Supreme Court of India
BRAJENDRASINGHversusSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 116
- Decided
- 28 February 2012
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- A K PATNAIK
Holding
The appellant is guilty of murder under Section 302 IPC and the death sentence is not justified; it is commuted to life imprisonment.
Summary
The appellant, Brajendrasingh, was convicted of murdering his wife and their three young children after alleging an illicit affair between his wife and a neighbour. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, forensic findings, and the appellant's own statements under Section 313 CrPC, while the defence claimed the wife had killed the children. The Supreme Court held that the evidence proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the death sentence was not warranted as the case did not fall within the "rarest of rare" category. Consequently, the death penalty was commuted to life imprisonment of 21 years. The Court also clarified that a statement under Section 313 can be used against the accused when it aligns with the prosecution’s case, and that an FIR is not a confessional statement but is admissible as evidence.
Issues considered
- The prosecution's circumstantial evidence and the appellant's statements under Section 313 CrPC prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
- Whether the death sentence imposed under Section 302 IPC is justified under the 'rarest of rare' doctrine.
- Whether a statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC can be used as substantive evidence against the accused.
- Whether an FIR recorded based on the accused's own statement can be treated as a confessional statement.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313, s. 354(3)
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 309
Subjects
murdercircumstantial evidencedeath penaltyrarest of rare doctrineSection 313 CrPClife imprisonmentmental imbalancefamily homicidesentencing
Judgment
[2012] 3 S.C.R. 599
BRAJENDRASINGH A
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 113-114 of 2010)
FEBRUARY 28, 2012
8
[A.K. PATNAIK AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.)
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Conviction and sentence
under - A/legations that accused suspecting his wife having
illicit relations with his neighbour killed his three young C
children who were asleep and sprinkled kerosene oil on his
wife and put her an fire - Convicted uls. 302 and sentenced
to death by courts below - On appeal held: Circumstantial
evidences read with the statements of the prosecution
witnesses and the statement of the accused himself prove D
one fact without doubt, that the accused had certainly
murdered his wife - Regarding the death of the children, as
alleged by the accused that his wife caused death of three
children, when the deceased inflicted severe injuries on the
throat of the sleeping child, the child would have got up, there E
would have been commotion and disturbance in the room
which would have provided enough opportunity to the accused
to protect his other two children - He could have overpowered
his wife and could even have prevented the murder of all the
three children - This abnormal and unnatural conduct of the
F
appellant renders his defence unbelievable and untrustworthy
- Thus, the appellant is guilty of offence u/s. 302 for
murdering his wife and three minor children - As regards the
quantum of sentence, circumstances examined cumulatively
would to some extent, suggest the existence of a mental
imbalance in the accused at the moment of committing the G
crime - Case does not fall in the category of 'rarest of rare'
cases where imposition of death sentence is imperative as
also it is not a case where imposing any other sentence would
599 H
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A not serve the ends of justice or would be entirely inadequate
- Drawing the balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and examining them in the light of the facts
and circumstances of the instant case, it is not a case where
extreme penalty of death be imposed upon the accused -
B Thus, the death sentence awarded to the accused is
commuted to one of life imprisonment - Sentence/Sentencing.
FIR - FIR recorded by Sub-inspector based on statement
of accused, made in Police Station - Evidentiary value -
Held: FIR cannot be treated in law and in fact, as a
C confessional statement made by the accused - It would
certainly attain its admissibility in evidence as an FIR
recorded by the competent officer in accordance with law.
Evidence - Conviction based on circumstantial evidence
o - General Principles - Stated.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
s. 313 - Statement of accused under - Held: Can be
used as evidence against the accused, insofar as it supports
E the case of the prosecution - Statement uls. 313 simplicitor
normally cannot be made the basis for conviction of the
accused - However, where the statement of the accused uls.
313 is in line with the case of the prosecution, then certainly
the heavy onus of proof on the prosecution is to some extent
F reduced.
s. 354 (3) - Award of death sentence - Recording of
special reasons - Need for - Principles governing exercise
of such discretion - Stated.
G According to the prosecution, appellant suspected
his wife 'A' of having illicit relations with 'LT' (neighbor),
and killed his three young children, who were asleep,
sprinkled kerosene oil on his wife and put her on fire.
H The appellant had forbidden his wife from talking to
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 601
PRADESH
'LT' (neighbour). On the fateful day, he allegedly stopped A
her from talking to 'LT' but she retorted that she would
die and poured kerosene oil on her person and then put
herself on fire. The appellant then tried to extinguish the
fire, but being under the impression that she was dying,
he also caused injuries to his wife by a knife and killed B
her. The appellant also suffered burn injuries in his
attempt to extinguish the fire. Thereafter, he killed his
children by inflicting injuries by knife to the throat. He also
tried to commit suicide by injuring his· neck but did not
succeed. Thereafter, he went towards the Bye Pass Road c
and was about to commit suicide under the truck but in
the meantime the police came and stopped him and
brought him to the police station. In the midnight, the
appellant lodged a report in respect of the commission
of the crime. Investigations were carried out. The 0
appellant was committed to the Court of Sessions since
the offence was under Sections 302 and 309 IPC. The
appellant stood trial and made a statement under Section
313 Cr.P.C. that it was the deceased 'A' who had inflicted
injuries upon their three minor children and poured
E
kerosene on herself and thereafter, set herself on fire. The
trial court acquitted the appellant for the offence under
Section 309 IPC. However, convicted him for the offence
under Section 302 IPC and imposed death sentence. The
High Court upheld the same. Therefore, the appellant
filed the instant appeals. F
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Having appreciated the evidence on record,
there is no hesitation in holding that the appellant is guilty G
of an offence under Section 302 IPC for murdering his
wife and three minor children. Once the balance-sheet of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances is drawn and
examined in the light of the facts and circumstances of
the instant case, there is no hesitation in coming to the H
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A conclusion that this is not a case where this Court ought
to impose the extreme penalty of death upon the
accused. Therefore, the death sentence awarded to the
accused is commuted to one of life imprisonment (21
years). [Paras 22 and 28] [621-G; 629-F-H]
B
2.1. The statement of an accused under Section 313
Cr.P.C. can be used as evidence against the accused,
insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution. Equally
true is that the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
simplicitor normally cannot be made the· basis for
C conviction of the accused. But where the statement of the
accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is in line with the case
of the prosecution then certainly the heavy onus of proof
on the prosecution is, to some extent reduced. [Para 10]
D [614-H; 615-A-B]
2.2. The FIR was recorded by Sub-Inspector Mohan
PW16 based on the statement of the appellant itself,
made in the Police Station. This cannot be treated, in law
and in fact, as a confessional statement made by the
E accused and it would certainly attain its admissibility in
evidence as an FIR recorded by the competent officer in
accordance with law. [Para 12] [616-D]
2.3. ·in the instant case, there is no eye-witness
F despite the fact that it occurred in an LIG flat and
obviously some people must be living around that flat.
However, to complete the chain of events and to prove
the version given by the appellant in the FIR, it examined
a number of witnesses. PW2 is the brother-in-law of the
appellant and brother of the deceased 'A'. He clearly
G stated that the appellant had been married to 'A' 12-13
years before the date on which his statement was
recorded and the couple had three children. He was
staying with his sister and on the date of the incident he
had been in the house of the accused during the day and
H left in the evening. At about 2.30 a.m. in the night, he
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 603
PRADESH
received a phone call from the Police Station informing A
him that his sister, nephews and niece had been
murdered. He went to the Police Station where he found
the accused was also present. PW3 was examined to
prove that the appellant was the tenant at a monthly rent
and had been given two rooms. According to her, 'LT' s
had also been residing in one room in the same building
on rent. PW5, is the sister of the deceased 'A' whose
statement was similar to that of PW2. This witness was
declared hostile and was subjected to cross-examination
by the prosecution. PW7, the husband of PW5 and c
brother of the appellant, also made a similar statement.
PW10, 'LT' was also examined and he stated that he was
residing in the same building in ~ne room. PW12 is the
doctor who had performed post mortem examination
upon the body of 'A' and noticed various injuries on her
0
body. Post mortem upon the other dead bodies was also
performed by PW12 and the cause of death was
common. PW16 is the Sub-Inspector in the Police Station,
He recorded the statement at the Police Station and had
conducted the investigation. He had prepared the site E
plan and seized the knife. It is with the help of these
witnesses that the prosecution attempted to prove its
case but the foundation of the case was laid on the basis
of the information given by the appellant-accused
himself. The statements of these witnesses have to be
examined in light of the FIR, Exhibit P27, as well as the F
statement of the accused made under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
But for Exhibit P27, it would have been difficult for the
prosecution to demonstrate as to who was responsible
for committing the murder of the three young children. To
this extent, it is a case purely of circumstantial evidence. G
[Paras 13, 14, 15] [616-E-H; 617-A-H; 618-A-D]
2.4. There is no doubt that it is not a case of direct
evidence but the conviction of the accused is founded
on circumstantial evidence. It is a settled principle of law H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A that the prosecution has to satisfy certain conditions
before a conviction based on circumstantial evidence can
be sustained. The circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established and should also be consistent with only one
B hypothesis, i.e. the guilt of the accused. The
circumstances should be conclusive and proved by the
prosecution. There must be a chain of events so
complete so as not to leave any substantial doubt in the
· mind of the Court. Irresistibly, the evidence should lead
c to the conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the
accused and the only possibility that the accused has
committed the crime. To put it simply, the circumstances
forming the chain of ev~nts should be proved and they
should cumulatively point towards the guilt of the
accused alone. In such circumstances, the inference of
0
guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts
and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other
person. Furthermore, the rule which needs to be
observed by the Court while dealing with the cases of
E circumstantial evidence is that the best evidence must be
adduced which the nature of the case admits. The
circumstances have to be examined cumulatively. The
Court has to examine the complete chain of events and
then see whether all the material facts sought to be
F established by the prosecution to bring home the guilt of
the accused, have been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. It has to be kept in mind that all these principles
are based upon one basic cannon of the criminal
jurisprudence that the accused is innocent till proven
G guilty and that the accused is entitled to a just and fair
trial. [Para 16] [618-E-H; 619-A-C]
2.5. The circumstances in the instant case, which
have been proved, are. that the couple used to quarrel on
H the issue of deceased 'A' speaking to 'LT' even after the
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 605
PRADESH
appellant having restrained her from doing so; that the A
three children were sleeping at the time of occurrence;
that the injury on their necks just below the jaw was
caused by a knife which was recovered and exhi5ited;
and that it was mentioned in the Doctor's report that there
were number of burn injuries on the body of 'A' and the B
injuries on the throats of all the deceased. The cause of
death was common to all, that is excessive hemorrhage.
These circumstantial evidences read with the statements
of the prosecution witnesses and the statement of the
appellant himself prove one fact without doubt, i.e., the C
accused had certainly murdered his wife. His stand was
that since he believed that his wife may not survive the
burn injuries, therefore, he killed her by inflicting the
injury with knife on her throat similar to the one inflicted
upon the throats of the three young children. [Paras 18 D
and 19] [619-F-H; 620-A-D]
2.6. As regards death of the children, one very
abnormal conduct on the part of the appellant comes to
light from the evidence on record that a father, seeing his
wife killing his children, would certainly have prevented E
the death of at least two out of the three children. He
could have overpowered his wife and could even have
prevented the murder of all the three children. This
abnormal conduct of the appellant renders his defence
unbelievable and untrustworthy. Upon appreciation of F
the evidence on record, there is an inclination to accept
the story of the prosecution though it is primarily based
on circumstantial evidenc.e and there is no witness to
give optical happening of events. Once these
circumstances have been proved and the irresistible G
conclusion points to the guilt of the accused, the
accused has to be held guilty of the offences. Normally,
the injuries like the ones inflicted in the instant case
would not lead to instantaneous death. The excessive
bleeding leading to death would be possible over a short H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A period. The injured would struggle before he succumbs
to such injury. As alleged by the accused, if the wife
caused death of all the three children, he could have
certainly prevented death of at least two of them. When
the deceased inflicted such severe injuries on the throat
B of the sleeping child, the child would have got up, there
would have been commotion and disturbance in the room
which would have provided enough opportunity to the
appellant to protect his other two children. According to
the prosecution, at that stage, none had suffered any
C injury. This unnatural conduct of the accused in not
making an effort to protect the children and exhibiting
helplessness creates a serious doubt and renders the
entire case put forward by the defence as unreliable and
of no credence. This abnormal conduct of exhibiting
helplessness on the part of the appellant creates a
0
serious doubt and entire case put forward by the defence
loses its credibility. [Para 20] [620-E-H; 621-A-C] .
2.7. The cumulative effect of the prosecution
evidence is that the accused persisted with commission
E of the crime despite availability of an opportunity to check
himself from indulging in such heinous crime. May be
there was some provocation initially but nothing can
justify his conduct. Whatever be the extent of his anger,
revenge and temper, he still could have been kind to his
F own children and spared their life. He is expected to have
overcome his doubts about the conduct of his wife, for
the larger 'benefit of his own children. Though the
appellant had stated that he lost his mind and did not
know what he was doing, this excuse is not worthy of
G credence. Admittedly, he was not ailing from any mental
disorder or frustration. He was a person who was earning
his livelihood by working hard. [Para 21] [621-D-F]
3.1. As regards the question of quantum of sentence,
it is always appropriate for this Court to remind itself of
H the need for recording of special reasons, as
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 607
PRADESH
contemplated under Section 354(3) Cr.P.C., where the A
Court proposes to award the· extreme penalty of death to
an accused. [Para 23] [621-H; 622-A]
3.2. First and the foremost, the Court has not only to
examine whether the instant case falls under the category
8
of 'rarest of rare' cases but also whether any other
sentence, except death penalty, would be inadequate in
the facts and circumstances of the instant case. [Para 24]
(627-H; 628-A]
3.3. The appellant is held guilty of an offence under C
Section 302 IPC for committing the murder of his three
children and the wife. All this happened in the spur of
moment, but, of course, the incident must have
continued for a while, during which period the deceased
'A' received burn injuries as well as the fatal injury on the D
throat. All the three children received injuries with a knife
similar to that of the deceased 'A'. But one circumstance
which cannot be ignored is that the prosecution
witnesses clearly stated that there was a rift between the
couple on account of her talking to 'LT', the neighbor, E
PW10. Even if some credence is given to the statement
made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein
he stated that he had seen the deceased and PW10 in a
compromising position in the house of PW10, it also
supports the allegation of the prosecution that there was F
rift between the husband and wife on account of PW10.
It is also clearly exhibited in the FIR that the accused had
forbidden his wife from talking to PW10, which despite
such warning she persisted with and, therefore, he
committed the murder of her wife along with the children. G
It would be useful to refer to the conduct of the accused
prior to, at the time of and subsequent to the commission
of the crime. Prior to the commission of the crime, none
of the prosecution witnesses, including the immediate
blood relations of the deceased, made any complaint
H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A about his behaviour or character. On the contrary, it is
admitted that he used to prohibit 'A' from speaking to
PW10 about which she really did not bother. His conduct,
either way, at the time of commission of the crime is
unnatural and to some extent even unexpected. However,
B subsequent to the commission of the crime, he was in
such a mental state that he wanted to commit the suicide
and even .inflicted injuries to his own throat and also went
to the. bye-pass road with the intention of committing
suicide, where he was stopped by PW4, Head Constable
c and taken to the Police Station wherein he lodged the FIR.
In other words, he felt great remorse and was sorry for
his acts. He informed the police correctly about what he
had done, [Para 25] [628-B-H; 629-A]
3.4. ·Another mitigating circumstance is that as a
D result of the commission of the crime, the appellant
himself is the greatest sufferer. He has lost his children,
whom he had brought up for years and also his wife.
Besides that, it was not a planned crime and also lacked
motive. It was a crime which had been committed out of
E suspicion and frustration. The circumstances examined
cumulatively would, to some extent, suggest the
existence of a mental imbalance in the accused at the
moment of committing the crime. It cannot be conceived
much less accepted by any stretch of imagination that the
F accused was justified in committing the crime as he
claims to 'have believed at that moment. [Para 26] [629-
B-C]
3.5. It is not a case which falls in the category of
G 'rarest of rare' cases where imposition of death sentence
is imperative. It is also not a case where imposing any
other sentence would not serve the ends of justice or
·would be entirely inadequate. [Para 27] [629-D-E]
Dhananajoy Chatterjee vs. State of WB. JT 1994 (1) SC
H 33: 1994 (1) SCR 37; Shivu and Anr. v. R.G. High Court of
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 609
PRADESH
Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 713: 2007 (2) SCR 555; Shivaji@ A
Dadya Shankar A/hat v. State of Ma.harashtra AIR 2009 SC
56: 2008 (13) SCR 81- referred to.
Case Law Reference:
1994 (1) SCR 37 Referred to. Para 16 B
2007 (2) SCR 555 Referred to. Para 16
2008 (13) SCR 81 Referred to. Para 16
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal C
No. 113-114 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 20.08.2009 of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore, in Criminal Appeal
No. 734 of 2007 and Criminal Death Reference No. 2 of 2007.
D
Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Chitanya S. for the Appellant.
S.K. Dubey, G.D. Singh, Sakshi Kakkar, Kusumanjali
Sharma for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E
SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. The present appeals are
directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, Bench at Indore, confirming the judgment of conviction
and order of sentence of imposition of extreme penalty of death F
by the Trial Court.
2. The disaster that can flow from unchastity of a woman
and the suspicions of a man upon the character of his wife
cannot be more pathetically stated than the facts emerging from G
the present case. As per the case of the prosecution, a man
suspecting his wife of having illicit relations with his neighbor,
killed his three young children, namely, Varsha, Lokesh and
Mayank, who were asleep, sprinkled kerosene oil on his wife
and put her on fire. However, when called upon to make a
statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A Procedure, 1973 (for short, Cr.P.C.), the accused rendered the
following explanation : .
"There was illicit relationship between my wife, the
deceased Aradhna and Liladhar, when on 27.02.2005 I
~ame from the factory, at that time it was 11.00 - 11.30
B
O'clock at night, there was no fixed time coming and going
from the factory. When I came to my house the door of the
house was opened. My wife was not at the house and then
I searched her here and there. I heard her voice in the
house of Liladhar Tiwari, the voice of male was also
c coming. My children were sleeping in my house, when I
shouted loudly and I hit the door of Liladhar Tiwari with foot,
then the door opened then I saw that both were naked and
then she came out then I threw her on the ground after
catching her hair and then she started shouted and
D speaking cohabitedly and said that she would go with
Tiwari Jee only and if I would stop her from meeting Tiwari
Jee then she would kill the children and she would kill me
also. Thus quarrel went on. After some time she came with
knife from the kitchen and she inflicted injuries in the necks
E of the three children. I tried to snatch the knife from her and
the in that process in my neck also the knife inflicted injury
and then after taking that very knife I inflicted injury on the
neck of deceased because she had inflicted the injury in
the necks of children, Aradhna fell down on the back after
F being hit by the knife. My mental balance was upset and I
put the kerosene oil kept there at myself, that some of that
kerosene oil fell on me and some on the deceased, I was
standing nearby. I ignited the match stick and at first I burnt
myself and the match stick fell on the deceased, due to
G which she was also burnt and then in the burning condition
after extinguishing the fire taking the knife I went towards
the Bye-pass. After some time, I saw that one truck was
coming, I was going to commit suicide under that truck but
in the meantime police came there and the police brought
H me to the police station. I got the report written but as I had
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 611
PRADESH [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
said in the report it was not written like that. I have not killed A
the children."
3. From the above statement, it is clear that the accused
neither disputes the attempt to murder, nor the consequent
death of his three young children and wife, Aradhna. What this
8
Court has to examine, with reference to the evidence on record,
is as to which of the two versions is correct and stands
established beyond reasonable doubt, i.e., whether the case
of the prosecution is to be accepted as proved beyond
reasonable probability or whether the defence of the appellant C
is to be accepted by the Court.
4. Before we dwell upon the issues before us, it will be
appropriate to refer to the facts giving rise to the present
appeal, as stated by the prosecution. The facts, as given, as
well as the conduct of the appellant are somewhat strange in D
the present case as the appellant who is accused of this
heinous crime, is himself the informant of the incident.
Laconically, the factual matrix of the case that emerges from
the record is that the appellant had lodged a report in respect
of the commission of the crime at the Police Station, Industrial E
Area, District Dewas in the night intervening the 27/28th,
February, 2005 at about 2.00 a.m. which was recorded by Sub-
Inspector Mohan Singh Maurya, PW16. The appellant was
serving in White Star Milk Product Factory, Dewas. Besides
his wife and three young children, his brother-in-law was also F
residing with him who was serving in Sudarshan Factory. One.
Liladhar Tiwari was the neighbour of the appellant. In fact, both
the appellant and Liladhar Tiwari stayed in two different rooms
of the same flat, i.e., LIG Flat No.225, Vikas Nagar, Dewas
which they had taken on rent from PW3, Smt. Kamal Kunwar. G
Smt. Aradhna, the deceased wife of the appellant, used to talk
to Liladhar, to which the appellant had serious objections. He
had forbidden her from doing so. Again, on the fateful day, he
had allegedly stopped her from talking to Liladhar Tiwari, but
she retorted that she would die and poured kerosene oil on her H
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A person and then put herself on fire. The appellant claims to have
made an effort to extinguish the fire. However, being under the
impression that she was dying, he also caused injuries to his
wife by a knife (chhuri) and killed her. The appellant also
suffered burn injuries in his attempt to extinguish the fire. After
B killing his wife, he was concerned about what would be the fate
of their children, who will now have to grow up without their
mother. Thus, he killed them by the same process, i.e., inflicting
injuries by knife to the throat of the children. After committing
the murder of his own family members, he also tried to commit
c suicide by injuring his neck but could not succeed in his attempt.
The incident is said to have occurred at 2330 hours on the night
of 27th February, 2005.
5. PW4, Sri Ram Verma, Head Constable, was on
patrolling duty and he, along with another constable, was
D patrolling by road by a Government vehicle bearing registration
No. MP 03 - 5492 in the night between half past one and two
O'clock. They saw a person on the bye-pass road. They
stopped the said vehicle and interrogated him. Then they came
to know that he was Brajendrasingh, the appellant. The
E appellant narrated the entire incident to the Police and informed
them that he wanted to commit suicide. The Police Officers
stopped him from doing so and brought him to the Police
Station, Industrial Area in the same Government vehicle. Upon
reaching the Police Station, the appellant lodged the report at
F 2.00 a.m. narrating the above facts to the Police.
6. On the basis of the statement of the appellant, First
Information Report, Exhibit P27, under Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC), was registered on 27/28th February, 2005
G at about 2.00 a.m. PW16, Mohan Singh Maurya, prepared the
inquest report Exhibits P2 to PS and the bodies of the
deceased persons were taken into custody. The dead bodies
were taken to the hospital for post. mortem which was
performed by Dr. Shakir Ali, PW12 and the post mortem reports
H were recorded as Exhibits P12 to P15. The doctor opined that
the injuries on the person of the deceased could have been
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 613
PRADESH [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
caused by a knife. The appellant was also examined medically A
by Dr. Hari Singh Rana, PW14, who issued his medico-legal
certificate report Exhibit P18. The clothes of the deceased
persons were seized. The photographs of the spot were taken
and the CDs of photography were seized vide Exhibits P7 to I/
9. Blood stained and controlled earth (P4) was taken into B
custody vide Exhibit P10, knife, shirt and pant of the appellant
were seized vide Exhibit P13. Seized articles were sent to the
Forensic Science Laboratory, Sagar for chemical examination
from which the reports Exhibits P22, P24 and P26 were
received. As per the post mortem report of deceased Aradhna, c
Exhibit P12, the medical expert found 36 per cent burn injuries
on her chest and abdomen. The Investigating Officer recorded
the statement of 16 prosecution witnesses and after completing
the investigation in all respects, he submitted the charge sheet
before the Court. The accused was committed to the Court of D
Sessions as the offences were exclusively triable by the Court
of Sessions being an offence under Sections 302 and 309 IPC.
The accused stood trial and made a statement under Section
313 Cr.P.C. giving his stand and explanation as afore-
indicated. The learned Trial Court, vide its judgment dated 15th
June, 2007, acquitted the accused for the offence under Section E
309 IPC. However, while returning a finding of being guilty for
the offence under Section 302 IPC, the Court held that it does
not appear to be appropriate to award any sentence less than
death sentence to the appellant and, therefore, imposed upon
him the extreme punishment of death under Section 302 IPC. F
This judgment of the Trial Court was challenged before the High
Court which affirmed the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence of death. Against these concurrent findings, the
appellant has filed the present appeals.
G
7. We may notice here that -against the acquittal of the
appellant under Section 309 IPC, no appeal was preferred by
the State, either before the High Court or before this Court.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has H
primarily raised the following two contentions :
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A (i) The courts have failed to appreciate the evidence
in its correct perspective. The accused'had stated
that his wife had murdered the three children and
that he had only inflicted injuries on her body under
a belief that she was not going to survive. He .had
B no intention to kill her. Thus, the applicant cannot
be punished for murder of the entire family. It is also
the contention of the appellant that the prosecution
has not been able to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt.
c (ii) The imposition of extreme penalty of death was not
called for in the facts and circumstances of the
present case. The incident even if, as stated by the
prosecution, assumed to be correct, still it was an
offence committed on extreme provocation and at
D the spur of the moment without any intent to kill any
person.
9. Neither the death of three children nor that of his wife
Aradhna is disputed and/or practically admitted by the appellant
E in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. He has also
admitted that he had inflicted injuries on the person of the
deceased Aradhna with a knife. Only a part of his statement
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. does not corroborate the
prosecution evidence. According to the case of the prosecution,
F the appellant had inflicted injuries resulting in the death of three
minor children and then he had poured the kerosene oil upon
the deceased Aradhna as well as inflicted injury on her throat,
whereas according to the appellant, it was the deceased
Aradhna who had inflicted injuries upon their three minor
G children and poured kerosene on herself and thereafter set
herself on fire.
10. It is a settled principle of law that the statement of an
accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used as evidence
against the accused, insofar as it supports the case of the
H prosecution. Equally true is that the statement under Section
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 615
PRADESH [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
313 Cr.P.C. simplicitor normally cannot be made the basis for A
conviction of the accused. But where the statement of the
accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is in line with the case of
the prosecution, then certainly the heavy onus of proof on the
prosecution is, to some extent, reduced. We may refer to a
recent judgment of this Court in the case of Ramnaresh & Ors. B
v. State of Chhattisgarh, (being pronounced today) wherein this
Court held as under :
"In terms of Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused has the
freedom to maintain silence during the investigation as
well as before the Court. The accused may choose to C
maintain silence or complete denial even when his
statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is being recorded,
of course, the Court would be entitled to draw an inference,
including adverse inference, as may be permissible to it
in accordance with law. Right to fair trial, presumption of D
innocence unless proven guilty and proof by the
prosecution of its case beyond any reasonable doubt are
the fundamentals of our criminal jurisprudence. When we
speak of prejudice to an accused, it has to be shown that
the accused has suffered some disability or detriment in E
relation to any of these protections substantially. Such
prejudice should also demonstrate that it has occasioned
failure of justice to the accused. One of the other cardinal
principles of criminal justice administration is that the courts
should make a close examination to ascertain? whether F
there was really a failure of justice or whether it is only a
camouflage, as this expression is perhaps too pliable. [Ref.
Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2011) 8
sec 3001.
It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to G
put material evidence to the accused under Section 313
Cr.P.C. is upon the Court. One of the main objects of
recording of a statement under this provision of the Cr.P.C.
is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the
circumstances appearing against him as well as to put H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once
he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in
law must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this
opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313
Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the case of the prosecution,
B can be used against him for rendering conviction. Even
under the latter, he faces the consequences in law."
11. Now, all that this Court is called ·upon to decide in the
present case is that between the varying versions put forward
C by the prosecution and the accused which one is correct and
has been proved in accordance with law.
12. As we have already noticed in the narration of facts
above that the FIR was recorded by Sub-Inspector Mohan Singh
Maurya, PW16 based on the statement of the appellant itself,
D made in the Police Station. This cannot be treated, in law and
in fact, as a confessional statement made by the accused and
it would certainly attain its admissibility in evidence as an FIR
recorded by the competent officer in accordance with law.
E 13. There is no doubt that there is no eye witness in this
case despite the fact that it occurred in an LIG flat and obviously
some people must be living around that flat. However, to
complete the chain of events and to prove the version given by
the appella_nt in the FIR, it examined a number of witnesses.
PW2 is the brother-in-law of the appellant and brother of the
F deceased Aradhna. He clearly stated that Brajendrasingh had
been married to Aradhna 12-13 years before the date on which
his statement was recorded and the couple had three children.
He was staying with his sister and on 27th February, 2005, he
had been in the house of the accused during the day and in
G the evening he left for the house of his brother Kamla Singh who
was staying at Joshipura whereafter he went to Sudarshan
Factory near Dewas to work. At about 2.30 a.m. in the night,
while he was in the factory, he received a phone call from the
Police Station informing him that his sister, nephews and niece
H had been murdered. He came back and went to the Police
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 617
PRADESH [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Station where he found Brajendrasingh, the accused was also A
present.
14. PW3, Smt. Kamal Kunwar was examined to prove that
the appellant was the tenant at a monthly rent of Rs.650/- and
two rooms had been given to him on rent. According to her, 8
one Liladhar Tiwari had also been residing in one room in the
same building on rent.
15. PW5, Shobhna is again the sister of the deceased
Aradhna. Her statement was similar to that of PW2. According
to her, somebody from Vikas Nagar had come and told her that C
an altercation had taken place between Aradhna and the
accused. He asked her to go there. After she reached near the
house of the accused, she met two boys who told her that
somebody had killed Aradhna and her three children. Upon
hearing this, she fell unconscious. This witness was declared D
hostile and was subjected to cross-examination by the
prosecution. Witness PW7, Veerendra Singh, who is the
husband of PW5 and brother of the present appellant, also
made a similar statement. PW10, Liladhar Tiwari, was also
examined and he stated that he was residing in the same E
building in one room. When his children and wife used to go to
village, he used to live alone in that room. According to him,
the Police had come to his house at about 2.00 O'clock in the
night, knocked at his door and informed him about the murder.
He stated that wife of the accused used to inquire from him F
whenever he came late, "brother today you have come late" and
I used to reply that because of heavy work I was late. PW12 is
Dr. Shakir Ali who had performed post mortem examination
upon the body of Aradhna and noticed various injuries on her
body. According to him, both the lungs were having less blood G
and two portions of the heart were empty of blood. The upside
down Carotid artery was incised. The membrane of the
intestines was healthy. The liver, spleen and kidney all were
blood less and all the injuries were ante mortem and fatal.
According to the doctor, the cause of death was shock which H
618 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 3 S.C.R.
A had resulted from excessive hemorrhage. Post mortem upon
the other dead bodies was also performed by this witness and
the cause of death was common. The incised wound of Lokesh
was 1" x W' x 2" below the jaw which resulted in excessive
bleeding and death. PW16 is the Sub-Inspector in the Police
B Station, Industrial Area, Dewas. He, as already noticed, had
recorded his statement at the Police Station and had conducted
the investigation. He had prepared the site plan and seized the
knife Exhibit P12. It is with the help of these witnesses that the
prosecution has attempted to prove its case but the foundation
c of this case was laid on the basis of the information given by
the appellant-accused himself. The statements of these
witnesses have to be examined in light of the FIR, Exhibit P27,
as well as the statement of the accused made under Section
313 Cr.P.C. But for Exhibit P27, it would have been difficult for
0 the prosecution to demonstrate as to who was responsible for
committing the murder of the three young children. To this extent,
it is a case purely of circumstantial evidence.
16. There is no doubt that it is not a case of direct evidence
but the conviction of the accused is founded on circumstantial
E evidence. It is a settled principle of law that the prosecution has
to satisfy certain conditions before a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained. The circumstances
from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established and should also be consistent with only one
F hypothesis, i.e. the guilt of the accused. The circumstances
should be conclusive and proved by the prosecution. There
must be a chain of events so complete so as not to leave any
substantial doubt in the mind of the Court. Irresistibly, the
evidence should lead to the conclusion inconsistent with tile
G innocence of the accused and the only possibility that the
accused has committed the crime. To put it simply, the
circumstances forming the chain of events should be proved and
they should cumulatively point towards the guilt of the accused
alone. In such circumstances, the inference of guilt can be
H justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 619
PRADESH [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused A
or the guilt of any other person. Furthermore, the rule which
needs to be observed by the Court while dealing with the cases
of circumstantial evidence is that the best evidence must be
adduced which the nature of the case admits. The
circumstances have to be examined cumulatively. The Court has 8
to examine the complete ch~in of events and then see whether
all the material facts sought to be established by the
prosecution to bring home the guilt of the accused, have been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. It has to be kept in mind that
all these principles are based upon one basic cannon of our C
criminal jurisprudence that the accused is innocent till proven
guilty and that the accused is entitled to a just and fair trial. [Ref.
Dhananajoy Chatterjee vs. State of WB. [JT 1994 (1) SC 33];
Shivu & Anr. v. R.G. High Court of Karnataka [(2007) 4 SCC
713]; and Shivaji @ Dadya Shankar A/hat v. State of
0
Maharashtra [(AIR 2009 SC 56].
17. It is a settled rule of law that in a case based on
circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish the
chain of events leading to the incident and the facts forming part
of that chain should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. They E
have to be of definite character and cannot be a mere
possibility.
18. The circumstances in the present case, which have
been proved, are that :
F
(1) The couple used to quarrel on the issue of
deceased Aradhna speaking to Liladhar Tiwari
even after the appellant having restrained her from
doing so;
G
(2) The three children were sleeping at the time of
occurrence;
(3) The injury on their necks just below the jaw was
caused by a knife which was recovered and
H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A exhibited as article 'L' in accordance with law.
(4) It was mentioned in Doctor's report that there were
number of burn injuries on the body of Aradhna and
the injuries on tne throats of all the deceased. The
cause of death was common to all, i.e., excessive
B hemorrhage.
19. These circumstantial evidences read with the
statements of the prosecution witnesses and the statement of
the appellant himself prove one fact without doubt, i.e., the
c accused had certainly murdered his wife. His stand is that since
he believed that his wife may not survive the burn injuries,
therefore, he killed her by inflicting the injury with knife on her
throat similar to the one inflicted upon the throats of the three
young children. Thus, there is no escape for the appellant from
o conviction for the offence under Section 302 IPC vis-a-vis the
murder of his wife Aradhna.
20. Now, coming to the death of the children, according
to the prosecution, they had been murdered by the appellant
while according to the appellant, they had been murdered by
E his wife Aradhna. One very abnormal conduct on the part of the
appellant comes to light from the evidence on record that a
father, seeing his wife killing his children, would certainly have
prevented the death of at least two out of the three children.
He could have overpowered his wife and could even have
F prevented the murder of all the three children. This abnormal
conduct of the appellant renders his defence unbelievable and
untrustworthy. Upon appreciation of the evidence on record, we
are more inclined to accept the story of the prosecution though
it is primarily based on circumstantial evidence and there is no
G witness to give optical happening of events. Once these
circumstances have been proved and the irresistible conclusion
points to the guilt of the accused, the accused has to be held
guilty of the offences. Normally, the injuries like the ones inflicted
in the present case would not lead to instantaneous death. The
H excessive bleeding leading to death would be possible over a
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 621
PRADESH [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
short period. The injured would struggle before he succumbs A
to such injury. As alleged by the accused, if the wife caused
death of all the three children, he could have certainly prevented
death of at least two of them. When the deceased inflicted such
severe injuries on the throat of the sleeping child, the child would
have got up, there would have been commotion and disturbance B
in the room which would have provided enough opportunity to
the appellant to protect his other two children. According to the
prosecution, at that stage, none had suffered any injury. This
unnatural conduct of the accused in not making an effort to
protect the children and exhibiting helplessness creates a c
serious doubt and renders the entire case put forward by the
defence as unreliable and of no credence. This abnormal
conduct of exhibiting helplessness on the part of the appellant
creates a serious doubt and entire case put forward by the
defence loses its credibility. D
21. The cumulative effect of the prosecution evidence is that
the accused persisted with commission of the crime despite
availability of an opportunity to check himself from indulging in
such heinous crime. May be there was some provocation initially
but nothing can justify his conduct. Whatever be the extent of E
his anger, revenge and temper, he still could have been kind to
his own children and spared their life. He is expected to have
overcome his doubts about the conduct of his wife, for the larger
benefit of his own children. Though the appellant had stated that
he lost his mind and did not know what he was doing, this F
excuse is not worthy of credence. Admittedly, he was not ailing
from any mental disorder or frustration. He was a person who
was earning his livelihood by working hard.
22. Having appreciated the evidence on record, we have G
no hesitation in holding that the appellant is guilty of an offence
under Section 302 IPC for murdering his wife and three minor
children. He deserves to be punished accordingly.
23. Now, coming to the question of quantum of sentence,
it is always appropriate for this Court to remind itself of the need H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 3 S.C.R.
A for recording of special reasons, as contemplated under
Section 354(3) Cr.P.C., where the Court proposes to award the
extreme penalty of death to an accused. This leads us to place
on record the principles governing exercise of such discretion
which have been stated in a very recent judgment of this Bench
8 in the case of Ramnaresh (supra) wherein the Court, after
considering the entire law on the subject, recapitulated and
enunciated the aggravating and mitigating circumstances as
well as the principles that should guide the judicial discretion
of the Court in such cases. This Court held as under :
c "The above judgments provide us with the dicta of the Court
relating to imposition of death penalty. Merely because a
crime is heinous per se may not be a sufficient reason for
the imposition of death penalty without reference to the
other factors and attendant circumstances.
D
Most of the heinous crimes under the IPC are
punishable by death penalty or life imprisonment. That by
itself does not suggest that in all such offences, penalty of
death should be awarded. We must notice, even at the
E cost of repetition, that in such cases awarding of life
imprisonment would be a rule, while 'death' would be the
exception. The term 'rarest of rare case' which is the
consistent determinative rule declared by this Court, itself
suggests that it has to be an exceptional case. The life of
F a particular individual cannot be taken away except
according to the procedure established by law and that is
the constitutional mandate. The law contemplates recording
of special reasons and, therefore, the expression 'special'
has to be given a definite meaning and connotation.
'Special reasons' in contra-distinction to 'reasons'
G
simplicitor conveys the legislative mandate of putting a
restriction on exercise of judicial discretion by placing the
requirement of special reasons.
Since, the later judgments of this Court have added
H to the principles stated by this Court in the case of Bachan
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 623
PRADESH [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Singh (supra) and Machhi Singh (supra), it will be useful A
to re-state the stated principles while also bringing them
in consonance, with the recent judgments.
The law enunciated by this Court in its recent
judgments, as already noticed, adds and elaborates the B
principles that were stated in the case of Bachan Singh
(supra) and thereafter, in the case of Machhi Singh
(supra). The aforesaid judgments, primarily dissect these
principles into two different compartments - one being the
'aggravating circumstances' while the other being the
'mitigating circumstance'. The Court would consider the C
cumulative effect of both these aspects and normally, it may
not be very appropriate for the Court to decide the most
significant aspect of sentencing policy with reference to
one of the classes under any of the following heads while
completely ignoring other classes under other heads. To D
balance the two is the primary duty of the Court. It will be
appropriate for the Court to come to a final conclusion upon
balancing the exercise that would help to administer the
criminal justice system better and provide an effective and
meaningful reasoning by the Court as contemplated under E
Section 354(3) Cr.P.C.
Aggravating Circumstances :
1. The offences relating to the commission of heinous
crimes like murder, rape, armed dacoity, kidnapping etc. F
by the accused with a prior record of conviction for capital
felony or offences committed by the person having a
substantial history of serious assaults and criminal
convictions.
G
2. The offence was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of another serious offence.
3. The offence was committed with the intention to create
a fear psychosis in the public at large and was committed
H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A in a public place by a weapon or device which clearly
could be hazardous to the life of more than one person.
4. The offence of murder was committed for ransom or like
offences to receive money or monetary benefits.
8 5, Hired killings.
6. The offence was committed outrageously for want only
while involving inhumane treatment and torture to the victim.
7. The offence was committed by a person while in lawful
c custody.
8. The murder or the offence was committed, to prevent a
person lawfully carrying out his duty like arrest or custody
in a place of lawful confinement of himself or another. For
D instance, murder is of a person who had acted in lawful
discharge of his duty under Section 43 Cr.P.C.
9. When the crime is enormous in proportion like making
an attempt of murder of the entire family or members of a
E particular community.
10. When the victim is innocent, helpless or a person relies
upon the trust of relationship and social norms, like a child,
helpless woman, a daughter or a niece staying with a
father/uncle and is inflicted with the crime by such a trusted
F person.
11. When murder is committed for a motive which
evidences total depravity and meanness.
12. When there is a cold blooded murder without
G
provocation.
13. The crime is committed so brutally that it pricks or
shocks not only the judicial conscience but even the
conscience of the society.
H
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 625
PRADESH [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Mitigating Circumstances : A
1. The manner and circumstances in and under which the
offence was committed, for example, extreme mental or
emotional disturbance or extreme provocation in
contradistinction to all these situations in normal course.
B
2. The age of the accused is a relevant consideration but
not a determinative factor by itself.
3. The chances of the accused of not indulging in
commission of the crime again and the probability of the c
accused being reformed and rehabilitated.
4. The condition of the accused shows that he was
mentally defective and the defect impaired his capacity to
appreciate the circumstances of his criminal conduct.
D
5. The circumstances which, in normal course oflife, would
render such a behavior possible and could have the effect
of giving rise to mental imbalance in that given situation
like persistent harassment or, in fact, leading to such a
peak of human behavior that, in the facts and E
circumstances of the case, the accused believed that he
was morally justified in committing the offence.
6. Where the Court upon proper appreciation of evidence
is of the view that the crime was not committed in a pre- F
ordained manner and that the death resulted in the course
of commission of another crime and that there was a
possibility of it being construed as consequences to the
commission of the primary crime.
7. Where it is absolutely unsafe to rely upon the testimony G
of a sole eye-witness though prosecution has brought
home the guilt of the accused.
While determining the questions re!ateable to
sentencing policy, the Court has to follow certain principles H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A and those principles are the loadstar besides the above
considerations in imposition or othel"Wise of the death
sentence.
Principles :
B . 1. The Court has to apply the test to determine, if it was
the 'rarest of rare' case for imposition of a death sentence.
2. In the opinion of the Court, imposition of any other
punishment, i.e., life imprisonment would be completely
c inadequate and would not meet the ends of justice.
3. Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an
exception.
4, The option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life
D cann9t be cautiously exercised having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and all relevant
circumstances.
5. The method (planned or otherwise) and the manner
E (extent of brutality and inhumanity, etc.) in which the crime
was committed and the circumstances leading to
commission of such heinous crime.
Stated broadly, these are the accepted indicators for
the exercise of judicial discretion but it is always preferred
F not to fetter the judicial discretion by attempting to make
the excessive enumeration, in one way or another. In other
words, these are the considerations which may collectively
or otherwise weigh in the mind of the Court, while
exercising its jurisdiction. It is difficult to state, it as an
G absolute rule. Every case has to be decided on its own
merits. The judicial pronouncements, can only state the
precepts that may govern the exercise of judicial discretion
to a, limited extent. Justice may be done on the facts of
each case. These are the factors which the Court may
H
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 627
PRADESH [SWATANT~R KUMAR, J.]
consider in its endeavour to do complete justice between A
the parties.
The Court then would draw a balance-sheet of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Both aspects
have to be given their respective weightage. The Court has
8
to strike a balance between the two and see towards which
side the scale/balance of justice tilts. The principle of
proportion between the crime and the punishment is the
principle of 'just deserts' that serves as the foundation of
every criminal sentence that is justifiable. In other words, C
the 'doctrine of proportionality' has a valuable application
to the sentencing policy under the Indian criminal
jurisprudence. Thus, the court will not only have to examine
what is just but also as to what the accused deserves
keeping in view the impact on the society at large.
D
Every punishment imposed is bound to have its
effect not only on the accused alone, but also on the society
as a whole. Thus, the Courts should consider retributive
and deterrent aspect of punishment while imposing the
extreme punishment of death. E
\
Wherever, the offence which is committed, manner
in which it is committed, its attendant circumstances and
the motive and status of the victim, undoubtedly brings the
case within the ambit of 'rarest of rare' cases and the
Court finds that. the imposition of life imprisonment would F
be inflicting of inadequate punishment, the Court may
award death penalty. Wherever, the case falls in any of the
exceptions to the 'rarest of rare' cases, the Court may
exercise its judicial discretion while imposing life
imprisonment in place of death sentence." G
24. First and the foremost, this Court has not only to
examine whether the instant case falls under the category of
'rarest of rare' cases but also whether any other sentence,
H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A except death penalty, would be inadequate in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
25. We have already held the appellant guilty of an offence
under Section 302, IPC for committing the murder of his three
children and the wife. All this happened in the spur of moment,
8
but, of course, the incident must have continued for a while,
during which period the deceased Aradhna received burn
injuries as well as the fatal injury on the throat. All the three
children received injuries with a knife similar to that of the
C deceased Aradhna. But one circumstance which cannot be
ignored by this Court is that the prosecution witnesses have
clearly stated that there was a rift between the couple on
account of her talking to Liladhar Tiwari, the neighbor, PWiO.
Even if some credence is given to the statement made by the
accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he stated that he
D had seen the deceased and PW10 in a compromising position
in the house of PW10, it also supports the allegation of the
prosecution that there was rift between the husband and wife
on account of PW10. It is also clearly exhibited in the FIR (P27)
that the accused had forbidden his wife from talking to PW10,
E which despite such warning she persisted with and, therefore,
he had committed the murder of her wife along with the children.
It will be useful to refer to the conduct of the accused prior to,
at the time of and subsequent to the commission of the crime.
Prior to the commission of the crime, none of the prosecution
F witnesses, including the immediate blood relations of the
deceased, made any complaint about his behaviour or
character. On the contrary, it is admitted that he used to prohibit
Aradhna from speaking to PW10 about which she really did not
bother. His conduct, either way, at the time of commission of
G the crime is unnatural and to some extent even unexpected.
However, subsequent to the commission of the crime, he was
in such a mental state that he wanted to commit the suicide
and even inflicted injuries to his own throat and also went to
the bye-pass road with the intention of committing suicide,
H where he was stopped by PW4, Head Constable and taken to
BRAJENDRASINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA 629
PRADESH [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the Police Station wherein he lodged the FIR Exhibit P27. In A
other words, he felt great remorse and was sorry for his acts.
He informed the Police correctly about what he had done.
26. Still another mitigating circumstance is that as a result
of the commission of the crime, the appellant himself is the
8
greatest sufferer. He has lost his children, whom he had brought
up for years and also his wife. Besides that, it was not a
planned crime and also lacked motive. It was a crime which
had been committed out of suspicion and frustration. The
circumstances examined cumulatively would, to some extent, C
suggest the existence of a mental imbalance in the accused
at the moment of committing the crime. It cannot be conceived
much less accepted by any stretch of imagination that the
accused was justified in comr:nitting the crime as he claims to
have believed at that moment.
D
27. Considering the above aspects, we are of .the
considered view that it is not a case which falls in the category
of 'rarest of rare' cases where imposition of death sentence is
imperative. It is also not a case where imposing any other
sentence would not serve the ends of justice or would be entirely E
inadequate.
28. Once we draw the balance-sheet of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and examine them in the light of the
facts and circumstances of the present case, we have no
F
hesitation in coming to the conclusion that this is not a case
where this Court ought to impose the extreme penalty of death
upon the accused. Therefore, while partially accepting the
appeals only with regard to quantum of sentence, we commute
the death sentence awarded to the accused to one of life
imprisonment (21 years). G
N.J. Appeals partly allowed.
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