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Supreme Court of India

BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS OF INDIAversusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

Citation
1994 INSC 294
Decided
1 August 1994
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The word “construction” in Section 32A(2)(b)(iii) must be read together with the phrase “manufacture or production of any article or thing” and therefore applies only to movable articles like ships, not to immovable constructions.

Summary

The Builders Associations of India filed a writ petition under Article 32 challenging the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. N.C. Budharaja & Co., which held that the word “construction” in Section 32A(2)(b)(iii) of the Income‑Tax Act applies only to movable items such as ships and not to immovable structures like dams or buildings. The petition argued that three important circumstances – an independent reading of “construction”, a 1986 CBDT circular, and a later decision in Bhageeratha Engineering Ltd. – were not considered and warranted a larger bench review. The Court rejected these contentions, holding that “construction” cannot be read separately from the phrase “manufacture or production of any article or thing” and that the provision continues to apply only to movable articles. It also observed that the clarificatory sub‑section 2A does not alter this interpretation and that the Law Ministry’s opinion and the CBDT circular are not binding. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

  • The scope of the word “construction” in Section 32A(2)(b)(iii) – whether it can be read independently of the accompanying phrase “manufacture or production of any article or thing”.
  • The relevance of the 1986 Central Board of Direct Taxes circular on the interpretation of Section 32A.
  • Whether the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bhageeratha Engineering Ltd. conflicts with the Budharaja judgment and requires reconsideration.
  • The overall applicability of Section 32A(2)(b)(iii) to immovable constructions such as dams, bridges, buildings and roads.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Income TaxSection 32AConstructionInvestment allowanceStatutory interpretationShipsImmovable propertyCircularLaw Ministry opinionArticle 32Writ petition

Judgment

A                    BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS OF INDIA
                                    v.
                         UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

                                  AUGUST 1, 1994

B                  [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND S.C. SEN, JJ.)

          I11come Tax Act, 1961-Sections 32A(2)(b)(iii) and 32A(2A)--As in-
    serted by Finance (No. 2) Act, 1977.

C        The word "constniction" occurring in the sub-clause (iii) of clause (b)f
  Sub-Section (2) of Section 32A of Income Tax Act. Not to be dissociated
  from the words "manufacture or production of a11y article or thi11g not bei11g
  an article or thing specified in the list in the Eleventh Schedule'C-/Jy the
  retention of the word "constntction" in the new sub-clause (iii), it was intended
  that the ships shall continue to be within the purview of present sub-clause
D (iii) as they were within the purview of erstwhile sub-clause (ii).
           Interpretation of Statutes-Taxing Laws.

           Opinion of Law Ministry and reply of Minister of State for Finance in
    Parliament-Not of much relevance for the purpose of interpreting sub-clause
E   (iii) of clause (b) of Sub-Section (2) of Sec. 32A of the Income tax Act, 1961.

          A writ petition was filed under Art. 32 challenging the correctness or
    the decision or this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. N.C. Bud-
    haraja & Co., (204) I.T.R. 412.

F          The challenge was based on the ground that as the following three
     Important circumstances were not brought to the notice of this Court, the
     decision, in so far as it relates to Section 32A(2)(b)(lii), requires recon-
     sideration by a larger Bench :-

G           (a) The word "construction" in clause (Iii) or clause (b) or Sub-Sec-
     tion (2) of Section 32A should be read independent of and not In associa-
     tion with the words following, viz., "manufacture or production of any
     article or thing".

          (For this proposition reliance was placed on the opinion of Law
H    Ministry and Reply of Finance Minister In Parliament)
                                          376
                  BUILDERSASSNS. OFINDIA v. U.0.1.                       377

      (b) The circular issued by t.he Central Board of Direct Taxes in the      A
year 1986 [published in 161 l.T.R. (statutes) 24 to 26] with reference to
Section 32·AB which was introduced with effect from April 1, 1987 but
which contains identical words negatives the construction put by this
Court in Budharaja 's case.

      (c) This court had in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bhageeratha           B
Engineering Limited, (1993) l.T.R. 12, taken a view contrary to the one taken
iu Budharaja and Co. with respect to Section 32A(2)(b) (iii).

      Dismissing the writ petition,

      HELD : 1.1. Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of
                                                                                c
Section 32A of the Income tax Act, 1961 continues to apply to ships. The
word "construction" occurring in the said sub· clause cannot be dissociated
from the following !"ords "manufacture or production of any article or
thing not being an article or thing specified in the list in the Eleventh
Schedule". The context and the structure of the sub-clause does not permit      D
such Jissociation of the word "construction" from the following words. If
that were the intention of the Parliament, it would have employed ap·
propriate words to dissociate the word "construction" from the following
words. There are none. As explained in the Budltaraja's case, the word
"construction" was retained in the new sub-clause (iii) because the ships       E
continue to be within th< purview of present sub-clause (iii) as they were
within the purview of former sub-clause (ii). It is not necessary to repeat
the reasoning in Budharaja & Co. over again. (379-D; 385-F·G·H; 386-A]

      1.2. Sub-section (2A) of Section 32A was inserted by Finance (No. 2)
Act, 1977 by way of an amendment; Sub-section makes it clear that if any
                                                                              F
machinery or plant is used mainly for the purpose of business of construc·
tion, manufacture or production of any article or thing which does not fall
within the prohibited list in the Eleventh Schedule, it will qualify for
prohibited list in the Eleventh Schedule, it will qualify for diduction under
Section 32A. The deduction will not be denied only because such machinery G
or plant is also used for the purpose of business of construction, manufac·
ture or production of any article or thing included in the prohibited list.
Sub-section (2A) of Section 32A is clarifacatory in nature. It clarifies that
machinery or plant mainly used for inter alia, construction of articles or
things which are not included in the prohibited list, will qualify for H
    378                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R ..

A   diduction under Section 32A, notwithstanding the fact that such machinery
    or plant is also used for construction of articles or things contained in the
    prohibited list. (386-B, D·E-FJ

           1.3. If the word 'construction' is not to be associated with the phrase
    'any article or thing' then it was not necessary to use the phrase 'construe·
B
    lion, manufacture or production of any article or thing' in the clariflcatory
    sub-section (2A). It will then have to be held that the word 'construction'
    in sub-section (2A) is redundant and a mere surplusage. Opinion of the
    Law Ministry and the reply of the Minister of State for Finance in the
     Parliament are not of much relevance on the construction of the said
c   sub-clause by this Court. (386-G-H; 387-A)

         1.4. The opinion of the Law Ministry may be in favour of the assessee
    or may be against the assessee. Similarly the answer given by the Minister
    may be in favour of the assessee or against him. They are mere opinions
D   and cannot be treated as binding upon the Courts. (387 ·Al

           1.5. The circular of the C.B.D.T. issued in the year 1986 explaining the
    provisions in Section 32AB does not in any manner help the assessee. The
    said circular issued with reference to a different provision and explaining a
E   different scheme altogether can have no significant relevance as an instruc·
    lion or direction under Section 119 vis-a·vis Section 32A. The relevance, if
    any, is only inferential ·and, therefore, remote. It is significant that the said
    circular also deals with Section 32A but no stich statement is contained
    therein. Even if the said circular had been brought to the notice Qf this
    Court, it could not have made any difference. (387-F; 388-E-F]
F
          1.6. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bhageerath Engineering Ltd.,
    (1993) I.T.R.12 the interpretation of the words "construction, manufacture
    or production of any article or thing not being an article or thing specified
    in the list in the Eleventh Schedule" was not really in issue. It, therefore,
G   cannot be said that this Court has taken a different view on the interpreta·
    lion of the said words in Bhageeratha Engineering Ltd. (382-D; 389-B)

        Commissioner of Income Tax v. N.C. Budharaja & Co., (1993) 204 ITR
  412 :1993 Tax LR 1117, followed and Commissioner of Income Tax v.
H Bhageeratha Engineering Ltd., (1993) 199 ITR 12, distinguished. (329-C)
                  BUILDERS ASSNS. OF INDIA v. U.0.1.                      379

      CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No. 430 A
of 1994.

      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

      Nani Palkivala, V. Gaurishankar and S. Rajappa for the Petitioner.
                                                                                 B
      The following Order of the Court was delivered :

      Though we are dismissing this writ petition preferred under Article
32 of the Constitution of India at the stage of admission itself, we deem it
appropriate to record our reasons therefor in view of the contentions urged      C
by Shri N.A. Palkhivala, learned senior advocate for the petitioner.

        In Commissio11er of Income Tax v. NC. Budharaja & Co., 204 l.T.R.
412, a Bench of this Court comprising one of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.)
and N. Venkatachala, J. held inter a/ia that the words "construction,
manufacture or production of any article or thing not being an article .or       D
thing specified in the list in the Eleventh Schedule" occurring in sub-clause
(iii) of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 32-A of the Income-Tax Act,
1961 do not take in construction of a darn, a building, a brid_ge, a road and
the like. The reason given was that a darn, a building, a bridge or road
cannot be brought within the purview of the words "article or thing". After
referring to the legislative history of the said clause it was held that the     E
words "any article or thing" refer to only 11).0vables and that the use of the
word "construction" in the said clause is referable to construction of ships.
It was held that the words "construction, manufacture or production of any
article or thing" cannot be extended to construction of immovabie proper-
ties like the construction of a dam, building, bridge, a road and the like. It   F
was observed that doing so would do violence to the plain meaning of the
words "article or thing" occurring in the said sub-clause.

      In this writ petition, Sri Palkhivala contends that inasmuch as three
important circumstances were not brought to the notice of this Court by          G
the counsel appearing for the assessees in Budharaja & Co. and were,
therefore, not considered by this Court, the decision in so far as it relates
to Section 32- A(2)(b)(iii) requires reconsideration and must be referred
to a larger Bench. Had the said three circumstances been brought to the
notice of this Court, says Sri Palkhivala, the decision would certainly have
been different. The three circumstances mentioned by the learned counsel         H
    380                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A are the following :
           (A) That the word "construction" occurring in the said sub-clause
    should· be read independent of and not in association with the words
    following, viz., "manufacture or production of any article or thing". Learned
    counsel says that if so read disjunctively, the word "construction" takes
B   within its sweep all types of construction including the construction of
    dams, buildings, bridges, roads and the iike. Learned counsel brought to
    our notice. the opinion of the Law Ministry tendered on February 16, 1984
    to the Ministry of Fmance and the reply of the Minister of State for
    Finance to an unstarred question in Parliament (given sometime in 1987-
C   88). The opinion of the Law Ministry, as set out in the writ petition, reads
    as follows:

             "With regard to the above question, it may be stated that S.32A
             (2) b (iii) refers to any other industrial undertaking for the purpose
             of business of construction, manufacture or production (of an
D            article) or thing specified in the list in the XI schedule. The
           · expression "construction" occurring in this provision would indicate
             that it stands independently and does not qualify articles or things.
             It is intended to cover any new machinery or plant entitled to any
             other industrial undertaking for the purpose of business or con-
E            struction relating to the industrial undertaking concern".

          The reply of the Minister of State for Finance to an unstarred
    question No. 5495 dated 11.12.1987 reads thus :

             "(a) Investment allowance u/s 32A of the Income Tax Act is
F            allowable in respect of new plant and machinery which is installed
             and used for the purposes of business of construction, manufacture
             or production of any article or thing.

             (b) There has been a difference of opinion regarding the inter-
             pretation of this provision as to whether plant and machinery used
G            for the purpose of business of construction is also entitled to this
             allowance. As a result of the same, the investment allowance is
             being allowed under the jurisdiction of some other CIT's whereas
             it is not being allowed in the jurisdiction of some other CIT's.

H            (c) Some of the benches of !TAT .have held that plant and
                  BUILDERS ASSNS. OF INDIA v. U.O.l.                      381

        machinery used for the business of construction is entitled to this      A
        allowance.

        (d). The Law Ministry, whose opinion was sought by the govern-
        ment on this issue, is also of the view that plant and machinery
        used for the business of construction is entitled to this allowance."
                                                                                 B
      Indeed Sri Palkhivala contended that having accepted the opinion of
the Law Ministry, it was not open to the Government of India to have filed
or persisted with the appeals in this Court which resulted in the decision
in Budharaja and Co. Learned counsel submitted that in ali fairness, the
Government of India ought to have instructed its counsel not to press the        c
said appeals.

       (B) The circular issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes in the
year 1986 [published in 161 I.T.R. (Statutes) 24 to 26) with r~ference to
Section 32-AB which was introduced with effect from April 1, 1987 but
which contains identical words. The circular states that the Government of       D
India has introduced a new scheme of Investment Deposit Account with
effect from the Year 1986-87 with a view to neutralise the bias in favour of
borrowing and needless capacity creation. It then proceeds to state :     p




        "The new scheme differs from the existing provisions of investment       E
        allowance as under :-

        (a) The existing provisions of the investment allowance apply to
        only those assessees-

        (i) who purchase a ship or aircraft, which is first put to use in the    F
        business of the assessee; or

        (ii) who install new machinery or plant in an industrial undertaking
        for the purposes only of business of construction, manufacture or
        production of any article or thing not specified in the Eleventh         G
        Schedule to the Income-tax Act.

        In the case of small scale industrial undertaking, this benefit is not
        denied even if such an undertaking produces a non- priority item
        listed in the Eleventh Schedule, like alcoholic spirits, tobacco
        preparations, cosmetics, etc.                                            H
    382                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A           The new scheme is applicable to all existing types of assessees as
            also to the professionals and the leasing companies which have not
            leased out machinery to those industrial undertakings other than -
            a small scale industrial undertaking, engaged in the manufacture
            or production of articles or things listed in.the Eleventh Schedule
            to the Income-tax Act. In other words, the deduction is admissible
B           to all the assessees who carry on "eligible business or profession",
            which as per section 32AB(2) means business or profession other
            than the business of construction, manufacture or production of
            any article or thing specified in the list in the Eleventh Schedule
            (in case it is not a small scale industrial undertaking) and the
c           business of leasing or hiring of machinery or plant to an industrial
            undertaking other than a small scale industrial undertaking
            engaged in the business of low priority items as specified in the
            list in the Eleventh Schedule. If may be clarified that the business
            of construction is an eligible business for the purposes of this
                       11
            provision.
D
          ( C) The fact that this court had in Commissioner of Income Tax v.
    Bhageeratha Engineering Limited, (1993) l.T.R. 12, taken a view contrary to
    the one taken in Bud}Jaraja and Co. with respect to Section 32A(ii)(b)(iii).
    The judgment in Bhagreeratha Engineering Ltd. reads as follows :
E
            "Heard learned counsel on both sides. The question of law formu-
            lated for the opinion of the High Court on a reference under
            section 256 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, pertains to the entitlement
            of the assessee to the investment allowance under section 32A of
F           the Act. The High Court held (see (1992] 193 !TR 674, 680) :

             "The Tribunal further found that since the machinery was used in
             an industrial undertaking in the business of construction, manufac-         •
             ture or production or articles or things, the assessee is entitled to       '
              investment allowance under section 32A of the Act. The finding
G            that the assessee is engaged mainly in the manufacture or process-
                                                                                         I
             ing of goods and is an industrial undertaking is not in challenge
              before us. Admittedly, the assessee is a construction company and
             for the purpose of the manufacturing activities performed by it, it
            . used the machinery in its business of construction ........... It is not
H             open · to the Revenue to contend in these references that the
                   BUILDERS ASSNS. OF INDIA v. U.0.1.                        383

         assessee-company is not an industrial undertaking, since the find- A
         ing of fact in that regard entered by the Tribunal, has not been
         e:<pressly challenged. by an appropriate question raised in the
         reference.:

         The contention of the asses see (sic) in relation to the construction      B
         activity carried on by him cannot be said to be an industrial
         undertaking, becomes irrelevant.

         With this finding, the special leave petition is dismissed."

      We are of the considered opinion that none of the contentions urged . C
by Shri Palkhivala calls for reconsideration of this Court's judgment in
Budharaja and Co. We proceed to give our reasons with respect to each
of the three grounds/contentions urged by the learned counsel.

      Re: contention (A) :
                                                                                    D
       Jn our opinion, the word "construction" occurring in the said sub:
clause cannot be read independently, torn from its context. In so far as it
is relevant, the provision reads thus :

       "The ship or aircraft or machinery or plant referred to in sub- section      E
{1) shall be the following, narnely: ...... ,.. (b) any new machinery or plant
installed after the 31st day of March, 1976,....... (iii) in any other industrial
undertaking for the purposes of business of construction, manufacture or
production of any article or thing, not being an article or thing specified
in the list in the Eleventh Schedule."
                                                                                    F
       This Court explained in its judgment in Budharaja and Co. the reason
for which the word "construction" was used in the corresponding sub'clause
prior to April 1, 1978, viz., sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section {2),
which referred to articles and things in the Ninth Schedule and the legis-
lative change brought about by Finance (No.2) Act of 1977 with effect from          G
April 1, 1978. It is pointed out therein that the former sub- clause (ii) which
applied only to the articles and things in the !Xth Schedule - all of which
were movables including ships - now became sub-clause (iii) which applies
to all articles and things other than those mentioned in tlie Eleventh
Schedule. The following discussion in the said judgment brings out the
ratio;                                                                              H
    384                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A         ''Though at first sight, the use of the words "construction" and
          "thing" appear to lend some substance to the contention of learned
          counsel for the assessee, a deeper scrutiny - and in particular, the
          legislative history of the relevant provisions - militates against the
          acceptance of his submission. Sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause
          (b) of sub section (2) of Section 32A were substituted by the
B         Finance (No. 2) Act of 1977, with effect from April 1, 1978. Prior
          to the said amendment, the sub-clauses read as follows :

          "(ii) for the purposes of business of construction, manufacture or
          production of any one or more of the articles or things specified
          in the list in the Ninth Schedule; or
c
          (iii) in a small-scale industrial undertaking for the purposes of
          business of manufactm e or production of any other articles or
          things."

          The unamended sub-clause (ii), which <:Orresponds to present
D
          sub-clause (iii), was thus confined to the "articles and things" in
          the Ninth Schedule. The Ninth, Schedule, since omitted, contained
          as many as 33 items. Item 15 therein related to "ships". All the
          items referred only to movables; none of them refers to an inunov-
          able object like a building, factory or bridge. Since the appropriate ·
E         word in the case of ships is 11 construction" - in common parlance
          one speaks of construction of ships and not manufacture of ships
          - the Legislature used the expression "construction" in unamended
          sub- clause (ii). The said sub-clause also referred to "articles or
          things", which is the heading of the Ninth Schedule. After amend-
          ment, sub-clause (ii), which became sub-clause (iii), underwent a
F         certain change. Not only were the words "in any other industrial
          undertaking" added at the beginning of the sub-clause, the ap-
          plicability of the sub-clause was extended to all articles and things
          except those articles and things mentioned in the Eleventh
          Schedule. The heading of lhe Eleventh Schedue is again "list of
          articles or things", but the list does not include "ships". In other
G         words, sub-clause (iii), after amendment, continues to apply to
          ships. Ships are among the articles or things to which the present
          sub-clause (iii) applies. And that is precisely the reason the word
          "construction" is retained in amended sub-clause (iii) - the sub-
          clause corresponding to unamended sub-clasue (ii). So far as the
H         use of the word "thing" is concerned, it has no special significance
                  BUILDERS AS SNS. OF INDIA v. U.0.1.                 385

        inasmuch as both the Ninth Schedule and the Eleventh Schedule A
        contain a list of articles or things. Both the Ninth Schedule, to
        which alone the unamehded sub-clause (ii) applied, as well as the
        Eleventh Schedule, the articles and things wherein are excluded
        from the purview of amended sub-clause (iii), refer only to movable
        objects - called articles or things. In this background, it is not
        possible or permissible to read the word permissible to read the B
        word 11 construction 11 as referring to construction of dams, bridges,
        buildings, roads or canals. The association of words in former
        sub-clause (ii) and the present sub-clause (iii) is also not without
                                    1
        significance. The words are: 'construction, manufacture or produc-
                                                                            c
        tion of any one or more of the articles and things .............. " and
        "construction, manufacture or production of any· articles and
        things ..... ", respectively. It is equally evident that in these sub-
        clauses as well as in the Ninth Schedule and the Eleventh Schedule,
        the words "articles" and "things" are used interchangeably. In the
        scheme and context of the provision, it would not be right to isolate
        the word "thing", ascertain its meaning with reference to law D
        lexicons and attach to it a meaning which it was never intended to
        bear. A statute cannot always be construed with the dictionary in
        one hand and the statute in the other. Regard must also be had
        to the scheme, context and-as in this case - to the legislative history
        of the provision. We are, therefore, of the opinion that sub-clause
        (iii) of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 32A does not E
        comprehend within its ambit construction of a dam, a bridge, a
        building, a road, a canal and other similar constructions."

      We are not pursuaded to take a different view than the one taken in
the said decision. We are of the considered view that the word "construe- F
tion" occurring in the said sub-clause cannot be dissociated from the
following words "manufacture or production of any article or thing not
being an article or thing specified in the list in the Eleventh Schedule". The
context and the structure of the sub-clause does not permit such dissocia-
tion of the word "construction" from the following words. If that were the G
intention of the Parliament, it would have employed appropriate words to
dissociate the word "construction" from the following words. There are
none. The absence of any such words clearly and conclusively militates
against the contention of Shri Palkhivala. As explained in the said judg-
ment, the word "construction" was retained in the new sub-clause (iii)
because the ships continue to be within the purview of present sub-clause H
    386                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (iii) as they were within the purview of fo~mer sub-clause (ii). It is not
    necessary to repea~ the reasoning in Budharaja & Co. over again.

          There is another indication in Section 32A which tends to support
    our opinion, viz., sub-section (2A) of Section 32A. It was inserted by
    Finance (No.2) Act, 1977 by way of an amendment. The object of this
B   amendment was stated in the Notes on Clauses of Finance (No. 2) Bill,
    1977 as follows :-

              "New sub-section (2A) seeks to provide that the deduction in
            · respect of investment allowance shall not be denied in respect of
              machinery or plant installed and used mainly for the purposes of
c             business of construction, manufacture or production of any article
              or thing merely on the ground that such machinery or plant is used
              in part for the purposes of business of construction, manufacture
              or production of any article or thing specified in the list in the
              Eleventh Schedule."
D
             Sub-section (2A) of Section 32A makes it clear that if any machinery
      or plant is used mainly for the purpose of business of construction,
      mannfacture or production of any article or thing which does not fall within
      the prohibited list in the Eleventh Schedule, it will qualify for deduction
E     under Section 32A. The deduction will not be denied only because such
    . machinery or plant is also used for the purpose of business of construction,
      manufacture or production of any article or thing included in the
      prohibited list. Sub-section (2A) of Section 32A is clarificatory in nature.
      It clarifies that machinery or plant mainly used inter alia, for construction
      of articles or things which are not included in the prohibited lis~ will qualify
F     for deduction under Section 32A, notwithstanding the fact that such
      machinery or plant is also used for construction of articles or things
      contained in the prohibited list.

           If the word 'construction' is not to be associated with the phrase 'any
G   article or thing', then it was not necessary to use the phrase 'construction,
    manufacture or production of any article or thing' in the clarificatory
    sub-section (2A). It will then have to be held that the word 'construction'
    in sub-section (2A) is redundant and a mere surplusage.

          S_o far as opinion of the Law Ministry and the reply of thl' Minister
H   of State for Finance in the Parliament is concerned, we are of the opinion
                  BUILDERS ASSNS. OF INDIA v. U.0.1.                       387

they are not of much relevance on the construction of the said sub-clause A
by this Court. The opinion of the Law Ministry may be in favour of the
assessee or may be against the assessee. Similarly the answer given by the
Minister may be in favour of the assessee or against him. They are mere
opinions and cannot be treated as binding upon the Courts. It is not even
suggested that the said opinion was communicated to the assessing
                                                                                  B
authorfries.

      So for as the contention of Sri Palkhivala that in view of the said
answer given by the Minister of State for Finance in the Parliament, the
Government of India ought to have instructed its counsel not to file the
said appeals or that it ought to have instructed its counsel not to press the     c
said appeals is concerned, we are of the opinion it is not a matter which
concerns the Court nor does it reflect upon the correctness of the inter-
pretation placed by this Court upon the said sub-clause. What transpired
or what did not transpire between the government and its counsel is a
matter between them. We have no say in the matter.
                                                                                  D
       We are, therefore, ol the opinion that even if the facts and cir-
cumstances mentioned under contention (A) urged by Shri Palkhivala had
been brought to the notice of this Court, it could not have le.d to a different
result.' We are also of the opinion that this contention does not call for
reconsideration of the decision in Budharaja & Co.                                E
      Re:(B):

       We are equally of the opinion that circular of the C.B.D.T. issued in
the year 1986 explaining the provisions in Section 32AB does not in any
manner help the assessee. A careful reading of the last paragraph in the F
extract quoted hereinbefore shows that the new scheme contained in
Section 32AB is "admissible to all the assessees who carry on "eligible
business or profession" which as per Section 32-AB(2) means business or
profession other than the business of construction manufacture or produc-
tion of any article or thing specified in the list in the Eleventh Schedule (in G
case it is not a small-scale industrial undertaking) and the business of
leasing or hiring of machinery or plant to an industrial undertaking other
than a small-scale industrial undertaking engaged in the business of low
priority items as specified in the list in the Eleventh Schedule'. Having so
said, the circular stated: "it may be clarified that the business of construc-
tion is eligible business for the purposes of this provision." It is this H
    388                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A sentence, the last sentence in the paragraph, which is strongly relied upon
    and emphasised by Sri Palkhivala as supporting his contention. For a
    proper appreciation of the said circular, it is necessary to notice the scheme
    of Investment Deposit Account introduced by Section 32-AB with effect
    from April 1, 1987. If the assessee deposits any amount in his account
    maintained by him with the Development Bank within the period specified
B
    therein or utilise any amount during the previous year for the purchase of
    articles mentioned therein, he becomes entitled to a deduction specified in
    the Section. Sub- section (4) states that no deduction under sub-section (1)
    of the said section shall be allowed in respect of any amount utilised for
    the purchase of - "( e) any new machinery or plant to be installed in an
C   industrial ·undertaking, other than a small-scale industrial undertaking, as
    defined in section 80HHA, for the purposes of business of construction,
    manufacture or production of any article or thing specified in the list in
    the Eleventh Schedule". The Circular was evidently referring to this
    provision in the pragraph referred to above. We may also say that the
D   sentence emphasised by Shri Palkhivala merely says that "business of
    construction is an eligible business" for the purposes of Section 32AB. It
    does not clearly say that construction of all types is included. In the
    circumstances we are of the opinion that the said circular issued with
     reference to a different provision and explaining a different sheme al-
     together can have no significant relevance as an instruction or direction
E    under Section 119 vis-a-vis Section 32A. The relevance, if any, is only
     inferential " and, therefore, remote. It is significant that the said circular
     also deals with Section 32A but no such statement is contained therein. We
     are, therefore, of the opinion that Even if the said circular had been
     brought to the notice of this Court, it could not have made any difference.
F
          Re: (C):

          We have set out the judgment of this Court in Bhageeratha E11gineer-
    ing Ltd. in full hereinbefore. This Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal in
     view of the finding reeorded by the Tribunal (which finding was accepted
G    by the High Court) that "the assessee is engaged mainly in the manufacture
     or processing of goods and is an 'industrial undertaking"'. The Tribunal
     had also found that the assessee had used the machinery in the business of
     construction, and the said finding was not challenged before the High
     Court. In the above circumstances, the High Court opined that it was not
H    open to the Revenue to contend before it that the assessee-company was
                   BUILDERS ASSNS. OFINDIA v. U.0.1.                    389

not an 'industrial company'. The extract from the High Court's judgment A
quoted in this Court's order clearly shows that the contention of the
Revenue was that the assessee was not an 'industrial company' and that the
interpretation of the words "construction, manufacture or production of
any article or thing not being an article or thing specified in the list in the
Eleventh Schedule" was not really in issue therein. It therefore, cannot be
said that this Court has taken. a different view on the interpretation of the
                                                                                B
said words in Bhageeratha Engineering Ltd. Indeed, Sri Palkhivala did not
seriously press this point.

       For the above reasons, the writ petition is dismissed.

A.G.                                                     Petition dismissed.   c


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