BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARDversusKANTA AGGARWAL AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 772
- Decided
- 7 July 2008
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
Compensation under Section 166 must be reduced by any pecuniary benefit received by the claimant due to the accidental death, and the deposited amount may be withdrawn as full settlement.
Summary
In 1994 a motor accident caused the death of K.C. Aggarwal, leaving his widow Kanta Aggarwal and three children as claimants under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal awarded them Rs 8.48 lakh with interest, while the widow was simultaneously given a compassionate appointment with a salary of Rs 4,700 per month and a residence. The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the appellant's contention that these benefits should be deducted from the compensation. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that any pecuniary benefit received by a claimant due to the accidental death must be taken into account while fixing compensation, and therefore the compensation should be reduced accordingly. Since the accident occurred over 14 years earlier, the Court did not remit the matter to the Tribunal but allowed the claimants to withdraw the Rs 5 lakh already deposited as full and final settlement. The appeal was partly allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether the salary and residence received by the widow under a compassionate appointment constitute a pecuniary benefit that must be deducted from the compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
- Whether the High Court erred in refusing to consider such benefits while fixing the quantum of compensation.
Legislation cited
- Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 110, s. 166, s. 95
Subjects
Judgment
[2008] 10 S.C.R. 165
~ BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD A
V.
KANTA AGGARWAL AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 4216 of 2008)
JULY 7, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.J
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: s. 166 - Just compensation .::_
Determination of - Benefits received by widow on account of
death of husband in motor accident - Held: To be deducted c
while computing the compensation - On facts, widow provided
with compassionate appointment and getting salary of
Rs.47001- p.m. and also provided residence - Tribunal
awarded compensation of Rs. 8.48 lacs - In view of fact that
.> accident took place 14 years back, it would be just and proper
-y' D
that sum of Rs. 5 lakhs already deposited, be withdrawn by
claimants in full and final settlement.
In a motor accident, husband of first respondent-
claimant died. Respondents who were widow ·and chil-
dren of deceased filed claim petition under s.166 of Mo- E
tor Vehicles Act. The Tribunal awarded compensation of
Rs.8.48 lacs along with interest @ 9% p.a.
Before High Court stand of appellant was that on the
death of deceased, widow was provided with compas-
-~
sionate appointment and was getting salary of Rs.4700/- F
p.m. and a residence was also provided to her. High Court
did not accept this plea and observed that quantum of
compensation was rightly fixed.
In appeal to this Court, the appellant ccmtended that
G
the benefits which claimant had received on account of
-r death of her husband were to be deducted while com-
puting the compensation and that the appeal filed by the
claimants was pending adjudication and without consid-
165 H
166 SUPREME COURI REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
.- '
A ering the relevant factors, the High Court had declined to
interfere.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. There are several undisputed factors: (i)
s the husband of respondent No.1 had received fatal inju-
ries in an accident; (ii) the claimants seem to be facing· fi-
nancial problem; (iii) the concept of just compensation
cannot be lost sight of. The High Court does not appear to
have considered the effect of amount received on account
c of compassionate appointment. [Para 6] [168-D & E]
1.2. The High Court lost sight of the· fact that the ben-
efits which the claimant receives on account of the death
or injury have to be duly considered while fixing the com-
. pensation. It is pointed out that respondent No.1 was get-
D ting Rs.4,700/- p.m. and a residence has been provided
to her and actually the compassionate appointment was
given immediately after the accident. In view of this, the
High Court's judgment is clearly unsustainaole. However,
the accident took place more than 14 years back and it
E would not be desirable to send the matter back to the Tri-
bunal for fresh consideration. A sum of rupees five lakhs
has been deposited by this Court's order dated 1.11.2004.
In view of the background facts, it is just and proper that
the sum of Rupees five lakhs already deposited should
F be permitted to be withdrawn by the claimants in full and
final settlement of the claim relatable to the death of the
deceased. [Paras 12, 13] [174-G,H; 175-A,B & C]
CIVIL. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
4216 of 2008
G
· From the final Judgment and order dated 11 /5/2004 of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in F.A.O.
No. 3351/2003
Dhruv Mehta, Yashraj Singh Dcora, Harshvardhan Jha and
H Mis. K.L. Mehta & Co. for the Appellant.
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KANTA 167
AGGARWAL & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
Jasbir Singh Malik. Shilpi, DeepakAggarwal, R.K. Tripathi A
and S.K. Sabharwal for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned 8
Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismiss-
ing the appeal filed against the award dated 4.2.2003 passed
by Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal, Chandigarh (in short 'Tribu-
nal').
c
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
In an accident which took place on 16.11.1994 at about
10.00 p.m. K.C. Aggarwal (hereinafter referred to as the 'de-
ceased') who was sitting directly behind the driver lost his life.
Balbir Singh (PW-1) was an eye witness to the accident. At the D
relevant time, he was standing in front of Mayur Dhaba near
which the accident took place. He categorically deposed that
the jeep was coming from Bilaspur side and was going towards
Sunder Nagar at a very high speed. It was being driven by the
driver in the middle of the road. He also stated that a truck was E 1
coming from the opposite side at normal speed. When the truck 1
reached ne~r the jeep, the driver of the jeep applied brakes,
but because the jeep was being driven at a very high speed, it
came to halt in the middle of the road. The back portion of the
truck struck against the right side portion of the jeep. Some F
persons rushed towards the jeep. In the meantime, the truck
sped away from the spot. He categorically stated that the acci-
dent occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the jeep driver.
The deceased left behind a widow and three children.
A claim petition was filed by the widow and the children G
under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short the
'Act'). The Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.8,48, 160/-
along with interest@9% per annum from the date of institution.
An appeal was filed before the High Court. It was pointed H
· 168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
A out that on the death of K.C. Aggarwal, respondent No.1-widow ~-
had been provided with compassionate appointment and she
was getting salary of nearly Rs.4,700/- p.m. (basic pay of nearly
Rs.4,700/-) and a residence was provided to her. The High
Court did not accept this plea and observed that the quantum
B of compensation has been rightly fixed.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
benefits which claimant has received on account of death of
her husband have to be deducted while computing the com-
pensation, if any, payable. With reference to the factual aspects
C it is submitted that respondent No.1 was getting salary of nearly
Rs.4,700/- and therefore she was not entitled to compassion-
ate appointment. It is pointed out that the appeal filed by the
claimants is pending adjudication and without considering the
relevant factors the High Court has declined to interfere.
D
5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand
submitted that the judgment of the High Court is in order.
6. There are several undisputed factors: (i) the husband of
respondent No.1 had received fatal injuries in an accident; (ii)
E the claimants seem to be facing financial problem; (iii) the con-
.• cept of just compensation cannot be.lost sight of. The High Court
does not appear to have considered the effect of amount re-
ceived on account of compassionate appointment.
7. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Patricia
F Jean Mahajan and Ors. (2002 (6) SCC 281) it was inter-alia
observed as follows:
"24. Mr. Soli J. Sorabji submitted that while assessing the
amount of compensation, the benefits which have accrued
to the claimants by reason of death must also be taken
G
into account.- A kind of balancing of losses and the gains
or benefit by reason of death would be necessary. In
support of the above contention he has referred to a
decision reported in Gobald Motors Service Limited v. R.
M. K. Veiuswami (1962 (1) SCR 929), and others. It is a
H
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KANTA 169
AGGARWAL & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
.r-* decision by a three-Judge Bench of this Court, and at A
SCR page 938 the observations made by the House of
Lords in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries'
Ltd. (1942 AC page 601) has been quoted which reads
as follows : AIR ER p. 658 B)
~- "The general rule which has always prevailed in B
regard to the assessment of damages under the Fatal
Accidents Acts is well settled, namely, that any benefit
accruing to a dependent by reason of the relevant
death must be taken into account. Under those Acts,
the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the c
death must be ascertained, the position of each
dependant being considered separately."
25. To further elaborate the above proposition,
~ observations made by Lord Wright in Davies case (supra)
""¥
D
have also been quoted. It reads as follows :-
"The damages are to be based on the reasonable,
expectation of pecuniary benefit or benefit reducible
to money value. In assessing the damages all
circumstances which may be legitimately placed in E
diminution of the damages must be considered .....
The actual pecuniary, loss of each individual entitled
to sue can only be ascertained by balancing, on the
one hand, the loss to him of the future pecuniary
-Jr benefit, and on the other, any pecuniary advantage F
which from whatever source comes to him by reason
of the death."
The learned counsel laid stress on the last part of
observation made to the effect that - for the purposes of
balancing losses and gains any pecuniary advantage G
which from whatever source come to them, has to be
·-> considered.
26. It is submitted in Gobald's case the principle of Davies
Case was referred and taken into consideration. Reliance
H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
A has also been placed on a decision reported in M/s.
.Sheikhupura Transport Cb. Ltd. v. Northern India Transport
Insurance Company·(1971 (1) SCC page 785), particularly
to the observations made by the Court in paragraph 6 of
the judgment where the principle in the case of Go~ald
B Motors ·(supra) has been reiterated. In this connection Jr
learned counsel for the Insurance Company has also drawn
our attention to the decision in the case of Susamma
Thomas ·(supra) particularly on paragraph 8 of the report,
where it is observed that the principle in the case of Davies
c v. Powell was adopted, in the case of Gobald Motors
(supra). It is thus submitted that principle of balancing of
loss and gains, so as to arrive at a just and fair amount of
compensation has been accepted by this Court as well.
On behalf of the Insurance Company Hodgson v. Trapp
(1988· (3) All ER 870) has been relied on in which our
D
attention has particularly been drawn to the following
observations made at All ER p. 873j-874b:
" ........ the basic rule is that it is the net consequential
loss and expense which the Court must measure. If,
E : in consequence of the injuries sustained, the plaintiff
has enjoyed receipts to which he would not otherwise
have been entitled, prima facie, those receipts are
to be set against the aggregate of the plaintiff's
. losses and expenses in arriving at the measure of
F his damages. All this is elementary and has been
said over and over again. To this ~asic rule there
are, of course, certain well established, though not
always precisely defined and delineated, exceptions.
But the Courts are, I think, sometimes in danger, in
seeking .to explore the rationale of the exceptions, of
G
forgetting that they are exceptions. It is the rule which
is fundamental and axiomatic and exceptions to it
which are only to be admitted on grounds which
clearly justify their treatment as such."
H From the above passage it is clear that the deductior
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KANTA 171
AGGARWAL & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
,. .+ are admissible from the amount of compensation in case A
the claimant receives the benefit as a consequence of
injuries sustained, which otherwise he would not have been
entitled to. It does not cover cases where the payment
received is not dependent upon an injury sustained on
.... meeting with an accident. The other observation to which B
our attention has been drawn at page 876 placitum 'f' also
does not help the contention raised on behalf of the
Insurance Company for deduction of amounts in the
present case. The Court was considering a situation where
due to the injuries received the victim was claiming cost c
of care necessary in future in respect of which statutory
provision, provided for attendant's allowance. It was found
that the statutory benefit and the damages claimed were
designed to meet the identical expenses. This is however
• ~
not so, at least not shown, to be so in the case in hand."
D
8. Similarly, in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. and Anr. Vs.
R.M.K. Ve/uswami and Ors. (1962 (1) SCR 929 at p.938) it
was inter-alia observed as follows:
"The general rule which has always prevailed in regard to
the assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents E
Acts is well settled, namely, that any benefit accruing to a
dependant by reason of the relevant death must be taken
into account. Under those Acts the balance of loss and
gain· to a dependant by the death must be ascertained,
- J.
the position of each dependants being considered F
separately."
9. In Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra S.R. TC. (1999 (1)
sec 90) it was held as follows:
I
"32. So far as the general principle of estimating damages 6
under the common law is concerned, it is settled that the
t-f pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on
one hand, the loss to the claimant of the future pecuniary
benefits that would have accrued to him but for the death
with the "pesuniary advantage" which from whatever source 'H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
A comes to him by reason of the death. In other words, it is 'h.,
the balancing of loss and gain of the claimant occasioned
by the death: But this has to change its colour to the extent
a statute intends to do. Thus, this has to be interpreted in
the light of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
B It is very clear, to which there could be no doubt that this
>r
Act delivers compensation to the claimant only on account
of ;:iccidental injury or death, not on account of any other
d.eath. Thus, the pecuniary advantage accruing under this
Act has to be deciphered, correlating with the accidental
c death. The compensation payable under the Motor
Vehicles Act is on account of the pecuniary loss to the
claimant by accidental injury or death and not other forms
of death. If the~e is natural death or death by suicide,
serious illness, induding even death by accident, through
train, air flight not involving a motor vehicle, it would not be
r- •
D
covered under the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, the
application of the general principle under the common law
of loss and gain for the computation of compensation
under this Act must correlate to this type of injury or death,
viz., accidental. If the words "pecuniary advantage" from
E whatever source are to be interpreted to mean any form
of death under this Act, it would dilute all possible benefits
conferred on the claimant and would be contrary to the
spirit of the law. If the "pecuniary advantage" resulting from
death means pecuniary advantage coming under all forms
F of death then it will include all the assets moveable,
immovable, shares, bank accounts, cash and every amount
*'"
receivable· under any contract. In other words, all heritable
assets including what is willed by the deceased etc. This
would obliterate both, all possible conferment of economic
G security to the claimant by the ~eceased and the intentions
of the legislature. By such an interpretation, the tortfeasor
in spite of his wrongful act or negligence, which· contributes ..l:-·i
to the death, would have in many cases no liability or
meagre liability. In our considered opinion, the general
H principle of loss and gain takes colour of this statute, viz.,
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KANTA 173
,,,---t AGGARWAL & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
the gain has to be interpreted which is as a result of the A
accidental death and the loss on account of the accidental
death. Thus, under the present Act, whatever pecuniary
advantage is received by the claimant, from whatever
source, would only mean which comes to the claimant on
account of the accidental death and not other forms of B
. death. The constitution of the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal itself under Section 110 is, as the section states:
" ... for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for
compensation in respect of accidents involving the
death of, or bodily injury to, ... ". c
33. Thus, it would not include that which the claimant
receives on account of other forms of deaths, which he
... ....
would have received even apart from accidental death .
Thus, such pecuniary advantage would have no corelation
D
to the accidental death for which compensation is
computed. Any amount received or receivable not only on
account of the accidental death but that which would have
come to the claimant even otherwise, could not be
construed to be the "pecuniary advantage", liable for
deduction. However, where the employer insures his E
employee, as against injury or death arising out of an
accident, any amount received out of such insurance on
->- the happening of such incident may be an amount liable
for deduction. However, our legislature has taken note of
such contingency through the proviso of Section 95. Under F
it the liability of the insurer is excluded in·respect of injury
or death, arising out of and in the course of employee.
34. This is based on the principle that the claimant for the
happening of the same incidence may not gain twice from
G
•-I two sources. This, it is excluded thus, either through the
wisdom of the legislature or through the principle of loss
and gain through deduction not to give gain to the claimant
twice arising from the same transaction, viz., the same
accident. It is significant to record here in both the sources,
H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 10 S.C.R.
A viz., either under the Motor Vehicles Act or from the
employer, the compensation receivable by the claimant is
either statutory or through the security of the employer
securing for his employee but in both cases he receives
the.amount Without his contribution. How thus an amount x-
B earned out of one's labour or contribution towards one's
wealth, savings, etc. either for himself or for his family
• w_hich such P.erson knows under the law has to go to his
.heirs after his death either by succession or under a Will
could be said to be the "pecuniary gain" only on account
c of one's accidental death. This, of course, is a pecuniary
gain but how this is equitable or could be balanced out of
the amount to be received as compensation under the
Motor Vehicles Act. There is no corelation between the
two amounts. Not even remotely. How can an amount of
.loss and gain of one contract be made applicable to the
D
loss and gain of another contract. Similarly, how an amount
receivable under a statute has any corelation with an
amount earned by an individual. Principle of loss and gain
has to be on the same plane within the same sphere, of
course, subject to the contract to the -contrary or any
E provision of law."
10. It is pointed out that the award as made is extremely
high and the concept of just compensation has been lost sight of.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the judg- +-
F ment and additionally submitted that appeal of respondent No.1
is pending. In normal course, when two appeals are directed
against the .common judgment, both the appeals should be
heard by t.he same Bench of the High court.
G 12. But we find that the High Court lost sight of the fact that
the benefits which the claimant receives on account of the death
or injury have to be duly considered while fixing the compensa-
tion. It is pointed out that respondent No.1 was getting Rs.4,700/
-.p.rn. and a residence has been provided to her and actually
the compassionate appointment was given immediately after
H
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KANTA 175
AGGARWAL & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
the accident. A
13. In view of what has been stated above, the High Court's
judgment is clearly unsustainable. However, the accident took
place more than 14 years back and it would not be desirable to
send the matter back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. A
sum of rupees five lakhs has been deposited vide this Court's B
order dated 1.11.2004. We are of the considered view that in
view of the background facts, it is just and proper that the sum
of Rupees five-~lakhs already deposited shall be permitted to
be withdrawn by the claimants in full and final settlement of the
claim relatable to the death of the deceased. It is for the Tribu- C
nal to fix the quantum of fixed deposit and the amount to be
released to the claimants.
14. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid extent..
. D.G. Appeal partly allowed.
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