CH. JOSEPHversusTHE TELANGANA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION & OTHER

                 [2025] 8 S.C.R. 320 : 2025 INSC 920

                      Ch. Joseph
                           v.
 The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other
                       (Civil Appeal No. 9986 of 2025)
                                01 August 2025
            [J.K. Maheshwari and Aravind Kumar,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       i) Whether the retirement of the appellant on medical grounds
       due to colour blindness, without offering alternative employment,
       is legally sustainable in light of applicable service regulations and
       binding settlements; ii) whether Clause 14 of the Memorandum of
       Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed u/s.12(3) of the Industrial
       Disputes Act, 1947, remains valid, binding, and enforceable
       despite the subsequent 1986 settlement and internal administrative
       circulars; iii) whether the respondents complied with their duty to
       make a bona fide assessment of alternative employment options
       for the appellant, as required by law, policy, and principles of
       natural justice; iv) whether the reliance placed by the High Court
       on B.S. Reddy was legally tenable in the context of the appellant’s
       independent rights under a binding industrial settlement.

                                   Headnotes†
       Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
       Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – APSRTC Employees
       (Service) Regulations, 1964 – Regn. 6A(5)(b) – Appellant-
       driver was found to be colour blind and was declared unfit
       to hold the post of driver – The appellant’s representation
       seeking alternate employment came to be rejected by the
       respondent-corporation – The corporation passed an order
       retiring the appellant – Whether the retirement of the appellant
       on medical grounds due to colour blindness, without offering
       alternative employment, is legally sustainable in light of
       applicable service regulations and binding settlements:
       Held: 1. The appellant’s retirement from service on the ground of
       colour blindness was effected without any demonstrable effort by
       the respondent-corporation to identify or assess the feasibility of


* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                               321

                            Ch. Joseph v.
       The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

     alternative employment, despite the appellant having expressed
     willingness to be reassigned to a non-driving post – Such inaction
     violates both statutory obligation and administrative fairness.
     [Para 10.1]
     2. The primary legal flaw lies in the assumption that medical
     unfitness for a particular post automatically entails incapacity
     for public service altogether – Colour blindness, though a
     disqualification for driving, does not render the appellant unfit to
     serve in any other non-driving role – There is no evidence that
     he was declared wholly incapacitated or incapable of performing
     other duties. [Para 13]
     3. The MOS dated 17.12.1979 entered into u/s.12 (3) of Industrial
     Disputes Act, 1947 between the employer and the union representing
     the workmen under Clause 14 would indicate that the drivers found
     with “colour blindness” would be provided an alternate job and all
     service benefits would stand protected – However, the Corporation
     has relied upon the subsequent agreement, namely Memorandum
     of Settlement (MOS) dated 22.12.1986 to stave off the claim
     for alternate employment raised by the appellant in the instant
     case – A plea has been raised in the Counter affidavit filed by the
     Corporation that the MOS dated 17.12.1979 has been superseded
     by the agreement of 1986 – The said contention is rejected – The
     agreement dated 22.12.1986 does not refer to the agreement dated
     17.12.1979 – In fact, Clause 5 (d) of the settlement agreement
     22.12.1986 would indicate, suitable alternate jobs would have to be
     identified and only in the event of not being possible to identify such
     job, recourse to payment of additional monetary benefit as per the
     proposal sent to the government will be given after government’s
     approval – The Settlement dated 22.12.1986 does not specifically
     supersede the settlement agreement of 17.12.1979 – It is only by
     way of a communication dated 10.11.2014, the benefit of alternate
     employment given to the drivers declared unfit due to “colour
     blindness” has been sought to be taken away which benefit was
     extended till that date. [Paras 14, 16, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3]
     4. Retirement on medical grounds must be a measure of last
     resort, only after the employer exhausts all reasonable avenues
     for redeployment – This principle is inherent in the concept of
     “reasonable accommodation”, which is now recognised as an
     aspect of substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21 – The
     failure to explore alternate employment before resorting to medical
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       retirement is not merely a procedural lapse—it is a substantive
       illegality that violates the appellant’s right to livelihood and equal
       treatment. [Para 17]

       Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection
       of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Industrial
       Disputes Act, 1947 – s.12(3) – APSRTC Employees (Service)
       Regulations, 1964 – Regn. 6A(5)(b) – Whether Clause 14 of
       the Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed
       u/s.12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, remains valid,
       binding, and enforceable despite the subsequent 1986
       settlement and internal administrative circulars:
       Held: 1. The appellant’s entitlement to re-deployment arises
       from Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement dated
       17.12.1979, executed u/s.12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
       1947, which specifically provides for alternate employment to
       drivers declared colour blind, with pay protection and continuity of
       service – This clause remains valid and enforceable. [Para 10.2]
       2. The Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, was executed
       between the Corporation and its recognised union u/s.12(3) of the
       Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – The Memorandum of Settlement is
       not a mere administrative circular—it is a binding statutory contract
       forged between labour and management. [Para 18]
       3. The enforceability of this settlement is not diminished by the
       subsequent settlement dated 22.12.1986, which the Corporation
       claims to be governing the field – Clause 5(d) of the 1986 settlement
       provides that drivers who are medically unfit may, “to the extent
       possible”, be provided alternative employment, and where not
       feasible, will be granted Additional Monetary Benefit (AMB) –
       Crucially, this clause does not contain any express language
       annulling or modifying Clause 14 of the 1979 agreement – Also,
       the absence of a termination clause in the 1986 settlement,
       coupled with the Corporation’s continued adherence to Clause 14
       in other cases even after 1986, confirms that the earlier agreement
       remained operational – Accordingly, this Court finds that 1986
       settlement does not explicitly abrogate or nullify Clause 14 of the
       1979 settlement. [Para 21]

       Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
       Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Industrial Disputes
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                                 323

                            Ch. Joseph v.
       The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

     Act, 1947 – APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964 –
     Whether the respondents complied with their duty to make
     a bona fide assessment of alternative employment options
     for the appellant, as required by law, policy, and principles
     of natural justice:
     Held: 1. From the record, it is evident that the Corporation made
     no effort whatsoever to assess the feasibility of assigning the
     appellant to a non-driving post – There is no file noting, committee
     report, vacancy statement, or suitability assessment relating to
     the appellant – His representation requesting the post of Shramik
     remained unanswered – No comparative evaluation was conducted,
     and no individualized inquiry was held – The only justification offered
     is that the Corporation’s circulars bar such alternate employment.
     [Para 24]
     2. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the respondents
     examined even the most basic parameters—availability of
     vacancies, suitability of tasks, or the appellant’s qualifications – This
     total failure undermines the Corporation’s claim of compliance with
     either the 1979 or 1986 framework, and renders the retirement
     order void for non-consideration of appellant’s claim in proper
     perspective. [Para 27]

     Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of
     Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Industrial Disputes
     Act, 1947 – s.47 – APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations,
     1964 – Whether the reliance placed by the High Court on B.S.
     Reddy was legally tenable in the context of the appellant’s
     independent rights under a binding industrial settlement:
     Held: 1. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in applying the
     judgment in B.S. Reddy, which dealt with the limited scope of s.47
     of the 1995 Act, and did not consider claims arising independently
     under industrial settlements – The present case stands on an
     entirely different legal footing. [Para 10.5]
     2. The B.S. Reddy judgment did not deal with the enforceability
     of a clause in an agreement/settlement entered into u/s.12(3)
     of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 or the Corporation’s obligations
     under bilateral agreements with its workers – The High Court
     overlooked the fundamental distinction between statutory rights
     under disability law and contractual service conditions enforceable
     through settlements. [Para 29]
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       3. The Court in Mohamed Ibrahim clarified that employees with
       conditions like colour blindness, although not falling within the
       defined categories of the statute, must still be accommodated
       wherever their functional capacity permits – To do otherwise would
       result in a regressive interpretation of the law, undermining the very
       foundation of equal opportunity in public employment. [Para 36]
       4. Even though in the present case the appellant had an enforceable
       right under a statutory industrial settlement—placing his claim on
       firmer footing—this Court finds it necessary to reaffirm that even
       in the absence of such contractual rights, employees who acquire
       disabilities during service must not be abandoned or prematurely
       retired without being afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity
       for reassignment. [Para 37]

                                Case Law Cited
       Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Another [2003] 1 SCR 1059 :
       (2003) 4 SCC 524; Mohamed Ibrahim v. The Chairman and
       Managing Director and Others [2023] 13 SCR 924 – relied on.
       Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Represented
       by its Managing Director and Others v. B.S. Reddy (2018) 12
       SCC 704; Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission and
       Others [2021] 12 SCR 311 : (2021) 5 SCC 370; Ravinder Kumar
       Dhariwal and Another v. Union of India and Others [2021] 13 SCR
       823 – referred to.

                                   List of Acts
       Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights
       and Full Participation) Act, 1995; Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

                                List of Keywords
       Service Law; Retirement; Medical grounds; Retirement on medical
       grounds; Colour blind; Post of driver; Alternative employment;
       Service regulations; Binding settlements; Internal administrative
       circulars; Principles of Natural Justice; Statutory obligation;
       Administrative fairness; Incapacity for public service; Additional
       monetary benefit; Concept of reasonable accommodation;
       Termination clause; Right to livelihood; Equal treatment; Article 14
       of Constitution; Article 21 of Constitution; Statutory rights under
       disability law; Reasonable opportunity for reassignment.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                             325

                            Ch. Joseph v.
       The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

                             Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9986 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.08.2017 of the High Court
     Of Judicature at Hyderabad for The State of Telangana and The
     State of Andhra Pradesh in WA No. 1343 of 2017

                          Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     C. Mohan Rao, Sr. Adv., R. Santhana Krishnan, Lokesh Kumar
     Sharma, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Satyam Reddy Sarasani, Sr. Adv. Ms. Sri Ruma Sarasani, Shishir
     Pinaki.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

     Aravind Kumar, J.

1.   Leave granted.
2.   Appellant herein is aggrieved by the judgment passed by the High
     Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and
     the State of Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as High Court)
     in Writ Appeal No. 1343 of 2017 dated 21.08.2017, whereunder the
     writ appeal filed by Telangana State Road Transport Corporation
     [hereinafter referred to as “TSRTC”] i.e., Respondent No. 1, came to
     be allowed and the judgment of the single Judge dated 10.03.2016
     passed in Writ Petition No. 5164 of 2016 directing the Respondent
     No.1 to provide the appellant an alternate employment came to be set-
     aside and permitted the appellant to make a detailed representation
     to the respondent-corporation to seek alternate employment.

     FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
3.   Appellant herein was selected and appointed as a ‘driver’ in the
     Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (“APSRTC” –i.e.,
     the predecessor-in-title of the respondent-corporation) on 01.05.2014,
     after fulfilling the eligibility criteria fixed for the post. On a periodical
326                                                            [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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       medical examination conducted by the medical officer of the
       dispensary belonging to the respondent-corporation, it was found
       that the appellant was ‘colour blind’ and was declared unfit to hold
       the post of ‘driver’. The appellant preferred an appeal challenging the
       observation regarding his fitness for the post of ‘driver’, alternatively,
       the appellant also sought for alternate employment in the event, he
       was declared ‘medically unfit’. The appellate authority dismissed
       the appeal filed by the appellant, upon which appellant made a
       representation to the Medical Board, to consider his case by the
       hospital belonging to the corporation. The Medical Board after
       considering the case of the appellant, reiterated the findings of the
       medical officer and the Appellate Authority.
4.     The appellant’s representation seeking alternate employment came
       to be rejected by the corporation on the ground that extant rules
       do not provide for granting alternate employment to colour blind
       drivers. The corporation, vide order dated 27.01.2016, passed an
       order retiring the appellant w.e.f. 06.01.2016 and directed him to
       avail the additional monetary benefits provided under the policy
       governing the same.
5.     The appellant approached the High Court by filing a Writ Petition
       No. 5164/2016, impugning the order dated 27.01.2016 and
       sought for a direction to the corporation to provide him alternate
       employment contending his disability falls under the category of
       disablement under the provisions of the Persons with Disabilities
       (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act,
       1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and therefore he cannot
       be discriminated; it was also contended that such discrimination
       would be in violation of Section 47 of the Act and Article 14 and
       Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The appellant also relied on
       a Memorandum of Settlement (hereinafter referred to as “MOS”)
       dated 17.12.1979 entered between the respondent-corporation and
       the recognized union, which had a provision, namely, Clause 14 of
       the MOS, which stated that the ‘drivers’ would be provided with an
       alternate employment.
6.     The Single Judge vide order dated 10.03.2016, allowed the Writ
       Petition. No. 25577/2014 wherein it was held that the category
       of ‘colour also falls within the category of disablement within the
       provisions of the Act. Aggrieved by the direction of the Single Judge,
       the corporation filed an appeal and the Division Bench relying on the
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                         327

                              Ch. Joseph v.
         The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

      judgment of this Court in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport
      Corporation Represented by its Managing Director and Others v.
      B.S. Reddy1 and connected matters set-aside the order of the Single
      Judge and directed the appellant to make a representation to the
      corporation seeking the benefit as prescribed under the regulations
      and the scheme governing the corporation.

      SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:
7.    Mr. C. Mohan Rao, learned Senior Advocate representing the
      Appellant contends as follows:
      7.1. The Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) entered between
           the APSRTC and the recognized unions u/s 12(3) of the
           Industrial Disputes Act,1947 dated 17.12.1979 is binding on
           the respondent-corporation and according to the same, the
           appellant herein being the ‘driver’ of the corporation is entitled
           for an alternate employment and therefore, the appellant has
           the right to seek alternate employment.
      7.2. The High Court ought to have considered the case of the
           appellant positively and has failed to appreciate that the case
           of the Appellant falls within the category of people who have
           acquired the disability during service and thus appellant would
           be entitled for alternate employment.
      7.3. The High Court failed to appreciate the principles enunciated
           in the case of Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Another2
           by this Court wherein this Court differentiated between the
           disability of a person and acquired disability while in service
           and contended that appellant having acquired disability while
           in service is entitled to alternate employment.
      7.4. The High Court ought to have considered that the Appellant
           herein is entitled to the benefit of Section 47 of the Act and
           therefore has the right to alternate employment.
      7.5. The appellant also relied on the judgment of this Court in
           Mohamed Ibrahim v. The Chairman and Managing Director
           and Others in Civil Appeal No. 6785 of 2023, wherein this court


1    (2018) 12 SCC 704
2    (2003) 4 SCC 524
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            directed Respondent-Corporation therein to give the appellant,
            who was colour blind, an alternate employment.
8.     Mr. Satyam Reddy Sarasani, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
       of the respondent-corporation, supporting the impugned order, has
       contended:
       8.1. That MOS dated 17.12.1979 was replaced by the Memorandum
            of Settlement dated 22.12.1986, and the previous clause relating
            to alternate employment to the drivers came to be replaced by
            Clause 5(d) under the MOS dated 22.12.1986, which state as
            follows:
                  “5(d) Medically unfit driver- it is agreed that to
                  the extent possible suitable alternative job will
                  be identified. In case it is not possible to identify
                  suitable jobs, additional monetary benefit as per the
                  proposals sent to the Government will be given after
                  Government’s approval”
       8.2. As the appellant being an illiterate person and being a person
            without qualification, does not fall in the category of persons
            who can be given alternate employment as per clause 5(d)
            of the MOS dated 22.12.1986 and therefore, as there is no
            suitable post available in the corporation to accommodate
            the appellant, the decision of the corporation to terminate the
            services of the appellant is correct. The corporation also relied
            on the regulations governing the workmen of the corporation
            to demonstrate that, no provision is available in the regulation
            which imposes an obligation on the corporation to appoint the
            appellant by providing an alternate employment.
       8.3. The term ‘colour blindness’ does not fall under the category of
            ‘disability’ as defined under Section 2(i) of the Act and therefore
            Section 47 of the Act does not apply. It is further contended
            that, the judgment passed in Civil Appeal No. 3529 of 2017,
            relied on by the High Court is correct and therefore supported
            the impugned order passed by the High Court.
       8.4. On the bare reading of the definition given in Section 2(i) it can be
            seen that, persons who have more than 40% of disability will fall
            into the category of ‘persons with disability’, and appellant’s case
            therefore does not fall in the category of ‘persons with disability’.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                            329

                                Ch. Joseph v.
           The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

     8.5. That the corporation has also introduced a scheme for providing
          employment to one of the family members of the medically
          invalidated workers of the Corporation, therefore appellant
          should opt for the same.
9.   Upon hearing the learned counsels appearing for the parties and
     perusing the material available on record the following questions
     arise for our consideration.
     I.      Whether the retirement of the Appellant on medical grounds due
             to colour blindness, without offering alternative employment, is
             legally sustainable in light of applicable service regulations and
             binding settlements?
     II.     Whether Clause 14 of the Memorandum of Settlement
             dated 17.12.1979, executed under Section 12(3) of the
             Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, remains valid, binding, and
             enforceable despite the subsequent 1986 settlement and internal
             administrative circulars?
     III.    Whether the Respondents complied with their duty to make a
             bona fide assessment of alternative employment options for
             the Appellant , as required by law, policy, and principles of
             natural justice?
     IV.     Whether the reliance placed by the High Court on B.S.
             Reddy (supra) was legally tenable in the context of the Appellant’s
             independent rights under a binding industrial settlement?

     FINDINGS:
10. Before we proceed to elaborate on the detailed analysis of the issues
    arising in the present case, we deem it appropriate to set out in brief
    the principal grounds which compel us to set aside the impugned
    order passed by the High Court and to allow the present petition.
    We do so for the following reasons:
     10.1. Firstly, the Appellant’s retirement from service on the ground
           of colour blindness was effected without any demonstrable
           effort by the Respondent–Corporation to identify or assess
           the feasibility of alternative employment, despite the Appellant
           having expressed willingness to be reassigned to a non-
           driving post. Such inaction violates both statutory obligation
           and administrative fairness.
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       10.2. Secondly, the Appellant’s entitlement to redeployment arises
             from Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement
             dated 17.12.1979, executed under Section 12(3) of the
             Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which specifically provides for
             alternate employment to drivers declared colour blind, with
             pay protection and continuity of service. This clause remains
             valid and enforceable.
       10.3. Thirdly, the subsequent settlement dated 22.12.1986 neither
             expressly overrides nor impliedly nullifies the 1979 settlement.
             Both settlements operate harmoniously, with the latter being
             general in scope and the former addressing a specific category
             of disability. Hence, the Respondents’ reliance on the 1986
             settlement to deny relief is misplaced.
       10.4. Fourthly, internal circulars issued by the Corporation in 2014
             and 2015, which purport to deny alternate employment to
             colour-blind drivers, are administrative instructions that cannot
             override binding service conditions created by a statutory
             settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act.
       10.5. Fifthly, the Division Bench of the High Court erred in applying
             the judgment in B.S. Reddy (supra), which dealt with the
             limited scope of Section 47 of the Act, and did not consider
             claims arising independently under industrial settlements.
             The present case stands on an entirely different legal footing.
11. We now proceed to examine each of these issues in detail.

       RE: ISSUE – I
12. The undisputed factual position is that the Appellant was appointed
    as a driver with the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation
    (TSRTC), was medically examined and declared fit at the time of entry
    and discharged his duties until he was found colour blind during a
    routine medical check-up. Pursuant to the medical report declaring him
    unfit for driving duties, he was retired from service under Regulation
    6A(5)(b) of the APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964.
    The Respondents have sought to justify this action by referring to
    internal circulars dated 10.11.2014 and 14.05.2015, which stipulate
    that employees found medically unfit due to colour blindness shall
    not be offered alternate employment, and shall be retired with the
    grant of “Additional Monetary Benefit” (AMB).
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                           331

                            Ch. Joseph v.
       The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

13. The primary legal flaw in this approach lies in the assumption
    that medical unfitness for a particular post automatically entails
    incapacity for public service altogether. Colour blindness, though
    a disqualification for driving, does not render the Appellant unfit
    to serve in any other non-driving role. There is no evidence that
    he was declared wholly incapacitated or incapable of performing
    other duties. This Court in Kunal Singh (supra), held that when
    an employee acquires a disability in the course of service, the
    employer must retain the employee by providing suitable alternate
    employment, unless no such post exists. In the present case, the
    Appellant had requested reassignment to the post of Shramik, which,
    by its nature, does not demand normal colour vision. No effort was
    made by the Corporation to assess his suitability or to examine the
    availability of such posts.
14. Further, it can be seen that, Rule 6A (5) (b) only provides for the
    extent of terminal benefits which an employee may be entitled to,
    in the case of retirement of a driver on medical grounds. The MOS
    dated 17.12.1979 entered into under Section 12 (3) of Industrial
    Disputes Act, 1947 between the employer and the union representing
    the workmen under Clause 14 would indicate that the drivers found
    with “colour blindness” would be provided an alternate job and all
    service benefits would stand protected.
15. For immediate reference Clause 14 of the said MOS dated 17.12.1979
    is extracted below:
           “14. Colour Blind Drivers
           a) The long pending issue has been decided and it was
           agreed to give alternate job to the Drivers found colour
           blind during the periodical examination. While giving the
           alternate job, the time scale and pay drawn by the Driver
           at the time of disqualification would be protected. Circular
           instructions would be issued in this regard incorporating the
           cases arising after the issue of circular No. P1/210(1)/76-
           PD, dt. 16-8-1976.
           b) Having given the alternative job, the seniority of Drivers
           will, however, be continued in the Drivers cadre, and they
           shall take their further promotions at appropriate time as
           per Cadre & Recruitment Regulations.
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            c) Drivers who are found Colour Blind during periodical
            Medical Examination would be given day duties subject
            to availability of such duties in the Depots.
            d) Regarding the suggestion of the Union for finding out
            an alternate test for Ishara test, the VC & GM agreed to
            request the Eye Specialist of RTC Hospital Dr. E. Babu Rao
            and after hearing the views of few other eye Specialists, the
            decision would be taken whether to continue the Ishara Test
            or a suitable alternate test is available for determination of
            colour blindness keeping in view the safety of passengers
            and the vehicle.”
16. However as can be seen from the Counter affidavit, the Corporation
    has relied upon the subsequent agreement, namely Memorandum
    of Settlement (MOS) dated 22.12.1986 to stave off the claim for
    alternate employment raised by the Appellant in the instant case.
    A perusal of the said MOS dated 22.12.1986 would indicate that
    it was referrable to two earlier agreements dated 9.10.1985 and
    10.03.1986. Though a plea has been raised in the Counter affidavit
    filed by the Corporation that the MOS dated 17.12.1979 has been
    superseded by the agreement of 1986, we are loath in accepting
    the said contention for reasons more than one which are as under:
       16.1. Firstly, the agreement dated 22.12.1986 does not refer to
             the agreement dated 17.12.1979
       16.2. Secondly, 17.12.1979 agreement, there is a specific reference
             to ‘Colour Blind Drivers’ (Clause 14) which refers to the same,
             has been extracted supra. In fact, Clause 5 (d) of the settlement
             agreement 22.12.1986 which has been heavily relied upon by
             the Corporation to reject the claim of the Appellant requires
             to be noticed to the benefit of the Appellant. It reads thus:
                 “5.⁠ ⁠Problems of Drivers:
                 “….. d) MEDICALLY UNFIT DRIVERS : It is agreed
                 that to the extent possible suitable alternate jobs
                 will be identified. In case it is not possible to identify
                 suitable jobs, additional monetary benefit· as per the
                 proposals sent to the Government will be given after
                 Govt’s approval.”
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                             Ch. Joseph v.
        The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

              A perusal of the above clause would indicate, suitable alternate
              jobs would have to be identified and only in the event of not
              being possible to identify such job, recourse to payment of
              additional monetary benefit as per the proposal sent to the
              government will be given after government’s approval.
     16.3. Thirdly, the Settlement dated 22.12.1986 does not specifically
           supersede the settlement agreement of 17.12.1979. It is only
           by way of a communication dated 10.11.2014, the benefit of
           alternate employment given to the drivers declared unfit due
           to “colour blindness” has been sought to be taken away which
           benefit was extended till that date. The only ground on which
           the aforesaid communication 10.11.2014 came to be issued is
           on account of the reliance on the dicta laid down by this Court
           in Union of India v. Devendra Kumar Pant and Others3.
17. The Respondents’ defence based solely on internal circulars and
    a mechanical reading of Regulation 6A(5)(b) cannot override this
    obligation. Retirement on medical grounds must be a measure of last
    resort, only after the employer exhausts all reasonable avenues for
    redeployment. This principle is inherent in the concept of “reasonable
    accommodation”, which is now recognised as an aspect of substantive
    equality under Articles 14 and 21. The failure to explore alternate
    employment before resorting to medical retirement is not merely
    a procedural lapse—it is a substantive illegality that violates the
    Appellant’s right to livelihood and equal treatment.

     RE: ISSUE – II
18. The Appellant relies upon the Memorandum of Settlement dated
    17.12.1979, executed between the Corporation and its recognised
    union under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The
    Memorandum of Settlement is not a mere administrative circular—it is
    a binding statutory contract forged between labour and management.
19. Clause 14 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979
    provides as follows:
            “(a)…It was agreed to give alternate job to the Drivers found
            colour blind during the periodical examination. While giving


3   (2009) 14 SCC 546
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          the alternate job, the time scale and pay drawn by the
          Driver at the time of disqualification would be protected…”
20. This provision was incorporated into a settlement concluded under
    Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, during conciliation
    proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour. By virtue
    of Section 18(3) of the Act, such a settlement binds not only the
    parties to the dispute but also all workmen of the establishment and
    their successors.
21. The enforceability of this settlement is not diminished by the
    subsequent settlement dated 22.12.1986, which the Corporation
    claims to be governing the field. Clause 5(d) of the 1986 settlement
    provides that drivers who are medically unfit may, “to the extent
    possible”, be provided alternative employment, and where not
    feasible, will be granted AMB. Crucially, this clause does not contain
    any express language annulling or modifying Clause 14 of the 1979
    agreement. Clause 14 of the 1979 Settlement specifically provides
    for alternative employment in cases of colour blindness, with pay
    protection and continuity of seniority. It is neither time-barred nor
    ambiguous. The Corporation’s submission that this was superseded
    by the later settlement dated 22.12.1986 is both misplaced and
    misconceived. This industrial settlement, being a bilateral agreement
    between employer and workmen, has statutory force and is binding.
    In industrial law, a beneficial provision in a prior settlement cannot
    be deemed overridden unless there is an express revocation or
    contradiction. No such conflict exists in the present case. Additionally,
    the 1986 clause is general in nature, addressing medically unfit
    drivers as a class. The 1979 clause is specific, dealing solely with
    colour blindness. Applying the principle of generalia specialibus
    non derogant [A general provision does not override a specific
    provision], the 1979 clause continues to govern the case of colour-
    blind drivers. The absence of a termination clause in the 1986
    settlement, coupled with the Corporation’s continued adherence to
    Clause 14 in other cases even after 1986, confirms that the earlier
    agreement remained operational. Accordingly, we find that 1986
    settlement does not explicitly abrogate or nullify Clause 14 of the
    1979 settlement.
22. Settlements entered under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes
    Act are not administrative conveniences. They are quasi-statutory
    instruments reflecting negotiated justice, and they bind both employer
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                           335

                            Ch. Joseph v.
       The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

     and employee with the force of law. Where such settlements create
     specific entitlements, courts must give them purposive effect, unless
     expressly rescinded or demonstrably superseded. Their terms are not
     to be overridden by internal policy or circulars issued in contravention
     thereof.
23. Further, the Corporation’s internal circulars dated 10.11.2014 and
    14.05.2015, which purport to deny alternate employment to colour-
    blind drivers and limit them to AMB, are administrative in nature
    and cannot override the binding effect of a statutory settlement
    under Section 12(3). Therefore, the Respondents’ reliance on
    internal instructions in disregard Clause 14 is both procedurally and
    substantively invalid.

     RE: ISSUE – III
24. From the record, it is evident that the Corporation made no effort
    whatsoever to assess the feasibility of assigning the Appellant to a
    non-driving post. There is no file noting, committee report, vacancy
    statement, or suitability assessment relating to the Appellant. His
    representation requesting the post of Shramik remained unanswered.
    No comparative evaluation was conducted, and no individualized
    inquiry was held. The only justification offered is that the Corporation’s
    circulars bar such alternate employment.
25. Such inaction is wholly unjustified. Even assuming the applicability
    of the 1986 settlement, it expressly mandates that alternate jobs
    be identified “to the extent possible”. The phrase itself presumes
    an active, documented effort to explore available posts. The failure to
    discharge this obligation violates not only the terms of the settlement
    but also the principle of natural justice, which demands that before
    depriving a person of livelihood, relevant material be gathered and
    considered.
26. The burden lies on the Corporation—not the employee—to establish
    that no suitable alternate post was available or could reasonably be
    created. Mere invocation of a medical certificate, or the silence of a
    circular, cannot constitute compliance. Inaction is not neutrality; in
    such cases, it is a form of institutional exclusion.
27. In the present case, there is no evidence that the Respondents
    examined even the most basic parameters—availability of vacancies,
    suitability of tasks, or the Appellant’s qualifications. This total failure
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       undermines the Corporation’s claim of compliance with either the
       1979 or 1986 framework, and renders the retirement order void for
       non-consideration of Appellant’s claim in proper perspective.

       RE: ISSUE – IV
28. The Division Bench of the High Court reversed the relief granted by
    the learned Single Judge by placing reliance on the decision in B.S.
    Reddy (supra), where this Court held that the protection of Section
    47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 is limited to disabilities
    enumerated under Section 2(i) of that Act4. However, the Division
    Bench erred in applying that ruling to the present case, as the
    Appellant’s rights do not solely emanate from Section 475, but rather
    from a contractual settlement which carries independent statutory
    force under Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947.
29. The B.S. Reddy (supra) judgment did not deal with the enforceability
    of a clause in an agreement/settlement entered into under Section
    12(3)6 or the Corporation’s obligations under bilateral agreements with
    its workers. The High Court overlooked the fundamental distinction
    between statutory rights under disability law and contractual service
    conditions enforceable through settlements. The correct line of
    precedent is that found in Kunal Singh (supra) and Vikash Kumar v.
    Union Public Service Commission and Others7, which recognise
    that even beyond codified statutes, constitutional obligations of non-
    discrimination and fairness demand that employers seek to retain
    employees with acquired impairments through accommodation and
    redeployment. In this case, where a specific settlement exists and
    a broad practice of redeployment was followed for similarly placed
    employees, the denial of relief to the Appellant amounts to arbitrary
    discrimination and failure of equal protection.
30. While we have, in the preceding analysis, demonstrated sufficient and
    independent grounds to set aside the impugned action on the basis of
    binding industrial obligations and procedural infirmities, we consider it
    necessary to also reaffirm the broader legal framework that governs


4   Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995
5   Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995
6   Industrial Disputes Act,1947
7   (2021) 5 SCC 370
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                          337

                            Ch. Joseph v.
       The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

     cases involving employees who acquire disability during service. Our
     concern is not confined to the facts of the present case but extends
     to the systemic risk that employers, particularly public sector entities,
     may attempt to bypass their obligation to offer alternate employment
     by drawing rigid distinctions between recognised and unrecognised
     disabilities under statutory frameworks. To safeguard against such
     evasion, and to reinforce the constitutional and statutory principles
     of non-discrimination, reasonable accommodation, and substantive
     equality, we draw guidance from a consistent line of precedent that
     interprets such protections not narrowly, but purposively.
     In Kunal Singh (supra), this Court made a clear distinction between
     “disability” and “person with disability” under the 1995 Act, and
     emphasised the mandatory obligation imposed by Section 47 to
     protect the employment of persons who acquire a disability during
     their tenure. The Court held:
           “9. …It must be remembered that a person does not
           acquire or suffer disability by choice. An employee, who
           acquires disability during his service, is sought to be
           protected under Section 47 of the Act specifically. Such
           employee, acquiring disability, if not protected, would not
           only suffer himself, but possibly all those who depend
           on him would also suffer. The very frame and contents
           of Section 47 clearly indicate its mandatory nature. The
           very opening part of the Section reads “no establishment
           shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who
           acquires a disability during his service”.
           The Section further provides that if an employee after
           acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was
           holding, could be shifted to some other post with the
           same pay scale and service benefits; if it is not possible
           to adjust the employee against any post he will be kept
           on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available
           or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is
           earlier. Added to this no promotion shall be denied to a
           person merely on the ground of his disability as is evident
           from sub-section (2) of Section 47. Section 47 contains a
           clear directive that the employer shall not dispense with or
           reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during
338                                                         [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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          the service. In construing a provision of social beneficial
          enactment that too dealing with disabled persons intended
          to give them equal opportunities, protection of rights and
          full participation, the view that advances the object of the
          Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one
          which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose
          of the Act. Language of Section 47 is plain and certain
          casting statutory obligation on the employer to protect an
          employee acquiring disability during service.”
31. Perusal of the above judgment in Kunal Singh (supra) rendered by
    this court makes it clear that there is a distinction between persons
    suffering from disability and persons who have acquired disability
    during service. It would be apposite to reproduce Section 47 of the
    Act. It reads thus:
          “47. Non-discrimination in Government employment.-
          (1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank,
          an employee who acquires a disability during his service:
          Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is
          not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted
          to some other post with the same pay scale and service
          benefits:
          Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the
          employee against any post, he may be kept on a
          supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he
          attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.’
          (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on
          the ground of his disability:
          Provided that the appropriate Government may, having
          regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment,
          by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may
          be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment
          from the provisions of this section.”
32. Section 47 mandates that such an employee be shifted to another
    post with the same pay and service benefits, and if no such post is
    available, be retained on a supernumerary post until one becomes
    available or until the date of superannuation. The provision further
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                               339

                             Ch. Joseph v.
        The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

     ensures that no promotion is denied merely on the ground of disability,
     recognizing that employment security is central not only to individual
     dignity but also to familial survival.
33. This principle was further extended in Mohamed Ibrahim v. The
    Chairman and Managing Director & Ors.8, wherein one of us
    (Aravind Kumar, J.) was party to the judgment. The Court held
    that even if colour blindness does not fall within the statutory definition
    of “disability” under Section 2(i) or “persons with disability” under
    Section 2(t) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, the
    employer is still bound to provide reasonable accommodation and
    cannot terminate employment without exploring alternate roles. This
    Court observed:
             “19. The Act contains a general non-discriminatory
             provision:
                    “3. Equality and non-discrimination.
                    (1) The appropriate Government shall ensure that the
                    persons with disabilities enjoy the right to equality,
                    life with dignity and respect for his or her integrity
                    equally with others.
                    (2) The appropriate Government shall take steps
                    to utilise the capacity of persons with disabilities by
                    providing appropriate environment.
                    (3) No person with disability shall be discriminated
                    on the ground of disability, unless it is shown that the
                    impugned act or omission is a proportionate means
                    of achieving a legitimate aim.
                    (4) No person shall be deprived of his or her personal
                    liberty only on the ground of disability.
                    (5) The appropriate Government shall take necessary
                    steps to ensure reasonable accommodation for
                    persons with disabilities.”
             20. The twin conditions of falling within defined categories,
             and also a threshold condition of a minimum percentage,


8   Civil Appeal No. 6785 of 2023
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       of such disabilities, in fact are a barrier. The facts of this
       case demonstrate that the appellant is fit, in all senses
       of the term, to discharge the duties attached to the post
       he applied and was selected for. Yet, he is denied the
       position, for being “disabled” as he is colour blind. At the
       same time, he does not fit the category of PWD under the
       lexicon of the universe contained within the Act. These
       challenges traditional understandings of what constitute
       “disabilities”. The court has to, therefore, travel beyond
       the provisions of the Act and discern a principle which
       can be rationally applied.
       21. In Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India, [2016] 4 SCR 638.
       this court observed:
            “40. In international human rights law, equality is
            founded upon two complementary principles: non-
            discrimination and reasonable differentiation. The
            principle of non-discrimination seeks to ensure that all
            persons can equally enjoy and exercise all their rights
            and freedoms. Discrimination occurs due to arbitrary
            denial of opportunities for equal participation. For
            example, when public facilities and services are set on
            standards out of the reach of persons with disabilities,
            it leads to exclusion and denial of rights. Equality
            not only implies preventing discrimination (example,
            the protection of individuals against unfavourable
            treatment by introducing antidiscrimination laws),
            but goes beyond in remedying discrimination against
            groups suffering systematic discrimination in society.
            In concrete terms, it means embracing the notion
            of positive rights, affirmative action and reasonable
            accommodation.”
       22. Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, 2021 (13)
       SCR 823 highlighted on the right to equality and underlined
       the two aspects: formal equality and substantive equality. It
       stated that substantive equality aims at producing equality
       of outcomes, and in the context of the case, observed that
       the “principle of reasonable accommodation is one of the
       means for achieving substantive equality, pursuant to which
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                             341

                            Ch. Joseph v.
       The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

           disabled individuals must be reasonably accommodated
           based on their individual capacities.” The court recollected
           Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission, 2021
           (12) SCR 311, which held as follows:
                “The principle of reasonable accommodation
                acknowledges that if disability” should be remedied
                and opportunities are “to be affirmatively created
                for facilitating the development of the disabled.
                Reasonable accommodation is founded in the norm
                of inclusion. Exclusion results in the negation of
                individual dignity and worth or they can choose the
                route of reasonable accommodation, where each
                individual’s dignity and worth is respected.”
           23. It was also noted that provisions of Chapters VII
           and VIII of the Act are in furtherance of the principle of
           reasonable accommodation which is a component of the
           guarantee of equality. This has been recognised by a line
           of precedent. This court, in multiple cases has held that
           the principle of reasonable differentiation, recognising the
           different needs of persons with disabilities is a facet of the
           principle of equality.
           24. The significant impact of Vikash Kumar (supra) is that
           the case dealt with a person with a chronic neurological
           condition resulting in Writer’s Cramp, experiencing extreme
           difficulty in writing. He was denied a scribe for the civil
           services exam by the UPSC, because he did not come
           within the definition of person with benchmark disability
           (40% or more of a specified disability). This court, rejected
           this stand, and held him to be a person with disability. It
           was also stated that the provision of scribe to him fell within
           the scope of reasonable accommodation. The Court said:
                “… the accommodation which the law mandates
                is ‘reasonable’ because it has to be tailored to the
                requirements of each condition of disability. The
                expectations which every disabled person has are
                unique to the nature of the disability and the character
                of the impediments which are encountered as its
                consequence…”
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            25. The appellant is, for all purposes, treated as a person
            with disability, but does not fall within the categories
            defined in the Act, nor does he possess the requisite
            benchmark eligibility condition. The objective material
            on the record shows that the colour vision impairment is
            mild. Yet, TANGEDCO’s concerns cannot be characterised
            as unreasonable. However, TANGEDCO is under an
            obligation to work under the framework of “reasonable
            accommodation”, which is defined by Section 2 (y) as
            follows:
                   “(y) “reasonable accommodation” means necessary
                   and appropriate modification and adjustments, without
                   imposing a disproportionate or undue burden in a
                   particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities
                   the enjoyment or exercise of rights equally with
                   others;..”
            26. Reasonable accommodation thus, is “appropriate
            modification and adjustments” that should be taken by
            the employer, in the present case, without that duty being
            imposed with “disproportionate or undue burden”.
34. Similarly, in Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal and Another v. Union of India
    and Others9, the Court reaffirmed that reasonable accommodation is
    a means to achieve substantive equality, and obligates the employer
    to assess each case individually, based on the employee’s residual
    functional ability and not just on formal disability classifications.
35. When a disability is acquired in the course of service, the legal
    framework must respond not with exclusion but with adjustment. The
    duty of a public employer is not merely to discharge functionaries,
    but to preserve human potential where it continues to exist. The law
    does not permit the severance of service by the stroke of a medical
    certificate without first exhausting the possibility of meaningful
    redeployment. Such obligation is not rooted in compassion, but in
    constitutional discipline and statutory expectation.
36. In light of this evolving doctrine, the Court in Mohamed Ibrahim clarified
    that employees with conditions like colour blindness, although not


9   [2021] 13 SCR 823
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                         343

                            Ch. Joseph v.
       The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

     falling within the defined categories of the statute, must still be
     accommodated wherever their functional capacity permits. To do
     otherwise would result in a regressive interpretation of the law,
     undermining the very foundation of equal opportunity in public
     employment.
37. Thus, even though in the present case the Appellant had an
    enforceable right under a statutory industrial settlement—placing his
    claim on firmer footing—we find it necessary to reaffirm that even in the
    absence of such contractual rights, employees who acquire disabilities
    during service must not be abandoned or prematurely retired without
    being afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity for reassignment.
    The obligation to reasonably accommodate such employees is not
    just a matter of administrative grace, but a constitutional and statutory
    imperative, rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, dignity, and
    equal treatment.
38. This Court, therefore, affirms that beneficial and remedial legislation
    must not be diluted by narrow interpretation, and the protections
    offered therein must be extended purposively to protect the livelihood,
    dignity and service continuity of employees who acquire disabilities
    during employment. In doing so, we not only vindicate the Appellant’s
    rights but also reaffirm our constitutional commitment to a just and
    humane employer-employee relationship.

     CONCLUSION:
39. To conclude, the record before us makes it clear that the Appellant
    was prematurely retired from service on medical grounds without
    any meaningful effort by the Respondent–Corporation to explore
    his suitability for alternate employment. This action, taken in
    disregard of Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement
    dated 17.12.1979 and without adherence to principles of fairness or
    accommodation, cannot be sustained in law.
40. The Corporation’s omission to consider redeployment violates
    both statutory and constitutional obligations. Settled jurisprudence,
    including Kunal Singh (supra), which mandates that an employee
    who acquires a disability during service must be protected through
    reassignment where possible. The duty to reasonably accommodate
    such employees is now part of our constitutional fabric, rooted in
    Articles 14 and 21.
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41. While judicial restraint guards against overreach, it must not become
    an excuse for disengagement from injustice. When an employee is
    removed from service for a condition he did not choose, and where
    viable alternatives are ignored, the Court is not crossing a line by
    intervening, it is upholding one drawn by the Constitution itself. The
    employer’s discretion ends where the employee’s dignity begins.
42. In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the High Court in W.A. No.
    1343 of 2017 is set aside. The Respondent–Corporation is directed to
    appoint the Appellant to a suitable post, consistent with his condition,
    and on the same pay grade as he held on 06.01.2016, within eight
    weeks from the date of receipt of this order. The Appellant shall be
    entitled to 25% of the arrears of salary, allowances, and benefits
    from the date of his termination to the date of reinstatement. The
    intervening period shall be reckoned as continuous service for all
    purposes.
43. The Appeal stands allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan