Holding

The appellant is not entitled to protection under s.84 IPC as he failed to prove legal insanity, and the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

The appellant, Bapu/Gajraj Singh, was convicted of murder under s.302 IPC for beheading his wife with a blood‑stained sickle. He claimed exemption under s.84 IPC, asserting that he was of unsound mind at the time of the offence. The trial court and the Rajasthan High Court rejected the plea, and the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court held that the burden of proving legal insanity rests on the accused under s.105 of the Evidence Act and that the evidence did not show that the appellant was incapable of understanding the nature or wrongfulness of his act. Consequently, the protection of s.84 IPC was not applicable and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant can invoke the defence of unsound mind under s.84 IPC.
Who bears the burden of proving legal insanity and what standard applies.
What constitutes 'unsoundness of mind' for the purpose of s.84 IPC.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Section 84 IPClegal insanityunsoundness of mindburden of proofmurdercriminal responsibilityIndian Evidence Actmental disorder

Judgment

BAPU@ GAJRAJ SINGH A
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JUNE4, 2007

[DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860 :

s.84-Exception to an offence for reason of unsound mind-Protection C
of-Accused in a room closed from inside seen carrying blood stained sickle
in one hand and chopped head of his wife in the other-Conviction uls 302
recorded by trial court-Plea of protection u/s 84 rejected by trial court as
.also by High Court-Held : Onus of proving unsoundness of mind is on the
accused-On facts, instant case is not one where protection uls 84 can be
applied-Principles underlying the provision and test of responsibility in D
cases of unsoundness of mind explained-Evidence Act, 1872-s. 105.

Maxim-'Actus non reum facit nici men's sit rea'-Applicability of

Appellant was prosecuted under s.302 IPC for killing his wife. The
prosecution case was that PWl heard some persons shouting that accused E
was beating his wife inside his house. On looking inside from the roof top
he found that accused was carrying a bood stained sickle in one hand and the
chopped head of his wife in the other. The blood was flowing on the floor from
the body. Some other also witnessed this. The trial court convicted the
accused of the charge. The plea that accused was of unsound mind and entitled
to protection u/s 84 IPC was rejected by the trial court as also by the High F
Court in the appeal.

In the instant appeal it was contended for the accused-appellant that ·
the police officials themselves wanted protection from the Court with regard
to violent behaviour of the accused; that the grandfather and the uncle of the G
accused suffered from insanity and, therefore, the trial court and the High
Court were not justified in refusing him protection u/s 84 IPC.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

917 H
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 7 S.C.R.

A HELD : 1.1. Section 84 IPC lays down the legal test of responsibility in
cases of alleged unsoundness of mind. There is no definition of "unsoundness
of mind" in the IPC. Courts have, however, mainly treated this expression as
equivalent to insanity. But the term "insanity" itself has no precise definition.
It is a term used to describe varying degrees of mental disorder. So, every
B person, who is mentally diseased, is not ipso facto exempted from criminal
responsibility. (Para 7) (922-C)

1.2. A distinction is to be made between legal insanity and medical
insanity. A court is concerned with legal insanity, and not with medical
insanity. The burden of proof rests on an accused to prove his insanity, which
C arises by virtue of Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and is not so
onerous as that upon the prosecution to prove that the accused committed
the act with which he is charged. The burden on the accused is no higher
than that resting upon a plaintiff or a defendant in a civil proceeding.
[Para 7) (922-D-E)

D Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1964) SC 1563, relied on.

1.3. Under Section 84 IPC, a person is exonerated from liability for ~--

doing an act on the ground of unsoundness of mind if he, at the time of doing
the act, is either incapable of knowing (a) the nature of the act, or (b) that he
E is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. He is, however, not protected
if he knew that what he was doing was wrong, even if he did not know that it
was contrary to law, and also if he knew that what he was doing was contrary
to law even though he did not know that it was wrong. (Para 8) [923-B-C)

1.4. Section 84 embodies the fundamental maxim of criminal law, i.e.,
F actus non reumfacit nisi mens sit rea" (an act does not constitute guilt unless
done with a guilty intention). In order to constitute an offence, the intent and
\ "-·
act must concur; but in the case of insane persons, no culpability is fastened
on them as they have no free will (furios is nulla voluntas est). The section
itself provides that the benefit is available only after it is proved that at the
time of committing the act, the accused was labouring under such a defect of
G reason, form disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing, or that even if he did not know it, it was either wrong or
contrary to law then this section must be applied. The crucial point of time
for deciding whether the benefit of this section should be given or not, is the
material time when the offence takes place. In coming to that conclusion, the I
relevant circumstances are to be taken into consideration, it would be
H
BAPU@ GAJRAJ SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 919

dangerous to admit the defence of instantly upon arguments derived merely A
from the character of the crime. It is only unsoundness of mind which
naturally impairs the cognitive faculties of the mind that can form a ground
of exemption from criminal responsibility. [Para 9 and 11] (924-A-D)

Archbold's Criminal Pleadings, Evidence and Practice, 35th Edn. Pp.31-
32, Russell on Crimes and Misdemeanors, 12th Edn. Vol.,p. 105; 1 Hala's Pleas B
• of the Grown 34 and Russell, 12 Edn. Vol. 1, p. 103; Hale PC 31 and stephen
in 'History of the Criminal law of England', vol. II, page 166, referred to.
,.
·1
1.5. Mere absence of motive for a crime, however atrocious it may be,
cannot in the absence of plea and proof oflegal insanity, bring the case within
s. 84. Behaviour, antecedent, attendant and subsequent to the event, may be c
relevant in finding the mental condition of the accused at the time of the event,
but not that remote in time, it is difficult to prove the precise state of the
offender's mind at the time of the commission of the offence, but some
indication thereof is often furnished by the conduct of the offender while
committing it or immediately after the commission of the offence. A lucid
D
interval of an Insane person is not merely a cessation of the violent symptoms
-~
of the disorder, but a restoration of the faculties of the mind sufficiently to
enable the person soundly to judge the act; but the expression does not
necessarily mean complete or prefect restoration of the mental faculties to

. their original condition. So, if there is such a restoration, the person
concerned can do the act with such reason, memory and judgment as to make E
it a legal act; but merely a cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder
is not sufficient. [Para 11) [924-E, F, H; 923-A-C)

Sherall Walli Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra (1972) Cr. LJ 1523
SC, relied on.
F
>· I
M Naughton's case. (1843) 4 St. Tr. (NS) 847, referred to.

1.6. The standard to be applied is whether according to the ordinary
standard, adopted by reasonable men, the act was right or wrong. The mere
fact that an accused is conceited, odd irascible and his brain is not quite all G
right, or that the physical and mental ailments from which he suffered had
rendered his intellect weak and had affected his emotions and will, or that he
had committed certain unusual acts, In the past or that he was liable to
recurring fits of insanity at short intervals, or that he was subject to getting
epileptic fits but there was nothing abnormal in his behaviour, or that
H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 7 S.C.R.

A behaviour was queer, cannot be sufficient to attract the application of this ,..~
'f
section. In the instant case, the order of the trial Court shows that because of
abnormal behaviour appellant was under treatment Mother of the appellant
(PW-8) stated that appellant had remained mentally fir for about four years
after treatment During trial also pursuant to Court's order he was sent for
treatment and his conduct was normal thereafter. Considering the principles
B set out in the judgment in the background facts, the instant case is not one
where the protection under Section 84 IPC can be applied. However, as and
when jail authorities feel that the appellant needs treatment, the same should
be immediately treated, preferably at the named Hospital where he was earlier )" "'
treated or any other mental hospital of repute.
c (Paras 12, 13 and 14) (925-D-G)

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1313 of
2006.
~

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2004 of the High Court
D of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Criminal Jail Appeal No. 378
of2003.
r-
C.N. Sree Kumar (A.C.) for the Appellant.

Naveen Kumar Singh, Mukul Sood, Shashwat Gupta and Aruneshwar
E Gupta for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ARIJJT PASA YAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment
of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur dismissing the
F appeal filed by the appellant who was convicted for offence punishable under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
} "
Rs.500/- with default stipulation. The order of conviction was recorded by
learned Special Judge SC/ST, (Prevention of Atrocities) and Additional Sessions
Judge, Partap Garh, Rajasthan.
G
2. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows: On 26.8.1995
at about 8 a.m. Mithu Singh (PW!) heard the scream that "run run he will kill
her". On hearing the scream he rushed towards the house of appellant where
Smt. Bhanwar Kanwar, Smt. Nand Kanwar, Smt. Jagdish Kanwar and Smt.
j
..
Mohan Kanwar were shouting. loudly. Smt. Phool Kanwar told him that the
H
BAPU fif,GAJRAJ SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [PASAYAT. J.] 921

accused is beating his wife. It was found by the infonnant on looking inside A
from the roof top that the accused was carrying a sickle in one hand and the
chopped head of Smt. Gov ind Kanwar (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased')
in other hand. The sickle was blood stained and the blood was flowing on
the floor from the body. Number of other persons including Ram Singh and
Chain Singh came to the spot. Sohanlal and Udai Singh who belonged to the
police force also reached at the spot. Constable Udai Singh climbed up to B
the roof and looked into the house. He also found that the accused was
standing in the house with the chopped head of a lady in one hand and a
blood stained sickle in the other hand. With efforts made by the people
present at the spot, door was unbolted by the accused and he was arrested
by the police. C
3. lnfonnation was lodged at Partap Garh police station at about 8.30
p.m. After investigation charge sheet was filed. To further prosecution
version 15 witnesses were examined. The learned trial Judge also examined
the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in
short the 'Cr.P.C.'). Five witnesses resiled from their statements made during D
investigation. However, considering the evidence on record the trial court
found the evidence to be credible and cogent and accordingly convicted anCI
sentenced the accused-Gajraj Singh. During trial a plea was taken that the
accused was of unsound mind and, therefore, entitled to protection under
Section 84 IPC. Same was rejected by trial Court. The High Court also found
that the plea regarding applicability of Section 84 IPC was not acceptable. It E
found that though some of the witnesses stated about the accused suffering
from unsoundness of mind, the crucial question was whether at the time of
commission of offence the accused was incapable to understand the nature
of the act committed by him or suffered from insanity and had to be given
protection under Section 84 IPC. The High Court found that Section 84 IPC F
has correctly been applied.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant with reference to the evidence of
some of the witnesses submitted that the police officials themselves wanted
protection from the Court being disturbed by the violent behaviour of the
appellant. It was submitted that grand father and the uncle of the accused G
.. suffered from insanity and, therefore, the trial Court and the High Court were
not justified in refusing the protection under Section 84 IPC .

.5. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand supported
the judgment of convictiOn as recorded by the trial Court and as upheld by H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A the High Court. According to him though there is material on record to show
that the accused appellant at some point of time suffered from unsoundness
of mind, that is not sufficient to bring in application of Section 84 IPC.
Additionally, the application filed by the father of the accused was after about
one year of the incident.

B 6. We shall first deal with the question whether Section 84, IPC has
application to the facts of the case.

7. Section 84 lays down the legal test of responsibility in cases of
alleged unsoundness of mind. There, is no definition of "unsoundness of
mind" in the IPC. Courts have, however, mainly treated this expression as
C equivalent to insanity. But the term "insanity" itself has no precise definition.
It is a term used to describe varying degrees of mental disorder. So, every
person, who is mentally diseased, is not ipso facto exempted from criminal
responsibility. A distinction is to be made between legal insanity and medical
insanity. A Court is concerned with legal insanity, and not with medical
D insanity. The burden ofproofrests on an accused to prove his insanity, which
. arises by virtue of Section I 05 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the
· 'Evid,ence Act') and is not so onerous as that upon the prosecution to prove
that the accused committed the act with which he is charged. The burden on
the accused is no higher than that resting upon a plaintiff or a defendant in
a civil proceeding. [See Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1964) SC 1563].
E In dealing with cases involving a defence of insanity, distinction must be
made between cases, in which insanity is more or less proved and the
question is only as to the degree of irresponsibility, and cases, in which
insanity is sought to be proved in respect of a person, who for all intents and
purposes, appears sane. In all cases, where previous insanity is proved or
F admitted, certain considerations have to be borne in mind. Mayne summarises
them as follows:

"Whether there was deliberation and preparation for the act; whether
it was done in a manner which showed a desire to concealment ;
whether after the crime, the offender showed consciousness of guilt
G and made efforts to avoid detections whether, after his arrest, he
offered false excuses and made false statements. All facts of this sort
are material as bearing on the test, which Bramwall, submitted to a jury
in such a case : 'Would the prisoner have committed the act if there
had been a policeman at his elbow? It is to be remembered that these
tests are good for cases in which previous insanity is more or less
H
BAPU@GAJRAJ SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [PASAYAT.J.) 923
established. These tests are not always reliable where there is, what A
Mayne calls, "inferential insanity''.

8. Under Section 84 IPC, a person is exonerated from liability for doing
an act on the ground of unsoundness of mind if he, at the time of doing the
act, is either incapable of knowing (a) the nature of the act, or (b) that he is
doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The accused is protected not B
only when, on account of insanity, he was incapable of knowing the nature
of the act, but also when he did not know either that the act was wrong or
that it was contrary to law, although he might know the nature of the act itself.
He is, however, not protected if he knew that what he was doing was wrong,
even if he did not know that it was contrary to law, and also if he knew that C
what he was doing was contrary to law even though he did not know that
it was wrong. The onus of proving unsoundness of mind is on the accused.
But where during the investigation previous history of insanity is revealed,
it is the duty of an honest investigator to subject the accused to a medical
examination and place that evidence before the Court and if this is not done,
it creates a serious infirmity in the prosecution case and the benefit of doubt D
has t9 be given to the accused. The onus, however, has to be discharged by
producing evidence as to the conduct of the accused shortly prior to the
offence and his conduct at the time or immediately afterwards, also by evidence
of his mental condition and other relevant factors. Every person is presumed
to know the natural consequences of his act. Similarly every person is also
presumed to know the law. The prosecution has not to establish these facts. E

9. There are four kinds of persons who may be said to be non compos
mentis (not of sound mind), i.e., (1) an idiot; (2) one made non compos by
illness (3) a lunatic or a mad man and (4.) one who is drunk. An idiot is one
who is of non-sane memory from his birth, by a perpetual infirmity, without F
lucid intervals; and those are said to be idiots who cannot count twenty, or
tell the days of the week, or who do not know their fathers or mothers, or
the like, (See Archbold's Criminal Pleadings, Evidence and Practice, 35th Edn.
pp.31-32; Russell on Crimes and Misdemeanors, 12th Edn. Vol., p.105; 1 Hala's
Pleas of the Grown 34). A person made non compos men-us by illness is
excused in criminal cases from such acts as are-committed while under the G
influence of his disorder, (See l Hale PC 30). A lunatic is one who is afflicted
by mental disorder only at certain periods and vicissitudes, having intervals
...... of reason, (See Russell, 12 Edn. Vol. l, p. 103; Hale PC 31). Madness is
permanent. Lunacy and madness are spoken of as acquired insanity, and
idiocy as natural insanity. H
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 7 S.C.R.

A 10. Section 84 embodies the fundamental maxim of criminal law, i.e., '(
I-..

actus non reum facit nisi mens sit rea" (an act does not constitute guilt
unless done with a guilty intention). In order to constitute an offence, the
intent and act must concur; but in the case of insane persons, no culpability
is fastened on them as they have no free will (furios is nulla voluntas est).

B 1 l. The section itself provides that the benefit is available only after it
is proved that at the time of committing the act, the accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the ,....
)-

nature and quality of the act he was doing, or that even if he did not know
it, it was either wrong or contrary to law then this section must be applied.
C The crucial point of time for deciding whether the benefit of this section
should be given or not, is the material time when the offence takes place. In
coming to that conclusion, the relevant circumstances are to be taken into
consideration, it would be dangerous to admit the: defence of insanity upon
arguwenis derived merely from the character of the crime. It is only
unsoundness of mind which naturally impairs the cognitive faculties of the
D mind that can form a ground of: exemption from criminal responsibility. Stephen
in 'History of the Criminal Law of England, Vo. II, page 166 has observed that ( ....
if a persons cut off the head of a sleeping man because it would be great fun
to see him looking for it when he woke up, would obviously be a case where
the perpetrator of the act wou Id be incapable of knowing the physical effects
E of his act. The law recognizes nothing but incapacity to realise the nature of
the act and presumes that where a man's mind or his faculties of ratiocination
are sufficiently dim to apprehend what he is doing, he must always be
presumed to intend the consequence of the action he takes. Mere absence
of motive for a crime, howsoever atrocious it may be, cannot in the absence
of plea and proof of legal insanity, bring the case within this section This
F Court in Sherall Walli Mohammedv. State of Maharashtra, (1972) Cr.LJ 1523
SC, held that the mere fact that no motive has been proved why the accused
murdered his wife and child or the fact that he made no attempt to run away
when the door was broken open would not indicate that he was insane or that
he did not have necessary mens rea for the offence. Mere abnormality of
G mind or partial delusion, irresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of a
psychopath a;fords no protection under Section 84 as the law contained in I
that section is still squarely based on the outdated Naughton rules of 19th I
Century England. The provisions of Section 84 are in substance the same as
that laid down in the answers of the Judges to the questions put to them by
,,
the House of Lords, in M Naughton 's case. ( 1843) 4 St. Tr. (NS) 847. Behaviour,
H antecedent, attendant and subsequent to the event, may be relevant in finding l
l
BAPU@GAJRAJ SINGHv. STATEOFRAJASTHAN [PASAYAT,J.] 925

..... the mental condition of the accused at the time of the event, but not that A
remote in time. It is difficult to prove the precise state of the offender's mind
at the time of the commission of the offence, but some indication thereof is
often furnished by the conduct of the offender while committing it or
immediately after the commission of the offence. A lucid interval of an insane
person is not merely a cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder, but
a restoration of the faculties of the mind sufficiently to enable the person B
soundly to judge the act; but the expression does not necessarily mean
complete or prefect restoration of the mental faculties to their original condition .
..-- ' So, if there is such a restoration, the person concerned can do the act with
such reason, memory and judgment as to make it a legal act ; but merely a
cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder is not sufficient. c
12. The standard to be applied is whether according to the ordinary
standard, adopted by reasonable men, the act was right or wrong. The mere
fact that an accused is conceited, odd irascible and his brain is not quite all
right, or that the physical and mental ailments from which he suffered had
rendered his intellect weak and had affected his emotions and will, or that he D
.. )
had committed certain unusual acts, in the past or that he was liable to
recurring fits of insanity at short intervals, or that he was subject to getting
epileptic fits but there was nothing abnormal in his behaviour, or that his
behaviour was queer, cannot be sufficient to attract the application of this
section.
E
13. Order of the trial Court shows that because of abnormal behaviour
appellant was under treatment. Mother of the appellant (PW-8) stated that
appellant had remained mentally fit for about four years after treatment.
During trial also pursuant to Court's order he was sent for treatment and his
conduct was normal thereafter. F
... • 14. Considering the principles set out above in the background facts,
the present case is not one where the protection under Section 84 IPC can
be applied. However, as and when jail authorities feel that the appellant needs
treatment, the same should be immediately treated, preferably at Man Singh
Medical Hospital, Jaipur, where he was earlier treated or any other mental G
hospital of repute.

15. Appeal is without any merit and is dismissed.

RP. Appeal dismissed.
H