Holding

An unexplained delay of 22 years is a sufficient ground to refuse reinstatement, and the petitioner’s claim of discrimination under Article 14 cannot override the doctrine of laches.

Summary

In 1967 a large number of Delhi police constables, including the petitioner Bhoop Singh, were terminated for participating in a mass agitation. While many of those dismissed were later reinstated after filing writ petitions in the 1970s, Bhoop Singh waited 22 years before filing a petition before the Central Administrative Tribunal in 1989 seeking reinstatement. The Tribunal rejected his claim on the ground of inordinate, unexplained delay. The Supreme Court, hearing a Special Leave Petition, held that a government servant must approach the court within a reasonable period; an unexplained delay of 22 years constitutes a ground of laches and precludes relief, and the petitioner’s discrimination claim under Article 14 is untenable. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that equity and administrative efficiency outweigh the petitioner’s claim. The relief under Article 136 was also denied.

Issues considered

Whether a delay of 22 years in filing a claim for reinstatement bars relief under the principles of laches.
Whether the petitioner can claim discrimination under Article 14 by comparing his case with earlier reinstated constables.
Whether the earlier reinstatements create a legal obligation to reinstate the petitioner despite the delay.
Whether the Supreme Court can intervene in the Central Administrative Tribunal’s order in view of the delay.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 136, s. 14, s. 311

Subjects

Article 14DiscriminationLachesDelayReinstatementPolice constableService terminationCentral Administrative TribunalSpecial Leave Petition

Judgment

BHOOP SINGH A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

APRIL 29, 1992

[LAUT MOHAN SHARMA, J.S. VERMA AND A.S. ANAND, JJ.) B

Constitution of India, 1950:-

Articles 14 and 311-Police agitation-Services of several police
constables tenninated-Many constables filed writ petitions and were
reinstated-Petitioner one such dismissed constable-Challenged his ter-
c
mination order after 22 years-No explanation offered for delay-Not
entitled to relief merely because others have been reinstated-Refusal of
relief-Held not discriminatory-Relief of reinstatement-To be granteq to
one who is diligent.
D
A large number of police constables participated in a mass agitation
on April 14, 1967. The services of the agitating police constables were
terminated on that account without specifying that reason for the termina-.
tion. Apart from termination, many of these police constables were also
prosecuted. As a result of the demand by some Members of Parliament, E
many of the dismissed constables were taken back in service as tresh
entrants and the Home Minister also directed withdrawal of the prosecu-
tion against them.

Some of these dismissed constables who were not taken back in
service even as fresh entrants filed writ petitions in the High Court in 1969 F
and 1970 which were allowed by the High Court on October 1, 1975,
quashing the orders of their termination. Subsequently, some other con-
stables whose services were similarly terminated also filed writ petitions
in the High Court in 1978, which too were allowed, rejecting the objection
raised on the ground of delay and laches.
G
Another set of similarly dismissed constables then filed writ peti-
tio~s in the High Court challenging the termination of their services
contending that their claim was identical with that·oftbe petitioners in the
writ petitions filed in 1978. These petitions were.trJtnsferred to the Central
Administrative Tribunal which held that they were entitled to the same H
969
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992]. 2 S.C.R.

A relief as was granted in the writ petitions filed in the High Court in 1978.
Appeals to this Court by the Delhi Administration against this decision ~
were dismissed.

Lt. Governor of Delhi and others v. Dharampal and others, (1990] 4
sec 13.
B
The petitioner in the Special Leave Petition claimed to be a
similarly dismissed police constable and filed a petition . before the
Central Administrative Tribunal for re-instatement in service and con-
sequential benefits on the ground that his case and claim was similar
C to that of the police constables who had succeeded in the earlier rounds
of litigation.

The Tribunal rejected the application on the ground that it was
highly belated and there was no cogent explanation for the inordinate delay ..(,
of 22 years in filing the application on 13th March, 1989 after termination
D of the service in 1967.

In the appeal to this Court, it was contended that the petitioner was
~ntitled to the relief of reinstatement like the others dismissed with him
and then reinstated and the question of delay or laches does not arise, and
that the Delhi Administration was dutybound to reinstate him along with
E
others and in not doing so, it has discriminated him.

Dismissing the special leave petition, this Court,

HELD : 1. It is expected of a Government servant who has a
F legitimate claim to approach the Court for the relief he seeks within a
reasonable period, assuming no fixed period of limitation applies. This is
necessary to avoid dislocating the administrative set-up after it has been
functioning on a certain basis for years. During the interregnum those who
have been working gain more experience and acquire rights which cannot
be defeated casually by lateral entry of a person at a higher point without
G the benefit of actual experience during the period of his absence when he
chose to remain silent for years before making the claim. Apart from the
consequential benefits of reinstatement without. actually working, the im-
pact on the administrative set-up and on other employees is a strong
reason to decline consideration of a stale claim unless the delay is satis-
H factorily explained and is not attributable to the claimant. This is a
BHOOP SINGH v. U.0.1. 971

material fact to be given due weight while considering the argument of A
....... discrimination for deciding whether the petitioner is in the same class as
those who challenged their dismissal several years earlier and were conse-
quently granlt'd the relief of reinstatement. [974 G-975 BJ

In the instant case, the petitioner was appointed in 1964 and his
service terminated after about three years in 1967. It is in 1989, after a B
>- lapse of about 22 years from the date of termination or his service that the
petitioner chose to assail his dismissal, notwithstanding the fact that some
of the dismissed ~onstables challenged their dismissal as early as in 1969

---t
and 1970, within a period of two ,to three years and others too did so after
the success of the first batch in getting reinstated. N_o attempt has been
made by the petitioner to explain why he chose to be silent so long if he
too was interested in being reinstated and had not abandoned bis claim,
c
)v if any. (974 D, E]

2. The lapse of such a long unexplained period of several years in
the case of the petitioner is a strong reason to not classify him with the D
other dismissed constables who approached the Court earlier and got
reinstatement. It was clear to the petitioner latest in 1978 when the second
batch of petitions were filed that the petitioner also will have to file a
petition for getting reinstatement. Even then he chose to wait till 1989,
Dhamipa/'s case also being decided in 1987. The argument of discrimina- E
tion is, therefore, not available to the petitioner. [975 C, DJ
-t
3. Inordinate and unexplained delay or lapses is by itself a ground
to refuse relief to the petitioner irrespective of the merits of his claim. If
.,_. a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby
gives rise to a reasonable belief in the minds of others that he is not F
interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on
that belief. It is more so in service matters where vacancies are required
.l,.,--<_ - to be filled promptly. (975 EJ

4. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his
G
service after a period of 22 years, without any cogent explanation for the
inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been
reinstated as a result or their earlier petitions being allowed. (975 F]

,.__ S. Article 14 or the principle of non-discrimination is an equitable
principle and, therefore, any relief claimed on that basis must itself be H
972 SUPREME' COURT !USP.ORTS (1992) 2 S.C.R.

A founded on equity and not be alien to that concept. (975 G]
In the instant case, grant of the relief to the petitioner would be
inequitable instead of its refusal being discriminatory as asserted on
behalf_ of the petitioner. {975 H-976 A]:

B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 1485 of 199i

From the Order and Judgment dated 30.9.1991 of the Central Ad-
ministrative Tribunal, Delhi in R.A. N'o. 162 of 1991 in 0.A. No. 753 of
1989.
c
Govind Mukhoty, A.P. Singh and K.N. Rai for the Petitioner.

The Judgement of the Court was delivered by

D VERMA, J. The petitioner was appointed a constable in the Delhi
Armed Police in 1964. A' large number of police constables participated in
a mass agitation on April 14, 1967. The services of the agitating police
constables were terminated on that account without specifying that reason
for the. termination. The petitioner claims that his service was similarly
E terminated on 3.8.1967 due to his participati~n in the agitation with other
police constables. Apart from terminating their services, many of those
police constables were also prosecuted. It appears that as a result of the
demand by some Members of Parliament, many of the dismissed c0nstables
were taken back in service as fresh entrants and the Home Minister also
directed withdrawal of prosecution against them. Some of the dismissed
F constables who were not taken back in service even as fresh entrants filed
writ.petitions in the Delhi High Court in 1969 and 1.970 which were allowed
by the High Court on October 1, 1975 quashing the orders of termination
of those. petitioners. Subsequently, some other constables whose servi~es
were similarly terminated also filed writ petitions in the Delhi High Court
G in 1978 which too were allowed rejecting the objection raised on the ground
·of delay and laches. Another set of similarly dismissed constables then filed
writ petitions in the Delhi High Court challenging the termination of their
~ervices contending that their claim was identical with that of the
petitioners in the writ petitions filed in 1978. These writ petitions were
H transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal which held that the
BHOOP SINGH v. U.0.I. (VERMA, J.) 973

petitioners therein were entitled to the same relief as was granted to the A
~ petitioners in the writ petitions filed in the High Court in 1978. The Delhi
Administration preferred appeals in this Court against that decision. Those
appeals _were dismissed by the judgment in Lt. Governor of Delhi and others
v. Dharampal and others, [1990] 4 SCC 13.
B
.)... Petitioner, Bhoop Singh, claiming to be a similarly dismissed police
constable filed 0.A. No. 753 of 1989 in the Central Administrative Tribunal
praying for reinstatement in service and ail consequential benefits on the
ground that his case and claim is similar to that of the police constables
....... who had succeeded in the earlier rounds of litigation. The Tribunal has
rejected the petitioner's application on the ground that it is highly belated c
'f and there is no cogent explanation for the inordinate delay of twenty-two
,..,.. ; years in filing the application on 13.3.1989 after termination of the
petitioner's service in 1%7.

Shri Gobinda Mukhoty, learned counsel for the petitioner strenuous- D
ly urged that the petitioner is entitled to the relief of reinstatement like the
others dismi~sed with him and then reinstated and the question of delay or
laches does not arise. Learned counsel contended that the Delhi Ad:
ministration was duty bound to reinstate the petitioner also with the others
and in not doing so, it has discriminated the petitioner. On this basis, it E
was urged, the question of laches or delay does not arise. Shri Mukhoty
-1' places strong reliance on the decision in Dlzarampal (supra) to support
his submission.
_. The real question is : whether, the mere fact that termination of
petitioner's service as a police constable in 1967 is alleged to-be similar to
F
that of the other police constables so dismissed in 1967 and then reinstated
in the above manner is sufficient to grant him the relief of reinstatement
~·< ignoring the fact that he made the claim after the lapse of twenty-two years
in 1989? It has, therefore, ·to be seen whether this fact alone is sufficient
to classify the petitioner with the earlier reinstated police constables for G
granting the relief of reinstatement claimed in 1989 when those reinstated
had made their claim several years earlier .

..!~~
• ~. In Dharampal (supra) there is no consideration or discussion of this
question and in that case this Court had refused to interfere with the relief H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 2 S.C.R.

A granted by the Tribunal. The question here is of interfering with the
)...
Tribunal's order since the Tribunal has refused relief on this gr011nd.
Unless it can be held that delay of several years in claiming the relief of
reinstatement must be ignored simply because some other similarly dis-
missed had been reinstated as a result of their success in the petitions filed
B many years earlier, the Tribunal's order cannot be reversed in the present
case. Dharampal is of no assistance for this purpose. Whether, the delay ...(
in making the claim has been explained satisfactorily to negative the
objection of laches is a question of fact in each case. In Dltarampal the
Tribunal had apparently been satisfied with the explanation for the delay
and this Court declined interference with the Tribunal's view. In the
c present case, there has been a much longer delay and the Tribunal has
~

't
stated that the same has not been explained. Dharampal does not, there-
fore, help the petitioner to circumvent this obstacle.
~
\he petitioner was appointed in 1964 and his service terminated after
D about three years in 1967. It is in 1989 after a lapse of about twenty-two
years from the date of termination of his service that the petitioner chose
to assail his dismissal, notwithstanding the fact that some of the dismissed
constables challenged their dismissal as early as 1%9 and 1970, within a
period of two to three years, and others too did so soon after the success
E of the first batch in getting reinstated. No attempt has been made by the
petitioner to explain why he chose to be silent for so long, if he too was
interested in being reinstated and had not abandoned his claim, if any. If t-
the petitioner's contention is upheld that lapse of any length of time is of

F
no consequence in the present case, it would mean that any such police
constable can choose to wait even till he attains the age of superannuation
and then assail the termination of his service and claim monetary benefits
for the entire period on the same ground. That would .be a startling
-
proposition. In our opinion, this cannot be the true import of Article 14 or
the requirement of the prinicple. of non-discrimination embodied therein, -~ /-
which is the foundation of petitioner's case.
G
It is expected of a government servant who has a legitimate 'claim to
approach the Court for the relief he seeks within a reasonable period,
assuming no fixed period of limitation applies. This is necessary to avoid
dislocating the administrative set•up after it has been functioning on a ~
.
H certain basis for years. During the interregnum those who have been
BHOOP SINGH v. U.0.1. [VERMA, J.] 975

working gain more experience and acquire rights which cannot be defeated A
casually by lateral entry of a person at a .higher point without the benefit
of actual experience during the period of his absence when he chose to
remain silent for years before making the claim. Apart from the consequen-
tial benefits of reinstatement without actually working, the impact on the
administrative set-up and on other employees is a strong reason to decline B
consideration of a stale claim unless the delay is satisfactorily explained
and is not attributable to the claimant. This is a material fact to be given
due weight while considering the argument of discrimination in the present

..... case for deciding whether the petitioner iS in the same Class as those who
challenged their dismissal several years earlier and were consequently
granted the relief of reinstatement. In our opinion, the lapse of a much
C

longer unexplained period of several years in the case of the petitioner is
a strong reason to not classify him with the other dismissed constables who
">- approached the Court earlier and got reinstatement. It was clear to the
petitioner latest in 1978 when the second batch of petitions were filed that
the petitioner also will have lo file a petition for getting reinstatement. Even D
then he chose to wait till l989, Dharampal's case also being decided in
1987. The argument of discrimination is, therefore, not available to the
petitioner.

There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained E
delay or· laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner,
irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses
to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the

-- mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are
then justified in acting on that belief. This is more so in service matters
where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be
permitted to challenge the termination of bis service after a period of
F

twenty-two years, wiihout any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay,
merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result
of their earlier petitions being allowed. Accepting the petitioner's conten-
tion would upset the entire service jurisprudence and we are unable to G
construe Dharampal in the manner suggested by the petit~oner. Article 14
or the principle of non-discrimination is an equitable principle and, there-
fore, any relief claimed on that basis must itself be founded on-equity and
not be alien to that concept. In our opinion, grant ot the relief to the
H
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 2 S.C.R.

A petitioner, in the present case, would be inequitable in~ead of its refusal )....
being discriminatory as asserted by learned counsel for the petitioner. We
are further of the· view that these circumstancei. also justify refusal of the
relief claimed under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Special Leave Petition is dismissed.

N.V.K. Petition dismissed. ~