicted
  cut.injuries on the head of PW-3. They also inflicted cut injury
  on Muruganathan-PW4, who was taking bath near a watert?P·
  The witnesses ran away from the place and came back only
  after some time and they were informed that injured Ramesh
B was removed from the scene of occurrence by a police
  constable.

        3. Based on the complaint lodged by PW-1, a case was
  registered against the accused in Crime No.152/1997 under
C Sections 147, 148, 307 read with Section 149 IPC. R~mesh
  and other injured witnesses were examined by PW-11-Dr.
  Baskaran in General Hospital, Pondicherry. On 21.05.1997,
  Ramesh succumbed to injuries and the case was altered to
  Section 302 IPC. After due investigation, chargesheet was filed
D against all the five accused.

        4. To substantiate the charges, onbehalf of the
  prosecution, fifteen witnesses were examined. The trial court
  held that the prosecution has established guilt of the accused
E beyond reasonable doubt and convicted all the five accused
  under Section 148 IPC and Section 302 read with Section
  149 IPC and various other offences and sentenced them to
  undergo imprisonment for life and also imposed sentences
  for other offences. Aggrieved by the verdict of conviction,
F accused preferred appeal before the High Court. Vide
  impugned judgment dated 15.07.2005, High Court modified
  the conviction as aforesaid in para (1) and partly allowed the
  criminal appeal. Aggrieved, the appellants have preferred this
  appeal.
G
       . 5. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that
  the testimony of PW-2 who is an injured witness is not
  believable as firstly all the injured witnesses were examined
  soon after the incident in Government Hospital and they
H deposed that they were assaulted by unknown persons.
     BALU@BALASUBRAMANIAM v. STATE (U.T. OF                       715
         PONDICHERRY) [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

· However, PW-2, who was examined after three ·days, has A
  stated that he was assaulted by accused No.1-Giri and not·
  attributed any overt act to the appellants-accused No.4 and 5.
  It was further submitted that even as per the prosecution case,
  the occurrence was due to a sudden fight and that when peace
  talks were going on between the complainant and the accused -S
  party and on being informed that one Anand belonging to
  accused party was cut by the complainant party, fight ensued
  between two groups.and as the act was not committed in
  furtherance of the common intention, the High Court erred in
  convicting the appellants under Section 302 read with Section C
  341PC.

         6. Taking us through the evidence onbehalf of the
 respondent, learned Senior Counsel Mr. V. Kanagaraj
 submitted that on exhortation by Giri-accused No.1, the          D
 appellants and other accu~ed attacked deceased-Ramesh
 and injuries were caused in furtherance of common intention
 of all the accused would be liable under Section 302 read with
 Section 34 IPC for the act of committing murder'of Ramesh
 and the appellants have been rightly convicted by the courts     E
 below.

      7. We have carefully considered the rival contention and
 perused the impugned judgment and material on record.
                                                                  F
      8. Prosecution has examined fifteen witnesses out of
 which PWs 2 to .4 are injured witnesses. PW-3 Saravanan,
 PW-4 Muruganathan (nephew of accused No.3) did not support
 the prosecution case and prosecution thus relied upon the
 evidence of PW1-Murgan and PW5-Suresh and injured G
 witness PW2-Kannan. In his evidence, PW-1 stated that
 accused No.1 and 2 attacked Ramesh on his head with knives·
 and accused No. 3 to 5 attacked Ramesh on his face by stick
 and Ramesh fell down on the road. Suresh-PW5 had also
 stated that the appellants attacked Ramesh by stick. PW2- H
716         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A Kannan. injured witness stated that accused No.1-Giri and
  accused No.2- Seenu attacked Ramesh by knives on his head.
  So far as the overt act of the appellants, PW2-Kannan stated
  that Accused No. 4 and 5 took the wooden stick from a bullock
  cart standing nearby. PW-2 did not say anything about the
B overt act of the appellants. Though the appellants denied their
  presence at the place of incident and pleaded that a false case
  has been foisted against them, consistent version of PWs 1
  and 5 establish presence of the appellants and that they
  attacked Ramesh with sticks. Presence of the appellants and
C that they were armed with sticks is also substantiated by the
  evidence of injured witness KannancPW2. Findings recorded
  by the courts below that the appellants attacked Ramesh with
  sticks is unassailable.

D           9. In the facts and circumstances of the case, whether
      the High Court was right in finding that the appellants acted in
      furtherance of common intention in committing murder of
      Ramesh and whether the High Court was right in attributing
      constructive liability to the appellants while convicting them
E     under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is the point falling
      for consideration.

        10. To invoke Section 34 IPC, it must be established that
  the criminal act was done by more than one person in
F furtherance of common intention of all. It must, therefore, be
  proved that:- (i) there was common intention on the part of
  several person.s to commit a particular crime and (ii) the crime
  was actually committed by them in furtherance of that common
  intention. The essence of liability under Section 34 .IPC is
G simultaneous conscious mind of persons participating in the
  criminal action to bring about a particular result. Minds
  regarding the sharir19 of common intention gets satisfied when
  an overt act is established qua each of the accused. Common
H intention implies pre-arranged plan and acting in concert
    BALU@BALASUBRAMANIAM v. STATE (U.T. OF                                717
        PONDICHERRY) [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

pursu_ant to the pre-arranged plan. Common intention is an                A
intention to commit the crime actually committed and each
accused person c_an be convicted of that crime, only if he has
participated in that common intention.

      11. The classic case on the subject is the judgment of              B
the Privy Council in Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC
118, wherein it was held as under:-

       " ... Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in the
       doing of a criminal act. The section does not say "the             C
       common intentions of all" nor does it say "an intention
       common to all". Under the section, the essence of that
       liability is to be found in the existence of a common
       intention animating the accused leading to the doing-of
       a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. To invoke         0
       the aid of Section 34 successfully; it must be shown that
       the criminal act complained against was done by one of
      the accused persons in the furtherance of the common
       intention of all; if this is shown. then liability for the crime
       may be imposed on any one of the persons in the same               E
      manner as if the act were done by him alone. This being
      the principle, it is clear to their· Lordships that common
      ·intention within the meaning of the section implies a pre-
      arranged plan, and to convict the accus~d of an offence
    . applying the section it should be proved that the criminal          F
      act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged
      plan. As has been often observed, it is difficult if not
      impossible to procure direct evidence to prove the
      intention of an individual; in most cases it has to be
      inferred from his act or conduct or other relevant                  G
      circumstances of the case."(Underlining added)

     Reiterating the above principles laid down by the Privy
Council in Mahbub Shah's case, in Shanker/al Kacharabhai
and Others vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1260, this Court H
718         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A     held that the criminal act mentioned in Section 34 IPC is the
      result of the concerted action of more than one person and if
      the said result was reached in furtherance of the common
      intention, each person is liable for the result as if he had done
      it himself.
B
           12. In Ramesh Singh aliasphottiv. State ofA.P., (2004)
      11 SCC 305, this Court held as under:-
           "12 .... As a general principle in a case of criminal liability
           it is the primary responsibility of the person who actually
c          commits the offence and only that person who has
           committed the crime can be held guilty. By introducing
           Section 34 in the Penal Code the legislature laid down
           the principle of joint liability in doing a criminal act. The
 D         essence of that.liability is to be found in the existence of
           a common intention connecting the accused leading to
           the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention.
           Thus, if the act is the result of a common intention then
           every person who did the criminal act with that common
 E         intention would be responsible for the offence committed
           irrespective of the share which he had in its perpetration.
           Section 34 IPC embodies the principle of joint liability in
           doing the criminal act based on a common intention.
           Common intention .essentially being a state of mind it is
 F         verv difficult to procure direct evidence to prove such
           intention. Therefore, in most cases it has to be inferred
           from the act like. the conduct of the accused or other
           relevant circumstances of the case. The inference can
           be gathered from the manner in which the accused
G          arrived at the scene and mounted the attack. the
           determination and concert with which the attack was
           made. and from the nature of injury caused by one or
           some of them. The contributory acts of the persons who
           are not responsible for the injury can further be inferred
H          from the subsequent conduct after the attack. In this
    BALU@BALASUBRAMANIAM v. S'fATE (U.T. OF                      719
        PONDICHERRY) [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

     regard even an illegal omission on the part of such A
     accused can indicate the sharing of common intention ..
     In other words, the totality of circumstances must be taken
     into consideration in arriving. at the conclusion whether
     the accused had the common intention to commit an
     offence of which they could be convicted. (See Noor B
     Mohammad Mohd. Y(Jsuf. Momin v. State of
     Maharashtra, (1970) 1SCC696)" (Underlining added)
        13. Common intention is .seldom capable of direct proof,.
it is almost invariably to be inferred from proved circumstances c
relating to the entire conduct of all the persons and not only
from the individual act actually performed. The inference to be
drawn from the manner of the origin of the occurrence, the
 manner in which the accused arrived at the scene and the
concert with which attack was made and from the injuries D
 caused by one or·some of them. The criminal act actually
committed would certainly be one of the important factor to be
taken into consideration but should not be taken to be the sole
factor.
                                                                  E
        14. Under Section 34 IPC, a pre-concert in the sense of
a distinct previous plan is n.ot necessary to be proved. The
common intention to bring about a particular result may well
develop on the spot as between a number of persons, with.
reference to the facts of the case and circumstances of the F
situation. The question whether there was any common
intention ornot depends upon the inference to be drawn from
the proving facts and circumstances of each case. The totality
of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in
arriving at the. conclusion whether the accused had a common G
intention to commit an offence with which they could be
convicted. ·

     15. In the light of the above principles, considering the
present case, in our view, the facts and circumstances do not · H
720       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015) 11 S.C.R.


A indicate that there was common intention to commit murder of
  Ramesh. On 18.05.1997 in the forenoon, there were
  settlement talks which did not materialise and therefore they
  left the place stating that they could resume settlement talks in
  the evening. On the evening at about 6.30 P.M., PW2-Kannan,
B PW3-Saravanan, PW5-Suresh, Arumugam and Nagarajan
  went to Sakthi Nagar and resumed settlement talks. At that
  time, one person belonging to the accused party came and
  informed that at the corner of lane, Anand-friend of the accused
  party was cut by the person who came for the settlement talks.
C On hearing the same, Giri-Accused No.1 and Seenu-Jl.ccused
  No.2 questioned-the complainant party as to how they could
  attack their man even when settlement talks were going on
  and so saying accused No.1 and 2 took their knives which
  they were hiding behind their back and accused No. 3 to 5
0
  took sticks from a cart standing nearby attacked PWs 2, 3
  and 5. Atthattime Ramesh and his uncle PW-1 Murgan were
  coming in the opposite direction and on seeing them accused
  No.1-Giri pointing out to Ramesh, exhorted others saying that
E Ramesh belonged to Kannan party and that he be cut and by
  so saying accused No.1-Giri cut Ramesh on his head with knife
  and Seenu-Accused No.2 also attacked Ramesh with knife.
  The appellants and Partheeban-Accused No.3 have also
  attacked Ramesh with sticks on his face.
F
        16. Facts and circumstances of the case show that the
  attack was not a premeditated one nor was the.re a prior
  concert. Initially settlement talks were on and fight started only
  when the accused party was informed by their person that
G Anand was cut by complainant party and thus the incident arose
  suddenly. No doubt, common intention could develop even at
  the spur of the moment; but in the present case, the way the
  occurrence took place as depicted by the prosecution, there .
  could not have been common intention between the accused.
H The totality of the circumstances must be taken into
     BALU@ BALASUBRAMANIAM v. STATE (UT OF                        721
         PONDICHERRY) [R BANUMATHI, J.]

  consideration in order to arrive at a conclusion that the A
  appellants had a common intention to commit the offence under
· which they were convicted. The appellants were not armed
  and admittedly they are said to have removed sticks from the
  bullock cart standing nearby and on the exhortation by accused
  No.1-Giri, the appellants have attacked Ramesh. There.may B ·
  be similar intention in the minds of the assailants to attack; but
  it cannot be said that the appellants have acted in furtherance
  of common. intention to attract constructive liability under
  Section 34 IPC. The facts and circumstances, in ou·r vi~w. do
  not give rise to an inference of pre-concert.                  -   C

       17. For conviction of an offence read with Section 34
 IPC, it is necessary that there should be a finding as to the
 common intention of the participants. Though the High Court
 has modified the conviction from Section 302 read ·with D
 Section 149 !PC.as Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC,
 the High Court has not recorded any finding as to.how the
 appellants shared the common intention to establish their
 constructive liability to sustain the conviction under Section 302
 read with Section 34 IPC. The appellants are said to have E
 attacked Ramesh with sticks on his face. Ramesh sustained
 nasal bone fracture probably due to the attack on the face.
 But this cannot be said to be an act in furtherance of common
 intention to commit the murder of Ramesh along with accused F
 No.1 and 2. They are random individual acts done without
 meeting of minds and in our view, the appellants can be held
 liable only for their individual acts. Considering the totality of
 the circumstances, conviction of the appellants under Section
 302 read with Section 34 IPC cannot be sustained and the G
 same is modified as the conviction under Section 325 IPC
 and the sentence is modified to the period of imprisonment
 already undergone.

     18'. For attacking the witnesses PW2-Kannan, PW4-            H
 Muruganathan and PW5-Suresh, the appellants were convicted
722          SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A by the trial court under Section 326 read with Section 149 IPC
   and under Section 324 read with Section 149 IPC which was
   modified by the High Court. No specific overt act is attributed
   to the appellants in attacking the prosecution witnesses 2, 4
   and 5. As the appellants have not shared or acted in furtherance
B of common intention in the attack of the witnesses and therefore
   the conviction of the appellants as modified by the High Court
   under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section
   324 read with Section 34 IPC cannot be sustained and the
  ·same is liable to be set aside.
c
        19. Conviction of the appellants Balu (A-4) and Raja(A-
  5) under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is modified as
  conviction under Section 325 IPC and they are sentenced to
  undergo imprisonment to the period already undergone. Their
D conviction under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and
  under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC is set aside and
  the appellants are acquitted of those charges. The appeal is
  partly allowed to the extent indicated above. The appellants
  are on bail. Their bail bonds shall stand-discharged.
E
      Kalpana K. Tripathy                       Appeal Partly allowed.


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