BHADRAGIRI VENKATA RAVIversusPUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD

                     [2013] 6 S.C.R. 529


               BHADRAGIRI VENKATA RAVI                            A
                              v.
      PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P.,
                      HYDERABAD
           (Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 2007)
                                                                  B
                        MAY 29, 2013
      [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Death of woman due to burn
injuries - Acquittal of accused-appellant (divorced husband       C
of deceased) by trial court - But conviction by High Court ul
s.302 - On appeal, held: There were three dying declarations
- First two declarations did not implicate the appellant - The
third declaration dated 28.4.2000 implicated the appellant but
the same being full of contradictions does not inspire            D
confidence - Settled legal proposition that in case there are
apparent discrepancies in two dying declarations, it would be
unsafe to convict the accused - In such a fact-situation, the
accused gets the benefit of doubt - Trial Court found material
inconsistencies in the case of the prosecufion and did not see    E
any reason to rely upon the dying declaration dated 28.4.2000
- High Court did not consider the matter in correct perspective
nor observed the parameters laid down by Supreme Court to
interfere against the order of acquittal - Order of trial courl
restored.                                                         F
    Evidence Act, 1872 - s.32 - Multiple dying declarations -
Appreciation of.

    Appeal - Appeal against acquittal - Scope of interference.
                                                                  G
     A woman died due to burn injuries. One day after the
incident, on 15-4-2000, the statement I complaint of the
deceased was recorded by the head constab~ of police
wherein she stated that a stove full of kerosene oil fell
                             529                                  H
    530      $UPREME COURT REPORTS           [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A upon her and thus, she suffered burn injuries. On the
  same day, her dying declaration was recorded by the
  Executive Magistrate after getting certificate of fitness
  from the Doctor, wherein a similar statement had been
  recorded.
B
       A fortnight later, on 28.4.2000, her another dying
  declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate
  wherein she alleged that while she was cooking food and
  all the students had gone home, the appellant (the
C divorced husband of the deceased) poured kerosene on
  her body and threw the burning stove on her, due to
  which She received severe burn injuries.

      The trial Court acquitted the appellant, but on appeal
  by the State, the High Court reversed the acquittal and
D convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and
  sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment. Hence, the
  instant appeal.

          Allowing the appeal, the Court
E      HE;LD: 1. The first two dying declarations were made
  in the Government Headquarter Hospital, Vijianagaram
  and the Magistrate had reached there on being called by
  the police. There is no inconsistency between the first
  two dying declarations and it is evident from the said
F dying declarations recorded on 15.4.2000 that both of
  them had been recorded in the Government Headquarter
  Hospital, Vijianagaram. The third dying declaration makes
  it evident that on 15.4.2000 she had not been taken to the
  Government Hospital and her in-laws were not available
G on 14.4.2000. Her husband had been treating her at home
  and had also given her injections for two-three days. Her
  parents-in-laws reached on 15.4.2000 from Rajahmundry
  and then she was admitted to the private hospital on
  16.4.2,000. As she could not recover therein, then she was
H trans.ferred to Government Headquarter Hospital,
BHADRAGIRI VENKATA RAVI v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH 531
            COURT OF AP., HYDERABAD

Vijianagaram on that day. [Para 8] [539-0-F]                   A

     2. The Trial Court found material inconsistencies in
the case of the prosecution and did not see any reason
whatsoever to rely upon the dying declaration dated
28.4.2000 as the contents thereof were admittedly false
                                                               B
and could not be relied upon. If the dying declaration has
been recorded by the Executive Magistrate on 15.4.2000
in the Government hospital, the question of her being
treated by her husband for 2-3 days and then her
admission in a private hospital did not arise at all. Her      C
version that she was admitted to the Government
Headquarter hospital, Vijianagaram on 16.4.2000 could
not be true. The contents of the dying declaration dated
28.4.2000 being full of contradiction do not inspire
confidence. [Para 13] [541-A-C]
                                                               D
      3. Admittedly, there was a divorce between the
parties. Therefore, the question of demand of dowry or
ill-treatment or harassment could not arise after 8 years
of divorce decree by the court. The mother of the
deceased has deposed about the illicit relationship of the     E
appellant and another woman and the appellant wanted
to marry that woman. In case the parties had separated
by a divorce through court, one fails to understand how
the deceased or her parents were concerned about such
a relationship. [Para 14] [541-0-E]                            F

     4. It is a settled legal proposition that in case there
are apparent discrepancies in two dying declarations, it
would be unsafe to convict the accused. In such a fact-
situation, the accused gets the benefit of doubt. In case
of plural/multiple dying declarations, the court has to        G
scrutinise the evidence cautiously and must find out
whether there is consistency particularly in material
particulars therein. In case there are inter-se
discrepancies in the depositions of the witnesses given
in support of one of the dying declarations, it would not      Ii
    532    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A be safe to rely upon the same. In fact it is not the plurality
  of the dying declarations but the reliability thereof that
  adds weigh to the prosecution case. If the dying
  declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made
  in a fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any
B corroboration. But the statements should be consistent
  throughout. In case of inconsistencies, the court has to
  examinll! the nature of the same, i.e. whether they are
  material or not and while scrutinising the contents of
  various dying declarations, the court has to examine the
c same in the light of the various surrounding facts and
  circumstances. In case of dying declaration, as the
  accused does not have right to cross-examine the maker
  and not able to elicit the truth as happens in the case of
  other witnesses, it would not be safe to rely if the dying
  declaration does not inspire full confidence of the court
0
  about its correctness, as it may be result of tutoring,
  prompting or product of imagination. The court has to be
  satisfied that the maker was in a fit state of mind and had
  a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant
E (s). [Paras 15, 16 & 17] [541-F-H; 54:!-A-D]
       Sanjay v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 148: 2007
  (3) SCR 644; Heerafal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2009)
  12 SC¢ 671: 2009 (4) SCR 283; Smt. Kam/a v. State of
  Punjab AIR 1993 SC 37 4: 1993 (1) SCC 1; Kishan Lal v.
F State of Rajasthan AIR 1999 SC 3062: 1999 (1) Suppl. SCR
  517; Lella Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P. AIR 2004 SC 1720:
  2004 (2) SCR 659; Amo/ Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
  (2008) 5 SCC 468: 2008 (8) SCR 956; State of Andhra
  Pradesh v. P. Khaja Hussain (2009) 15 SCC 120: 2009 (6)
G SCR 660 and Sharda v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2010 SC 408:
  2009 (16) SCR 441 - relied on.
        5. This court has time and again laid down
    parameters for interference by a superior court against
    the order of acquittal. In exceptional cases where there
H
 BHADRAGIRI VENKATA RAVI v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH       533
             COURT OF AP., HYDERABAD

are compelling circumstances and the judgment under             A
appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can
interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court
should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the
accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal
bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference         B
in a routine manner where the other view is possible
should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for
interference. [Para 18] [542-G-H]

    6. The High Court did not consider the matter in
correct perspective nor observed the parameters laid
                                                                c
down by this court to interfere against the order of
acquittal. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The
judgment of the trial Court is restored. [Paras 19, 20] [543-
A-BJ
                                                                D
                     Case Law Reference:
    2007 (3) SCR 644            relied on          Para 15
    2009 (4) SCR 283            relied on          Para 15
                                                                E
    1993 (1) sec 1              relied on          Para 17
    1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 517 relied on              Para 17
    2004 (2) SCR 659            relied on          Para 17
    2008 (8) SCR 956            relied on          Para 17      F

    2009 (6) SCR 660            relied on          Para 17
    2009 (16) SCR 441           relied on          Para 17
    CRIMINAL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal          G
No. 248 of 2007.
    From the Judgment and Order dated 13.09.2006 of the
High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad in
Criminal Revision Appeal No. 863 of 2004.
                                                                H
    534         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 6 S.C.R.


A           Rameshwar Prasad Goyal for the Appellant.

            D. Mfilhesh Babu for the Respondent.

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B         DR. B.5. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed
     against the judgment and order dated 13.9.2006, passed by
     the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal
     Appeal l'rJo.863 of 2004, by way of which the High Court
     reversed the judgment and order of the Sessions Judge,
c    Vijianagaram dated 19.10.2001, passed in Sessions Case
    'No.40 of 2001, by way of which and whereunder the appellant
     stood acquitted of the charges under Section 302 read with
     Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (hereinafter
     referred to as the 'IPC').
D           2. Ffilcts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are
    that:

       A. "fhe appellant had developed intimacy with Ratna
  Kumari (deceased) and got an inter caste marriage, registered
E on 26.10.1991 under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Their
  married life was not very happy, therefore, Divorce Petition
  being O.P. No.37/92 was filed and the same was rejected by
  the Family Court on the ground that one year had not elapsed
  after thelir marriage.
F
       B. Thus, a fresh Divorce Petition, i.e., O.P. No.65of1992
  was filed on 31.12.1992. Their marriage was dissolved and the
  appellant and deceased stood separated. There was no child
  out of the said wedlock.

G       C. The deceased was a well qualified woman as she has
  obtained M.Com., LLB. qualification. In order to earn her
  livelihood, she had been giving tuitions to the students in a
  rented premises i.e. House no. 754, Phoolbagh Colony,
  Vijianagaram. The appellant, as alleged, in spite of their divorce,
H was having visiting terms with the deceased.
 BHADRAGIRI VENKATA RAVI v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH          535
   COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

    D. On 15.4.2000, Ratna Kumari was admitt~d in the Govt.        A
Headquarter Hospital; Vijianagaram at 1.30 p.m. with 44%
burns. Her statement/complaint was recorded by the head
constable of police wherein she had stated that a stove full of
kerosene oil fell upon her and thus, she suffered burn injuries.
On the basis of the same an FIR was registered.                    B

     E. On the same day, her dying declaration was recorded
by the Executive Magistrate after getting certificate of fitness
from the Doctor, wherein a similar statement had been
recorded. She remained admitted in the hospital.
                                                                   c
     On 28.4.2000, her another dying declaration was recorded
by the Executive Magistrate wherein she alleged that on
14.4.2000 at about 1.30 p.m. while the deceased was cooking
food and all the students had gone home, the appellant poured
kerosene on her body and threw the burning stove on her, due       D
to which she received severe burn injuries. The deceased
raised hue and cry which attracted some of the neighbours.

     F. Ratna Kumari (deceased) expired on 3.6.2000 in the
hospital and on getting the information, the police altered the
                                                                   E
FIR into Section 302 and 498A IPC. The doctor conducted the
post mortem and opined that the cause of death was
septicemia shock due to ante-mortem burns.

     G. After necessary investigation, the police filed charge
sheet on 2.12.2000 against the appellant and his parents for       F
offences under Sections 302 and 498A IPC. After committal
of the proceedings, the trial commenced on 6.8.2001. After
conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court vide judgment and order
dated 19.10.2001 acquitted all the accused observing that
prosecution could not prove any case whatsoever agaim:it           G
either of them as there was no iota of evidence to show the
involvement of either of them.

    H. Aggrieved, the State preferred Criminal Appeal No.863
of 2004 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
                                                                   H
    536      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2013] 6 S.C.R.


A Hyderabad. The court dismissed the appeal against the parents
  of the appellant at the stage of admission itself. The appeal was
  admitted only qua the appellant. The appeal of the State has
  been allowed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated
  13.9.2006, convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC and
B awarding the sentence to undergo life imprisonment and to pay
  fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default, to undergo further S.I. for a period
  of one ye<ir. Appellant was acquitted of all other charges.

          Henc;e, this appeal.

C      3. Shri H.S. Phoolka, learned senior counsel appearing for
  the appellant has submitted that admittedly after the marriage
  the parties had separated themselves and therefore, there was
  no questi¢>n of living as husband and wife even after 8 years of
  their divorce. Just immediately after the incident when Raina
D Kumari, deceased was taken to the hospital, she lodged a
  complaint/FIR which was recorded by the Head Constable
  though after her death the same was treated as her dying
  declaration. On the same day, her dying declaration was also
  recorded by the Executive Magistrate and both these dying
E declarations clearly speak non-involvement of the appellant or
  anybody else. It is a clear case of accident. The deceased was
  tutored by her mother and hence in third dying declaration, the
  appellant and his parents were enroped, in the offence. The
  declaration dated 28.4.2000 is self contradictory. The appeal
F deserves to be allowed.

       4. Per contra, Shri Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel
  appearing for the State has submitted that the High Court has
  appreciated the evidence and the dying declarations of Ratna
  (deceased) recorded on 15.4.2000 and on 28.4.2000, and the
G latter clearly involved the appellant and his parents. The High
  Court has taken a lenient view and did not admit the appeal
  against the parents of the appellant. While deciding the appeal,
  the High Court has met all the parameters laid down by this
  Court for interfering against the order of acquittal. Hence, the
H appeal is liable to be dismissed.
 BHADRAGIRI VENKATA RAVI v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH            537
   COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

       5. We have considered the rival submissions made by           A
· learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

     The FIR/dying declaration recorded on 15.4.2000 reads
 as under:-

     "I belong-to-Phoolbagh Colony, Vijianage1ram. I married 10      B
     years back with Ramana of Kamma while I was studying
     at Tirupathi. After one year living together, we got divorced
     through Vijianagaram District. I am living alone and gave
     tuitions to children and studying law. I forgone my relation
     with my own people. There are nobody of my own.                 c
     Yesterday on 14.04.2000 night at about 8 hours time the
     current was cut off. I lit my kerosene stove and prepared
     tea. In the darkness my polyster saree worned by me got
     fire and my eniire body, chest, hands, face, legs, foot and
     some portion of the stomach were burnt. I phoned to my          D
     known friend i.e. Bhadragin Lalita of Pradeep Nagar. She
     came and too1< me to the Pradeep Nagar. By then I
     purchased ointment and applied it. Not cured. Today i.e.
     15.04.2000 morning by 10 hours 1·came to Government
     Hospital, Vijianagaram with the help of my friend               E
     Bhadragin Lalitha. Nobody is aware due to air and rain
     while I was burning. I poured water and put of. Then I felt
     nothing. Doctor gave medicines." (Emphasis added)

     The Doctor has put an endorsement on the declaration that
                                                                     F
 she was fit to make the declaration and signed the same. The
 declaration bears signature of the rriaker (deceased) and the
 person recording the same.

    6. The dying declaration recorded by the Executive
 Magistrate dated 15.4.2000 reads as under:                          G

           ''Yesterday night at about 8 hours when I was lilting
     the kerosene stove to prepare tea, huge winds are coming
     in the meanwhile my saree was burnt and flames came
     out. Likewise my body was burnt. I have no children. I got
                                                                     H
    538       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A         divor~ed with my husband through Court ten years back. I
          alone present when this happened. There are no disputes
          in between myself and my husband. My husband never
          came to my house after divorce. There are no disputes
          between myself and neighbours. Though I raised cries
B         none of neighbours came as huge winds are flowing.
          Hence it might not be heard. My friend Lalitha took me to
          the Hospital. As myself has poured water vessel on me
          available in the kitchen. The flames were put of. I have no
          relationship with my parent-in-law's house. This is
c         happened unexpectedly. No body did this." (Emphasis
          added)

        This declaration also contains the endorsement by the
    Doctor in respect of the fit condition of the maker. It bears the
    signature of the deceased and the Executive Magistrate.
D
        7. However, in the third dying declaration made on
  28.4.2000 before the Magistrate, she has stated that she had
  been brought to the hospital by her husband Ravi, mother-in-
  law Lolitha, and father-in-law Gangaraju. That they got married
E on 26.10.1991. She was preparing food on kerosene stove in
  the mid day between 1.30 to 2.00 p.m. on 14.4.2000. Her
  husband asked her whether she had paid the electricity bill. She
  replied that she could not deposit as the office was closed. Her
  husband sent one student, namely Matcha Basava Raju to the
F electricity office to see whether it was opened or closed. He
  came badk and answered that it was closed. However, there
  was exchange of words between them. He took up a kerosene
  tin lying there and poured the kerosene on her shoulders and
  immediately threw her on the burnt stove. She got burn injuries.
G Her husband took the water from the bath room and poured on
  her. Srinu, a next door neighbour came there and also poured
  water on her. The flames were put of. No neighbour came
  except Srinu. Her husband requested Srinu not to reveal
  anything i;ibout the incident to anybody. Her husband arranged
  some medicines and gave injections to her. He gave her tablets
H
BHADRAGIRI VENKATA RAVI v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH           539
  COURT OF AP., HYDERABAD [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

frequently. He had given six injections within a period of 3 days   A
at home. Her parents-in-law came from Rajahmundry on
15.4.2000. They also requested the deceased not to reveal
anyone about the incident. On 16.4.2000, her husband and
parents-in-law took her to a private hospital. The doctor gave
her glucose and one injection. On the same day at about 12          B
noon, she was taken to Government hospital on cot by her
husband and in-laws and thereafter, none of them could be
found. She had earlier made a statement before the police as
narrated by her husband and in-laws. She has no
consciousness to such extent, but the persons were visible.         c
Previously, the police or Magistrate had not taken any
statement forcibly from her.

     8. The first two dying declarations were made in the
Government Headquarter Hospital, Vijianagaram and the
Magistrate had reached there on being called by the police.         D
There is no inconsistency between the first two dying
declarations and it is evident from the said dying declarations
recorded on 15.4.2000 that both of them had been recorded
in the Government Headquarter Hospital, Vijianagaram.
                                                                    E
     The third dying declaration makes it evident that on
15.4.2000 she had not been taken to the Government Hospital
and her in-laws were not available on 14.4.2000. Her husband
had been treating her at home and had also given her injections
for two-three days. Her parents-in-laws reached on 15.4.2000        F
from Rajahmundry and then she was admitted to the private
hospital on 16.4.2000. As she could not recover therein, then
she. was transferred to Government Headquarter Hospital,
Vijianagaram on that day.

    9. Satyavarapu Anasuya (PW.1 ), mother of the deceased          G
has deposed that Ratna {deceased) used to tell her that she
was harassed by her husband to bring dowry, though she had
given sufficient dowry at the time of marriage. She came to
know about the burn injuries of her daughter on 15.4.2000 and
immediately went to the Government Hospital. There she found        H
    540     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2013] 6 S.C.R.


A the appellant and his parents. On being asked, Ratna Kumari
  told her that she suffered the bum injuries by accident. Ten days
  later, she told the witness that the appellant poured kerosene
  on her and pushed her on a burning stove, that is why she
  sustained b1.1rn injuries. That her another daughter was a police
B constable and therefore, the appellant apprehended some
  action by the police against him and his parents. She has further
  deposed that prior to the death of her daughter, the appellant
  had developed illicit relationship with another woman just after
  Sankranthi festival and she had been informed about this by
c her daught~r that appellant wanted to marry that woman.
        10. Kondru Srinivasrao (PW. 7), a second year student and
  neighbour of the deceased used to come for tuition to the
  deceased. He deposed that he had heard shrieks coming from
  the house of Ratna and reached the place of occurrence. He
D found Ratna in bath room and appellant was pouring water on
  her. On her request, the witness also brought water from the
  well and given to the appellant who poured the water on her.
  He has further deposed that he had not told about this incident
  to anybody.
E
        11. Matcha Basavaraju (PW.8), a young student coming
  for tuition to the deceased deposed that he was not knowing
  the husband of Ratna but he had seen the appellant going on
  his scoot~r in Phoolbagh colony. He had never seen the
F appellant in the house of Ratna.

       12. Dr, Ch. Suryanarayana (PW.16) deposed that he had
  signed the dying declaration dated 28.4.2000. That Raina was
  having 44% of bums. The record of the hospital revealed that
  she had been admitted in the hospital on 14.5.2000 and had
G been given regular treatment and blood many times between
  14.5.2000 and 31.5.2000. As per the hospital record she had
  been brought there by Lalita, a friend of Ratna (deceased). She
  had given the name of her husband as Ramana and it has
  further been mentioned in the hospital record that the patient
H herself had stated that she suffered with burn injuries
 BHADRAGIRI VENKATARAVI v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH 541
   COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

accidentally.                                                       A

      13. The Trial Court has found material inconsistencies in
the case of the prosecution and did not see any reason
whatsoever to rely upon the dying declaration dated 28.4.2000
as the contents thereof were admittedly false and could not be      8
relied upon. If the dying declaration has been recorded by the
Executive Magistrate on 15.4.2000 in the Government hospital,
the question of her being treated by her husband for 2-3 days
and then her admission in a private hospital did not arise at
all. Her version that she was admitted to the Government            C
Headquarter hospital, Vijianagaram on 16.4.2000 could not be
true. The contents of the dying declaration dated 28.4.2000
being full of contradiction do not inspire confidence.

     14. Admittedly, there was a divorce between the parties.
Therefore, the question of demand of dowry or ill-treatment or      D
harassment could not arise after 8 years of divorce decree by
the court. The mother of Ratna has deposed about the illicit
relationship of the appellant and another woman and the
appellant wanted to marry that woman. In case the parties had
separated by a divorce through court, we fail to understand how     E
Raina (deceased) or her parents were concerned about such
a relationship.

    15. It is a settled legal proposition that in case there are
apparent discrepancies in two dying declarations, it would be
                                                                    F
unsafe to convict the accused. In such a fact-situation, the
accused gets the benefit of doubt. (Vide: Sanjay v. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 148; and Heeralal v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, (2009) 12 SCC 671).

    16. In case of plural/multiple dying declarations, the court    G
has to scrutinise the evidence cautiously and must find out
whether there is consistency particularly in material particulars
therein. In case there are inter-se discrepancies in the
depositions of the witnesses given in support of one of the dying
declarations, it would not be safe to rely upon the same. In fact   H
    542      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the reliability
  thereof that adds weigh to the prosecution case. If the dying
  declaratio~ is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in a fit
  mental condition, it can be relied upon without any
  corroboration. But the statements should be consistent
B throughout.

       17. In case of inconsistencies, the court has to examine
  the nature of the same, i.e. whether they are material or not and
  while scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, the
C court has to examine the same in the light of the various
  surrounding facts and circumstances. In case of dying
  declaration, as the accused does not have right to cross-
  examine the maker and not able to elicit the truth as happens
  in the case of other witnesses, it would not be safe to rely if
  the dying declaration does not inspire full confidence of the court
D about its correctness, as it may be result of tutoring, prompting
  or product of imagination. The court has to be satisfied that the
  maker wa$ in a fit state of mind and had a clear opportunity to
  observe and identify the assailant (s).

E      (Vide: Smt. Kam/av. State of Punjab, AIR 1993 SC 374;
  Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1999 SC 3062; Lella
  Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 2004 SC 1720; Amo/
  Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 5 SCC 468; State
  of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Khaja Hussain, (2009) 15 SCC 120;
F and Sharr.la v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2010 SC 408).

        18. This court has time and again laid down parameters
  for interference by a superior court against the order of acquittal.
  In excepti<1>nal cases where there are compelling circumstances
  and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the
G appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The
  appellate, court should bear in mind the presumption of
  innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's
  acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference
  in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be
H avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.
BHADRAGIRI VENKATA RAVI v. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH          543
  COURT OF AP., HYDERABAD [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

     19. The High Court did not consider the matter in r-Jrrect   A
perspective nor observed the parameters laid down by this
court to interfere against the order of acquittal.

    20. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the
judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The judgment   8
and order of the Sessions Court is restored. The appellant is
on bail. His bail bonds stand discharged.

B.B.B.                                        Appeal allowed.