Supreme Court of India
BANKATLALversusSPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER & ANR.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 977
- Decided
- 30 June 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S MUKHOPADHAYA
Holding
Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 does not apply to acquisitions under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1966, and without a statutory provision a review application cannot be entertained.
Summary
The appellant challenged land acquisition of 10.80 acres undertaken under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1966. An award was passed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in 1968, later set aside by the High Court in 1974 only on compensation grounds. While the proceedings were pending, Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act was introduced in 1984, imposing a two‑year limit for passing a fresh award. The appellant argued that Section 11A applied to the pending case and that the Collector, not being a "court", lacked power to review his own orders. The Supreme Court held that the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act is a complete code except for the incorporated provisions of the 1894 Act, and that subsequent amendments to the 1894 Act, including Section 11A, do not affect acquisitions made under the State Act. Consequently, Section 11A was not applicable, and in the absence of a statutory provision a review application cannot be entertained. The appeals were dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 applies to land acquisition proceedings conducted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1966.
- Whether the Collector, as defined under Section 3(c) of the Land Acquisition Act, possesses inherent power of review over his own orders in the absence of an express statutory provision.
- Whether a review application can be entertained when no statutory provision confers such power.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 11A, s. 3(c), s. 9(1), s. 9(2), s. 9(3)
- Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act 68 of 1984)
- Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1966s. 39, s. 45
- Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
Subjects
Land acquisitionSection 11ANagpur Improvement Trust ActReview jurisdictionCollector power of reviewStatutory amendmentIncorporation doctrineCompensation award
Judgment
[2014] 7 S.C.R. 879
BANKATLAL A
v.
SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 6087-6087A of 2002)
JUNE 30, 2014
B
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
KURIAN JOSEPH, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s. 11 A - Applicability of,
where land acquired under the provisions of Nagpur c
Improvement Trust Act, 1966 - Held: Nagpur Improvement
Trust Act, 1966 is complete code py itself except for the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which stood
legislatively incorporated in the State Act - Subsequent
·.amendments to the Land Acquisition Act including 0
amendment made vide Act 68of1984 inserting s. 11A would
have no effect on the acquisition made or to be made under
the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1966 - On facts, the land
acquisition proceedings made under the Nagpur Improvement
Trust Act, 1966 not hit by s. 11A as the said Section was
E
brought into effect after 10 years from the judgment wherein
the award was declared illegal - Nagpur Improvement Trust
Act, 1966.
Review - Review application,_ Maintainability • Held: In
absence of a statutory provision, review application cannot be F
entertained - Even in garb of clarification, earlier order cannot
be modified or corrected - On facts, it is not necessary to
decide the question as to whether the Collector has power of
review as on merit itself, thus, interference with the order
passed by the High Court not called for. G
The question which arose for consideration before
this Court was whether Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 is applicable to the cases where.
879 H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A land is acquired under the provisions of Nagpur
Improvement Trust Act, 1966.
Land which was sought to be acquired, was owned
by the predecessor in title of the appellant. Notification
was issued u/s. 39 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act,
8
1966 for acquisition of the said land. Thereafter,
declaration was issued under Section 45 of the Act.
Subsequently, notices were served u/ss. 9(3), (1) and (2)
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on the appellant's
C father:-DJS. DJS then claimed compensation. Thereafter,
award was passed u/s. 11 of the 1894 Act fixing the
compensation. DJS challenged the award before the High
Court. Subsequently, the Acquiring Authority took over
the possession of the said land. Thereafter, the High
Court set aside the award only with respect to
D compensation to be paid in favour of DJS. Subsequently,
DJS died. The appellant filed a writ petition challenging
the land acquisition proceedings and an interim stay was
granted. During pendency, Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 was brought into effect from 24th
E September, 1984. Appellant withdrew the writ petition and
subsequently filed a suit challenging the acquisition
proceedings. The respondent no. 1 by letter dated 20th
June, 1998 informed the appellant that by virtue of the
provisions contained in Section 11A of the Land
F Acquisition Act, 1894, there was no scope to pass a fresh
award in the acquisition proceedings. Respondent no. 2,
filed an applicci.tion before the respondent no. 1 for
recalling the said order. Respondent no. 1 recalled the
order dated 20th June, 1998 and ordered that the case
G be reopened. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a writ petition
contending that the Collector as defined in Section 3(c)
of the Land Acquisition Act is not a "court" and power
of review has not been expressly conferred on the
Collector, thus, has no power to review its decisions/
H
BANKATLAL v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION 881
OFFICER
orders passed; and that the respondent no. 1 did not A
consider the fact that the provisions of Section 11 A of the
Land Acquisition Act were also made applicable to the
proceedings pending on the date of the commencement
of the Act 68 of 1984 as the award was set aside by the
High Court. The High Court granted an ad-interim stay of B
the proceedings. Respondent no. 1 contended that the
Land Acquisition Officer being a court could recall his
order and, therefore, there was no illegality committed by
him in recalling the order dated 20th June, 1998. Appellant
then filed an application in the writ petition for certain C
directions to the respondents. The Division Bench of
High Court dismissed the writ petition. The review petition
against the same was also dismissed. Hence, the instant
appeal~.
D
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1966
is complete code by itself except lor the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which stood legislatively
incorporated in the State Act. The subsequent E
amendments to the Land Acquisition Act including
amendment made vide Act 68 of 1984 inserting Section
11A would have no effect on the acquisition made or to
be made under the Nagpur·lmprovement Trust Act, 1966.
[Para 25] [898-A-B] F
Gimar Traders (3) vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2011
(3) SCR 1:(2011) 3 sec 1 - followed.
Nagpur Improvement Trusts vs. Vasantrao & Others 2002
(2) Suppl. SCR 636: (2002) 7 SCC 657 - referred to. G
2. In absence of a statutory provision, review
application cannot be entertained. Even in garb of
clarification, earlier order cannot be modified or
corrected. [Para 26] [898-C] H
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A Kalabharati Advertising vs. Hemant Vimalnath
Narichania and Others 2010 (10) SCR 971:(2010) 9 SCC 437
- relied on.
3.1. Respondent No.2, contended that the appellant
8 in Writ Petition No.452/1968 challenged the land
acquisition proceedings undertaken by the respondent,
and after hearing the parties the High Court set aside the
avvard only in respect of the compensation aspect of it
in view of the declaration by the Apex Court that
C paragraphs 10(2) and 10(3) of the schedule to the Nagpur
Improvement Trust Act, insofar as they add a new Clause
3(a) to Section 23 and a proviso to sub-Section (2) of
Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are ultra vires and
violative of the guarantee of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India and for the said reasons, in the writ petition the
D Hig~ Court directed the respondent no. 1 to pass a fresh
award after taking into consideration the said aspect and
give full opportunity to the parties, only to the extent of
compensation part thereof. Respondent no. 2 submitted
that the award was set aside on technical ground,
E therefore, the matter was remitted back to the Land
Acquisition Officer with a direction to pass a fresh award.
As far as the appellant is concerned, he claims to be the
owner of the agricultural land and has no concern with
the scheme of the respondents for which other lands are
F unc;Jer consideration. The possession of the land in
question was taken long back in 1971. The answering
respondent has already developed and allotted more
than 500 flats to the economically weaker section 1981
onwards. The land was acquired for the purpose of
G implementing Nagpur Improvement Trust Scheme. After
taking the possession of the land, the land was developed
into small size plots and allotted the same to the
economically weaker sections. The submission that the
land acquisition proceedings in the instant case are not
H
BANKATLAL v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION 883
OFFICER
hit by Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as A
the said section was brought into effect on 24th
September, 1984 i.e. after 10 years from the judgment
dated 8th July, 1974 wherein the award was declared
illegal, is accepted. [Para 21] [891-H; 892-A-H]
B
3.2. In the instant case, the Division Bench of the
High Court by impugned judgment made the following
observation that "a perusal of the observation made by
this Court in the referred judgment, undoubtedly makes
it clear that the award was not set aside for want of any
procedural illegality; however, the same was quashed C
only to the extent of the provisions, came to be declared
as ultra vires by the Apex Court, which undoubtedly
deals with the aspect of compensation only." In view of
the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the
provisions of Section 11 (A) of the Land Acquisition Act D
are not attracted since the award was already made prior
to Section 11 (A) came into existence in the year 1984. The
submission of the counsel for the petitioner, in this
regard, cannot be accepted and fails." In view of such
finding, it is not necessary to decide the question as to E
whether the Collector has power of review as on merit
itself, there is no ground to interfere with the order passed
by the High Court.[Para 27, 28] [898-D-H; 899-A]
3.3. The appellant made an alternative prayer by filing F
I.A. to consider the appellant's entitlement to the benefit
of Government Resolution dated 17.01.92 but the counsel
for the respondents pointed out that the appellant had
already claimed such relief by filing a writ petition before
the High Court which was dismissed by the High Court. G
Therefore, no such relief can be granted in the instant
appeal. After judgment was reserved, the appellant filed
. another I.A. stating that "the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act" has come into force from 1st January,
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 7 S.C.R.
A 2014 but there is no inclination to decide such issue
which was not raised before the High Court or this
Court.[Para 29, 30] [899-8-D]
Case Law Reference:
B 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR636 Referred to Para 23
2011 (3) SCR 1 Followed Para 24
2010 (10) SCR 971 Relied on Para 25
~· CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
Nos.6087-6087A of 2002.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.12.2000 and
28.08.2000 Passed by Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High
Court in Misc. Civil application No. 286/2000 and Writ Petition
D No. 593/1999.
C.U. Singh, Manish Pitale, Sunil Kumar (for Chander
Shekhar Ashri) for the Appellant.
E Satyajit A. Desai, Somanath Padhan, Anagha S. Desai for
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. 1. This
F appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and orders
dated 28th August, 2000 and 19th December, 2000 passed
by the Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No.
593/99 and MCA No. 286/2000 in Writ Petition No. 593/99
respectively. By its first order, the High Court dismissed the writ
G petition preferred by the appellant and by the second order,
High Court rejected the review application filed by the appellant.
2. The question that arises for determination is whether
Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is applicable
H
BAN KATLAL v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION 885
OFFICER [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
to the cases where land is acquired under the provisions of A
Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1966.
/ 3. The factual matrix of the case are as.follows:
A Notification under Section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement
8
Trust Act, 1966 was issued for acquisition of land admeasuring
10.80 Acres' situated at Khasra No. 1/1, MOUf'. Pardi, Tah. &
District, Nagpur. Section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust
Act is similar to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
The said land was acquired for the eastern industrial area street
scheme of the second respondent. C
· 4. According to the appellant, the aforesaid land was
owned and was in possession of his predecessor in title late
Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda(grandfather of the appellant).
D
5. A declaration under Section 45 of the Nagpur
Improvement Trust Act was issued on 16th March, 1967. The
aforesaid Section 45 is similar to Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. Thereafter, a notice dated 31st July,
1967 under Section 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was
served on late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda. Simultaneously, noticed E
dated 8th August, 1967 under Section 9(1) & (2) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 was also served on late Dhanraj Jaluram
Sarda.
6. Further, the case of the appellant is that his predecessor F
in title late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda claimed compensation on
31st January, 1968 (@ Rs.2,00,000/- per acre) and thereafter,
award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was
passed on 27th April, 1968 by the first respondent. The
compensation fixed for 10.8 acres was @ Rs.8, 100/- which G
according to the first respondent was the fair market value of
the property under acquisition on the date of the first notification
i.e. 13th June, 1963. The aforesaid amount was payable with
interest @ 6% per annum w.e.f. 13th June, 1963 till the date of
payment of the said amount.
H-
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 7 S.C.R.
A 7. At that stage late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda filed a special
civil application before the Bombay High Court challenging the
award dated 27th April, 1968 and seeking a direction on
respondent no. 1 to determine the compensation payable to
him against the acquisition of his land on the basis of market
B value as provided in the Land Acquisition Act. He further prayed
to quash the notifications dated 13th June, 1963 and 16th
March, 1967 published in the government gazette insofar as it
relates to land belonging to him; Clause 10(3) of the schedule
to the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 was also challenged
c in the said writ petition. A further prayer was made to direct the
respondent no.3 to consider his application under Section 68
of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1966 and also to direct
respondent no. 1 to act according to the decision on the
application.
D 8. On 18th May, 1968, the possession of the land
belonging to late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda was taken over by the
Acquiring authority. After about a month i.e. on 10th June, 1968,
the High Court admitted the case and granted interim stay in
the said Special Civil Application No.452/1968. Subsequently,
E by judgment and order dated 8th July, 1974, the High Court
held as follows:
"Accordingly, the impugned awards in all the three cases
are set aside and the case are sent back to the Land
F Acquisition Act without the aforesaid amendments
introduced by paras 10(2) and 10(3) of the schedule to the
Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, after giving full
opportunities to the parties to make further pleadings and
lead evidence. To this extent, the petitions are allowed.
There will be no order as to costs."
G
9. From the aforesaid order, it is clear that the award dated
27th July, 1968 was set aside only with respect to
compensation to be paid in favour of late Dhanraj Jaluram
Sarda.
H
BANKATLAL v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION 887
OFFICER [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
10. According to appellant, late Dhanraj Jaluram Sarda A
executed a Will dated 1st May, 1980 whereunder the present
appellant as a legatee acquired title to and interest in the
property in question, i.e. the property which was sought to be
acquired by the respondents.
B
11. Subsequently, after the death of Dhanraj Jaluram
Sarda on 13th May, 198~, present appellant filed a Writ Petition
No. 191/1984 before the Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court
challenging the land acquisition proceedings. The same was
admitted and an interim stay was granted by the High Court
on 1st February, 1984. c
12. During the pendency of the writ petition, Section 11A
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was brought into effect from
24th September, 1984. On 19th September, 1991, the Writ
petition No. 191/1984 was withdrawn by the appellant, in effect D
the interim stay in the aforesaid writ petition ceased to exist
from that date.
13. The appellant subsequently filed a Regular Civil Suit
No.2915/1991 challenging the acquisition proceedings. As no
E
application for interim orders was preferred by the appellant,
the Trial Court did not pass any interim order or any order as
contemplated by the Explanation to Section 11 A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 in the aforesaid suit.
14. The respondent no. 1 vide its letter dated 20th June, F
,...__
1998 informed the appellant that by virtue of the provisions
contained in Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
there was no scope to pass a fresh award in the acquisition
proceedings. Respondent no. 2, filed an application before the
respondent no. 1 on 18th August, 1998 for recalling the order G
dated 20th June, 1998 passed in Revenue Case No. 105/A-
65/1966-67. The appellant filed his reply to the said application
on 18th December, 1998.
15. Respondent no. 1, thereafter, by an order dated 2nd
H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A January, 1999, reconsidered the case and recalled the order
dated 20th June, 1998 and ordered that the case be reopened.
It further fixed the case for passing an award referring the
direction of the High Court dated 8th July, 1984.
16. Aggrieved by the order dated 2nd January, 1999
B
passed by the respondent no.1, the appellant preferred Writ
Petition No. 593/1999 before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay
High Court. In the writ petition the appellant raised the following
contentions:
C (a) The Collector as defined in Section 3(c) of the Land
Acquisition Act is not a "court" and thus has no
power to review its decisions/orders passed.
(b) The power of review has to be expressly conferred
o on the Collector, which is absent under the Land
Acquisition Act.
(c) No opportunity was given to the petitioner before
the order impugned was passed.
E (d) Respondent no. 1 did not consider the fact that the
provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition
Act were also made applicable to the proceedings
pending on the date of the commencement of the
Act 68 of 1984. As the award dated 27th April,
F 1968 was already set aside by the Hon'ble High
Court vide its order dated 8th July, 1984, there was
in effect no award in existence after 8th July, 1984
and that the award had to be passed within 2 years
from the date of the order passed by the Hon'ble
G High Court or in any case, within 2 years from 19th
September, 1991, i.e., the date when the present
petitioner had withdrawn Writ Petition No. 191/1984
and the interim order had ceased to exist.
17. Initially, on 9th February, 1999, the High Court granted
H
. BANKATLAL v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION 889
OFFICER [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
an ad-interim stay of the proceedings. In the said writ petition, A
the respondent no. 1 filed its reply, contending that the land
acquisition Officer being in Court can recall his order and,
therefore, there was no illegality committed by him in recalling
the order dated 20th June, 1998.
B
18. The appellant preferred a Civil Application No.3159/
1999 in the aforesaid writ petition on 7th July, 1999, for certain
directions to the respondents. The Division Bench of the Nagpur
Bench of Bombay High Court by the impugned order dated 28th
August, 2000 dismissed the writ petition with following C
observation:
"10. A perusal of the observations made by this Court in
the above referred judgment dated 8th July, 1987
undoubtedly makes it clear that the award was not set
aside for want of any procedural illegality; however, the D
same was quashed only to the extent of the provisions,
which are referred to hereinabove, came to be declared
as ultra vires by the Apex Court, which undoubtedly deals
with t~.e aspect of compensation only.
E
12. It is, therefore, clear to us that this is not the case where
the respondents failed to pass award after Section· 11 (A)
was introduced in the Land Acquisition Act, in the year, F
1984. The award was already way back in 1967. However,
for the reasons stated hereinabove, the part of which was
based on the provisions which were not good law. The
award was quashed and set aside to that extent only and
the direction was given to consider the aspect of G
compensation by giving appropriate opportunity to the
petitioner in this regard."
19. The review petition vide M.C.A. No. 286/2000 preferred
H
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A against the same was also dismissed on 19th December, 2000
with the following observation:
"There is no quarrel with the proposition laid-down by the
Kerala High Court. However, in view of peculiar facts of
B this case, the law laid down by the Kerala High Court will
not be applicable for the reason that in the instant case,
this court did not set aside the award for want of
procedural illegality, but the same was quashed only in
respect of compensation aspect of it in view of the
declaration by the Apex Court that the provisions of
c paragraphs 10(2) and 10(3) of the schedule to the Nagyur
Improvement Trust Act insofar as they add a new Clause
•3(a) to Section 23 and a proviso to sub-section(2) ·of
Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are ultra vires and
violative of the guarantee of Article 14 of the Constitution
D of India. The operative part of the judgment dated 8.7.1974
in Special Civil Application Nos. 495/1967, 497/1967 and
452/1968 makes it abundantly clear that the matter was
remanded back for passing award only in respect of
compensation in each case on the basis of Land
E Acquisition Act. .. "
20. Lea[ne.QJ;ounsel for the appellant made the following
submissions:
(i) After insertion of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition
F
Act, there is a statutory obligation on the part of the
respondents to make an award within the stipulated period
oftwo years from the date of publication of declaration,
failing which the land acquisition proceedings shall
automatically lapse, in view of the provision of the said Act.
G
It is contended that in the instant case, after award/awards
was/were set aside in the year 1974, till now no fresh
award was passed by respondents, and, therefore, the
entire land proceedings automatically lapsed in view of
H Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act.
BANKATLAL v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION 891
OFFICER [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
(ii) That the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act is not a A
complete code in itself, insofar as acquisition of land is
concerned. Although Sections 39 and 45 of the said Act
are akin to Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, the further process of acquisition of land is
undertaken as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition B
Act, 1894. This is evident from the perusal of Sections 58,
59 onwards of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act and the
schedule appended thereto.
(iii) Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act is applicable C
to pending proceedings also. Section 11A came into
operation on 24th September, 1984 and at that time the
land acquisition proceedings with respect to land belonging
to the appellant was pending. In the case of the appellant,
Section 11 A .of the Act would thus apply from 19th
September, 1991, i.e. the date from which the appellant D
withdrew the writ petition no. 191/1984, and, therefore, the
award ought to be passed within a period of two years from
20th September, 1991. The respondents being failed to
do so within the stipulated time, the first respondent vide
its order dated 20th June, 1998 was right in law to hold E
that no award could now be passed in respect of land
related to the appellant in view of Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. Further since 19th September,
1991, no award had been passed by the first respondent
in respect of the land in question, till 9th February, 1999. F
21. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent
no.2, contended that in the instance case, Notification under
Section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act was published
on 13th June, 1963 and similarly on 16th March, 1967, the
Notification under Section 45 of the said Act was also G
published. It is contended that the respondent no. 1 also passed
an award on 27th April, 1968. It is further contended that the
appellant in Writ Petition No.452/1968 challenged the land
acquisition proceedings undertaken by the respondent, and H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A after hearing the parties the High Court on 8th July, 1974 set
aside the award only in respect of the compensation aspect of
it in view of the declaration by the Apex Court that paragraphs
10(2) and 10(3) of the schedule to the Nagpur Improvement
Trust Act, insofar as they add a new Clause 3(a) to Section 23
8 and a proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 23 of the Land
Acquisition Act are ultra vires and violative of the guarantee of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that for
the said reasons, in the writ petition the High Court directed
the respondent no. 1 to pass a fresh award after taking into
c consideration the aforesaid aspect and give full opportunity to
the parties, only to the extent of compensation part thereof.
According to the respondent no. 2, the award was set
aside on technical ground, therefore, the matter was remitted
back to the Land Acquisition Officer with a direction to pass a
D fresh award. As far as the appellant is concerned, he claims
to be the owner of the agricultural land i.e. land admeasuring
10.80 acres situate at Khasra No.1/1, Mouz Pardi.P.C. No. 17,
Teh.& Dist. Nagpur and has no concerned with the scheme of
the respondents for which other lands are under consideration.
E The possession of the land in question was taken long back in
1971. The answering respondent has already developed and
allotted more than 500 flats to the economically weaker section
1981 onwards. The land was acquired for the purpose of
implementing Nagpur Improvement Trust Scheme. After taking
F the possession of the land, the land was developed into small
size plots and allotted the same to the economically weaker
sections.
It was lastly contended that the land acquisition
G proceedings in the instant case are not hit by Section 11 A of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as the said section was brought
into effect on 24th September, 1984 i.e. after 10 years from
the judgment dated 8th July, 1974 wherein the award was
declared illegal.
H 22. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and
BANKATLAL v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION 893
OFFICER [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
circumstances of the case and the submissions made by Jhe A
learned counsel for the parties, we find ourselves in complete
agreement with the submission made on behalf of the
respondents and the decision of the High Court rendered in the
judgment impugned.
B
23. Similar question whether subsequent amendments
made to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall automaticall~
apply to the State Act i.e. Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936,
Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 and U.P. Avas Evam
Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (1 of 1966) was raised and C
considered by this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trusts vs.
Vasantrao & Others, (2002) 7 SCC 657. Relevant paragraphs
31 and 59 read as under:
"31. We shall now proceed to consider whether the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as modified D
by the State Acts stand incorporated in the State Acts or
whether there is a mere reference or citation of the Land
Acquisition Act in the State Acts. The law on the subjecf
· is well settled. When an earlier Act or certain of its
provisions are incorporated by reference into a later Act, E
the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of
the later Act as ifthey had been bodily transposed into it.
The incorporation· of an earlier Act into a later Act is a
legislative device adopted for the sake of convenience in
order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of F
the earlier Act into the later. But this must be.-distinguished
from a referential legislation which merely contains a
reference or the citation of the provisions of an earlier
statute. In a case where a statute is incorporated, by
reference, into a ·second statute, the repeal of the first G
statute by a third does not.affect the second. The later Act
along with the incorporated provisions of the earlier Act
constitutes an independent legislation which is not
modified or repealed by a modification or repeal of the.
earlier Act. However, where in a later Act there is a mere H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A reference to an earlier Act, the modification, repeal or
amendment of the statute that is referred, will also have
an effect on the statute in which it is referred. It is equally
well settled that the question whether a former statute is
merely referred to or cited in a later statute, or whether it
8 is wholly or partially incorporated therein, is a question of
construction."
"59. So far as the acquisitions under the Nagpur Act and
the U.P. Act are concerned, they have been challenged
on the ground that the notification corresponding to the
c declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act
was made more than 3 years after the expiry of the date
of the publication of the notification corresponding to the
notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.
This was on the assumption that the provisions of the
D Land Acquisition Act were not incorporated in the State
Acts but were merely referred to and the amendment of
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act by insertion of
proviso thereto by Act 13 of 1967, would apply to the
acquisitions. We have already held that the provisions
E of the Land Acquisition Act as modified by the State Acts
and the Schedule thereto stand incorporated in the State
Acts and, therefore, the subsequent amendments of
Section 6 by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and
Validation) Act, 1967 (Act 13 of 1967) or by Act 68 of
F 1984, will have no effect on the acquisition made under
the State Acts. The High Court of Allahabad has taken
this view while the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench,
Nagpur has taken the contrary view. The appeals,
therefore, which are directed against the judgment of the
G High Court of Allahabad must be dismissed and those
against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay,
Nagpur Bench, Nagpur, must be allowed. Since we have
held that the Land Acquisition Act stands incorporated
in the State Acts, with the consequence that subsequent
H amendments to the Land Acquisition Act have no effect
BANKATLAL v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION , 895
OFFICER [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
upon the acquisitions made under the State Acts, it is not A
necessary to consider the submission of Mr Rakesh
Dwivedi, Senior Advocate, that in view of the judgment
of this Court in T.M. Peter case (1980) 3 SCC 554 the
absence of any time-limit in the State Acts for issuance
of notification corresponding to the declaration under B
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act will no( expose the
State Acts· to the charge of discrimination invoking the
principles enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution."
24. Recently in Gimar Traders (3) vs. State of Maharashtra C
& Ors. (2011) 3 SCC 1, a question as to whether all provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Central Act
68 of 1984 can be read into provision under Chapter VII of
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 ('MRTP
Act' for short) for an acquisition, came up for consideration of
this Court. Question was raised as to whether Section 11A of D
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is applicable in the case of
acquisition of land under MRTP Act. The matter was referred
to a Larger Bench for consideration. In the said case the
Constitution Bench of five Judges held and observed:
E
"69. For an Act to be a "self-contained code", it is required
to be shown that it is a complete legislation for the purpose
for which it is enacted. The provisions of the MRTP Act
relate to preparation, submission and sanction of approval
of different plans by the authorities concerned which are F
aimed at achieving the object of planned development in
contradistinction to haphazard development. An owner/
person interested in the land and who wishes to object to
the plans at the appropriate stage a self-contained
adjudicatory machinery has been spelt out in the MRTP G
Act. Even the remedy of appeal is available under the
MRTP Act with a complete chapter being devoted to
acq1.,1isition of land for the planned development. Providing
adjudicatory mechanism is one of the most important
H
896 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A facets of deciding whether a particular statute is a
"complete code" in itself or not." _
"86. At the very outset, we may notice that in the preceding
paragraphs of the judgment, we have specifically held that
B the MRTP Act is a self-contained code. Once such finding
is recorded, application of either of the doctrines i.e.
"legislation by reference" or "legislation by incorporation",
would lose their significance particularly when the two Acts
can coexist and operate without conflict."
c "135. While applying any of the doctrines, the Court will
have to take care that there is no distortion or destruction
of the provisions of the principal statute. For examining this
aspect, it really would not matter whether we apply the
doctrine of incorporation or reference to the facts of the
D present case. It will have to be examined on the touchstone
of effective and complete workability while protecting
legislative intent. Primarily, we have to examine whether
incorporating provisions of Section 11-A of the Land
Acquisition Act into the provisions of the MRTP Act by
E reference would disturb the scheme of the MRTP Act and
cause legal and practical impediments in the execution of
this Act."
"137. The Court cannot lose sight of one very import;;lnt
fact that the MRTP Act is an Act relating to planned
F development and acquisition is an incidental aspect
thereof. Planned development is quite different from merely
"achieving a public purpose" for which the land is acquired
under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.
Development plan, regional plan and town planning
G scheme are major events in the development of a State.
They are controlled and guided by different financial,
architectural and public interest for the development
including macro and micro planning of the entire State.
H 138. The provisions relating to planned development of the
. BANKATLAL v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION 897
OFFICER [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
State or any part thereof, read in conjtmction with the object A
of the Act, show that different time-frames are required. for
initiation, finalisation and complete execution of such
development plans. The period of 10 years stated' in
Section 127 of the MRTP Act, therefore, cannot be said
to be arbitrary or unreasonable ex fade. If the provisions B
of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, with its
serious consequence of lapsing of entire acquisition
proceedings, are bodily lifted and read into the provisions
of the MRTP Act, it is bound to frustrate the entire scheme
and render it ineffective and uncertain. Keeping in view the c
consequence· of Section 11-A of the Central Act, every
development plan could stand frustrated only for the reason
that period of two years has lapsed and it will tantamount
to putting an end to the entire development process.
139. Another reason for rejecting the contention of the D
appellants is that for the full and complete implementation
of the scheme dehors such reservation, allotm~:nt and
designation, lands have to be acquired and .once
acquisition as argued, fails on the application of Section
11-A of the Central Act, those lands would have to be E
restored to the owners while lands of other plot owners
under the same scheme would continue to be under
reservation, allotment or designation. Even this would
render the scheme unworkable~ If the legislature has opted
not to introduce any such limitation in the MRTP Act, then F
to read the same with reference to the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act would be unjust and render the
scheme under the State Act completely unworkable. That
certainly is not the legislative intent.
G
140. Thus, in our view, reading of Section 11-A of the
Land Acquisition Act into Chapter VII of the MRTP Act
will render the substantive provisions of the State Act
ineffective, unworkable and may frustrate the object of the
Act materially."
H
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R.
A 25. In view of the aforesaid finding of this Court, we hold
that the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1966 is complete code
by itself except for the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 which stood legislatively incorporated in the State Act. The
subsequent amendments to the Land Acquisition Act including
B amendment made vide Act 68 of 1984 inserting Section 11 A
would have no effect on the acquisition made or to be made
under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1966.
26. As regards to the second limb of issue, we find
ourselves entirely in agreement with the submission that in
C absence of a statutory provision, review application cannot be
entertained. Even in garb of clarification, earlier order cannot
be modified or corrected. (See KALABHARA Tl
ADVERTISING VS. HEMANT VIMALNA TH NARICHANIA
AND OTHERS, (2010) 9 sec 437).
D
27. In the present case, the Division Bench of the High
Court by impugned judgment dated 28th August, 2000 made
"the following observation:
" 10. A perusal of the observation made by this Court in
E
the above referred judgment, dated 8th July, 1984,
undoubtedly makes it clear that the award was not set
aside for want of any procedural illegality; however, the
same was quashed only to the extent of the provisions,
which are referred to hereinabove, came to be declared
F as ultra vires by the Apex Court, which undoubtedly deals
with the aspect of compensation only."
"13. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in our opinion, the provisions of Section 11 (A) of the
G Land Acquisition Act are not attracted since the award was
already made prior to Section 11 (A) came into existence
in the year 1984. The contention of the learned counsel for
the petitioner, in this regard, cannot be accepted and must
fail."
H
BANKATLAL v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION 899
OFFICER [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
28. In view of such finding, it is not necessary to decide A
the question as to whether the Collector has power of review
as on merit itself, we find no ground to interfere with the order
' passed by the High Court.
29. Learned counsel for the appellant made an alternative
8
. prayer by filing I.A. No. 9 of 2008 to consider the appellant's
entitlement to the benefit of Government Resolution dated 17th
January, 1992 but learned counsel for the respondents pointed
out that such relief has already .been claimed by the
\ .
appellant
by filing a writ petition before the High Court which has been
dismissed by the High Court on 12th October, 2001. Therefore, C
no such relief can be granted in the present appeal.
30. After judgment was' reserved, the appellant has filed
another I.A. Nos. 13-14/2014 stating that "the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquis~Uon, D
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act" has come into force from
1st January,2014 but we are not inclined to decide such issue
which was not raised before the High Court or this Court.
31. For the reasons aforesaid, the interlocutory
applications are rejected and the appeals are dismissed. There E
shall be no order as to costs.
Nidhi Jain Appeals dismissed.
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