Supreme Court of India
BONDU RAMASWAMYversusBANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 271
- Decided
- 5 May 2010
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- K G BALAKRISHNAN
Holding
The Bangalore Development Authority Act is a valid special law under List II, not repugnant to the Land Acquisition Act, and its acquisition provisions are enforceable despite the lack of President's assent, but the Court must remedy the arbitrary deletions and discrimination through specific directions.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined the legality of land acquisitions undertaken by the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) for the Arkavathi layout, focusing on whether the BDA Act required President's assent, was repugnant to the Land Acquisition Act, and complied with constitutional provisions under Parts IX and IX‑A. The Court held that the omission of Article 31 rendered the President's assent requirement moot, and that the BDA Act, being a special law under Entry 5 of List II, is not repugnant to the central Land Acquisition Act which occupies Entry 42 of List III. It further found that the BDA had jurisdiction over the villages in question, that the procedural requirements of the BDA Act were satisfied, and that while the acquisition was not void, there were instances of arbitrary deletions and discrimination. Consequently, the Court upheld the acquisition but imposed corrective directions, including preferential allotment of plots to affected land‑owners and a review of disputed villages. The appeal was disposed of, affirming the High Court’s directions with modifications.
Issues considered
- Whether the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 is invalid for lacking President's assent under Article 31(3) of the Constitution.
- Whether the BDA Act is repugnant to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 under Article 254 of the Constitution.
- Whether the provisions of Parts IX and IX‑A of the Constitution render the BDA Act inoperative or void.
- Whether the BDA has territorial jurisdiction over the sixteen villages where land was acquired.
- Whether the amendment to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act imposing a one‑year limit on final declarations applies to acquisitions under the BDA Act.
- Whether Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act are applicable to acquisitions under the BDA Act.
- Whether the BDA complied with procedural requirements of Sections 15‑19 of the BDA Act, including specificity, material particulars, and valid government sanction.
- Whether the deletion of 1089 acres from the proposed acquisition amounts to hostile discrimination violating Article 14.
Legislation cited
- Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976s. 15, s. 16, s. 17, s. 18, s. 19, s. 2(c), s. 36
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 243P(c), s. Article 243ZF, s. Article 254, s. Article 31(1), s. Article 31(2), s. Article 31(3), s. Part IX, s. Part IX-A
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4, s. 5A, s. 6
Subjects
land acquisitionBangalore Development AuthorityrepugnancyArticle 31Article 254Article 14Parts IX and IX-Amunicipal corporationdevelopment schemepith and substancediscriminationarbitrary deletioncompensationequality before law
Judgment
[2010) 6 S.C.R. 29
BONDU RAMASWAMY A
v.
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 4097 of 2010 etc.}
MAY 5, 2010
B
[K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI., R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND
D.K. JAIN, JJ.]
Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976:
Whether the Act repugnant to Land Acquisition Act - C
Held: The Act is not repugnant to Land Acquisition Act -
Repugnancy under Article 254 arises only when two laws
relate to subjects in List Ill - Article 254(1) will have no
application if the State law in pith and substance relates to a
matter in List II and incidentally touches upon some item in D
List Ill - If the law covered by Entry in List If contains a
provision directly and substantially relating to the matter
enumerated in List Ill, the repugnant provision of List II might
be void unless it could co-exist and operate without
repugnancy to the provisions of the existing law - Bangalore E
Development Authority Act in pith and substance falls under
Entry 5 of List II and is not r.eferable to Entry 42 of List Ill -
The main object of the Act is development of the city and
acquisition for such development is incidental to the main
object - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 254; Seventh F
Schedule List II Entry 5 and List Ill Entry 42 -Land Acquisition
4.ct, 1894 - ss. 4 to 6 - Doctrine of pith and substance.
Enforcement of the Act- Validity of, in absence of assent
of President - Held: Article 31 (3) pf the Constitution did not G
render the Act invalid in absence of assent of the President
- Though the Act did not receive the assent of the President,
but once Article 31 (3) was omitted from the Constitution, need
for such assent disappeared -Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 31 (3).
29 H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A ss. 15 to 19 - Acquisition of land - By Development
Authority - For planned development of city - Preliminary
notification proposing to acquire land - The objections of land-
holders considered - State Government granting sanction for
acquisition after noting that certain land was excluded from
B the proposed extent of land - Final declaration issued - Writ
petitions challenging the acquisition - Entire acquisition
quashed by Single Judge of High Court - Writ appeals -
Division Bench of High Court upheld the acquisition -
However, finding that there was discrimination in acquisition
c of certain lands and in deletion of similar lands, gave liberty
to /and-owners to seek withdrawal of their lands from
acquisition - On appeal, held: Acquisition was in compliance
with the provisions of the Act - But there was arbitrariness and
discrimination in the matter of inclusions and exclusions of
the lands - Decision of Division Be{/f;h of High Court is
0
affirmed - However, the liberty granted to /and-owners would
lead to further litigations and complications - Therefore, it
would be equitable to uphold the directions issued by High
Court, subject to the condition that /he Development Authority
provides an option to land-losers to secure some additional
E benefits as an incentive to accept the acquisition - Direction
issued to provide preferential allotment of some plots at
prevailing market price in addition to compensation to the
/and"/osers - Such directions not in conflict with Allotment
Rules - Bangalore Development Authority (Allotment of
F Sites) Rules, 1984.
ss. 19(1) and 36 - Land acquisition - Final declaration
uls. 19(1) - Published beyond one year from the date of
publication of preliminary notification uls. 17(1) and (3) of the
G Act- Whether valid on account of delay in view of amendment
of s. 6 of Land Acquisition Act, providing a time limit for issue
of final declaration - Held: The final declaration does not
suffer from any infirmity - In view of limited application of Land
Acquisition Act in terms of s. 36, provisions of ss. 4 to 6 of
H Land Acquisition Act would not apply in respect of scheme
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 31
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
for acquisition u/s. 15 to 19 of the Act- Thus, amendment to A
s. 6 also not applicable - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s. 6.
s. 15 rlw s. 2(c) - Power of Development Authority to draw
up schemes for development of metropolitan area - Whether
became inoperative on coming into force of Parts IX and IXA
of the Constitution - Held: Provisions of the Act would not
8
become inoperative on Parts IX and IXA coming into force -
Parts IX and IXA are applicable to the municipality and not
to development authority - Article 243ZF which provided for
giving opportunity to State Government to bring the existing
law relating to municipality in conformity with Parts IX and l{<A, C
is not applicable to the Act - Mere existence of Municipal
Corporation Act duly amended to bring it in conformity with
Part IXA would not nullify or render the Act redundant -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Parts IX and IXA -Karnataka
Municipal Corporation Act, 1976. D
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss. 4, 5A and 6 -
Applicability of - To acquisition under Bangalore
Development Authority Act - ss. 4 to 6 would not apply to
acquisition under BOA Act - In view of s. 36 of BOA Act, only E
such provisions of Land Acquisition Act are applicable to the
acquisition under BDA Act, for which a corresponding
provision is not found in the BOA Act - ss. 17 to 19 of the
BOA Act are the corresponding, provisions to ss. 4 to 6 -
Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 - ss. 17 to 19
and 36. ,F
Constitution of India, 1950:
Article 31(1), (2) and (3) - Acquisition of land under
Bangalore Development Authority Act - Whether violative of G
fundamental Right provided in Article 31 - Held: BOA Act
does not violate any provision of Article 31 - Since the State
had the legislative competence to enact the BOA Act, clause
(1) is not violated - In view of s. 36 of BOA Act Land
Acquisition Act was applicable for determination of
H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A compensation, hence clause (2) is not violated - Since
Clause (3) does not specify any fundamental right and only
provides the procedure, it does not nullify any law - However,
once the requirement of assent of the President disappeared
on omission of Article 31, the provisions relating to acquisition
B became enforceable - Bangalore Development Authority Act,
1976.
Article 14 - /llegal favours shown to land-owners by
acquisition authority, in deleting their lands from proposed
acquisition - Plea of other land-owners seeking deletion of
C their lands on the ground of equality - Held: Article 14
guarantees equality before law and not equality in subverting
law nor equality in securing illegal benefits - Negative
equality cannot be enforced - Land owners not entitled to
seek deletion on the ground of equality -But where large
D extent of land has been indiscriminately and arbitrarily
deleted, making the development scheme inexecutable, or
resulted in abandonment, relief can be granted on the
adoption of common factor - Land Acquisition.
Land Acquisition:
E
Acquisition of land for planned development of city -
Deletion from the proposed acquisition - Basis for - Held:
Deletion should be only with regard to areas which are already
well-developed in a planned manner - Sporadic small
F unauthorized constructions in unauthorized colonies are not
to be deleted ...,. If hardship is the reason for deletion,
appropriate course is to give preference to the land-owners
in allotment of developed plots and help them to resettle -
Development authority should either provide orderly
G development or should stay away from development - Urban
Development.
Land acquisition governed by Land Acquisition Act -
Present system of - Held: Requires urgent attention of the
State Government and Development Authorities - It is
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE · 33
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
necessary to evolve tailor-made schemes to suit particular A
acquisitiorl to make it smooth, speedy, litigation free and
beneficial to all concerned - Acquisition should be for the
benefit of society and improve the city and not to benefit the
development authority - Need for the Law Commission and
the Parliament to revisit the Land Acquisition Act - Land B
Acquisition Act, 1894.
Interpretation of Statutes - Vague and ambiguous
provision - An interpretation that would avoid absurd results
should be adopted - When the object orpolicy of a statute
can be ascertained, imprecision in its language not to be C
allowed in the way of adopting a reasonable construction
which avoids absurdities and incongruities and carries out the
object or policy - A court cannot supply a real casus omis'sus I
nor can it interpret a statute to create a casus omissus when
there is really none. D
Doctrines:
Doctrine of casus omissus - Applicability of.
Doctrine of Pith and Substance - Applicability of.
E
Civic Agencies· - 'Municipal Corporation' and
'Development Authority' - Difference between - Discussed.
Writ petitions were filed challenging the acquisition
of land by Bangalore Development Authority (BOA)
under Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (BOA f
Act). The same were allowed by Single Judge of High
Court quashing the entire acquisition. Writ appeals were
allowed by Division Bench of High Court. Hence the
present appeals.
The questions which arose for consideration in the G
present appeals were: (i) Whether the BOA Act, in so far
as it provides for compulsory acquisition of property, is
still-born and ineffective as it did not receive the assent
of the President, as required by Article 31 (3) of the
Constitution of India. (ii) Whether the provisions of the H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A BOA Act, in particular Section 15 r/w Section 2(c) dealing
with the power of BOA to draw up schemes for
development for Bangalore Metropolitan Area became
inoperative, void or was impliedly repealed, by virtue of
Parts IX and IX(A) of the Constitution inserted by the 73rd
B and 74th Amendments to the Constitution. (iii) Whether
the sixteen villages where the lands have been acquired,
fall outside the Bangalore Metropolitan Area as defined
in Section 2(c) of the BOA Act and therefore, the
Bangalore Development Authority has no territorial
c jurisdiction to make development schemes or acquire
lands in those villages. (iv) Whether the amondment to
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 requiring the
final declaration to be issued within one year from the
date of publication of the preliminary notification is
0 applicable to the acquisitions under the BOA Act; and
whether the declaration u/s. 19(1) of BOA Act, having been
issued after the expiry of one year from the date of the
preliminary notification u/s. 17(1) and (3) of BOA Act, is
invalid. (v) Whether the provisions of Sections 4, 5A, 6 of
E Land Acquisition Act, would be applicable in regard to
acquisitions under the BOA Act and whether non-
compliance with those provisions, vitiate the acquisition
proceedings (vi) Whether the development scheme and
the acquisitions are invalid for non-compliance with the
procedure prescribed u/ss. 15 to 19 of the BOA Act in
F regard to: (a) absence of specificity and discrepancy in
extent of land to be acquired; (b) failure to furnish material
particulars to the Government as required u/s. 18(1) r/w
Section 16 of the BOA Act; and (c) absence of valid
sanction by the Government, u/s. 18(3) of the BOA Act.
G (vii) Whether the deletion of 1089 Ac~s 12 Guntas from
the proposed acquisition, while proceeding with the
acquisition of similar contiguous lands of appellants
amounted to hostile discrimination and therefore the
lands of appellants also required to be withdrawn from
H acquisition.
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 35
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Disposing of the appeals, the Court A
HELD:
Question (i) - Re : Invalidity on account of non-
compliance with Article 31(3) of the Constitution:
1.1. It is true that the BOA Act received only the 8
assent of the Governor and was neither reserved for the
assent of the President nor received the assent of the
President. But once Article 31 was omitted from the
Constitution on 20.06.1979, the need for such assent
disappeared and the impediment for enforcement of the C
provisions in the BOA Act relating to acquisition also
disappeared. Article 31 (3) did not render the enactment a
nullity, if there was no assent of the President. Acquisition
of property is only an incidental and not the main object
and purpose of the BOA Act. Once the requirement of D
assent stood deleted from the Constitution, there was
absolutely no bar for enforcement of the provisions
relating to acquisition in the BOA Act. The State
Legislature had the legislative competence to enact such
a statute, under Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule E
to the Constitution. If any part of the Act did not come into
effect for non-compliance with any provision of the
Constitution that part of the Act may be unenforceable,
but not invalid. [Para 9) [72-~; 73-A-E]
1.2. Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976, F
does not violate any provision of Article 31 in Part Ill of
the Constitution. As the BOA Act is made by the State
Legislature having competence to make such law, there
is no violation of Article 31 (1 ). Clause (2) of Article 31
provided that no law shall authorise acquisition unless it G
provided for compensation for such acquisition and
either fixed the amount of compensation, or specified the
principles on which, and the manner in which, the
compensation was to be determined and given. BOA Act
does not fix the amount of compensation, but Section 36 H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A thereof clearly provides that the acquisition will be
regulated by the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 so far as they are applicable. Thus the principles
on which the compensation is to be determined and the
manner in which the compensation is to be determined
8 set out in the Land Acquisition Act become applicable to
acquisitions underI
BOA Act. Thus there is no violation
of Article 31(2). Article 31(3) merely provides that no law
providing for acquisition shall have effect unless such
law has received the assent of the President. Article 31 (3)
C does not specify any fundamental right, but relates to the
procedure for making a law providing for acquisition. It
does not nullify any law, but postpones the enforcement
of a law relating to acquisition, until it receives the assent
of the President. There is therefore no violation of Part
Ill of the Constitution that can lead to any part of the BOA
0 Act being treated as a nullity. The effect of Article 31(3)
was that enforcement of the provisions relating to
acquisition was not possible/permissible till the assent
of the President was received. Therefore, once the
requirement of assent disappeared, the provisions
E relating to acquisition became enforceable. [Para 11] [76-
A-H; 77-A]
M.P. V. Sundararamier and Co. v. 'The State of Andhra
Pradesh and Anr. AIR 1958 SC 468, followed
F Munithimmaiah v. State of Kamataka 2002 (4) SCC 326,
relied on
Mahendra Lal Jain v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1963 Supp
(1) SCR 912, referred to
G Question (ii) - Re : Invalidity with reference to Parts IX
and IX-A of the Constitution :
2.1. Part IX-A of the Constitution seeks to strengthen
the democratic political governance at grass-root level in
H .urban areas by providing constitutional status to
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 37
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Municipalities, and by laying down minimum uniform A
norms and by ensuring regular and fair conduct of
elections. When Part IXA came into force, the provisions
of the existing laws relating to municipalities which were
inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of Part IX-
A would have ceased to apply. To provide continuity for B
some time and an opportunity to the concerned State
Governments to bring the respective enactments relating
to municipalities in consonance with the provisions of
Part IX-A in the meanwhile, Article 243ZF was inserted.
The object was not to invalidate any law relating to city C
improvement trusts or development authorities which
operate with reference to specific and specialised field of
planned development of cities by forming layouts and
making available plots/houses/apartments to the
members of the public. [Para 21] [94-H; 95-A-C] o
2.2. The benefit of Article 243ZF is available only in
regard to laws relating to 'municipalities'. Thus Article
243ZF has no relevance to test the validity of the BOA Act
or any provision thereof. If BOA Act or any provision
thereof is found to be inconsistent with the provisions of E
Part IXA, such inconsistent provision will be invalid even
from 1.6.1993, and the benefit of continuance for a period
of one year permitted under Article 243ZF will not be
available to such a provision of law, as BOA Act is not a
law relating to Municipalities. [Para 20] [94-A-O] F
2.3. The object and functions of a Municipal
Corporations are completely different from the object and
purpose of a development authority like BOA. BOA is not
a municipality. Therefore, it cannot be said that mere G
existence of Municipal Corporations Act, duly amended
to bring it in conformity with Part IX-A of the Constitution,
will nullify or render redundant, the BOA Act. [Para 23]
[97-G-H]
2.4. The declaration of metropolitan area by the H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A Governor, as provided in clause (c) of Article 243P is
specifically with reference to the law relating to
municipalities. The Bangalore Metropolitan Area as
defined in the Bangalore Development Authority Act is
only for the purpose of development i.e. development by
B way of building or engineering operations in or over or
under land. Therefore neither the provision defining
'metropolitan area' in Article 243P(c) nor the provision for
constitution of a Metropolitan Planning Committee for
preparing a draft development plan for such metropolitan
c area Linder Article 243ZE has any relevance or bearing to
the Bangalore Metropolitan Area with reference to which
BOA has been constituted. [Para 24) [98-D-G]
2.5. The area in which the BOA Act operates is totally
different from the areas in which Part IX A of the
D Constitution and Municipal Corporation Act which relate
to local self-government operate. The development plan
to be drawn for a metropolitan area, by a Metropolitan
Planning Committee should not be confused with a
development scheme to be drawn by a development
E authority like BOA for a metropolitan area. Insofar as
Bangalore is concerned, the Bangalore Metropolitan Area
as defined in Section 2(c) of the BOA Act is the area
comprising the City of Bangalore p.s defined in the City
of Bangalore Municipal Corporatipn Act, 1949, the area
F where the city of Bangalore lmprdvernent Act, 1945 was
immediately before the commencenient of the BOA Act
in force, and such other areas adjacent to the aforesaid,
as the Government may from time to time by notification
specify. On the other hand, the Bangalore Metropolitan
G Area, referred to in Section 503-B of Municipal
Corporation Act is an area to be specified by the
Governor by public notification under Article 243P(c) of
the Constitution of India. In fact the Governor had not
even specified the Bangalore Metropolitan Area for the
H . purpose of Municipal Corporation Act. Neither the
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 39
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Bangalore Metropolitan Area nor a Metropolitan Planning A
Committee is in existence under the Karnataka Municipal
Corporation Act. In these circumstances, it is not correct
to say that the BOA Act, is no longer in force and that
BOA has no jurisdiction or authority to draw up a
development scheme to form layouts and acquir~ land to B
form lay outs in pursuance of any development scheme
for Bangalore Metropolitan Area. [Para 25] [99-H; 100-A-
B; 102-B-C]
2.6. While it is true that BOA is not an elected body
like the municipality, it has several elected C
representatives as members. The members of the BOA
represent different interests and groups, technical
persons and elected representatives. Further, no
development scheme can be finalised or put into effect
without the sanction of the State Government which in D
turn has to take note of any representation by the
Bangalore Municipal Corporation in regard to the
development scheme. Therefore, the mere fact that BOA
is not wholly elected body as in the case of a Municipal
Corporation will make no difference. The membership E
pattern is more suited to fulfil the requirements of a
specialist agency executing development schemes.
Therefore, it is not correct to say that the provisions of
BOA Act become inoperative, on Parts IX and IX-A of the
Constitution coming into force. [Para 27] [100--G; F
101-E-G]
Question (iii) - Re : BOA lacking territorial jurisdiction to
draw up the development scheme:
3.1. It is not correct to say that Bangalore G
Development Authority does not have territorial
jurisdiction to form any development scheme in regard
to the 16 villages which are the subject matter of the final
declaration. [Para 41] [110-D]
3.2. Section 15 empowers the BOA to draw up H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2010] 6 S.C.R.
A de'telopment schemes or additional development
schemes for the development of the Bangalore
Metropolitan Area. Bangalore Metropolitan Area is defined
in Section 2(c). The areas in which the City of Bangalore
Improvement Act, 1945 was in force immediately before
B the commencement of BOA Act was the City of Bangalore
and other areas adjoining the city specified by the State
Government from time to time by notification (vide Section
1(2) of the said Act). [Para 29) (102-E-G]
3.3. The State Government issued a notification dated
C 1.11.1965, u/s. 4A (1) of the 'Town Planning Act' declaring
the area comprising the City of Bangalore and other areas
(218 villages) enumerated in Schedule I thereto to be the
'Local Planning Area' for the purposes of the said Act to
be called as the Bangalore City Planning Area and the
D limits of the said planning area were as described in
Schedule II thereto. All the 16 villages in which the lands
were acquired-for scheme in question fell within the said
Bangalore City Planning Area (that is within the 'other
areas' described in the I Schedule). The Government of
E Karnataka issued another notification dated 13.3.1984
declaring that the area comprising 325 peripheral villages
around Bangalore as indicated in Schedule I to be Local
Planning Area for the environs of Bangalore and the limits
of the said planning area shall be as indicated in
F Schedule II thereto. Schedule II to the notification dated
13.3.1984 gave the boundaries of the entire local planning
area of Bangalore which included not only 325 villages
which were added by the said notification but the original
planning area described and declared in the notification
G dated 1.11.1965. Thereafter, the Government of Karnataka
issued a notification dated 6.4.1984 amalgamating the
'Local Planning Area of Bangalore' declared under
notification dated 1.11.1965 anCI the 'Local Planning Area'
declared for the environs of Bangalore by notification
H dated 13.3.1984. The Government of Karnataka issued a
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 41
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
notification dated 1.3.1988 in exercise of the power u/s. A
2(c) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976
specifying the villages, indicated in I Schedule and within
the boundaries indicated in II Schedule to the notification
dated 13.3.1984, to be the areas for the purpose of the
said clause. [Paras 30, 31, 32 and 33] [102-H; 103-A-H; B
104-A-C]
3.4. The notification dated 1.3.1988 would show that
the clear intention of the State Government was to
declare the entire area declared under the notification
dated 1.11.1965 and the notification dated 13.3.1984, C
together as the Bangalore Metropolitan· Area. The
notification dated 1.3.1988 clearly states that the entire
area situated within the boundaries indicated in Schedule
II to the notification dated 13.3.1984 was the area for the
purpose of Section 2(c) of BOA Act. There is no dispute D
/that the boundaries indicated in Schedule II to the
notification dated 13.3.1984 would include not only the
villages enumerated in I Schedule to the notification dated
13.3.1984 but also the area that was declared as planning
area under the notification dated 1.11.1965. This is E
because the areas declared JJnder notification dated
1.11.1965 are the core area (Bangalore City) and the area
surrounding the core area that is 218 villages forming the
first concentric circle; and the area declared under the
notification dated 13.3.1984 (32-5 villages) surrounding the F
area declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965
forms the second concentric circle. Therefore, the
boundaries of the lands declared under the notification
dated 13.3.1984, would also include the lands which are
declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965 and G
therefore, the 16 villages which are the subject matter of
the impugned acquisition, are part of the Bangalore
Metropolitan Area. [Para 34] [104-G-H; 105-A-C]
3.5. It cannot be said that the note at the end of II
Schedule to the notification dated 13.3.1984 excluded the H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A Bangalore city planning area declared under the
notification dated 1.11.1965. As the planning area that was
being declared under the notification dated 13.3.1984, was
in addition to the area that was declared under the
notification dated 1.11.1965, it was made clear in the note
B at the end of the notification dated 13.3.1984 that the area
declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965 is to be
excluded. The purpose of the note was not to exclude the
area declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965 from
the local planning area. The intention was to specify what
c was being added, to the local planning area declared
under the notification dated 1.11.1965. But in the
notification dated 1.3.1988, what is declared as the
Bangalore Metropolitan Area is the area that is within the
boundaries indicated in schedule II to the notification
dated 13.3.1984, which is the area notified on 1.11.1965
0
as also the area notified on 13.3.1984. The note in the
notification dated 13.3.1984 was only a note for the
purposes of the notification dated 13.3.1984 and did not
form part of the notification dated 1.3.1988. There is
therefore no doubt that the in.tention of the State
E Government was to include the entire area within the
boundaries described in Schedule II, that is the area
declared under two notifications dated 1.11.1965 and
13.3.1984, as the Bangalore Metropolitan Area. [Para 35]
[105-D-H; 106-A-B]
F
3.6. It is true that the wording of the notification is
clumsy and ambiguous. When there is vagueness and
ambiguity, an interpretation that would avoid absurd
results should be adopted. The interpretation put forth by
G the appellants, if accepted would mean the outer centric
circle of Bangalore which consists of only the peripheral
villages would be the Bangalore Metropolitan Area and
neither the Bangalore city nor the 218 villages
immediately adjoining and surrounding the Bangalore
H city would form part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area. This
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 43
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
is absurd and will be in direct violation of Section 2(c) of A
BOA Act which states that Bangalore City and the areas
surrounding it where City of Bangalore Improvement Act,
1945 was in force, will form part of Bangalore Metropolitan
Area. [Para 37] [106-0-H]
8
3.7. The doctrine of casus omissus is a general rule
that the court may not by construction insert words or
phrases in a statute or supply a casus omissus by giving
force and effect to the language of the statute when
applied to a subject about which nothing whatever is
said, and which, to all appearances, was not in the mind C
of the legislature at the time of the enactment of law. But
the position will be different where the language is
ambiguous and an intelligible interpretation would require
addition of words particularly when the intention of the
State Government is clear and evident and it is reiterated D
by the State Government and the BOA. When the object
or policy of a statute can be ascertained, imprecision in
its language should not be readily allowed in the way of
adopting a reasonable construction which avoids
absurdities and incongruities and carries out the object E
or policy. A court cannot supply a real casus omissus,
nor can it interpret a statute to create a casus omissus
when there is really none. [Para 39] [107-G-H; 108-A-O]
Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray v. Justice 8. Lentin and Ors. F
1988 (4) SCC 419; S. R. Bommai and Ors. v. UOI and Ors.
1994 (3) SCC 1; Padma Sunder Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu
2002 (3) sec 533, referred to
American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series Vol. 73; Principles
of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh 2008 G
Edition - Page 65, referred to.
3.8. Section 2(c) of BOA Act makes it clear that the
city of Bangalore as defined in the Municipal Corporation
Act is part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area. It also makes
it clear that the areas where the city of Bangalore H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A Improvement Act, 1945 was in force, is also part of
Bangalore Metropolitan Area. It contemplates other areas
adjacent to the aforesaid areas being specified as part of
Bangalore Metropolitan Area by a notification. Therefore,
clearly, the area that is contemplated for being specified
B in a notification u/s. 2(c) is "other areas adjacent" to the
areas specifically referred to in Section 2(c). But it is seen
from the notification dated 1.3.1988 that it does not
purport to specify the "such other areas adjacent" to the
areas specifically referred to in section 2(c), but purports
c to specify the Bangalore Metropolitan Area itself as it
states that it is specifying the "areas for the purpose of
the said clause". If the notification specifies the entire
Bangalore Metropolitan Area, the interpretation put forth
by the appellants that only the villages included in
Schedule I to the notification dated 13.3.1984 would be
D
the Bangalore Metropolitan Area, would result In an
absurd situation. The notification dated 1.3.1988 made It
clear that the Bangalore Metropolitan Area would be the
area within the boundaries Indicated in II Schedule to the
notification dated 13.3.1984. It would mean that the three
E areas, namely, the central core area, the adjoining 218
villages constituting the first concentric circle area and
the next adjoining 325 villages forming the second
concentric circle are all included within the Bangalore
Metropolitan Area. What ls already specifically included
F by Section 2(c) of BOA Act cannot obviously be excluded
by notification dated 1.3.1988 while purporting to specify
the additional areas adjoining to the areas which were
already enumerated. Therefore, the proper way of reading
the notification dated 1.3.1988 is to read it as specifying
G 325 villages which are described in the First Schedule to
the notification dated 13.3.1984 to be added to the
existing met:nnolitan area and clarifying that the entire
areas within the boundaries of Second Schedule to the
notification dated 13.3.1984 would constitute the
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 45
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Bangalore Metropolitan Area. [Para 40) (108-G-H; 109-A- A
H; 110-A-C]
Question (iv) - Re : Invalidity of final declaration with
reference to time limit in Section 6 of Land Acquisition
Act:
B
4. BOA Act contains provisions relating to
acquisition of properties, up to the stage of publication
of final declaration. BOA Act does not contain the
subsequent provisions relating to completion of the
acquisition, that is issue of notices, enquiry and award,
vesting of land, payment of compensation,· principles
relating to determination of compensation etc. Section 36
of BOA Act does not make the Land Acquisition Act
applicable in its entirety, but states that the acquisition
under BOA Act, shall be regulated by_ the provisions, so o
far as they are applicable, of Land Acquisition Act.
Therefore it follows that where there are already
provisions in the BOA Act regulating certain aspects or
stages of acquisition or the proceedings relating thereto,
the corresponding provisions of LA Act will not apply to E
the acquisitions under the BOA Act. Only those
provisions of LA Act, relating to the ~tages of acquisition,
for which there is no provision in the BOA Act, are applied
to the acquisitions under the BOA Act. The BOA Act
contains specific provisions relating to preliminary
notification and final declaration. In factthe procedure up
F
to final declaration under BOA Act is different from the
procedure under the Land Acquisitio11 Act relating to
acquisition proceedings up to the stage of final
notification. Therefore, having regard to the Scheme for
acquisition u/ss. 15 to 19 of the BDA Act and the limited G
application of Land Acquisition Act in terms of Section
36 of BOA Act, the provisions of Sections 4 to 6 of Land
Acquisition Act will not apply to the acquisitions under
the BOA Act. If Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act is not
made applicable, the question of amendment to Section H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A 6 of Land Acquisition Act providing a time limit for issue
of final declaration, will also not apply. The final
declaration dated 23.2.2004 does not suffer from any
infirmity on account of the same having been published
a few days beyond one year from the date of publication
B of the preliminary notification u/ss. 17 (1) and (3) of the
BOA Act. [Para 43 & 44] (111-C-H; 112-A; G-H; 113-A]
Munithimmaiah vs. State of Karnataka 2002 (4) SCC
326, relied on
c Question (v) - Re: Applicability of Sections 4, 5A & 6 of
Land Acquisition Act:
5.1. It is not correct to say that the BOA Act has to
yield to Land Acquisition Act and consequently, tile
provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Land Acquisition Act
D will be applicable and have to be complied with fo1·
acquisitions under the BOA Act. [Para 51] [119-E]
5.2. The assumption by the appellant that Chapter Ill
of the BOA Act relating to development schemes does not
E provide for acquisition, is erroneous. Sections 15 to 19
of the BOA Act contemplate drawing-up of a
development scheme or additional development scheme
for the Bangalore Metropolitan Area, containing the
particulars set down in Section 16 of the said Act, which
F includes the details of the lands to be acquired for
execution of the scheme. Section 36 of BOA Act provides
that the "acquisition of land under this Act", shall be
regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable
of the Land Acquisition Act. In view of the categorical
G reference in Section 36 of the BOA Act, to acquisitions
under that Act, there cannot be any doubt that the
acquisitions for BOA is not under the Land Acquisition
Act, but under the BOA Act itself. It is also clear from
Section 36 that Land Acquisition Act, in its entirety, is not
applicable to the acquisition under the BOA Ace, but only
H such of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for
BON DU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 47
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
which a corresponding provision is not found in the BOA A
Act, will apply to acquisitions under the BOA Act. In view
of Sections 17 to 19 of the BOA Act, the corresponding
provisions - Sections 4 to 6 of the Land Acquisition Act
will not apply to acquisitions under the BOA Act. [Para
47] [114-E-F; 115-E-G] B
5.3. The question of repugnancy arises only when
both the legislatures are competent to legislate in the
same field, that is, when both the Union and State laws
relate to a subject in List Ill of Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution. Article 254 has no application except where C
the two laws relate to subjects in List Ill. But if the law
made by the State Legislature, covered by an Entry in the
State List, incidentally touches upon any of the matters
in the Concurrent List, it is well~settled that it will not be
considered to be repugnant to an existing Central law D
with respect to such a matter enumerated in the
Concurrent List. In such cases of overlapping between
mutually exclusive lists, the doctrine of pith and
substance would apply. Article 254(1) will have no
application if the State law in pith and substance relates E
to a matter in List II, even if it may incidentally trench upon
some item in List Ill. Where the law covered by an Entry
in the State List made by the State Legislature contains
a provision which direi:tly and substantially relates to a
matter enumerated in the Concurrent List and is F
repugnant to the provisions of any existing law with
respect to that matter in the Concurrent List, then the
repugnant provision in the State List may be void unless
it can co-exist and operate without repugnancy to the
provisions of the existing law. The BOA Act is an Act to G
provide for the establishment of a development authority
to facilitate and ensure planned growth and development
of the City of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto, and
that acquisition of any lands, for such development, is
merely incidental to the main object of the Act, that is H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R
A development of Bangalore Metropolitan area. In pith and
substance, the BOA Act is one which squarely falls under
Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and is not a law
for acquisition of land like the Land Acquisition Act,
traceable to Entry 42 of List Ill of the Seventh Schedule,
B the field in respect of which is already occupied by the
Central Act, as amended from time to time. If at all, BOA
Act, so far as acquisitfon of land for its developmental
activities is concerned, in substance and effect will
constitute a special law providing for acquisition for the
C special purposes of BOA and the same will not be
considered to be a part of the Land Acquisition Act. The
appellant have erroneously assumed that BOA Act is a
law referable to Entry 42 of List Ill, while it is a law
referable to Entry 5 of List II. Hence the question of
repugnancy and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act
0
prevailing over Section 19 of BOA Act would not at all
arise. [Para 49] [116-F-H; 117-A-H; 118-A]
Mis. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals vs. State of Bihar - 1983
(4) SCC 45; Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia AIR 1947 PC 72;
E: Lakhi Narayan v. Province of Bihar AIR 1950 FC 59, relied
on.
Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka 2002 (4) SCC 326,
referred to.
F 5.4. The assumption that a final declaration u/s. 19
has to be preceded by an inquiry, similar to what is
contemplated u/s. 5A of Land Acquisition Act, is without
any basis. The scheme of BOA Act also contemplates
consideration of objections but does not require any
G personal hearing or inquiry. While the scheme for
acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act and the BOA
Act contemplates notice to the landholders/persons
interested, the procedure thereafter is markedly different.
Therefore, it is impermissible to import the requirement
H of Section 5A of Land Acqusition Act in regard to
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 49
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
acquisitions under the BOA Act. [Para 50] [118-B, F-G; A
119-D]
Question (vi) - Re : Non-compliance with Sections 15 to
19 of the BOA Act:
(a) Absence of Specifying and Discrepancy in extract: B
6.1. The mere fact that there were some modifications
from time to time between the date when the initial
proposal was mooted till the issue of the notification u/s.
17(1) and (3) or that some lands were omitted/deleted in
the declaration u/s. 19(1) will not affect the validity of the C
scheme. The changes and modifications are intact
contemplated in the process of making the scheme u/ss.
15 to 19 of BOA Act. [Para 56] [123-B-D]
(b) Non-furnishing of material particulars to the o
Government for the purpose of sanction:
6.2. It cannot be said that the material required for
seeking sanction had not been furnished by the BOA to
the Government. Section 18 is clear about the material to
be furnished by the BOA for seeking sanction of the E
scheme. On examining the records of the BOA and the
Government, the Division Bench recorded a finding that
all the required particulars had been furnished so that the
Government can apply its mind. In fact, the notings show
that in response to the further information sought by the F
Government, the Authority furnished the required
information. The project map was not one of the
documents that had to be furnished by the BOA while
seeking sanction of the scheme. In fact the scheme report
had been submitted on 5.2.2004 itself and that had been G
made available to the Government. The Government had
stated therein that whatever particulars that were required
to be furnished, had been furnished and they were
satisfied that the scheme required to be sanctioned. It is
H
50 .SUPREME COURT REPORTS (20'10] 6 S.C.R.
A only thereafter that sanction was granted. [Para 60) [126-
D-H; 127-A-B]
(c) Absence of valid sanction by the Government:
6.3. In the instant case, the matter (relating to
B sanction u/ss. 18(3) of BOA Act) was placed befo.re the
Chief Minister who also happened to be the Ministt:lr-in-
Charge on 20.2.2004. He granted the approval subject to
ratification by the Cabinet. In view of the subsequent
ratification by the Cabinet there is nothing irregular in the
c procedure adopted. The delay in ratification was on
account of the dissolution of the House. [Para 62) [129-
F-H]
6.4. It cannot be said that the sanction is void. Rule
12 requires that the matter should ordinarily be
D considered at a meeting of the Cabinet. This itself shows
that there can be exceptional circumstances where it will
not be possible to place it before the Cabinet. The
approval granted by the Chief Minister, subject to the
ratification of the Cabinet was treated by the Urban
E Development Department as approval for the sanction u/
s. 18(3) and a Government order was made in the name
of the Governor granting sanction u/s. 18(3) of the BOA
Act. The State Government also issued a final declaration
u/s. 19(1) of BOA Act. It is thus evident that the State
F Government proceeded on the basis that the order of
approval of the Chief Minister for the sanction, was
sufficient for grant of sanction. Even if it is to be assumed
that such approval was irregular as it was made subject
to ratification, as the ratification was subsequently made,
G the challenge for want of proper approval of the Cabinet
for the sanction cannot be accepted. (Para 63) (130-A-D]
Question (vii) : Re : Discrimination, malafides and
arbitrariness : .
H
7.1. The State Government granted sanction for
BONDU RAMASV'!AMY v. BANGALORE 51
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
acquisition of 2750 acres after noting that 589 acres 12 A
guntas was excluded from the proposed extent of 3339
acres 12 guntas, after considering the representations
received in pursuance of notices issued u/s. 17(5~of BOA
Act. But when the cases came up before the High Court
and this court, the categorical case of BOA is that the total B
area notified u/s. 17(1) and (3) of the BOA Act, was 3839
acres 12 guntas and that the area deleted/excluded was
1089 acres 12 guntas. How the preliminary notification
extent ar1::1a increased by 500 acres and how the area
deleted also increased exactly by 500 acres is not c
properly explained and ic; virtually a mystery. [Para 64]
[131-0-F]
7.2. The BOA does not seriously dispute the fact that
there were some amount of arbitrariness and
discrimination in the matter of inclusions and exclusions. D
Apart from that the BOA has not come up with true and
correct position. The break up of deletions and the
reasons for such deletions have not been disclosed. The
extent of deletion without explanation has jumped froi:n
589.12 acres to 1089.12 acres. The BOA has not chosen E
to explain the exact extent of the Government land
involved. Even the map produced showing the 2750 acres
of acquired land and 1089 acres 12 guntas of deleted
area contains several discrepancies. [Para 69, 70] [134-
C-F] F
7.3. The acquisition was for planned development of
the city and to avoid haphazard growth. But when the
layout plan is examined with reference to the preliminary
notification and final declaration, several startling facts
emerge. Pick and choose method was adopted with G
reference to two villages. Haphazard and arbitrary
exclusions are in several other villages also, though not
to the extent in the above-mentioned two villages. [Para
72, 73) [135-G-H; 136-A, G]
H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 6 S.C.R.
A 7.4. The object of establishing a deve.lopment
authority is to provide fo.r orderly and planned
development so that the haphazard growth of a city is
checked. Large tracts of lands running into hundreds of
acres are acquired to have integrated layouts. [Para 74)
1::3 [138-B; 139-A]
7.5. If authorities like BOA notify 3000 acres of land
for development and then delete from the proposed
acquisition several pockets which aggregate to about
1000 to 1500 acres, then the result is obvious. There will
C be no integrated development at all. What was intended
to be a uniform, contiguous and continuous layout of
3000 acres will get split into small pockets which are not
connected with the other pockets or will be intersected
by own illegal pockets of private colonies thereby
D perpetuating what was intended to be prevented, that is
haphazard growth without proper infrastructure. [Para
75) [140-B-C]
7.6. The deletion from proposed acquisition should
E be only with regard to areas which are already well
developed in a planned manner. Sporadic small
unauthorised constructions in unauthorised colonies/
layouts, are not to be deleted as the very purpose of
acquisition for planned development is to avoid such
unauthorised development. If hardship is the reason for
F such deletion, the appropriate course is to give
preference to the land/plot owners in making allotments
and help them to resettle and not to continue the illegal
and haphazard pockets merely on the ground that some
temporary structure or a dilapidated structure existed
G therein. A development authority should either provide
orderly development or should stay away from
development. The power of deletion and withdrawal
unless exercised with responsibility and fairly and
reasonably, will play havoc with orderly development, will
H add to haphazard and irregular growth and create
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 53
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
discontent among sections of society who were not A
fortunate to have their lands deleted. [Paras 76 and 77]
[141-C-G]
7.7. Single Judge as also the Division Bench of High
Court have concurrently found that BOA had indulged in
8
pick and choose deletions and acquisitions. They have
found discrimination and irregularities, both in initial
omission of certain lands and in deleting of some lands
. which were notified. They have also recorded a finding
that having regard to the nature of deletions, the required
lands do not form a continuous or contiguous area and C
acquisition of small extents of land surrounded by large
chunks of un-acquired lands and lands which have been
omitted from acquisition would make the development of
acquired pockets exceedingly difficult. [Para 78] [142-0-
E] D
7.8. The Division Bench was of the view that
quashing of the entire acquisition may not be the remedy.
It, therefore, decided to salvage t~e situation by issuing
a series of directions, whereby the land owners were E
permitted to apply for· deletion of their lands also from
acquisition on the ground that (a) the lands were situated
within green belt area; (b) the lani,s were totally built up;
(c) the lands had buildings constructed by charitable,
educational and/or religious institutions; (d) the lands
were used for nurseries; (e) lands where running factories
F
had been set up; and (f) lands were similar to the
adjoining lands which were not notified for acquisition.
The Court directed that if the BOA comes to the
conclusion that the lands of applicants were released are
similar to those which have been excluded from G
acquisition their lands should also be deleted from
acquisition. [Para 79] [142-F-H; 143-A]
7.9. The fact that an Authority has extended favours
illegally in the case of several persons cannot be a H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A ground for courts to issue a mandamus directing
repetition thereof, by applying the principle of equality.
Article 14 guarantees equality before law and not equality
in subverting law nor equality in securing illegal benefits.
But courts cannot be silent bystanders If acquisition
s process is used by officers of the Authority with ulterior
or malafide motives. [Para 81) [146-D-F]
Chandigarh Admn. and Anr. v. Jagjit Singh and Anr.
1995 (1) SCC 745; Gurshanan Singh and Ors. v. New Delhi
Municipal Committee and Ors. 1996 (2) SCC 459; State of
C Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann 1997 (3) SCC 321, relied on
7.10. A land owner is not entitled to seek deletion of
his land from acquisition, merely on the ground that lands
of some others have been deleted. He should make out
0 a justifiable cause for deleting his land from acquisition.
If the Rules/Scheme/Policy provides for deletion of
certain categories of land and if the petitioner falls under
those categories, he will be entitled to relief. But if under
the Rules or Scheme or policy for deletion, his land is not
E eligible for deletion, his land cannot be deleted merely on
the ground that some other land similarly situated had
been deleted (even though that land also did not fall
under any category eligible to be deleted), as that would
amount to enforcing negative equality. But where large
extents of land of ot~ers are indiscriminately and
F arbitrarily deleted, then the court may grant relief, if on
account of such deletions, the development scheme for
that ar"!•' has become inexecutable or has resulted in
abandonment of the scheme. Alternatively, if a common
factor can be identified in respect of other lands which
G were deleted, and if the petitioner's land also has that
common factor, relief can be granted on the ground that
the Authority had adopted the common factor as the
criterion in the case of others and therefore adopting the
same yardstick, the land of petitioners also should be
H deleted. These principles may be kept in view while
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 55
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
implementing direction of the Judgment of the Division A
Bench of the High Court. [Para 82] [148-G-H; 149-A-D]
7.11. Frequent complaints and grievances in regard
to the following areas, with reference to the prevailing
system of acquisitions governed by Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, requires the urgent attention of the State 8
Governments and development authorities: (i) absence of
proper or adequate survey and planning before
embarking upon acquisition; (ii) indiscriminate use of
emergency provisions in Section 17 of the Land
Acquisition Act; (iii)notification of areas far larger than C
. what is actually required, for acquisition, and then making
, arbitrary deletions and withdrawals from the acquisitions;
(iv)offer of very low amount as compensation by Land
Acquisition Collectors, necessitating references to court
in almost all cases; (v) inordinate delay in payment of D
compensation; and (vi) absence of any rehabilitatory
measures. [Para 84] [152-C-GJ
Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Mahaboob 2009 (3)
SCALE 263, referred to.
E
7 .12. There are several avenues for providing
rehabilitation and economic security to land-losers. They
can be by way of offering employment, allotment of
alternative lands, providing housing or house plots,
providing safe investment opportunities for the F
compensation amount to generate a stable income, or
providing a permanent regular income by way of
, annuities. The nature of benefits to the landlosers can
) vary depending upon the nature of the acquisition. For
1 this limited purpose, the acquisitions can be conveniently G
divided into three broad categories: (i) Acquisitions for
the benefit of the general public or in national interest; (ii)
Acquisitions for economic. development and industrial
growth; and (iii) Acquisitions for planned development of
urban areas. [Para 85] [153-B-F] H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A 7.13. Acquisitions of the first kind, does not normally
create any resistance or hostility. But in acquisitions of
the second kind, where the beneficiaries of acquisition
are industries, business houses or private sector
companies and in acquisitions of the third kind where the
B beneficiaries are private individuals, there is a general
feeling among the land-losers that their lands are taken
away, to benefit other classes of people; that their lands
are given to others for exploitation or enjoyment, while
they are denied their land and their source of livelihood.
c When this grievance and resentment remains
unaddressed, it leads to unrest and agitations. The
solution is to make the land-losers also the beneficiaries
of acquisition so that the land-losers do not feel alienated
but welcome the acquisition. [Para 86] [154-A-D]
D 7.14. It is necessary to evolve tailor-made schemes
to suit particular acquisitions, so that they will be smooth,
speedy, litigation free and beneficial to all concerned.
Proper planning, adequate counselling, and timely
mediation with different groups of land-losers, should be
E resorted. [Para 87] [154-E-F]
7.15. In acquisitions of the first kind the State should
however ensure that the landloser gets reasonable
compensation promptly at the time of dispossession, so
that he can make alternative arrangements for his
F rehabilitation and survival. Where the acquisition is for
industrial or business houses the State should act as a
benevolent trustee and safeguard the interests of the
landlosers. The Land Acquisition Collectors should also
become Grievance Settlement Authorities. The various
G alternatives including providing employment, providing
equity participation, providing annuity benefits ensuring
a regular income for life, providing rehabilitation in the
form of housing or new businesses, should be
considered and "Nhichever is 'ound feasible or suitable
H should be made an integral process of the scheme of
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 57
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
such acquisitions. Where the acquisition is of the third A
kind, the land-losers can be given a share in the
development itself, by making available a reasonable
portion of the developed land to the land-loser so that he
can either use it personally or dispose of a part and retain
a part or put it to other beneficial use. [Para 87] [154-G- B
H; 155-A, D; 155-E-G]
,·
7.16. There is also a ·need for' the Law Commission
and the Parliament to revisit the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, which is more than a century old. There is also a
need to remind Development Authorities that they exist C
to serve the people and not vice versa. Any development
scheme should be to benefit the society and improve the
city, and not to benefit the Development Authority. [Para
88) [156-E-H]
D,
7.17. Where arbitrary and unexplained deletions and .
exclusions from acquisition, of large extents of notified
lands, render the acquisitions meaningless, or totally
unworkable, the court will have no alternative but to
quash the entire acquisition. But where many land-losers E
have accepted the acquisition and received the
compensation, and where possession of considerable
portions of acquired lands has already been taken, and
development activities have been carried out by laying
plots and even making provisional or actual allotments, F
those factors have to be taken note of, while granting
relief. The Division Bench has made an effort to protect
the interests of all parties, on the facts and
circumstances, by issuing detailed directions. But
implementation of these directions may lead to further
litigations and complications. To salvage the acquisition G
and to avoid hard~hips to BOA and its allottees and to
avoid prolonged further round litigations emanating from
the directions of the High Court, a more equitable way
would be to uphold the decision of the Division Bench,
but subject BDA's actions to certain corrective measures H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A by requiring it to re-examine certain aspects and provide
an option to the landlosers to secure some additional
benefit, as an incentive to accept the acquisition. A
direction to provide an option to the land-losers to seek
allotment of developed plots in lieu of compensation or
s to provide for preferential allotment of some plots at the
prevailing market price in addition to compensation will
meet the ends of justice. Such directions will not be in
conflict with the BOA (Allotment of sites) Rules, as they
are intended to save the acquisitions. [Para 90) [157-G-
C H; 158-A-O]
Conclusion:
8.1. In regard to the acquisition of lands in two
villages, BOA is directed to re-consider the objections to
0 the acquisitions having regard to the fact that large areas
were not initially notified for acquisition, and more than
50% of whatever that was proposed for acquisition was
also subsequently deleted from acquisition. BOA has to
consider whether in view of deletions to a large extent,
E whether development with respect to the balance of the
acquired lands has become illogical and impractical, and
if so, whether the balance area also should be deleted
from acquisition. If BOA proposes to continue the
acquisition, it shall file a report within four months before
the High Court so that consequential orders could be
F passed. [Para 91) [158-G-H; 159-A-B]
8.2. In regard to villages where there are several very
small pockets of acquired lands surrounded by lands
which were not acquired or which were deleted from the
G proposed acquisition, BOA may consider whether such
small pockets should also be deleted if they are not
suitable for forming self contained layouts. The
acquisition thereof cannot be justified on the ground that
these small islands of acquired land, could be used as a
H stand alone park or playground in regard to a layout
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 59
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
formed in different unconnected lands in other villages. A
Similar isolated pockets in other villages should also be
dealt with in a similar manner. [Para 91) [159-C-E]
8.3. BOA shall give an option to each writ petitioner
whose land has been acquired for the layout in question
to accept allotment of 15% (fifteen percent) of the land B
acquired from him, by way of developed plots, in lieu of
compensation (any fractions in ex_cessof 15% may be
charged prevailing rates of allotment) or (b) in. cases
where the extent of land acquired exceeds half an acre,
to claim in addition to compensation (without prejudice c
to seek reference if he is not satisfied with the quantum),
allotment of a plot measuring 30' x 40' for every half acre
of land acquired at the prevailing allotment price. [Para
91) [159-E-H; 160-A]
D
Case Law Reference:
2002 (4) sec 326 Relied on. Paras 9, 44
AIR 1958 SC 468 Followed Para 10
1963 Supp (1) SCR 912 Referred to. Para 11 E
1988 (4) sec 419 Referred to. Para 39
1994 (3) sec 1 Referred to. Para 39
2002 (3) sec 533 Referred to. Para 39
·F
2002 (4) sec 326 Referred to. Para 49
1983 (4) sec 45 Relied on. Para 49
AIR 1947 PC 72 Relied on. Para 49
AIR 1950 FC 59 Relied on. Para 49 G
1995 (1) sec 745 Relied on. Para 80
1996 (2) sec 459 Relied on. Para 80
1997 (3) sec 321 Relied on. Para 80 H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A 2009 (3) SCALE 263 Referred to. Para 83
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4097 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 25.112005 of the High
B Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in W.A. Nos. 2625 of 2005,
2626 & 2721 of2005 alongwith W.P. Nos. 11365 & 14771 of
2005.
With
c Civil Appeal Nos. 4133, 4098, 4099, 4100, 4101, 4102, 4103,
4104,4105,4106,4107,4108,4109,4110,4111,4112,4113,
4114,4115,4116,4117,4118,4119,4120,4121,4122,4123,
4124, 4125, 4126, 4127, 4128, 4129, 4130, 4131, 4132 &
4179-80 of 2010, SLP ..... (CC/No. 5682 of 2006)
D Dushyant A. Dave, V.N. Lakshmi Naraina, K.K.
Venugopal, Altaf Ahmed, P. Viswanatha Shetty, P.R.
Ramesesh, Kiran Suri, Subramani, S.J. Smith, Girish
Ananthamurthy, P.P. Singh, R.S. Hegde, Chandra Prakash,
Rahul Tyagi, Savitri Pandy, Roy Abraham, Seema Jain,
E Himinder Lal, S.N. Bhat, N.P.S. Panwar, D.P. Chaturvedi,
D.Pavanesh, Satya Mitra, Joseph Pookkatt, Prashant Kumar,
· Pooja Dhar, Atrayee Majumdar, Nikhil Majithia, Saurabh Suman
Sinha, Dileep Tandon, Shailesh Madiyal, Raka Bijoy Phookan,
Hrishikesh Baruah, Arjun Bobde, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi
F Agrawala, E.C. Agrawala, Gaurav Goel, S.S. Shamshery,
· Pramod Kumar (for Dr. Kailash Chand),· N.D.R. Ramchandra
Rao, Vaijayanthi Girish, T.V. Ratnam, K. Subba Rao, P.S.
Dinesh Kumar, Naresh Kaushik, Lalita Kaushik, B.S. Methaila,
Arnita Kalkal, Parag Goyal, Satish D., Kh. Nobin Singh, Nataraj
G R., Rajesh Mahale, Radhananda, Raghavendra S. Srivatsa,
Rajesh Mahale, K.N. Manjunath, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, K.H.
Soma Shekar, Prakash Kumar Singh, Priya Kasyap, Nikhil
Nayyar, Ankit Singhal, Vivekananda, V.N. Raghupathy, G.V.
Chandrashekar (for Anjana Chandrashekar), R.B. Phookan,
H (for J.S. Bhatia), S. Balaji, S. Sainivasan, Madhusmita Bora,
80NDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 61
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
S.R. Sharma, M:A. Chinnasamy, K. Krishna Kumar, B.B. A
Chauhan, Sanjay Parikh, M.Qamaruddin, M. Qumaruddin (for
Ambar Qamaruddin), S.K. Kulkarni, Anukur S. Kulkarni,
Nirnimesh Dube, M. Gireesh Kumar, S.J. Aristotle, Vijay Kumar,
Sanjay R.Hegde; Anil K. Mishra, Vikrant Yadav, Rajesh
Srivastava; Krishnan Venugopal, Shashi Kiran Shetty, Sharan B
Dev Singh Thakur, Pradeep Kr. Bakshi for the appearing
patties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R.V. RAVEENDRAN J. 1. Leave granted. These appeals c
relate to the challenge of acquisition of lands for formation of
Arkavathi layout on the outskirts of Bangalore by the Bangalore
Development Authority [for short 'BOA'] under the Bangalore
Development Authority Act, 1976 ('BOA Act' or 'Act' for short).
2. On 2.1.2001 the Executive Engineer (North) of BOA D
submitted a scheme report with detailed estimates for formation
of a proposed new layout in an area of 1650 acres spread over
twelve villages, to be called as 'Hennur Devanahalli Layout'. On
7.10.2002 after an initial sul'Vey, the Additional Land Acquisition
Officer of BOA submitted a report proposing that 3000 acres E
of land in the said twelve villages and two adjoining villages
(Chellakere and Kempapura) and suggested that scheme may
be called as 'Arkavathi Town or layout' instead of 'Hennur
Devanahalli layout'. The Commissioner agreed with the
proposal on 8.10.2002 and placed the matter before the F
Authority (that is the members constituting the Bangalore
Development Authority). The Authority in its meeting held on
10.12.2002 considered the proposal and decided to issue
preliminary notification under sub-sections (1) and (3) of section
17 of BOA Act proposing to acquire in all about 3000 acres of G
land in 14 villages. After the said resolution, lands in two more
villages (Nagavara and Hebbala) were also included to provide
better access to the layout. A preliminary notification dated
3.2.2003 under sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 17 of BOA
Act was issued proposing to acquire 3339 acres 12 guntas. H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 6 S.C.R.
A Certain government lands, tanks, grazing lands, tank
catchments area, stone quarry, burial grounds were shown in
the Schedule to the notification dated 3.2.2003, but their extent
was not included in the abstract of lands proposed to be
acquired. The abstract apparently referred only to the ptlvate
s lands to be acquired. In the circumstances, a modified
preliminary notificatio.n was issued in August 2003 published
in the Gazette dated 16.9.2003 showing the total extent of land
likely to be needed for the purpose of formation of Akravathi
Layout as 3839 A, 12 G of land. The s~id extent of land was
c situated in the following 16 villages : (1) Dasarahalli (2)
Byrathikhane (3) Chellakere (4) Geddalahalli (5) K.
Narayanapura (6) Rachenahalli (7) Thanisandra (8)
Amaruthahalli (9) Jakkur (10) Kempapura (11) Sampigehalli
(12) Srirampura (13) Venkateshapura (14) Hennur (15)
Hebbala and (16) Nagavara.
0
3. Notices were issued to land owners under section 17(5)
of the Act giving an opportunity to show cause why the
acquisition should not be made. Public notice was also issued
in the newspapers inviting objections. No objections were
E received in regard to 91 acres 7 Guntas. The objections
received in regard to 2658 acres were considered and
rejected. The Authority decided to seek the sanction of the
government for the acquisition of 2750 acres of land, after
deleting 1089 A 12 G acres of land from the proposed scheme.
F On 3.2.2004, the authority passed a resolution to obtain the
approval of the state government for implementation of the
Arkavathi layout under Section 15(2) of BDA Act and
requesting sanction for acquisition of 2750 acres for formation
of 28600 sites of different dimensions. The scheme as
G modified at an estimated cost of Rs. 981.36 crores (in view of
the reduction of the area to 2750 acres), along with the draft
final notification and relevant records was forwarded by the
BDA to the State Government, under cover of letter dated
13.2.2004. After securing certain clarification, by Government
Order dated 21.2.2004, the Sta.te government accorded
!H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 63
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
sanction for the scheme under Section 18(3) of the Act. In A
pursuance of it, the .final declaration dated 23.2.2004 was
issued by the State Government, under section 19(1) of the Act
(published in the Karnataka Gazette on the same day) stating
that sanction had been granted for the scheme and declaring
that the lands specified in the Schedule thereto in all 2750 acres B
(a little more or less) were needed for the public purpose of
formation.of Arkavathi Layout. According to BOA, in pursuance
of the same, it made several awards from 12.5.2004 onwards
in regard to extent of 1618.38 acres took possession of
1459.37 acres of private land and 459.16 acres of government c
land in all 1919.13 acres, and formed the layout by laying 14103
plots, apart from roads, drains etc.
4. Several writ petitions were filed challenging the
acquisition. A learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High
Court by order dated 15.4.2005 allowed the writ petitions and D
quashed the entire acqui~Jtion holding as follows:
(i) BOA had no jurisdiction or authority to take· up any
development scheme in Bangalore Metropolitan Area
having regard to parts IX and IXA of the Constitution read E
with section 503B of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation
Act, 1976.
(ii) There were several discrepancies in the scheme and
the scheme was not properly framed. There was also no
application of mind by the State Government or proper F
consideration of the scheme, before according sanction
under section 18(3) of the BOA Act.
(iii) BOA Act has to yield to the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 ('LA Act' for short) which is a central G
legislation and ihe mandatory procedures laid down in the
said Central Act had to be applied and followed even in
regard to acquisitions under the BOA Act to have a
uniformity. Neither the procedures laid down under the LA
Act nor the procedures laid down under BOA Act were H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 6 S.C.R.
A followed by BOA in regard to this acquisition.
(iv) As BOA is not elected body having the mandate of the
people, and as BOA is subordinate to the state
government, it cannot acq.uire lands for public purpose and
the notification under Section 17(1) of BOA Act is bad in
B
law, for non-issue of a notification under Section 4(1) of
LA Act by the State Government.
(v) The Acquisition cannot be said to be for public purpose,
as BOA did not demonstrate that 3000 acres were
c required for 28600 plots and no valid reasons were
assigned for deleting a large extent of land from the
acquisition.
(vi) The Commissioner of BOA could not authorise his
subordinate, namely, the Addi. Land Acquisition Officer, to
D
perform duties under section 4(2) of LA Act.
(vii) The 'enquiry' by the Authority to consider the
objections to the acquisition was not fair, reasonable or
in compliance with the principles of natural justice.
E
(viii) The action of BOA in forming sites for allotment, even
before issuing a notification under section 16(2) of the LA
Act (as amended in Karnataka), declaring that possession
has been taken, was bad in law.
F
(ix) The amendment to BOA (Allotment of Sites) Rules,
1984, removing the restrictions on the allottee in regard
to alienation/use, had the effect of reducing BOA, a
statutory development authority, into a mere dealer/estate
agent in real estate.
G
(x) Deletion of lands similar to and contiguous to the lands
of the appellants, while acquiring their lands, amounts to
hostile discrimination violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 65
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
5. Feeling aggrieved, the BOA filed writ appeals which A
were allowed by a division bench of the High Court, by a
common judgment dated 25.11.2005 and upheld the
acquisition. The Division Bench however affirmed the finding
of discrimination in acquisition of some lands while deleting
similarly placed adjacent lands and gave liberty to land owners B
to file applications seeking withdrawal from acquisition on the
ground of discrimination. The Division Bench held:
(i) BOA is not a municipality and the provisions of the BOA
Act, which is a special legislation, are not inconsistent with C
Parts IX and IX(a) of the Constitution of India or the
provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act,
1976 or the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964; and the
provisions of BOA Act are neither impliedly nor expressly
repealed by Part IX or IX(A) of the Constitution.
D
(ii) BOA Act is a special self-contained Code enacted by
the State Government for development of Bangalore
Metropolitan Area under power traceable to Entry 5 of List
II of S~venth Schedule. Sections 4, SA and 6 of LA Act
are not applicable and do not override the provisions of E
Section 17 to 19 of the BOA Act and the provisions of LA
Act do not override the proviSions of BOA Act.
(iii) The acquisition was for a public purpose and there is
no violation of Article 19 or Article 21 of the Constitution
F
of India.
(iv) The Commissioner of BOA, in his capacity as its Chief
Executive and Administrative Officer is empowered to
authorise his subordinates to enter upon the lands in
question to carry out survey and measurements. The error G
in invoking Section 4(2) of LA Act instead of Section 52
of BOA Act for entry and measurements is only mentioning
of a wrong provision of law and does not vitiate the
authorisation under Section 52 of BOA Act.
H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 6 S.C.R.
A (v) The sanction accorded by the State Government under
Section 18(3) of BOA Act is valid and does not suffer from
the vice of non-application of mind. The procedure adopted
namely Chief Minister approving the scheme subject to
ratification by the Cabinet and the subsequent ratification
B is valid and not open to question by appellants.
(vi) Though there was discrimination in the matter of
acquisition, that would not invalidate the acquisition and the
same could be set right by consequential directions.
C 6. The Division Bench therefore set aside the order of the
learned Single Judge. It also allowed a writ appeal filed by a
former Chief Minister and expunged certain unwarranted
remarks against the former Chief Minister in para 30 of the
learned Single Judge's order and further held as follows :
D
(C). The acquisition of the lands for the formation of
Akravathi Layout is upheld subject to the following
conditions :
(a) In so far as the site owners are concerned they are
E entitled to the following reliefs :
(i) These site owners/writ petitioners shall register
themselves as applicants for allotment under the
Bangalore Development Authority (Allotment of
F Site) Rules 1984 within a period of two months from
today (extendable by another one month by BOA, if
sufficient cause is shown). Petitioners will have to
pay the registration fee. They need not pay initial
deposit as their sites have been acquired and they
G have agree not to receive compensation in regard
to the sites under this arrangement.
(ii) The petitioners shall file applications for allotment
of sites to BOA within three months from today in
the prescribed form stating that they are applicants
H who were the petitioners in these writ petitions.
I
BONOU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 67
nEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENORAN, J.]
Petitioners shall file their documents with BOA A
within a period of two months to enable BOA to
verify the same.
(iii) BOA will treat them as applicants entitled to priority
in allotment and allot each of them a site
B
measuring 30 x 40 in Arkavathi layout or in any
other nearby layouts in Bangalore at the prevailing
allotment prices subject to petitioners satisfying the
twin requirements for allotment under the BOA
(Allotment of sites) Rules 1984, that they must be
the residents of Bangalore (ten year domicile) and
c
should not be owning any residential property in
Bangalore.
(iv) If there are no rival claimants for compensation in
regard to the plots claimed by petitioners, and if the 0
ownership of the petitioners in regard to their
respective sites which have been acquired is not
disputed, BOA shall calculate the compensation
payable to the petitioners and give credit to the
same by adjusting the same towards the allotment E
price for the site to be allotted and call upon the
petitioners to pay the balance. Petitioners shall be
given six months time for making payment. {To
enable petitioners to know the amount of
compensation which they will be entitled and to F
ascertain how much balance they should pay].
(v) If there are rival claimants in regard to the survey
numbers or the sites or if any petitioners title in
regard to the sites are challenged, BOA shall make
a reference in regard to the compensation in regard G
to such site/land in question, to the civil court under
section 30 of the Land Acguisition Act, 1894, and
the petitioners will have to sort out the matter before
the reference court. In that event, such petitioners ·
will have to pay the full allotment price within the H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A time stipulated, without seeking adjustment of
compensation for the acquired site.
(vi) If any of the petitioners does not fulfil the
requirements for allotment, under the allotment
rules, their cases may be considered for allotment
B
of 20 x 30 sites as per the Rules containing
incentive scheme for voluntary surrender of lands.
For the purpose of the said scheme, such
petitioners will be deemed to have voluntarily
surrendered the sites.
c
(vii) The above scheme will be available to only those
who are owners, as a consequence of execution of
registered sale deeds in their favour prior to the
date of preliminary notification (and not to GPA/
D Agreement holders).
(D) In so far as the land owners excluding the site owners,
are entitled to the following reliefs : -
(i) All the petitioners who are the land owners who are
E seeking dropping of the acquisition proceeding in
so far as their respective lands are concerned, on
the ground that (a) their lands are situated within
green belt area; (b) they are totally built up; (c)
properties wherein there are buildings constructed
F by charitable, educational and/or religious
institutions (d) nursery lands; (e) who have set up
factories (f) their lands are similar to the lands which
are adjoining their lands but not notified for
acquisition at all, are permitted to make appropriate
G application to the authorities seeking such exclusion
and exemption and producing documents to
substantiate their contentions within one month
from the date of this order.
It is made clear that the BOA shall consider such
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 69
l?E.VFbPPM~NT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.)
request keeping in mind the status of the land as A
on the date of preliminary notification and to exclude
any developments, improvemer:its, constructions put
up subsequent to the preliminary notification and
they decided whether their cases as similar to that
of the land owners whose lands, are notified for B
~gquisition, flOtified and whose objections were
upheld and no final natification is issued.
In the event of BDA comes to the conclusion that
the lands of those persons are similarly placed, then C
to exclude those lands from acquisition.
(ii) Petitioners who are interested in availing this
benefit shall ma~e appropriate application within 30
days from the date of this order and thereafter the
BDA shall give notice to these persons, hear them D
13nd pass appropriate ·orders expeditiously.
(iii) Till the ~foresaid exercise is undertaken by the BDA
and the application filed by the petitioners either for
allotment of site or for denotifying or exemption E
sought for are considered their possession shall not
be disturbed and the existing construction shall not
be demolished. After consideration of the
applications, in the light of the aforesaid directions,
if the lands are not excluded then the BOA is at F
liberty t<;> pr9ceed with the acquisition.
(E) The BOA is directed to exclude the land bearing Sy.
No.9/1 measuring 0.27, 10/2 measuring 1.16 and 10/3
measuring 1.02 of land which are the subject matter of WP
Nos; 1353-54 of 2005 filed by University of Agricultural G
Science Employees House Building Cooperative Society
from acquisition.
(F) W.P. No.28087 of 2004 is allowed and acquisition of
land in respect of 53 acres of land in Nagavara villag~ H
: ...
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A which is the subject matter of the aforesaid writ petition Is
quashed.
7. The said judgment is challenged by the land-losers on
several grounds. On the contentions urged, the following
B questions arise for consideration :
(i) Whether BOA Act, in so far as it provides for compulsory
acquisition of property, is still-born and ineffective as it did
not receive the assent of the President, as required by
Article 31 (3) of the Constitution of India.
c
(ii) Whether the provisions of the BOA Act, in particular
section 15 read with section 2(c) dealing with the power
of the Authority to draw up schemes for development for
Bangalore Metropolitan Area became inoperative, void or
D was impliedly repealed, by virtue of Parts IX and IX(A) of
the Constitution inserted by the 73rd and 74th
Amendments to the Constitution.
(iii) Whether the sixteen villages where the lands have
been acquired, fall outside the Bangalore Metropolitan
E Area as defined in section 2(c) of the BOA Act and
therefore, the Bangalore Development Authority has no
territorial jurisdiction to make development schemes or
acquire lands in those villages.
F (iv) Whether the amendment to section 6 of the LA Act
requiring the final declaration to be issued within one year
from the date of publication of the preliminary notification
is applicable to the acquisitions under the BOA Act; and
whether the declaration under section 19(1) of BDA Act,
G having been issued after the expiry of one year from the
.date of the preliminary notification under section 17(1) and
(3) of BOA Act, is invalid.
(v) Whether the provisions of sections 4, 5A, 6 of LA Act,
would be applicable in regard to acquisitions under the
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 71
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAV~eNDRAN, J.]
BDA Act and whether non-compliance with those A
provisions, vitiate the acquisition proceedings.
(vi) Whether the development scheme and the acquisitions
are invalid for non-compliance with the procedure
prescribed under sections 15 to 19 of the BDA Act in
8
regard to:
,.
(a) absence of specificity and discrepancy in extent of
land to be acquired;
(b) failure to furnish material particulars to the c
government as required under section 18(1) read
with section 16 of the BDA Act; and
(c) absence of valid sanction by the government, under
section 18(3) of the BDA Act.
D
(vii) Whether the deletion of 1089 A.12G. from the
proposed acquisition, while proceeding with the acquisition
of similar contiguous lands of appellants amounted to
hostile discrimination and therefore the lands of appellants
also required to be withdrawn from acquisition. E
. '
Question (i) - Re : Invalidity on account of non-
compliance with Article 31 (3) of the Constitution.
8. The contention of the appellants is as under : BOA Act
was enacted by the Karnataka Legislature, received the assent F
of the Governor on 2.3.1976, was published in the Karnataka
Gazette dated 8.3.1976 and brought into force with
retrospective effect from 20. 12.1975. BDA Act provides for
compulsory acquisition of property, vide provisions contained
in Chapters Ill and IV. When the BDA Act was enacted and G
brought into effect, Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution
were in force. Article 31(3) provided that no law providing for
a
acquisition of property for public purposes, made by State
Legislature shall have effect unless such law has been reserved
for the consideration of the President and has received his H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A assent. BOA Act was not reserved for the consideration of the
President; nor received his assent. Therefore, the BOA Act, in
so far as it provides for acquisition of property, is still-born and
ineffective. It is submitted that though Article 19(1)(f) and Article
31 were omitted from the Constitution with effect from
B 20.6.1979, as such omission was not with retrospective effect,
any law made prior to 20.6.1979 should be tested on the
touchstone of the said articles.
9. Article 31 of the Constitution dealt with compulsory
acquisition of property. Clauses (1) to (3) of the said Article
C relevant for our purpose are extracted blow:
"(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.
0 (2) No property, movable or immovable, including any
interest in, or in any company owning any commercial or
industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or
acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the
taking of such possession of such acquisition, unless the
law provides for compensation for the property taken
E
possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of
the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and
the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined
and given.
F (3) No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by
the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless such law,
having been reserved for the consideration of the
President, has received his assent."
G By the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, the
right to property was deleted from the list of fundamental rights
by omitting sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of Article 19.
Simultaneously, Article 31 was also deleted with effect from
20.6.1979 by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act,
H 1978. It is no doubt true that the BOA Act received only the
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 73
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENORAN, J.]
assent of the Governor and was neither reserved for the assent A
of the President nor received the assent of the President. As
clause (3) of Article 31 provided that a law providing for ·
acquisition of property for public purposes, would not have
effect unless such law received the assent of the President, it
was open to a land owner to contend that the provisions relating B
to acquisition in the BOA Act did not come into effect for want
of President's assent. But once Article 31 was omitted from the
Constitution on 20.6.1979, the need for such assent
disappeared and the impediment for enforcement of the
provisions in the BOA Act relating to acquisition also c
. disappeared. Article 31 did not render the enactment a nullity,
·if there was no assent of the President. It only directed that a
law relating to compulsory acquisition will not have effect unless
the law received the assent of the President. As observed in
Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka [2002 (4) SCC 326], O
acquisition of property is only an incidental and not the main
object and purpose of the BOA Act. Once the requirement of
assent stood deleted from the Constitution, there was absolutely
no bar for enforcement of the provisions relating to acquisition
in the BOA Act. The Karnataka Legislature had the legislative E
competence to enact such a statute, under Entry 5 of List II of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. If any part of the Act
did not come into effect for non-compliance with any provision
of the Constitution, that part of the Act may be unenforceable,
but not invalid.
F
10. Our view is fortified by the following observations of a
Constitution Bench of this Court in M.P. V. Sundararamier &
Co. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. [AIR 1958 SC 468]
G
"Now, in consiaering the question as to the effect of
unconstitutionality of a statute, it is necessary to remember
that unconstitutionality might arise either because the law
is in respect of a matter not within the competence of the
legislature, or because the matter itself being within its H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A competence, its provisions offend some constitutional
restrictions. In a Federal Constitution where legislature
powers are distributed between different bodies, the
competence of the legislature to enact a particular law
must depend upon whether the topic of that legislation has
B been assigned by the Constitution Act to that legislature.
Thi.is, a law of the State on an Entry in List I, Schedule VII
of the Constitution would be wholly incompetent and void.
But the law may be on a topic within its competence, as
for example, an Entry in List II, but it might infringe
c restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the character
of the law to be passed, as for example, limitations
enacted in Part Ill of the Constitution. Here also, the law to
the extent of the repugnancy will be void. Thus, a legislation
on a topic not within the competence of the legislature and
D a legislation within its competence but violative of
constitutional limitations have both the same reckoning in
a court of law; they are both of them unenforceable. But
does it follow from this that both the laws are of the same
quality and character, and stand on the same footing for
all purposes? This question has been the subject of
E
consideration in numerous decisions in the American
Courts, and the preponderance of authority is in favour of
the view that while a law on a matter not within the
competence of the legislature is a nullity, a law on a topic
within the competence but repugnant to the constitutional
F prohibitions is only unenforceable. This distinction has a
material bearing on the present discussion. If a law is on
a field not within the domain of the legislature, it is
absolutely null and void, and a subsequent cession of that
field to the legislature will not have the effect of breathing
G life into what was a still-born piece of legislation and a fresh
legislation on the subject would be requisite. But if the law
is in respect of a matter assigned to the legislature but
its provisions disregard constitutional prohibitions, though
the law would be unenforceable by reason of those
H prohibitions, when once they are removed, the law will
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 75
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
become effective without re-enactment." A
(emphasis supplied)
11. The appellants relied upon the following observations
in Mahendra Lal Jain v. State of UP & Ors. [1963 Supp (1)
SCR 912] :- B
"Parliament and the Legislatures of States have power to
make laws in respect of any of the matters enumerated in
the relevant Lists in the Seventh Schedule and that power
to make laws is subject to the provisions of the c
Constitution, including Art. 13, i.e., the power is made
subject to the limitations imposed by Part Ill of the
Constitution. The general power to that extent is limited.
The Legislature, therefore, has no power to make any law
in derogation of the injunction contained in Art. 13. Art. o
13(1) deals with laws in force in the territory of India before
the commencement of the Constitution and such laws
insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part,
Ill st:iall to the extent of such inconsistency be void. The
clause, therefore, recognises the validity of the pre- E
Constitution laws and only declares that said· laws would
be void thereafter to the extent of their inconsistency with
Part Ill; whereas clause (2) of that Article imposes a
prohibition· on the State making laws taking away or
abridging the rights conferred by Part Ill, and declares that F
laws made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent
of the contravention be void. There is a clear distinction
between the two clauses. Under clause (1) a pre-
Constitution law subsists except to the extent of its
inconsistency with the provisions of part Ill, whereas no
post-Constitution law can be made contravening the G
provisions of Part Ill and therefore the law to that extent,
though made, is a nullity from its inception".
(emphasis supplied)
H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 6 S.C.R.
A On a careful consideration of the aforesaid observations, we
are of the view that the said decision does not in any way
express any view contrary to the clear enunciation of law in
Sundaramier. In MafJendra Lal Jain, this court explained the
difference between pre-constitutional laws governed by Article
B 13(1) and post-constitutional laws which are governed by Article
13(2) and held that any post-constitutional law made in
contravention of provisions of Part Ill, to the extent of
contravention is a nullity from its inception. Let us now examine
whether any provision of the BOA Act violated any provisions
c of Article 31 in part Ill of the Constitution. Clause (1) of Article
31 provided that no person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law. As we are examining the validity of a
law made by the state legislature having competence to make
such law, there is no violation of Article 31(1). Clause (2) of
Article 31 provided that no law shall authorise acquisition
0
unless it provided for compensation for such acquisition and
either fixed the amount of compensation, or specified the
principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation
was to be determined and given. BOA Act, does not fix the
amount of compensation, but Section 36 thereof clearly
E provides that the acquisition will be regulated by the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 so far as they are applicable.
Thus the principles on which the compensation is to be
determined and the manner in which the compensation is to
be determined set out in the LA Act, become applicable to
F acquisitions under BOA Act. Thus there is no violation of Article
31(~). Article 31(3) merely provides that no law providing for
acquisition shall have effect unless such law has received the
assent of the President. Article 31(3) does not specify any
fundamental right, but relates to the procedure for making a law
G providing for acquisition. As noticed above, it does not nullify
any laws, but postpones the enforcement of a law relating to
acquisition, until it receives the assent of the President. There
is therefore no violation of Part Ill of the Constitution that can
lead to any part of the BOA Act being treated as a nullity. As
H stated above, the effect of Article 31 (3) was that enforcement
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 77
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
of the provisions relating to acquisition was not possible/ A
permissible till the assent of the President was received.
Therefore, once the requirement of assent disappeared, the
provisions relating to acquisition beccime enforceable.
Question (ii) - Re : Invalidity with reference to Parts IX and
8
IX-A of the Constitution
12. Part IX and IX-A of the Constitution, relating to
Panchayats and Municipalities were inserted by the Constitution
(Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992 and Constitution
(Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992. Part IX and IX-A came C
into force on 24.4.1993 and 1.6.1993 respectively. The object
of Part-IX was to introduce the Panchayat system at grass root
level. As Panchayat systems were based on state legislations
and their functioning was unsatisfactory, the amendment to the
Constitution sought to strengthen the Panchayat system by D
giving a uniform constitutional base so that the Panchayats
become vibrant units of administration in the rural area by
establishing strong, effective and democratic local
administration so that there can be rapid implementation of
rural development programmes. The object of Part-IX as stated E
in the Statement of Objects & Reasons is extracted below:-
"ln many States, local bodies have become weak and
ineffective on account of variety of reasons, including the
failure to hold regular elections, prolonged supersessions F
and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a
result, urban local bodies are not able to perform effectively
as vibrant democratic units of self-Government.
Having regard to these inadequacies, it is considered
necessary that provisions relating to urban local bodies are G
incorporated in the Constitution, particularly for -
(i) putting on a firmer footing the relationship between the
State Government and the Urban Local Bodies with
respect to:
H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 6 S.C.R.
A (a) the functions and taxation powers, and
(b) arrangements for revenue sharing.
(ii) ensuring regular conduct of elections.
B (iii) ensuring timely elections in the case of
supersession; and
(iv) providing adequate representation for the weaker
sections like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
women".
c
13. We may first refer to the provisions of Part IX in brief.
Clause (d) and (e) of Article 243 define 'Panchayat' and
'Panchayat area'. Article 2438 deals with constitution of
Panchayats, Article 243C deals with composition of
D Panchayats. Article 2430 relates to reservation of seats.
Article 243E stipulates the duration of Panchayats. Article 243F
prescribes the disqualification for membership. 243G refers to
powers, authorities and responsibilities of Panchayats. Article
243H refers to power to impose taxes by Panchayats and funds
E of the Panchayats. Article 2431 directs the constitution of
Finance Commissions to review the financial position. Article
243J relates to audit of accounts of Panchayats. Article 243K
relates to election to Panchyats. Article 243M enumerates the
areas to which the part will not apply. Article 243N provides for
F continuance of existing laws and Panchayats.
14. Similarly, in Part IX-A relating to Municipalities, the
terms 'Metropolitan Area', 'Municipal Area', and 'Municipality'
are defined by Clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Article 243P. Article
2430 and Article 243R deals with the constitution and
G composition of Municipalities. Article 243S deals with
constitution and composition of Ward Committees. Article 243T
deals with reservation of seats. Article 243U deals with duration
of Municipalities. Article 243V prescribes the disqualifications
for membership. Article 243W enumerates the powers, authority
H and responsibilities of Municipalities. Article 243X empowers
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 79
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
the legislature by law authorise municipalities to levy, collect A
and appropriate taxes, duties, tolls and fees. Article 243Y
·requires the Finance Commission constituted under Article 2431
to review the financial position of Municipalities and make
recommendations, Article 243Z requires audit of accounts of
Municipalities. Article 243ZA relates to elections. Article 243ZC B
refers to the areas to which the part will not apply. Article 243ZD
requires the constitution of Committees for district planning.
Article 243ZE requires the constitution of Metropolitan Planning
Committees for every Metropolitan Area arid preparation of a
draft development plan for the. Metropolitan Area as a whole. c
Article 243ZF provides for the continuance of existing laws and
Municipalities for a period of one year.
·.
15. We may now extract some of the Articles in Part-IXA
with reference to Municipalities, relevant for our purpose:-
D
"243P. Definitions.- In this part, unless the context
otherwise requires- · ·
xxx xxx 'xxx
(c) "Metropolitan area" means an area having a population E
of ten lakhs or more, comprised in orte oi"rnore districts
and consisting of two or more Municipalities or Panchayats
or other contiguous areas, specified by the Governor by
public notification to be a Metropolitan area for the
purposes of this Part; F
(d) "Municipal area" means the territorial area of a
Municipality as is notified by the Governor;
(e) "Municipality" means an institution of self-government G
constituted under article 2430;
xxx xxx xxx
"2430. Constitution of Municipalities.- (1) There shall be
constituted in every State,- H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 6 S.C.R.
A (a) a Nagar Panchayat (by whatever name callled) for a
transitional area, that is to say, an area in transition from
a rural area to an urban area;
(b) a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area; and
B (c) a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area, in
accordance with the provisions of this Part:"
xxx xxx xxx
"243W. Powers, authority and responsibilities of
c Municipalities, etc.- Subject to the provisions of this
Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow-
(a) the Municipalities with such powers and authority as
may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions
D of self-government and such law may contain provisions
for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon
Municipalities, subject to such conditions as may be
specified therein, with respect to- .
E (i) the preparation of plans for economic development and
social justice;
(ii) the performance of functions and the implementation
of schemes as may be entrusted to them including those
in relation to the matters
F
listed in the Twelfth Schedule;
(b) the Committees with such powers and authority as may
be necessary to enable them to carry out the
responsibilities conferred upon them including those in
G
relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth Schedule".
xxx xxx xxx
"243ZD. Committee for district planning.-(1) There shall
H be constituted in every State at the district level a District
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 81
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
Planning Committee to consolidate the plans prepared by A
the Panchayats and the Municipalities in the district and
to prepare a draft development plan for the district as a
whole."
xxx xxx xxx B
'"243ZE. Committee for Metropolitan p/anning.-(1) There
. shall be constituted in every Metropolitan area a
Metropolitan Planning Committee to prepare a draft
development plan for the Metropolitan area as a whole.
c
(2) The Legislature of a State may, by law, make provision
with respect to-
( a) the composition of the Metropolitan Planning
Committees;
D
(b) the manner in which the seats in such Committees shall
be filled:
Provided that not less than two-thirds of the members of
such Committee shall be elected by, and from amongst, E
the elected members of the Municipalities and
Chairpersons of the Panchayats in the Metropolitan area
in proportion to the ratio between the population of the
Municipalities and of the Panchayats in that area;
(c) the representation in such Committees of the F
Government of India and the Government of the State and .
of such organisations and institutions as may be deemed
necessary for carrying out the functions assigned to such
Committees;
G
(d) the functions relating to planning and coordination for
the
Metropolitan area whfoh may be assigned to such
Committees;
H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A (e} the manner in which the Chairpersons of such
Committees shall be chosen.
(3) Every Metropolitan Planning Committee shall, in
preparing the draft development plan,-
B (a} have regard to-
(i} the plans prepared by the Municipalities and the
Panchayats in the Metropolitan area;
(ii} matters of common interest between the
c Municipalities and the Panchayats, including
coordinated spatial planning of the area, sharing of
water and other physical and natural resources, the
integrated development of infrastructure and
environmental conservation;
D
(iii} the overall objectives and priorities set by the
Government of India and the Government of the
State;
E (iv} the extent and nature of investments likely to be
made in the Metropolitan area by agencies of the
Government of India and of the Government of the
State and other available resources whether
financial or otherwise;
F (b} consult such institutions and organisations as the
Governor may, by order, specify.
(4) The Chairperson of every Metropolitan Planning
Committee shall forward the development plan, as
G recommended by such Committee, to the Government of
the State.
"243ZF. Continuance of existing laws and Municipalities.-
Notwithstanding anything in this Part, any provision of any
law relating to Municipalities in force in a State
H immediately before the commencement of the Constitution
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 83
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
(Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, which is A
inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall continue
to be in force until amended or repealed by a competent
Legislature or other competent authority or until the
expiration of one year from such commencement,
whichever is earlier: B
Provided that all the Municipalities existing immediately
before such commencement shall continue till the
expiration of their duration, unless sooner dissolved by a
resolution passed to that effect by the Legislative
Assembly of that State or, ih the case of a State having a C
Legislative Council, by each House of the Legislature of
that State".
In Karnataka, the Municipal Corporations for larger urban areas
are constituted and governed by the Karnataka Municipal D
Corporations Act, 1976 ('KMC Act' for short) and the Municipal
Councils for smaller urban areas are constituted and governed
by the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 ('KM Act' for short).
Regulation of planned growth of land use and development and
making and execution of town planning schemes in the State · E
of Karnataka is governed by the Karnataka Town and Country
Planning Act, 1961 ('Town Planning Act' for short).
16. The KMC Act was exhaustively amended by
Amendment Act 35 of 1994 to bring the said Act in conformity
with Chapter IXA of the Constitution o'f India. Section 3 F
empowers the Governor to specify by notification larger urban
areas, having regard to the factors mentioned in Clauses (a)
to (f) of Sub-section (1) and the requirements of Clause (a) to
(d) of the proviso to that Sub-Section. Sub-seCtion (1A) provides
that any area specified as a larger urban area by the Governor G
under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be a-· City and a
Corporation shall be established for the said city. Section 503-
A relating to preparation of a development plan and Section
503-B relating to constitution of Metropolitan Planning
H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 6 S.C.R.
A Committees, inserted in KMC Act by Amendment Act 35 of
1994 are extracted below:
"503-A. Preparation of development plan: Every
Corpo.ration shall prepare every year a development plan
and submit to the District Planning Committee constituted
B
under Section 310 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act,
1993, or as the case may be the Metropolitan Planning
Cort1mittee constituted ·under Section 503B of this Act.".
"503-B. Metropolitan Planning
c Committee: (1) The Government shall constitute a
Metropolitan Planning Committee for the Bangalore
Metropolitan Area to prepare a draft development plan for
such area as a whole.
D Explanation: For the purpose of this section "Bangalore
Metropolitan Area" means an area specified by the
Governor to be a metropolitan area under clause (c) of
Article 243-P of the Constitution of India.
(2) The Metropolitan Planning Committee shall consist of
E thirty persons of which -
(a) such number of persons, not being less tnan two-thirds
of the members of the committee, as may be specified by
the Government shall be elected in the prescribed manner
F by, and from amongst, the elected members of the
Corporations, the Municipal Councils and Town
Panchayats, and the Adhyakshas and Upadhyakshas of
Zila Panchayats, Taluk Pachayats and Grama Panchayats
in the metropolitan area in proportion to the ratio between
G
the population of the city and other municipal area and that
of the areas in the jurisdiction of Zilla Panchayat, Taluk
Panchayat and Grama Pachayat;
(b) such number of representatives of -
H (i) The Government of India and the State Government as
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 85
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
may be determined by the State Government, and A
nominated by the Government of India or as the case may
be, the State Government;
(ii) such organisations and institutions as may be deemed
necessary for carrying out of functions assigned to the
committee, nominated by the State Government; 6
(3) All the members of the House of the People and the
State Legislative Assembly whose constituencies lie
within the Metropolitan area and the members of the
Council of State and the State Legislative Council who are C
registered as electors in such area shall be permanent
invitees of the committee.
(4) The Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority
shall be the Secretary of the Committee.
D
(5) The Chairman of the Metropolitan Planning Committee
shall be chosen in such manner as may be prescribed.
(6) The Metropolitan Planning Committee shall prepare a
draft development plan for the Bangalore Development E
Area as a whole.
(7) Metropolitan Planning Committee shall, in preparing the
draft development plan -
(a) have regard to- F
(i) the plans prepared by the local authorities in the
Metropolitan Area;
(ii) matters of common interest between the local
authorities including co-ordinated spatial planning G
of the area, sharing of water and other physical and
natural resources, the integrated development of
infrastructure and environmental conservation;
(iii) the overall objectives and priorities set by the H
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 6 S.C.R.
A Government of India and the State Government;
(iv) the extent and nature of the investments likely to be
made in the Metropolitan area by agencies of the
'3overnment of India and of the State Government
and the available resources whether financial or
B otherwise;
(a) Consult such institutions and organisations as the
Governor may, by order, specify.
c (8) The Chairman of the Metropolitan Planning Committee
shall forward the development plan, as recommended by
such committee, to the State Government".
17. The BOA Act was enacted to establish a development
authority for the development of city of Bangalore and areas
D adjacent thereto and for matters connected therewith. The
statement of objects and reasons of the said Act reads thus:
"Bangalore City with its population (as per last census) is
a Metropolitan City. Different Authorities like the City of
E Bangalore Municipal Corporation, the City Improvement
Trust Board, the Karnataka Industrial Area Development
Board, the Housing Board and the Bangalore City
Planning Authority are exercising jurisdiction over the area.
Some of the functions of these bodies like development,
F planning etc., are overlapping creating thereby avoidable
confusion, besides hampering co-ordinated development.
It is, therefore, considered necessary to set up a single
authority like the Delhi Development Authority for the city
areas adjacent to it which in course of time will become
part of the city.
G
For the speedy implementation of the above said objects
as also the 20-point programme and for establishing a co-
coordinating Central Authority, urgent action was called for.
Moreover, the haphazard and irregular growth would
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 87
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
continue unless checked by the Development Authority and A
it may not be possible to rectify or correct mistakes in the
future."
Section 3 of BDA Act relates to constitution and incorporation
of the Bangalore Development Authority. It provides for the State B
Government, by notification, constituting an Authority for the
Bangalore Metropolitan Area, to be called as Bangalore
Development Authority. Section 2(c) of the BDA Act defines
'Bangalore Metropolitan Area' as follows:
"Bangalore Metropolitan Area" means the area comprising C ·
the City of Bangalore as defined in the City of Bangalore
Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (Karnataka Act 69 of
· 1949), the areas where the City of Bangalore Improvement
Act, 1945 (Karnataka Act 5 of 1945) was immediately
before the commencement of this Act in force and such D
other areas adjacent to the aforesaid as the Government
may from time to time by notification specify.
Clause 0) of Section 2 of the BDA Act defines "development"
as follows:
E
"Development" with its grammatical variations means the
carrying out of building, engineering, or other operations
in or over or under land or the making of any material
change in any building or land and includes redevelopment.
F
Section .15 empowers Authority to undertake works and incur
expenditure for development etc. The said section is extracted
below:-
"15. Power of Authority to undertake works and incur
expenditure for development, etc.- (1) The Authority may,- G
(a) draw up detailed schemes (hereinafter referred to as
"development scheme") for the development of the
Bangalore Metropolitan Area and
H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A (b) with the previous approval of the Government,
undertake from time to time any works for ihe development
of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area and incur expenditure
therefor and also for the framing and execution of
development schemes.
B
(2) The Authority may also from time to time make and take
up any new or additional development schemes,-
(i) on its own initiative, if satisfied of the sufficiency
of its resources, or
c
(ii) on the recommendation of the local authority if
the local authority places at the disposal of the
Authority the necessary funds for framing and
carrying out any scheme; or
D (iii) otherwise.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or in any other law
for the time being in force, the Government may, whenever
it deems necessary require the Authority to take up any
E development scheme or work and execute it subject to
such ter:11s and conditions as may be specified by the
Government".
Section 16 enumerates the particulars to be provided in a
F development scheme and the said section is extracted below:-
"16. Particulars to be provided for in a development
scheme.- E."very development scheme under section 15,-
(1) shall, within the limits of the area comprised in the
G scheme, provide for,-
(a) the acquisition of any land which, in the opinion of the
Authority, will be necessary for or affected by the execution
of the scheme ;
H (b) laying and re-laying out all or any land including the
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 89
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
construction and reconstruction of buildings and formation A
and alteration of streets;
(c) drainage, water supply and electricity;
(d) the reservation of not less than fifteen percent of the
total area of the layout for public parks and playgrounds 8
and an additional area of not less than ten percent of the
total area of the layout for civic amenities.
(2) may, within the limits aforesaid, provide for,-
C
(a) raising any land which the Authority may consider
expedient to raise to facilitate better drainage ;
(b) forming open spaces for the better ventilation of the
area comprised in the scheme or any adjoining area ;
D
(c) the sanitary arrangements required ;
[(d) x x x [omitted by Act 17 of 1984).
(3) may, within and without the limit~ aforesaid provide for
the construction of houses". E
Section 17 lays down the procedure on completion of scheme
and is extracted below:-
"17. Procedure on completion of scheme .- (1) When a
F
development scheme has been prepared, the Authority
shall draw up a notification stating the fact of a scheme
having been made and the limits of the area comprised
therein, and naming a place where particulars of the
scheme, a map of the area comprised therein, a statement
specifying the land which is proposed to be acquired and G
of the land in regard to which a betterment tax may be
levied may be seen at all reasonable hours.
(2) A copy of the said notification shall be sent to the
Corporation which shall, within thirty days from the date of H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A receipt thereof, forward to the Authority for transmission to
the Government as hereinafter provided, any representation
which the Corporation may think fit to make with regard to
the scheme.
(3) The Authority shall also cause a copy of the said
B
notification to be published in [ x x x ] the official Gazette
and affixed in some conspicuous part of its own office, the
Deputy Commissioner's Office, the office of the
Corporation and in such other places as the Authority may
consider necessary.
c
(4) If no representation is received from the Corporation
within the time specified in sub-section (2), the concurrence
of the Corporation to the scheme shall be deemed to have
been given.
D
(5) During the thirty days next following the day on which
such notification is published in the official Gazette the
Authority shall serve a notice on every person whose name
appears in the assessment list of the local authority or in
the land revenue register as being primarily liable to pay
E
the property tax or land revenue assessment on any
building or land which is proposed to be acquired in
executing the scheme or in regard to which the Authority
proposes to recover betterment tax requiring such person
to show cause within thirty days from the date of the receipt
F of the notice why such acquisition of the building or land
and the recovery of betterment tax should not be made.
(6) The notice shall be signed by or by the order of the
(Commissioner} and shall be served,-
G
(a} by personal delivery or if such person is absent or
cannot be found, on his agent, or if no agent can be found,
then by leaving the same on the land or the building ; or
(b} by leaving the same at the usual or last known place of
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 91
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
abode or business of such person ; or A
(c) by registered post addressed to the usual or last known
place of abode or business of such person.
Section 18 requires sanction of the scheme by the Government
and reads thus : B
"18. Sanction of scheme .- (1) After publication of the
scheme and service of notices as provided in section 17
and after consideration of representations, if any, received
in respect thereof, the Authority shall submit the scheme, c
making such modifications therein as it may think fit, to
the Government for sanction, furnishing,-
(a) a description with full particulars of the scheme
including the reasons for any modifications inserted therein
0
(b) complete plans and estimates of the cost of executing
the scheme;
(c) a statement specifying the land proposed to be E
acquired ;
(d) any representation received under sub-section (2) of
section 17;
(e) a schedule showing the rateable value, as entered in F
the municipal assessment book on the date of the
publication of a notification relating to the land under the
section 17 or the land assessment of all land specified in
the statement under clause(c) ; and
G
(f) such other particulars, if any, as may be prescribed.
(2) Where any development scheme provides for the
construction of houses, the Authority shall also submit to
the Government plans and estimates for the construction
of the houses. H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A (3) After considering the proposal submitted to it the
Government may, by order, give sanction to the scheme".
Section 19 requires declaration to be published giving
particulars of the land to be acquired, upon sanction of the
scheme by the Government.
B
18. The contentions urged by learned counsel for
appellants based on Parts IX and IX-A of the Constitution can
be summarised thus :
c (i) BOA Act is a legislation relatable to Article 24~W and
some of the matters listed in the Twelfth Schedule.
Therefore BOA Act is deemed to be a law relating to
Municipalities. Having regard to Article 243 ZF, any
provision inconsistent with the provisions of Part IXA of the
0 Constitution, law relating to municipalities ceased to be in
force on the expiry of one year from 1.6.1993. - the date of
commencement of the Constitution 74th Amendment Act,
1992.
(ii) After the insertion of Part IXA of-the Constitution, there
E cannot be any 'metropolitan area' other than what is
declared by the Governor as a metropolitan area, as
provided under Article 243P(c). Only an area having a
population of 10 lakhs or more in one or more districts and
consisting of two or more municipalities or Panchayats or
F other contiguous areas and specified by the Governor by
a public notification to be a Metropolitan Area can be a
'Metropolitan Area'. Consequently, the 'Bangalore
Metropolitan Area' as defined under section 2(c) of the
BDA Act had ceased to exist and therefore BOA could not
G draw up any development scheme for Bangalore
Metropolitan Area.
(iii) A development scheme or an additional development
scheme for Bangalore Metropolitan area which the BOA
is required to draw up under Section 15 of the BOA Act
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 93
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
are conceptually and in effect same as the development A
plan with reference to a municipality referred to in Article
243W and a development plan for a metropolitan area
referred to in Article 243ZE. After the insertion of Part IXA
in the Constitution, a development plan for a metropolitan
area can only be drawn up by a democratically elected B
representative body that is the Metropolitan Planning
Committee by taking into account the factors mentioned
in Clause (3) of Article 243ZE. Therefore on the expiry of
one year from 1.6.1993 (the date on which Part IXA of the
Constitution was inserted), BOA has no authority to draw c
up any development scheme.
19. Any statute or provision thereof which is inconsistent
· with any constitutional provision will be struck down by courts.
Consequently, if BOA Act or any provision of the BOA Act is
found to be inconsistent with any provision of Part IXA of the D
Constitution, it will be struck down by courts as violative of the
constitution. In regard to any provision of any law relating to
municipalities, Article 243ZF suspends such inva11dity or
postpones the invalidity for a period of one year from 1.6.1993
to enable the competent Legislature to remove the E
inconsistency by amending or repealing such law relating to
municipalitiPs to bring it in consonance with the provisions of
Part IXA of the Constitution. Article 243ZF is a provision
enabliny continuance of any provision of a law relating to
municipalities in spite of such provision being inconsistent with F
the provisions of Part IXA of the Constitution for a specified
period of one year. It does not extend the benefit of continuance
to any law other than laws relating to municipalities; it also does
not provide for continuance of a law for one year, if the violation
is in respect of any constitutional provision other than Part IXA; G
and it does not declare any provision of a statute to be
inconsistent with it nor declare any statute to be invalid. The
invalidity of a statute is declared by a court when it finds that a
statute or its provision to be inconsistent with a constitutional
provision. H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 6 S.C.R.
A 20. The benefit of Article 243ZF is available only in regard
to laws relating to 'municipalities'. The term 'municipality' has
a specific meaning assigned to it under Part IX-A. Article
243P(c) defines the word as meaning an institution of self-
government constituted under Article 2430. Article 2430 refers
B specifically to three types of municipalities. that is, a Nagar
Panchayat for a transitional area, a municipal council for a
smaller urban area and a municipal corporation for a larger
urban area. Thus, neither any city improvement trust nor any
development authority is a municipality, referred to in Article
c 243ZF. Thus Article 243ZF has no relevance to test the validity
of the BOA Act or any provision thereof. If BOA Act or any
provision thereof· is found to be inconsistent with the provisions
of Part IXA, such inconsistent provision will be invalid even from
1.6.1993, and the benefit of continuance for a period of one
year permitted under Article 243ZF will not be available to such
0
a provision of law, as BOA Act is not a law relating to
Municipalities.
21. The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1992 inserting Part IX-A in the Constitution, seeks to strengthen
E the system of municipalities in urban areas, by placing these
local self-governments on sound and effective footing and
provide measures for regular and fair conduct of elections.
Even before the insertion of the said Part IX-A, Municipalities
existed all over the country but there were no uniform or strong
F foundations for these local self-governments to function
effectively. Provisions relating to composition of Municipalities,
constitution and composition of Ward Committees, reservation
of seats for weaker sections, duration of Municipalities, powers,
authority, responsibilities of Municipalities, power to impose
G taxes, proper superintendence and centralised control of
elections to Municipalities, constitution of Committees for
District Planning and Metropolitan Planning, were either not in
existence or were found to be inadequate or defective in the
state laws relating to municipalities. Part IX-A seeks to
H strengthen the democratic political governance at grass root
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 95
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
level in urban areas by providing constitutional status to A
Municipalities, and by laying down minimum uniform norms and
by ensuring regular and fair conduct of elections. When Part
IX-A came into force, the provisions of the existing laws relating
to municipalities which were inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of Part IX-A would have ceased to apply. To provide B
continuity for some time and an opportunity to the concerned
State Governments to bring the respective enactments relating
to municipalities in consonance with the provisions of Part IX-
A in the meanwhile, Article 243ZF was inserted. The object was
not to invalidate any law relating to city improvement trusts or c
development authorities which operate with reference to
specific and specialised field of planned development of cities
by forming layouts and making available plots/houses/
apartments to the members of the public.
22. To enable the municipalities (that is municipal D
corporations, municipal councils and Nagar Panchayats) to
function as institutions of self-government, Article 243W
authorises the legislature of a state to endow to the
municipalities, such powers and authority as may be necessary,
by law. Such law made by the state legislature may contain E
provision for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon
municipalities, with respect to the following:
(i) The preparation of plans for economic development and
social justice; and F
(ii) The performance of functions and implementation of
schemes as may be entrusted to them including those in
relation to the following matters (earmarked in the twelfth
schedule):
G
1. Urban planning including town planning.
2. Regulation of land-use and construction of
buildings.
H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A 3. Planning for economic and social development.
4. Roads and bridges.
5. Water supply for domestic, industrial and
commercial purposes.
B
6. Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid
waste management.
7. Fire services.
C 8. Urban forestry, protection of the environment and
promotion of ecological aspects.
9. Safeguarding the interests of weaker sections of
society, including the handicapped and mentally
D retarded.
10. Slum improvement and upgradation.
11. Urban poverty alleviation.
E 12. Provision of urban amenities and facilities such as
parks, gardens, playgrounds.
13. Promotion of cultural, educational and aesthetic
aspects.
F 14. Burials and burial grounds; cremations, cremation
grounds; and electric crematoriums.
15. Cattle pounds; prevention of cruelty to animals.
16. Vital statistics including registration of births and
G deaths.
17. Public amenities including street lighting, parking
lots, bus stops and public conveniences.
H 18. Regulation of slaughter houses and tanneries.
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 97
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
The aforesaid powers and authority (enumerated in the twelfth A
Schedule) may also be endowed to the Ward Committees
which are required to be constituted, by Article 243S.
23. On the other hand, the purpose and object of the BOA
is to act as a development authority for the development of the . 8
city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto. The Preamble
of BOA Act describes it as 'an Act to. provide for the
establishment of a Development Authority for the development
of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and for
matters connected therewith. The development contemplated .
by the BOA Act is "carrying out of building, engineering or other C
operations in or over or under land or the making of any material
change in any building or land and includes redevelopment"
(vide Section 2(j) of BOA Act. Therefore, the purpose is to make
lay outs, construct buildings or carry out other operations in
regard to land. Municipalities are not concerned with nor 0
entrusted with functions similar to those entrusted to BOA under
the BOA Act, that is building, engineering or other operations
by forming layout of plots with all amenities, construction of
houses and apartments, as a part of any scheme to develop a
city. Municipalities are concerned with the overall economic E
development providing sodal justice (urban poverty alleviation
and slum improvement) regulating land use and constructions,
providing amenities (roads, bridges, water supply, fire services,
street lighting, parking, bus stops, public conveniences),
promoting education and culture etc. Neither urban town F
planning nor regulation of land use and construction, is similar
to the 'development' as contemplated in BDA Act, that is
carrying out building, engineering operations in or over or under
land. It would thus be seen that the object and functions of a
Municipal Corporations are completely different from the object G
and purpose of a development authority like BOA. BDA is not
a municipality. Therefore, it cannot be said that mere existence
of Municipal Corporations Act, duly amended to bring it in
conformity with Part IX-A of the Constitution, will nullify or render
redundant, the BOA Act. H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A 24. Article 243ZE no doubt provides that there ..sflall be
constituted in every metropolitan area, a MetropolitEln Planning
Committee to prepare a draft development plan for the
metropolitan area as a whole. The metropolitan area is defined
in clause (c} of Article 243P as an area having a population of
B 10 lakhs or more comprised in one or more districts and
consisting of two or more municipalities or panchayats or other
contiguous areas specified by the Governor by a public
notification to be a metropolitan area for the purpose of Part
IXA. The Bangalore Development Authority is constituted inter
c alia to draw up a detailed scheme for the Bangalore
Metropolitan Area. The Bangalore Metropolitan Area is defined
in Section 2(c) of the BOA Act and1be said definition need not
necessarily be the same as or equivalent to any metropolitan
area declared with reference to Bangalore under Article
243P(c) of the Constitution. It was submitted before the High
0
Court that the Governor had not issued any public notification
specifying any area as metropolitan area, with reference to
Bangalore city. Further the declaration of metropolitan area by
the Governor, as provided in clause (c} of Article 243P is
E specifically with reference to the law relating to municipalities.
The Bangalore Metropolitan Area as defined in the Bangalore
Development Authority Act is only for the purpose of
development i.e. development by way of building or engineering
operations in or over or under land. Therefore neither the
provision defining 'metropolitan area' in Article 243P(c) nor the
F provision for constitution of a Metropolitan planning committee
for preparing a draft development plan for such metropolitan
area under Article 243ZE has any relevance or bearing to the
Bangalore Metropolitan Area with reference to which BOA has
been constituted.
G
25. Next contention urged by the appellant is that in
pursuance of Article 243ZE, KMC Act has been amended
inserting Section 503-B providing for constitution of a
Metropolitan Planning Committee for preparing a draft
H development plan for the Bangalore Metropolitan Area and
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 99
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
therefore the Bangalore Development Authority can no longer A
function as an authority for development of metropolitan area,
nor can it draw development schemes therefor. Development
scheme to be drawn up by the BDA for development of
Bangalore Metropolitan Area is specific i.e. acquisition of land,
laying out or re-laying plots, formation of roads, construction of B
buildings, providing drainage, water supply and electricity and
allot them to members of the public. On the other hand, the
development plan for the metropolitan area as a whole, to be
prepared by Metropolitan Planning Committee constituted under
the KMC Act involves making a plan for overall development c
with reference to the various functions enumerated in the twelfth
Schedule, that is, plans for economic and social justice,
planning for economic and social development, slum
improvement and upgradation, urban poverty alleviation, and
providing several urban amenities and facilities referred to in D
the twelfth Schedule. It would thus be seen that the 'development
scheme' formulated for Bangalore Metropolitan Area by BDA
has nothing to do with a 'development plan' that has to be drawn
by a municipality or by Metropolitan Planning Committee. The
development plan to be drawn for a metropolitan area, by a
Metropolitan Planning Committee should not be confused with E
a development scheme to be drawn by a development authority
like BOA for a metropolitan area. It should also be noticed that
insofar as Bangalore is concerned,·the Bangalore Metropolitan
Area as defined in Section 2(c) of the BDA Act is the area
comprising the City of Bangalore as defined in the City of F
Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, the area where the
city of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 was immediately
before the commencement of the BOA Act in force, and such
other areas adjacent to the aforesaid, as the Government may
from time to time by notification specify. On the other hand, the G
Bangalore Metropolitan Area, referred to in Section 503-B of
KMC Act is an area to be specified by the Governor by public
notification under Article 243P(c) of the Constitution of India.
In fact the Governor had not even specified the Bangalore
Metropolitan Area for the purpose of KMC Act. Neither the H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A Bangalore Metropolitan Area nor a Metropolitan Planning
Committee is in existence under the KMC Act. In these
circumstances, the contentions that the BOA Act, is no longer
in force and that BOA has no jurisdiction or authority to draw
up a development scheme to form layouts and acquire land to
B form lay outs in pursuance of any development scheme for
Bangalore Metropolitan Area, is wholly untenable.
26. The appellants submitted that the powers, authority and
responsibilities, to be endowed by the State Legislatiure upon
C the Municipalities are enumerated in Article 243W read with
Twelfth Schedule; that Articles 234ZD and 243ZE require the
state government to constitute a District Planning Committee
at District Level and a Metropolitan Planning Committee for
every Metropolitan Area; that such Metropolitan Planning
Committee is required to prepare a draft development plan for
D the Metropolitan Area as a whole. It was contended that the
BOA Act was a Legislation which related to some of the
responsibilities and functions of Municipalities, enumerated in
the Twelfth Schedule to the Constitution read with Article 243W
and that its provisions, in particular, sections 15 to 19 were
E inconsistent with the provisions of Part IXA of the Constitution;
that no law can entrust powers and responsibilities referred to
in Article 243W including those relating to matters listed in
Twelfth Schedule to an authority other than an authority having
popular mandate; and that therefore the BOA Act entrusting
F such powers and responsibilities to a non-elected authority
ceases to be in force.
27. While it is true that BDA is not an elected boqy like
the municipality, it has several elected representatives as
G members. Section 3 relates to the Constitution of the Authority
and provides that the Authority shall consist of 22 members and
made up as follows :
Six officers of the BOA viz., The Chairman, The
Finance Member, The Engineering Member, The
H Town Planning Member, The Commissioner and
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 101
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
Secretary of the Authority. (All of them are full-time A
employees, three of them are specialists in finance,·
engineering and town planning.
Four elected representatives, that is, two members
of state legislature assembly and two counsellors B
of Bangalore Municipal Corporation.
One representative of the state government and four
representatives of statutory corporations, that is, the
Commissioner of Bangalore Municipal Corporation
and representatives of Bangalore Water Supply C
Sewerage Board, Karnataka Electricity Board, and
Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation.
Six members of the public (with minimum of one
woman, one person belonging to SC/ST, and one 0
representing labour)
One Architect.
It would thus be seen that members of the BOA represent
different interests and groups, technical persons and elected E
representatives. Further, no development scheme can be
finalised or put into effect without the sanction of the State
Government which in turn has to take note of any representation
by the Bangalore Municipal Corporation in regard to the
development scheme. Therefore, the mere fact that BOA is not F
wholly elected body as in the case of a municipal corporation
will make no difference. The membership pattern is more suited
to fulfil the requirements of a specialist agency executing
development schemes. We therefore find no merit in the
contention that provisions of BOA Act become inoperative, on G
Parts IX and IX-A of the Constitution coming into force.
28. The BDA Act empowers the Bangalore Development
Authority to formulate schemes for the development of
Bangalore Metropolitan Area. The word 'development' refers
H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A to building, engineering or other operations in regard to land,
that is making layouts and making available plots for allotment
to members of the public. It is authorised to acquire lands for
execution of development schemes, prepare layouts and
construct buildings, provide drainage, water supply and
B electricity, provide sanitary arrangements, form open spaces,
lease, sell or transfer the plots/immovable properties. The area
in which the BOA Act operates is totally different from the areas
in which Part IX A of the Constitution and KMC Act which relate
to local self-government operate.
C Question (iii) - Re : BOA lacking territorial !urisdiction to
draw up the development scheme
29. The contention of appellants is that the villages in which
the acquired lands are situated do not fall within the Bangalore
o Metropolitan Area as defined in section 2(c) of the BOA Act,
and consequently the BOA has no jurisdiction to either acquire
lands or make a development scheme in regard to those areas.
As noticed above, section 15 empowers the BOA to draw up
development schemes or additional development schemes for
E the development of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area.
Bangalore Metropolitan Area is defined in section 2(c) as the
area comprising (i) the City of Bangalqre as defined in the City
Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949; (ii) the areas
where the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 was
F immediately before the commencement of this Act was in force;
(iii) such other areas adjacent to the aforesaid areas as the
government may from time to time by notification specify. The
areas in which the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945
was in force immediately before the commencement of BOA
G Act was the City of Bangalore and other areas adjoining the
city specified by the state government from time to time by
notification (vide section 1(2) of the said Act).
30. The Government of Karnataka issued a notification
dated 1.11.1965, under section 4A (1) of the 'Town Planning
H Act' declaring the area comprising the City of Bangalore and
BON DU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 103
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
other areas (218 villages) enumerated in Schedule I thereto to A
be the 'Local Planning Area' for the purposes of the said Act
to be called as the Bangalore City Planning Area and the limits
of the said planning area were as described in Schedule II
thereto. All the 16 villages in which the lands were acquired for
Arkavathi Layout fell within the said Bangalore City Planning B
Area (that is within the 'other areas' described in the I
Schedule).
31. The Government of Karnataka is&iled another
notification dated 13.3.1984 under section 4A (1) of the Town
Planning Act declaring that the area comprising 325 peripheral C
villages around Bangalore as indicated in Schedule I to be Local
Planning Area for the environs of Bangalore and the limits of
the said planning area shall be as indicated in Schedule II
thereto. It may be mentioned that the areas added by this
notification were beyond the core area (Bangalore City) and D
the first concentric circle area which were already notified as
the Bangalore City planning area under the notification dated
1.11.1965. Schedule II to the notification dated 13.3.1984 gave
the boundaries of the entire local planning area of Bangalore
which included not only 325 villages which were added by the E
said notification but the original planning area described and
declared in the notification dated 1.11.1965. The following note
was added after the Schedule II to the notification dated
13.3.1984 : "This excludes the Bangalore city local planning
area declared (by) government notification No.PLN/42/MNP/65/ F
S0/3446 dated 1.11.1965."
32. Thereafter, the Government of Karnataka issued a
notification dated 6.4.1984 under section 4A (3) of the Town
Planning Act, amalgamating the 'Local Planning Area of G
Bangalore' declared under notification dated 1.11.1965 and the
'Local Planning Area' declared for the environs of Bangalore
by notification dated 13.3.1984. The said notification called the
amalgamated Local Planning Area as the 'Bangalore City
Planning Area' with effect from 1.4.1984. Schedule I to the said H
.1· .: - ·
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A notification consolidated the areas shown in Schedule I to the
notification dated 1.11.1965 and the Schedule I to the
notification dated 13.3.1984 and contained the names of 538
villages. It also confirmed that the limits of the planning area
shall be as indicated in II Schedule to the notifications dated
B 1.11.1965 and 13.3.1984.
33. The Government of Karnataka issued a notification
dated 1.3.1988 in exercise of the power under section 2(c) 0 1
the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 specifying the
villages, indicated in I Schedule and within the boundaries
C indicated in II Schedule to the notification dated 13.3.1984, to
be the areas for the purpose of the said clause. The contention
of the petitioner is that the notification dated 1.3.1988 only
specifies the villages indicated in the notification dated
13.3.1984 as Bangalore Metropolitan area; that therefore, the
D areas that were earlier declared as a local planning area under
the notification dated 1.11.1965, were not part of Bangalore
Metropolitan area; and that as all the 16 villages which were
the subject matter of the impugned acquisition, were part of the
local planning area declared under notification dated 1.11.1965,
E but not part of the local planning area declared under the
notification dated 13.3.1984, the said 16 villages do not form
part of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area for the purpose of
section 2(c) of the BOA Act; and consequently, BOA cannot
execute any development scheme in regard to the said 16
F villages under section 15 of the BOA Act.
34. A careful reading of the notification dated 1.3.1988
would show that the clear intention of the state government was
to declare the entire area declared under the notification dated
1.11.1965 and the notification dated 13.3.1984, together as the
G Bangalore Metropolitan Area. The notification dated 1.3.1988
clearly states that the entire area situated within the boundaries
indicated in Schedule II to the notification dated 13.3.1984 was
the area for the purpose of section 2(c) of BOA Act. There is
no dispute that the boundaries indicated in Schedule II to the
H
BON DU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 105
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
notification dated 13.3.1984 would include not only the villages A
enumerated in I Schedule to the notification dated 13.3.1984
but also the area that was declared as planning area under the
notification dated 1.11.1965. This is because the areas
declared under notification dated 1.11.1965 are the core area
(Bangalore City) and the area surrounding the core area that B ·
is 218 villages forming the first concentric circle; and the area
declared under the notification dated 13.3.1984 (325 villages)
surrounding the ar~a declared under the notification dated
1.11.1965 forms the second concentric circle. Therefore, the
boundaries of the lands declared under the notification dated c
13.3.1984, would also include the lands which are declared
under the notification dated 1.11.1965 and therefore, the 16
villages which are the subject matter of the impugned
acquisition, are part of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area.
35. The learned counsel for the Appellants contended that D
the note at the end of II Schedule to the notification dated
13.3.1984 excluded the Bangalore city planning area declared
under the notification dated 1.11.1965. As the planning area
that was being declared under the notification dated 13.3.1984,
was in addition to the area that was declared under the E
notification dated 1.11.1965, it was made clear in the note
at the end of the notification dated 13.3.1984 that the area
declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965 is to be
excluded. The purpose of the note was not to exclude the area
declared under the notification dated 1.11.1965 from the local F
planning area. The intention was to specify what was being
added, to the local planning area declared under the notification
dated 1.11.1965. But in the notification dated 1.3.1988, what
is declared as the Bangalore Metropolitan Area is the area that
is within the boundaries indicated in schedule II to the G
notification dated 13.3.1984, which as noticed above is the
area notified on 1.11.1965 as also the area notified on
13.3.1984. The note in ·the notification dated 13.3.1984 was
only a note for the purposes of the notification dated 13.3.1984
and did not form part of the notification dated 1.3.1988. There H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A is therefore no doubt that the intention of the state government
was to include the entire area within the boundaries described
in Schedule II, that is the area declared under two notifications
dated 1.11.1965 and 13.3.1984, as the Bangalore Metropolitan
Area.
B
36. In fact ever since 1988, everyone had proceeded on
the basis that the Bangalore Metropolitan Area included the
entire area within the boundaries mentioned in Schedule II to
the notification dated 13.3.1984. Between 1988 and 2003,
BOA had made several development schemes for the areas
C in the first concentric circle around Bangalore City (that is, in
the 218 village described in I Schedule to the notification dated
1.11.1965) and the state government had sanctioned them.
None of those were challenged on the ground that the area was
not part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area.
0
37. It is true that the wording of the notification is clumsy
and ambiguous. It refers to the villages indicated in Schedule I
and it also refers to villages within the boundaries of Schedule
II. It also states that the area stated in the notification is the area
E for the purpose of section 2(c) of BOA Act. It is well settled that
when there is vagueness and ambiguity, an interpretation that
would avoid absurd results should be adopted. The
interpretation put forth by the appellants, if accepted would
mean the outer centric circle of Bangalore which consists of
F only the peripheral villages would be the Bangalore Metropolitan
Area and neither the Bangalore city nor the 218 villages
immediately adjoining and surrounding the Bangalore city
would form part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area. This, to say
the least, is absurd and will be in direct violation of section 2(c)
G of BOA Act which states that Bangalore City and the areas
surrounding it where City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945
was in force, will form part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area.
38. Let us view it from another angle. Bangalore City forms
the central corE. area or the innermost circle. The adjoining 218
H villages enumerated in the notification dated 1.11.1965
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 107
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
surrounding Bangalore City form the first concentric circle. The A
peripheral villages described in Schedule I to the notification
dated 13.3.1984 form the second concentric circle which
surrounds the central core area and the areas within the first
concentric circle. To interpret Bangalore Metropolitan Area as
referring only to the peripheral villages and not the core city area B
and its adjoining villages would be like saying the outer skin of
a fruit is the fruit and the entire fruit inside does not form part
of the fruit.
39. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that
if the notification dated 1.3.1988 is interpreted as including the C
inner areas, then it would amount to reading the words
"Government of Karnataka hereby specifies the villages
indicated in Schedule I and within the boundaries indicated in
Schedule II to the notification dated 13.3.1984 to be the area
for the purpose of the said Clause" as follows: D
"Government of Karnataka hereby specifies the villages
indicated in Schedule I and the villages within the
boundaries indicated in Schedule II to the notification dated
13.3.1984 to be the areas for the purpose of the said E
clause".
It is submitted that a casus omissus cannot be supplied by
courts where the language is clear and unambiguous and is
capable of an intelligible interpretation. Reliance is placed on
the decisions of this court in Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray v. F
Justice 8. Lentin & Ors. - 1988 (4) SCC 419, and S.R.
Bommai & Ors. v. UOf & Ors, - 1994 (3) sec 1 and several
declsicms following them, to contend that the court cannot, in
interpreting a provision, supply any casus omissus. The
doctrine of casus omissf.Js was e)(pl;:iinec:f thus in American G
Jwisprudf)nce, 2nd Sl3ri~s Vol, 73 ai pagf) 397 : '1t is a gener;:il
rule that tile court r•. ay not by construction insert words or
p!lrases in a statute or sµpply a cas(.Js omiss1.1s by giving force
and effect to the l;:inguage of the statute when applied to a
H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A subject about which nothing whatever is said, and which, to all
appearances, was not in the mind of the legislature at the time
of the enactment of law". But the position will be different where
the language is ambiguous and an intelligible interpretation
would require addition of words particularly when the intention
8 of the State Government is clear and evident and it is reiterated
by the State Government and the BDA. Justice G.P. Singh in
his Principles of Statutory Interpretation (2008 Edition - Page
65) expresses the view that when the object or policy of a
statute can be ascertained, imprecision in its language should
C not be readily allowed in the way of adopting a reasonable
construction which avoids absurdities and incongruities and
carries out the object or policy. This Court has also repeatedly
emphasised that although a court cannot supply a real casus
omissus, nor can it interpret a Statute to create a casus
omissus when there is really none. In Padma Sunder Rao v.
D State of Tamil Nadu 2002 (3) SCC 533, a Constitution Bench
of the this Court held :
•..... a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court by
judicial interpretative process, except in the case of clear
E necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners
of the statute itself, but at the same time a casus omissus
should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the
parts of a Statute or section must be construed together
and every clause of a section should be construed with
F reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that
the construction to be put on a particular provision makes
a consistent enactment of the whole Statute."
40. Let us now refer to the wording and the ambiguity in
the notification. Section 2(c) of BOA Act makes it clear that the
G city of Bangalore as defined in the Municipal Corporation Act
is part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area. It also makes it clear
that the areas where the city of Bangalore Improvement Act,
1945 was in force, is also part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area.
It contemplates other areas adjacent to the aforesaid areas
H
BON DU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 109
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
being specified as part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area by a A
notification. Therefore, clearly, the area that is contemplated for
being specified in a notification under Section 2(c) is "other
areas adjacent" to the areas specifically referred to in Section
2(c). But it is seen from the notification dated 1.3.1988 that it
does not purport to specify the "such other areas adjacent" to B
the areas specifically referred to in section 2(c), but purports
to specify the Bangalore Metropolitan Area itself as it states
that it is specifying the "areas for the purpose of the said
clause". If the notification specifies the entire Bangalore
Metropolitan Area, the interpretation put forth by the appellants c
that only the villages included in Schedule I to the notification
· dated ii 3.3.1984 would be the Bangalore Metropolitan Area,
would result in an absurd situation. Q_~iously the city of
Bangalore and the adjoining areas whic~ere notified under
the city of Bangalore Improvement Act-4 945 are already 0
included in the Bangalore Metropolitan Area and the
interpretation put forth by the appellants would have the effect
of excluding those areas from the Bangalore Metropolitan Area.
As stated above, the core area or the inner circle area, that is
Bangalore City, is a part of Bangalore Metropolitan Area in view
of the definition under Section 2(c). The 218 villages specified E
. in the notification dated 1.11.1965 are the villages immediately
surrounding and adjoining Bangalore city and it forms the first
concentric circle area around core area of Bangalore city. The
325 villages listed in I Schedule to the notification dated
13.3.1984 are situated beyond the 218 villages and form a F
wider second concentric circle around the central core area and
the ·first concentric circle area of 218 villages.•That is why the
notification dated 1.3.1988 made it clear that the Bangalore
Metropclitan Acea would be the area within the boundaries
indicated in II Schedule to the notification dated 13.3.1984. It G
would mean that the three areas, namely, the central core area,
the adjoining ·?18 villages constituting the first concentric circle
area and the 'hext adjoining 325 villages forming the second
con·centric circle are all included within the Bangalore
Metropolitan Area. What is already specifically included by H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A Section 2(c) of BOA Act cannot obviously· be excluded by
notification dated 1.3.1988 while purporting to specify the
additional areas adjoining to the areas which were already
enumerated. Therefore, the proper way of reading the
notification dated 1.3.1988 is to read it as specifying 325
B villages which are described in the First Schedule to the
notification dated 13.3.1984 to be added to the existing
metropolitan area and clarifying that the entire areas within the
boundaries of Second Schedule to the notification dated
13.3.1984 would constitute the Bangalore Metropolitan Area.
c There is no dispute that the boundaries indicated in the
notification dated 13.3.1984 would clearly include the 16
villages which are the subject mater of the acquisition.
41. We therefore, reject the contention of the appellant that
Bangalore Development Authority does not have territorial
D jurisdiction to form any development scheme in regard to the
16 villages which are th&subject matter of the final declaration
dated 23.2.2004.
Question Civl - Re : Invalidity of final declaration with
E reference to time limit in section 6 of Land Acquisition Act.
42. This question arises from the contention raised by one
of the appellants that the provisions of section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 ('LA Act" for short) will apply to the
acquisitions under the BOA Act and consequently if the final
F declaration under section 19(1) is not issued within one year
from the date of publication of the notification under sections
17 (1) and (3) of the BOA Act, such final declaration will be
invalid. The appellants submissions are as under : The
notification under sections 17(1) and (3) of the Act was issued
G and gazetted on 3.2.2003 and the declaration under section
19(1) was issued and published on 23.2.2004. Section 36 of
the Act provides that the acquisition of land under the BOA Act
within or outside the Bangalore Metropolitan Area, shall be
regulated by the provisions of the LA Act, so far as they are
H applicable. Section 6 of LA Act requires that no declaration shall
,.., BONPU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 111 "'
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
be mad~.:!!J respect of any land covered by a notification under A
section 4 of the LA Act, after the expiry of one year from the
__ .J' date of the publication of such notification under section 4 of
LA Act. As the provisions of LA Act have been made applicable
to acquisitions under BOA Act, it is necessary that the
declaration under Section 19(1) of BOA Act, (which is equivalent B
to the final declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act), should
also be made before the expiry of one year from the date of
publication of notification under Sections 17 (1) and (3) of BOA
Act (which is equivalent to Section 4(1) of LA Act).
43. BOA Act contains provisions relating to acquisition of C
properties, up to the stage of publication of final declaration.
BOA Act does not contain the subsequent provisions relating
to completion of the acquisition, that is issue of notices, enquiry
and award, vesting of land, payment of compensation, principles
relating to determination of compensation etc. Section 36 of D
BOA Act does not make the LA Act applicable in its entirety,
but states that the acquisition under BOA Act, shall be regulated
by the provisions, so far as they are applicable, of LA Act.
Therefore it follows that where there are already provisions in
the BDA Act regulating certain aspects or stages of acquisition E
or the proceedings relating thereto, the corresponding
provisions of LA Act will not apply to the acquisitions under the
BOA Act. Only those provisions of LA Act, relating to the stages
of acquisition, for which there is no provision in the BDA Act,
are applied to the acquisitiqns under BOA Act. BOA Act F
contains specific provisions relating to preliminary notification
and final declaration. In fact the procedure up to final declaration
under BOA Act is different from the procedure under the LA Act
· relating to acquisition proceedings up to the stage of final
notification. Therefore, having regard to the Scheme for G
acquisition under sections 15 to 19 of BDA Act and the limited
application of LA Act in terms of section 36 of BDA 1\ct, the
provisions of Sections 4 to 6 of LA Act will not c.fipiy to the
acquisitions under BDA Act. If section 6 of LA Act is not made
applicable, the question of amendment to section 6 of ~·Act H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A providing a time limit for issue of final declaration, will also not ·
apply.
44. Learned counsel for the BOA submitted that the issue
0
is no longer res integra. He submitted that in Munithimmaiah
B vs. State of Kamataka - 2002 (4) SCC 326, this Court held that
the BOA Act is a special and self-contained code; that BDA
and LA Act cannot be said to be either supplemental to each
other, er pari materia legislations; that BOA Act could not be
said to be either wholly unworkable and ineffectual if the
subsequent amendments to the LA Act are not imported into
C BOA Act; and that the amendments to LA Act subsequent to
the enactment of the BOA Act did not get attracted or become
applicable to acquisitions under the BDA Act either by express
provision or by necessary intendment or implication. He
therefore submitted that the appellants cannot rely upon the
D amendment to Section 6 of LA Act requiring publication of the
final declaration within one year from the date of publication of
the preliminary notification, to contend that the final declaration
under the BOA Act should be made within one year from the
date of preliminary notification. The learned counsel for the
E appellants submitted that the issue whether the provisions of
LA Act as amended would apply to acquisitions under laws
relating to town planning has been referred to a larger Bench
of this Court and the decision therein will have a bearing on
the issue whether amendments to the provisions of LA Act
F would apply to acquisition under laws relating to City
Improvement Trusts and development authorities. It is
unnecessary to enter into the controversy whether the
amendments to LA Act inserting Section 11A\ would apply to
acquisitions under Town Planning Laws or City Improvement/
3 Development Laws, as that issue does not arise here. As
noticed above, when section 6 of the LA Act itself is
inapplicable to acquisition under BOA Act, the question
whether amendment to Section 6 will apply will not arise. We
accordingly hold that the final declaration dated 23.2.2004 does
H not suffer from any infirmity on account of the same having been
•
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 113
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
published a few days beyond one year from the date of A
publication of the preliminary notification under sections 17 (1)
and (3) of the BOA Act. :
~
Question (v) - Re : Applicability of sections 4, 5A and 16
of LA Act
B
45. The appellants contend that the provisions of sections
4, 5A and 6 of LA Act apply to the acquisitions under the BOA
Act and the acquisition is liable to be quashed, as being in
violation of the said provisions. Different appellants have raised
two distinct and somewhat inconsistent contentions to say that C
sections 4 to 6 of LA Act are applicable.
46. The first contention is as follows : The BOA Act relates
to development of Bangalore Metropolitan Area. It is not an Act
for acquisition of property. Sections 15 and 19 when read with 0
section 36 of BOA Act, can lead to only a conclusion that for
acquisition of lands for its development schemes, BOA has to
resort only to the provisions of LA Act, in entirety and BOA Act
does not provide for or empower BOA to make acquisitions.
Section 15 enables the authorities to draw-up development E
schemes or additional development schemes for development
of Bangalore Metropolitan Area. Section 15 does not confer
any power to acquire land. Section 16 only specifies the
particulars to be provided for in the development schemes and
does not empower BOA to acquire land. The reference to
acquisition in clause (1)(a) of section 16 is not to empower F
acquisition, but merely to provide that every development
scheme shall, within the limits of the area comprised in the
scheme provide for acquisition of any land which will be
necessary for or affected by the execution of the scheme.
Section 16(1}(a) therefore refers to only identifying the lands G
to be acquired and does not authorise acquisition. Section 17
contains the procedure to be followed when the development
· scheme has been prepared. Section 18 refers to the need for
the BOA to submit the scheme to the Government for its
sanction, and grant of sanction by the Government. Neither H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A section 17 nor section 18 authorise the BOA to acquire land.
Section 19 requires a declaration to be published by the
Government stating that it had sanctioned a development
scheme of BOA, and the lands proposed to be acquired by the
authority are required for a public purpose. Therefore, the actual
B acquisition as such should follow the declaration under section
19 of the BOA Act by issuing a preliminary notification under
section 4, by an inquiry under section 5A and a final declaration
under section 6 of the LA Act, followed by an award, reference
etc. Sectiofl 36 of the BOA Act provides that acquisitions shall
C be regulated by the provisions of LA Act, as far as they are
applicable. This makes it clear that the entire acquisition will
have to be made under the provisions of the LA Act. BOA has
all along proceeded on a wrong assumption that it has the
power to acquire property under the BOA Act when it has no
such power.
0
47. The assumption by the appellant that Chapter Ill of the
BOA Act relating to development schemes does not provide
for acquisition is erroneous. Sections 15 to 19 of the BOA Act
contemplate drawing-up of a development scheme or
E additional development scheme for the Bangalore Metropolitan
Area, containing the particulars set down in section 16 of the
said Act, which includes the details of the lands to be acquired
for execution of the scheme. Section 17 requires the BOA on
preparation of the development scheme, to draw-up and publish
F in the Gazette, a notification stating that the scheme has been
made, showing the limits of the area comprised in such scheme
and specifying the lands which are to be acquired. The other
provisions of section 17 make it clear that the BOA has to
furnish a copy of the said notification and invite a representation
G from the Bangalore City Corporation, affix the notification at
conspicuous places in various offices, and serve notice on every
person whose land is to be acquired. Thus, the notification that
is issued under section 17(1) and published under section
17(3), is a preliminary notification for acquiring the lands
H required for the scheme under the Act. Section 17(5) and
I
BON DU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 1 115/
1
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
,, /
section 18 (1) requires BOA to give an opportunity to A
landowners to show cause against acquisition and consider the
representations received in that behalf. Section 18 (1) also
requires BOA to furnish a statement of the lands1)jroposed to
be acquired to the State Government for obtaining it~,,,$~r;u~tion
for the scheme including the acquisition. Sub-seq~idn (1) of B
section 19 requires the Government to publish a"declaration
upon sanctioning the scheme, declaring that such a sanction
has been given and declaring that the "lands proposed to be
acquired by the authority" are required for public purpose. Sub-
section (3) of section 19 makes it clear that the declaration c
published under section 19(1) should be conclusive evidence
that the land is needed for a public purpose and that the
Authority shall, upon publication of such declaration, proceed
to execute the same. Thus, it is clear that the acquisition by the
Authority for the purposes of the development scheme is
0
initiated and proceeded with under the provisions of the BOA
Act. Section 36 of BOA Act provides that the "acquisition of
land under this Act", shall be regulated by the provisions, so
.. far as they are applicable of the LA Act. fo view of the
" categorical reference in section 36 of the BDA Act, to
acquisitions under that Act, there cannot be any doubt that the E
acquisitions for BDA is not under the LA Act, but under the BDA
Act' itself. It is also clear from section 36 that LA Act, in its
entirety, is not applicable to the acquisition under the BOA Act,
but only such of the provisions of the LA Act for whK:h a
corresponding provision is not found in the BDA Act, will apply F
to acquisitions under the BDA Act. In view of sections 17 to
19 of the BDA Act, the corresponding provisions - Sections 4
to 6 of the LA Act-will not apply to acquisitions under the BDA
Act. We therefore reject the contention that the BDA Act does
not contemplate acquisition and that the acquisition which is G
required to be made as a part of the development scheme,
should be made under the LA Act, applying sections 4, SA and
6 of LA Act.
48. The second contention urged by the appellants is as H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A follows : A development authority is a City Improvement Trust
referred to in Entry 5 of the State List (List II of the Seventh
Schedule). 'Acquisition of property' is a matter enumerated in
Entry 42 in the Concurrent List (List Ill of the Seventh Schedule).
LA Act relating to acquisition of property, is an existing law with
B respect to a matter (Entry 42) enumerated in the Concurrent
List. BOA Act providing for acquisition of property is a law
made by the State Legislature under Entry 42 of the Concurrent
List. Article 254 of the Constitution provides that if there is any
repugnancy between a law made by the State Legislature (BOA
c Act) and an existing central law in regard to a matter
enumerated in the Concurrent List (LA Act), then subject to the
provisions of clause (2) thereof, the existing Central law shall
prevail and the State law, to the extent of repugnancy, shall be
void. Clause (2) of Article 254 provides that if the law made by
the State Legislature in regard to any matter enumerated in the
0
Concurrent List, contains any provision repugnant to an existing
law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the
State Legislature, if it had been reserved for the consideration
of the President and has received his assent, shall prevail in
that State. It is contended that the provisions of section 19 of
E the BOA Act are repugnant to the provisions of section 6 of the
LA Act; and as BOA Act has not been reserved for
consideration of the President and has not received his assent,
section 6 of LA Act will prevail over section 19 of BOA Act.
F 49. This contention also has no merit. The question of
repugnancy can arise only where the State law and the existing
Central law are with reference to any one of the matters
enumerated in the Concurrent List. The question of repugnancy
arises only when both the legislatures are competent to
G legislate in the same field, that is, when both the Union and
State laws relate to a subject in List Ill. Article 254 has no
application except where the two laws relate to subjects in List
Ill [See: Mis. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals vs. State of Bihar -
1983 (4) SCC 45]. But if the law made by the State Legislature,
H covered by an Entry in the State List, incidentally touches upon
\ \
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 117
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
any of the matters in the Concurrent List, it is well-settled that it A
will not be considered to be repugnant to an existing Central
law with respect to such a matter enumerated in the Concurrent
List. In such cases of overlapping between mutually exclusive
lists, the doctrine of pith and substance would apply. Article
254(1) will have no application if the State law in pith and B
substance relates to a matter in List II, even if it may incidentally
trench upon some item in List Ill. (See Hoechst (supra), Megh
Raj v. Allah Rakhia AIR 1947 PC 72, Lakhi Narayan v.
Province of Bihar AIR 1950 FC 59). Where the law covered
by an Entry in the State List made by the State Legislature c
contains a provision which directly and substantially relates to
a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List and is repugnant
to the provisions of any existing law with respect to that matter
in the Concurrent List, then the repugnant provision in the State
List may be void unless it can co-exist and operate without 0
repugnancy to the provisions of the existing law. This Court in
Munithimmiah (supra) has held that the BOA Act is an Act to
provide for the establishment of a development authority to
facilitate and ensure planned growth and development of the
City of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto, and that
acquisition of any lands, for such development, is merely E
incidental to the main object of the Act, that is development of
Bangalore Metropolitan area. This Court held that in pith and
substance, the BOA Act is one which squarely falls under Entry
5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and is not a law for
acquisition of land like the LA Act, traceable to Entry 42 of List · F
Ill of the Seventh Schedule, the field in respect of which is
already occupied by the Central Act, as amended from time to
time. This Court held that if at all, BOA Act, so far as acquisition
of land for its developmental activities is concerned, in
substance and effect will constitute a special law providing for G
acquisition for the special purposes of BOA and the same will
not be considered to be a part of the LA Act. The fallacy in the
contention of the appellants is that it assumes, erroneously, that
BOA Act is a law referable to Entry 42 of List Ill, while it is a
law referable to Entry 5 of List II. Hence the question of H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A repugnancy and Section 6 of the LA Act prevailing over Section
19 of BDA Act would not at all arise.
50. We may next refer to the argument that there is no
enquiry as contemplated under section 5A of the LA Act. The
assumption that a final declaration under section 19 has to be.
8
preceded by an inquiry, similar to what is contemplated under
section 5A of LA Act, is without any basis. Section 5A of LA
Act relates to hearing of objections. Sub-section (1) thereof
provides that any person interested in any land which has been
notified under section 4(1) as being needed or likely to be
C needed, for a public purpose, may, within thirty days from the
date of the publication of the notification, object to the
acquisition. Sub-section (2) of section 5A of LA Act provides
that every objection under sub-section (1) of section 5A shall
be made to the Collector and the Collector shall give the
D objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by any
person authorised by him in that behalf or by a pleader and
shall after hearing all such objections and after making such
further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make
reporUs in respect of the land which has been notified under
E section 4(1) to the appropriate Government, containing the
recommendations on the objections, together with the record
of the proceedings held by him for the decision of the
Government, and the decision of the appropriate Government
on the objection shall be final. We have already held that section
F 5A is inapplicable to acquisitions under the BDA Act. The
scheme of BDA Act also contemplates consideration of
objections but does not require any personal hearing or inquiry.
Sub-section (5) of section 17 of the BDA Act requires that
during the thirty days next following the date on which the
G preliminary notification under section 17(1) and (3) is published,
the authorities shall serve a notice on every person whose name
appears in the assessment list/land revenue register, requiring
such person to show-cause within thirty days from the date of
receipt of the notice why such acquisition should not be made.
H Sub-section (1) of section 18 provides that the authority shall,
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 119
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
after service of notices as provided in section 17 and after A
consideration of the representations, if any received in respect
thereof, shall submit the scheme, making such modifications
therein as it may think fit for Government for sanction. It would
thus be seen that while the scheme for acquisition under the
LA Act and the BDA Act contemplates notice to the B
landholders/persons interested, the procedure thereafter is
markedly different. While LA Act requires an 'enquiry' where
the Dy. Commissioner is required to give the objectors
opportunity of being heard in person and conducting such
further inquiry as he thinks necessary, BDA Act requires issuing c
notices to the persons interested to show-cause why
acquisition should not be made and consider the
representations received. No personal hearing or 'enquiry' is
contemplated. Therefore, it is impermissible to import the
requirement of section SA of LA Act in regard to acquisitions 0
under the BOA Act.
51. In view of the above, the contention that the BOA Act
has to yield to LA Act and consequently, the provisions of
sections 4, 5 and 6 of LA Act will be applicable and have to
. be complied with for acquisitions under the BOA Act, does not E
have any merit and the same is rejected.
Question (vi)- Re : Non-compliance with section 15 to
19 of the BOA Act. . . ...
52. The appellants contend that a clear and specific F
development scheme is fundcimentcil pre-requisite for an
acquisition and in the present case there was no such scheme
; before the acquisition was initiated. It is submitted that sanction
· of the Government to the development scheme is a condition
prececjent for publication of a q139laration uncler Section 1~(1) G·
of the Act. It is submittec:1 that the requirement of a sanction has
Ileen reduced to an empty formality, firstly by BOA not placing
the necessary material before the Government, secondly, by
government by rnshing through the entire process without proper
H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A application of mind and thirdly by the Chief Minister giving
administrative sanction, without placing the· matter before the
Cabinet as required by the relevant Transaction of Business
Rules. We will deal with each of these submissions separately.
B (al Absence of specificity and discrepancy in extract.
53. Chapter Ill of BOA Act relates to development
schemes. Section 15 provides that authority may draw up a
d~tailed scheme for the development of the Bangalore
Metropolitan Area. It also provides that the Authority can also
C from time to time make and take up new or additional
development schemes either on its own initiative or on the
recommendation of the local authority or otherwise. Section 16
provides that the development scheme under section 15 shall,
within the limits of the area comprised in the scheme, provide
D for acquisition of land which will be necessary for execution of
the scheme, laying and re-laying out of land (including
construction or reconstruction of buildings) and formation and
alteration of streets, drainage, water supply, electricity, and
reservation of space for public parks and playgrounds and civic
E amenities. When the development scheme is prepared the
authority is required to draw up a notification as stated in
Section 17(1 ). The said notification has to be published in the
Official Gazette, and a copy thereof sent to the Bangalore City
Corporation for its comments. Notices have to be served on
F the land holders to show cause why the land should not be
acquired. After such publication and service of notices and after
consideration of the representations the authority is required
to submit the scheme making such modification as it may think
fit to the Government for sanction furnishing the documents/
G details as stated in Sub-section (1) of Section 18. On
consideration of the development scheme, the Government may
grant sanction for the same. Upon such sanction, the
Government shall publish a declaration stating that sanction has
been granted and the land proposed to be acquired by the
authority for the purpose of the scheme is required for the public
H purpose.
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 121
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [RV. RAVEENDRAN,J.]
54. Let us consider whether the said provisions have been A
complied with in this case. On 2.1.2001 the Executive Engineer
(North) of BOA, submitted a scheme report dated 1.1.2001 for
development of Hennur Devanahalli Road Extension covering
an area of 1650 acres in 12 villages (that is Hennur,
Geddalahalli, Byrathi Khare, Thanisandra, K. Narayanapura, B
Rachenahalli, Sriramapura, Venkateshpura, Sampigehalli,
Amruthahalli, Dasarahalli, and Jakkur). It contemplated the
execution of the development in three stages: laying 4524 sites
in 300 acres in the first stage, 12817 sites in 850 acres in the
second stage and 7539 sites in 500 acres in the third stage, c
in all 24880 sites. It also gave the detailed working of the cost
of the development scheme and the amount expected to be
realised by allotment/sale of plots and made it clear that it will
be a self-financing scheme.
55. On receipt of the said scheme report, the Surveyors D
of BDA made a survey and reported that about 3000 acres of
land will be available in 14 villages, that is, the twelve villages
mentioned in the report dated 2.1.2001 and two other villages
namely Kempapura and Challakere. Therefore, the Addi. Land
Acquisition Officer placed a note, reporting that surveyors had E
located about 3000 acres of land and suggestirig that the layout
may be named as Arkavathi layout instead of Hennur
Devanahalli Road layout. The;! Commissioner agreed with the
proposal on 8.10.2002 and placed the scheme before the
Authority. The Authority considered it in its meeting dated F
10.10.2002 and approved the proposal and decided to issue
a preliminary notification for 3000 acres of land in regard to 14
villages. Subsequently with a view to have proper access to the
layout certain lands in Hebbala and Nagavara were also added.
Thereafter, the preliminary notification dated 3.2.2003 under G
section 17(1) was published by the Commissioner, BOA,
proposing to acquire the lands shown in the Schedule to the
notification. The preliminary notification also contained an
abstract of the extents of lands proposed to be acquired for
formation of Arkavathi layout. It is stated that the proposal H
122 • SUPREME COURT REPORTS (201 O] 6 S.C.R.
A contemplated of utilisation of about 500 acres of government
land also which did not require acquisition and consequently,
the total extent was shown as 3389A.12G in the abstract. A
corrigendum was issued showing the extent as 3889A.12G. A
copy of the notification was forwarded to the Bangalore City
B Corporation and notices were also issued to the persons
registered as the owners of the lands proposed to be acquired
requiring them to show cause why such acquisition should not
be made. After consideration of the representations the
authoril/ modified the scheme by deleting 1089.12 acres and
c submitted the modified scheme for acquisition of 2750 acres
in 16 villages to the Government for its sanction. The
Government sanctioned the scheme for formation of Arkavathi
layout vide Government Order No. UDO 193 MNX 204 dated
21.2.2004. Thereafter a final notification dated 23.2.2004 was
issued by the Government of Karnataka under section 19(1) of
0
the Act and published in the Gazette on the same day. The said
notification stated that the Government has sanctioned the
layout and the lands stated in the Schedule ~herein were
required for the public purpose for formation of the Arkavathi
E layout. We have repeated the reference to the events in detail
to show that there has been due compliance with the
provisions of Sections 15 to 19 of the Act.
56. The mere fact that there were modifications from time
to time or that some of the lands originally proposed were
F thereafter omitted will not in any way affect the validity of the
,scheme. Similarly the fact that acquisition was initially
.·contemplated in regard to lands in only 12 villages and that two
villages were added by the authority in October, 2002 for
making a bigger layout or the fact that two other villages were
G also added to provide better access to the layout will not be in
~ · ·violation of the scheme. Such additions were all made by the
Authority prior to the issue of preliminary notification. The fact
. ,
1
that there were changes in extent does not make the scheme
vague or uncertain. Necessarily a preparation of a development
H scheme would contemplat~ survey and ascertainment of
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 123
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
suitable available land for acquisition and preparation of a A
scheme. Before the scheme is finalised there will necessarily
be modifications and changes. Even publication of a
notification under sections 17(1) and (3) of the Act stating that
the scheme has been made and specifying the lands which are
proposed to be acquired is subject to a revision on B
consideration of representations/objections and deletions
warranted. Therefore the mere fact that there were some
modifications from time to time between 2001 when the initial
proposal was mooted till the issue of the notification under
Sections 17(1) and (3) or that some lands were omitted/deleted c
in the declaration under Section 19(1) will not effect the validity
of the scheme. In fact deletion of some items of land or reducing
the extent proposed to be acquired in some items of land, when
issuing final declaration is made is quite .common and is indeed
a result of the process prescribed under any Act providing for 0
acquisitions. The changes and modifications are infact
contemplated in the process of making the scheme under
Sections 15 to 19 of BOA Act.
(bl Non-furnishing of material particulars to the
Government for purpose of sanction. E
57. The appellants submitted that for obtaining sanction the
BOA had to submit the scheme, after making sucfl
modifications as it may think fit, to the Government for sanction,
furnishing (a) a description with full particulars of the scheme F
including the reasons for any modifications inserted therein; (b)
complete plans and estimates of the cost of executing the
scheme; (c) a statement specifying the land proposed to be
acquired; (d) any representation received under section 17(2)
of the BOA Act from the Bangalore City Corporation; (e) a G
schedule showing the rateable value, as entered in the
Municipal assessment Book relating to the land under section
17 or the land assessment of all lands specified in the statement
under clause (c); and (f) any other particulars as may be
prescribed.
H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A 58. The Commissioner, addressed a letter dated
13.2.2004 to the Principal Secretary to Government, Urban
Devell)pment Department, seeking sanction. The said letter
referred to the preliminary notification, the subsequent
consideration of representations/objections and the resolution
B dated 3.2.2004 to acquire 2750 acres of land, preparation of
a project for formation of a layout with 28,600 sites at a cost of
Rs.981.36 crores under Section 15(2) of BOA Act and
requested for sanction under section 18(3) of the BOA Act and
publication of the final declaration in the Official Gazette under
c section 19(1) of the Act. The Government having examined the
proposal, sent a letter dated 17.2.2004 seeking the following
clarifications/particulars: (a) Information as to how the Authority
will bear the expenses for the proposed project and whether it
will bear it from its own sources; (b) Copies of the project map;
and (c) Copies of the final declaration. The required particulars
0
were furnished by BOA. The state government, after
considering them made an order dated 21.2.2004 granting
permission as under (vide Government Order No.NAE 193 BLA
2004 made in the name of the Governor) :
E "(3) The Bangalore Development Authority has obtained
the approval of the General Body to procure the sanction
of the Government to the Arkavathi Layout Scheme and
to procure issuances of a final notification under Section
19(1) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976
F for the purpose of formation of the layout over available
2750 acres of land as per the No.43/2004 in the meeting
of the Authority dated 2.3.2004. As per the approval of the
General Body, the Authority has in the letters referred to
above put forward a proposal seeking for the sanction of
G the Government for the Arkavathy Layout Scheme as well
as for the issuance of the Final Notification. The Authority
has informed that it will meet out of its coffers the entire
expenditure that would be incurred for the proposed
scheme. After executing 589 acres 12 guntas from the total
extent of 3339 acres 12 guntas notified in the preliminary
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 125
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
notification, the proposal for sanction of the scheme as per A
Section 18(3) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act,
1976 for the Arkavathy Layout Scheme in 2750 acres of
land involving the following scheme particulars have been
considered.
B
Sy. Name of Appro- Extent of No. of sites Executed Expected
No. the Layout xi mate land proposed recovery total saving
Extent proposed to be (Rs. in (Rs. In
Acres to be formed crores) crores)
Guntas acquired
Acres
Guntas c
1 Arkavathy 933-47 2750-00 28600 of 981.36 47.89
varying
dimens-
ions
The approximate cost of the Arkavathy Layout, which is D
being referred to in the Proposal of the Bangalore
Development Authority, is Rs.933.47 crores. The approval
has been given under Section 18(3) of the Bangalore
Development Authority Act, 1976 subject to the following
conditions: E
1. The Bangalore Development Authority shall bear all the
expenses to be incurred for the implementation of the
scheme from its own resources and shall not expect any
financial assistance from the Government for the same.
F
2. For the implementation of the said scheme, the
Government shall not be the guarantor for any of the loans
that may be taken by the BOA. It shall be the sole
responsibility of the BOA to repay the said loan amount.
G
3. The Government shall to be party to any transactions that
the BDA may enter into with respect to the proposed
scheme.
4. With respect to the proposed scheme if the land has to
be converted for using it, it shall be mandatory to get pre- H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 6 S.C.R.
A approval from the Government".
The zonal regulation shall be strictly followed and the
requisitions shall be complied with."
59. The appellants contended that the fact that the non-
B furnishing of the said information/documents showed that the
scheme was not finalised or complete when the proposal was
sent to the Government for approval and BDA had not even
prepared a map of the area to be acquired and therefore there
was non-compliance with the requirements of section 18(1) of
C the BDA Act by BDA and that in the absence of necessary
material, there could not have been proper application of mind
by the Government for granting the sanction.
60. Section 18 is clear about the material to be furnished
0 by the BDA for seeking sanction of the scheme. On examining
the records of the BDA and the Government, the Division Bench
recorded a finding that all the required particulars had been
furnished so that the Government can apply its mind. In fact, the
notings show that in response to the further information sought
E by the Government on 17.2.2004, the Authority furnished the
required information, that is, the Authority will bear the entire
expenses for Akravathi layout project from its own sources, it
also noted that the BDA had informed that the preparation of
the project map was at the final stage and will be furnished after
completion thereof. This of course shows that the project map
F was not ready either on 17.2.2004 when the BDA sent its reply
to the letter dated 17.2.2004 or at the time the Government
granted sanction on 21.2.2004. But what is relevant to be
noticed is that the project map was not one of the documents
that had to be furnished by the BOA while seeking sanction of
G the scheme. We have already referred to the documents and
particulars to be furnished by the BOA. The project map was
not one of the items that had to be furnished. In fact the scheme
report had been submitted by the Executive Engineer, North
Division of BOA to the Engineer Member on 5.2.2004 itself and
H that had been made available to the Government. The
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 127
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
Government in its reply stated that whatever particulars that A
were required to be furnished, had been furnished and they were
satisfied that the scheme required to be sanctioned. It is only
thereafter sanction was granted. We therefore reject the
contention that the material required for seeking sanction had
not been furnished by the BDA to the Government. B
Ccl Absence of valid sanction bv the Government
61. As far as the BDA is concerned, there is thus due
compliance with Sections 18 and 19 also. Bui the appellants
would contend having regard to the provisions of the Karnataka C
Government Transaction of Business Rules, 1977, the sanction
for the scheme under Section 18(3) could validity be given only
by a decision of the Cabinet; and that in these cases, the
decision of the Government was based on the order of the Chief
Minister and not the Cabinet, and therefore, sanction was not D
a valid sanction in law. As noticed above, the BDA sent the
scheme approved by the authority for the sanction of the
Government by writing a letter to the Principal Secretary to the
Government Urban Development Department on 13.2.2004. By
the time the communication reached the Government, there was E
a demand for dissolution of the House on 16.2.2004 and the
House was dissolved on 21.2.2004. In the meanwhile, certain
clarifications were sought on 17.2.2004 which were furnished
on the same day. The file was processed and the matter was
placed before the Chief Minister who had the dual capacity of F
Chief Minister and the Minister-in-charge of Bangalore
Development Authority. The Chief Minister approved the
proposal on 20.2.2004. The noting placed by the concerned
Ministry and the order of the Chief Minister thereon are
extracted below : G
"(10) The above receipt is kept at page no.11. Kindly
peruse note para 1 to 6. On the background of paras 6 to
9, few information from authority (page 10) was sought, the
authority has furnished to the required information (page-
11 ). The authority has informed in the said letter that it will H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A bear the expenses required for the Arkavati layout
Extension Project from its sources itself and the
preparation project map is at final stage, it will be furnished
after completion. And also the construction work of the
Arkavati layout extension has to be taken immediately and
B the sites has to be distributed to the publics hence the
authority has requested to give approval for the Arkavathi
~~
layout extension and the final notification has to be
published.
,; (11) The authority has informed that it will bear the
c expenses for the proposed project out of its source its self
hence the necessity of getting ratification of the Finance
Department for this proposal does not arise.
(12) According to Rule 15 of Government of Karnataka
D (Execution of Business) Rules 1977, the ratification of the
Cabinet is required for the expenses of project works
which is more than 500 lakh rupees. On this background,
the ratification of Cabinet has to be obtained for the below
mentioned points :
E
(a) To issue Government's approval for the Arkavathi
Layout extension project approximately of Rs.981.36
crores under section 18(3) of Bangalore Development
Authority Act.
F (b) To publish final notification under section 19(1) of
Bangalore Development Authority Act for the available
2750 acres land for construction of Arkavathi layout
extension (page 138-1212). It may be requested Hon'ble
Chief Minister for according ratification before tabling the
G file for ratification of the Cabinet.
xxxxxxxx
Chief Minister,
H PSCM 1180/2004/20.2.2004
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 129
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [RV RAVEENDRAN, J.]
(14) Pending ratification by the Cabinet, para 12(a) and A
(b) is approved.
Sd/-
(S.M. Krishna)
Chief Minister"
B
Subsequently the matter was placed before the Cabinet
and ratified.
62. The appellants contend that such an order by the Chief
Minister and ratification thereof were invalid, having regard to
Rules 12, 20 and 21 read with Entry 36 in the First Schedule C
of the Karnataka Government (Transaction of Business) Rules
1977. Rule 12 provides that there shall be a Committee of the
Council of Ministers to be called the Cabinet and all matters
referred to in the First Schedule to the Rules shall ordinarily be
considered at a meeting of the Cabinet. Rule 20 provides that D
cases specified in the First Schedule to the Rules shall be
brought before the Cabinet after submission to the Minister-in-
charge of the Department; and cases other than those specified
in the First Schedule should be brought before the Cabinet by
the direction of the Chief Minister, or the Minister-in-Charge of E
the Department with the consent of the Chief Minister. Rule 21
provides that subject to provisions of Rule 20 all cases specified
in the First Schedule to the Rules shall be brought before the
Cabinet. Entry 36 of the First Schedule relates to "all self-
financing schemes of local bodies including the Urban F
Development Authorities, the Karnataka Housing -Board and
such other statutory bodies". In this case the matter (relating to
sanction under section 18(3) of BOA Act) was placed before
the Chief Minister who also happened to be the Minister-in-
Charge on 20.2.2004. He granted the approval subject to G
ratification by the Cabinet. In view of the subsequent ratification
by the Cabinet there is nothing irregular in the procedure
adopted. The delay in ratification was on account of the
dissolution of the house.
H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A 63. The contentions that the sanction is void, is untenable.
As noticed above, Rule 12 requires that the matter should
ordinarily be considered at a meeting of the Cabinet. This itself
shows that there can be exceptional circumstances where it will
not be possible to place it before the Cabinet. The approval
B granted by the Chief Minister, subject to the ratification of the
Cabinet was treated by the Urban Development Department
as approval for the sanction under Section 18(3) and a
Government order was made on 21.2.2004 in the name of the
Governor granting sanction under section 18(3) of the BDA Act.
c The State Government also issued a final declaration under
Section 19(1) of BDA Act. It is thus evident that the State
Government proceeded on the basis that the order of approval
of the Chief Minister for the sanction, was sufficient for grant of
sanction. Even if it is to be assumed that such approval was
D irregular as it was made subject to ratification, as the
ratification was subsequently made, the challenge for want of
proper approval of the Cabinet for the sanction cannot be
accepted.
question (vii) : Re : Discrimination, malafides and
E arbitrariness :
64. We may start with the following preliminary facts :
Date Stage Area
F proposed to
be acquired
(i) 2.1.2001 Initial proposal by the Executive 1650 Acres
Engineer (North) (12 villages)
(ii) 10.12.2002 Resolution of Bangalore 3000 Acres
Development Authority to issue (14 villages)
G a p!:f!liminary notification under
sections 17(1) and (3) of the Act
(iii) 3.2.2003 Area notified in the preliminary 3339 acres
notification under section 17(3) 12 guntas
of SDA Act (in 16 villages)
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 131
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
(iv) 16.9.2003 Corrigendum regarding notifica- 3839 acres A
tion u/s. 17(3) of BOA Act 12 guntas
(in 16 villages)
(v) 3.2.2004 Resolution of BOA to implement 2750 acres
Arkavathy Scheme .(in 16 villages)
(vi) 23.2.2004 Declaration under section 19(1) ,2750 acres B
of BOA Act. (in 16 villages)
The proposal placed before the Authority and resolution dated
3.2.2004 of the Authority (approving the scheme to be placed
before the Government for sanction) proceeded on the basis C
that the total area notified proposing acquisition was 3339 acres
12 guntas, and the area deleted/withdrawn from the said area
notified in the preliminary notification on examining the
representations was 589 acres 12 guntas and therefore the final
declaration for acquisition was for 2750 acres. This was the D
scheme that was placed for approval before the state
government. The state government also in the sanction order
dated 21.2.2004 granted sanction for acquisition of 275 acres
after noting that 589 acres 12 guntas was excluded from the
proposed extent of 3339 acres 12 guntas, after considering 'the E
representations received in pursuance of notices issued \Jnder
Section 17(5) of BDA Act. But when the cases came up before
the High Court and this court, the categorical case of BDA is
that the total area notified under section 17(1) and (3) of the
BDA Act, was 3839 acres 12 guntas and that the area deleted/ F
excluded was 1089 acres 12 guntas. How the preliminary
notification extent area increased by 500 acres and how the
area deleted also increased exactly by 500 acres is not
properly explained and is virtually a mystery. Different
.explanations have been given at different points of time.
G
65. On behalf of BDA, an affidavit dated 14.3.2007 was
filed before us wherein it is disclosed that in regard to a
question put regarding deletion in the Karnataka Legislative
Assembly, the followino particulars were furnished on 25.1.2006:
H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 6 S.C.R.
A (i) Extent of land acquired 2626 acres 13 guntas
(ii) Extent dropped in the final 1089 acres 12 guntas
Notification
B (iii) Extent of government lands 487 acres 11 guntas
Included in formation of
Arkavathi layout
In a statement furnished in this Court on 20.3.2006, BDA gave
c the break up as under:
(i) Extent as per preliminary 3839 acres 12 guntas
Notification
(ii) Extent deleted after preliminary : 1089 acres 12 guntas
0
Notification
(iii) Extent of government lands 459 acres
acquired as per final
notification
E
(iv) Extent of private land acquired : 2291 acres 2750 acres
as per final notification
Another statement furnished to us shows 500 acres have
F been deleted under the heading "religious institutions".
66. The appellants contended that the deletion of as much
as 1089 acres 12 guntas from out of 3839 acres 12 guntas
proposed to be acquired under the preliminary notification would
mean that more than 28% was deleted. Several deletions
G formed islands within the acquired areas. Some of the deletions
in some villages were of such a magnitude that what remained
of the acquisition in those villages were small and negligible
islands completely surrounded by acquired/deleted lands
making it difficult or impossible to effectively use such
H remaining land for development. Such an extensive deletion can
.BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 133
D~VELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
lead to the following two inferences: (i) that there was total non A
application of mind when the proposal was made and without
proper survey and by completely ignoring the ground realities
about the constructed areas, suitability and availability for
acquisition and other relevant circumstances, BOA in extreme
haste had proposed acquisition; and/or (ii) the deletion of such B
vast areas,showed that the deletions were arbitrarily made or
to favour a chosen few.
67. The learned Single Judge after examining the facts
held that there were improper inclusions and exclusions which
amounted to hostile discrimination. He held that the acquisition C
of certain lands and non-acquisition or deletion from acquisition
of some other similarly situated lands situated in the same area,
was arbitrary and discriminatory, violative of Article 14of the
Constitution. He further held that the BOA had failed to furnish
any plan showing the details of the lands proposed for D
acquisition, lands deleted from acquisition, built up areas and
the lands originally not incluqed in the acquisition, even though
they were in the midst of the acquired lands. The learned Single
Judge also noticed that in regard to the deletion of 500 acres,
no reasons have been assigned. E
68. The Division Bench agreed with the single Judge that
there were improper inclusions and exclusions amounting to
discrimination. The Division Bench was of the view that though
the single Judge was justified in holding that there was F
discrimination in acquiring the land, that alone cannot be a
ground for quashing the entire acquisition of 2750 acres. The
Division Bench also noticed that the BDA had not traversed the
allegations regarding discrimination specifically and even a
bare perusal of the map showed that 2750 acres sought to be G
acquired, did not form a contiguous area. In particular he
referred to the haphazard manner in which the acquisition of
deletions were made in Kempapura and Srirampura villages.
The Division Bench noticed that even in other villages small
extents of acquired lands were completely surrounded by large
H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A chunks of areas which were either not acquired or deleted from
acquisition, making access to such notified land difficult. In the
circumstances instead of setting aside the acquisition, in view
a memo and the memo filed by the BDA proposing certain
remedial measures, the Division Bench decided to give an
B opportunity to all the landowners (excluding site owners) who
had taken the plea of discrimination to file an appropriate
application before the BDA for deletion of their lands from
acquisition and to substanti51te their contention by producing
such evidence as was available with them.
c 69. The BOA does not seriously dispute the fact that there
were some amount of arbitrariness and discrimination in the
matter of inclusions and exclusions. Apart from that we find that
even in this court the BOA has not come up with true and
correct position. As noticed above the break up of deletions
0 and the reasons for such deletions have not been disclosed.
The extent of deletion without explanation has jumped from
589.12 acres to 1089 acres 12 guntas. The BOA has not
chosen to explain the exact extent of the government land
involved.
E
70. Even the map produced showing the 2750 acres of
acquired land and 1089 acres 12 guntas of deleted area
contains several discrepancies. For example, in regard to
Sampigehalli, the map produced before us shows that the
F entire extent of the village has been acquired except the village
proper (Abadi) and survey Nos.1 O and 11. But we find that
survey Nos.1 Oand 11 are not in fact deleted and the declaration
shows those survey nos. as acquired. In the same village a
perusal of the preliminary notification and final declaration
shows that Survey Nos.38/2A, 44/10, 44/11, 44/13, 44/14, 44/
G 15 and 46/4 have been omitted in the final declaration but the
plan shows no such omission. On the other hand, it shows the
entire village as having been acquired.
71. We give below the particulars of the area notified and
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 135
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
deleted to get a true picture of the magnitude of deletions and · A
the resultant discrimination:
s. Name of the Extent notified Total extent Extent dropped
No. village in the notified in from
preliminary the final acquisition B
notification dt. declaration while issuing
3.2.2003 dated final
23.2.2004 declaration
(in Acre. (in Acre.
Gunta) Gunta)
1. Dasarahalli 380.04 225.18 154.22
c
2. Byrathikhare 86.07 77.25 8.22
3. Chellakere 155.03 135.14 19.29
4. Geddalahalli 210.22 133.24 76.38
5. K. Narayanpura 195.13 133.05 62.08 D
6. Rachenahalli 396.29 298.03 98.26
7. Thanisandra 557.04 482.07 74.37
8. Amruthahalli 196.11 139.01 56.10
9. Jakkur 422.28 360.24 62.04 E
10. Kempapura 55.13 26.38 28.15
11. Sampigehalli 401.39 256.20 145.21
12. Sriramapura 196.35 94.13 102.22
13. Venkateshpura 95.65 60.13 34.28
F
14. Hennur 262.22 140.21 122.01
15. Hebbala 59.01 59.14
16. Nagavara 169.16 127.00 42.16
Total 3839A.12G. 2750A. 1089 A. 12 G.
G
72. The acquisition was for planned development of the
c'ity and to avoid haphazard growth. But when the layout plan
is examined with reference to the preliminary notification and
final declaration, several startling facts emerge. We may first
refer to the pick. and choose method adopted with reference H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A to Kempapura and S~iramapura villages, to which the division
bench maC:.a specific reference.
(i) In Kempapura village, large areas, that is nearly 50%
of the area of the village (Sy. No.2, 4 to 16, 23, 24, 30,
31) had not been included in the preliminary notification,
B
even though the entire surrounding area had been notified.
Only 55.13 acres were notified in the preliminary
notification but the final declaration was only in regard to
26A.38G and the remaining 28A.15G (more than 51% of
what was notified) were deleted. After deletion of Sy. No.1,
c 3, 18(Part) and 33 the entire northern portion (north of the
Road bisecting the village) is free from acquisition (except
part of Sy. No.17). Even in the southern portion of the
village, there are haphazard deletions.
D (ii) In Srirampura village, quite a few lands (Sy. No.2, 3,
?(Part), 13, 62, 64, 65) were not included in the preliminary
notification even though all the surrounding areas had been
notified. Further, out of total area of 196A.35G notified in
the preliminary notification, only 94A.13G find a place in
E the final declaration and the remaining 102A.22G (more
than 52% of what was notified) were deleted. The 11cquired
lands of 94A.13G are not in a contiguous block~ but in
eleven odd shaped pockets. The deletions and initial
omissions make it impossible to have orderly development
F in regard to acquisition in this village. Some of the pockets
are of such odd shape and size that BOA proposes to
leave them as stand alone parks/open spaces/community
centres, without any development.
73. We find the haphazard and arbitrary exclusions are in
G several other villages also, though not to the extent in
Kempapura and Sriramapura. We may refer to some of them:
(i) Venkateshapura is a comparatively small village. All the
lands were proposed for acquisition under the preliminary
H notification (except a block consisting of Sy. No.6, 7 and
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 137
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
8) in all measuring 95A.05G. Virtually the entire southern A
and western portions of the village have been omitted in
the final declaration and only 60A.13G are included in the
final declaration. But the entire southern portion of the
village (about 30 acres) have been deleted except four
small pockets which have not been deleted : B
(a) Sy. No.30 and 31 measuring 24 Guntas and 25
Guntas in all one acre and nine guntas.
(b) Sy. No.33 and 34 measuring 2A.06G and 1A.18G,
in all 3A.24G; C
(c) Sy No.37/2 measuring 2A.10G.
(d) Sy. No.19/1 measuring 3A.31 G.
There is no explanation as to why, when all surrounding lands D
are deleted these small four pockets are acquired.
(ii) In Nagavara and Hennuru villages, the southern portions
of the villages were not notified for acquisition. But
deletions are haphazard and have left some small pockets / E
of acquired lands. For example, in Nagavara, Sy. No.107
measuring 1A.4G, portion of Sy. No. 7 measuring 21
Guntas, Sy. No. 70 measuring 25 Guntas, Sy. No.152
measuring 6A.4G bifurcated by a road form islands of
acquired lands. In the entire southern part of Nagavara F
·which runs into hundreds of acres, only part of Sy. No.152
is proposed to be acquired. In Hennuru Sy. No.103 is a
small pocket (28 Guntas) which is acquired, is surrounded
by lands not acquired/deleted. There are several other
islands in Hennuru which are not capable of being G
developed due to their small extents. Their Survey
Numbers are not clear in the map produced.
(iii) In Challakere also we find haphazard deletions. We
may refer to two stand alone pockets, that is land ~o the
east of Sy. No.104 and t.he land to the east of 100. H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A What we have referred above is illustrative and not exhaustive.
Similar pockets of small extents of acquired lands surrounded
by lands which are not acquired/deleted, exist in other villages
also.
B 74. The object of establishing a development authority like
BOA is to provide for orderly and planned development so that
the haphazard growth of a city is checked. The disastrous ·
effects of unauthorised and illegal development by some
unscrupulous colonisers/developers are well known. In a
C planned and authorised standard residential developments,
about 30% to 35% of the total area is used to provide broad
and adequate roads and footpaths, drains etc., and at least
another 10% to 15% of the land is earmarked for parks,
playgrounds and community development or civic amenities
(schools, hospitals, police stations, post offices, mini markets,
D community halls etc). Further the layout will have adequate
provision for drainage of rain water as well as sewerage water,
adequate water supply and electricity, well laid metalled roads
which properly connect the layout to Main Roads and other
surrounding areas, by providing approaches and linkages. But
E in an unauthorised or illegal development, the roads are narrow
and minimal, virtually no open sp-aces for parks and
playgrounds, and no area earmarked for civic amenities. There
will be no proper water supply or drainage; and there will be a
mixed use of the area for residential, commercial and industrial
F purposes converting the entire area into a polluting concrete
jungle. The entries and exits from the layouts will be bottlenecks
leading to traffic jams. Once such illegal colonies come up with
poor infrastructure and amenities, it will not be possible to either
rectify and correct the mistakes in planning nor provide any
G amenities even in future. Residents of such unauthorised layouts
are forever be condemned to a life of misery and discomfort. It
is to avoid such haphazard, unhealthy development activities
by greedy illegal colonisers and ignorant land-owners, the State
Legislatures provided for City Improvement Trusts and
H Development Authorities so that they could develop well
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 139
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
planned citizen friendly layouts with all amenities and facilities. A
In this background large tracts of lands running into hundreds
of acres are acquired to have integrated layouts. Only when a
layout is formed on a large scale, adequate provision can be
made for good size parks, playgrounds and community/civil
amenities. For example, if a layout is made in 1000 acres of B
land, the developer can provide a good sized park of twenty
acres and one or two small parks of 2 to 5 acres, have
playgrounds of 5 to 10 acres. Instead of such an integrated
large layout, if 200 small individual layouts are made in areas
ranging from 2 to 10 acres, there will obviously be no provision c
for a park or a playground nor any space for civil amenities.
Further small private colonies/layouts will not have well aligned
unifom1 roads and accesses. While it is true that Municipal and
Town Planning authorities can by strict monitoring and licensing
procedures arrest haphazard development, it is seldom done. D
That is why formation of small layouts by developers is
discouraged and development authorities take up large scale ·
developments. If 200 acres of land on the outskirts of a city,
has to be developed, and if 30 to 50 private developers
proceed to develop areas ranging from 2 to 15-acres, it will
be impossible for them to provide for parks or any playgrounds E
of reasonable size or make provision for planned civil
amenities. Further, there will be no alignment in regard to roads.
Each layout will have roads to suit their own convenience and
this will lead to mis-alignment and bottlenecks leading to traffic
snarls. The width of the roads also will differ from layout to F
layout depending upon the 'greed' of each private developer,
resulting in the size, shape and alignment of roads varying for
every stretch of 200 to 500 meters. There will be no proper
drainage of rain water or sewerage water leading to constant
flooding or stagnation. Therefore large integrated layouts were G
found to be the answer for orderly development. No small
developer can develop a good township in a few acres of land.
It was also thought that developers will be mainly profit
motivated and will try to minimise the. roads, open spaces and
community areas. It is therefore that legislature constituted H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A statutory development authorities to undertake large scale
developments without any profit motive.
75. If authorities like BDA notify 3000 acres of land for
development and then delete from the proposed acquisition
B several pockets which aggregate to about 1000 to 1500 acres,
then the result is obvious. There will be no integrated
development at all. What was intended to be a uniform,
contiguous and continuous layout of 3000 acres will get split
into small pockets which are not connected with the other
pockets or will be intersected by own illegal pockets of private
C colonies thereby perpetuating what was intended to be
prevented, that is haphazard growth without proper
infrastructure. It will then not be possible to provide proper road
connections and drainage and impossible to provide
appropriate parks, playgrounds and civic amenities of
D appropriate and adequate size and situation. When a
development authority starts developing pockets of lands
measuring 2 acres to 5 acres, obviously it also cannot provide
open spaces and civic amenities and may end up with one
pocket having plots, another far away pocket having a
E playground and another far away pocket having a park and their
being no uniformity or continuity of roads. As noticed above, a
large layout enables formation of long and straight roads for
easy movement of traffic. On the other hand, short and disjointed
roads affect smooth movement of traffic. Therefore, if a
F development authority having acquired a large tract of land
withdraws or deletes huge chunks, the development by the
development authority will resemble haphazard developments
by unscrupulous private developers rather than being a planned
and orderly development expected from a Development
G Authority. Therefore when a large layout is being planned, the
development authorities should exercise care and caution in
deleting large number of pockets/chunks of land in the middle
of the proposed layout. There is no point in proposing a planned
layout but then deleting various portions of land in the middle
H merely on the ground that there is a small structure of 100 sq.ft
I
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 141
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
or 200 sq.ft. which may be authorized or unauthorized. Such A
/deletions make a mockery of development. Further such
1
deletions/exclusions encourage corruption and favouritism and
- bring discontent among those who are not favourably treated.
76. The complaint by appellants is that in the proposed B
Arkavathi layout, rich and powerful with "connections" and
"money power" were able to get their lands, (even vacant lands)
released, by showing some imaginary structure or by putting
up some unauthorised structure overnight. Though we do not
propose to go into motives, the concurrent finding by the C
learned Single Judge and Division Bench is that there are
arbitrary unexplained deletions. While we may not comment on
policy, it is obvious that deletion from proposed acquisition
should be only in regard to areas which are already well
developed in a planned manner. Sporadic small. unauthorised
constructions in unauthorised colonies/ layouts, are not to be D
deleted as the very purpose of acquisition for planned
development is to avoid such unauthorised ,development. If
hardship is the reason for such deletion, the appropriate course
is to give preference to the land/plot owners in making
allotments and help them to resettle and not to continue the E
illegal and haphazard pockets merely on the ground that some
temporary structure or a dilapidated structure existed therein.
A development authority should either provide orderly
development or should stay away from development. It cannot
act like unscrupulous private developers//colonisers attempting F
development of small bits of land with only profit motive. When
we refer to private developers/colonisers by way of comparison,
our intention is not to deprecate all private developers/
colonisers. We are aware that several private developers/
colonisers provide large, well planned authorized developments, G
some of which are even better than developments by
development authorities. What is discouraged and deprecated
is small unauthorized layouts without any basic amenities. Be
that as it may.
H
77. What do we say about a 'development', where with
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 6 S.C.R.
A reference to the total extent of a village, one-third is not notified
at all, and more than half is deleted from proposed acquisition
of the remaining two-third and only the remaining about 20%
to 30% area is acquired, that too not contiguously, but in
different parcels and pockets. What can be done with such
B acquisition? Can it be used for orderly development? Can it
avoid haphazard and irregular growth? The power of deletion
and withdrawal unless exercised with responsibility and fairly
and reasonably, will play havoc with orderly development, will
add to haphazard and irregular growth and create discontent
c among sections of society who were not fortunate to have their
lands deleted.
78. Learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench have
concurrently found that BOA had indulged in pick and choose
deletions !=!nd acquisitions. The learned Single Judge and the
D Division Bench have found discrimination and irregularities,
both in initial omission of certain lands and in deleting of some
lands which were notified. They have also recorded a finding
that having regard to the nature of deletions, the acquisition
lands do not form a continuous or contiguOLJS area and
E acquisition of small extents of land surrounded by large chunks
of un-acquired lands and lands which have been omitted from
acquisition would make the development of acquired pockets
exceedingly difficult.
F 79. The Division Bench was of the view that -quashing of
the entire acquisition may not the remedy. It, therefore, decided
to salvage the situation by issuing a series of directions,
whereby the land owners were permitted to apply for deletion
of their lands also from acquisition on the ground that (a) the
G lands were situated within green belt area; (b) the lands were
totally built up; (c) the lands had buildings constructed by
charitable, educational and/or religious institutions; (d) the lands
were used for nurseries; (e) lands where running factories had
been set up; and (f) lands were similar to the adjoining lands
H which were not notified for acquisition. The Court directed that
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 143
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
ff the BOA comes to the conclusion that the lands of applicants A
were released are similar to those which have been excluded
from acquisition their lands should also be deleted from
acquisition. This direction requires clarification.
80. The principles relating to grant of relief in cases of B
discrimination are well settled. The classic statement is found
in Chandigarh Admn. & Anr. v. Jagjit Singh & Anr. [1995 (1)
SCC 745), wherein this Court held:
"Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-
authority has passed a particular order in the case of C
another person similarly situated can never be the ground
for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of
discrimination. The order in favour of the other person
might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be
investigated first before it can be directed to be followed D ·
in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the
other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted
in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious
that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the
basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority E
to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted
order. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the
High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely
because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/
unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High ·court to F
compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and
again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected,
if it can be done according to law - indeed, wherever it is
possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority
to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law - but G
even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it
can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct
the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the court
is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such
illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be
prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable
mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and
the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of
the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it
B can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the
petitioner if it is found that the petitioners' case is similar
to the other persons' case. But then why examine another
person's case in his absence rather than examining the
case of the petitioner who is present before the court and
c seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and
convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner
before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and
circumstances of his case than to enquire into the
correctness of the order made or action taken in another
person's case, which other person is not before the case
D
nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course
- barring exceptional situations - would neither be
advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court
cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms
governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one
E case a particular order has been passed or a particular
action has been taken, the same must be repeated
irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is
contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided
on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with
F relevant legal principles".
In Gurshanan Singh & Ors. v. New Delhi Municipal
Committee & Ors. 1996 (2) SCC 459 this court held:
"There appears to be some confusion in respect of the
G
scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees
equality before law to all citizens. This guarantee of equality
before law is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced
by a citizen or court in a negative manner. To put it in other
words, if an illegality or irregularity has been committed in
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 145
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
favour of any individual or a group of individualsi the others A
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this
Court, that the same irregularity or illegality be committed
by the State or an authority which can be held to be a State
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, so far
such petitioners are concerned, on the reasoning that they B
have been denied the benefits which have been extended
to others although in an irregular or illegal manner. Such
petitioners can question the validity of orders which are
said to have been passed in favour of persons who were
not entitled to the same, but they cannot claim orders which c
are not sanctioned by law in their favour on principle of
equality before law. Neither Article 14 of the Constitution
conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article
226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of
equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall 0
amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal
procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits
to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is
upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his
claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while E
it has been extended to others and in this process there
has been discrimination".
In State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann-· 1997 (3) SCC
321 - this court held that the doctrine of discrimination is found
upon existence of an enforceable right and that Article 14 would F
apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out to equals
and similarly circumstanced without any rational basis or
relationship in that behalf. This court further held that a person
who has no legal right cannot be given relief merely because
such relief has been wrongly given to others and a wrong order G
cannot be the foundation for claiming equality, nor does a wrong
decision by the Government give a right to enforce the benefit
thereof and claim parity or equajity. There are several other
decisions which reiterate this position. It is not necessary to
refer to all of them. H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A 81. We are conscious of the fact tliat when a person
subjected to blatant discrimination, approaches a court seeking
equal treatment, he expects relief similar to what others have
been granted. All that he is interested is getting relief for
himself, as others. He is not interested in getting the relief
B illegally granted to others, quashed. Nor is he interested in
knowing whether others were granted relief legally or about the
distinctic)ll qetween positive equality and negative equality. In
fact he will be reluctant to approach courts for quashing the
relief granted to others on the ground that it is illegal, as he does
c not want to incur the wrath of those who have benefited from
the wrong action. As a result, in most cases those who benefit
by the illegal grants/ac!ions by authorities, get away with the
benefit, while others who are not fortunate to have 'connections'
or 'money power' suffer. But these are not the grounds for courts
to enforce negative equality and perpetuate the illegality. The
0
fact that an Authority has extended favours illegally in the case
of several persons cannot be a ground for courts to issue a
mandamus directing repetition thereof, by applying the principle
of equality. Article 14 guarantees equality before law and not
equality in subverting law nor equality in securing illegal
E benefits. But courts cannot be silent bystanders if acquisition
process is used by officers of the Authority with ulterior or
malafide motives. For example, let us take a case where 2000
acres are required for a project as per the Development
Scheme, but the preliminary notification is issued in respect of
F 3000 acres; and when the land owners 'apply' or 'approach'
the Authority, 1000 acres of lands are released. Or take a case
where a project required 1000 acres of contiguous land for a
development project. and preliminary notice is accordingly
issued for acquisition of a compact contiguous extent of 1000
G acres; but thereafter without any logical explanation or
perceivable reason, several large areas in the midst of the
proposed layout, are denotified or deleted making it virtually
impossible to execute the development scheme, as proposed.
In the absence of satisfactory explanations in such a case, it
H may be necessary to presume that there was misuse or abuse
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 147
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
of the acquisition process. Be that as it may. A
82. We may illustrate the principle relating to positive and
negative equality with reference to following notional acquisition
cases:
(i) Where a petitioner's land and his neighbour's land are B
of similar size and have similar structures and are similarly
situated, and the policy of the Development Authority is to
withdraw the acquisition in respect of lands which are
'constructed', if the neighbour's land is deleted from the
proposed acquisition on the ground that it has a C
construction of 1000 sq.ft. and the petitioner's land is not
so deleted, the petitioner will be entitled to relief on the
ground of discrimination. But if the neighbour's land
measures 2000 sq.ft. and contains a house of 1000 sq.ft
and the petitioner's land measures one acre and contains D
a house measuring 1000 sq.ft., the petitioner cannot
obviously contend that because his neighbour's property
was deleted from acquisition, being a land with a
construction, his one acre land should also be deleted in
entirety from the acquisition, as it had a 1000 sq.ft. E
construction. But it may be possible for him to contend that
an extent equal to what was released to his neighbour,
should be released.
(ii) Where the lands owned by two neighbours are equal
in size having similar structures, but one was constructed F
before the preliminary notification after obtaining a licence
and the other was constructed after the preliminary
notification unauthorisedly, the owner of the land with the
unauthorised structure cannot obviously claim parity with
the owner of the land-with the authorised structure, for G
seeking deletion from acquisition.
(iii) Where the vacant lands of 'A' and 'B' - two neighbours
are acquired. The Authority had a policy to delete
H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 6 S.C.R.
A properties with constructions, as on the date of preliminary
notification. Both put up unauthorised structures
clandestinely overnight, after the preliminary notification.
The land of 'B' is deleted from acquisition on the ground
that it has a construction. If 'A' approaches court and
B claims release of his land claiming parity with 'B', the
claim will have to be rejected. But, where the Authority
admits that B's land was deleted even though the
construction was subsequent to preliminary notification,
the court may direct the Authority to take appropriate action
c in accordance with law for cancelling the deletion.
(iv) If in a village all the lands are notified and subsequently
all lands except two or three small pockets are deleted
without any valid ground, the persons whose lands were
acquired can also seek deletion, on the ground that all the·
D surrounding lands have been deleted. Court cannot direct
deletion merely because the surrounding lands were
deleted, as those deletions were illegal and not based on
any valid policy. But the petitioners can contend that the
very purpose of acquisition had been rendered infructuous
E by deletion of the majority of lands from the proposed
acquisition, and the project or the scheme has ceased to
exist and cannot be executed only with reference to their
lands. In such a case, relief can be granted not on the
ground that there has been discrimination, but on the
F ground that the proposed development scheme became
non-existent on account of most of the lands being deleted
from acquisition.
Therefore, a land owner is not entitled to seek deletion of his
G land from acquisition, merely on the ground that lands of some
others have been deleted. He should make out a justifiable
cause for deleting his land from acquisition. If the Rules/
Scheme/Policy provides for deletion of certain categories of
land and if the petitioner falls under those categories, he will
be entitled to relief. But if under the Rules or Scl1.cme or policy
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE · 149
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
for deletion, his land is not eligible for deletion, his land cannot A
be deleted merely on the ground that some other land similarly
situated had been deleted (even though that land also did not
fall under any category eligible to be deleted), as that would
amount to enforcing negative equality. But where large extents
of land of others are indiscriminately and arbitrarily deleted, B
then the court may grant relief, if on accou11t of such deletions,
the development scheme for.Jhat area has become
inexecutable or has resulted in abandonment of the scheme.
Alternatively, if a common factor can, ~e identified in respect
of other lands which were deleted, and~lf the petitioner's land c
also has that common factor, relief ~an be granted on the
ground that the Authority had adopted the common factor as
the criterion in the case of others and therefore adopting the
same yardstick, the land of petitioners also should be deleted.
These principles may be kept in view while implementing
0
direction in para 105D(i)(f) of the Judgment of the Division
Bench of the High Court.
83. It is necessary to refer another aspect of land
acquisition for urban development. 'Public purposes' may be
of different degrees of import.ance/priority/urgency. An E
acquisition for laying a road or a water supply canal may be of
higher priority category when compared to acquisitions for
formation of an urban residential layout. Planned urban
development \by forming residential layouts, is carried out not
only by statutory development authorities, but also by private F
developers/ colonisers. The reason why legislature has created
Development Authorities for executing 9evelopment schemes,
is because they can undertakENarge scale developments ·
providing better quality facilities with no profit motives. But in
trying to achieve planned development and thereby benefit the G
urban middle class or urban poor by providing them housing
plots, the interests of agriculturists/land owners who lose their
livelihood on account of such acquisition, should not be ignored.
Though the legislature intended that the land-loser should get
reasonable compensation at the time of dispossession or H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2tt ·O] 6 S.C.R.
A immediately thereafter, it seldom happens in practice. This court
had occasion to refer to the travails of land-losers in getting the
compensation in Special Land Acquisition Officer v.
Mahaboob [2009 (3) SCALE 263] thus:
"The Collector (LAO) is supposed to offer fair
B
compensation by taking all relevant circumstances relating
to market value into account. To safeguard the interests of
the land-loser, the Act requires the collector to make the
award before the land owner is dispossessed. The
intention is that the land-loser will immediately be able to
c draw compensation and purchase some other suitable
land or make appropriate arrangements for his livelihood.
But in practice the Collectors (LAOs) seldom make
reasonable offers. They tend to err on the 'safer' side and
invariably assess very low compensation. Such meagre
D awards force the land-loser to seek reference to civil court
for increase in compensation in regard to almost every
award made by the LAO. In fact, many a time, even the
reference courts are conservative in estimating the market
value and it requires further appeals by the land-loser to
E the High Court and Supreme Court to get just
compensation for the land. We can take judicial notice of
the fact that in several States the awards of the reference
court or the judgments of the High Court and this court
increasing the compensation, are not complied with and
F the land-losers are again driven to courts to initiate time
consuming execution process (which also involves
considerable expense by way of lawyers fee) to recover
what is justly due. Resultantly the land-losers seldom get
a substantial portion of proper compensation for their land
G in one lump sum immediately after the acquisition. The
effect may be highlighted by the following illustration:
"A farmer owns 3 acres of land in a village, which is his
sole means of livelihood. The land is acquired for some
project in the year 1990. The true market value of the land
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 151
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
was around Rs.1,50,000/- per acre in 1990. If he got the ·A
said price, that is, Rs. 4,50,000/- with solatium, additional
amount and interest in the year 1991, he has a reasonable
opportunity of purchasing some alternative land, so that he
can eke out his livelihood and continue to live with dignity.
But this rarely happens in practice. The final notification is B
made in 1992 and the LAO makes an award in the year
1993 offering Rs.50,000/- per acre. So the land-loser is
constrained to seek a reference to the court. The reference
court takes three to four years to decide the reference and
increases the compensation to Rs. one lakh per acre in c
the year 1996. The increased amount is dP.posited in 1997-
1998. The land-loser is constrained to file a further appeal
to the High Court and the High Court takes another three
to four years and increases the compensation to Rs.1.5
lakh per acre in the year 2000 and such increase is
0
deposited in the year 2001-02. That is, the loser is forced
to fight at least in two courts to get the compensation
commensurate with the market value of Rs.1.5 lakhs per
acre. To add to his woes, when the reference court or the
High Court increases the compensation, the Government
does not pay the increased amount immediately and drives E
him to execution proceedings also. This means that the
land owner gets compensation piecemeal, that is, Rs.
50,000/- per acre in 1993, another Rs. 50,000/- per acre
in 1997-98, and another Rs.50,000/- per acre in 2001-02.
At every stage he has to incur expenses for litigation. As F
he does not get the full compensation in one lump sum,
he is not in a position to purchase an alternative land.
When the land is acquired, he loses his means of
livelihood, as he knows no other type of work. The result
is, he is forced to spend the compensation received in G
piecemeal, on sustenance of his family when he fights the
legal battles for increasing the compensation and for
recovering the increases granted, by levying execution. The
result is that whatever compensation is received
piecemeal, gets spent for the sustenance of the family, and H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A litigation cost during the course of prolonged litigation. At
the end of the legal battle, he is hardly left with any money
to purchase alternative land and by then the prices of land
would have also increased manifold, making it impossible
to purchase even a fraction of the land which he originally
8 possessed. Illiteracy, ignorance, and lack of counselling
add to his woes and the piecemeal compensation is
dissipated leaving him with neither land, nor money to buy
alternative land, nor any means of livelihood. In short, he
is stripped of his land and livelihood."
c 84. Frequent complaints and grievances in regard to the
following five areas, with reference to the prevailing system of
acquisitions governed by Land Acquisition Act, 1894, requires
the urgent attention of the state governments and development
authorities:
D
(i) absence of proper or adequate survey and
planning before embarking upon acquisition;
(ii) indiscriminate use of emergency provisions in
section 17 of the LA Act;
E
. (iii) notification of areas far larger than what is actually
required, for acquisition, and then making arbitrary
deletions and withdrawals from the acquisitions;
F (iv) offer of very low amount as compensat - 1-., ;i,i'.'l
Acquisition Collectors, necessitating refe1:.. .:;es to
court in almost all cases;
(v) inordinate delay in payment of compensation; and
G
(vi) absence of any rehabilitatory measures.
While the plight of project oustees and landlosers affected by
acquisition for industries has been frequently highlighted in the
H media, there has been very little effort to draw attention to the
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 153
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
plight of farmers affected by frequent acquisitions for urban A
development.
85. There are several avenues for providing rehabilitation
and economic security to landlosers. They can be by way of
offering employment, allotment of alternative lands, providing s
housing or house plots, providing safe investment opportunities
for the compensation amount to generate a stable income, or
providing a permanent regular income by way of annuities. The
nature of benefits to the landlosers can vary depending upon
the nature of the acquisition. For this limited purpose, the C
acquisitions can be conveniently divided into three broad
categories:
(i) Acquisitions for the benefit of the general public or in
national interest. This will include acquisitions for roads,
bridges, water supply projects, power projects, defence D
establishments, residential colonies for rehabilitation of
victims of natural calamities.
(ii) Acquisitions for economic development and industrial
growth. This will include acquisitions for Industrial Layouts/ E
Zones, corporations owned or controlled by the State,
expansion of existing industries, and setting up Special
Economic Zones.
(iii) Acquisitions for planned development of urban areas.
This will include acquisitions for formation of residential F
layouts and construction of apartment Blocks, for allotment
to urban middle class and urban poor, rural poor etc.
86. In acquisitions falling under the first category, the
general public are the direct beneficiaries. In the second G
category, the beneficiaries are industrial or business houses,
though ultimately, there will be indirect benefit to the public by
way of generation of employment and overall economic
development. In the third category, the beneficiaries are
individual members of public who, on account of allotment of H
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 6 S.C.R.
A plots/flats, will be able to lead a better quality of life by having
a shelter with comforts, apart from the fact that the planned
development of cities and towns is itself in public interest. At
present, irrespective of the purpose, in all cases of acquisition,
the landloser gets only monetary compensation. Acquisitions
B of the first kind, does not normally create any resistance or
hostility. But in acquisitions of the second kind, where the
beneficiaries of acquisition are industries, business houses or
private sector companies and in acquisitions of the third kind
where the beneficiaries are private individuals, there is a
c general feeling among the land-losers that their lands are taken
away, to benefit other classes of people; that these amount to
robbing Peter to pay Paul; that their lands are given to .others
for exploitation or enjoyment, while they are denied their land
and their source of livelihood. When this grievance and
0 resentment remains unaddressed, it leads to unrest and
agitations. The solution is to make the land-losers also the
beneficiaries of acquisition so that the land-losers do not feel
alienated but welcome the acquisition.
87. It is necessary to evolve tailor-made schemes to suit
E particular acquisitions, so that they will be smooth, speedy,
litigation free and beneficial to all concerned. Proper planning,
adequate counselling, and timely mediation with different
groups of landlosers, should be resorted. Let us consider the
different types of benefits that will make acquisitions land:oser-
F friendly.
(87.1) In acquisitions of the first kind (for benefit of general
public or in national interest) the question of providing any
benefit other than what is presently provided in the Land
G Acquisition Act, 1894 may not be feasible. The State should
however ensure that the landloser gets reasonable
compensation promptly at the time of dispossession, so that
he can make alternative arrangemel)ts for his rehah!litation and
survival.
H (87.2) Where the acquisition /is for industrial or business
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 155
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
houses (for setting-up industries or special economic zones A
etc.), the Government should play not only the role of a land
acquirer but also the role of the protector of the land-losers. As
most of the agriculturists/small holders who lose their land, do
not have the expertise or the capacity for a negotiated
settlement, the state should act as a benevolent trustee and B
safeguard their interests. The Land Acquisition Collectors
should also become Grievance Settlement Authorities. The
various alternatives including providing employment, providing
equity participation, providing annuity benefits ensuring a
regular income for life, providing rehabilitation in the form of C
housing or new businesses, should be considered and
whichever is found feasible or suitable, should be made an
integral process of the scheme of such acquisitions. If the
government or Development Authorities act merely as
facilitators for industrial or business houses, mining companies D
and developers or colonisers, to acquire large extent of land
ignoring the legitimate rights of land-owners, it leads to
resistance, resentment and hostility towards acquisition
process.
(87.3) Where the acquisition is of the third kind, that is, for E
urban development (either by formation of housing colonies by
Development Authorities or by making bulk allotment to
colonisers, developers or housing societies), there is no scope
for providing benefits like employment or a share in the equity.
But the landlosers can be given a share in the development F
itself, by making available a reasonable portion of the
developed land to the landloser so that he can either use it
personally or dispose of a part and retain a part or put it to other
beneficial use. We may give by way of an illustration a model
scheme for large scale acquisitions for planned urban G
development by forming residential layouts: Out of the total
acquired area, 30% of the land area can be earmarked for
roads and footpaths; and 15% to 10% for parks, open spaces
and civic amenities. Out of the remaining 55% to 60% area
available for forming plots, the Development Authority can
H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] e S.C.R.
A auction 10% area as plots, allot 15% area as plot• to urban
middle class and allot 15% area aa plot8 to ~~6nomically
weaker sections (at cost or subsidised cost), and release the
remaining 15% to 20% area in the form of plots to the land-
lose rs whose lands have been acquired, in lieu of
B compensation. {The percentages mentioned above are me~ly
illustrative and can vary from scheme to 8eheme depending
upon the local conditions, relevant Bye-laws/Rules, value of ma
acquired land, the estimated cost of devetoph1ent etc.). Such
a model makes the land·loser a stake-holder and direct
C beneficiary of the acquisition leading to co-operation for the
urban development scheme.
88. In the preceding para, we have touched upon matters
that may be considered to be in the realm of government policy.
We have referred to them as acquisition of lands affect the vital
D rights of farmers and give rise to considerable litigations and
agitations. Our suggestions and observations are intended to
draw attention of the government and development Authorities
to some probable solutions to the vex~d problems associated
with land acquisition, existence of which can neither be denied
E nor disputed, and to alleviate the hardships of the land owners.
It may be possible for the government and development
authorities to come up With better solutions. There is also a
need for the Law Commission and the Parliament to revisit the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is more than a century old.
F There is also a need to remind Development Authorities that
they exist to serve the people and not vice versa. We have
come across Development Authorities which resort to
'developmental activities' by acquiring lands and forming
layouts, not with the goal of achieving planned development or
G provide plots at reasonable costs in well formed layouts, but to
provide work to their employees and generate funds for
payment of salaries. Any development scheme should be· to
benefit the society and improve the city, and not to benefit the
development authority. Be that as it may.
H
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 157
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
89. When BOA prepares a development Scheme it is A
requited to conduct an initial survey about the availability and
suitability of the lands to be acquired. While acquiring 16
villages at a stretch, if in respect of any of the villages, about
30% area of the village is not included in the notification under
section 4(1) though available for acquisition, and out of the B
remaining 70% area which is notified, more than half (that is
about 40% of the village area) is deleted when final notification
is issued, and the acquisition is only of 30% area which is non-
contiguous, it means that there was no proper survey or
application of mind when formulating the development sch'eme c
or that the deletions were for extraneous or arbitrary reasons.
Inclusion of the land of a person in an acquisition notification,
is a traumatic experience for tne landowner, particularly if he
was eking out his ljvelihood Jrom that land. If large areas are
notified and then large extents are to b.e .deleted, it breeds 0
corruption and nepotism among officials. lt also .creates hostility,
mutual distrust and disharmony among the villagers, dividing
them on the lines of 'those who can influence and get their lands
deleted' and 'those who cannot'. Touts and middlemen flaunting
political connections flourish, extracting money for getting lands E
deleted. Why subject a large number to citizens to such
traumatic experience? Why not plan properly before embarking
upon acquisition process? In this case, out of the four villages
included at the final stages of finalising the development
scheme, irregularities have been found at least in regard to
three villages, thereby emphasising the need for proper planning F
· and survey before embarking upon acquisition.
90. Where arbitrary and unexplained deletions and
exclusions from acquisition, of large extents of notified lands,
render the acquisitions meaningless, or totally unworkable, the G
court will have no alternative but to quash the entire acquisition.
But where many landlosers have accepted the acquisition and
received the compensation, and where possession of
considerable portions of acquired lands has already been
. taken, and development activities have been carried out by . H
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A laying plots and even making provisional or actual allotments,
those factors have to be taken note of, while granting relief. The
Division Bench has made an effort to protect the interests of
all parties, on the fact and circumstances, by issuing detailed
directions. But implementation of these directions may lead to
B further litigations and complications. To salvage the acquisition :
and to avoid hardships to BDA and its allottees and to avoid
prolonged further round litigations emanating from the directions
of the High Court, a more equitable way would be to uphold
the decision of the division bench, but subject BDA's actions
c to certain corrective m~asures by requiring it to re-examine
certain aspects and provide an option to the landlosers to
secure some additional benefit, as an incentive to accept the
acquisition. A direction to provide an option to the land-losers
to seek allotment of developed plots in lieu of compensation
0 or to provide for preferential allotment of some plots at the
prevailing market price in addition to compensation will meet
the ends of justice. Such directions will not be in conflict with
the BOA (Allotment of sites) Rules, as they are intended to save
the acquisitions. If the acquisitions are to be quashed in entirety
E by accepting the challenges to the acquisition on the ground
of arbitrary deletions and exclusions, there may be no
development scheme at all, thereby putting BDA to enormous
loss. The directions of the High Court and this Court are
warranted by the peculiar facts of the case and are not intended
to be general directions applicable to regular acquisitions in
F accordance with law, without any irregularities.
Conclusion
91. In view of the foregoing, we affirm the directions of the
G Division Bench subject to the following further directions and
clarifications:
(i) In regard to the acquisition of lands in Kempapura and
Srirampura, BDA is directed to re-consider the objections
to the acquisitions having regard to the fact that large
H areas were not initially notified for acquisition, and more
BONDU RAMASWAMY v. BANGALORE 159
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
than 50% of whatever that was proposed for acquisition A
was also subsequently deleted from acquisition. BOA has
to consider whether in view of deletions to a large extent,
whether development with respect to the balance of the
acquired lands has become illogical and impractical, and
if so, whether the balance area also should be deleted from B
,acquisition. If BOA proposes to continue the acquisition,
it shall file a report within four months before the High Court
so that consequential orders could be passed.
(ii) In regard to villages of Venkateshapura, Nagavara,
Hennur and Challakere where there are several very small C
pockets of acquired lands surrounded by lands which were
not acquired or which were deleted from the proposed
acquisition, BOA may consider whether such small
pockets should also be deleted if they are not suitable for
forming self contained layouts. The acquisition thereof D
cannot be justified on the ground that these small islands
of acquired land, could be used as a stand alone park or
playground in regard to a layout formed in different
unconnected lands in other villages. Similar isolated
pockets in other villages should also be dealt with in a E
similar manner.
(iii) BOA shall give an option to each writ petitioner whose
land has been acquired for Arkavathy layout:
(a) to accept allotment of 15% (fifteen percent) of the land F
acquired from him, by way of developed plots, in lieu of
compensation (any fractions in excess of 15% may be
charged prevailing rates of allotment).
OR G
(b) in cases where the extent of land acquired exceeds half
an acre, to claim in addition to compensation (without
prejudice to seek reference if he is not satisfied with the
quantum), allotment of a plot measuring 30' x 40' for every H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 6 S.C.R.
A half acre of land acquired at the prevailing allotment price.
(iv) Any allotment made by BOA, either by forming layouts
or by way of bulk allotments, will be subjept to the above.
The appeals are disposed of accordingly. All pendiniJ
B applications also stand disposed of.
K.K.T. Matters disposed of.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "land acquisition"Sign in to search