RATNABEN W/O DIPAKKUMAR PITRODA D/O ARUNBHI VRAJLAL CHUDASAMAversusDIPAKKUMAR KANTILAL PITRODA
- Disposal
- 53-ALLOWED / GRANTED @ ADM.STAGE
Holding
The delay of 105 days is condoned as the appellant has established sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Summary
The appellant, a wife, filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of a 105‑day delay in filing an appeal against a Family Court decree of divorce dated 13‑05‑2025. The respondent argued that the delay was not due to genuine financial hardship, citing the appellant’s earlier filing of a domestic‑violence complaint and a maintenance application as evidence of sufficient means. The court examined the submissions, referring to Supreme Court judgments in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (2024 SCC Online SC 513) and Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, which emphasize a strict approach to limitation but allow liberal construction of Section 5 when sufficient cause is shown. Considering the appellant’s lower‑strata background and lack of contrary evidence, the court found the delay was not deliberate or negligent and that sufficient cause existed. Consequently, the court condoned the delay and allowed the appeal to proceed.
Issues considered
- Whether the 105‑day delay in filing the appeal can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether the appellant’s alleged financial hardship constitutes a sufficient cause for condonation.
- Whether the appellant’s prior legal actions negate the claim of financial incapacity.
Legislation cited
- Limitation Act, 1963s. 3, s. 5
Subjects
Judgment
C/CA/5895/2025 ORDER DATED: 09/06/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 5895 of
2025
In
F/FIRST APPEAL/36399/2025
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RATNABEN W/O DIPAKKUMAR PITRODA D/O ARUNBHI VRAJLAL
CHUDASAMA & ANR.
Versus
DIPAKKUMAR KANTILAL PITRODA
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Appearance:
MR JOHNSEY P MACWAN(5498) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2
MR YN RAVANI(718) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 09/06/2026
ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA)
1. This application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has
been filed on behalf of the appellant, seeking condonation of delay
of 105 days in filing the present appeal.
2. We have heard learned counsel Mr. J. P. Macwan and Mr. Y. N.
Ravani, for the respective parties.
3. Brief facts giving rise to file present application are that, the
opponent husband had filed a Family Suit No. 228 of 2018 in the
Family Court at Nadiad for divorce from the applicants herein on the
ground that she has been living adulterous life. Vide judgment and
decree dated 13.05.2025, the Family Court dissolved the marriage.
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C/CA/5895/2025 ORDER DATED: 09/06/2026
4. In the aforesaid facts, after delay of 105 days, the appeal has been
presented before this Court. It is averred in the application that,
delay has occasioned on account of acute financial crunch and it is
only after arranging of necessary amount to be paid towards
professional fees, the applicant has been able to file the aforesaid
Appeal.
5. Mr. Macwan, learned advocate reiterating the averments made in the
application, has submitted that, the applicant wife has no means for
her livelihood and due to financial crunch, she could not arrange a
necessary professional fees and after the arrangement, she would
able to file an Appeal and on that ground, the delay has occasioned.
In such circumstances, it is submitted that, the sufficient cause may
be liberally construed to do substantial justice.
6. On the other hand, opposing the application, Mr. Y.N. Ravani,
learned counsel reiterating the contentions of the affidavit-in-reply,
has submitted that the reasons set forth for the delay are totally
insufficient to condone the delay and the explanation is not
satisfactory. He would further urge that, the decree came to be
passed on 13.05.2025. The applicant moved an application dated
22.09.2025 addressed to Vadodara Police for domestic violence etc,
thereafter on 27.11.2025, she filed a Recovery Application of
interim maintenance and then, on 03.12.2025, she has presented the
appeal along with delay condonation application. Thus, it shows that
the applicant had spent amount towards the legal proceedings, which
proves that, the plea of financial crunch is fabricated excuse and
therefore, the delay has caused is not due to lack of means but
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C/CA/5895/2025 ORDER DATED: 09/06/2026
deliberate and negligent act on the part of the applicant. Thus,
considering the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the applicant,
who is admittedly living adulterous life with the applicant no. 2, no
sufficient ground made out for condoning the delay.
7. We have considered the submissions and averments made in the
application as well as the affidavit in reply.
8. The Apex Court has observed as under:
“8. It is well settled that the discretion to condone delay has to be
exercised judiciously, based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
It is also equally well settled that even though limitation may harshly
affect the rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour
as prescribed under the statute, as the Courts have no choice but to
apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay
on equitable grounds.
9. In a case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by L.Rs. and others Vs.
Special Deputy Collector (L.A.), 2024 SCC Online SC 513wherein the
Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-
"26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law,
as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident
that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should
be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather
than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed
of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a
fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense
whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial
justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to
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C/CA/5895/2025 ORDER DATED: 09/06/2026
defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of
the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the
delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of
power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if
sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where
there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does
not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the
court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing
the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning
the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed,
tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision."
10. In a case of Basawaraj Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, the
Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-
"12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power
to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has
no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation."
The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it
giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex
which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted
in such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while
interpreting a statute"
25. In the aforesaid case law, the Hon'ble Apex Court further
held as follows:-
"15. The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
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C/CA/5895/2025 ORDER DATED: 09/06/2026
"sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation
of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever,
amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature."
9. Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case law and having
regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, it
is an admitted facts that the applicant wife is belonged to lower
strata of the society and nothing on record to show that she is
financially sound. The applicant no. 2, against whom the allegation
being made, has been joined because before the Family Court, he
was joined as an opponent. The opponent husband failed to
demonstrate that the applicant no. 2 having sufficient means and he
is able to bare the legal expenses. In such circumstances, merely
filing complaints and perusing the recovery proceedings, cannot be a
ground to presume that the applicant no. 1 having sufficient means.
Thus, therefore, in our opinion, in such circumstances, avoiding
technical approach and construing liberally, the term “sufficient
cause” to do substantial justice, we are of the considered opinion
that, the delay was not occasioned deliberately or on account of
negligence or malafides.
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C/CA/5895/2025 ORDER DATED: 09/06/2026
10. For the reasons recorded, we are satisfied with the reasons stated in
the application. The applicants have established sufficient cause and
therefore, delay in preferring the first appeal deserves to be
condoned and is hereby condoned. Rule is made absolute.
(ILESH J. VORA,J)
(R. T. VACHHANI, J)
P.S. JOSHI
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: PALLAV SUBHASHCHANDRA JOSHI(HC00177), Principal Pvt. Secretary, at High Court of Gujarat on 10/06/2026 13:40:17
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