Supreme Court of India
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIAversusUNION OF INDIA
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 314
- Decided
- 3 August 2012
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- RAJENDRA MAL LODHA
Holding
Chapter VI‑A (Sections 22‑A to 22‑E) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 is constitutionally valid and does not violate Articles 14, 21, or the rule of law.
Summary
The Bar Council of India challenged the constitutional validity of Sections 22‑A to 22‑E of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (as inserted by the 2002 Amendment), arguing that they were arbitrary, violated Articles 14 and 21, denied a right of appeal and encroached on the jurisdiction of special statutes. The Supreme Court examined whether a Permanent Lok Adalat, an alternative dispute‑resolution mechanism for public‑utility disputes, could adjudicate matters without being bound by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Evidence Act, and whether its composition of judicial and non‑judicial members compromised independence. Relying on the earlier decision in S.N. Pandey v. Union of India and principles of Article 39‑A, the Court held that Chapter VI‑A is a valid legislative scheme, not violative of Articles 14, 21 or the rule of law, and that the absence of a statutory right of appeal does not render the provisions unconstitutional. The Court also clarified that Permanent Lok Adalats are complementary to, not a derogation of, special tribunals, and that their awards are subject to supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed.
Issues considered
- The constitutionality of Sections 22‑A to 22‑E of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
- Whether the lack of a statutory right of appeal from Permanent Lok Adalat awards violates the rule of law
- Whether the jurisdiction of Permanent Lok Adalats infringes upon the jurisdiction of special statutes such as the Consumer Protection Act, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act and the Insurance Act
- Whether the composition of Permanent Lok Adalats (judicial and non‑judicial members) compromises independence and fairness
- Whether the provisions are arbitrary per se and contrary to Article 39‑A
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 141, s. Article 21, s. Article 226, s. Article 227, s. Article 32, s. Article 39-A
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872
- Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987s. 22-A, s. 22-B, s. 22-C, s. 22-D, s. 22-E
Subjects
Legal Services Authorities ActPermanent Lok AdalatPre‑litigation conciliationPublic utility servicesConstitutional validityArticle 14Article 21Alternative dispute resolutionTribunal jurisdictionRight of appeal
Judgment
[2012] 6 S.C.R. 1094
A BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA
v.
UNION OF INDIA
(Writ Petition (Civil ) No. 666 of 2002)
AUGUST 3, 2012
B
[R.M. LODHA AND ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.)
Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 - Chapter VI-A (ss.
22-A to 22-E) [as inserted by Legal Services Authorities
C (Amendment) Act, 2002] - Pre-litigation conciliation and
settlement - Establishment of Permanent Lok Ada/at - For
settlement of disputes in matters of public utility services -
Constitutional validity of - Held: Chapter VJ-A is
constitutionally valid - It is not violative of Articles 14 and 2t
o of the Constitution nor contrary to rule of law, fairness and
even-handed justice - It is an alternative institutional
mechanism for settlement of disputes concerning public utility
services - Legislature has the power to set up such
mechanism - It is in addition to and not in derogation of for a
E provided under special statutes - It is not a constitutional right
to have dispute adjudicated by means of court only - Not
making CPC and evidence Act applicable to the Lok Ada/at
does not make its justice delivery ineffective as the Ada/at has
to follow the principles of na_tural justice - Absence of right to
F appeal also does not make the provisions unconstitutional -
The independence of the Lok Adalats have a/so not been
compromised - Since the challenge to the provisions has
already been decided by Supreme Court in an earlier case
on merits and dismissed, deciding the same issues again is
G against public policy - Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles
39-A, 14, 21 and 141 - Precedent.
Appeal - Held: There is no inherent right of appeal -
Appeal is a creature of statute - Non providing of appeal in
H - 1094
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1095
a statute by itself may not render that statute unconstitutional A
- Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.
The petitioner challenged the vires of Chapter VIA
comprising of ~s. 22-A to 22-E of the Legal Services
Authorities Act, 1987, as inserted by the Legal Services 8
Authorities (Amendment) Act, 2002. The provisions were
challenged on the ground that the same were arbitrary
per se, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India
and were contrary to the rule of law as they denied fair,
unbiased and even-handed justice to all.
c
The respondent-State interalia contended that the
issues raised in the present writ petition sin~e already
been decided in S.N. Pandey v. Union of India (Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 543/2002 decided by Supreme Court on
28.10.2002), the present petition deserved to be D
dismissed on this ground alone.
Dismissing the petition, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Article 39-A came to be inserted in the
Constitution by Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 E
with effect from 3.1.1977. It enjoins upon the State to
secure that the operation of the legal system promotes
justice on the basis of equal opportunity and in particular
to provide free legal aid by suitable legislation or
schemes or in any other way and to ensure that F
opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any
citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. Equal
justice to all and free legal aid are hallmark of Article 39-
A. Pursuant to these objectives, the 1987 Act was
enacted by the Parliament to constitute legal services G
authorities to provide free and competent legal services
to the weaker sections of the society to ensure that
opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any
citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities, and
to organize Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of H
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal
opportunity. It was felt that the system of Lok Adalats
provided in the 1987 Act sometimes results in delaying
the dispensation of justice where the parties do not arrive
at any compromise or settlement in Lok Adalat and the
B case is returned to the court of law or the parties are
advised to pursue appropriate remedy for redressal of
their grievance. Accordingly, amendment in the 1987 Act
was felt by the Parliament to be necessary. [Paras 10 and
11] [1107-E-G; 1108-A; 1109-F-G]
c 1.2. Chapter VI-A inserted by the 2002 Amendment
Act in 1987 Act, as its title suggests, provides for pre-
litigation. conciliation and settlement procedure. The
disputes relating to public utility service like transport
service for carriage of passengers or goods by air, road
D or water or postal, telegraph or telephone ~ervice or
supply of power, light or water or public conservancy
system or sanitation or service in hospital or dispensary
or insurance service, etc., in the very scheme of things
deserve to be settled expeditiously. Prolonged dispute in
E respect of the above matters between the service
provider and an aggrieved party may result in
irretrievable damage to either party to the dispute. Today,
with increasing number of cases, the judicial courts are
not able to cope with the heavy burden of inflow of cases
F and the matters coming before them. The disputes in
relation to public utility service need urgent attention with
focus on their resolution at threshold by conciliation and
settlement and if for any reason such effort fails, then to
have such disputes adjudicated through an appropriate
G mechanism as early as may be possible. With large
populatio!J in the country and many public utility services
being provided by various service providers, the disputes
in relation to these services are not infrequent between
the service providers and common man. Slow motion
H procedures in the judicial courts are not conducive for
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1097
adjudication of disputes relating to public utility service. A
[Para 18] [1114-H; 1115-A-E]
1.3. The statement of objects and reasons itself spells
out the salient features of Chapter VI-A. By bringing in
this law, the litigation concerning public utility service is 8
sought to be nipped in the bud by first affording the
parties to such dispute an opportunity to settle their
dispute through the endeavours of the Permanent Lok
Adalat and if such effort fails then to have the dispute
between the parties adjudicated through the decision of C
the Permanent Lok Adalat. The mechanism provided in
Chapter VI-A enables a party to a dispute relating to
public utility service to approach the Permanent Lok
Adalat for the settlement of dispute before the dispute is
brought before any court. [Para 19] [1115-F-H]
D
1.4. Settlement of dispute between the parties in
matters of public utility services is the main theme.
However, where despite the endeavours and efforts of
the Permanent Lok Adalat the settlement between the
parties is not through and the parties are required to have E
their dispute determined and adjudicated, to avoid delay
in adjudication of disputes relating to pu'blic utility
services, the Parliament has intervened and conferred
power of adjudication upon the Permanent Lok Adalat.
The power conferred on Permanent Lok Adalats to F
adjudicate the disputes between the parties concerning
public utility service upto a specific pecuniary limit, if they
do not relate to any offence, as provided under Section
22-C(S), cannot be said to be unconstitutional and
irrational. [Para 22] [1116-G-H; 1117-A-B]
G
1.5. An authority empowered to adjudicate the
disputes between the parties and act as a tribunal may
not necessarily have all the trappings of the court. What
is essential is that it must be a creature of statute and
should adjudicate the dispute between the parties before H
1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 6 S.C.R.
A it after giving reasonable opportunity to them consistent
with the principles of fair play and natural justice. It is not
a constitutional right of any person to have the dispute
adjudicated by means of a court only. Chapter VI-A has
been enacted to provide for an institutional mechanism,
B through the establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats for
settlement of disputes concerning public utility service
before the matter is brought to the court and in the event
of failure to reach any settlement, empowering the
Permanent Lok Adalat to adjudicate such dispute if it
c does not relate to any offence. [Para 22) [1117-C-E]
1.6. Parliament can definitely set up effective
alternative institutional mechanisms or make
arrangements which may be more efficacious than the
ordinary mechanism of adjudication of disputes through
D the judicial courts. Such institutional mechanisms or
arrangements by no stretch of imagination can be said
to be contrary to constitutional scheme or against the
rule of law. The establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats
and conferring them jurisdiction upto a specific pecuniary
E limit in respect of one or more public utility services as
defined in Section 22-A(b) before the dispute is brought
before any court by any party to the dispute is not
anathema to the rule of law. Instead of ordinary civil
courts, if other institutional mechanisms are set up or
F arrangements are made by the Parliament with an
adjudicatory power, such institutional mechanisms or
arrangements cannot be faulted on the ground of
arbitrariness or irrationality. [Para 20) [1116-A-D]
G 1.7. It is not correct to say that the service provider
may pre-empt the consideration of a dispute by a court
or a forum under special statute by approaching the
Permanent Lok Adalat established under Chapter VI-A of
the 1987 Act and, thus, depriving the user or consumer
of such public utility service of an opportunity to have the
H
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1099
dispute adjudicated by a civil court or a 'forum created A
under special statute. In the first place, the jurisdiction of
fora created under the Special Statutes has not been
taken away in any manner whatsoever by the impugned
provisions. The Permanent Lok Adalats are in addition to
and not in derogation of fora provided under Special B
Statutes. Secondly, not a single instance has been cited
where a provider of service of public utility in a dispute
with its user has approached the Permanent Lok Adalat
first. [Para 28] [1120-E-H]
1.8. By not making applicable the Code of Civil C
Procedure and the statutory provisions of the Evidence
Act, there is no compromise on the quality of
determination of dispute since the Permanent Lok Adalat
has to be objective, decide the dispute with fairness and
follow the principles of natural justice. Sense of justice D
and equity continue to guide the Permanent Lok Adalat
while conducting conciliation proceedings or when the
conciliation proceedings fail, in deciding a dispute on
merit. [Para 29] [1121-B-C]
E
1.9. In view of the composition of Central Authority
and the State Authority, it is misconceived to say that the
judiciary has been kept out in the appointment of
members of the Permanent Lok Adalats. The
independence of Permanent Lok Adalats does not seem F
to have been compromised at all as even the non-judicial
members of every Permanent Lok Adalat have to be
appointed on the recommendation of a high powered
Central or State Authority headed by none other than the
Chief Justice of India or a serving or retired Judge of the G
Supreme Court where the nomination is made by the
Central Government or by the Chief Justice of the. State
High Court or a serving or retired Judge of the High Court
where the nomination is made by the State Government.
[Para 30] [1122-A-D]
H
1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A 1.10. It is· not unusual to have the tribunals
comprising of judicial as well as non-judicial members.
The whole idea of having non-judicial members in a
tribunal like Permanent Lok Adalat is to make sure that
the legal technicalities do not get paramountcy in
B conciliation or adjudicatory proceedings. The fact that a
Permanent Lok Adalat established under Section 22-B
comprises of one judicial officer and two other persons
having adequate experience in public utility service does
not show any abhorrence to the rule of law nor such
c composition becomes violative of principles of fairness
and justice or is contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India. [Para 31) [1122-E-G]
1.11. It is true that the award made by the Permanent
Lok Adalat under 1987 Act has to be by majority of the
D persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. In a
given case, it may be that the two non-judicial members
disagree with the judicial member but that does not mean
that such majority decision lacks in fairness or sense of
justice. [Para 32) [1122-G-H]
E
1.12. There is no inherent right of appeal. Appeal is
always a creature of statute and if no appeal is provided
to an aggrieved party in a particular statute, that by itself
may not render that statute unconstitutional. Section 22-
F E(1) makes every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat
under 1987 Act either on merit· or in terms of a settlement,
final and binding on all the parties thereto and on persons
claiming under them. No appeal is provided from the
award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat but that,
does not render the impugned prov1s1ons
G unconstitutional. In the first place, having regard to the
nature of dispute upto a specific pecuniary limit relating
to public utility service and resolution of such dispute by
the procedure provided in Section 22-C(1) to 22-C(8), it
is important that such dispute is brought to an end at the
H
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1101
earliest and is not prolonged unnecessarily. Secondly, A
and more importantly, if at all a party to the dispute has
a grievance against the award of Permanent Lok Adalat
he can always approach the High Court under its
supervisory and extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of .India. [Para 33] [1123- B
A-D]
The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram
Wadke ofBombay and Ors. (1976) (1) SCC 496: 1976 (1)
SCR 427; Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. N.K. Modi C
(1996) 6 sec 385: 1996 (4) Suppl. SCR 820; Skypak
Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. (2000) 5 SCC 294: 2000
(1) Suppl. SCR 324; Trans Mediterranean Airways v.
Universal Exports and Anr. (2011) 10 SCC 316: 2011 (14)
SCR 47; National Seeds Corporation Limited v. M.
Madhusudhan Reddy and Anr. (2012) 2 SCC 506; Secretary, D
Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M.
Lalitha (Dead) through LRs. and Ors. (2004) 1 SCC 305:
2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 659; Kishore Lal v. Chairman,
Employees' State Insurance Corpn. (2007) 4 SCC 579: 2007
(6) SCR 139; Mis. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam E
Sundar Jhunjhunwala and Ors. 1962 (2) SCR 339; Associated
Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N.Sharma and Anr. (1965) 2
SCR 366; Kihoto Hol/ohan v. Zachi/lhu and Ors.1992 Supp
(2) SCC 651: 1992 (1) SCR 686; Union of India v. R. Gandhi,
President, Madras Bar Association 2010 (2010) 11 SCC 1: F
2010 (6) SCR 857 - referred to.
2. The challenge to the validity of the impugned
provisions came up before this Court in S.N. Pandey
Case*. Although the disposal of writ petition in S.N. G
Pandey was in limine and the order is brief, but the Court
disposed of the same on merits. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the order passed therein cannot be construed
as a binding precedent; and that the said decision does
not declare any law under Article 141 of the Constitution.
It is against public policy and well defined principles of H
1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A judicial discretion to entertain or hear petitions relating
to same subject matter where the matter was heard and
dismissed on an earlier occasion. [Paras 34, 35 and 36]
[1123-F; 1124-F-H; 1125-C]
B. Prabhakar Rao and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh
8
and Ors.1985(Supp) SCC 432; Union of India and Ors. v.
Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 SCC 121: 2003 (5) Sup.pl. SCR 115
- relied on.
*S.N. Pandey v. Union of India Judgement in Writ
C Petition (Civil) No. 543 of 2002 passed by Supreme Court
on 22.10.2002; B. Sha ma Rao v. Union Territory of
Pondicherry AIR 1967 SC 1480: 1967 SCR 650; Municipal
Corporation of Delhi v. Gumam Kaur (1989) 1 SCC 101: 1988
(2) Suppl. SCR 929; State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999)
D 6 SCC 172: 1999 (3) SCR 977 - referred to.
Case Law Reference:
1976 (1) SCR 427 Referred to Para 7
E 1996 (4) Suppl. SCR 820 Referred to Para 7
2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 324 Referred to Para 7
2011 (14) SCR 47 Referred to Para 7
2012 (2) sec 506 Referred to Para 7
F
2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 659 Referred to Para 7
2007 (6) SCR 139 Referred to Para 7
1985 (Supp) sec 432 Relied on Para 9
G 2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 115 Relied on Para 9
1967 SCR 650 Referred to Para 9
1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 929 Referred to Para 9
H 1999 (3) SCR 977 Referred to Para 9
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1103
1962 (2) SCR 339 Referred to Para 23 A
1965 (2) SCR 366 Referred to Para 24
1992 (1) SCR 686 Referred to Para 25
2010 (6) SCR 857 Referred to Para 26 B
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.
666 of 2002.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
Manoj Goel, Shuvodeep Roy, Wajeeh Shafiq, Gopal C
Verma, Shashank Kathuria (for Brij Bhusan) for the Petitioner.
T.S. Doabia, Rashmi Malhotra, Sunita Sharma (for B.V.
Balramdas) for the Respondent.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R.M. LODHA, J. 1. Bar Council of India by means ofthjs
writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has
raised challenge to the vires of Sections 22-A; 22-B, 22-C, 22-
D and 22-E of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for E
short, '1987 Act') as inserted by the Legal Services Authorities
(Amendment) Act, 2002 (for short, '2002 Amendment Act').
2. By 2002 Amendment Act, in Section 22 of the 1987 Act,
the words "Lok Adalat" were substituted by "Lok Adalat or F
Permanent Lok Adalat" and a new Chapter VI-A entitled "Pre-
litigation Conciliation and Settlement" comprising of Sections
22-A to 22-E came to be inserted. In Section 23 of the 1987
Act, the words "members of the Lok Adalats" were substituted
by the words "members of the Lok Adalats or the persons G
constituting Permanent Lok Adalats".
3. The challenge is principally ort the ground that Sections
22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D and 22-E are arbitrary per se; violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and are contrary to the
H
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A rule of law as they deny fair, unbiased and even-handed justice
to all.
4. We have heard Mr. Manoj Goel, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. T. S. Doabia, learned senior counsel for the
Union of India. After oral arguments were over, Mr. Manoj Goel,
8
learned counsel for the petitioner has also filed written
submissions. Elaborating the vice of arbitrariness in the
impugned provisions, in the written submissions, it is submitted
that Section 22-C(1) read with Section 22-C(2) provides that
C a dispute before Permanent Lok Adalat can be raised by
moving an application to it unilaterally by any party to the dispute
(before the dispute is brought before any court for settlement).
The public utility service provider, thus, can play mischief by pre-
empting an aggrieved consumer from going to the consumer
fora or availing other judicial process for redressal of his
D grievance and enforcement of his rights. Permanent Lok
Adalats have been empowered to decide dispute on merits
upon failure between the parties to arrive at a settlement under
Section 22-C(8). While deciding the case on merits, the
Permanent Lok Adalat is not required to follow the provisions
E of the Civil Procedure Code or the Evidence Act. Section 22-
C(8) prevents the courts and the consumer fora to examine the
deficiencies in services such as transport, postal and telegraph,
supply of power, light or water, public conservancy or sanitation,
service in hospital, etc. and renders the provisions under
F challenge arbitrary and irrational.
5. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that
award of the Permanent Lok Ada lat on merits is made final and
binding and cannot be called in question in any forum or court
of law under Section 22-E(1) and (4). No right to appeal has
G been provided for against the award in any court of law. Since
all the public utility services basically relate to the fundamental
right to life provided under Article 21 of the Constitution, any
adverse decision on merits by Permanent Lok Adalat would
immediately impinge upon fundamental right of an aggrieved
H
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1105
[R.M. LODHA, J.]
citizen and, therefore, even absence of one right of appeal A
. makes these provisions unconstitutional as it is against the
fundamental principles of fair procedure. To say that an
aggrieved person can approach the High Court under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution against awards given by the
Permanent Lok Adalats on merits and, therefore, absence of B
right of appeal does not matter, is completely misplaced. The
writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 is extremely limited and
is no substitute of the appellate jurisdiction.
6. An argument was raised that though Permanent Lok
Adalat supplants the civil court, consumer court or motor C
accident claims tribunal yet its mechanism and delivery of
justice are not as effective as the above fora as the Permanent
Lok Adalat is not required to follow the procedure contemplated
in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Act. Moreover
an award given on merits by Permanent Lok Adalat has to be D
by majority and since Permanent Lok Adalat consists of one
judicial member and two administrative members, there is
preponderance of administrative members which is against
fundamental principles of justice enshrined in the Constitution.
E
7. It was strenuously submitted on behalf of the petitioner
' that the jurisdiction conferred upon Permanent Lok Adalat can
not oust the jurisdiction of the fora created under specialized
statutes dealing with the services referred to in Section 22-A(b).
In this regard, the provisions contained in three specialized F
statutes, namely, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, The
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 and the
Insurance Act, 1938 were referred. By relying upon a decision
of this Court in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kam/ekar
Shantaram Wadke of Bombay and Others1, in the written G
arguments it has been submittedthat the consumer fora as well
as specialized courts/tribunals under the Telecom Regulatory
Authority of India Act, 1997 and the Insurance Act, 1938 have
exclusive jurisdiction as far as enforcement of rights under
1. (1976) (1) sec 496 H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A these statutes are concerned and their jurisdiction can not be
taken away by Permanent Lok Adalat. Particularly, with .
reference to the provisions contained in the Consumer
Protection Act, it is submitted that compensatory remedies
available under this law are in addition to and not in derogation
B of any other law and since Permanent Lok Adalats have no
jurisdiction to grant compensatory relief, the jurisdiction of the
consumer fora remains intact. Reliance has been placed on the
decisions of this Court in Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. and
another v. N.K. Modi2, Skypak Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals
c Ltd. 3, Trans Mediterranean Airways v. Universal Exports and
anothef' and National Seeds Corporation Limited v. M.
Madhusudhan Reddy and another5 . National Seeds
Corporation Limited5 was also pressed into service in support
of the submission that consumer protection laws were enacted
pursuant to the solemn international obligations of our country
0
and, therefore, the Permanent Lok Adalats cannot oust the
jurisdiction of the consumer courts. It is also submitted that the
jurisdiction of the consumer courts is protected unless it is
expressly b.arred even in cases where some disputes can be
E adjudicated in different fora. Two decisions of this Court in this
regard, namely, Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative
Agricultural Credit Society v. .M. Lalitha (Dead) through LRs.
and Others6 and Kishore Lal v. Chairman, Employees' State
Insurance Corpn7 . have been relied upon.
F 8. Mr. T.S. Doabia, learned senior counsel for the Union
of India, on the other hand, submitted that the issues raised in
the writ petition have already been decided by this Court in S.N.
Pandey v. Union of India (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 543/2002;
2. (1996) 6 sec 385.
G
3. c2000) 5 sec 294.
4. c2011) 10 sec 316.
5. c2012) 2 sec 506.
6. c2004) 1 sec 305.
H 7. c2007) 4 sec 579.
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1107
[R.M. LODHA, J.]
decided on 28.10.2002) and the writ petition deserves to be A
dismissed on this ground alone. He submitted that the
impugned provisions are in conformity with the objectives of
Article 39A and intended to provide an affordable, speedy and
efficient mechanism to secure justice.
B
9. As regards decision of this Court in S.N. Pandey
(supra), the counsel for the petitioner in rejoinder would submit
that the dismissal of the earlier writ petition was in limine and
would not be a binding precedent. The decisions of this Court
in 8. Prabhakar Rao and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh
and others8, Union of India and others v. Jaipal Singh 9 were
c
relied upon. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted
that in the earlier writ petition, there was no law declared under
Article 141 of the Constitution since points now raised in the
present writ petition were neither argued nor discussed. In this
regard, the learned counsel referred to the two decisions of this D
Court in· 8. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry10,
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur11 and State
of Punjab v. 8aldev Singh 12•
10. Article 39-A came to be inserted in the Constitution E
by Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from
3.1.1977. It enjoins upon the State to secure that the operation
of the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal
opportunity and in particular to provide free legal aid by suitable
legislation or schemes or in any other way and to ensure that F
opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen
by reason of economic or other disabilities. Equal justiGe to all
and free legal aid are hallmark of Article 39-A. Pursuant to these
objectives, the 1987 Act was enacted by the Parliament t.o
constitute legal services authorities to provide free and G
8. 1985 {Supp) sec 432.
9. (2004) 1 sec 121.
10. AIR 1967 SC 1480.
11. (1989) 1 sec 101.
12. (1999) 6 sec 112. H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A competent legal services to the weaker sections of the society
to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied
to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities, and
to organize Lok Ada lats to secure that the operation of the legal
system promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity. The
B statement of objects and reasons that led to enactment of 1987
Act reads as follows :
"Article 39-A of the Constitution provides that the State
shall secure that the operation of the legal system
promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity, and
c shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable
legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that
opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any
citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.
D 2. With the object of providing free legal aid, Government
had, by Resolution dated the 26th September, 1980
appointed the "Committee for Implementing Legal Aid
Schemes" (CILAS) under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice
P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was) to monitor and implement
E legal aid programmes on a uniform basis in all the States
and Union territories. CILAS evolved a model scheme for
legal Aid programme applicable throughout the country by
which several legal aid and advice boards have been set
up in the States and Union territories. CILAS is funded
wholly by grants from the Central Government. The
F
Government is accordingly concerned with the programme
of legal aid as it is the implementation of a constitutional
mandate. But on a review of the working of the CILAS
certain deficiencies have come to the fore. It is, therefore,
felt that it will be desirable to constitute statutory legal
G
service authorities at the National, State and District levels
so as to provide for the effective monitoring of legal aid
programmes. The Bill provides for the composition of such
authorities and for the funding of these authorities by
means of grants from the Central Government and the
H
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1109
[R.M. LODHA, J.]
State Governments. Power has been also given to the A
National Committee and the State Committees to
supervise the effective implementation of legal aid
schemes.
3. For some time now, Lok Adalats are being 8
constituted at various places in the country for the disposal,
in a summary way and through the process of arbitration
and settlement between the parties, of a large number of
cases expeditiously and with lesser costs. The institution
of Lok Adalats is at present functioning as a voluntary and
conciliatory agency without any statutory backing for its C
decisions. It has proved to be very popular in providing for
a speedier system of administration of justice. In view of
its growing popularity, there has been a demand for
providing a statutory backing to this institution and the
awards given by Lok Adalats. It is felt that such a statutory D
support would not only reduce the burden of arrears of work
in regular Courts, but would also take justice to the door-
steps of the poor and the needy and make justice quicker
and less expensive."
E
11. For about a decade and half, the operation of the 1987
Act was closely watched. It was felt that the system of Lok
Adalats provided in the 1987 Act sometimes results in delaying
the dispensation of justice where the parties do not arrive at
any compromise or settlement (n Lok Adalat and the case is F
returned to the court of law or the parties are advised to pursue
appropriate remedy for redressal of their grievance.
Accordingly, amendment in the 1987 Act was felt by the
Parliament to be necessary. The statement of objects and
reasons of the 2002 Amendment Act, inter alia, reads as under: G
"The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 was enacted
to constitute legal services authorities for providing and
competent legal services to the weaker sections of the
society to ensure that opportunities for securing justice
were not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or H
1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A other disabilities and to organize Lok Adalats to ensure
that the operation of the legal system promoted justice on
a basis of equal opportunity. The system of Lok Adalat,
which is an innovative mechanism for alternate dispute
resolution, has proved effective for resolving disputes in a
B spirit of conciliation outside the Court.
2. However, the major drawback in the existing scheme
of organisation of the Lok Adalats under Chapter VI of the
said Act is that the system of Lok Adalats is mainly based
on compromise or settlement between the parties. If the
c parties do not arrive at any compromise or settlement, the
case is either returned to the Court of law or the parties
are advised to seek remedy in a Court of law. This causes
unnecessary delay in the dispensation of justice. If Lok
Adalats are given power to decide the cases on merits in
D case parties fails to arrive at any compromise or
settlement, this problem can be tackled to a great extent.
Further, the cases which arise in relation to public utility
services such as Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited,
Delhi Vidyut Board, etc., need to be settled urgently so that
E people get justice without delay even at pre-litigation stage
and thus most of the petty cases which ought not to go in
the regular Courts would be settled at the pre-litigation
stage itself which would result in reducing the workload of
the regular Courts to a ·great extent. It is, therefore,
F proposed to amend the Legal Service Authorities Act,
1987 to set up Permanent Lok Adalats for providing
compulsory pre-litigative mechanism for conciliation and
settlement of cases relating to public utility seniices.
3. The salient features of proposed legislation are as
G
follows:-
(i) to provide for the establishment of Permanent Lok
Adalats which shall consists (sic) of a Chairman who is or
has been a District Judge or Additional District Judge or
H has held judicial officer (sic) higher in rank than that of the
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1111
[R.M. LODHA, J.]
District Judge and two other persons having adequate A
experience in public utility services;
(ii) the Permanent Lok Adalat shall exercise
jurisdiction in respect of one or more public utility services
such as transport services of passengers of goods by air,
B
road and water, postal, telegraph or telephone services,
supply of power, light or water to the public by any
establishment, public conservancy or sanitation, services
in hospitals or dispensaries, and insurance services;
(iii) the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok C
Adalat shall be up to Rupees Ten Lakhs. However, the
Central Government may increase the said pecuniary
jurisdiction from time to time. It shall have no jurisdiction
in respect of any matter relating to an offence· not
compoundable under any law; D
(iv) it also provides that before the dispute is brought
before any Court, any party to the dispute may make an
application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for settlement of
the dispute;
E
(v) where it appears to the Permanent Lok Adalat
that there exist elements of a settlement, which may be
acceptable to the parties, it shall formulate the terms of a
possible settlement and submit them to the parties for their
observations and in case the parties reach an agreement, F
the Permanent Lok Adalat shall pass an award in terms
thereof. In case parties to the dispute fail to reach an
agreement, the Permanent Lok Adalat shall decide the
dispute on merits; and
G
(vi) every award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat
shall be final and binding on all the parties thereto and shall
be by a majority of the persons constituting the Permanent
Lok Adalat."
12. With the above objectives, 2002 Amendment Act was H
1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A enacted by the Parliament and thereby Chapter VI-A (Sections
22-A to 22-E) was brought in with few other consequential
amendments elsewhere.
13. The title of Chapter VI-A is "Pre-litigation Conciliation
and Settlement". Section 22-A(a) defines "Permanent Lok
8
Adalat" to mean a Permanent Lok Adalat established under
sub-section (1) of Section 22-B. "Public utility service" is
defined in Section 22-A(b). It means (i) transport service for the
carriage of passengers or goods by air, road or water; or (ii)
postal, telegraph or telephone service; or (iii) supply of power,
C light or water to the public by any establishment; or (iv) system
of public conservancy or sanitation; or (v) service in hospital or
dispensary; or (vi) insurance service. If the Central Government
or the State Government declares in the public interest, any
service to be a public utility service for the purposes of Chapter
D VI-A, such service on declaration is also included in the
definition of 'public utility service' under Section 22-A(b).
14. T,he establishment of Permanent Lok Adalat is done
under Sectioh 22-B. The Central Authority and every State
E Authority, as the case may be, have been mandated to
establish Permanent Lok Adalats at such places and for
exercising such jurisdiction in respect of one or more public
utility services and for such areas as may be notified. The
composition of Permanent Lok Adalat is provided in Section
F 22-B (2). Accordingly, every Permanent Lok Adalat shall consist
of (a) a person who is or has been a District Judge or
Additional District Judge or has held judicial office higher in rank
than that of a District Judge and (b) two other persons having
adequate experience in public utility service to be nominated
,,G by the Central Government or by the State Government, as the
case may be on the recommendation of the Central Authority
or by the State Authority (as the case may be). The judicial
officer, namely, the District Judge or Additional District Judge
or the Judicial Officer higher in rank than that of a District Judge
shall be the Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat.
H
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1113
[R.M. LODHA, J.]
15. Section 22-C provides for the procedure for raising A
dispute before the Permanent Lok Adalat. Sub-section (1)
provides that any party to a dispute may make an application
to the Permanent Lok Adalat for the settlement of dispute
before the dispute is brought before any court. However,
Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiption to deal with any matter B
relating to an offence not compoundable under any law. The
second proviso puts a cap on the pecuniary jurisdiction
inasmuch as it provides that the Permanent Lok Adalat shall
nqt have jurisdiction in a matter where the value of the property
in dispute exceeds ten lakh rupees. The Central Government, c
however, may increase the limit of ten lakh rupees in
consultation with the Central Authority by notification.
16. Sub-section (2) of Section 22-C puts an embargo on
the parties to a dispute after an application has been made by
any one of them under sub-section (1) in invoking jurisdiction D
of any court in the same dispute.
16.1. Sub-section (3) of Section 22-C provides for the
procedure to be followed by the Permanent Lok Adalat once
an application is made before it by any party to a dispute under E
sub-section (1 ). This procedure includes filing of a written
statement by each party to the application stating therein the
facts and nature of the dispute and highlighting the points or
issues in such dispute and the documents and other evidence
in support of their respective written statement and exchange F
of copy of such written statement together with copy of
documents/other evidence. The Permanent Lok Adalat may
require any party to the application to file additional statement
before it at any stage of the conciliation proceedings. Any
document or statement received by Permanent Lok Adalat from G
any party to the application is given to the other party. On
completion of the above procedure, the Permanent Lok Adalat
proceeds with conciliati.on proceedings between the parties to
the application under sub-section (4) of S\3ction 22-C. During
conduct of the conciliation proceeaings under sub-section (4)
H
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 6 S.C.R.
A of Section 22-C, the Permanent Lok Adalat is obliged to assist
the parties in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of
the dispute in an independent and impartial manner. Every party
to the application has a duty to cooperate in good faith with the
Permanent Lok Adalat in conciliation of the dispute relating to
B the application and to comply with the direction of the
Permanent Lok Adalat to produce evidence and other related
documents pefore it.
16.2. On satisfaction that there is likelihood of settlement
in the proceedings, the Permanent Lok Adalat may formulate
C the terms of possible settlement of the dispute and give to the
parties for their observations and where the parties reach at
an agreement on the settlement of the dispute, they shall sign
the settlement/agreement and Permanent Lok Adalat then
passes an award in terms thereof and furnishes a copy of the
D same to each of the parties concerned.
17. Upto the above pre-litigation conciliation and settlement
procedure, there is no problem or issue. The petitioner is
seriously aggrieved by the provision contained in Section 22-
E C(8) which provides that where the parties fail to reach at an
agreement under sub-section (7), the Permanent Lok Adalat
shall, if the dispute does not relate to any offence, decide the
dispute. This provision followed by Section 22-0 which, inter-
alia, provides that while deciding a dispute on merit the
F Permanent Lok Adalat shall not be bound by the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and
Section 22-E which accords finality to the award of Permanent
Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) and the provision made in sub-
section (4) that every award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat
G shall be final and hence shall not be called in question in any
original suit, application or execution proceedings form mainly
bone of contention. Are these provisions violative of Article 14
of the Constitution of India and contrary to rule of law, fairness
and even- handed justice? are the questions to be considered.
H 18. Chapter VI-A inserted by the 2002 Amendment Act in
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1115
[R.M. LODHA, J.]
1987 Act, as its title suggests, provides for pre-litigation A
conciliation and settlement procedure. The disputes relating to
public utility service like transport service for carriage of
passengers or goods by air, road or water or postal, telegraph
or telephone service or supply of power, light or water or public
conservancy system or sanitation or service in hospital or B
dispensary or insurance service, etc., in the very scheme of
things deserve to be settled expeditiously. Prolonged dispute
in respect of the above matters between the service provider
and an aggrieved party may result in irretrievable damage to
either party to the dispute. Today, with increasing number of c
cases, the judicial courts are not able to cope with the heavy
burden of inflow of cases and the matters coming before them.
The disputes in relation to public utility service need urgent
attention with focus on their resolution at threshold by
c::onciliation and settlement and if for any reason such effort fails,
0
then to have such disputes adjudicated through an appropriate
mechanism as early as may be possible. With large population
in the country and many public utility services being provided
by various service providers, the disputes in relation to these
services are not infrequent between the service providers and
E
common man. Slow motion procedures in the judicial courts are
not conducive for adjudication of disputes relating to public utility
service.
19. The statement of objects and reasons itself spells out
the salient features of Chapter VI-A. By bringing in this law, the F
litigation concerning public utility service is sought to be nipped
in the bud by first affording the parties to such dispute an
opportunity to settle their dispute through the endeavours of the
Permanent Lok Adalat and if such effort fails then to have the
dispute between the parties adjudicated through the decision G
of the Permanent Lok Adalat. The mechanism provided in
Chapter VI-A enables a party to a dispute relating to public utility
service to approach the Permanent Lok Adalat for the
settlement of dispute before the diS'pute is brought before any
court. H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 6 S.C.R.
A 20. Parliament can definitely set up effective alternative
institutional mechanisms or make arrangements which may be
more efficacious than the ordinary mechanism of adjudication
of disputes through the judicial courts. Such institutional
mechanisms or arrangements by no stretch of imagination can
B be said to be contrary to constitutional scheme or against the
rule of law. The establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats and
conferring them jurisdiction upto a specific pecuniary limit in
respect of one or more public utility services as defined in
Section 22-A(b) before the dispute is brought before any court
c by any party to the dispute is not anathema to the rule of law.
Instead of ordinary civil courts, if other institutional mechanisms
are set up or arrangements are made by the Parliament with
an adjudicatory power, in our view, such institutional
mechanisms or arrangements cannot be faulted on the ground
of arbitrariness or irrationality.
0
21. The Permanent Lok Adalats under the 1987 Act (as
amended by 2002 Amendment Act) are in addition to and not
in derogation of Fora provided under various statutes. This
position is accepted by the Central Government in their counter
E affidavit.
22. It is necessary to bear in mind that the disputes relating
to public utility services have been entrusted to Permanent Lok
Adalats only if the process of conciliation and settlement fails.
F The emphasis is on settlement in respect of disputes
concerning public utility services through the medium of
Permanent Lok Adalat. It is for this reason that sub-section (1)
of Section 22-C states in no unambiguous terms that any party
to a dispute may before the dispute is brought before any court
G make an application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for
settlement of dispute. Thus, settlement of dispute between the
parties in matters of public utility services is the main theme.
However, where despite the endeavours and efforts of the
Permanent Lok Adalat the settlement between the parties is
not through and the parties are required to have their dispute
H
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1117
[R.M. LODHA, J.]
determined and adjudicated, to avoid delay in adjudication of A
disputes relating to public utility services, the Parliament has
intervened and conferred power of adjudication upon the
Permanent Lok Adalat. Can the power conferred on Permanent
Lok Adalats to adjudicate the disputes between the parties
concerning public utility service upto a specific pecuniary limit, B
if they do not relate to any offence, as provided under Section·
22-C(8), be said to be unconstitutional and irrational? We think
not. It is settled law that an authority empowered to adjudicate
the disputes between the parties and act as a tribunal may not
necessarily have all the trappings of the court. What is essential c
is that it must be a creature of statute and should adjudicate
the dispute between the parties before it after giving reasonable
opportunity to them consistent with the principles of fair play and
natural justice. It is not a constitutional right of any person to
have the dispute adjudicated by means of a court only. Chapter 0
VI-A has been enacted to provide for an institutional
mechanism, through the establishment of Permanent Lok
Adalats for settlement of disputes concerning public utility
service before the matter is brought to the court and in the event
of failure to reach any settlement, empowering the Permanent
Lok Adalat. to adjudicate such dispute if it does not relate to E
any offence.
23. The difference between "courts" and "tribunals" has
come up for consideration before this Court on more than one
occasion. Almost five decades back, this Court in Mis. F
Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwa/a
and others13 stated that by "courts" the courts of civil judicature
is meant and by "tribunals" those bodies of men who are
appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special
laws. All tribunals are not courts though all courts are tribunals. G
It was further observed that in the exercise of judicial power, a
clear division was noticeable between courts and tribunals,
particularly, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the
residue goes before the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature.
13. 1962 (2) SCR 339. H
1 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 6 S.C.R.
A Their procedures may differ, but the functions are not essentially
different. Both courts and tribunals act "judicially".
24. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. p. N.
Sharma &Anr. 14, the Constitution Bench of this Court observed
B that under our Constitution, the judicial functions and powers
of the State have been primarily conferred on the ordinary
courts; the Constitution recognises a hierarchy of courts and
they are normally entrusted to adjudicate all disputes between
citizens and citizens as well as between the citizens and the
State. The powers which the courts exercise are judicial
C powers, the functions they discharge are judicial functions and
the decisions they reach and pronounce are judicial decisions.
The tribunals decide special matters entrusted to them for their
decision. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may
not always be so strictly prescribed but the approach adopted
D by both the courts and tribunals is substantially the same; it is
State's inherent judicial function which they discharge.
25. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachil/hu & Ors. 15, it has been
stated by this Court that where the authority is called upon to
E decide a lis on the rights and obligations of the parties, there
is an exercise of judicial power. The authority is called a tribunal
if it does not have all the trappings of a court.
26. In a comparatively recent decision in Union of India
v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association 16 (Civil
F Appeal No. 3067 of 2004); decided on May 11, 2010, a
Constitution Bench of this Court was concerned with the
matters wherein the constitutional validity of Parts 1-B and 1-C
of the Companies Act, 1956 inserted by Companies (Second
Amendment) Act, 2002 providing for the Constitution of National
G Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate
Tribunal was under challenge. The Court while examining the
14. (1965) 2 SCR 366.
15. 1992 Supp (2) sec 651.
H 16. (2010) 11 sec 1.
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1119
[R.M. LODHA, J.]
difference between the courts and tribunals, inter alia, referred A
to earlier decisions of this Court, some of which have been
noted above. The Court summarized the legal position as
follows:
"(a) A legislature can enact a law transferring the
8
jurisdiction-exercised by_ courts in regard to any specified
subject (other than those which are vested in courts by
express provisions of the Constitution) to any tribunal.
(b) All courts are tribunals. Any tribunal to which any existing
jurisdiction of courts is transferred should also be a C
Judicial Tribunal. This means that such Tribunal should have
as members, persons of a rank, capacity and status as
nearly as possible equal to the rank, status and capacity
of the court which was till then dealing with such matters
and the members of the Tribunal should have the D
independence and s~curity of tenure associated with
Judicial Tribunals.
(c) Whenever there is need for 'Tribunals', there is no
presumption that there should be technical members in the E
Tribunals. When any jurisdiction is shifted from courts to
Tribunals, on the ground of pendency and delay in courts,
and the jurisdiction so transferred does not involve any
technical aspects requiring the assistance of experts, the
Tribunals should normally have only judicial members. Only
where the exercise of jurisdiction involves inquiry and F
decisions into technical or. special aspects, where
presence of technical members will be useful and
necessary, Tribunals should have technical members.
Indiscriminate appointment of technical members in all
tribunals will dilute and adversely affect the independence G
of the Judiciary.
(d) The Legislature can re-organize the jurisdictions of
Judicial Tribunals. For example, it can provide that a
specified category of cases tried by a higher court can be H
1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 6 S.C.R.
A tried by a lower court or vice versa (A standard example
is the variation of pecuniary limits of the courts). Similarly
while constituting Tribunals, the Legislature can prescribe
the qualifications/eligibility criteria. The same is however
subject to Judicial Review. If the court in exercise of judicial
s review is of the view that such tribunalisation would
adversely affect the independence of the judiciary or the
standards of the judiciary, the court may interfere to
preserve the independence and standards of the judiciary.
Such an exercise will be part of the checks and balances
c measures to maintain the separation of powers and to
prevent any encroachment, intentional or unintentional, by
either the legislature or by the executive."
27. The competence of the Parliament to.make a law
creating tribunals to deal with disputes arising under or relating
D to a particular statute or statutes or particular disputes is, thus,
beyond question.
28. Sine qua non of taking cognizance of a dispute
concerning public utility service by the Permanent Lok Adalat
E is that neither party to a dispute has approached the civil court.
There is no merit in the submission of the petitioner that the
service provider may pre-empt the consideration of a dispute
by a court or a forum under special statute by approaching the
Permanent Lok Adalat established under Chapter VI-A of the
F 1987 Act and, thus, depriving the user or consumer of such
public utility service of an opportunity to have the dispute
adjudicated by a civil court or a forum created under special
statute. In the first place, the jurisdiction of fora created under
the Special Statutes has not been taken away in any manner
whatsoever by the impugned provisions. As noted above, the
G Permanent Lok Adalats are in addition to and not in derogation
of fora provided under Special Statutes. Secondly, not a single
instance has been cited where a provider of service of public
utility in a dispute with its user has approached the Permanent
Lok Adalat first. The submission is unfounded and misplaced.
H
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1121
[R.M. LODHA, J.]
29. The alternative institutional mechanism in Chapter VI- A
A with regard to the disputes concerning public utility service
is intended to provide an affordable, speedy and efficient
mechanism to secure justice. By not making applicable the
Code of Civil Procedure and the statutory provisions of the
Indian Evidence Act, there is no compromise on the quality of B
determination of dispute since the Permanent Lok Adalat has
to be objective, decide the dispute with fairness and follow the
principles of natural justice. Sense of justice and equity continue
to guide the Permanent Lok Adalat while conducting
conciliation proceedings or when the conciliation proceedings c
fail, in deciding a dispute on merit.
30. Insofar as composition of Permanent Lok Adalat is
concerned, Section 22-B(2) provides that every Permanent Lok
Adalat shall consist of a person who is or has been a District
Judge or Additional District Judge or has held judicial office D
higher in rank than that of a District Judge and two other
persons having adequate experience in public utility service to
be nominated by the Central Government or the State
Government, as the case may be, on the recommendation of
the Central Authority or the State Authority, as the case may E
be. Of the three members, the judicial officer is the Chairman
of the Permanent Lok Adalat. The Central Authority under
Section 3 of the 1987 Act, inter alia, consists of the Chief
Justice of India, a serving or retired Judge of the Supreme
Court to be nominated by the President in consultation with the F
Chief Justice of India and the other members to be nominated
by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice
of India. The Chief Justice of India is the Patron-in-Chief of the
Central Authority while a serving or retired Judge of the
Supreme Court is the Executive Chairman. Similarly, the State G
Authority under Section 6 consists of the Chief Justice of the
High Court, a serving or retired Judge of the High Court to be
nominated by the Governor in consultation with the Chief Justice
of the High Court and such number of other members to be
nominated by the State Government in consultation with the H
1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A Chief Justice of the High Court. It would be, thus, seen that the
two members other than the judicial officer of a Permanent Lok
Adalat can be appointed by the Central Government or the
State Government, as the case may be, on the
recommendation of the Central Authority or the State Authority
B only. The composition of Central Authority and the State
Authority has been noted above. In the above view, it is
misconceived _to say that the judiciary has been kept out in the
appointment of members of the Permanent Lok Adalats. The
independence of Permanent Lok Adalats does not seem to
c have been compromised at all as even the non-judicial
members of every Permanent Lok Adalat have to be appointed
on the recomrn~ndation of a high powered Central or State
Authoritiheaded by none other than the Chief Justice of India
or a serving or retired Judge of the Supreme Court where the
nomination is made by the Central Government or by the Chief
0
Justice of the State High Court or a serving or retired Judge of
the High Court where the nomination is made by the State
Government.
31. It is not unusual to have the tribunals comprising of
E judicial as well as non-judicial members. The whole idea of
having non-judicial members in a tribunal like Permanent Lok
Adalat is to make sure that the legal technicalities do not get
paramountcy in conciliation or adjudicatory proceedings. The
fact that a Permanent Lok Adalat established under Section 22-
F B comprises of one judicial officer and two other persons
having adequate experience in public utility service does not
show any abhorrence to the rule of law nor such composition
becomes violative of principles of fairness and justice or is
contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
G
32. It is true that the award made by the Permanent Lok
Adalat under 1987 Act has to be by majority of the persons
constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. In a given case, it may
be that the two non-judicial members disagree with the judicial
member but that does not mean that such majority decision
H lacks in fairness or sense of justice.
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1123
[R.M. LODHA, J.]
33. There is no inherent right of appeal. Appeal is always A
a creature of statute and if no appeal is provided to an
aggrieved party in a particular statute, that by itself may not
render that statute unconstitutional. Section 22-E(1) makes
every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under 1987 Act either
on merit or in terms of a settlement final and binding on all the B
parties thereto and on persons claiming under them. No appeal
is provided from the award passed by the Permanent Lok
Adalat but that, in our opinion, does not render the impugned
provisions unconstitutional. In the first place, having regard to
the nature of dispute upto a specific pecuniary limit relating to c
public utility service and. resolution of such dispute by the
procedure provided in Section 22-C(1) to 22-C(8), it is
important that such dispute is brought to an end at the earliest
and is not prolonged unnecessarily. Secondly, and more
importantly, if at all a party to the dispute has a grievance D
against the award of Permanent Lok Adalat he can always
approach the High Court under its supervisory and extraordinary
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India. There is no merit in the submission of the learned counsel
for the petitioner that in that situation the burden of litigation E
would be brought back on the High Courts after the award is
passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat on merits.
34. The challenge to the validity of the impugned provisions
came up before this Court in S.N. Pandey (supra). A three-
Judge Bench of this Court was not persuaded by the challenge F
and held as under:
'We have gone through the provisions of the said Chapter
which contemplated the setting up of permanent Lok
Adalats, for deciding disputes in which public utility G
services is one of the matters involved. It is quite obvious
that the effort of the legislature is to decrease the work load
in the Courts by resorting to alternative disputes resolution.
Lok Adalat is a mode of dispute resolution which has been
in vogue since over two decades. Hundreds of thousands
H
of cases have been settled through this mechanism and
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 6 S.C.R.
A is undisputedly a fast means of dispensation of justice.
The litigation is brought to a quick end with no further
appeals or anguish to the litigants. The constitution of the
permanent Lok Adalats mechanism contemplate the
judicial officer or a retired judicial officer being there
B alongwith other persons having adequate experience in the
public utility services.
We do not find any constitutional infirmity in the said
legislation. The act ensures that justice will be available to
the litigant speedily and impartially. We do emphasis that
c the persons who are appointed on the Permanent Lok
Adalats should be person of integrity and adequate
experience. Appropriate rules, inter alia in this regard, no
doubt will have to be framed, if not already in place.
o We upheld the validity of the said Act and hope the
Permanent Lok Adalats will be set up at an early date. The
Lok Adalats are enacted to Primarily bring about
settlement amongst the parties. The parties are normally
required to be present in person and since the impugned
E provisions are in the interest of the litigating public, the Lok
Adalats shall perform their duties and will function; even if
members of the Bar choose not t~ appear."
35. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
disposal of the writ petition filed by S.N. Pandey was in limine
F and the order passed therein cannot be construed as a binding
precedent. It was also submitted that the said decision does
not declare any law under Article 141 of the Constitution since
points now raised in the present matter, were neither argued
nor discussed.
G
36. We are not persuaded by the submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioner. Although the disposal of writ
petition in S.N. Pandey was in limine and the order is brief but
the court has disposed of the same on merits. In B. Prabhakar
H
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. UNION OF INDIA 1125
[R.M. LODHA, J.]
Rao 8 , 0. Chinnappa Reddy ,J. did observe in para 22 that the A
dismissal in limine of a writ petition caRnot possibly bar the
subsequent writ petitions but at the same time he also observed
that such a dismissal in limine may inhibit the discretion of the
Court. V. Khalid, J. in his supplementing judgment in para 27(6)
exposited the position that normally this Court would be B
disinclined to entertain or to hear petitions raising identical
points again where on an earlier occasion, the matter was
heard and dismissed. Not that this Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain such matters, but would normally exercise its
discretion against it. We are in complete agreement with the c
above view of V. Khalid, J. It is against public policy and well
defined principles of judicial discretion to entertain or hear
petitions relating to same subject matter where the matter was
heard and dismissed on an earlier occasion.
37. Independent of the view of this Court in S.N. Pandey, D
for the reasons that we have indicated above, we find no merit
in the challenge to the impugned provisions of Chapter VI-A
brought in the 1987 Act by 2002 Amendment Act.
38. We, accordingly, dismiss the writ petition with no order E
as to costs.
K.K.T. Writ Petition dismissed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Legal Services Authorities Act"Sign in to search