BRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR.versusNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY

504                      [2020]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    9 S.C.R. 504                [2020] 9 S.C.R.


A                    BRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR.
                                          v.
                     NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
                         (Civil Appeal No. 2926 of 2020)
B                              AUGUST 07, 2020
                [N. V. RAMANA, S. ABDUL NAZEER AND
                          SURYA KANT JJ.]
            Motor Vehicles Act, 1988:
C            s. 173 – Delay of 45 days in filing appeal against order of
      Motor Accident Claim Tribunal – Application for condonation of
      delay and appeal dismissed by High Court – Appeal to Supreme
      Court – Held: s. 173 provides limitation period for filing appeal –
      The provision also gives sufficient discretionary powers to the Court
      to condone delay in filing the appeal if it is satisfied that there
D
      existed “sufficient cause” - The provision being a beneficial
      legislation “sufficient cause” must be given liberal interpretation
      to serve the object of the Act – In the present case delay of 45 days
      has been properly explained – The strict approach taken in the
      impugned order was hypertechnical and hence not sustainable –
E     Delay is condoned – Matter remanded to High Court to be decided
      on merit – Limitation – Delay.
            Delay:
            Condonation of delay – Criteria to be adopted – Held: There
      is no straight jacket formula for condonation of delay – The Courts
F     are required to take into consideration entire facts and circumstances
      of the case as well as conduct of the parties while considering
      condonation of delay – Keeping in view substantive rights of the
      parties, undue emphasis should not be given to technicalities and
      provisions cannot be viewed strictly as compared to commercial
G     claims.
            Interpretation of Statutes:
            Beneficial legislation – Interpretation of – Held: Interpretation
      of beneficial legislation must be remedial and must be in furtherance
      of the purpose which the statute seeks to serve.
H
                                       504
            BRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR. v.                              505
             NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY

      Words and Phrases:                                                A
       Expressions “may” and “sufficient cause” — Interpretation
of, in the context of s. 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1. Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a
beneficial legislation intended at protecting the rights of victims     B
affected in road accidents. Moreover, the Act is a self-contained
code in itself which provides procedures for filing claims, for
passing of award and for preferring an appeal. Even, the limitations
for preferring the remedies are contained in the code itself. The
interpretation of a beneficial legislation must be remedial and         C
must be in furtherance with the purpose which the statute seeks
to serve. [Paras 8 and 9][509-F-G]
      Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy Director,
      Employees State Insurance Corporation. (2009) 9 SCC
      61 : [2009] 13 SCR 1139; Vimla Devi v. National                   D
      Insurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 2 SCC 186 : [2018] 13 SCR
      753 – relied on.
       2.1 Section 173 of the Act provides that, any person
aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal may approach the
High Court within ninety days. However, the second proviso
                                                                        E
states that the High Court “may” still entertain such appeal even
after the expiry of ninety days, if the appellant satisfies the Court
that there exists sufficient reason behind the delay. [Para 12][511-
D]
       2.2 Ordinarily, the word “may” is not a word of compulsion.
It is an enabling word and it only confers capacity, power or           F
authority and implies discretion.“It is used in a statute to indicate
that something may be done which prior to it could not be done”.
[Para 13][511-E]
      Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder v. Ayyavoo
      alias Periana Gounder (1982) 1 SCC 159 : [1982] 2                 G
      SCR 146; Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree
      Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. [1962] 3 Suppl. SCR 973 –
      relied on.
      Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.
      Singh, 14th Edn. - referred to.                                   H
506            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2020] 9 S.C.R.


A             2.3 The legislature by usage of the word “may” in Section
      173 of the Act, conferred sufficient discretionary powers upon
      the Court to entertain appeals even beyond the period of ninety
      days. Such discretionary power is conferred upon the Courts, to
      enforce the rights of the victims and their dependents. The
      legislature intended that Courts must have such power so as to
B
      ensure that substantive justice is not trumped by technicalities.
      If the specific conditions wherein the power could be exercised
      is also provided in the statute, then the Court must exercise the
      aforesaid discretion in the manner as specified by the statute
      itself. In the second proviso to Section 173 it is stated that Court
C     has the power to condone delay only if it is satisfied that there
      existed “sufficient cause”. [Paras 14, 16 and 17][511-F; 512-C-
      F]
              Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd. (1977) 2
              SCC 166 : [1977] 2 SCR 964 – relied on.
D             Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Dave Bhagwatprasad
              Prabhuprasad AIR 1963 SC 120 : [1963] 3 SCR 312;
              Shri Prakash Chand Agarwal v. Hindustan Steel Ltd.,
              (1970) 2 SCC 806 : [1969] 2 SCR 675 – referred to.
              2.4 Although the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do
      not apply while deciding claims under the Motor Vehicles Act,
E
      but even while interpreting “sufficient cause” under the
      Limitation Act Courts have taken a liberal interpretation.
      [Para 18][512-G]
              Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v.
              Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 8 SCC 321 :
F             [2008] 11 SCR 1; Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish
              Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685 : [2010] 8 SCR 597; Maniben
              Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
              Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157 – relied on.
              2.5 Therefore, the aforesaid provision being a beneficial
G     legislation, must be given liberal interpretation to serve its object.
      Keeping in view the substantive rights of the parties, undue
      emphasis should not be given to technicalities. In such cases
      delay in filing and refiling cannot be viewed strictly, as compared
      to commercial claims under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
      1996 or the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. [Para 22][514-F-G]
H
           BRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR. v.                              507
            NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY

      P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar (2019) 13 SCC 445 :               A
      [2018] 12 SCR 143 – relied on.

     2.6 The legislative intent of Motor Vehicles Act is to provide
appropriate compensation for the victims and to protect their
substantive rights, in pursuit of the same, the interpretation
should not be as strict as commercial claims. [Para 22][515-E]         B

      2.7 Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts with
discretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the same
time it also places an obligation upon the party to justify that he
was prevented from abiding by the same due to the existence of         C
“sufficient cause”. Although there exists no strait jacket formula
for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not only
take into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case
but also the conduct of the parties. The concept of reasonableness
dictates that the Courts even while taking a liberal approach must
weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties. When a        D
right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence
and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrain
from exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief. [Para 23][515-
F-G]
                                                                       E
      3. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
delay of 45 days has been properly explained by the appellants,
which was on account of illness of the wife of Appellant No.1. It
was not appropriate on the part of the High Court to dismiss the
appeal merely on the ground of delay of short duration, particularly
in matters involving death in motor accident claims. Moreover,         F
in the present case no mala fide can be imputable against the
appellants for filing the appeal after the expiry of ninety days.
Therefore, the strict approach taken in the impugned order is
hyper-technical and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.
[Para 24][515-H; 516-A-B]
                                                                       G
      4. As the adjudication on the merits of the case has not
taken place, the matter is remanded to the High Court for fresh
consideration on merits. [Para 25][516-C]

                                                                       H
508            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 9 S.C.R.


A                              Case Law Reference
      [2009] 13 SCR 1139                  relied on               Para 9
      [2018] 13 SCR 753                   relied on               Para 10
      [1982] 2 SCR 146                    relied on               Para 13
B     [1962] 3 Suppl. SCR 973             relied on               Para 13
      [1977] 2 SCR 964                    relied on               Para 15
      [1963] SCR 312                      referred to             Para 16
      [1969] 2 SCR 675                    referred to             Para 16
C
      [2008] 11 SCR 1                     relied on               Para 18
      [2010] 8 SCR 597                    relied on               Para 19
      (2012) 5 SCC 157                    relied on               Para 21
      [2018] 12 SCR 143                   relied on               Para 22
D
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2926
      of 2020.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 17.10.2016 of the High Court
      of Uttarakhand at Nainital in A.O. No. 266 of 2014.
E           Yunus Malik, Anish Maheshwari, Aman Malik, Samir Malik,
      Ms. Meenakshi Midha, Kapil Midha, Ms. Pritika Juneja, Chander
      Shekhar Ashri, Advs. for the appearing parties.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            N. V. RAMANA, J.
F
            1. Delay condoned.
            2. Leave granted.
            3. This appeal arises out of the impugned order dated 17.10.2016
      passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in AO No.266 of
G     2014, wherein the High Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds of
      delay of 45 days.
             4. The facts in brief giving rise to this appeal are as follows: The
      deceased aged 26 years, met with an accident on 15.04.2011, as his bike
      crashed into a truck parked negligently on the road, without anyback-
H     light’s indication. Resultantly, he succumbed to the injuries while being
         BRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR. v.                                        509
   NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

taken to the hospital. The appellants (parents of the deceased) preferred      A
a petition before the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal seeking
compensation to the tune of Rs. 10 lakhs. Vide order 07.02.2014, the
tribunal awarded a total sum of Rs.2.24 Lakhs as compensation along
with interest of 6% p.a. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the High
Court for seeking enhancement of compensation. It is to be noted that
                                                                               B
the aforesaid appeal before the High Court was filed with 45 days delay.
In order to explain the same, the appellants herein filed an application
being CLMA 6569/2014, seeking condonation of delay on the ground
that his wife was ill, which prevented him from appealing in time.
       5. By impugned order dated 17.10.2016, the High Court dismissed
the aforesaid delay condonation application, consequent upon which the         C
appeal also got dismissed. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellants
herein have approached this Court through special leave petition.
      6. The counsel on behalf of the appellants submitted that High
Court has acted in an unjustified manner in dismissing the application for
condonation of delay. On the contrary, the counsel on behalf of the            D
Respondent supported the judgment passed by the High Court.
       7. Having heard the counsel for both parties, the short question
which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the High Court
erred in dismissing the delay condonation application for 45 days? This
question turns on interpretation of Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act,         E
1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).
       8. At the outset, we must note that, Chapter XII of the Act is a
beneficial legislation intended at protecting the rights of victims affected
in road accidents. Moreover, the Act is a self-contained code in itself
which provides procedures for filing claims, for passing of award and          F
for preferring an appeal. Even, the limitations for preferring the remedies
are contained in the code itself.
       9. The interpretation of a beneficial legislation must be remedial
and must be in furtherance with the purpose which the statute seeks to
serve. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this court on multiple        G
occasions wherein this court has highlighted the importance
acknowledging legislative intention while interpreting the provisions of
the statute. This court in the case of Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant
v. Deputy Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation., (2009)
9 SCC 61while interpreting the provisions of the Employees State
                                                                               H
510             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 9 S.C.R.


A     Insurance Act held that it being a beneficial legislation should receive a
      liberal construction so as to promote its objectives. This court held therein:
             “20. The Employees’ State Insurance Act is a beneficial
             legislation. The main purpose of the enactment as the Preamble
             suggests, is to provide for certain benefits to employees of a
B            factory in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and
             to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto.
             The Employees’ State Insurance Act is a social security
             legislation and the canons of interpreting a social legislation
             are different from the canons of interpretation of taxation
             law. The courts must not countenance any subterfuge which
C            would defeat the provisions of social legislation and the
             courts must even, if necessary, strain the language of the
             Act in order to achieve the purpose which the legislature
             had in placing this legislation on the statute book. The Act,
             therefore, must receive a liberal construction so as to
D            promote its objects.”                       (emphasis supplied)
             10. Similarly, this Court in the case of Vimla Devi v. National
      Insurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 2 SCC 186 while interpreting the provisions
      of the Act held that strict compliance of procedures can be relaxed in
      order to ensure that victims receive just compensation. This court observed
E     therein:
             “15. At the outset, we may reiterate as has been consistently
             said by this Court in a series of cases that the Act is a beneficial
             piece of legislation enacted to give solace to the victims of the
             motor accident who suffer bodily injury or die untimely. The Act
F            is designed in a manner, which relieves the victims from
             ensuring strict compliance provided in law, which are
             otherwise applicable to the suits and other proceedings
             while prosecuting the claim petition filed under the Act for
             claiming compensation for the loss sustained by them in
             the accident.”                               (emphasis supplied)
G
             11. While keeping in view, the general nature of the legislation, it
      is pertinent for us to have a look at Section 173 of the Act which reads
      as under:
             173. Appeals. — (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2),
             any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may,
H
          BRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR. v.                                             511
    NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

       within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to            A
       the High Court:
       Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any
       amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High
       Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees
       or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in             B
       the manner directed by the High Court:
       Provided further that the High Court may entertain the
       appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it
       is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient
       cause from preferring the appeal in time.                                     C
       (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if
       the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.
                                                        (emphasis supplied)
       12. Section 173 provides that, any person aggrieved by the award              D
passed by the Tribunal may approach the High Court within ninety days.
However, the second proviso states that the High Court “may” still
entertain such appeal even after the expiry of ninety days, if the appellant
satisfies the Court that there exists sufficient reason behind the delay.
      13. Ordinarily, the word “may” is not a word of compulsion.1It is
                                                                                     E
an enabling word and it only confers capacity, power or authority and
implies discretion.2 “It is used in a statute to indicate that something may
be done which prior to it could not be done”.3
       14. The legislature by usage of the word “may” in Section 173 of
the Act, conferred sufficient discretionary powers upon the Court to
                                                                                     F
entertain appeals even beyond the period of ninety days. The pertinent
issuebefore us relates towhat the extent of such discretionary power is.
      15. In order to understand the extent of conferment of power by
the usage of the word “may”, we may observe Official Liquidator v.
Dharti Dhan (P.) Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 166, wherein this Court held:
                                                                                     G

1
  Justice G.P. Singh in Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edn.,page 519
2
  Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder v. Ayyavoo alias Periana Gounder, (1982)
1 SCC 159
3
  Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd., 1962 Supp
(3) SCR 973                                                                          H
512             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 9 S.C.R.


A           “10.The principle laid down above has been followed consistently
            by this Court whenever it has been contended that the word “may”
            carries with it the obligation to exercise a power in a particular
            manner or direction. In such a case, it is always the purpose
            of the power which has to be examined in order to
            determine the scope of the discretion conferred upon the
B
            donee of the power.If the conditions in which the power is
            to be exercised in particular cases are also specified by a
            statute then, on the fulfilment of those conditions, the power
            conferred becomes annexed with a duty to exercise it in
            that manner”                                (emphasis supplied)
C            16. This Court has firstly held that purpose of conferment of such
      power must be examined for the determination of the scope of such
      discretion conferred upon the court.[refer to Bhaiya Punjalal
      Bhagwandin v. Dave Bhagwat prasad Prabhuprasad , AIR 1963 SC
      120; Shri Prakash Chand Agarwal v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 2
D     SCC 806]. Our analysis of the purpose of the Act suggests that such
      discretionary power is conferred upon the Courts, to enforce the rights
      of the victims and their dependents. The legislature intended that Courts
      must have such power so as to ensure that substantive justice is not
      trumped by technicalities.
E            17. Secondly, it has been held that if the specific conditions wherein
      the power could be exercised is also provided in the statute, then the
      Court must exercise the aforesaid discretion in the manner as specified
      by the statute itself. In the second proviso to Section 173 it is stated that
      Court has the power to condone delay only if it is satisfied that there
      existed “sufficient cause”.
F
               18. At this juncture, we need to interpret the term “sufficient
      cause” as a condition precedent for the granting of the discretionary
      relief of allowing the appeal beyond the statutory limit of ninety days.
      Although this Court has held that provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963
      does not apply while deciding claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, but
G     it is relevant to note that even while interpreting “sufficient cause” under
      the Limitation Act Courts have taken a liberal interpretation. This Court
      in the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v.
      Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 8 SCC 321, observed that:
            “13. …The words “sufficient cause for not making the
H           application within the period of limitation” should be
         BRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR. v.                                         513
   NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

      understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical              A
      and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and
      circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words
      “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive
      a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when
      the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona
                                                                                B
      fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)
       19. The aforesaid view was reiterated in the case of Balwant
Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, wherein this Court
held that:                                                                      C
      “25. We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause” has to
      receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept
      of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned.
      The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally
      is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is                  D
      understood in its general connotation.
       26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite
consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These
principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on
the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right              E
has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the
other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and
its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on
the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is
directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party.
Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of            F
justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in
implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive
the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result
of his acting vigilantly.”                          (emphasis supplied)
       20. The Court in the above-mentioned cases, highlighted upon the         G
importance introducing the concept of “reasonableness” while giving
the clause “sufficient cause” a liberal interpretation.In furtherance of
the same, this Court has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing
cases where delay is of few days,as against the cases where the delay
is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other
                                                                                H
514             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 9 S.C.R.


A     party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is
      attributable to the party’s inaction and negligence, the Courts have to
      take a strict approach so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties.
            21. The aforesaid view was taken by this Court in the case of
      Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai,
B     (2012) 5 SCC 157 wherein the Court held that:
             “23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal
             and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the
             exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other
             similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of
C            the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights
             on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of
             time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from
             the cost.
             24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in
D            the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona
             fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has
             been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the
             cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it
             may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation
             given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is
E            thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would
             be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the
             delay.”                                     (emphasis supplied)
              22. Therefore, the aforesaid provision being a beneficial legislation,
      must be given liberal interpretation to serve its object. Keeping in view
F     the substantive rights of the parties, undue emphasis should not be given
      to technicalities. In such cases delay in filing and refiling cannot be viewed
      strictly, as compared to commercial claims under the Arbitration and
      Conciliation Act, 1996 or the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. In P. Radha
      Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445, wherein this Court while
G     interpreting Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, held that the right to object
      to an award itself is substantively bound with the limitation period
      prescribed therein and the same cannot merely a procedural prescription.
      In effect the Court held that a complete petition, has to be filed within
      the time prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Actand ‘not
      thereafter’. The Court while coming to the aforesaid conclusion,
H     reasoned as under:
         BRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR. v.                                        515
   NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY [N. V. RAMANA, J.]

      “36.1 First, the purpose of the Arbitration Act was to provide for       A
      a speedy dispute resolution process. The Statement of Objects
      and Reasons reveal that the legislative intent of enacting the
      Arbitration Act was to provide parties with an efficient alternative
      dispute resolution system which gives litigants an expedited
      resolution of disputes while reducing the burden on the courts.
                                                                               B
      Article 34(3) reflects this intent when it defines the
      commencement and concluding period for challenging an award.
      This Court in Popular Construction case [Union of
      India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470]
      highlighted the importance of the fixed periods under the
      Arbitration Act. We may also add that the finality is a                  C
      fundamental principle enshrined under the Arbitration Act
      and a definitive time-limit for challenging an award is
      necessary for ensuring finality. If Section 17 were to be applied,
      an award can be challenged even after 120 days. This would
      defeat the Arbitration Act’s objective of speedy resolution of
                                                                               D
      disputes. The finality of award would also be in a limbo as a party
      can challenge an award even after the 120 day period.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)
       Coming back to the Motor Vehicles Act, the legislative intent is to
provide appropriate compensation for the victims and to protect their          E
substantive rights, in pursuit of the same, the interpretation should not be
as strict as commercial claims as elucidated above.
       23. Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts with
discretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the same time it
also places an obligation upon the party to justify that he was prevented      F
from abiding by the same due to the existence of “sufficient cause”.
Although there exists no strait jacket formula for the Courts to condone
delay, but the Courts must not only take into consideration the entire
facts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. The
concept of reasonableness dictates that, the Courts even while taking a
liberal approach must weigh in the rights and obligations of both the          G
parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross
negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrain
from exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief.
      24. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the
present case, we are of the opinion that the delay of 45 days has been         H
516             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 9 S.C.R.


A     properly explained by the appellants, which was on account of illness of
      the wife of Appellant No.1. It was not appropriate on the part of the
      High Court to dismiss the appeal merely on the ground of delay of short
      duration, particularly in matters involving death in motor accident claims.
      Moreover, in the present case no malafide can be imputable against the
      appellants for filing the appeal after the expiry of ninety days.Therefore,
B
      we are of the opinion that the strict approach taken in the impugned
      order is hyper-technical and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.
             25. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned
      order of the High Court is set aside. As the adjudication on the merits of
      the case has not taken place, we remand the matter to the said Court for
C     fresh consideration on merits.
            26. Taking into consideration the fact that the appeal is of the
      year 2014, we request the High Court to dispose of the same within a
      period of six months from the date of communication of this order.
D
      Kalpana K. Tripathy                                          Appeal allowed.




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F




G




H