BIPIN KUMAR MONDALversusSTATE OF WEST BENGAL

                       [2010] 8 S.C.R. 1036


A                     BIPIN KUMAR MONDAL
                                  V.
                    STATE OF WEST BENGAL
                (Criminal Appeal No.1247 of 2008)
                           JULY 26, 2010
B
        [P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

       Penal Code, 1860: ss.302, 323 - Murder - Appellant
  stabbing his wife and son to death - PW-1, the other son while
C trying to intervene also sustaining injuries - Conviction ul
  ss. 302 and 323 - Challenged - Held: There was nothing to
  show that PW-1 had any reason to rope his father into such
  gruesome murder - Evidence of PW-1 was natural, probable
  and convincing - The other witnesses who were close relatives
D and neighbours and reached the spot after hearing the shouts
  of PW-1, also supported the prosecution case - Ocular
  evidence was duly supported by post mortem report - Courts
  below were right in ordering conviction based on the testimony
  of a single witness since the evidence was cogent and
E credible - Absence of motive would not dislodge the
  prosecution case as there was direct evidence of a trustworthy
  witness regarding the commission of crime - Evidence Act,
  1872 - s. 134 - Witness - Sole witness.

        Criminal law: Motive - Held: Becomes totally irrelevant
F when there is direct evidence of a trustworthy witness regarding
    commission of the crime - Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302 and
    323.

       The prosecution case was that PW-1 lodged an
G Ejahar stating that his father (appellant) came to their
  house on the fateful night and attacked his mother and
  the younger brother with a knife. When PW-1 tried to save
  his mother, he was also attacked and he received injuries


H                               1036
    BIPIN KUMAR MON DAL v. STATE OF WEST                1037
                  BENGAL

on his head and hands. The appellant ran away. Both             A
the victims died on the spot. The neighbours reached the
place of incident on hearing the shouts of PW-1. The trial
court held that prosecution was able to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt and convicted the appellant
under Section 302 and Section 323 IPC. The High Court           B
affirmed the order of conviction. The order of conviction
was challenged in the instant appeal.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1. The Ejahar lodged by PW-1 giving full           C
details of the commission of the offence and naming his
father as the person who committed the offences was
written by PW-10. On scrutiny of the evidence of PW-10,
it became evident that he was an independent witness
residing in another village and could not have any              0
grudge to support the case of the prosecution by
deposing falsely. [Para 11] [1044-G-H; 1045-A]

     1.2. The conduct of PW-1 remained very natural,
probable and convincing. No reason came forward in his          E
cross-examination as to why he would depose against
his father. There was no suggestion by PW-1 that he was
not sure as to who had committed the offence, as in his
cross-examination, he denied such suggestion stating
that it was not a fact that he told the name of the assailant
                                                                F
as his father by suspicion. The other witnesses who
were close relatives and neighbours of the appellant
supported the prosecution case. PW-2 deposed that he
reached the place of occurrence at about mid-night when
PW-1 shouted and on enquiry from PW-1, he learnt that
his mother and brother were murdered by his father with         G
a sharp cutting knife. PW-1 was also injured on ·his head
and hands. PW-3, PW-4, PW-6, PW~7 and PW-8 al_so
deposed to the same effect. All these witnesses were
cross-examined but there was nothing to show that any
                                                                H
    1038   SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A part of their depositions could be doubted. There was
  nothing on record to show that there could be any
  reason for PW-1, a son, to falsely implicate and rope his
  father into such a gruesome murder or the other
  witnesses, who had been so close relatives and
B neighbours of the appellant, would support the
  prosecution case. The defence did not even make a
  suggestion to PW-1, that he was not injured by the
  appellant with a knife. The evidence of PW-1, therefore,
  cannot be ignored. However, as the prosecution failed to
c produce any evidence to the effect that PW-1 remained
  admitted in public health centre, that part of the evidence
  was ignored by the trial court as well as by the High Court.
  The witnesses were natural and most probable and their
  presence at the place of occurrence immediately after the
  commission of crime was expected, being close relatives
0
  and neighbours. No reason could be given as to why
  such close relations of the appellant would depose
  against him. [Paras 11, 16, 17] [1045-A-F; 1047-B-G]

       1.3. The ocular evidence given by PW-1, was duly
E supported by the post mortem report and by the doctor
  PW-5 who had explained that several stab injuries were
  caused in the chest, neck and heart of the deceased wife
  of appellant. He proved the post mortem report and
  opined that the cardio-respiratory failure due to shock
F and haemorrhage due to injuries, had been the cause of
  death. He also opined that the injuries were caused by
  sharp cutting weapon. Same was the situation as regards
  the injuries on the body of the son of the appellant. [Para
  14] [1046-E-G]
G
      1.4. PW-9 was the Investigating Officer at a later stage
  when the first Investigating Officer was transferred and
  he deposed to the effect that he submitted the charge
  sheet against the accused under Sections 302/324 IPC on
H 13.4.2000 showing the appellant as absconder. The
    BIPIN KUMAR MONO.AL v. STATE OF WEST                1039
                  BENGAL

appellant was given opportunity to cross"examine the A
said 1.0.; but the opportunity was not availed. In fact, he
was the best person to explain as to why there could not
be any recovery of the weapon used in the crime. [Para ·
13] (1046-C-D]
                                                                B
     2. Undoubtedly, there was nothing on record to show
as what could be ttie motive behind the murder of the
wife and son by the appellant. However, the issue -of·
motive becomes totally irrelevant when there is direct
evidence of a trustworthy witness regarding the C
commission of the crime. In such a case, particularly
when a son and other closely related persons deposed
against the appellant, the proof of motive by direct
evidence would lose its relevance. In the instant case, the
ocular evidence was supported by the medical evidence.
In a case relating to circumstantial evidence, motive does D
assume great importance, but to say that the absence of
motive would dislodge the entire prosecution story is
giving this one factor an importance which is not due.
Motive is in the mind of the accused and can seldom be
fathomed with any degree of accuracy. [Paras 17, 20] E
(1047-C-F; 1048-G]

    3. Abscondance by a person against whom FIR has
been lodged, having an apprehension of being
apprehended by the police, cannot be said to be                 F
unnatural. Thus, mere absconding by the appellant after
commission of the crime and remaining untraceable for
such a long time itself cannot establish his guilt. [Para 22]
(1050-C-E]
    Shivji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC G
55; Hari· Shankar v. State of UP. (1996) 9 SCC 40; Bikau.
Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar (2003) 12 SCC 616; Abu
Thakir & Ors. v. State otTamil Nadu (2010) 5 SCC 91; Ujagar
Singh v. State of Punjab (2007) 13 SCC 90; State of UP. v.
Kishanpal & Ors. (2008) 16 SCC 73; Matru@ Girish Chandra H
    1040    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2010) 8 S.C.R.


A   v. The State of UP. AIR 1971 SC 1050; Rahman v. State of
    UP. AIR 1972 SC 110; State of M.P v. Pa/tan Mal/ah & Ors.
    AIR 2005 SC 733, relied on.

       4. There is no legal impediment in convicting a
  person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is
8
  the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if
  there are doubts about the testimony, the courts will
  insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number, the
  quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-
C honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed
  and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a
  ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or
  otherwise. [Para 25] [1051-A-C]

      Sunil Kumar v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2003) 11
D SCC 367; Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 14 SCC
  150; Kunju @ Ba/achandran v. State of Tami Nadu AIR 2008
  SC 1381; Jagdish Prasad v. State of M.P. AIR 1994 SC
  1251; Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614,
    relied on.
E
                       Case Law Reference:
        AIR 1973 SC 55            relied on          Para 18
        (1996) 9 sec 40           relied on          Para 19
F       (2003) 12 sec 616         relied on          Para 19
        (201 o) 5 sec 91          relied on          Para 19
        (2001) 13 sec 90          relied on          Para 20
        (2008) 16 sec 73          relied on          Para 21
G
        AIR 1971 SC 1050          relied on          Para 22
        AIR 1972 SC 110           relied on          Para 22
        AIR 2005 SC 733           relied on          Para 22
H
     BIPIN KUMAR MONDAL v. STATE OF WEST                  1041
                   BENGAL

    (2003) 11 sec 367            relied on            Para 25      A
    (2001) 14 sec 150            relied on            Para 26

    AIR 2008 SC 1381             relied on            Para 27
    AIR 1994 SC 1251             relied on            Para 27      B
    AIR 1957 SC 614              relied on            Para 27

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1247 of 2008.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 13.7.2005 of the High          C
Court at Calcutta in CRA No. 352 of 2001.

    Seeraj Bagga (AC) for the Appellant.

    Avijit Bhattacharjee, Ananya Kar for the Respondent.           0
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been
preferred against the judgment and order dated 13th July,
2005, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 352 of 2001 by the High        E
Court of Calcutta, by which the High Court dismissed the
application filed by the appellant and upheld the conviction and
sentence passed by the Trial Court in Sessions Trial No. 4 of
2001 (State Vs. Bipin Kumar Monda/) under Sections 302 and
307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as the      F
'IPC').

Factual Matrix :

     2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are
that one Sujit Mondal, PW-1, lodged an Ejahar with Raninagar       G
Police Station on 6.12.1999 stating that his father Bipin Kumar
Monda!, appellant herein, came to their house at about midnight
on 5.12.1999 and attacked his mother, Usha Rani Monda!, with
a knife and inflicted severe injuries on her person. When he
went to save his mother, he was also attacked by his father.       H
    1042    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A   He received injuries on his head and hands and he had to
    escape out of fear. His younger brother, Ajit Mondal, was also
    severely injured with a knife by his father. On hearing the hue
    and cry made by Sujit Mondal, PW-1, his neighbours came and
    in the meantime his father ran away.
B
         3. On the basis of the said Ejahar, the police investigated
    the case and submitted the charge sheet against the appellant
    under Section 302/307 IPC. Appellant pleaded not guilty and
    hence, he was put to trial.

C         4. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 11
    witnesses to bring home the charge against the appellant. An
    Ejahar was lodged by the son of the appellant and other
    witnesses had been close neighbours and relatives residing in
    the same village. The Trial Court considered the evidence of
D   prosecution witnesses and came to the conclusion that petition
    of complaint had been written by Saidul Islam, PW-10, on the
    instructions of Sujit Monda I, PW-1, and both of them supported
    the prosecution case in Court. Saidul Islam, PW-10, was a
    resident of another village and had gone to Raninagar Public
E   Health Centre in connection with the treatment of his relation
    and there he was requested by Sujit Monda!, PW-1, to write
    the said Ejahar (Exh.-1 ). Sujit Mondal, PW-1, had deposed that
    he had gone to the same Public Health Centre at Raninagar
    and was admitted for treatment for one day. The other witnesses
F   who were close neighbours had supported the prosecution case
    and deposed that all of them reached the place of occurrence
    after hearing the shouts by Sujit Monda! and when they reached
    there, they were told by Sujit Monda!, PW-1, that his father had
    killed his mother and brother and inflicted injuries on his person.
G   After considering the entire evidence on record and taking it
    into consideration along with the defence taken by the appellant,
    which had been only to the extent that he was innocent, the trial
    Court held that the prosecution had succeeded in proving its
    case beyond reasonable doubt. However, the injuries on the
     person of Sujit Monda!, PW-1, were found not to be so serious
H
    BIPIN KUMAR MON DAL v. STATE OF WEST                 1043
         BENGAL [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

and he has failed to produce any certificate from Raninagar       A
Public Health Centre or any other proof that he was admitted
there. The appellant was convicted under Sections 302 and 323
IPC. Thus, he was awarded the sentence of life imprisonment
under Section 302 IPC and 6 months' RI under Section 323
IPC, however, it was held that both the sentences would run       B
concurrently vide judgment and order dated 12.6.2001.

     5. The appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No.352 of
2001, which has been dismissed by the High Court vide
impugned judgment and order dated 13th July, 2002. Hence,
this appeal.
                                                                  c
Rival Submissions :

     6. Shri Seeraj Bagga, learned Amicus Curiae, has
submitted that the appellant is innocent and has been falsely     0
implicated in the crime. Sujit Mondal, PW-1, was not sure as
to who had committed the offence. There was no motive for
committing the crime and the weapon with which the offence
had been committed has never been recovered. The
depositions made by PWs 2 to 8, the so-called related persons
                                                                  E
or neighbours are merely based on hearsay as none of them
had seen the commission of offence.

     7. There are material contradictions in their depositions.
Dilip Kumar, PW-4, had deposed that when he reached the
place of occurrence, Ajit Mondal died within a short time after   F
his arrival. However, none of the other witnesses have stated
that when they reached the place of occurrence after hearing
the hue and cry of Sujit Monda!, PW-1, Ajit Monda! was alive
and had died after some time. All the three persons had been
sleeping in the same room which was open. Therefore, it was       G
possible for any outsider to enter into the house and the
possibility that an outsider entered the house and committed
the offence could not be ruled out. The appellant was an anti-
social element and many persons had a grudge against him.
So, any other person could have committed the crime. The          H
    1044    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A   evidence to the effect that at the time of commission of offence,
    the lamp was burning and there was sufficient light, is also not
    free from doubt. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

       8. On the contrary, Shri Avij1t Bhattacharjee, learned
  counsel for the State, has opposed the appeal and vehemently
8
  submitted that Sujit Monda!, PW-1, had no doubt or suspicion
  in his mind that his father had committed the offence. The
  depositions made by PWs 2 to 8, who are close relatives and
  neighbours who had reached the place of occurrence
  immediately after commission of the offence, cannot be
C doubted as each of them has deposed before the Trial Court
  that Sujit Monda!, PW-1, told them that the appellant, his father
  has committed the crime. The recovery of knife used in the
  commission of offence could not be made because the
  appellant remained absconding for a long time. The conduct
D of the appellant i.e. absconding for a long time itself establishes
  the guilt of the appellant.

       9. All the witnesses had been put to cross-examination and
  nothing has been obtained to seek the credence of the
E evidence of any of them. The appellant just pleaded innocence
  and nothing else. He did not even disclose as under what
  circumstances he had absconded from his family home and had
  been living somewhere else, where he had been at the time of
  commission of offence and why did he not attend any ritual i.e.
F funeral etc. of the victims if he was innocent. The appeal lacks
  merit and is liable to be dismissed.

         10. We have considered the rival submissions made by
    learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

G     11. Sujit Mondal, PW-1, has lodged an Ejahar with
  Raninagar Police Station on 6.12.1999 giving full details of the
  commission of the offence and naming his father as the person
  who committed the offence. The said Ejahar had been written
  by Saidul Islam, PW-10. On scrutiny of evidence of PW-10, it
H becomes evident that he is an independent witness residing
      BIPIN KUMAR MON DAL v. STATE OF WEST                    1045
           BENGAL [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

  in another village and could not have any grudge to support the      A
  case of the prosecution by deposing falsely. The conduct of Sujit
  Monda!, PW-1, remains very natural, probable and convincing.
  During cross-examination, nothing could be elicited from him
  seeking the credence of his statement. No reason came
  forward in the cross-examination or otherwise as to why a son        B
  would depose against his father. There is no suggestion by Sujit
  Monda!, PW-1, that he was not sure as to who has committed
  the offence, as in cross-examination he denied such a
  suggestion stating that it was not a fact that he told the name
  of the assailant as his father by suspicion. The other witnesses     c
  who were close relatives and neighbours of the appellant have
  supported the prosecution case. Sambhu Nath, PW-2, had
  deposed that he reached at about mid-night when Sujit Monda!,
  PW-1, shouted and he came out from his house and on enquiry
  from PW-1, he learnt that his mother and brother had been
                                                                       D
  murdered by the appellant with a sharp cutting knife. PW-1 was
. also injured on his head and hands. Swapan Kumar, PW-3,
  deposed that on reaching the place of occurrence, he
  interrogated Sujit Monda!, who told him that his father had killed
  his mother, Usha Rani and brother, Ajit Monda! and there had
                                                                       E
  been an attempt by his father to kill him (Sujit Monda!) also with
  a sharp cutting knife. Dilip Kumar, PW-4, Binay Monda!, PW-
  6, Anukul Chandra, PW-7 and Prasanna Kumar, PW-8, also
  deposed to the same effect. All these witnesses had been
  cross-examined but there is nothing on record to show that any
  part of their depositions could be doubted. We do not find any       F
  force in the submissions made by Shri Seeraj Bagga that there
  were material contradictions in their depositions as learned
  counsel for the appellant had pointed out that Dilip Kumar, PW-
  4, had deposed that when he reached the place of occurrence,
  Ajit Monda! was alive and he interrogated him as to who had          G
  caused the injury and he told him that his father assaulted him
  and left. He further deposed that Sujit Monda! told him that Ajit
  Monda! and Usha Rani were also attacked by the appellant and
  Ajit Monda! died within a short time and Usha Rani had died
  before his arrival.           /                                      H
    1046    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2010] 8 S.C.R.


A      12. The submissions made by Shri Seeraj Bagga is that
  none of the other witnesses had deposed that when any of them
  reached the place of occurrence, Ajit Mondal was alive. In fact,
  there is nothing on record to show as who was the person who
  reached first at the place of occurrence. It cannot be presumed
B that all of them reached the place of occurrence at the same
  time/simultaneously. No other question had been put to Dilip
  Kumar, PW-4, in his cross-examination. Therefore, it is quite
  possible that he was the first man to arrive at the place of
  occurrerce and the statement made by him cannot be denied.
c       13. Bipin Mukherjee, PW-9, had been the Investigating
  Officer at a later stage when the first Investigating Officer had
  been transferred and he had deposed that he had submitted
  the charge sheet against the accused under Sections 302/324
  IPC on 13.4.2000 showing the appellant as absconder.
D The appellant was given opportunity to cross-examine the said
  1.0.; but the opportunity was not availed. In fact, he was the best
  person to explain as to why there could not be any recovery of
  the knife, the weapon used in the crime.

E       14. Saidul Islam, PW-10, an independent witness
  belonging to another village has successfully proved the Ejahar
  written by him at Raninagar Public Health Centre. The ocular
  evidence given by Sujit Mondal, PW-1, is duly supported by the
  post mortem report and by Dr. Tarun Kumar, PW-5, examined
F by the prosecution, who had explained that several stab injuries
  had been caused in the chest, neck and heart of Usha Rani
  Mondal. He proved the post mortem report and opined that the
  cardio respiratory failure due to shock and haemorrhage due
  to injuries, had been the cause of death. He also opined that
G injuries were caused by sharp cutting weapon. Same remains
  the situation so far as the injuries on the body of Ajit Mondal
  are concerned.

        15. For every question put to the appellant under Section
    313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the same reply was
H
    BIPIN KUMAR MONDAL v. STATE OF WEST                    1047
         BENGAL [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

given that he was innocent and he submitted that he would not       A
adduce any evidence in his defence.

     16. In view of the above, we reach the inescapable
conclusion that there is nothing on record to show that there
could be any reason for Sujit Monda!, PW-1, a son, to falsely
                                                                    B
implicate and rope his father into such a gruesome murder or
the other witnesses, who had been so close relatives and
neighbours of the appellant, would support the prosecution
case.

                                             -
      17. During the cross-examination of all of the witnesses,     c
nothing had transpired for which their evidence may be
discarded. The witnesses were natural and most probable and
their presence at the place of occurrence immediately after the
commission of crime is expected, being close relatives and
neighbours. No reason could be given as to why such close           D
relations of the appellant would depose against him.
Undoubtedly, there is nothing on record to show as what could
be the motive behind the murder of his wife and son by the
appellant. However, it can be difficult to understand the motive
behind the offence. The issue of motive becomes totally             E
irrelevant when there is direct evidence of a trustworthy witness
regarding the commission of the crime. In such a case,
particularly when a son and other closely related persons
depose against the appellant, the proof of motive by direct
evidence loses its relevance. In the instant case, the ocular       F
evidence is supported by the medical evidence. There is
nothing on record to show that the appellant had received any
grave or sudden provocation from the victims or that the
appellant had lost his power of self control from any action of
either of the victims.
                                                                    G
Motive:

    18. In fact, motive is a thing which is primarily known to
the accused himself and it may not be possible for the
prosecution to explain what actually prompted or excited him        H
    1048    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A to commit a particular crime. In Shivji Genu Mohite Vs. State
  of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 55, this Court held that in case
  the prosecution is not able to discover an impelling motive. that
  could not reflect upon the credibility of a witness proved to be
  a reliable eye-witness. Evidence as to motive would, no doubt,
B go a long way in cases wholly dependent on circumstantial
  evidence. Such evidence would form one of the links in the chain
  of circumstantial evidence in such a case. But that would not
  be so in cases where there are eye-witnesses of credibility,
  though even in such cases if a motive is properly proved, such
c proof would strengthen the prosecution case and fortify the court
  in its ultimate conclusion. But that does not mean that if motive
  is not established, the evidence of an eye-witness is rendered
  untrustworthy.

       19. It is settled legal proposition that even if the absence
D of motive as alleged is accepted that is of no consequence and
  pales into insignificance when direct evidence establishes the
  crime. Therefore, in case there is direct trustworthy evidence
  of witnesses as to commission of an offence, the motive part
  loses its significance. Therefore, if the genesis of the motive
E of the occurrence is not proved, the ocular testimony of the
  witnesses as to the occurrence could not be discarded only by
  the reason of the absence of motive, if otherwise the evidence
  is worthy of reliance. (Vide Hari Shankar Vs. State of UP.,
  (1996) 9 SCC 40; Bikau Pandey & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar,
F (2003) 12 SCC 616; and Abu Thakir & Or:s. Vs. State of Tamil
  Nadu, (201 O) 5 sec 91 ).
                          ·.
       20. In a case relating to circumstantial evidence, motive
  does assume great importance, but to say that the absence of
G motive would dislodge the entire prosecution story is giving this
  one factor an importance which is not due. Motive is in the mind
  of the accused and can seldom be fathomed with any degree
  of accuracy. (Vide Ujagar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2007)
   13 sec 90).

H
    BIPIN KUMAR MONDAL v. STATE OF WEST                     1049
         BENGAL [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

    21. While dealing with a similar issue, this Court in State      A
of UP. Vs. Kishanpal & Ors., (2008) 16 SCC 73 held as under:

    "The motive may be considered as a circumstance which
    is relevant for assessing the evidence but if the evidence
    is clear and unambiguous and the circumstances prove
                                                                     B
    the guilt of the accused, the same is not weakened even
    if the motive is not a very strong one. It is also settled law
    that the motive loses all its importance in a case where
    direct evidence of eyewitnesses is available, because even
    if there may be a very strong motive for the accused             C
    persons to commit a particular crime, they cannot be
    convicted if the evidence of eyewitnesses is not convincing.
    In the same way, even if there may not be an apparent
    motive but if the evidence of the eyewitnesses is clear and
    reliable, the absence or inadequacy of motive cannot stand
    in th~ way of conviction."                                       D

Abscondance by Accused :

     22. In Matru@ Girish Chandra Vs. The State of UP., AIR
1971 SC 1050, this Court repelled the submissions made by
                                                                     E
the State that as after commission of the offence the accused
had been absconding, therefore, the inference can be drawn
that he was a guilty person observing as under:

     "The appellant's conduct in absconding was also relied
    upon. Now, mere absconding by itself does not necessarily        F
    lead to a firm conclusion of guilty mind. Even an innocent
    man may feel panicky and try to evad9 arrest when wrongly
    suspected of a grave crime $L!Ch is the instinct of self-
    preservation. The act of absconding is no doubt relevant
    piece of evidence to be considered along with other              G
    evidence but its value would always depend on the
    circumstances of each case. Normally the courts are
    disinclined to attach much importance to the act of
    absconding, treating it as a very small item in the evidence
    for sustaining conviction. It can scarcely be held as a          H
    1050 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [201 O] 8 S.C.R.


A       determining link in completing the chain of circumstantial
        evidence which must admit of no other reasonable
        hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. In the
        present case the appellant was with Ram Chandra till the
        FIR was lodged. If thereafter he felt that he was being
B       wrongly suspected and he tried to keep out of the way we
        do not think this circumstance can be considered to be
        necessarily evidence of a guilty mind attempting to evade
        justice. It is not inconsistent with his innocence."

C       A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
    Rahman Vs. State of UP. AIR 1972 SC 110; and State of MP.
    Vs. Pa/tan Mal/ah & Ors. AIR 2005 SC 733.

       Abscondance by a person against whom FIR has been
  lodged, having an apprehension of being apprehended by the
D police, cannot be said to be unnatural.

       Thus, in view of the above, we do not find any force in the
  submission made by Shri Bhattacharjee that mere absconding
  by the appellant after commission of the crime and remaining
E untraceable for such a long time itself can establish his guilt.
  Absconding by itself is not conclusive either of guilt or of guilty
  conscience.

          23. The defence did not even make a suggestion to Sujit
    Monda!, PW-1, that he was not injured by the appellant with a
F   knife. The evidence of PW-1, therefore, cannot be ignored.
    However, as the prosecution failed to produce any evidence
    to the effect that Sujit Mondal. PW-1, remained admitted in PHC
    Raninagar. That part of the evidence has been ignored by the
    Trial Court as well as by the High Court.
G
    Testimony of Sole Witness :

       24. Shri Bagga has also submitted that there was sole
  testimony of Sujit Monda!, PW-1, and the rest, i.e. depositions
  of PW-2 to PW-8, could be treated merely as a hearsay. The
H same cannot be relied upon for conviction.
     BIPIN KUMAR MON DAL v. STATE OF WEST                       1051
          BENGAL[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

     25. In S.uml Kumar Vs. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, A
(2003) 11 SCC 367, this Court repelled a similar submission·,.
observing that as a general rule the Court can and may act on
the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable.
There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the S<?,le
testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 B
of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the
testimony the courts will insist on corroboration. In fact. it is not
the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-
honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not
counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is        c
cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise.

      26. In Namdeo Vs. State of Maharashtra. (2007) 14 SCC
150, this Court re-iterated the similar view observing that it is
the quality and not the quantity of evidence which is necessary
for proving or disproving a fact. The legal system has laid              D
emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than
on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is. therefore.
open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a
solitary witness and record conviction. Cc:;versely, it may acquit
the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if ii 1s          E
not satisfied about the quality of evidence.

     27. In Kunju @ Balachandran Vs. State of Tami Nadu,
AIR 2008 SC 1381. a similar view has been re-iterated placing
reliance on various earlier judgments of this court including            F
Jagdis/J Prasad Vs St2te of MP. AIR 1994 SC 1251; and
Vadivelu Thevar Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614.

      28. Thus, in view of the above, the bald contention made
by Shri Bagga that no conviction can be recorded in case of a
solitary eye-witness has no force and is negatived accordingly.          G

     29. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion
that the facts and circumstances of the case do not present
special features warranting the review of the judgments/orders
    1052   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010) 8 S.C.R.


A of the courts below. Appeal lacks merit and is accordingly
  dismissed.

         30. Before parting with the case. we record our
    appreciation, thanks and gratitude to Shri Seeraj Bagga in
    rendering full assistance to the Court during the course of
8
    hearing.

    D.G.                                    Appeal dismissed.