BHIM SINGH AND ANR.versusSTATE OF UTIARAKHAND
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 107
- Decided
- 11 February 2015
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- M Y EQBAL
Holding
The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of dowry death, raising the presumption under Section 1138, and the accused failed to rebut the statutory onus, so the conviction stands.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined the death of Prema Devi, who died within five months of marriage with extensive burn injuries and traces of poison. The prosecution alleged that she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband Bhim Singh and his brothers in connection with dowry demands, invoking Sections 304‑B of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The trial court convicted the accused, the High Court upheld the convictions of Bhim Singh and Aan Singh and acquitted the others, and the appellants challenged this order. The Court held that the prosecution had proved, on a circumstantial basis, that the victim was harassed for dowry shortly before her death, thereby raising the presumption of dowry death under Section 1138 of the Evidence Act, which the accused failed to rebut. Even assuming suicide, the onus under Section 113A shifted to the accused, which they could not discharge. Consequently, the conviction under Sections 304‑B, 498‑A IPC and the Dowry Act was affirmed and the appeal dismissed.
Issues considered
- The prosecution must establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with a dowry demand shortly before her death to invoke the presumption under Section 1138 Evidence Act.
- Whether the presumption of dowry death under Section 1138 can be raised when the death is alleged to be suicide, invoking Section 113A Evidence Act.
- Whether the circumstantial evidence presented forms an unbroken chain sufficient to convict without any reasonable doubt.
- Whether a demand for dowry must be made before marriage for a dowry‑death charge.
- Whether the accused discharged the statutory onus of rebutting the presumptions under Sections 1138 and 113A.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313, s. 374
- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 3, s. 4
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 1138, s. 113A
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304-B, s. 498-A
Subjects
Judgment
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 1043
SHIM SINGH AND ANR. A
v.
STATE OF UTIARAKHAND
(Criminal Appeal No. 2146 of 2009)
FEBRUARY 11, 2015
B
[M.Y. EQBAL AND PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860- ss.3048, 498-A- Prosecution under
rlw. ss. 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act - Death caused by
90% bum injuries - Of a married women, in her matrimonial C
house - Within 5 months of her marriage - Circumstantial
evidence - Plea of the accused that the deceased committed
suicide - Conviction by courts below - On appeal, held:
Prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in D
connection with demand of dowry - The courts therefore
rightly raised presumption uls. 1138 of Evidence Act that the
death was dowry death which the accused failed to rebut -
There was no missing link in the chain of circumstances to
entitle the accused to benefit of doubt - Even if it is assumed E
·that the deceased committed suicide, the presumption uls.
113-A for abetting the deceased to commit suicide is against
the accused, which they failed to rebut - Hence, conviction
upheld - Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 113A and 1138 - Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 - ss. 3 and 4 - Dowry Death. F
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. A conjoint reading of Section 1138 of the
Evidence Act and Section 304-B of l.P.C. shows that there
must be material to show that soon before her death the G
victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The
prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or
accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of
"death occurring otherwise than in normal
1043 H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A circumstances". In the present case, the prosecution has
proved by producing cogent evidence that soon before
her death the deceased was subjected to cruelty or
harassment in connection with the demand for dowry.
Thus, it becomes obligatory for the Court to raise a
B presumption that the death is a dowry death. [Para 12]
(1055-G-H; 1056-A-C]
Kaliyaperumal and Anr. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2004)
9 sec 157: 2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 1 - relied on.
C 2. Even if it is assumed that the deceased had
committed suicide, then u/s. 113A of Evidence Act, onus
is shifted on the accused to dislodge the presumption of
having committed abetment of suicide by a married
woman. Unlike as in Section 304-B where the court "shall
D presume" dowry death, when. the prosecution has
established the ingredients, under Section 113A of the
Evidence Act, discretion has been conferred upon the
Court wherein it has been provided that the Court may
presume abetment of suicide. Therefore the onus lies on
E the accused to rebut the presumption, and in case of
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act relatable to Section
3048 of IPC, the onus to prove shifts exclusively and
heavily on the accused. [Para 13] (1056-D-F]
Bansi/al vs. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359: 2011
F (1) SCR 724; Hemchand vs. State of Haryana AIR 1995 SC
120 1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 295; Gurbachan Singh vs. Satpal
Singh 1990 Cri. LJ 562 (SC) - relied on.
3. The circumstances from which the conclusion of
G guilt is to be drawn must or should be and not merely
"may be" fully established. The facts so established
should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt
of the accused, that is to say they should not be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that the
~H accused is guilty. The circumstances should be of
BHIM SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 1045
conclusive nature and tendency. They should exclude A
every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved
and, there must be a chain of evidence so complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have B
been done by the accused. Whenever there is a break in
the chain of circumstances, the accused is entitled to the
benefit of doubt. But in assessing the evidence,
imaginary possibilities have no prace. The Court
considers ordinary human probabilities. [Paras 15 and 16] c
[1058-C, E-H; 1059-A]
Gurpreet Singh vs. State of Haryana (2002) 8 SCC 18:
2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 337; Sharad Birdhichand Sardar vs.
State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116: 1985 (1) SCR 88 -
relied on. D
4. When facts are clear, it is immaterial whether
motive was proved. Absence of motive does not break
the link in the chain of circumstances connecting the
accused with the crime. Proof of motive or ill-will is
unnecessary to sustain conviction where there is clear E
evidence. [Para 14] [1057-F, G]
Mulakh Raj vs. Staish Kumar (1992) 3 SCC 43 - relied
on.
5. The plea of the accused that no demand for dowry F
was made before marriage is not sustainable. The
demand for dowry can be made at any time and not
necessarily before marriage. [Para 11]
State of Himacha/ Pradesh vs. Nikku Ram & Ors. (1995)
6 sec 219: 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 177 - relied on. G
6. The circumstantial evidence in the present case,
leads to the guilt of the accused persons, as the
prosecution has proved that the accused had the
opportunity to administer the poison and the doctors in
H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A the medical examination have also reported that the
deceased was a healthy woman who, along with her
family, was trying to reconcile matters with the accused
persons. There is no missing link in the circumstantial
evidence put forth by the prosecution, and hence the
B accused are not entitled to benefit of doubt. The fact that
the death occurred in the house of the accused persons,
leads to their guilt. They have not discharged the onus
of disproving the presumptions under Sections 113A and
1138. Thus, the question of suicide is ruled out. The
c Court is obliged to take the presumption raised under
Section 1138 of the Evidence Act. The guilt of the
accused persons i.e. the appellant Nos.1 & 2 u/s. 304-8
IPC has been successfully established. [Paras 13 and 18]
[1057-8-D; 1059-D]
D State of Maharashtra vs. Annappa Bandu Kavatage
(1979) 4 SCC 715: Kusuma Ankama Rao vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh, (2008) 13 SCC 256 - relied on.
Case Law Reference :
E 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 177 relied on Para 11
2003 (3) Suppl. SCR 1 relied on Para 12
2011 (1) SCR 724 relied on Para 13
1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 295 relied on Para 13
F 1990 Cri. LJ 562,571 (SC) relied on Para 13
1992 (2) SCR 484 relied on Para 14
2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 337 relied on Para 15
1985 (1) SCR 88 relied on Para 16
G
(1979) 4 sec 115 relied on Para 16
2008 (13) SCR 309 relied on Para 17
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
H · No. 2146 of 2009.
BHIM SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 1047
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.03.2009 of the A
High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Apepal No.
1706 of 2001.
Garvesh Kabra for the Appellants.
Ashutosh Kr. Sharma, Abhishek Atrey for the Respondent. B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J. 1. This appeal, by
special leave, has been filed against the judgment and order
dated 23.03.2009 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at
c
Nainital in Criminal Appeal No.1706 of 2001 whereby the High
Court while acquitting the two co-accused (appellant Nos.2 &
3 herein), upheld the conviction and sentence of appellant Nos.1
& 2 herein, as awarded by learned Special Judge (CBI)/
Additional Sessions Judge, Nainital, and dismissed their D
appeal. The learned Special Judge (CBl)/Additional Sessions
Judge, Nainital, by its judgment and order dated 25.04.2000
passed in Sessions Trial No.36 of 1998 convicted appellant
Nos.1 & 2 herein under Section 304-B of IPC and sentenced
them to imprisonment for life, and further convicted all the E
appellants under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced them to
rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.500/- to
each of them. All the appellants were also coovicted under
Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and
sentenced each of them to three months' simple imprisonment F
and fine.
2. The facts leading to this appeal are that one Bhim Singh
S/o of Govind Singh, resident of Village Naliana in District
Nainital got married to Prema Devi (deceased) on 4.5.1997. G
Appellants Nos.2 & 3, namely Aan Singh and Nain Singh are
brothers of Shim Singh and Appellant No.4, namely Janki Devi
is the wife of Aan Singh (appellant No.2 herein). Prema Devi
died unnatural death in her in-laws' house on 26.9.1997. Soon
after the death of Prema Devi, Pushpa Joshi, Village Pradhan J
H
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A of Jeolikot made a complaint telephonically to Sub-Divisional
Magistrate about the unnatural death of Prema Devi. Upon
receiving this information, the Magistrate along with Sub-
Inspector Shiv Singh Gusain (PW-7) reached the village and
took the dead body in their possession and an inquest report
B was prepared on the same day. Post-mortem examination of
the deceased was conducted on the same day at about 4.55
p.m. by Dr. D.K. Joshi (PW-5) and one Dr. H.C. Bhatt who
prepared the Autopsy Report. Post-mortem report reveals that
there were 90% burn injuries on the body of the deceased.
C Since the cause of death was not ascertained by the medical
officers, therefore, vicera was preserved for chemical
examination.
3. First Information Report was lodged on 27.9.1997 at
around 1830 Hrs., at Police Station Jyolikot, Police Station
D Tallital, District Nainital by one Sri. Birbal Singh Sambhal, inter
alia, stating that the marriage of his sister Smt. Prema Devi was
solemnized with Bhim Singh son of Govind Singh, in the month
of May, 1997 in Village Jyolikot, Nainital. The elder brother of
Bhim Singh, namely Aan Singh played the role of mediator in
E finalizing the marriage. Several items were given in the
aforesaid marriage. FIR states that Prema Devi, complainant's
sister, told him that when she went to the house of her in-laws
after marriage, her husband Bhim Singh, Aan Singh, Nain
Singh, all sons of Govind Singh and Smt. Janki Devi wife of
F Aan Singh, used to taunt and torture her by saying that she had
brought nothing in dowry. When she narrated these events to
her parents they persuaded Prema and told her to adjust with
her family and live with them cordially. Father of the complainant
however convinced Prema that he would himself talk to her in-
G laws and settle things. They went to the house of the in-laws of
Prema and tried their best to persuade them, but instead of
settling matters, they exhorted to taunting. Consequently, Prema
was advised to adjust herself to the situation. Thereafter when
she came to her parents' house on the occasion of Rakhi, she
H told them that Bhim Singh, Aan Singh, Nain Singh and Janki
SHIM SINGH v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND 1049
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
Devi are repeatedly taunting and torturing her. She further told A
that the elder brother, Aan Singh threatened to insult her before
the entire village and pressurised her for getting clothes and
other items from her parents' house. On 27.9.1997 the
complainant received information that his sister had died due
to burning. Upon receiving this information, they immediately s
went to the house of Prema's in-laws and they found her dead.
She was completely burnt. They were told that she had set
herself on fire.
4. Investigation was done by Simla Gunjyal, Deputy
Superintendent of Police (PW-6) and after the investigation was C
complete, charge-sheet against all the four accused persons
was filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the case was
committed to the Sessions Court for trial.
5. The Trial Court on finding that the prosecution has D
succeeded in proving the guilt of the appellants, convicted them
for offences under Section 498-A of IPC and sentenced them
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years each with a
fine of Rs.500/-, and in the event of default in payment of fine,
further simple imprisonment for fifteen days each. Accused E
8him Singh and Aan Singh (appellants Nos.1 & 2 herein) were
also held guilty of offence 304-8 of IPC and both of them were.
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. Appellants
were also convicted for the offences under Sections 3 & 4 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and sentenced to undergo F
three months' rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs.500/
-. In the event of default in payment of fine, they were to undergo
further simple imprisonment for fifteen days. However, all these
sentences were directed to run concurrently.
6. An appeal was preferred by the appellants under G
Section 374 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("Cr.P.C."
for short) against the judgment and order dated 25.04.2000
passed by the Special Judge (C.8.1)/ Additional Sessions
Judge, Nainital in Sessions Trial No.36 of 1998. After hearing
the counsel for the parties and perusing the Trial Court's record, H
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A the High Court relied, firstly on the finding by the team of two
doctors who after post-mortem examination prepared the
autopsy report. The said report disclosed that there were 90%
burns and all these burns were skin deep. As to the cause of
death, the two officers Dr. D.K. Joshi and Dr. H.C. Bhatt opined
B that the cause of death could not be ascertained, hence the
viscera was preserved. The viscera report on the Trial Court
record disclosed that pieces of stomach, intestine, liver, kidney
and spleen contained Organo Chloro Insecticide and Ethile
Alcohol poisons. The Autopsy report and chemical examiner's
c report with statement of Dr. D.K. Joshi clearly established the
fact that the deceased died an unnatural death. Secondly the
High Court also relied on the statements of Virbal Singh,
brother of the deceased (PW- 1), Maan Singh, father of the
deceased (PW-2) and Trilok Singh, uncle of the deceased (PW-
D 3) that the deceased got married to Bhim Singh on 07.05.1997
and died an unnatural death on 26.9.1997, within 5 months of
marriage. It also noted that the accused had themselves
admitted in their replies recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
that the marriage took place on the said date and Prema Devi
E died an unnatural death. The only question in dispute as framed
by the High Court was whether the deceased was subjected
to cruelty by the accused appellants before her death or not.
The High Court found that firstly the prosecution had sufficiently
shown as required under Section 304-8 IPC that the deceased
was subject to cruelty and harassment by 8him Singh and Aan
F Singh by relying on the statements made on oath by PW-1
Virbal Singh, PW-2 Maan Singh and PW-3 Trilok Singh where
they specifically stated that in the ceremony of Durgun, Aan
Singh complained that expenditure incurred by him in the
marriage had not been recovered. Their statements were
G corroborated by statement of Trilok Singh. Relying on Section
113-8 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 read with prosecution
evidence, the High Court opined that the prosecution had
successfully proved charge of offence punishable under Section
498-A and 304-8 of l.P.C. and one punishable under Sections
H 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 against Shim S1ngh and ·
BHIM SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 1051
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
Aan Singh. Secondly on the point of proving proximity between A
the taunts and death of the deceased, the High Court decided
that five months was proximate enough and that presumption
under Section 1138 was proved beyond doubt to prove charge.
Thirdly, the fact of living separately by showing ration cards
was immaterial. On being urged by the accused that the charge B
framed by Trial Court is defective and alternative charge could
not have been framed in the manner it is done by Trial Court,
the Court found that 1there was no error in stating the offence
nor in particulars stated in the charge, nor any failure of justice
as is shown by the appellants. Relying on Sections 221 and c
Section 464 of Cr.P.C. the High Court opined that there was
no error in the charge nor there was any failure of justice. On
going through the entire evidence on record the High Court
found that though the names of Nain Singh and Janki Devi are
mentioned with Bhim Singh and Aan Singh, no specific role in D
harassing the deceased is stated against them and as such
the possibility of implication of their names, on suspicion, cannot
be ruled out. Even in respect of charge of offence punishable
under Section 498-A and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961, charge against Nain Singh and Janki Devi had not E
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. But as far as conviction
recorded by the Trial Court in respect of Bhim Singh and Aan
Singh is concerned, the Trial Court had committed no error in
law in convicting and sentencing them under Section 498-A
l.P.C., 304-B 1.P.C., and one under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry
prohibition Act, 1961 as the charge against them was proved F
on the record beyond all reasonable doubt.
7. The High Court in the present matter convicted appellant
Nos.1 & 2, on the basis of circumstantial evidence in the
impugned judgment. It has been established in leading judicial G
precedents that where the prosecution case is based on
circumstantial evidence, only the circumstantial evidence of the
highest order can satisfy the test of proof in a criminal
prosecution. To base a conviction on circumstantial evidence
put forth by the prosecution should establish a complete and H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A unbroken chain of events so that only one inference could be
drawn out from the same and if more than one inference could
be drawn, then the accused should be E.ntitled to the benefit of
doubt.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the State of
8
Uttarakhand contended that PW-1 Birbal Singh had
categorically stated on oath that marriage of his sister Smt.
Prema Devi was solemnized on 7.5.1997 with Bhim Singh.
Elder brother of Bhim Singh, Aan Singh, played role of mediator
C in finalizing the marriage. Loan was taken for marriage.
However no demand for dowry was made. But his sister had
complained twice that his family was taunting her and
demanding dowry. This statement given by PW-1 is fully
corroborated by the father of the deceased also. Prosecution
counsel also examined PW-3 Trilok Singh the uncle, who said
D that Bhim Singh and Aan Singh talked about dowry before him
and thereupon he expressed his displeasure. The learned
counsel also argued that she died after 4 months and some
days of her marriage in an unnatural way. Further, it is argued
that since there was no mode of transport in the village at night,
E they could not go to the house of Prema Devi's in-laws on
26.9.1997 and next day when they reached by walking on foot
for about 15 km, they came to know that the dead body had
been sent to Nainital for post-mortem. Apart from the above
witnesses, Smt. Pushpa Joshi, the Gram Pradhan of the Village
F was produced as PW-4. She stated that the elder-brother Aan
Singh came to her and told her that Prema Devi had set herself
on fire and thereafter she along with her neighbor, went to their
house and saw Prema Devi lying there badly burnt. PW-4
informed Darogaji Gusai Singh about the incident. The learned
G counsel further stated that PW-5 Dr. D.K. Joshi examined the
dead body on 26.9.1997 and in external examination found
90% burn injuries on the body. The deceased had died 6-8
hours prior to examination. Since no cause of death was visible
from external examination, therefore, viscera of the deceased
H was preserved for internal examination. Post-mortem report
SHIM SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
1053
was prepared by Dr. H.C. Bhatt in which it was stated that he
....
A
was of the opinion that the deceased was given some toxic
substance before her death due to which she died and later
on she was burnt. Because no external reason of death was
found, the viscera was sent to the State Laboratory for chemical
examination and it was found that toxic material was present B
in the viscera. The counsel for the State, thus, submitted that
the accused tried to kill Smt. Prema Devi by giving poisonous
substance after torturing her for dowry and when they became
apprehensive whether she had died or not, they set her on fire
to confirm her death. Thereafter, they informed the Gram c
Pradhan of the Village that Prema Devi had died due to
burning so that the deceased is not able to give her dying
declaration.
9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellants
submitted that PW-1 Birbal has admitted in his statement that D
no demand for dowry was made by accused before the
marriage and if at all they wanted dowry, they would demand it
before marriage itself. None of them were in a position to
demand and give dowry. Birbal admitted in his statement that
the marriage was settled voluntarily by Birbal and his father on E
their own accord. He stated that "marriage of his sister was
settled by his father and his marriage was solemnized with the
consent of both me and my father. My sister came back to our
house after some days of marriage. But I cannot tell after how
many days she came back. Because I was in Haldwani that F
time." Further, it was urged that PW-1 and PW-2 have admitted
that no reports were lodged by them prior to death of Prema,
with respect to torture on demand of dowry. The Counsel further
said that, the conduct of the accused was of great importance,
as the information of the death was given by Aan Singh himself G
to the Gram Pradhan of the Village. If they had killed her, they
would not have informed her family members and instead would
have cremated her immediately after her death. Counsel urged
that, it appears that the deceased herself committed suicide,
by first consuming poisonous substance and thereafter she H
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
,,JI/la
A thought she might not die due to its consumption, theref:>re she
burnt herself. Learned Counsel further argued that Shim Singh,
husband of the deceased has two brothers. Aan Singh, elder
brother of Shim Singh is a Chowkidar in P.W.D. and living
separately with his wife. Shim Singh was a vehicle driver and
s his younger brother Nain Singh was running a shop. Thus, there
was no correlation of Aan Singh, Nain Singh and Janki Devi
with Shim Singh. All three were doing their separate
avocations. The voter lists and ration cards of all the three
•
brothers, which are on record, are separate. Thus, it is not
c proved that all three brothers were involved in the offence. On
the other hand, they have helped the police in this case by
informing them.
10. Thus, the present appeal requires an evaluation and
analysis of the circumstantial evidence on record and the
D statements made in the course of investigation and produced
against the accused appellants.
11. The first ground of defense taken by the appellants in
this appeal is that there is no specific incident of abuse or
E torture for dowry and no prior report of dowry demand was filed
by the family of the deceased. It is also stated that there was
no demand of dowry made by them before marriage as is
evident from the statements of PW-1 Sirbal Singh and PW-2
Man Singh. However, as held by this Court in the State of
F Himachal Pradesh v. Nikku Ram & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 219,
the demand for dowry can be made at any time, and not
necessarily before marriage. The demand can be made on
three occasions; before marriage, at the time of marriage and
after marriage. The relevant extract of the said judgment is
G reproduced hereunder:
"Dowry, dowry and dowry. This is the painful repetition
which confronts, and at times haunts, many parents of a
girl child in this holy land of ours where, in good old days
the belief was: "Yatra Naryastu Pujyante ramente tetra
H dewatah" (where woman is worshipped, there is abode of
BHIM SINGH v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND 1055
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
God). We have mentioned about dowry thrice, because this A
demand is made on three occasions: (i) before marriage;
(ii) at the time of marriage; and (iii) after the marriage.
Greed being limitless, the demands become insatiable in
many cases, followed by torture on the girl, leading to either
suicide in some cases or murder in some." B
12. The accused have taken the defense that the PWs.
have also stated in their statements that no demand for dowry
was made before marriage and that the marriage was
. concluded by the consent of the two parties. They also took the C
defense that no prior police complaint of dowry demand was
made by the family of the deceased. However, in light of the
decision of this Court in State of Himacha/ Pradesh v. Nikku
Ram & Ors. (supra) and the social evil of dowry that is prevalent
in the Indian society, this defense does not hold water. The
demand for dowry can be made at any time and not necessarily D
before marriage. The appellants have also taken the plea that
no specific incidents of abuse or torture were there. But in the
present case, PW-3 Trilok Singh has categorically stated in his
statement that the accused Aan Singh had come in the
ceremony of durgud, which is celebrated after marriage in E
which he had stated in the presence of all the persons that he
had not recovered the money he had spent in the marriage and
became angry. The PWs. have also stated that, the deceased,
Smt. Prema Devi had also complained to her family members
twice, regarding taunts and demand for dowry by the four F
accused persons. These incidents occurred "soon before her
death" as she died within 5 months of her marriage. This raises
a presumption, under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, as
to dowry death punishable under Section 304-8 of l.P.C. A
conjoint reading of Section 1138 of the Evidence Act and G
Section 304-8 of l.P.C. shows that there must be material to
show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to
cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the
possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within
the purview of "death occurring otherwise than in normal H
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A circumstances". The prosecution is obliged to show that soon
before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment for or
in connection with the demand for dowry. In other words, only
when the prosecution proves that soon before her death, the
lady was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection
B with any demand for dowry as laid down by this Court in
Kaliyaperumal and Anr. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2004) 9
SCC 157. The prosecution has proved by producing cogent
evidence that soon before her death the lady was subjected to
cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for dowry.
c Thus, it becomes obligatory for the Court to raise a presumption
that the death is a dowry death.
13. It is the case of the defense that the deceased would
have tried to commit suicide by consuming poison and when
she was apprehensive whether she would die or not, she set
D fire to herself. Assuming, without conceding, that Smt. Prema
had committed suicide, then under Section 113A of the Indian
evidence Act, onus is shifted on the accused to dislodge the
presumption of having committed abetment of suicide by a
married woman. Unlike as in Section 304-8 where the court
E "shall presume" dowry death, when the prosecution has
established the ingredients, under Section 113A of the
Evidence Act, discretion has been conferred upon the Court
wherein it has been provided that the Court may presume
abetment of suicide. Therefore the onus lies on the accused
F to rebut the presumption, and in case of Section 113-8 of the
Evidence Act relatable to Section 3048 of IPC, the onus to
prove shifts exclusively and heavily on the accused as held in
Bansi/al v. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359. Thus, where
the death of the wife was concurrently found to be unnatural,
G viz., by strangulation, and there was demand for dowry and also
cruelty on the part of the husband the presumption under
Section 1138 has been rightly drawn, as held in Hemchand v.
State of Haryana AIR 1995 SC 120, 121. Even then the
presumption against the accused persons as in Section 113A
H of the Evidence Act is rightly presumed as if we assume that
SHIM SINGH v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND 1057
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
she committed suicide, as the circumstantial evidence shows A
that she might be compelled to take the extreme steps as the
alleged suicide was committed within 7 years of marriage, as
held in Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh 1990 Cri. LJ 562,571
(SC). The circumstantial evidence leads to the guilt of the
accused persons, as the prosecution has proved that the B
accused had the opportunity to administer the poison and the
doctors in the medical examination have also reported that the
deceased was a healthy woman who, along with her family, was
trying to reconcile matters with the accused persons. The fact
that the death occurred in the house of the accused persons, c
leads to their guilt. They have not discharged the onus of
disproving the presumptions under Sections 113A and 1138.
Thus, the question of suicide is ruled out. The Court in this case
is obliged to take the presumption raised under Section 1138
of the Evidence Act. D
14. The accused persons have taken the defense that they
themselves had informed the Gram Panchayat after she had
died upon which the Gram Pradhan along with other persons
went to the accused persons house, where they found the dead
body ofSmt. Prema. A prudent man, trying to save a person E
from dying would have taken the deceased person to the
nearest hospital, and would not have waited for her to die. The
argument put forward by the learned counsel for the accused
that the deceased first consumed poison and then on being
apprehensive of her death, she set herself on fire, is further F
proved wrong, as any reasonable man would try to save his wife
if such a situation arise. When facts are clear, it is immaterial
whether motive was proved. Absence of motive does not break
the link in the chain of circumstances connecting the accused
with the crime as held by this Court in Mulakh Raj v. Staish G
=
Kumar, (1992) 3 SCC 43 AIR 1992 SC 1175. Further, proof
of motive or ill-will is unnecessary to sustain conviction where
there is clear evidence.
15. In the present case, the guilt or innocence of the
H
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A accused has to be adduced from the circumstantial evidence.
The law regarding circumstantial evidence is more or less well
settled. This Court in a plethora of judgments has held that when
the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence solely, then
there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances. If
B there is a snap in the chain, the accused is entitled to benefit
of doubt. Gurpreet Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) 8 SCC
18 is one of such cases. On the question of any reasonable
hypothesis, this Court has held that if some of the
circumstances in the chain can be explained by any other
C reasonable hypothesis, then the accused is entitled to benefit
of doubt. But in assessing the evidence, imaginary possibilities
have no place. The Court considers ordinary human
probabilities.
16. On circumstantial evidence, this Court has laid down
0
the following principles in Sharad Birdhichand Sardar v. State
of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116:
(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn must or should be and not merely "may be" fully
E estab.lished.
(2) The facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say they
should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that
F the accused is guilty.
(3) The circumstances should be of conclusive nature and
. tendency.
(4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except
G the one to be proved and,
(5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not
to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all
H human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
SHIM SINGH v. STATE OF UTIARAKHAND 1059
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
Whenever there is a break in the chain of circumstances, A
the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt; State of
Maharashtra v. Annappa Bandu Kavatage (1979) 4 SCC 715.
17. Following the decision in Sharad Birdhichand (supra),
this Court in the case of Liyakat v. State of Uttaranchal, (2008) B
16 sec 148, and in the case of Kusuma Ankama Rao v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 13 SCC 256, upheld the
conviction as awarded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the
High Court.
18. Thus, in light of the above, there is no missing link in C
the circumstantial evidence put forth by the prosecution, and
hence the accused are not entitled to benefit of doubt. The guilt
of the accused persons i.e. the appellant Nos.1 & 2 herein,
under Section 304-8 IPC has been successfully established.
We, therefore, find no infirmity in the impugned judgment D
passed by the High Court. This appeal is accordingly
dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal Dismissed.
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