Holding

The termination order was arbitrary, illegal and violative of natural justice, and the appellant, being an Indian citizen, is entitled to all service benefits.

Summary

Basudev Dutta, an Ophthalmic Assistant employed by the West Bengal Government since 1985, was terminated in 2011 after a police verification report, filed 25 years later, labeled him ‘unsuitable’ for the post. He challenged the termination, asserting Indian citizenship based on his father’s migration certificate and arguing that the termination violated principles of natural justice as no reasons were given and he was denied a personal hearing. The Supreme Court examined his citizenship claim under the Citizenship Act, 1955, and the procedural deficiencies in the termination process, including the inordinate delay in the police verification report. The Court held that the termination order was arbitrary, illegal, and contrary to natural justice, and that the appellant was indeed an Indian citizen entitled to service benefits. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order, restored the tribunal’s decision, and directed payment of the pending benefits.

Issues considered

Whether the termination order of the appellant was valid in view of the principles of natural justice and the lack of reasons and personal hearing.
Whether the appellant is a citizen of India under the Citizenship Act, 1955, based on his father’s migration certificate and descent.
Whether the 25-year delay in filing the police verification report invalidates the termination and entitles the appellant to pensionary and other service benefits.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Termination orderPolice verification reportUnsuitable for employmentOphthalmic AssistantPrinciples of natural justiceMigration certificateCitizen by descentCitizenship by registrationShow cause noticeEmployment to Government serviceQuasi-judicial authorityOpportunity of hearingDelayService benefitsReasoned orderVerification of credentials

Judgment

[2024] 12 S.C.R. 418 : 2024 INSC 940

Basudev Dutta
v.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 13919 of 2024)
05 December 2024
[J.K. Maheshwari and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards the correctness of the termination order of
the appellant-employee after rendering 26 years of service, based
on the police verification report that he was considered ‘unsuitable’
for employment to the post.

Headnotes†
Service law – Termination of service – Suitability for
employment to the post – Employee-Ophthalmic Assistant with
the State Government, terminated from service after rendering
26 years of service, based on the police verification report
that he was considered as ‘unsuitable’ for employment to the
post – Termination order set aside by the tribunal – High Court
restored the order of termination – Correctness:
Held: Order of termination passed against the appellant is
arbitrary, illegal and in violation of the principles of natural justice
and cannot be sustained – Claim of the appellant as regards his
nationality as Indian on the strength of the migration certificate
issued in favour of his father is accepted – His grandparents
are Indian citizens because of their birth and s.4 of the 1955
Act entitles the appellant’s father to be treated as a citizen by
descent – Also, the appellant entitled to citizenship by registration
as per s.5 of the 1955 Act – In all the documents, including the
memorandum, show cause notice, no reason mentioned as to
why the appellant was considered as ‘unsuitable’ for employment
to the post of Ophthalmic Assistant – Alleged police verification
report not served on the appellant, as such, he was unable to
make his defense with supportive materials, as a result was
terminated from service – Even in the termination order, there was
nothing about the unsuitability of the appellant for employment

* Author
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 419

Basudev Dutta v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

to the Government service – That apart, before passing the
termination order, no opportunity of personal hearing provided to
the appellant to defend his stand effectively – Tribunal was right
in observing that without following the principles of natural justice
and without affording any opportunity to explain his case before
the authority, appellant was terminated and thus, termination
order cannot be sustained in the eye of law; and set it aside –
However, the High Court erroneously set aside the order of the
tribunal by observing that the action of the authorities in issuing
show cause notice and inviting reply therefrom and the availing
of such opportunity by the appellant, is in adherence with the
principles of natural justice – Furthermore, the appellant joined
the post of Ophthalmic Assistant in 1985 upon production of
satisfactory report of medical examination and police verification
roll – Yet, the police verification report, which was supposed
to have been filed within three months from the date of initial
appointment of the appellant, was filed after 25 years of service
and just two months prior to the date of his retirement and relying
on the same, he was terminated from service – In view of the
enormous delay on the part of the authorities in submission of
the verification report, the appellant was rendered ineligible to
receive his pensionary benefits, though he had put in 26 years
of unblemished service – Authorities in their reply affidavit
categorically admitted about the inordinate delay occasioned
to ascertain the unsuitability of the appellant for appointment
to the Government service – However, they did not assign any
reason much less valid reason for the same – Such callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the authorities cannot be
accepted – Thus, the order of the High Court set aside and that
of the tribunal restored – Order of the tribunal granting liberty
to the authority to proceed against the appellant in accordance
with the principles of natural justice, after 14 years from the
date of retirement, would not serve any purpose – Thus, the
appellant entitled to receive all the service benefits duly payable
to him – Citizenship Act, 1955. [Paras 11.3, 12, 12.1, 12.3, 12.6,
12.8, 13, 14]

Judgment/order – Reasoned order – Necessity:
Held: Every administrative or quasi-judicial order must contain
the reasons – Such reasons go a long way in not only ensuring
that the authority has applied his mind to the facts and the law,
but also provide the grounds for the aggrieved party to assail the
420 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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order in the manner known to law – In the absence of any reasons,
it also possesses a difficulty for the judicial authorities to test the
correctness of the order or exercise its power of judicial review –
Reasons are heartbeat of every order and every notice must specify
the grounds on which the administrative or quasi-judicial authority
intends to proceed; if any document is relied upon to form the basis
of enquiry, such document must be furnished to the employee; it
is only then a meaningful reply can be furnished; and the failure
to furnish the documents referred and relied in the notice would
vitiate the entire proceedings as being arbitrary and in violation
of the principles of natural justice; and before taking any adverse
decision, the aggrieved person must be given an opportunity of
personal hearing. [Paras 12.2, 12.6]

Service law – Appointment – Verification of the credentials
of the candidates:
Held: Issuance of direction to the police officials of all the States
to complete the enquiry and file report as regards the character,
antecedents, nationality, genuineness of the documents produced
by the candidates selected for appointment to the Government
service, etc., within a stipulated time provided in the statute/G.O.,
or in any event, not later than six months from the date of their
appointment – Only upon verification of the credentials of the
candidates, their appointments will have to be regularized so as
to avoid further complications. [Para 13]

Case Law Cited
Nirma Industries Ltd. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India
[2013] 3 SCR 662 : (2013) 8 SCC 20; State of UP v. Sudhir Kumar
Singh [2020] 13 SCR 571 : (2021) 19 SCC 706; Dharampal Satyapal
Ltd v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati and Others
[2015] 6 SCR 437 : (2015) 8 SCC 519; Sarbananda Sonowal v.
Union of India [2006] Suppl. 10 SCR 167 : (2007) 1 SCC 174; Lal
Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer [1995] 1 SCR 877 :
(1995) 3 SCC 100; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed
Khan [2010] 10 SCR 1070 : (2010) 9 SCC 496 : (2010) 3 SCC
(Civ) 852 : 2010 SCC OnLine SC 987 – referred to.

List of Acts
Citizenship Act, 1955; Foreigners Act, 1946; Income Tax Act, 1961;
Evidence Act, 1872; Government of India Act, 1935; Constitution
of India.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 421

Basudev Dutta v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

List of Keywords
Termination order; Police verification report; ‘Unsuitable’ for
employment to the post; Ophthalmic Assistant with the State
Government; Principles of natural justice; Migration certificate;
Citizen by descent; Citizenship by registration; Memorandum; Show
cause notice; Employment to Government service; Quasi-judicial
authority; Opportunity of hearing; Delay; Callous and lackadaisical
attitude on the part of the authorities; Service benefits; Reasoned
order; Verification of the credentials of the candidates.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13919 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.08.2023 of the High Court
at Calcutta in WPST No. 106 of 2013

Appearances for Parties
Raj Kumar Gupta, Mayank Agrahari, Shekhar Kumar, Advs. for
the Appellant.
Biswajit Deb, Sr. Adv., Anando Mukherjee, Shwetank Singh, Advs.
for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

R. Mahadevan, J.

Leave granted.
2. Assailing the final judgment and order dated 16.08.2023 passed by
the High Court of Calcutta1 in W.P.S.T. No. 106 of 2013, the appellant
has come up with this appeal. Vide the said order, the High Court
set aside the order dated 28.08.2012 passed by the West Bengal
State Administrative Tribunal at Calcutta2 in O.A.No.331 of 2011,3 in
which, the order of termination passed against the appellant herein

1 Hereinafter shortly referred to as “the High Court”
2 Hereinafter shortly referred to as “the Tribunal”
3 Basudev Dutta v. The State of West Bengal and Others
422 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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was set aside, however, the authority concerned was granted liberty
to proceed against the appellant in accordance with law, following
the principles of natural justice.
3. According to the appellant, when he was aged about 16 years, he
along with his father by name Hariananda Dutta, came to India from
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and his father was issued with a
Migration Certificate being No.D/65/69 dated 19.05.1969 by the
authority concerned. Subsequently, the appellant joined Bangabasi
College, Calcutta and passed the Pre-University Examination in
Science in May, 1971 under the University of Calcutta. Thereafter,
he got admission in Regional Institute of Ophthalmology, Calcutta
and successfully completed Ophthalmic Assistant Course in 1984.
Later, he participated in the selection process and was appointed
as Para Medical Ophthalmic Assistant by the Director of Health
Services, Government of West Bengal, vide order dated 21.02.1985
and in terms of the said appointment order, the appellant joined
at Kadambini Block Primary Health Centre, Monteswar, Burdwan
on 06.03.1985. The Department received satisfactory report of the
medical examination and Police Verification Roll from the concerned
authorities. He continued in service and was granted yearly increment
and other consequential service benefits. While so, based on the
secret verification report dated 25.05.2010 of the Government of West
Bengal, which was communicated by the police to the department on
07.07.2010, the appellant was served with a memo dated 23.08.2010,
stating that he is ‘unsuitable’ for employment and directing him to
submit his defense, within 10 days from the date of receipt of the
memo. In response, the appellant sent the details of his candidature
on 09.09.2010. However, by order dated 11.02.2011 passed by
the Director of Health Services, Government of West Bengal, the
appellant was terminated from service with immediate effect without
any enquiry. Challenging the said order of termination, the appellant
preferred Original Application No.331 of 2011, which was allowed
by the Tribunal, by order dated 28.08.2012. Aggrieved by the same,
the State filed a writ petition being W.P.S.T.No.106 of 2013 and
the High Court by the order impugned herein, allowed the same
by setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal and affirming the
order of termination passed by the authority concerned. Therefore,
the appellant is before us with the present appeal.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 423

Basudev Dutta v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously argued that on
the basis of migration certificate issued in favour of the appellant’s
father, in which, the appellant’s name also finds place, the appellant
is a citizen of India with effect from 19.05.1969; he was issued with
ration card, Voter Identity Card and Aadhaar Card by the Government
of India and he participated in all local Assembly and Parliamentary
elections; and he is also an assessee under the Income Tax Act and
is regularly submitting his returns. Adding further, it is contended
that upon participating in the selection process, the appellant was
appointed as Ophthalmic Assistant, on 21.02.1985 and he joined
the service upon submission of the satisfactory report of medical
examination and police verification roll. After having rendered 26
years of unblemished service, the appellant was terminated from
service, based on the secret verification report of the Government.
While passing such order, the appellant was not given an opportunity
of personal hearing and was not furnished the alleged verification
report. Therefore, the order of termination passed against the appellant
is arbitrary, illegal and in violation of the principles of natural justice.
4.1. The learned counsel for the appellant also emphatically
submitted that it is mandatory on the part of the police authority
to submit the police verification report within a period of three
months from the date of appointment. Whereas, in the present
case, though the appellant joined the service on 06.03.1985,
the verification report was communicated by the police to the
department only on 07.07.2010, that too, just two months prior
to the date of retirement of the appellant. Hence, there was
inordinate delay on the part of the police authority for submission
of verification report to the appointing authority.
4.2. Ultimately, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal
rightly set aside the order of termination. However, the High
Court erred in allowing the writ petition filed by the State by
setting aside the order of the Tribunal. Therefore, the learned
counsel prayed for allowing this appeal by setting aside the
order of the High Court.
5. On the contrary, the learned senior counsel for the respondent(s)
submitted that except the migration certificate, the appellant did
not produce any document to prove that he is an Indian national.
424 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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Migration certificate does not recognize him as a citizen of India
and he has to register his citizenship with the authority concerned.
Though the appellant stated that he applied for citizenship certificate
and the Government of West Bengal issued no objection certificate
to him with respect to his citizenship, no such document was placed
on record. The Aadhaar Card, voter ID and Pan Card are not the
conclusive proof of evidence for citizenship or nationality as held by
this Court. Thus, the appellant being a non-citizen, he cannot claim
employment against the post reserved for the Indian citizen.
5.1. Elaborating further, the learned senior counsel for the
respondent(s) submitted that it was clearly stated in the
appointment order that the same is subject to satisfactory
reports of police verification and medical examination; though the
appellant cleared the medical examination, his police verification
report was still awaited; upon receipt of the communication
from the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Intelligence
Branch, Kolkata, vide Memo No.1899/S.231-04/SA-I/VR dated
07.07.2010, pursuant to the secret verification report dated
25.05.2010 of the Government, to the effect that the appellant
was considered as ‘unsuitable’ for employment to the post in
question, the Director of Health Services, Government of West
Bengal, issued a show cause notice by way of memo dated
23.08.2010, calling upon the appellant to submit his defence;
accordingly, the appellant submitted his reply on 09.09.2010;
being dissatisfied with the same, the authority concerned
terminated the appellant from service with immediate effect
on 11.02.2011. Thus, according to the learned counsel, only
after receipt of the reply submitted by the appellant and upon
considering the same, the termination order came to be issued
and hence, there was no violation of the principles of natural
justice.
5.2. Referring to the decisions of this court in Nirma Industries Ltd.
v. Securities and Exchange Board of India; 4 State of UP v.
Sudhir Kumar Singh; 5 and Dharampal Satyapal Ltd v. Deputy

4 [2013] 3 SCR 662 : (2013) 8 SCC 20
5 [2020] 13 SCR 571 : (2021) 19 SCC 706
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 425

Basudev Dutta v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati and Others,6 wherein,
it was observed that ‘the principles of natural justice means, a
fair hearing should be given to the concerned person and the
same would not necessarily imply oral hearing’, the learned
senior counsel for the respondent(s) submitted that merely
because the appellant was not given an opportunity of hearing,
that by itself is not sufficient to quash the proceedings, unless
and until it is pointed out by him that he was prejudiced by the
order, which was passed behind his back and therefore, the
denial of personal hearing before passing the termination order
would not amount to violation of the principles of natural justice.
5.3. Adding further, the learned senior counsel for the respondent(s)
submitted that police verification is essential for joining any
service and it is a settled principle of law that any act contrary
to law cannot be given the sanctity of being legal under law by
mere passage of time and hence, the delay in submission of the
verification report, cannot be a ground to quash the termination
order passed against the appellant.
5.4. Therefore, the learned senior counsel for the respondent(s)
submitted that the High Court correctly set aside the order of
the Tribunal and restored the termination order passed against
the appellant herein, by a reasoned order, which does not call
for any interference by this court.
6. By way of reply, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the grandfather of the appellant was a permanent resident of
Calcutta and the father of the appellant was born in the year 1911
at Calcutta and through migration certificate, the appellant came
to India along with his father in the year 1969, before creation of
Bangladesh (Formerly East Pakistan) and hence, he is a citizen of
India. Further, the police department has no authority to neutralize the
citizenship of a person. However, based on the information provided
by the police authority and without ascertaining the veracity of the
same and without any report / order following the provisions of the
Citizenship Act, 1955 and the Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946)
and the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964, the authority concerned
terminated the appellant from service with immediate effect, that

6 [2015] 6 SCR 437 : (2015) 8 SCC 519
426 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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too, without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant to
adjudicate his claim of nationality. Though the Tribunal set aside the
said order of termination, the High Court erred in reversing the same,
by the order impugned in this appeal. It is also submitted by the
learned counsel that the right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21
of the Constitution of India is seriously violated, in view of the State
not taking proper steps to continue the service of the appellant and
in failing to sanction and disburse the pensionary benefits to him,
after having served nearly 26 years of service.
7. Heard the learned senior counsel/counsel appearing for the parties
and also perused the materials available on record.
8. It cannot be disputed that as per the interim order of the High Court,
the appellant received the amount of general provident fund, group
insurance and leave Salary. However, the authority concerned did
not disburse the pension, gratuity and arrears of salary.
9. As indicated earlier, by order dated 11.02.2011, the appellant was
terminated from service after rendering 26 years of service, based on
the police verification report that he was considered as ‘unsuitable’ for
employment to the post of Ophthalmic Assistant. The said termination
order was set aside by the Tribunal, by order dated 28.08.2012 in
O.A.No.331 of 2011. However, the High Court reversed the order
of the Tribunal and restored the order of termination passed by the
authority concerned, by the order impugned herein.
10. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant,
assailing the order of termination passed by the authority concerned,
as affirmed by the High Court, are three-fold, though interlinked and
intertwined. Firstly, the appellant claimed his nationality as Indian on
the strength of the migration certificate dated 19.05.1969 issued in
favour of his father. Secondly, in the show cause notice, there was
no mention as to why the appellant was declared as ‘unsuitable’ for
employment to the Government service; the alleged secret police
verification report was not served on the appellant; and no opportunity
of personal hearing was provided to the appellant to defend his
stand and hence, there was total violation of the principles of natural
justice. Thirdly, the appellant joined the service in the year 1985,
but the police verification report, which was supposed to have been
filed, within a period of three months from the date of appointment,
was submitted to the department only in the year 2010 and thus,
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 427

Basudev Dutta v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

there was inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the police
authority in submission of the same.

ANALYSIS
11. Let us consider the first contention. According to the appellant, he
is an Indian citizen. Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 mandates
that the onus of proving citizenship of a person is upon that person
who claims to be a citizen of India. For better appreciation, Section 9
of the Foreigners Act, 1946, is extracted below:
“9. Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under
section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act
or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether
any person is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or
description the onus of proving that such person is not a
foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or
description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding
anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(1 of 1872), lie upon such person.”
11.1. In Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India,7 this Court pointed
out that ‘there is good and sound reason for placing the burden
of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen
of a particular country. In order to establish one’s citizenship,
normally he may be required to give evidence of his date of
birth, place of birth, name of his parents, their place of birth and
citizenship. Sometimes the place of birth of his grandparents
may also be relevant. All these facts would necessarily be within
the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of
the authorities of the State’.
11.2. In Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer,8 it was held
by this Court that ‘the question whether a person is a foreigner,
is a question of fact which would require careful scrutiny of
evidence since the enquiry is quasi-judicial in character’.
11.3. In the instant case, the appellant claimed that his grandparents
are Indian citizens because of their birth. The provisions relating

7 [2006] Supp. 10 SCR 167 : (2007) 1 SCC 174
8 [1995] 1 SCR 877 : (1995) 3 SCC 100
428 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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to citizenship are enshrined in Part II of the Constitution of
India under Articles 5 to 11. Section 4 of the Indian Citizenship
Act, 1955, entitles the appellant’s father to be treated
as a citizen by descent. The appellant is also entitled to
citizenship by registration as per Section 5 of the Act. As per
Section 5(1)(a), a person of Indian origin who has been an ordinary
resident in India for seven years prior to the application and as
per 5(1)(b), a person of Indian origin who is an ordinary resident
of any country or place outside undivided India is entitled to
citizenship. “Undivided India” has been defined in Section 2 (h)
as “India, as defined in the Government of India Act, 1935” as
originally enacted. The intention of the Central Government
to award citizenship to minorities from neighboring countries
has been spelled out by way of amendment to Section 2, by
introducing Proviso in Section 2 vide Amendment Act No.47
of 2019 with effect from 10.01.2020, which states that the
persons like the appellant herein are not be treated as “illegal
migrants”. Once an application has been submitted, the authority
concerned has to take appropriate decision within a reasonable
time by taking into consideration all the applicable laws and the
documents produced by the appellant. However, no decision
has been taken against the appellant. Therefore, we answer
the first contention in favour of the appellant.
12. Qua the second contention, we have carefully considered the
documents placed before us. Vide Memo No. 944-P.S. dated
25.05.2010, the Assistant Secretary to the Government of West
Bengal, Home (Political) Department, Secret Section, Kolkata,
informed to the Additional Director General of Police, Intelligence
Branch, West Bengal, Kolkata, that the Government considered
the appellant ‘unsuitable’ for employment to the post of Ophthalmic
Assistant under the Chief Municipal Officer of Health, Burdwan.
Vide Memo No.1899/S.231-04/SA-I/VR dated 07.07.2010, the said
information was communicated by the Deputy Inspector General of
Police, Intelligence Branch, West Bengal to the Chief Municipal Officer
of Health, Burden. Subsequently, by memo dated 04.11.2010, the
Director of Health Services, Government of West Bengal, Kolkata,
informed to the Special Superintendent of Police(C), Intelligence
Branch, West Bengal, that the case of the appellant was referred
to the Government to decide over the suitability or otherwise of the
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 429

Basudev Dutta v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

verification of his employment under the Chief Municipal Officer of
Health, Burdwan, because the nationality of the appellant could not
be determined as Indian national, during enquiry; and finally, the
appellant was considered ‘unsuitable’ by the Government. Pursuant
to the same, the Director of Health Service, West Bengal, sent
the show cause notice styled as ‘Memorandum’ dated 23.08.2010
directing the appellant to submit his defense within a period of 10
days. For better appreciation, the contents of the said Memorandum
are reproduced below:
“Whereas Shri Basudev Dutta, S/o.Hari Ananda Dutta of
30/C Buildings, Bonhooghly, Alambazar, Kolkata-700035
was offered appointment to the post of “Ophthalmic
Assistant” vide order No.A 6012 dated 21-02-1985 along
with 32 other incumbents subject to satisfactory reports
of Police Verification and Medical Examination;
And whereas the said Shri Basudev Dutta joined in the
forenoon of 06-03-1985 at Kadambini P.H.C., Monteswar,
Burdwan;
And whereas the Dy. Inspector General of Police,
Intelligence Branch, 13, Lord Sinha Road, Kolkata -71
in his No.1899/S. 231-04/SA-I/VR dated 07-07-2010 has
informed that the Government under his No.944-PS dated
25-05-2010 of Home (Pol) Department, Government of West
Bengal has declared Shri Basudev Dutta “UNSUITABLE”
for employment to the post of Ophthalmic Assistant;
And whereas the case of Shri Basudev Dutta, Ophthalmic
Assistant, attached to Kurmun B.P.H.C., Burdwan, has
since been reviewed in the light of terms and condition
laid down in the order of appointment bearing No.A 6012
dated 21-02-1985 and also declaring Shri Basudev Dutta
“UNSUITABLE” for employment to the Government service;
And as such, on going through the relevant papers /
documents in respect of the case of Shri Basudev Dutta
and applying my full mind on to it, I, the D.H.S., West
Bengal, being the appointing and disciplinary authority in
respect of the post held by Shri Basudev Dutta, Ophthalmic
Assistant, hold the view that the said Shri Basudev Dutta
430 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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does not have any right to continue further in Government
service and accordingly propose that the service of Shri
Basudev Dutta may be terminated with immediate effect;
Shri Basudev Dutta is hereby directed to say, if any, in his
defence within 10 (ten) days from the date of receipt of the
memorandum through the C.M.O.H., Burdwan, positively
failing which it may be presumed that he has nothing to
say and decision will be taken against him without any
further reference to him.”
12.1. Curiously, in all these documents, including the show cause
notice, no reason was mentioned as to why the appellant
was considered as ‘unsuitable’ for employment to the post of
Ophthalmic Assistant. Furthermore, the alleged police verification
report was not served on the appellant. As such, the appellant
was unable to make his defense with supportive materials.
Resultantly, he was terminated from service vide order dated
11.02.2011 of the Director of Health Services, West Bengal. Even
in the termination order, there was nothing about the unsuitability
of the appellant for employment to the Government service.
12.2. It is settled law that every administrative or quasi-judicial order
must contain the reasons. Such reasons go a long way in not
only ensuring that the authority has applied his mind to the facts
and the law, but also provide the grounds for the aggrieved
party to assail the order in the manner known to law. In the
absence of any reasons, it also possesses a difficulty for the
judicial authorities to test the correctness of the order or in other
words, exercise its power of judicial review. In this context, it
will be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in Kranti
Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan,9 wherein after a
detailed analysis of various judgments, it was held as follows:
“27. In Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuram v. State of
Kerala [(1979) 4 SCC 782 : AIR 1979 SC 1918] V.R. Krishna
Iyer, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench held that the
functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial in character.
One of the attributes of quasi-judicial functioning is the

9 [2010] 10 SCR 1070 : (2010) 9 SCC 496 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 852 : 2010 SCC OnLine SC 987
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 431

Basudev Dutta v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

recording of reasons in support of decisions taken and
the other requirement is following the principles of natural
justice. The learned Judge held that natural justice requires
reasons to be written for the conclusions made (see SCC
p. 788, para 14 : AIR p. 1922, para 14).
28. In Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab [(1979) 2
SCC 368 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 197] this Court, dealing with
a service matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor [(1973) 2
SCC 836 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 5 : AIR 1974 SC 87], held
that “rubber-stamp reason” is not enough and virtually
quoted the observation in Capoor (supra), SCC p. 854,
para 28, to the extent that:
“28. … Reasons are the links between the
materials on which certain conclusions are
based and the actual conclusions.” (See AIR
p. 377, para 18.)
29. In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in H.H.
Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commr., Hindu Religious
and Charitable Endowments Deptt. [(1979) 4 SCC 642 :
1980 SCC (Tax) 16 : AIR 1980 SC 1] while giving the
majority judgment Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. referred to (SCC
p. 658, para 29) Broom's Legal Maxims (1939 Edn., p. 97)
where the principle in Latin runs as follows:
“Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.”
30. The English version of the said principle given by the
Chief Justice is that : (H.H. Shri Swamiji case [(1979) 4
SCC 642 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 16 : AIR 1980 SC 1] , SCC
p. 658, para 29)
“29. … ‘reason is the soul of the law, and when
the reason of any particular law ceases, so does
the law itself’.” (See AIR p. 11, para 29.)
………
33. In Star Enterprises v. City and Industrial Development
Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd. [(1990) 3 SCC 280] a
three-Judge Bench of this Court held that in the present
day set-up judicial review of administrative action has
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become expansive and is becoming wider day by day
and the State has to justify its action in various fields of
public law. All these necessitate recording of reason for
executive actions including the rejection of the highest
offer. This Court held that disclosure of reasons in matters
of such rejection provides an opportunity for an objective
review both by superior administrative heads and for
judicial process and opined that such reasons should be
communicated unless there are specific justifications for
not doing so (see SCC pp. 284-85, para 10).
………..
46. The position in the United States has been indicated
by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee [(1990) 4 SCC 594 : 1990
SCC (Cri) 669 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 242 : (1991) 16 ATC 445 :
AIR 1990 SC 1984] in SCC p. 602, para 11 : AIR para 11 at
p. 1988 of the judgment. This Court held that in the United
States the courts have always insisted on the recording of
reasons by administrative authorities in exercise of their
powers. It was further held that such recording of reasons is
required as “the courts cannot exercise their duty of review
unless they are advised of the considerations underlying
the action under review”. In S.N. Mukherjee [(1990) 4 SCC
594 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 669 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 242 : (1991)
16 ATC 445 : AIR 1990 SC 1984] this Court relied on the
decisions of the US Court in Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Chenery Corpn. [87 L Ed 626 : 318 US 80
(1942)] and Dunlop v. Bachowski [44 L Ed 2d 377 : 421
US 560 (1974)] in support of its opinion discussed above.
47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record
reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such
decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in
support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve
the wider principle of justice that justice must not
only be done it must also appear to be done as well.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 433

Basudev Dutta v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint
on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and
quasi-judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised
by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by
disregarding extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable
a component of a decision-making process as
observing principles of natural justice by judicial,
quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by
superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed
to rule of law and constitutional governance is in
favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant
facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-
making justifying the principle that reason is the soul
of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days
can be as different as the judges and authorities who
deliver them. All these decisions serve one common
purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the
relevant factors have been objectively considered.
This is important for sustaining the litigants’ faith in
the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid
enough about his/her decision-making process then
it is impossible to know whether the person deciding
is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles
of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear
and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp
reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-
making process.
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(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine
qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers.
Transparency in decision-making not only makes the
judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but
also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See
David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987)
100 Harvard Law Review 731-37]).
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates
from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-
making, the said requirement is now virtually a
component of human rights and was considered
part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v.
Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29
and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ
405 (CA)], wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of
the European Convention of Human Rights which
requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be
given for judicial decisions”.
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital
role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore,
for development of law, requirement of giving reasons
for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a
part of “due process”.”
12.3. That apart, before passing the termination order, no opportunity
of personal hearing was provided to the appellant to defend his
stand effectively. In Mazharul Islam Hashmi v. State of U.P.,10
it was categorically held by this Court that ‘personal hearing
should be given, before termination of employee from service’.
The relevant paragraph of the same is quoted below for ready
reference:
“25. It was observed in that case that it is a fundamental
rule of law that no decision must be taken which will
affect the rights of any person without first giving
him an opportunity of putting forward his case. The
main requirements of a fair hearing, as pointed out

10 (1979) 4 SCC 537
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by this Court earlier, are: (i) A person must know the
case that he is to meet; and (ii) he must have an
adequate opportunity of meeting that case. These
rules of natural justice, however, operate in voids of a
statute. Their application can be expressly or implicitly
excluded by the legislature. But, such is not the case
here. On the contrary, the two circulars issued by the
State Government, to which a reference has been
made earlier, expressly imported these principles
of natural justice and required that in all cases in
which the services of an officer or servant were to
be determined on the ground of his unsuitability, they
must be given an opportunity of personal hearing by
the Committee. The whole purpose of the personal
interview was that, when it was proposed to declare
an official unsuitable for absorption, the Committee
had to afford him an opportunity to appear before it
and clear up his position. Since it is nobody’s case that
such an opportunity was afforded to the appellant, we
would hold that the order dated August 26, 1967 (of
termination of his services passed by the State) suffers
from a serious legal infirmity and must be quashed. He
will, therefore, have to be treated as having continued
in service till the age of superannuation and entitled
to all the benefits incidental to such a declaration.
12.4. In S.Govindaraju v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation11
again, this Court held thus:
“7…..There is no dispute that the appellant’s services
were terminated on the ground of his being found
unsuitable for the appointment and as a result of
which his name was deleted from the select list,
and he forfeited his chance for appointment. Once
a candidate is selected and his name is included in
the select list for appointment in accordance with
the Regulations, he gets a right to be considered
for appointment as and when vacancy arises. On

11 [1986] 2 SCR 509 : (1986) 3 SCC 273
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the removal of his name from the select list serious
consequences entail as he forfeits his right to
employment in future. In such a situation even though
the Regulations do not stipulate for affording any
opportunity to the employee, the principles of natural
justice would be attracted and the employee would
be entitled to an opportunity of explanation, though
no elaborate enquiry would be necessary. Giving
an opportunity of explanation would meet the bare
minimal requirement of natural justice. Before the
services of an employee are terminated, resulting in
forfeiture of his right to be considered for employment,
opportunity of explanation must be afforded to the
employee concerned. The appellant was not afforded
any opportunity of explanation before the issue of the
impugned order; consequently the order is rendered
null and void being inconsistent with the principles
of natural justice…”
12.5. This Court in Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa,12 in an
unequivocal terms observed as follows:
“73……This Court has repeatedly observed that even
when the rules are silent, principles of natural justice
must be read into them.
74. In its keen anxiety of being fair to the victim /
complainants and wrap up the complaints expeditiously,
the Committee has ended up being grossly unfair
to the appellant. It has completely overlooked the
cardinal principle that justice must not only be done,
but should manifestly be seen to be done. The
principles of audi alteram partem could not have
been thrown to the winds in this cavalier manner.”
12.6. It is manifestly clear from the above judgments that reasons
are heartbeat of every order and every notice must specify the
grounds on which the administrative or quasi-judicial authority
intends to proceed; if any document is relied upon to form

12 [2023] 7 SCR 772 : (2024) 1 SCC 632 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 621
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Basudev Dutta v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

the basis of enquiry, such document must be furnished to the
employee; it is only then a meaningful reply can be furnished;
and the failure to furnish the documents referred and relied in
the notice would vitiate the entire proceedings as being arbitrary
and in violation of the principles of natural justice; and before
taking any adverse decision, the aggrieved person must be
given an opportunity of personal hearing. In the light of the
same, we have no hesitation to hold that the order of termination
passed against the appellant is arbitrary, illegal and violative
of the principles of natural justice and it cannot be sustained.
12.7. Though we are in agreement with the proposition laid down in
the decisions cited on the side of the respondent(s), the same
does not apply to the present case, which factually differs.
12.8. Thus, in the ultimate analysis, we find that the Tribunal was
right in observing that without following the principles of natural
justice and without affording any opportunity to explain his case
before the authority, the appellant was terminated and hence,
his termination order cannot be sustained in the eye of law;
and accordingly, set aside the order of termination. However,
the High Court erroneously allowed the writ petition filed by the
State and set aside the order of the Tribunal by observing that
the action of the authorities in issuing a show cause notice and
inviting a reply therefrom and the availing of such opportunity
by the appellant, is in adherence with the principles of natural
justice. Hence, we are inclined to set aside the order of the
High Court and restore the order of the Tribunal to that extent.
13. As far as the third contention is concerned, it appears to us that the
appellant joined the post of Ophthalmic Assistant on 06.03.1985
upon production of satisfactory report of medical examination and
police verification roll. Yet, the police verification report, which was
supposed to have been filed within three months from the date of
initial appointment of the appellant, was filed only in the year 2010,
i.e., after 25 years of service and just two months prior to the date of
his retirement. Placing reliance on such report, he was terminated from
service. In view of the enormous delay on the part of the respondent
authorities in submission of the verification report, the appellant has
been rendered ineligible to receive his pensionary benefits, though
he had put in 26 years of unblemished service. The respondents
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in their reply affidavit categorically admitted about the inordinate
delay occasioned to ascertain the unsuitability of the appellant for
appointment to the Government service. However, they did not assign
any reason much less valid reason for the same. Such a callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the respondent authorities cannot
be countenanced by us. As held by us in paragraph 12.6 supra, the
order of termination passed against the appellant is arbitrary, illegal
and in violation of the principles of natural justice and it cannot be
sustained. In view of the same, the second limb of the order of
the Tribunal granting liberty to the authority to proceed against the
appellant in accordance with the principles of natural justice, after a
period of 14 years from the date of retirement, would not serve any
purpose. Hence, the appellant is entitled to receive all the service
benefits that are duly payable to him.
13.1. The given factual matrix would also compel this Court to issue a
direction to the police official(s) of all the States to complete the
enquiry and file report as regards the character, antecedents,
nationality, genuineness of the documents produced by the
candidates selected for appointment to the Government service,
etc., within a stipulated time provided in the statute/G.O., or
in any event, not later than six months from the date of their
appointment. It is made clear that only upon verification of the
credentials of the candidates, their appointments will have to
be regularized so as to avoid further complications, as in the
case on hand.
14. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this appeal is allowed
and the order of the High Court is set aside. As a sequel, the service
benefits which remain unpaid as on date, be paid to the appellant
within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of
this judgment. There is no order as to costs. Pending application(s),
if any, shall stand closed.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain