Holding

An appellate court has full, unrestricted power to re‑appreciate, review and reconsider the evidence and reach its own conclusions on both fact and law in an appeal against an order of acquittal, subject only to the double presumption of innocence and the requirement that two reasonable conclusions are not possible on the record.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined an appeal filed by the State under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the acquittal of Batcu Venkatehswarlu and others by a trial court. The Court held that an appellate court has full power to re‑appreciate, review and reconsider the entire evidence and reach its own conclusions on both fact and law in an appeal against acquittal, and that the statute imposes no limitation on this power. While exercising this power the court must respect the double presumption of innocence that accompanies an acquittal and should not disturb it unless the evidence does not support two reasonable conclusions. The High Court’s disposal of the appeal was found unsatisfactory, and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration. The decision reaffirmed that "substantial and compelling reasons" language is merely expressive and not a substantive restriction on appellate jurisdiction.

Issues considered

The scope of the appellate court's power under CrPC s.378(1) and (3) in an appeal against an order of acquittal.
Whether any statutory limitation or condition exists on the High Court's power to review evidence and overturn an acquittal.
The standard of proof and the role of the presumption of innocence when revisiting an acquittal.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 372-394, s. 378(1), s. 378(3)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 302, s. 307, s. 324, s. 34, s. 379, s. 427, s. 447, s. 448

Subjects

appeal against acquittalSection 378 CrPCappellate jurisdictionpresumption of innocencereasonable doubtreappreciation of evidencecriminal proceduredouble presumptionmiscarriage of justice

Judgment

[2008] 16 S.C.R. 851

- BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS.
v.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1159 of 2001)
A

DECEMBER 1, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, V.S. SIRPURKAR AND G.S.
SINGHVI, JJ.]
~

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- s. 378 (1) and (3) -
Appeal against acquittal - Power of appellate court - Ambit c,
and scope of -- Held: While dealing with an appeal against
acquittal there is no limitation, restriction or condition on the
power of appellate court - It has full power to reappreciate,
review and reconsider the evidence at large on which acquittal
was based and to reach its own conclusion on such evidence D
- Both questions of law and fact are open for determination -
Court to bear in mind that in such case there is double
presumption in favour of he accused viz. presumption of
innocence and the same being reinforced by acquittal - On
facts, the manner in which High Court disposed of the appeal
E
aga(nst acquittal, is not satisfactory - Hence, matter remitted
to High Court for disposal afresh.

Appellants-accused were tried under various
offences under IPC. Trial court acquitted them. The
appeal u/s. 378 (1) and (3) Cr.P.C. was allowed and the F
~
accused were convicted.

In appeal to this court, appellants contended that the
High Court order was passed without following the
parameters relating to appeals against acquittal. G
. :''

)
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. An appellate court has full power to
.
. 851 H
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

~

A review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach its
own conclusions on such evidence. ·Both questions of
fact and of law are open to determination by the High
Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal. Bare
8 reading of Section 378 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that no
restrictions have been imposed by the legis.lature on the
powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals
against acquittal. [Paras 11] [863-H; 864-A-B]
1.2. Various expressions, such as, "substantial and
C compelling reasons"; "good and sufficient grounds",
"very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions",
"glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail
extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal
against 'acquittal. Such phraseologies· are more in the
D nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the
reluctance ·of an.appellate court to interfere with acquittal
than to· curtail the power of the court to review the
evidence· and to come to its. own conclusion. [Para 37]
It I • ..

·E · ·1.3~·An appellate· court, however, must bear in mind
that in cas.e of acquittal, there is double presumption in
favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of'ci'iminal jurisprudence that every pel'Son shall
F be. presumed fo be innocent unless he is proved guilty
by a co'mpetent court of law. Secondly, the accused
having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his
inn.ocence
. . .
.
is further
, ' ..
reinforced,
. .
' ..reaffirmed and
.

str~og~l:len~d by Jhe trial _court.
{~~ .
[Para 37] [879;.C-D]
.

G 1.4.' lf'two' reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the
.trial court. ·[Para. 37l[879-D-El · ,
Prandas v. State AIR 1954 SC 36 and M.G. Agarwal v.
H
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 853
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP.

•
I

~ State of Maharashtra 1963 (2) SCR 405, followed. A
Surajpal Singh v. $fate 1~52 SCR 193; Ajmf!r Singh v.
state of Punjab 1953 SCR 418; Atley v. State of u.p. Al,~.1955
SC 807; Aher Raja Khima v. St€!te of ~aura_sh'tra 1955 (2)
SCR 1285; Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1.961 ,(3) SCR B
120; Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Mahar_ashtra 1973
(2) sec 793; K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P 1979 (1) sec
...
355; Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat 1996 (9) SCC
225; Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat 2002 (3) SCC
57; Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. 2002 (4) SCC 85;
Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.
c
2002 (6) SCC 4,70; Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha
2003 (12) sec 606; Kallu v. State of M.P. 2006 (10) sec 313
and Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Kamataka 2007 (4) SCC
415, relied on.
D
Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor 1934 (61) IA 398; ~ur Mohd.
v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 151, referred to.
2.1. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to
be convicted of an offence which is not established by
the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable E
doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there
is,. however, no absolute standard. What degree of
probability amounts to "proof' is an exercise particular
to each case. [Para 38] [879-E-F] ·
F
... 2.2~ D~ubts would be called reasonable if they are
free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot
afford any favourite other than truth. To. constitute
reasonable doubt, it must be free from .an over-emotional
response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts G
as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the
evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere
vague apprehensions.. A reasonable doubt is not an
imagina.ry, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair
doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must H
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A grow out of the evidence in the case. [Para 39) [880·C·D) ~

. 2.3. The concepts of probability, and· the degrees of
it~ cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be
mathemat~cally enumerated as to how many of such units
c-onstitute proof beyond r~asonable doubt. There is an
8
·unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the
degrees.of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic
probability· must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust
common sense· and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions -.,. .
of the Judge. While the protection given by the criminal
C process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at
the same time, uninformed legitimization of trivialities
would make a mockery of administration of criminal
justice. [Para 40) [880-E-G]
D State qf U.P. v. Krishna Gopal 1988 (4) SCC 302 and
Krishnan and Anr. v.. State,represented by Inspector qf Police
2003 (7) sec 56, relied on. ·
"The Mathematics of Proof II" by Glanville Williams,
Criminal Law.Re.view, ·1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p.340,
E referred to. ·
3. In ttle instate case, the manner of disposal of the
appe'al as done by the High Court is. highly
unsatisfactory. It leaves much to be desired: Hence, the
F matter is remitted to the High Court to dispose of the
appeal afresh .by analysing the conclusions and decide
whether any interference. is called for and, if the answer
is in~the affirmative, the reason therefor. [Paras 7 and 421
[862:-A; 881-B] . .
G • '! ~ ':

Case Law Reference:
., t
.· 934 (61) .IA· 398 Referred to. Para 14
. ;A.IR 1945
.,
PC 151 ···Referred to. Para 18
'·
H AIR 1954 SC 36 . Followed. Para 19
BATCU VENKAlEHSWARLU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 855
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP.
~
~
"·
1952 SCR 193 Relied on.
. Para 21 A
1953 SCR 418 Relied on. Para 22
AIR 1955 SC 807 Relied on. Para 24
1955 (2) SCR 1285 Relied on. Para 25
' B
1961 (3)SCR 120 Relied on. Para 26
1963 (2) SCR 405 Followed. Para 27
1973 (2) sec 793 Relied on. Para 28
1979 (1) sec 355 Relied on. Para 30 . c-
1996 (9) sec 225 Relied on. Para 31
2002 (3) sec s1 Relied on. Para 32
2002 (4) sec 85 Relied on. Para 33
2002 (6) sec 470 Relied on. Para 34 D
2003 (12) sec 606 Relied on. Para 35
2006 (10) sec 313 Relied on. Para 36
2001 (4) sec 415 Relied on. Para 37
E
1988 (4) sec 302 Relied on. Para 40
2003 (7) sec 56 Relied on. Para 41
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1159 of 2001. F
.J
From the final Judgment and Order dated 28.8.2001 of the
High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Crl.
Appeal No. 131 of 1999.

M. Karpaga Vinayagam, R. Sarithan Krishnan, T. Surya G
Kiran, K. Radha Rani and Anil Kumar Tandale for the
> Appellants.

'• D. Bharathi Reddy for the Respondent.
H
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by !-
1,..
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.1. Challenge in this appeal is to
the judgment of a Divi.sion Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
court allowing the appeal filed by the State under Section 378
(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
B
referred to as the "Present Code") against the judgment of
acquittal passed by learned First Additional Sessions Judge,
Guntur: There is no necessity to refer to the factual aspects in ~

detail.

c 2. In all.1 65 persons faced trial fof alleged commission of .---
offences punishable under. several sections of the Indian Penal
Code; 1860 (in short 'IPC').

3. Prosecution version as 1,mfolded during trial is as
D follows:
There were in all three murders. The names of the
deceased persons were Nallappaneni Sambasiva Rao,' Ch.
~
GhJnna Koteshwar Rao and Turaka pullaiah. They are
hereinafter referred to as 01, '02 and 03 respectively. Out of
E 36 cha'fges framed, prosecution did not examine witnesses to
prove the charges No.17, 18, 23 and 24. All the accused and
PWs 1 to 27 belong to Balausupadu Village within the limits of
Peddakurapadu Police Station, Sattenapalli Circle, Guntur
District. There. are two groups in the village. A 1 is the leader
F of one group and one lrukupatti Abaiah is the leader of'another
group. There were cases and counter cases between the two )..

groups and security proceedings were initiated against both the
groups. A police picket was posted in the village to maintain
law and order and peace.
G
· ·. ·On 14.5;1990 in the morning PW-1·2was stabbed by A-
11 in Harijanwada and· the same was registered as Crime
No.38/1990. The prosecution party retaliated by attacking a '
person by name A. Bharataiya and the said case was
I
registered as Crime No.37/1990. Due to the said violence,
H
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS..v. PUBLIC 857
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

- ,.
(
police opened fire. Fortunately, nobody was injured due to the
opening of fire, but police themselves sustained injuries as both
the groups pelted stones at them. The case was registered as
A

Crime No.36/1990. While the matter stood thus, at about 12.30
p.m., A-1 along with 200 supports including all the accused
mentioned in the charge sheet went to the house of PW-1 and B
made a~tacks. This is the main incident on which the trial was
conducted.

P.W.1 belongs to the opposite group. When P.W.1 was
discussing the attack made on P.W.12 in the morning by A11,
A1 went to his house and exhorted the other accused to kill and
c
beat. A1 alleged to have inflicted injuries by a spear on P.W.1
on his right thigh and on .tlis back. 01 happened to be the son
of P.W.1. He was terribly frightened on seeing the attack on his
father. He ran to the upstairs of the house. Then A1 to A4
allegedly chased 01 and attacked him with spears and axes. 0
A2 held 01 tightly and A3 put a towel over the neck of 01 and
pulled him down. Then A1 inflicted injuries by a spear on 01
on his right chest. A2 allegedly inflicted injuries by spear below
his right thigh. A3 stabbed on the left thigh of 01 and A4
allegedly inflicted injuries by axe on the left leg of 01. E

While A 1 to A4 chased 01, the other accused chased 02
and attacked him in the cattle-shed of one I. Nageshwar Rao,
A 18 alleged to have hit 02 on the back of his head by an axe.
A19 hit him on the left side of his head by a spear. A20 hit him F
on his back with spear and A21 hit on the back of his shoulder
with spear. A22 inflicted injuries on the left side of his chest with
spear. A23 speared on his right leg. A28 speared on his left
leg. At about the same time, 03 was returning to his house
along with·his wife, PW.24. When they were nearing the house
G
of PW.1, A18, A20, A21 and A3_0 to A35 attacked 03. A21 is
alleged to have attacked 03 on his right forehead. A18 is
·> alleged to have speared on his left chest. A-20 is alleged to ·
have speared on his left ribs and A-34 is alleged to have axed
on his right wrist.
H
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A It is the. further .case of the prosecution that A 1 to A4
attacked P .W.2. P.W.3 was attacked by A31, A36 to A38. A 1 • .;:,.
f

to A4 attacked P.W.4 and caused simple injuries. A9, A26 and
A35 attacked P.W.5, A39 attacked P.W.6 and caused simple
injurie~. A40, A41 and A42 attacked P.W.9 and caused simple
8 . injuries. A43 and A44 attacked P.W.8 and caused simple
injuries. A33, A44 and A54 attacked P.W.9 and caused simple
injuries. A16, A33, A56 to A59 attacked P.W.13 and 'caused
simple injuries. A 19, A33, A46 to A54, A60 to A62, A64 and ~-

A65 attacked P.W.11 and caused simple injuries.
c On the .. same day at about 2 p.m. P.W.1 reported the t'
offence to P.W.30, who happened to be the Head Constable,
attached to. Peddakurapadu Police Station,
. who was camping
at Balsapadu Village. The report was reduced to writing by
P.W.30. Ex.P1 is the said report P.\l\J.30, sent the said report
D to the Police Stati9n through a Constable, which was received
by P.W.33, Sub Inspector of Police, Peddakurapadu Police
Station. On the strer:igth of Ex.P1, P.W.33 registered the case
in Crime No.35/1990 against the accused for offences I
punishable· under Sections 147, 148, 324, 307, 448, 447, 427,
E 379 and 302 read with Section 149 IPC. He sent copies of the
FIR to all concerned. He informed the Inspector of Police,
P.W.35 who was at Guntur. P.W.35 and 33 reached the scene
of offence at about the same time. P.W.35 drafted observation
report of the scene ofoffence Ex.P2. P.W.25 acted as Panch
F witness to Ex.P2. P.W.35 prepared rough sketch of the scene
of offence marked as Ex.P26. He held inquest over the dead
body of DI from 7 to 9 p.m. P.W.25 acted as Panch. Ex.P3 is
the inquest report in respect ofD1. Thereafter he held inquest
over the dead body of 02 in the presence of PW.25 who acted
G as Panch witness. Subsequently, he examined PWs.1 to 5 on .
the same day.

On 15.5.1990, PW.35 examined PV'{s.10, 14 to 23 and
others. On 14.5.1990, the injured and 03 were referred to the
Hospital. PW.32, the Head Constable Sattenapally Police
-~'H
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 859
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [OR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

) Station recorded dying declaration of 03 which is produced on A
record at Ex.P22, on 14.5.1990 at 9.15 p.m. D3 died in the
hospital on 15.5.1990. Death intimation was given to the Police,
Station which is Ex.P.25.
'
PW.35 visited the Government Hospital, Sattenapally and
8
conducted inquest over dead body of 03 which is Ex.PS. The
inquest was conducted in the Hospital in the presence of
PW.27. Thereafter, PW.25 recorded the statements of PWs.5 ·
to 9 on 15.5.1990. He examined PW.9 on 16.5.1990. After the
inquest was over the. dead bodies of D1 to 03 were sent for
post mortem examination. Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government c
Hospital, Sattenapally, (PW.31) conducted post"mortem ·
examination over the dead body of 01 on 15.5, 1990. Ex.PB is
the post mortem certificate issued by him in respect of 01.
PW.30 found four injuries on the dead body of D1.
D
On 15.5.1990, Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government
Hospital, Sattenapally, (PW.29) conducted autopsy over the
dead body of D2. Post mortem certificate issued by him is
t Ex.P7, Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government Hospital,
Sattenapally, (PW.28) conducted post mortem examination over E
the dead body of D3 and issued Ex.P6 post mortem certificate.
PW-31 examined P.Ws 1to11on14.5.1990 in the night itself
and issued wound certificate Exs. P9 to P20 respectively. As
per the opinion of the Doctor, the injuries noticed on the
prosecution witnesses were simple in nature. But the injuries
F
~ found on the person of PW.4 were of grievous nature.
..
On completion of investigation PW-33 filed charge sheet.
As accused persons abjured guilt trial was held.

The trial Court after referring to the evidence of the G
witnesses produced by the prosecution held that prosecution
failed to fasten the guilt on the accused persons. In the State's
appeal the challenge was to the judgment of acquittal, which
was allowed.
H
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A Out of 65 accused persons, name of A-63 was deleted and ~
(.

A-18 and A-59 died during trial. Therefore, before the High
Court there were 62 respondents.

4. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that
the Division Bench of the High Court after referring to the
B prosecution case and the evidence of the witnesses came to
abrupt conclusions regarding the guilt of the accused and upset
the judgment of acquittal. The factors which weighed with the
-1
trial Court to direct acquittal were not taken note of by the High
Court. The High Court's judgment does not meet the
c parameters indicated ·by this Court relating to appeals against
acquittal. ·

5. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand
supported the judgment of the High Court.
D
6. We find that in the paper book filed by the appellants .
the judgment covers 43 pages. Out of them the prosecution
case and various decisions have been noted upto page 41.
After doing so, in three paragraphs the High Court disposed t

of the appeal. The conclusions read as follows:
E
"As far as the attack on 01 to 03 is concerned, we have
independently assessed the evidence of prosecution
witnesses. The injuries caused to 01 to 03 as spoken to
by the independent witnesses are materially corroborated
F by the medical evidence. This is a plus point in favour of
the prosecution.
..
>
).

As far as .the injuries on the prosecution witnesses
are concerned, we are not giving much importance.
P.W.31 speaks about the examination of P.Ws.,1, 21 3, 5,
G 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 by .him. He issued th.e wound
certificates Exs.P9 to P20 respectively. Except the injuries
on PW.4 injuries on the other persons were of simple. in
..
nature. The injuries on PW.4 are of grievous in nature. By
booking to the evidence on the point of injuries caused the
H
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 861
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

- ~
prosecution witnesses, we can affirm their presence at the
scene of offence. As far as the injuries on PW.4 are
A

concerned, the injuries were certified by the Doctor to be
grievous. As per the evidence of PW.4, those injuries were
attributed to Al who attacked PW.1, 01 and PW.4. We are
taking cognizance of the said attack by Al. B
As stated earlier, the prosecution did not lead, the
-~ evidence as far as charges No. 17, 18, 23 and 24 .are
concerned. Therefore, the accused are acquitted of thbse
'
charges.
c
Considering the entire evidence as brought :on
record, we convict Al to A4 for the offence punishable
under Section 148 and sentence each of them to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for one year. They are also
convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 D
read with 34 IPC and each of them is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for life' for causing the death of 01. We
convict Al8 to A23 and A28 for the offence punishable
under Section 148 IPC and sentence each of them
to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. We further E
convict A 18 to A23 for the offence punishable under
Section 302 read with 34 IPC and each of them is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life for causing the

-
death of 02. A18, A20, A21, A30 to A34 are convicted
for the offence punishable under Section 148 IPC anq F
..1
each of them is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment
for one year. They are also convicted for the offence
punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 IPC
for causing the death of 03 and each of them is sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for life. The substantive sentences ·
G
imposed upon A 18, A20 and A21 on two counts for
> causing the deaths of 02 and 03 are made to run
concurrently.

The appeal filed by the State is allowed to the extent
indicated above." H
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 16 S.C.R.

A 7. To say the least, the manner of disposal of the appeal
as done by the High Court is highly unsatisfactory.

8. Chapter XXIX (Sections 372-394) of the Present Code
deals with appeals: Section 372 expressly declares that no
8 appeal shall lie from any judgmer:it or order of a criminal court
except as prbvided by the Code or by any other law for the time
being in force. Section 373 provides for filing of appeals in
certain cases. Section 374 allows appeals from convictions.
Section 375 bars appeals in cases where the accused pleads
C guilty. Likewise, no appeal is maintainable in petty cases
(Section 376). Section 377 permits appeals by the State for
enhancement of sentence. Section 378 confers power on the
State to present an appeal to the High Court from an order of
acquittal. The said section is material and may be quoted in
extenso: '
D
"378. Appeal in case of acquittal.-(1) Save as otherwise
provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions
of sub-sections (3) and (5), the State Government may, in
any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an
E appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order
of acquittal passed by any court other than a High Court,
or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in
revision.
. .
(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in
F Which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi
·~
Special Police Establishment constituted under .the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or
by any other agency empowered to make· investigation
into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code,
G the Central Government may also direct the Public
Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions
of sub-section (3), to the High Court from the order of
acquittal.

H (3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 863
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
... ~ be entertained except with the leave ~f the High Court. A
(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case
instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an
application made to it by the complainant in this behalf,
grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, 8
· the complainant may present such an appeal to the High
Court.
,
. ~
(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of
special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal 'shall be
entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, c
_ where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days
in every other case, computed from the date of that order
of acquittal.

(6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for D
the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of ·
acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal .
shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2).

9. Whereas Sections 379-380 cover special cases of
appeals, other sections lay down procedure to be followed by E
appellate courts.

10. It may be stated that more or less similar provisions
were found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
(hereinafter referred to as "the old Code") which came up for F
consideration before various High Courts, Judicial Co!!!mittee
of the Privy Council as also before this Court. Since in the,'
present appeal, we have been called upon to decide the ambit;
and scope of the power of an appellate court in an appeal
against an order of acquittal, we have confined ourselves to one G
aspect only i.e. an appeal against an order of acquittal.
;. 11. Bare reading of Section 378 of the present Cod~
(appeal in case of acquittal) quoted above, makes it clear that
no restrictions have been. imposed by the legislature on the
powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals against H
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 16 S.C.R. - I

A acquittal. When such an appeal is filed; the High Court has full
power to.
reappreci~te,
,
review
. and reconsider the evidence at
~
..
large, the. material. on which the order of acquittal is founded
and to reach its qwn conclusions on such evidence. Both
qµestions of fact and of law are. open to determination by the
B High Court in an appeal against.an order of acquittal.
12. It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal,
there.is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
"I
.
'
the presumption of innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
c person should be pres1.fmed to be innocent unless he is proved
to be guilty by a competent court of law. Secqndly, the accused
having secured an ac~uittal, the presumption of his innocence
~
is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
D
13. Though the 'above principles are well established, a
different note was struck in several decisions by various High
Courts and even by this Court. It is, therefore, appropriate if we
·consider some of the le~ding decisions on the point.
E
14. The first important decision was rendere~ by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. R.
Emperor(1934) 61 IA 398). In Sheo Swarup the accused were
acquitted by the trial court and the local Government directed
the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court
F from an order of acquittal under Section 417 of the old Code
(similar to Section 378 of the present Code); At the time of
hearing of appeal before the High Court, it was contended on ""
behalf of the accused that in an appeal from an order of
acquittal, it was not open to the appellate court to interfere with
G the findings of fact recor~ed by the trial Judge unless such
findings could not have been reached by him had there not been
some perversity or incompeten.ce on his part. The High Court, .(

however, declined to accept the said view. It held that no
condition was imposed on the High Court in such appeal. It
H accordingly reviewed all the evidence in the case and having
BATCU VENKATEHSWAR.LU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 865
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

' formed an opinion of its weight and reliability different from that A
of the trial Judge, recorded an order of conviction. A petition
was presented to His Majesty in Council for leave to appeal
on the ground that conflicting views ·had been expressed by the 1

High Courts in different parts of India upon the question whether
· in an appeal from an order of acquittal, an appellate court had B
1

the power to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the
trial Judge. Their Lordships thought it fit to clarify the legal
t position and accordingly upon the "humble advice of their
Lordships", leave was granted by His Majesty. The case was,
thereafter, argued. The Committee considered the scheme and' c
interpreting Section 417 of the Code (old Code) observed that
there was no indication in the Code of any limitation or
restriction on the High Court in exercise of powers as an
Appellate Tribunal. The Code also made no distinction as.
regards powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal
D
against acquittal and an appeal against conviction. Though
several authorities were cited revealing different views by the
High Courts dealing with an appeal from an order of acquittal,
the Committee did not think it proper to discuss all the cases.
15. Lord Russel summed up the legal position thus: E
"There is, in their opinion, no foundation for the view,
apparently supported by the judgments of some courts in
India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to
reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in F
cases in which the lower court has 'obstinately blundered',
or has 'through incompetence, stupidity or perversity'
reached such 'distorted conclusions as to produce a
positive miscarriage of justice', or has in some other way
so conducted or misconducted itself as to produce a
glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by the G
defence so as to produce a similar result."

16. His Lordship, then proceeded to observe: (IA p.404) '

"Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which
· the order of acquittai was founded, and to reach the
"conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal
should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon
that power, u·nless it be found expressly stated in the
Code." -
B
17.-The Committee, however, cautioned appellate courts
and stated: (IA p.404)

"But in exercising the power conferred by the Co'de and
c before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court
should and will always give proper weight and
consideration fo such matters as ( 1) the views of the trial
Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the
presumption of innocence in favour of the ,accused, a
D presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he- has
been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to
the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an
appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by
a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.
E To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court
in its conduct of the-appeal should and will act in
accordance with rules and principle.c; well known and
recognised in the administration of justice." ·._

(emphasis supplied)
F
18. In Nur Mohd. v. Ef!1peror (AIR 1945 PC 151), the
Committee reiterated the above view in Sheo Swarup (Supra)
and.held that in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court has
full powers to review and to reverse acquittal.
G
19. So far·as this ~curt _is concerned, probably the first
, decision on the_ point was Prandas v. State (Al R 1954 SC 36)
(though the case was decided on 14-3-1950, itwas reported,
only in 1954). In that _case, the accused was acquitted by the
I H trial . Provincial Government preferred .an appeal
. court. The
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 867
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [DR. ARiJIT PASAYAT, J.]

which was allowed and the accused was convicted for offences A
punishable under Sections 302 and 323 IPC. The High Court,
for convicting the accused, placed reliance on certain
eyewitnesses.

20. Upholding the decision of the High Court and following B
__,
' the proposition of law in Sheo Swarup (supra), a six-Juqge
Bench held as follows:

"6. It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot
support the view which has been expressed in several
· cases that the High Court has no power under Section c
417, Criminal Procedure Code, to reverse a judgment of
acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the
subordinate court has in some way or other misdirected
itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice."
D
-:/ (emphasis supplied)

21. In Surajpal Singh v. State ( 1952 SCR 193), a two-
Judge Bench observed that it was well established that in an
appeal under Section 417 of the (old) Code, the High Court
had full power to review the evidence upon which the order of E
acquittal was founded. But it was equally well settled that the
presumption of innocence of th~ accused was further reinforced
by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial
court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and
hearing their evidence could be reversed only for very F
I substantial and compelling reasons.

22. In Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418)
the accused was acquitted by the trial court but was convicted
by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal filed by the G
State. The aggrieved accused approached this Court. It was
contended by him that there were "no compelling reasons" for
setting aside the order of acquittal and due and proper weight
had not been given by the High Court to the opinion of the trial
court as r~gards the credibility of witnesses seen and H
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A examined. It was also commented that the High Court ~
committed an error of law in observing that "when a strong
'prima facie' case is made out against an accused person it is
his duty to explain the circumstances appearing in evidence
against him and he cannot take shelter behind the presumption
B of innocence and cannot state that the law entitles him to keep
his lips sealedil.

23. Upholding the contention, this Court $aid: ~·

"We think this criticism is well founded. After an order of
c acquittal has been made the presumption of innocence is
further reinforced by that order, and that being so, the trial
court's decision can be reversed not on the ground that the
accused·had failed to explain the circumstances appearing
against him but only for very substantial and compelling;
0 reasons."

(emphasis supplied)

24. In Atley v. State oftJ.P. (AIR 1955 SC 807) this Court
said:
"
E
"In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the
appellate court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal
Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the judgment
of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set
F aside that order.

It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the \
High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to
review the entire evidence and to come to its own
conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established
G
rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is
. not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of
acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage
of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence
have been recorded in its presence.
H
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 869
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
)
It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide A
powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against
an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against
an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the
presumption of innocence with which the accused person
starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate , B
stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight
to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order
of acquittal.

If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those
principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the c
judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated."

(emphasis supplied)

25. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra (1955) 2 D
SCR 1285) the accused was prosecuted under Sections 302
and 447 IPC. He was acquitted by the trial court but convicted
by the High Court. Dealing with the power of the High Court
against an order of acquittal, Bose, J. speaking for the majority
(2:1) stated: (AIR p. 220, para 1) "It is, in our opinion, well settled
that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view
E
of the evidence; there must also be substantial and
compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong."

(emphasis supplied)
F
:I
26. In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR
120, a three-Judge Bench considereg almost all leading
decisions on the point and observed that there was no difficulty
in applying the principles laid down by the Privy Council and
accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, noted that
appellate courts found considerable difficulty in understanding
G
,)
the scope of the words "substantial and compelling reasons"
used in certain decisions. It was observed inter-alia as follows:
'
"This Court obviously did not and could not add a condition
to Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The ~
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 871
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
)
seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be A
reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons':
vide Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193). Similarly
in AjmerSingh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418), it was
observed that the interference of the High Court in an
appeal against the order of acqujttalwould be justified only B
if there are 'very substantial and compelling reasons to do
so'. In some other decisions, it has been stated that an
order of acquittal can be reversed only for 'good and
sufficiently cogent reasons' or for 'strong reasons'. In
appreciating the effect of these observations, it must be c
remembered that these observations were not intended to
lay down a rigid or inflexible rule which should govern the
decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals.
They were not intended, and should not be read to have
intended to introduce an additional condition in clause (a)
D
of Section 423(1) of the Code. All that the said
observations are intended to emphasize is that the
approach of the High Court in dealing with an appeal
against acquittal ought to be cautious because as Lord
Russell observed in Sheo Swarup the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused 'is not certainly Et
weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his
trial'. Therefore, the test suggested by the expression
'substantial and compelling reasons' should not be
construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in
every case. That is the effect of the recent decisions of this F
)
Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh. v. State of Rajasthan
and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab (1962Supp1 SCR ·
104) arid so, it is not necessary that before reversing a
judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily
characterise the findings r~corded therein as perverse." G
J (emphasis supplied)

28. Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade. v. State of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793) this Court
H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

!,
A held that in India, there is no jurisdictional limitation on the
powers of appellate court. "In law there are no fetters on the
plenary power of the appellate court to review the whole
evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed,
it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de novo,
B informed, however, by the weighty tho!Jght that the rebuttable
innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into
an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes to individual
liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the holding
without very convincing reasons and comprehensive
consideration."
c
. 29. Putting emphasis on balance between importance of
individual liberty and evil of acquitting guilty persons, this Court
observed as follows:
"6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a
D
necessary social perspective in criminal cas_es which
suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers
of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at
the expense of social defence and to the soothing
sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of
E justice to the victim and the community, demand especial
emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime
and escape. The judicial instrument has a public
accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread
of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro' the web
F of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace
. every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive
solicitude reflected iri the attitude that a thousand guilty men
may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false
dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused.
G Oth~.rwise any practical system of justice will then
breakdown and lose credibility with the community. The evil
ofacquitting a guilty person light-heartedly, as a learned L ~~.·
author (Glanville Williams in Proof of Guilt) has saliently
observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one
H guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 873
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
; become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard A
of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for
harsher legal presumptions against indicted 'persons' and
more severe punishment of those who are found guilty.
Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a
ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial B.
protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true
to say, with Viscount Simon, that 'a miscarriage of justice
may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from
the conviction of the innocent. .. .' In short, our
jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must c
be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal
justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck
between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to
set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of
preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents."
0
(emphasis supplied)

30. •n K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P (1979) 1 SCC 355,
the Court was considering the power of the High Court against
an order of acquittal under Section 378 of the present. Code. E
After considering the relevant decisions on the point it was
stated as follows:

"9. The principles are now well settled. At one time it was
thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for
'substantial and compelling reasons' only and courts used F
to launch on a search to discover those 'substantial and
compelling reasons'. However, the 'formulae' of 'substantial
and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficiently cogent
reasons' and 'strong reasons' and the search for them were
abandoned as a result of the pronouncement of this Court G
· in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120.
In Sanwat Singh case this Court harked back to the
principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swamp
v. R. Emperor and reaffirmed those principles. Aft~r
Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan this Court has H
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2008] 16 S.C.R.

l,
A consistently recognised the right .of the appellate court to
review the entire evidence and to come to its own
conclusion bearing in mind the considerations mentioned
by the Privy Council iri Sheo Swarup case. Occasionally
phrases like 'manifestly illegal', 'grossly unjust', have been
B used to describe the orders of acquittal which warrant
interference. But, such expressions have beeff used more
as flourishes of language, to emphasise the reluctance of
the appellate·court to interfere with ·an order of acquittal .
than to curtail the power of the appellate court to review
the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion. In
c some cases (Ramaphupala Reddy v. State of A.P., (AIR
1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh Rup Singh v. State of
Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC 286), it has been said that to
the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh case may be
added the further principle that 'if two reasonable
D
conclusions can be reached on the ba~is of the evidence
on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding
of the trial court'. This, of course, is not a new priociple. It
stems out of the fundamental principle of .our criminal
jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of
E any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably. probable and
evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, or_ie
must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable
Qoubt.. But, fanciful and remote possibili~ies m~st be left out
of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of
F a. doubt arising from the .possibility of a duality of views,
the possible view in .favour of. the accused must be as
nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the
preponderance of probability is all one way. a bare
possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to
G ; claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential
that any view of the. ~virJence in favour of the accused
must be reasonable even as .any doubt, the benefit of L

which an accused person may claim, must be
· reasonable."
H (emphasis supplied)
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU-AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 87:5
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
) 31. In Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat {1996) A
9 SCC 225, this Court said:

"While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate
court is first required to seek an answer to the question
whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong 1
B
manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the
appellate court answers the above question in the negative
i
the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if
the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that
the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of
any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only-
c
· reappraise.the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions."

32. In Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2002) 3
SCC 57;_ referring to earlier decisions, the Court stated: _
D
"7. The paramount consideration of the court should be to
avoid miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice which
may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from
the conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court
has taken a view based upon conjectures and hypothesis
E
and not on the legal evidence, a duty is cast upon the High
Court to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for
the purposes of ascertaining as to whether the accused
has committed any offence or not. Probable view taken by
the trial court which may not be disturbed in the appeal is
· such a view which is based upon legal and admissible F
_.)
evidence. Only because the accused has been acquitted
by the trial court, cannot be made a basis to urge that the
High Court under all circumstances should not disturb such
_a finding."
G
33. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85,
) the trial court acquitted the accused but the High Court
convicted them._ Negativing the contention of the appellants that
the High Court could not have disturbed the findings of fact of
the trial court even if that view was not correct, this Court H
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A observed:

"7. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned
counsel for the appellants that under Section 378 of the
Code of Crimi.rial Procedure the High Court could not
disturb the finding of facts of the trial court even if it found
B
that the view taken by the trial court was not proper. On
the basis of the pronouncements of this Court, the settled
position of law regardi11g the powers of the High Court in
an appeal against an order of acquittal is that the Court
has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order
c of acquittal is based and generally it will not interfere with
the order of acquittal because by passing an order of
acquittal the presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused is reinforced. The golden thread which runs
through the web of administration of justice in criminal case
D is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced
in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and
the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to
the accused should be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction
limitation on the appellate court but judge-made guidelines
E for circumspection. The paramount consideration of the
court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. A
miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal
of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an
innocent. In a case where the frial court has taken a view
F ignoring the admissible evidence, a duty is cast upon the
High Court to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal
appeal for the purposes of ascertaining as to whether all
or any of the accused has committed any offence or not".

G 34. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court
of AP. (2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court said:

"12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an
order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal
has full power to review the evidence to reach its own
H ...
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 877
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
) independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with. A
an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other
view is possible, because with the passing of an order of
acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the·
accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court
would not be justified to interfere with order of acquittal B
merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would
have proceeded to record a convrction; a duty is cast on
-~
the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to
examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court
to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If c
the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment
will suffer from serious infirmity."

35. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha (2003) 12
SCC 606, this Court observed:
D
"21. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing
the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based.
Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with
because the presumption of innocence of the accused is
further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which E
runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal
cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
favourable to the accused should be adopted. The F
paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that '
miscarriage of justice is prevented. A misca~riage of
justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less
than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where
admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the
G
appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in 'a case
,4
where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of
ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed
any offence or not".

36. Again in Ka/Ju v. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313, H
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A this Court stated:
"8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power
of the appellate court is no less than the power exercised
while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of
..· · appeals; the power exists to review the entire evidence.
8
· · However, one significant difference is that an order of
acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court,
where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence
and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not
reverse the decision of th/e trial court merely because a
c different view is possible. The appellate court will also
bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in
favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get
the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, .
it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of
D the trial court."

(emphasis supplied)

37. From the above decisions, in Chandrappa and Ors.
E v. State of Karnataka (2007 (4) SCC 415), the following general
principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal were culled out:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate
- and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of
F acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power
· and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach
G its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and l .

compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", ''very
strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring·
mistakesil, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers .
H
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 87$
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

- I
of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature .of "flourishes of
language" to emphasise the reluctance .of an appellate
A

court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of
the court to review the evidence and .to come to its own
conclusion. B
(4) An appellate court, however . must bear in mind that in
case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of
...
the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be c
innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court
of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
D
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not
disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.

38. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be
convicted of an offence which is not established by the
E
evidential standard of proof beyond reasonabie doubt. Though
this ~tandard is a higher standard, there is, however, no
absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to
"proof' is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to the
interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece F
_,I, - of evidence by another, a learned author says [see "The
Mathematics of Proof II": Glanville Williams, Criminal Law
Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p.340 (342)]:

"The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the G
separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events
are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the
evidence of such events may also be said to be
dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence
directed to establishing that the defendant did the H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

\
A prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally
dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an
alJe'g~d confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from
' -
,
~

the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is
generally guilty rather than innocent people who make
B confessions, and guilty rather than innocent people who run
away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The
one piece of evidence· may confirm the other."

39. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from
a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite
c other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free
from an over-emotional response. Doubts must be actual and
substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising
from the evidence, or from the lac~ of it, as opposed to mere
vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary,
D trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon
reason and commort sense. It must grow out of the evidence
in the case.
...
40. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it,
E cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be
mathematically· enumerated as to how many of such units
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an
. unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of. the
degrees_ of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic
F probability must,. in the last analysis, rest on· a robust common
sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge.
While the protection given by the criminal process to the
accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time,
uninformed legitimization of trivialities would make a mockery
of administration of criminal justice. This position was
G illuminatingly stated in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal (1988 (4)
sec 302).

41. The above position was also highlighted in Krishnan
and Anr. v. State represented by Inspector of Police (2003 (7)
H
BATCU VENKATEHSWARLU AND ORS. v. PUBLIC 881
PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF AP. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.J

- r' sec 56).
42. As the manner of disposal of the appeal leaves much
A

to be desired, we think it appropriate to remit the matter to the
High Court to dispose of the appeal afresh. Needless it has to
analyse the conclusions and decide whether any interference 8
is called for and, if the answer is in the affirmative, the reason
therefor.
43. The appeal is allowed.
K.K.T. Appeal allowed. C