Holding

The Court held that the relationship of witnesses does not automatically affect their credibility and that the facts warranted conviction under s.304 Part I IPC, not s.302 IPC.

Summary

The appellant Bhagwan Bahadure was convicted by the trial court and the Bombay High Court for murder (s.302 IPC) after allegedly striking the deceased Kachrabai on the head with a stick, causing injuries that led to her death. The appellant challenged the conviction on two grounds: that the key eyewitnesses (the victim's son and mother) were close relatives and thus unreliable, and that the offence should be qualified as culpable homicide not amounting to murder under s.304 Part I IPC rather than murder. The Supreme Court held that a witness's relationship to the victim does not, by itself, vitiate credibility and that the prosecution must prove the specific mens rea required for murder, which was absent here. Applying the distinctions between sections 299 and 300, the Court concluded that the injury was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to constitute murder, and therefore the appropriate conviction is under s.304 Part I with a ten‑year imprisonment. The appeal was partly allowed, the conviction altered, and the sentence reduced.

Issues considered

The credibility of eyewitnesses who are close relatives of the deceased.
Whether the facts constitute murder under s.302 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under s.304 Part I IPC.
The correct application of sections 299, 300 and 304 of the IPC to the facts.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 299, s. 300, s. 302, s. 304

Subjects

murderculpable homicide not amounting to murderwitness credibilityrelationship of witnessIPC sections 299 300 302 304mens reaevidentiary valuesentencing

Judgment

J
f_
BHAGWA"l\J BAHADURE A
V.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

SEPTEMBER 28, 2007
B
(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND LOKESHWARSINGHPANTA,JJ.]

J--
) Penal Code, 1860-ss. 299, 300, 302 and 304 (Part I)-
Prosecution for murder-Stick blow given on the head ofthe deceased,
causing serious injuries, which resulted in her death-Trial Court c
relying on evidence of eye witness and related witness convicting
accused under s. 302 and imposed life imprisonment-Justification
of-Held: Jn the light ofthe facts ofthe case and legal principles laid
down in ss. 299 and 300; and that witness being close relative does
not affect credibility ofwitness, convictiOn altered to one under s. 304 D
l._ (Part /)-Custodial sentence ofI 0 years awarded-Evidence-Related
'-..
witness-Evidentiary value.

According to the prosecution case, K was residingwith her mother
P.W-7. Appellant had come to stay with K. On the fateful day, the E
appellant had a quarrel with Kon a flimsy ground and assaulted K with
· the stick, giving blow on her head. K suffered serious injuries which later
resulted in her death. Son ofK- PW 1witnessed the incident and lodged
·<!- FIR. Appellant contended that PW 1 and 7 were related to Kand thus,
their evidence could not be acted upon. T~al Court found the evidence F
of PWs 1, 7 and 8 to be credible and cogent and convicted the appellant
under s. 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment High Court
upheld the conviction. Hence, the present appeal.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court G
HELD: 1. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a
witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal actual
culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation
has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, Court
397 H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether
it is cogent and credible. The ground that the witness being a close
relative and consequently a partisan witness, should not be relied upon,
has no substance. [Paras 7and10] [402-F, G; 403-E]

B Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State ofPunjab, AIR (1953) SC 364;
Guli Chand and Ors. v. State ofRajasthan, (1974] 3 SCC 698; Vadivelu
Thevarv. State ofMadras, AIR (1957) SC 614; Masalti and Ors. v. State
ofUP., AIR (1965) SC 202; State ofPunjab v. Jagir Singh, ;µR (1973)
SC 2407 ;-Lehna v. State ofHaryana, (2002] 3 SCC 76; Gangadhar Behera
c and Ors. v. State ofOrissa, [2002] 8 SCC 381; Babula! Bhagwan Khandare
andAnr. v. State ofMaharashtra, [2005] 10 SCC 404 and Salim Sahebv.
State ofMP., [2007] ~ SCC 99, referred to.
2.1. In the scheme of the IPC, culpable homicide is genus and
'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-
D versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special
characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'.
For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of
the generic offence, the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of
culpable homicide. The first is, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'.
E This is the gravest form ofculpable homicide, which is defined in Section
300 as 'murder'. The second is 'culpable homicide oftbe second degree'.
This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then is 'culpable
homicide ofthe third degree'. This is the lowest type ofculpable homicide
and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the .~:

F punishments provided for the three grades. It is punishable under the
second part of Section 304. [Para 14] [404-F, G,H; 405-A)

2.2. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3)
of Section 300. The distinguishing feature ofthe mens rea requisite under
G clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the
particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health
that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding
the fact that such harm would not ii!_ ~he ordinary way of nature be
sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. The
H 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2).
BHAGWAN BAHADURE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 399

Only the intention ofcausing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's A
knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the
particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit ofthis
clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended
to Section 300. [Para 16]
B
2.3. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such
knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under
)-
clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a
' fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from
an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow
is likely to cause death ofthat particular person as a result ofthe rupture
c
of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If
the assailant had no such k.'lowledge about the disease or special frailty
of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be
D
&,_ murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally
"" given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause
death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) ofSection 299, the words
"sufficient in the ordinary course ofnature" have been used. Obviously,
the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a
E
bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in
miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299
....... and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death
resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is
F
the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable
homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word
'likely' in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable as
distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily
injury.......sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death"
G
" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having
regard to the ordinary course of nature.
[Para 17] [406-F, G, H; 407-A, B, C]
2.4. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the
offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the H
\
'
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the >-
ordinary course of nature. [Para 18) [407-D)

Rajwant and Anr. v: State ofKera/a, AIR (1966) SC 1874, relied
on.

B 2.5. The test laid down by *Virsa Singh 's case for the applicability
of clause 'thirdly is now ingrained in Indian legal system and has become
part of the rule oflaw. Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable
homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.e.
(a) thatthe act which causes death is done with the intention of causing
C death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b)
that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention
to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of
nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz., that the injury found to be
D present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
[Para 22) [409-B, C, DJ

Virsa Singh v. State ofPunjab, AIR (1958) SC 465, relied on.
2.6. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both
E require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. Clause
(4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the
offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general
as distinguished from a particular person or persons-being caused from
his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty.
F Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest
degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender
w:~thoutanyexcuseforincurringtheriskofcausingdeathorsuchinjury.
[Para 24) [409-E, F, G)

G State ofAndhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr., [1976)
4 SCC 382; Abdul Waheed Khan@ Waheed and Ors. v. State ofAndhra
Pradesh, JT (2002) 6 SC 274 and Augustine Saldanha v. State of
Karnataka, (2003) 10 SCC 472, referred to.
3. In view of the legal principles, the factual position is to be
H
I
/-
BHAGWAN BAHADURE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 401
[PASAYAT, J.]
examined. It cannot be said as a rule of universal application that A
whenever one blow is given Section 302 IPC is ruled out It would depend
upon the facts of each case. The weapon used, size of the weapon, place
where the assault took place, background facts leading to the assault,
part of the body where the blow was given are some of the factors to be
considered. Considering the background facts involved, the appropriate B
conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC, and conviction is
accordingly altered. Custodial sentence oflO years would meet the ends
of justice. [Para27 and 28] [410-C, D,E]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1304of2007. C
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.04.2005 of the High Court
of Judicature Bombay, Nagpur Bench at Nagpur in Crl. Appeal No. 149
of2001.
June Chaudhary, Lalit Chauhan, Rajeev Mishra and Many Mitty (for D
Mis. P.H. Parekh & Co.) for the Appellant.
K.K. Adsure for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of
-~ _ the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench upholding the conviction of the
appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal F
Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and sentence of imprisonment for life and
fine of Rs. 1,000/- with default stipulation.
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
On 13th March, 2000 Bhagwan Bahadure came to Bhendala and G
stayed with Kachrabai (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'), who
was residing with her mother Tuljabai (PW-7). In the morning, of the day
of incident, the appellant started quarrelling with the deceased on a flimsy
ground. The appellant asked her to accompany him to his house. It is
alleged that the appellant, who had a stick in his hand, assaulted the H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 10 S.C.R.

A deceased by means of the stick. The deceased fell down on the ground. ~

;~
The appellant gave a blow with the stick on her head, whereby deceased
suffered serious injuries and became unconscious. The appellant thereafter
threw the stick and ran away towards bus stand. Sidharth (PW 1)
witnessed the incident. He went to the roadside for bringing a jeep to
B carry his mother to the hospital at Pauni. The Medical Officer gave-first-
aid to the victim as the injuries were severe and she was unconscious.
The Medical Officer advised the family members to take her to the Govt.
Medical College, Nagpur. In the meanwhile, PW 1 lodged a report in i
the police station against the appellant. Police registered a crime. Deceased
c succumbed to the injuries on way to the hospital at Nagpur.
4. Considering the evidence of PWs 1,7 and 8, trial court found the
evidence to be credible and cogent and accepted the same. He did not
find any substance in the plea of the appellant that PWs 1 & 7 were related
to the deceased and, therefore, their evidence could not be acted upon.
D
It also did not accept the plea that offence under Section 302 IPC was .
.....-
not made out. Questioning the correctness of the trial court's .order, appeal ·-·
was preferred before the High Court which as noted above did not find
any substance in the appeal.
E 5. The stand taken before the trial court and the High Court was
reiterated in this appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand supported the
judgment.
--'>
F 7. We shall first deal with the contention regarding interestedness of
the witnesses for furthering prosecution version. Relationship is not a factor
to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that a relation
would not conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent
person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In
G such cases, the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence
't
to find out whether it is cogent and credible.
8. In Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, AIR (1953)
SC 364 it has been laid down as under:-
H
BHAGWAN BAHADURE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 403
[PASAYAT, J.]
-( "A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or A
she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that
usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against
the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close
relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely
implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and B
there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag
in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along
_with the guilty, but ~oundation must be laid for such a criticism and
the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a
sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any C
sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on its own
facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often
put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There
is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be
governed by its own facts." D
9. The above decision has since been followed in Guli Chand and
Ors. V. State ofRajasthan, [1974] 3 sec 698 in which Vadivelu Thevar
v. State of Madras, AIR (1957) SC 614 was also relied upon.
10. We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a E
close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be
relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as
early as in Dalip Singh 's case (supra) in which surprise was expressed
over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the
Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian F
Bose, J. it was observed:
"We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court
that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration.
If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that G
the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on
their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the
reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable
to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and
one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in- H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] I 0 S.C.R.

A 'Rameshwar v. State ofRajasthan 'AIR (1952) SC 54 at p.59). >-
We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in· the
judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel."
11. Again in Masaiti and Ors. v. State of UP., AIR (1965) SC
B 202 this Court observed: (p. 209-210 para 14):
"But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence
given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it
is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses ....... The mechanical
rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan
c would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule
can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciate,d.
Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence;
but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is
partisan cannot be accepted as correct."
D
12. To the same effect is the decision in State ofPunjab v. Jagir ~·
Singh, AIR (1973) SC 2407, Lehna v. State of Haryana, [2002] 3
sec 76 and Gangadhar Behera and Ors. V. State ofOrissa, [2002]
s sec 381.
E 13. The above position was highlighted in Babula! Bhagwan
Khandare and Anr. v. State ofMaharashtra, [2005] I0 SCC 404 and
in Salim Saheb v. State of MP., [2007] I SCC 699.
14. This brings us to the crucial question as to which was the
F appropriate provision to be applied. In the scheme of the IPC culpable
homicide is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable
homicide' but not vice-versa Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans
'special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to
murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity
G of the generic offence, the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of
culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide
of the first degree'. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which
is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as
'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the
H first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third
I
t-
BHAGWAN BAHADURE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 405
[PASAYAT,J.]

-( degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment A
provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the
three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the
second part of Section 304.
15. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable B
homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The
confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning
of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to
be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the
interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in C
focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300.
The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points
of distinction between the two offences.
Section 299 Section 300
A person commits culpable homicide Subject to certain exceptions D
if the act by which the death is caused culpable homicide is murder
is done- if the act by which the
death is caused is done -

INTENTION
E
(a) with the intention of causing (l) with the intention of
death; or causing death; or

(b) with the intention of ca1.1sing (2) with the intention of
such bodily injury as is likely causing such bodily injury
to cause death; or as the offender knows to be F
likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm
is caused;
or
(3) With the intention of
causing bodily injury to any
person and the bodily injury
G
intended to be inflicted
is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature
to cause death; or
H
-·
\

406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A KNOWLEDGE )-

****
(c) with the knowledge that the act (4) with the knowledge that
is likely to cause death. the act..is so imminently
B dangerous that it must in all
probability cause death or
such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, and -{
.,
without any excuse for
incurring the risk of causing
c death or such injury as is
mentioned above.

16. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3)
of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under
clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the
D particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that
the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the
fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient ..
"'' to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy
that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause
E (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the
offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death
of the particular vic:tµTI, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of
this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b)
appended to Section 300.
F
17. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such
knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under
clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a
fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an
G enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely
to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the
liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant
had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim,
nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary
H course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if
l
1~
BHAGWAN BAHADURE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 407
[PASAYAT, J.]
the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) A
of Section 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in
the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies
between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but B
real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference
between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one
of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily
injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which
determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the C
lowest degree. The word 'likely' in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys
the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words
"bodily injury.......sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death"
means that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having
regard to the ordinary course of nature. D
18. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the
offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the
intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. Rajwant and Anr. v. State of Kera/a, AIR (1966) SC E
1874 is an apt illustration ofthis point.
19. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 465, Vivian
Bose, 1. speaking for the Court, explained the meaning and scope of
clause (3). It was observed that the prosecution must prove the following
facts before it can bring a case under Section 300, "thirdly". First, it must F
establish quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly the
nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective
investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to
inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or
unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these G
three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further,
and fourthly it must be proved that the injury of the type just described
made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death
in the ordinaiy course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective
H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
20. The ingredients of clause "Thirdly" of Section 300, IPC were
brought out by the illustrious Judge in his terse language as follows:
"To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts
B before it can bring a case under Section 300, "thirdly".
Fjrst, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is
present. -(
,,-
'
Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely
C objective investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
particular bodily injury, that is to say that it was not accidental or
unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
D Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry
proceeds further and,
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described
made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause
E death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is
purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the
intention of the offender."
21. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following
words (at page 468):
F
'The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious
injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury
that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if
the totality of the circumstances justify such an infer':!nce, then of
G course, the intent that the section requires is not proved-. But if there
is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted
it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it.
Whether he knew of its seriousness or intended serious
consequences, is neither here or there. The question, so far as the
H intention is concerned, is not wheth.er he intended to kill, or to inflict
)-
BHAGWAN BAHADURE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 409
[PASAYAT, J.]
an injury of a particular degree of seriousness but whether he A
intended to inflict the injury in question and once the existence of
the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be preswned unless
the evidence or the circwnstances warrant an opposite conclusion."
22. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus B
classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh 's case (supra) for the
applicability of clause "Thirdly" is now ingrained in our legal system and
has become part of the rule oflaw. Under clause thirdly of Section 300
IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are
satisfied: i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention C
of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury;
and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an
intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordiruuy course
of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz., that the injury found to be D
present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
23. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh 's case, even
if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend
to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration E
(c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.
24. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both
require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not
necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction F
between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause
(4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the
offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general
as distinguished from a particular person or persons-being caused from
his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such G
knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of
probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any
excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injwy as aforesaid.
25. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron
H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 10 S.C.R.
\
A imperatives. In most cases, their ob.servance will facilitate the task of the
\ ...
Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and
the third stages so telescoped into each other that it may not be convenient
to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and
third stages.
B
26. The position was illuminatingly highlighted by this Court in State
ofAndhra Pradesh V. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr., [1976] .4 sec
382, Abdul Waheed Khan@ Waheed and Ors. v. State of Andhra
·Pradesh, JT (2002) 6 SC 274 and Augustine Saldanha .v. State of
C Karnataka, [2003] 10 SCC 472 and Thangaiya v. State of Tamil
Nadu, [2005] 9 sec 650.
27. Keeping the aforesaid legal principles in view, the factual position
is to be examined. It cannot be said as a rule of universal application that
whenever one blow is given Section 302 IPC is ruled out It would depend
D upon the facts of each case. The weapon used, size of the weapon, place
where the assault took place, background facts leading to the assault, part
of the body wh~re the blow was given are some ef the factors to be
considered.
E 28. Considering the background facts involved, the appropriate
conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC, and conviction is
accordingly altered. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends
of justice.
29. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
F
N.J. Appeal partly allowed.