BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARDversusKRISHAN KUMAR VIJ & ANR.

-
                         [2010] 10 S.C.R. 462


    A           BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD
                                  v.
                    KRISHAN KUMAR VIJ & ANR.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 3439 of 2007)
                            AUGUST 19, 2010
    B
          [DALVEER BHANDARI AND DEEPAK VERMA, JJ.]

            Service Law:

    c       Time-bound promotional scale - Entitlement to - Held:
      The Circular of the Authority and service Regulations provided
      for time-bound promotional scale only to directly recruited
      Assistant Engineers/Assistant Executive Engineers or to
      those who had acquired the requisite qualifications prescribed
    0 for the direct recruitment - The order and the Regulations are
      not applicable to promotees irrespective of their academic
      qualification - Promotees cannot be treated at par with the
      direct recruits as the same would amount to violation of
      Arlie/es 14 and 16 of the Constitution - PSEB, Service of
    E Engineers (Electrical) Regulations, 1965/PSEB, Service of
      Engineers (Civil) Regulations, 1965 - Regulation 7(a)(i) rlw.
      Regulation 9 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Arlie/es 14 and
      16 - Administrative Law - Public Policy.

           Interpretation of Statutes - Purposive construction - A
    F statute or an enacting provision must be so construed as to
      make it effective and operative - When the words of a statute
      are clear and unambiguous, the courl is bound to give effect
      to that meaning only which serves the cause and purpose
      irrespective of the consequences - If there are two
    G interpretations, the narrower one which would fail to achieve
      the manifest purpose of the legislation, to be avoided.

            Constitution of India, 1950:


    H                               462
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KRISHAN 463
            KUMAR VIJ & ANR.
    Articles 136 and 141 - Special Leave Petition -                A
Dismissal of - At preliminary stage with non-speaking order
- Held: Does not constitute a binding precedent - Precedent.

    Article 226- Writ petition before High Court filed belatedly
- Held: Approach of High Court in condoning inordinate, long       B
and unexplained delay in a casual manner neither proper nor
legal - Delay!Laches.

     The Punjab State Electricity Board (PSEB) issued an
Office Order dated 23.4.1990 giving time-bound benefit of
promotional scale. According to this Circular, the benefit C
of first time-bound placement was to be available to an
employee on completion of 9 years of regular service on
the post and the second time bound promotional scale
was to be available after completion of sixteen years of
service. The Circular also provided that the employees D
who did not fulfil the qualification/passing of examination
essential for promotion to the next higher post; were also
to be placed into the time-bound promotional/devised
promotional scale. The above order was adopted by the
appellant-Board. Thereafter on 24.5.1990, PSEB issued E
another Order specifying the promotional scales for
Assistant Engineers and the conditions precedent for
eligibility thereof. The order also mentioned that the
higher scales as specified in the Orders was to be
available only to the directly recruited Assistant F
Engineers as per Regulation 7 (a) (i) r/w Regulation 9 of
PSEB, Services of Engineers (Electrical) Regulations,
1965, and PSEB Services of Engineers (Civil)
Regulations, 1965.

     Respondent No. 1 made several representations                 G
claiming grant of time-bound promotional scale, stating
that having completed 16 years of service, he was enti~led
to the same. As the representations were not heeded to,
he filed a writ petition. The High Court disposed of the
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    464      SUPREME COURT REPORTS          [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A same, directing the appellant-Board to decide the
  representation by reasoned order. The representation
  was decided by the appellant-Board, against respondent
  No. 1. He again filed a writ petition. High Court allowed
  the petition and directed grant of next higher pay-scale
s to the respondent. Therefore, the instant appeal was filed.
  Other appeals were also filed which involved the. same
  issue.

      The appellant-Board, interalia, contended that
C respondent No. 1 did not fall in the category of stagnated
  employee as provided under Clause 2 of the Order dated
  24.5.1990; and that the writ petition filed by respondent
  No. 1 was belated and liable to be dismissed on the
  ground of delay and laches.

D        Respondent No. 1 contended that the issue in
    question had already been decided by the High Court in
    favour of a similarly situated employee, which view was
    further approved by the Supreme Court, by dismissing
    the SLP challenging the order of the Court.
E
          Allowing the appeals, the Court

       HELD: 1. The earlier order of the High Court and this
  Court passed in a previous case creates no bar from re-
  examining the matter on merits. Mere dismissal of a
F Special Leave Petition at a preliminary stage does not
  constitute a binding precedent and accordingly, any
  order passed ~y the High Court placing reliance on an
  earlier order, can still be challenged subsequently. Thus,
  dismissal of a matter by this Court at the threshold, with
G a non-speaking order, would not fall in the category of
  binding precedent. Therefore, the impugned order of the
  Division Bench of the High Court can still be challenged
  on merits by the appellant-Board. [Paras 20 and 21] [478-
  C-D; 479-B]
H
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KRISHAN 465
            KUMAR VIJ & ANR.
    Kunhayammed and Ors vs. State of Kera/a amd Anr.            A
2000 (6) sec 359 - relied on.

     2.1 No illegality was committed by the Board in
rejecting respondent No.1 's representation. Tfle High
Court has clearly erred in setting aside and quashing the       B
same. The impugned judgment completely defeats
primary purpose of the Order dated 24.5.1990 and the
provisions applicable to the employees of the appellant-
Board. Though the Order dated 24.5.1990 was issued only
with an intention to remove the stagnation but this would       C
not give blanket or absolute right to any employee to be
entitled to higher pay scale even if he does not fulfil pre-
requisite qualifications for holding the higher post. If he
possesses the required qualifications but is unable to get
the higher post on account of non-availability of such
post, then only he can be categorised as suffering from         D
stagnation as per Order of 23.4.1990. An employee who
does not fulfil the qualification as per Regulation 10(4) for
the higher post would be ineligible for promotion and/or
higher pay scale. In that eventuality, such an employee
cannot complain of stagnation. Moreover, even while             E
adopting the Order dated 24.5.1990, it was made clear by
the appellant-Board that the time bound promotional/
devised promotional scales after 9/16 years' service are
admissible only in respect of the posts in which the initial
induction is through direct recruitment. [Paras 25, 26 and      F
27] [481-D-H; 482-A]

     2.2 Clause 2 of Order dated 24.5.1990 r/w. Regulation
9 of PSEB, Services of Engineers (Electrical) Regulation,
1965 and PSEB, Services of Engineers (Civil)                    G
Regulations, 1965, restricts the benefit only to directly
recruited Assistant Engineers/Assistant Executive
Engineers, meaning thereby that one must possess the
requisite qualification as prescribed under the
Regulations, then only the benefit would accrue to the
                                                                H
    466    SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2010) 10 S.C.R.

A employee, not otherwise. The note appended thereto
  clearly stipulates that even those employees who were
  promoted under Regulation 7(a)(ii) r/w Regulation 10(4)
  of PSEB Regulations shall be deemed to have been
  appointed by direct recruitment. This legal fiction is
s limited. It is applicable only to those employees who have
  been promoted in conformity with the provisions
  contained in clause 4. Thus, the employees who had
  passed both parts (A) and (B) of the AMIE Examination
  and were promoted against 9% posts reserved for that
c class were fictionally treated as direct recruits. Thus, it
  clearly stipulates that only those Assistant Engineers who
  were either directy recruited or had acquired the requisite
  qualifications prescribed for direct recruitment were
  chosen to be granted· higher scale if they had been
  promoted against the post falling within the quota of 9%
0
  of the cadre strength of the said post. [Para 23] [481-D-
    G]
       2.3 Order dated 24.5.1990 does not apply to the
  promotees irrespective of their academic qualifications
E nor can they be treated at par with the direct recruits.
  There was a purpose of treating them so, otherwise, it
  would have the effect of violating the constitutional
  mandate contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the
  Constitution of India, on the premise that unequals have
F been treated as equals. It is with that intention, to avoid
  criticism and future litigation that such persons who
  possessed qualifications for direct recruitment and could
  be promoted against the posts falling vacant, would
  become entitled to claim the benefit. Since respondent
G No.1 did not fall in this category, he was not entitled to
  the higher scale. [Para 24] [480-H; 481-A-C]
        2.4 The Regulations had been notified in the year
    1965. Respondent No.1 was in service with the appellant-
    Board for two decades or so after promulgation of the
H
 BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KRISHAN 467
             KUMAR VIJ & ANR.
Regulations. All the employees claiming b~nefit of the           A
Order dated 24.5.1990 retired long after the promulgation
of the Regulations. Thus, they were fully aware and
conscious of the fact that the relevant Regulation puts a
partial embargo and impediment on their future career for
promotion. They were aware that unless they are able to          B
acquire these requisite qualifications, the benefit of the
Order dated 24.5.1990 cannot be extended to them. Even
though, they had enough opportunity and time to do so,
but they did not improve their respective qualification. In
such a fact situation, they cannot complain of stagnation.       c
[Para 28] [482-B-D]

      2.5 During the course of the hearing, the appellant-
. Board agreed that an employee who is. able to acquire
  the requisite qualification and has also served the
  appellant-Board for the minimum required length of years       D
  as Assistant Engineer would be entitled to get the
  benefit, provided he fulfilled the requisite conditions. The
  appellant-Board has also agreed that if an employee has
  acquired qualifications for grant of promotion and has
  suffered stagnation, then he would be entitled for             E
  stepping up/revision of his pay scale. Thus, all such
  employees who have clearP.d both parts of the AMIE
  examination, but have not put in required experience of
  working as Assistant Engineer in consonance with the
  order dated 24.5.1990 and the Regulations, the appellant-      F
  Board would be fully justified in rejecting their claims.
  [Para 32] [483-F-G]

      3.1 A statute or any enacting provision must be so
 construed as to make it effective and operative. Any such       G
 construction which reduces the statute to a futility has
 to be avoided. The courts will reject the construction
 which is likely to defeat the plain intention of the
 legislature even though there may be some inexactitude
 in the language used.· If the choice ·is between two
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   468     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2010) 10 S.C.R.


A interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to
  achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation should be
  avoided. A statute is designed to be workable and the
  interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that
  object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes
B that end unattainable. When the words of the statute are
  clear, plain or unambiguous and are reasonably
  susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound
  to give effect to that meaning only which serves the
  cause and purpose, irrespective of the consequences.
c [Paras 36 and 38) [484-H; 485-F-G]
       Murray v. /RC (1918) AC 541; Whitney v. /RC (1926) AC
   37 - referred to.

       3.2 In order to attain the fruitful results of the Order
D dated 24.5.1990, a meaningful and proper construction
  has to be given which would achieve the object for which
  it was passed, rather than to give a narrower construction
  which may defeat the very purpose of passing the said
  order. No doubt, it is true that the Order dated 24.5.1990
E is not happily worded, but even then the only inevitable
  conclusion that can be deciphered from the same is that
  the benefit thereof would accrue to only those directly
  recruited Assistant Engineers/Assistant Executive
  Engineers who have pre-requisite qualification for
F appointment to the higher post. Obviously, if an employee
  does not have the required qualification, then under no
  circumstances he would be entitled to claim benefit of the
  Order dated 24.5.1990. [Para 36, 38) [484-H; 485-A; D-E]

       M. V. Joshi v. M.U. Shimpi AIR 1961 SC 1494 = 1961
G (3) SCR 986 - relied on.
      3.3 The implementation of the interpretation given by
  the High Court to the Order dated 24.5.1990 would lead
  to unsustainable consequences. It would then mean that
H every Assistant Engineer irrespective of his conduct,
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KRISHAN 469
            KUMAR VIJ & ANR.
qualifications, performance or behaviour would become         A
entitled to the higher scale on completion of particular
length of service. If that be so, then even those employees
with poor service record and doubtful integrity would
also become entitled to claim higher scale merely
because they had completed a particular length of             B
service. If such an interpretation is to be given to the
Order dated 24.5.1990, then it would not only be improper
but would also be against public policy and interest of
the appellant-Board. [Para 33) (483-H; 484-A-B]

    4. The writ petition of respondent No. 1 deserved to
                                                              c
be dismissed only on the ground of delay and laches.
The employers had categorically raised the ground of
delay of eight years, by the employee, in approaching the
High Court. But the High Court has simply brushed it
aside and condoned such an inordinate, long and               D
unexplained delay in a casual manner. The approach of
the High Court was neither proper nor legal. (Para 39)
[485-H; 486-A-B]

    5. All the respondents of various appeals have since      E
demitted the office on attaining the age of
superannuation. While they were in service, may be on
account of orders of the Higt Court, to save itself from
being hauled up for committing contempt of court, the
appellant-Board has made payments to them towards             F
arrears etc. After such a long lapse of time, more so, when
the respondents have already retired, it will be harsh on
the part of the Court to direct recovery thereof. Thus, it
is directed that the amounts already paid to the
respondents would not be recovered by the appellant-          G
Board. [Para 40) [486-C-D)
                     Case Law Reference:
     2000 (6) sec 359        Relied on.           Para 20
     (1918) AC 541           Referred to.        Para 34      H
    470      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A         (1926) AC 37            Referred to.          Para 34
          AIR 1961 SC 1494        Relied on.            Para 37

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    3439 of 2007.
B
        From the Judgment & Order dated 06.12.2004 of the High
    Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition
    No. 19306 of 2003.

                                WITH
c
    C.A. Nos. 3438, 3418 & 3440 OF 2007.

       J.L. Gupta, D.S. Nehra, Nidhi Gupta (for S. Janani)
  Satinder S. Gulati, Kamaldeep Gulati, Dr. Kailash Chand for
D the Appellant.

       Mahaveer Singh, T.S. Doabia, Reena Singh, Sanjeev
  Kumar, Roshan (for T. Mahipal), Kuldip Singh (for Ajay Pal),
  Kiran Bhardwaj (for Sushma Suri) (for Anil Katiyar), Anil Mittal,
  Vibhuti Sushant, Kumud Lata Das, Rajiv Kataria, Debjani Das
E Purkayastha (for Delhi Law Chambers) for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       DEEPAK VERMA, J. 1. This Judgment and Order shall
F govern disposal of C.A.No.3439 of 2007, C.A.No.3438 of 2007,
  C.A. No. 3418 of 2007 and C.A. No.3440 of 2007 as they
  project common question of law to be answered by this Court.
  Precisely, we are required to consider whether in the light of
  the Order/Circular issued by the appellant- Bhakra Beas
  Management Board (hereinafter shall be called as 'Board'),
G respondent No.1 - employee would be entitled to the benefit of
  higher scale of pc;iy/upgradation/stepping up of salary sans pre-
  requisite qualification for the grant of the same.

          2. For the sake of convenience, facts appearing in Civil
H
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KRISHAN 471
    KUMAR VIJ & ANR. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
Appeal No.3439 of 2007 are being taken into consideration.              A
Respondent No.1, Krishan Kumar Vij had initially joined the
services of the State of Punjab, Department of Irrigation as
Tracer in 1949. He was thereafter promoted as a Draftsman
in the year 1950. He was further promoted as Divisional Head
Draftsman, some time in the year 1962. Thereafter, he was               B
transferred in the services of the Board. There also, he earned
promotion as Circle Head Draftsman and then as the Assistant
Design Engineer. Regular promotion to respondent No.1 on the
post of Asstt. Design Engineer in Punjab Service of Engineers
(II) was granted with retrospective effect from 1.6.1976. Finally,      c
on attaining the age of superannuation, he retired from service
on 31.1.1987. Even though, respondent no.1 had earned
several promotions, while in service, he still complained of
stagnation in service as he was not able to earn further
promotion. This was the cause for triggering off the instant            D
litigation.

     3. Brief history giving rise to this litigation is as under :-

    4. State of Punjab was of the opinion that there existed
stagnation amongst various cadres of regular employees.                 E
Pursuant thereto, an Office Order was issued by the Punjab
State Electricity Board (for short 'PSEB') on 23.4.1990,
adopted by the Board vide Order dated 26.06.1992. The aims
and objects of the said Office Order issued by the PSEB are
reproduced hereinbelow :                                                F

     "The Punjab State Electricity Board have been seized of
     the problems of stagnation prevailing amongst the various
     cadres of regular employees and its consequent effect in
     their efficiency. It is felt that an employee should under ideal
     service conditions get normally two promotions from his            G
     initial recruitment level during his service. However, this is
     not always possible owing to non-availability of promotional
     posts. The aspiration of the employees can however, be
     met to a great extent, by allowing time-bound higher scales
     to the employees at two stages in their service career. The        H
    472       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A         Punjab State Electricity Board has, therefore, decided to
          introduc!e scheme to allow time-bound benefit of
          promotional scales after the completion of 9/16 years of
          regular service in the PSEB, provided the maximum
          benefit on being placed in the time-bound promotional
B         scales does not exceed five increments including
          promotional increment(s) to the subordinate employees
          having a maximum scale upto Rs.3500/- except the
          categories where the benefit of time-bound placement to
          higher scale is applicable on the Punjab Government
c         pattern as in the case of teachers etc."

       5. The said scheme of time-bound benefit of promotional
  scale commenced from 1.1.1986 but the payment of arr~ars
  was spread over two years i.e. arrears from 1.1.1986 to
  28.2.1989 were to be paid in 1990-91 and 1991-1992. As per
D this Circular, the benefit of first time-bound placement would be
  available to an employee on completion of 9 years of regular
  service on the post and second time-bound promotional scale
  would be available after completion of sixteen years of service.
  Para 7 thereof refers to those employees who do not fulfil the
E qualification/passing of examination essential for promotion to
  the next higher post, but they shall also be placed into the time
  bound promotional/devised promotional scale to be specified
  by the Board in the schedule as referred to in para 5. It has
  been mentioned in para 5 that the Board shall draw schedules
F indicating the lowest post(s) for direct recruitment in respect of
  various cadres for the_ purpose of this order, separately.

       6. Pursuant to the said order, another order was issued
  by P.S.E.B. on 24.5.1990 (hereinafter for brevity shall be
  referred to as 'Order of 1990') specifying the promotional
G scales for Assistant Engineers and the conditions precedent
  for eligibility thereof, adopted by the Board.

         7. The relevant part of the said Order of 1990, is
    reproduced hereinbelow:
H
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KRISHAN 473
    KUMAR VIJ & ANR. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]

   "2. The above higher scales will only be available to the      A
   directly recruited Assistant Engineers as per regulation.
   (emphasis supplied by us)

   7-A(i) read with regulation-9 of PSEB. Service of

   7-A(i) read with Regulation-9 of PSEB, Service of              B

   Engineers(Electrical)Regulation-1965

   Engineers (Civil) Regulations - 1965

   The cases of Assistant Engineers appointed by promotion        C
   as per provisions of the Regulation 7-A (ii) read with
   Regulation - 10 of the Regulations ibid will be governed
   by Guidelines circulated vide Secretary Finance Officer
   Order No. Hl7/PRC/FIN-1988 dated 23.04.1990.
                                                                  D
   Note: The departmental (Technical Subordinate and
   Drawing Staff) who while in service of the Board have been
   promoted to the post of AE(Electrical) (Civil) against quota
   reserved for promotion from amongst them under
   Regulation 7-a(ii)read with                                    E

   Regulation 7-(A)ii) read with

   Regulation 10 (7) of the P S E B - - - - - - -

   Regulation 10 (4) of the P S E B - - - - - - -                 F
   Service of Engineers (Electrical) Regulations-1965

   Service of Engineers (Civil) Regulations - 1965

   shall be deemed to have been appointed as Assistant            G
   Engineers like the Assistant Engineers appointed through
   direct appointment under

   Regulation 7 A (i) read with Regulation - 9 of the

   Regulation 7-a(i) read with Regulation-9 of the                H
    474      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2010] 10 S.C.R.


A         Service of Engineers (Electrical)
          Service of Engineers (Civil)
          Ibid for the purpose of grant of above next higher scales
          after 9/16 years of regular service as Assistant Engineer/
B         Assistant Executive Engineer/ Executive Engineer,
          prescribed period to be counted from the date of joining
          the post of Assistant Engineer on regular basis. Similarly,
          Graduates in
          Electrical/MechanicalEngineering/AMIE qualified
c
                Civil Engineering/AMIE qualified
          hands who possesses this qualification before joining the
          service of the Board and subsequently promoted as
          Assistant Engineers against quota reserved for promotion
D         from amongst them in terms of provisions of
          Regulation 7-a(ii)read with Regulation 10(9) of
          Regulation 7-a(ii) read with Regulation 10(6) of
E         Service of Engineers(Electrical) Regulations-1965
          Service of Engineers (Civil) Regulations-1965
               will be treated likewise. "
F   Regulation 7 A has wrongly been described in the Order/
    Circulars instead, it be read as Regulation 7 (a). wherever it
    appears.
       8. Clause 2 of the aforesaid Order of 1990 categorically
  stipulates that it would be applicable only to directly recruited
G Assistant Engineers as per Regulation 7(a)(i) read with
  Regulation 9 of the Regulations and to none others.
        9. In the case in hand, we are concerned only with Civil
  Engineers, directly recruited to the posts of Assistant Engineers
H (Civil).
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KRISHAN 475
    KUMAR VIJ & ANR. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
    10. Pursuant to the above two Orders, respondent no.1 had         A
made several representations claiming grant of time-bound
promotional scale of Rs.4500-6300 w.e.f. 1.1.1986.

      11. Since several representations made by respondent
 no.1 did not bring required result, he was constrained to file       B
 C.W.P. No. 6945 of 2003 in the High Court of Punjab and
 Haryana, which came to be disposed of on 8.5.2003, with a
 direction to the Board to decide the representation in the light
 of relevant law, rules and instructions by passing a speaking
 order. In the aforesaid Writ Petition, no notice was issued to       C
 the appellant-Board. In consequence of the directions passed
 by the High Court as mentioned hereinabove, respondent
 No.1 's representation was considered at length by the Board
 but was decided against him on 22.8.2003 which was again
 challenged by respondent No.1 before the Division Bench of
 the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The High Court vide the        D
 impugned judgment and order passed on 6.12.2004 allowed
 respondent No.1 's Writ Petition whereby and whereunder the
·order dated 22.8.2003, passed by the Board was set aside
 with further direction to grant to the said respondent the next
 higher pay scale after completion of 16 years of service. It is      E
 this order which is being assailed by the Board before us.

      12. According to respondent No.1, since he had completed
requisite length of service of 16 years on the post of Assistant
Design Engineer, thus had become entitled for the higher pay          F
scale. It appears, he took the cue for filing the 2nd Writ Petition
on the strength of orders passed by the High Court in another
petition filed by other employee, as mentioned hereinbelow.

      13. It is pertinent to mention here that one of such
employees Rajinder Singh Patpatia had also independently              G
filed C.W.P.No. 9162of1994, which was allowed on 26.8.1999
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana. Letters Patent Appeal No.1127 of 1999 filed by the
Board, against the aforesaid judgment and order of the learned
Single Judge was dismissed on 13.1.2001 by the Division               H
    476       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A Bench of the said High Court. Challenging the order of Division
  Bench as also that of the learned Single Judge of the High Court,
  the Board had preferred Special Leave Petition No.2393 of
  2002 in this Court, which was dismissed on 15.2.2002. An
  application for review of the said order was filed by the Board
B in this Court but was similarly dismissed and met the same fate.

       14. We have heard learned Senior Counsel Shri Jawabar
  Lal Gupta, Mr. D.S. Nehra and Ms. Nidhi Gupta, Advocate for
  the appellant-Board. Shri Mahabir Singh, Ms. Reena Singh,
  Mr.Sanjeev Kumar, Mr. Mahipal, advocates, Mr. T.S. Doabia,
C Sr. Advocate, Mr.Anil Mittal, Mr.Rajiv Kataria, advocates
  appeared for the respondents at length and perused the
  records.

      15. Mr. Jawahar Lal Gupta, learned Senior Counsel
D appearing for appellant strenuously challenged, attacked and
  hammered the impugned judgment broadly on the following
  grounds:

       (i) Respondent No.1 's Writ Petition could not have been
E entertained, belatedly after a lapse of 8 years, thus was liable
  to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

        (ii) Respondent No.1 herein had already earned 3/4
    promotions before he attained the age of superannuation. Thus,
    his case would not fall under the category of stagnated
F   employee.

         (iii) Order of 1990 has wrongly been interpreted by the
    Division Bench of the High Court.

        (iv) Clause 2 of Order of 1990 clearly stipulated that the
G same would be applicable only to directly recruited Assistant
  Engineers (Civil) and to none others. Admittedly, respondent
  No.1 does not fall in that category, consequently would not be
  entitled for it.

H         (v) The Division Bench also lost sight of the fact that unless
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KRISHAN 477
    KUMAR VIJ & ANR. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
an employee had pre-requisite qualification for promotion, the     A
question of grant of time-bound higher pay scale or upgradation
in salary, would not arise.

     16. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent no.1
contended that issue is no more res integra in the light of the    B
order passed in the matter of Rajinder Singh Patpatia by
learned Single Judge of the High Court, confirmed in LPA by
Division Bench, further approved by this Court, by dismissing
the Board's Special Leave Petition at the threshold and then
rejection of review petition. It has been contended by them that   C
stagnation would be applicable at all stages and to all the
employees, who have not been granted promotion, otherwise
the very purpose of the word 'stagnation' would stand defeated.

     17. They have also submitted before us that there was no
question of granting promotion to them but the actual relief on    D
the strength of the order/circular which could have been granted
to the employees was stepping up, upgradation/ revision of the
pay scale without being actually promoted to next higher post.
In other words, they have contended that no interference is
called for in the impugned judgment and the appeals being          E
devoid of merits and substance, deserve to be dismissed.

     18. As mentioned herein above while granting relief to
respondent no.1, Division Bench has placed reliance on the
earlier Division Bench judgment rendered in the case of
                                                                   F
Rajinder Singh Patpatia, whereby and whereunder the Board's
Writ Appeal was dismissed and the order dated 26.8.1999
passed by Learned Single Judge was confirmed. Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 2393 of 2002 was dismissed on
15.2.2002 and a Review Petition filed by the Board also came
to be dismissed by this Court. They have thus contended that       G
the same reliefs ought to have been granted to respondent no.1
also as he was similarly situated and the High Court committed
no error in doing so.

     19. Thus, we are required to first consider this aspect of    H
    478       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A the matter, where earlier Special Leave Petition and Review
  having been dismissed at the preliminary stage by this Court,
  what would be its effect on the impuJned judgment. Whether
  the same can still be assailed and challenged even thouQ_h,
  earlier view of the High Court in identical matter has a seal of
B approval of this Court.

       20. However, this issue should not detain us any longer in
  view of well considered judgment of a three-Judge Bench of
  this Court reported in 2000(6) SCC 359 titled Kunhayammed
  & Ors Vs. State of Kera/a & Anr. wherein this Court
C categorically held that mere dismissal of a Special Leave
  Petition at a preliminary stage does not constitute a binding
  precedent, and accordingly, any order passed by the High
  Court placing reliance on earlier order, can still be challenged
  subsequently.
D
         21. The relevant para of the aforesaid judgment in
    Kunhayammed (supra) authored by most illustrious learned
    Judge (Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.C. Lahoti as he then was) in his
    lucid and concise language has held as under: (at page 377 ):
E
          "27. A petition for leave to appeal to this Court may be
          dismissed by a non-speaking order or by a speaking
          order. Whatever be the phraseology employed in the order
          of dismissal, if it is a non-speaking order, i.e., it does not
          assign reasons for dismissing the special leave petition,
F         it would neither attract the doctrine of merger so as to
          stand substituted in place of the order put in issue before
          it nor would it be a declaration of law by the Supreme
          Court under Article 141 of the Constitution for there is no
          law which has been declared. If the order of dismissal be
G         supported by reasons then also the doctrine of merger
          would not be attracted because the jurisdiction exercised
          was not an appellate jurisdiction but merely a discretionary
          jurisdiction refusing to grant leave to appeal. We have
          already dealt with this aspect earlier. Still the reasons
H
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KRISHAN 479
    KUMAR VIJ & ANR. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
   stated by the Court would attract applicability of Article 141   A
   of the Constitution if there is a law declared by the
   Supreme Court which obviously would be binding on all the
   courts and tribunals in India and certainly the parties
   thereto. The statement contained in the order other than
   on points of law would be binding on the parties and the         B
   court or tribunal, whose order was under challenge on the
   principle of judicial discipline, this Court being the Apex
   Court of the country. No court or tribunal or parties would
   have the liberty of taking or canvassing any view contrary
   to the one expressed by this Court. The order of Supreme         c
   Court would mean that it has declared the law and in that
   light the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. The
   declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 but still,
   the case not being one where leave was granted, the
   doctrine of merger does not apply. The Court sometimes
                                                                    0
   leaves the question of law open. Or it sometimes briefly
   lays down the principle, may be, contrary to the one laid
   down by the High Court and yet would dismiss the special
   leave petition. The reasons given are intended for
   purposes of Article 141. This is so done because in the
   event of merely dismissing the special leave petition, it is
                                                                    E
   likely that an argument could be advanced in the High Court
   that the Supreme Court has to be understood as not to
   have differed in law with the High Court."

   It was further held in para 40 reproduced hereinbelow :          F

         (page 382) "40 ...... In any case, the dismissal would
   remain a dismissal by a non-speaking order where no
   reasons have been assigned and no law has been
   declared by the Supreme Court. The dismissal is not of           G
   the appeal but of the special leave petition. Even if the
   merits have been gone into, they are the merits of the
   special leave petition only. In our opinion neither doctrine
   of merger nor Article 141 of the Constitution is attracted
   to such an order."
                                                                    H
    480      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A Thus, according to the law laid down by the Bench of three
  learned Judges of this Court, it is clear that dismissal of a
  matter by this Court at the threshold, with non-speaking order,
  would not fall in the category of binding precedent. Meaning
  thereby that the impugned O(der of the Di\lision Bench can still
    .                                            l
B be challenged on merits by the Appellant Board. Thus, the
  earlier order of the High Court and this Court passed in Rajinder
  Singh Patpatia's case, creates no bar from re-examining the
  matter on merits.

C       22. We have already mentioned hereinabove with regard
  to Clause 2 of Order of 1990 read with Regulation 9 which
  restricts the benefit only to directly recruited Assistant Engineers/
  Assistant Executive Engineers, meaning thereby that one must
  possess the requisite qualification as prescribed under the
  Regulations, then only the ber:iefit would accrue to the
D employee, not otherwise.

       23. The note appended thereto clearly stipulates that even
  those employees who were promoted under Regulation 7(a)(ii)
  read with Regulation 10(4) shall be deemed to have been
E appointed by direct recruitment. This legal fiction is limited. It
  is applicable only to. those employees who have been promoted
  in conformity with the provisions contained in clause 4. Thus,
  the employees who had passed both parts (A) and (B) of the
  AMIE Examination and were promoted against 9% posts
F reserved for that class were fictionally treated as direct recruits.
  Thus, it clearly stipulates that only those Assistant Engineers
  who were either directy recruited or had acquired the requisite
  qualifications prescribed for direct recruitment were chosen to
  be granted higher scale if they had been promoted against the
G post falling within the quota of 9% of the cadre strength of the
  said post.

      24. Order of 1990 contemplates that it is to be followed
  as per Regulation which provides that only such persons as
  have been promoted under Regulation 7(a)(ii) read with
H Regulation 10(4) shall be treated as direct recruits. In other
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KRISHAN 481
    KUMAR VIJ & ANR. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
words, it does not apply to the promotees irrespective of their       A
academic qualifications nor they can be treated at par with the
direct recruits. There was a purpose of treating them so,
otherwise, it would have the effect of violating the constitutional
mandate contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of
India, on the premise that unequals have been treated as              B
equals. It is with that intention, to avoid criticism and future
litigation that such persons who possessed qualifications for
direct recruitment and could be promoted against the posts
falling vacant, would become entitled to claim the benefit. Since
respondent no.1 did not fall in this category, obviously, he was      c
not entitled to the higher scale.

     25. Thus, there appears to be no illegality committed by
the Board in rejecting respondent no.1 's representation. So, in
our considered opinion, the High Court has clearly erred in
setting aside and quashing the same. Critical examination of          D
the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court completely defeats primary purpose of the Order
of 1990 and provisions applicable to the employees of the
Board. No doubt, it is true that the Order of 1990 was issued
only with an intention to remove the stagnation but this would        E
not give blanket or absolute right to any employee to be entitled
to higher pay scale even if he does not fulfil pre-requisite
qualifications for holding the higher post. In other words, if he
possesses the required qualifications but is unable to get the
higher post on account of non-availability of such post, then only    F
he can be categorised as suffering from stagnation as per
Order of 23.4.1990.

     26. Obviously, an employee who does not fulfil the
qualification as per Regulation 10(4) for the higher post would       G
be ineligible for promotion and/or higher pay scale. In that
eventuality, such an employee cannot complain of stagnation.

     27. Moreover, even while adopting the Order of 1990, it
was made clear by the Board vide its Order dated 26.6.1992
that the time bound promotional/devised promotional scales            H
    482      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.

A after 9/16 years' service are admissible only in respect of the
  posts in which the initial ind.uction is through direct recruitment.

       28. It is pertinent to mention here that the Regulations had
  been notified in the year 1965. Respondent no.1 was in service
B with the Board for two decades or so after promulgation of the
  Regulations. All the employees claiming benefit of the Order
  of 1990 had retired long after the promulgation of the
  Regulations. Thus, they were fully aware and conscious of the
  fact that the relevant Regulation puts a partial embargo and
C impediment on their future career for promotion. They were
  aware that unless they are able to acquire these requisite
  qualifications, the benefit of the Order of 1990 cannot be
  extended to them. Even though, they had enough opportunity·
  and time to do so, but they di~ not improve their respective
  qualification., In such a fact situation, they cannot complain of
D stagnation. They have to thank their own stars that despite
  having knowledge of the provisions of the Regulations
  applicable to them, they did not make any attempt to acquire
  the qualifications.

E       29. It is also to be noted that even though respondent no.1
  was junior to Rajinder Singh Patpatia who was granted relief
  by the High Court, still respondent No.1 took such a long time
  to approach the High Court. The aforesaid legal and factual
  aspect of the matter specially the interpretation of the order of
F 1990 read with the Regulations was not properly and
  reasonably appreciated by the Division Bench. In this regard,
  it is necessary to quote the stand of the appellant-Board right
  from the very beginning when it had proceeded to reject the
  representation of respondent no.1.
G        30. The relevant portion of the reason of the Board so
    assigned to reject the respondent's representation is
    reproduced hereinbelow :

          "in view of the principles/features enunciated in the scheme
H         for grant of time-bound placement into the promotional/
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KRISHAN 483
    KUMAR VIJ & ANR. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
    devised promotional scale after 9/16 years of re9ular             A
    service as introduced on the PSEB pattern, the case of
    Diploma Holder SDOs does not fall within the ambit of
    grant of 1st and 2nd Time-bound Promotional Scale after
    completion of 9/16 years regular service as admissible to
    the directly recruited Degree Holder AEs and                     B
    departmental employees (Technical Subordinate and
    Drawings Staff) who have been promoted on the basis of
    the AMIE/Degree in Engineering against their share quota
    on the PSEB pattern."

    The aforesaid reasoning of the Board entirely rests on the       C
Order of 1990 and the Regulations applicable to such
employees.

      31. During the course of the hearing, a question was posed
to the learned counsel for the appellant Board:- if an employee D
is able to acquire the requisite qualification and has also
served the Board for the minimum required length of years as ·
Assistant Engineer whether such an employee would be entitled
to get the benefit of the order of 1990 or not.
                                                                       E
      32. Mr. J.L Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for
the Board categorically submitted that such employees would
be entitled to get the benefit provi1fod, they fulfilled the requisite
 conditions. Learned counsel for the appellant has agreed that
 if an employee has acquired qualifications for grant of F
promotion and has suffered stagnation, then he would be
entitled for stepping up/revision of his pay scale. Meaning
thereby that all such employees who have cleared both parts
 of the AMIE examination, but have not put in required
experience of working as Assistant Engineer in consonance
with the order of 1990 and the Regulations, the Board would G
be fully justified in rejecting their claims.

    33. If the interpretation of the High Court to the Order of
1990 is to be implemented, then it would lead to unsustainable
consequences. It would then mean that every Assistant                 H
    484      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A Engineer irrespective of hi~ conduct, qualifications,
  performance or behaviour would become entitled to the higher
  scale on completion of particular length of service. If that be so,
  then even those employees with poor service record and
  doubtful integrity wou!d also become entitled to claim higher
B scale merely because they had completed a particular length
  of service. If such an interpretation is to be given to the Order
  of 1990, then it would not only be improper but would also be
  against public policy and interest of the Board. It is too well
  settled that a statute or any enacting provision must be so
c construed as to make it effective and operative. Any such
  construction which reduces the statute to a futility has to be
  avoided.
       34. It has been stated by Lord Dunedin, in the case of
  Murray v. /RC (1918) AC 541 at p. 553 that, 'it is our duty to
D make what we can of statutes, knowing that they are meant to
  be operative and not inept and nothing short of impossibility
  should in my judgment allow a judge to declare a statute
  unworkable'. The principle was reiterated by him in a later
  judgment in the case of Whitney v. /RC (1926) AC 37 at p.52,
E where he observed, 'a statute is designed to be workable and
  the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that
  object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end
  unattainable.
        35. The aforesaid observations make it abundantly clear
F that the courts will, therefore, reject the construction which is
  likely to defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though
  there may be some inexactitude in the language used. If the
  choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which
  would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation
G should be avoided.
       36. In view of this, to attain the fruitful results of the Order
  of 1990 we have to give it a meaningful and proper construction
  which would achieve the object for which it was passed, rather
H than to give a narrower construction which may defeat the very
BHAKRA BEAS MANAGEMENT BOARD v. KRISHAN 485
    KUMAR VIJ & ANR. [DEEPAK VERMA, J.]
purpose of passing the said order.                                    A

     37. In somewhat similar circumstances, a Bench of two
learned Judges of this Court in the case of M. V. Joshi v. M. U.
Shimpi AIR 1961 SC 1494        =1961 (3) SGR 986 eloquently
said as under :
                                                                      B
     ".... But these rules do not in any way affect the fundamental
     principles of interpretation, namely, that the primary test is
     - the language employed in the Act and when the words
     are clear and plain the court is bound to accept the
     expressed intention of the legislature."                         c
At the cost of repetition, we reiterate that the clear and plain
reading of the Order of 1990 is as has been interpreted by us
hereinabove.
     38. No doubt, it is true that the Order of 1990 is not happily   D
worded, but even then the only inevitable conclusion that can
be deciphered from the same is that the benefit thereof would
accrue to only those directly recruited Assistant Engineers/
Assistant Executive Engineers who have pre-requisite
qualification for appointment to the higher post. Obviously, if an    E
employee does not have the required qualification, then under
what circumstances he would be entitled to claim benefit of the
Order of 1990. A statute is desir ed to be workable and the
interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object
unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end
                                                                      F
unattainable. In our considered opinion, the Order of 1990
cannot be logically interpreted in any other manner than what
we have done. It is also too well settled that when the words of
the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous and are reasonably
susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give         G
effect to that meaning only which serves the cause and purpose
irrespective of the consequences.
    39. Yet, another question that draws our attention is with
regard to delay and laches. In fact, respondent no.1 's petition
deserved to be dismissed only on that ground but surprisingly         H
    486     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010) 10 S.C.R.


A the High Court overlooked that aspect of the matter and dealt
  with it in a rather casual and cursory manner. The appellant had
  categorically raised the ground of delay of over eight years in
  approaching the High Court for grant 6l the said relief. But the
  High Court has simply brushed it aside and condoned such an
B inordinate, long and unexplained delay in a casual manner.
  Since, we have decided the matter on merits, thus it is not
  proper to make avoidable observations, except to say that the
  approach of the High Court was neither proper nor legal.
       40. It is not in dispute that all the respondents of various
C appeals  have since demitted the office on attaining the age of
  superannuation. While they were in service, may be on account
  of orders of the High Court, to save itself from being hauled up
  for committing contempt of court, Board has made payments
  to them towards arrears etc. After such a long lapse of time,
D more so, when the respondents have already retired, it will be
  harsh on our part to direct recovery thereof. Thus, we direct that
  the amounts already paid to the respondents would not be
  recovered by the Board.
E      41'. At the cost of repetition, we may reiterate that the effect
  of the Order of 1990 read with the Regulations would be that
  only those employees who fulfilled the pre-requisite qualification
  for further promotion along with certain length of service as
  required would only be entitled to the benefit as per the Order
  of 1990. The other Assistant Engineers, even though they had
F completed the requisite length of service would not be entitled
  to claim the benefit, unless they had fulfilled the basic
  qualifications and minimum experience as required.
       42. In the tacts and circumstances of the case, we are of
G the cpnsidered opinion that the impugned order cannot be
  sustained. It has to be set aside and quashed and we
  accordingly do so. The appeals are accordingly allowed as
  indicated hereinabove. The parties to bear their costs.

    K.K.T                                          Appeals allowed.
H