Holding

An ex parte interim injunction in a defamation proceeding must be grounded in a detailed application of the three‑fold test and cannot be based on unreasoned orders; consequently, the trial judge’s and High Court’s injunctions were set aside.

Summary

Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited and others sought an ex parte ad interim injunction to compel Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited to remove a February 2024 article alleged to be defamatory. The trial judge granted the injunction on the basis of a brief reference to prior cases, without analysing the prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable harm. The Delhi High Court upheld the order, despite expressing doubts about the appeal's maintainability. The Supreme Court held that the three‑fold test for interim relief must be applied with detailed reasoning, especially in defamation cases involving media platforms, and that ex parte injunctions should be granted only in exceptional circumstances to protect free speech. It emphasized the Bonnard standard and warned against "SLAPP" suits that stifle public debate. Accordingly, the Court set aside both the trial judge’s and High Court’s orders and remitted the matter for fresh consideration, disposing of the appeal.

Issues considered

The trial judge's adequacy of applying the three‑fold test (prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable harm) for granting an ex parte interim injunction in a defamation suit.
Whether the Delhi High Court erred in upholding the trial judge’s injunction without a detailed analysis of the test and constitutional implications.
The propriety of granting ex parte injunctions against journalistic content vis‑à‑vis the right to free speech and the risk of SLAPP suits.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Subjects

Media platformOnline platformDefamationDefamation suitsInterim reliefInterim injunctionsPrima facie caseBalance of convenienceIrreparable hardshipEx parte injunctionAd interim injunctionUnreasoned censorshipDiscretionary powerUnreasoned orderDefamation proceedings against media platformInjunctionRight of free speechRight to reputation and privacyProtection of journalistic expressionPre‑trial interim injunctionsBonnard standardRight to freedom of speech of the authorPublic’s right to knowSLAPP suitsStrategic Litigation against Public ParticipationProlonged trials

Judgment

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 994 : 2024 INSC 255

Bloomberg Television Production Services
India Private Limited & Ors.
v.
Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited
(Civil Appeal No. 4602 of 2024)
22 March 2024
[Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud,* CJI, J B Pardiwala and
Manoj Misra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to the order of the High Court upholding the interim
order passed by the trial judge directing the appellants-media
platform to take down an article published on their online platform
against the respondent as also restrained them from posting,
circulating or publishing the article in respect of the respondent on
any online or offline platform till the next date of hearing.

Headnotes
Defamation – Defamation suits against media platform and/or
journalists – Interim relief/interim injunctions – Interim order
by the trial judge directing the appellants-media platform, its
editor, and the journalists to take down an article published
on their online platform against the respondent as also
restrained them from posting, circulating or publishing the
article in respect of the respondent on any online or offline
platform till the next date of hearing – Upheld by the High
Court – Correctness:
Held: Order of the trial judge does not discuss, even cursorily,
the prima facie strength of the plaintiff’s case, the balance of
convenience or the irreparable hardship that is caused – Trial
judge needed to have analysed why such an ex parte injunction
was essential – Such order amounts to unreasoned censorship
and cannot be accepted – Grant of an ex parte interim injunction
by way of an unreasoned order, definitely necessitates interference
by the High Court – Impact of the injunction on the constitutionally
protected right of free speech further warranted intervention – High
Court ought to have prima facie assessed whether the test for the
grant of an injunction was duly established after an evaluation of
facts – Error committed by the trial judge perpetuated by the Single
* Author
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 995

Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited & Ors.
v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

Judge of the High Court – Merely recording that a prima facie case
exists, that the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant of
injunction and that an irreparable injury would be caused, would
not amount to an application of mind to the facts of the case – In
the absence thereof, orders of the trial judge and the Single Judge
of the High Court set aside. [Paras 11-13]
Defamation – Defamation suits against media platform and/
or journalists – Interim relief/interim injunctions – Grant of –
Application of three fold test:
Held: Three-fold test is of establishing a prima facie case, balance
of convenience and irreparable loss or harm, for the grant of
interim relief – This test is equally applicable to the grant of interim
injunctions in defamation suits – Three-fold test must not be applied
mechanically, to the detriment of the other party and in the case
of injunctions against journalistic pieces, often to the detriment of
the public – While granting interim relief, the court must provide
detailed reasons and analyze how the test is satisfied and how the
precedents cited apply to the facts of the case – Also balancing
the fundamental right to free speech with the right to reputation
and privacy must be borne in mind – Constitutional mandate of
protecting journalistic expression cannot be understated, and courts
must tread cautiously while granting pre-trial interim injunctions –
Courts should not grant ex-parte injunctions except in exceptional
cases where the defence advanced by the respondent would
undoubtedly fail at trial – In all other cases, injunctions against the
publication of material should be granted only after a full-fledged
trial is conducted or in exceptional cases, after the respondent is
given a chance to make their submissions. [Paras 5, 7, 9]
Suits – ‘SLAPP Suits’– Concept of :
Held: Term ‘SLAPP’ stands for ‘Strategic Litigation against Public
Participation’ – It is an umbrella term used to refer to litigation
predominantly initiated by entities that wield immense economic
power against members of the media or civil society, to prevent
the public from knowing about or participating in important affairs
in the public interest – Grant of an interim injunction, before the
trial commences, often acts as a ‘death sentence’ to the material
sought to be published, well before the allegations have been
proven – While granting ad-interim injunctions in defamation suits,
the potential of using prolonged litigation to prevent free speech and
public participation must also be kept in mind by courts. [Para 10]
996 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Case Law Cited
Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction
Co. (P) Ltd [1996] Suppl. 2 SCR 295 : (1996) 4 SCC
622; Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das [1994]
Suppl. 1 SCR 136 : (1994) 4 SCC 225; R. Rajagopal
v. State of Tamil Nadu [1994] Suppl. 4 SCR 353 :
(1994) 6 SCC 632; Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. v.
Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel [2006] Suppl. 5 SCR 521 :
(2006) 8 SCC 726; Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam
Steel Industries Ltd. [2022] 3 SCR 1173 : (2023) 1 SCC
634 – referred to.
Bonnard v. Perryman (1891) 95 All ER 965; Holley v.
Smyth (1998) 1 All ER 853; Fraser v. Evans (1969) 1
Q.B. 349 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Donson, F.J.L. 2000. Legal Intimidation: A SLAPP in
the Face of Democracy. London, New York : Free
Association Books – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
Media platform; Online platform; Defamation; Defamation suits;
Interim relief/interim injunctions; Prima facie case; Balance of
convenience; Irreparable hardship; Ex parte injunction; Ad-
interim injunction; Unreasoned censorship; Discretionary power;
Unreasoned order; Defamation proceedings against media platform;
Injunction; Right of free speech; Right to reputation and privacy;
Protection of journalistic expression; Pre-trial interim injunctions;
Bonnard standard; Right to freedom of speech of the author;
Public’s right to know; ‘SLAPP Suits’; ‘Strategic Litigation against
Public Participation’; Prolonged trials.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4602 of
2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.03.2024 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in FAO No.79 of 2024
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 997

Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited & Ors.
v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

Appearances for Parties
Mukul Rohatgi, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Sr.
Advs., Rohit Kochhar, Shiv Sapra, Samiron Borkataky, Ms. Ranjeet
Rohatgi, Rajat Gava, Ikshvaaku Marwah, Vishal Singh, Sanskriti
Shrimali, Keshav Sehgal, Dhruv Sharma,Raghav Agarwal, Utkarsh
Pratap, Lavish Bhambhani, Harshvardhan Thakur, Ms. Suvangana
Agrawal, Advs. for the Appellants.
Mahesh Agarwal, Ms. Madhavi Agarwal, Shashwat Singh, E.C.
Agrawala, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI
1. Leave granted.
2. On 01 March 2024, an ex-parte ad interim order was passed by the
ADJ 05 of the South Saket Courts, New Delhi1 directing the appellants
(a media platform, one of its editors, and the concerned journalists) to
take down an article dated 21 February 2024 published on their online
platform within a week. The appellants were also restrained from posting,
circulating or publishing the article in respect of the respondent-plaintiff
on any online or offline platform till the next date of hearing.
3. The order of the trial Judge indicates that the discussion, after
recording the submission of the respondent, commences at paragraph
7. The only reasoning which is found in the order of the trial Judge
is in paragraphs 8-9, which read as follows:
“8. I have noticed that in Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi
(Supra), Chandra Kochar (Supra), Swami Ramdev
(Supra), ex-parte ad interim injunction was passed,
considering that the contents of the material in question
was per se defamatory.
9. In my view, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case for passing ad interim ex-parte orders of injunction,
balance of convenience is also in favour of plaintiff and

1 “trial Judge”
998 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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against the defendant and irreparable loss and injury
may be caused to the plaintiff, if the injunction as prayed
for is not granted. In view thereof, defendant no.1 and
defendant no.2 are directed to take down the article dated
21.02.2024 (page 84 to 86 of the plaintiff’s document)
from online platform within one week of receipt of this
order. The defendants are further restrained from posting,
circulating or publishing the aforesaid article in respect of
the plaintiff on any online or offline platform till the next
date of hearing.”
4. The order of the trial Judge has been upheld by a Single Judge of
the High Court of Delhi by order dated 14 March 2024.2 The Single
Judge of the High Court seems to have had doubts about the
maintainability of the appeal, but that point need not be laboured any
further having regard to the provisions of Order XLIII of the Code of
Civil Procedure 1908.
5. The three-fold test of establishing (i) a prima facie case, (ii) balance
of convenience and (iii) irreparable loss or harm, for the grant of
interim relief, is well-established in the jurisprudence of this Court.
This test is equally applicable to the grant of interim injunctions in
defamation suits. However, this three-fold test must not be applied
mechanically,3 to the detriment of the other party and in the case of
injunctions against journalistic pieces, often to the detriment of the
public. While granting interim relief, the court must provide detailed
reasons and analyze how the three-fold test is satisfied. A cursory
reproduction of the submissions and precedents before the court is
not sufficient. The court must explain how the test is satisfied and
how the precedents cited apply to the facts of the case.
6. In addition to this oft-repeated test, there are also additional factors,
which must weigh with courts while granting an ex-parte ad interim
injunction. Some of these factors were elucidated by a three-judge
bench of this Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick
Das,4 in the following terms:

2 “Impugned Order”
3 Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., [1996] Suppl. 2 SCR 295 : (1996) 4
SCC 622, para 38.
4 [1994] Suppl. 1 SCR 136 : (1994) 4 SCC 225.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 999

Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited & Ors.
v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

“36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be granted
only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which
should weigh with the court in the grant of ex parte
injunction are—
(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue
to the plaintiff;
(b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would
involve greater injustice than the grant of it would
involve;
(c) the court will also consider the time at which the
plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that
the making of improper order against a party in his
absence is prevented;
(d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had
acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances
it will not grant ex parte injunction;
(e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte
injunction to show utmost good faith in making the
application.
(f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for
a limited period of time.
(g) General principles like prima facie case, balance
of convenience and irreparable loss would also be
considered by the court.”
7. Significantly, in suits concerning defamation by media platforms and/or
journalists, an additional consideration of balancing the fundamental
right to free speech with the right to reputation and privacy must be
borne in mind.5 The constitutional mandate of protecting journalistic
expression cannot be understated, and courts must tread cautiously
while granting pre-trial interim injunctions. The standard to be followed
may be borrowed from the decision in Bonnard v. Perryman.6 This
standard, christened the ‘Bonnard standard’, laid down by the Court

5 R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1994] Suppl. 4 SCR 353 : (1994) 6 SCC 632.
6 (1891) 95 All ER 965.
1000 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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of Appeal (England and Wales), has acquired the status of a common
law principle for the grant of interim injunctions in defamation suits.7
The Court of Appeal in Bonnard (supra) held as follows:
“…But it is obvious that the subject-matter of an action for
defamation is so special as to require exceptional caution
in exercising the jurisdiction to interfere by injunction before
the trial of an action to prevent an anticipated wrong.
The right of free speech is one which it is for the public
interest that individuals should possess, and, indeed,
that they should exercise without impediment, so long as
no wrongful act is done; and, unless an alleged libel is
untrue, there is no wrong committed; but, on the contrary,
often a very wholesome act is performed in the publication
and repetition of an alleged libel. Until it is clear that an
alleged libel is untrue, it is not clear that any right at all
has been infringed; and the importance of leaving free
speech unfettered is a strong reason in cases of libel for
dealing most cautiously and warily with the granting of
interim injunctions.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. In Fraser v. Evans, 8 the Court of Appeal followed the Bonnard
principle and held as follows:
“… in so far as the article will be defamatory of Mr. Fraser,
it is clear he cannot get an injunction. The Court will not
restrain the publication of an article, even though it is
defamatory, when the defendant says he intends to justify it
or to make fair comment on a matter of public interest. That
has been established for many years ever since (Bonnard
v. Ferryman 1891 2 Ch. 269). ‘The reason sometimes given
is that the defences of justification and fair comment are
for the jury, which is the constitutional tribunal, and not
for a Judge. But a better reason is the importance in the
public interest that the truth should out. …”
(emphasis supplied)

7 Holley vs. Smyth, (1998) 1 All ER 853.
8 [1969] 1 Q.B. 349.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1001

Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited & Ors.
v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

9. In essence, the grant of a pre-trial injunction against the publication
of an article may have severe ramifications on the right to freedom
of speech of the author and the public’s right to know. An injunction,
particularly ex-parte, should not be granted without establishing that
the content sought to be restricted is ‘malicious’ or ‘palpably false’.
Granting interim injunctions, before the trial commences, in a cavalier
manner results in the stifling of public debate. In other words, courts
should not grant ex-parte injunctions except in exceptional cases
where the defence advanced by the respondent would undoubtedly
fail at trial. In all other cases, injunctions against the publication of
material should be granted only after a full-fledged trial is conducted
or in exceptional cases, after the respondent is given a chance to
make their submissions.
10. Increasingly, across various jurisdictions, the concept of ‘SLAPP
Suits’ has been recognized either by statute or by courts. The term
‘SLAPP’ stands for ‘Strategic Litigation against Public Participation’
and is an umbrella term used to refer to litigation predominantly
initiated by entities that wield immense economic power against
members of the media or civil society, to prevent the public from
knowing about or participating in important affairs in the public
interest.9 We must be cognizant of the realities of prolonged trials.
The grant of an interim injunction, before the trial commences, often
acts as a ‘death sentence’ to the material sought to be published, well
before the allegations have been proven. While granting ad-interim
injunctions in defamation suits, the potential of using prolonged
litigation to prevent free speech and public participation must also
be kept in mind by courts.
11. The order of the trial Judge does not discuss, even cursorily, the
prima facie strength of the plaintiff’s case, nor does it deal with the
balance of convenience or the irreparable hardship that is caused.
The trial Judge needed to have analysed why such an ex parte
injunction was essential, after setting out the factual basis and the
contentions of the respondent made before the trial Judge. The trial
Judge merely states, in paras 7-8, that the court has “gone through
the record available as on date” and noticed certain precedents

9 Donson, F.J.L. 2000. Legal Intimidation: A SLAPP in the Face of Democracy. London, New York: Free
Association Books.
1002 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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where an ad-interim injunction was granted. Without even cursorily
dwelling on the merits of the plaint, the ad-interim injunction granted
by the trial Judge amounts to unreasoned censorship which cannot
be countenanced.
12. Undoubtedly, the grant of an interim injunction is an exercise of
discretionary power and the appellate court (in this case, the High
Court) will usually not interfere with the grant of interim relief. However,
in a line of precedent, this Court has held that appellate courts must
interfere with the grant of interim relief if the discretion has been
exercised “arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or where the court has
ignored settled principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of
interlocutory injunctions.”10 The grant of an ex parte interim injunction
by way of an unreasoned order, definitely falls within the above
formulation, necessitating interference by the High Court. This being
a case of an injunction granted in defamation proceedings against
a media platform, the impact of the injunction on the constitutionally
protected right of free speech further warranted intervention.
13. In view of the above, the High Court ought to have, in our view,
also at least prima facie assessed whether the test for the grant of
an injunction was duly established after an evaluation of facts. The
same error which has been committed by the trial Judge has been
perpetuated by the Single Judge of the High Court. Merely recording
that a prima facie case exists, that the balance of convenience is
in favour of the grant of injunction and that an irreparable injury
would be caused, would not amount to an application of mind to
the facts of the case. The three-fold test cannot merely be recorded
as a mantra without looking into the facts on the basis of which an
injunction has been sought. In the absence of such a consideration
either by the trial Judge or by the High Court, we have no option but
to set aside both the orders of the trial Judge dated 1 March 2024
and of the Single Judge of the High Court dated 14 March 2024.
We do so accordingly.
14. Since the proceedings are now listed before the trial Judge on 26
March 2024, we direct that it would be open to the respondents to

10 Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel, [2006] Suppl. 5 SCR 521 : (2006) 8 SCC
726, para 128; Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd., [2022] 3 SCR 1173 : (2023) 1
SCC 634, para 37.
[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1003

Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited & Ors.
v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

renew their application for injunction, on which the trial Judge shall
pass fresh orders after hearing the parties and bearing in mind
the observations which are contained in the above segment of the
judgment and order. All the rights and contentions of the parties are
kept open in that regard. In the event that the appellants seek to
contest the application for injunction, they shall file their reply before
the trial Judge before the next date of listing.
15. It is clarified that the above segment of the judgment and order
may not be construed as a comment on the merits of the present
case. The purpose of the above segment is to provide the broad
parameters to be kept in mind while hearing the application for an
interim injunction.
16. The appeal is accordingly disposed of in the above terms.
17. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:
Appeal disposed of.