Supreme Court of India
CHAIRMAN, D.A., RANI LAKSHMI BAI K.G.BANKversusJAGDISH SHARAN VARSHNEY AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 413
- Decided
- 26 March 2009
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
Holding
An order of affirmation must contain at least brief reasons to demonstrate application of mind; lack of reasons invalidates the appellate order but does not automatically invalidate the disciplinary order.
Summary
Jagdish Sharan Varshney, an employee of Rani Lakshmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank, was charge‑sheeted and disciplined by fixing his pay scale under Regulation 38(1) (Kha‑11) of the Officers and Employees Service Rules, 2000. He appealed to the Board of Directors, which dismissed the appeal on 4 September 2003 without giving any reasons. The employee filed a writ petition; the Allahabad High Court set aside both the appellate order and the disciplinary order on the ground that the appellate order lacked reasons. The Supreme Court held that an order of affirmation by an appellate or revisional authority must contain at least brief reasons to show that the mind of the authority was applied, rejecting the proposition that no reasons are required. However, the Court found that the High Court was not justified in quashing the disciplinary order and therefore set aside that part of the High Court’s judgment. The matter was remitted to the appellate authority to rehear the appeal, afford a hearing, and pass a speaking order. The appeal was partly allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether an order of affirmation by an appellate authority must contain reasons.
- Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the disciplinary authority's order along with the appellate order.
Subjects
order of affirmationreasons in appellate orderdisciplinary proceedingsservice lawquasi‑judicial ordernatural justicespeaking orderremand
Judgment
(2009) 5 S.C.R. 326 .,
A CHAIRMAN, D.A., RANI LAKSHMI BAI K.G.BANK ._
v.
JAGDISH SHARAN VARSHNEY AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1921 of 2009)
8
MARCH 26, 2009 (. -
[MARKANDEY KATJU AND B.SUDERSHAN
REDDY, JJ.]
SERVICE LAW:
c
Order of affirmation - Appellate authority affirming order
of disciplinary authority - Requirement of reasons to be
recorded - HELD: It cannot be accepted as a proposition that
an order of affirmation need not contain any reasons at all -
D The order must contain some reasons, at least in brief, so that
>
one can know whether the appellate authority has applied its
mind while affirming the order of the disciplinary authority -
In the instant case, since the appellate authority's order does
not contain any reasons, it does not show any application of
mind - High Court rightly set aside the order of appellate
E
authority but it should not have set aside the order of
disciplinary authority- The judgment of the High Court to the
extent it has set aside the order of the disciplinary authority
is set aside - Matter remitted to the appellate authority to
decide the appeal filed by employee afresh in accordance with '# .
F law after affording him an opportunity of hearing and also by
a speaking order.
Divisional Forest Officer vs. Madhusudan Rao, JT 2008
(2) SC 253; Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India
G AIR 1966 SC 671 and Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing
Co. Ltd. vs. Union oflndia, AIR 1976 SC 1785, relied on.
State Bank of Bikaner & Haipur & Others vs. Prabhu
Dayal Grover (1995) 6 SCC 279; S.N.Mukherjee vs. Union
H 326
CHAIRMAN, D.A., RANI LAKSHMI BAI K.G.BANK v. 327
JAGDISH SHARAN VARSHNEY AND ORS.
of India (1990) 4 SCC 594 and State of Madras vs. A
Srinivasan, AIR 1966 SC 1827, referred to.
Case Law Reference:
--... 1995) s sec 219
(1990) 4 sec 594
referred to
referred to
para 7
para 10
B
1966 SC 1827 referred to para 13
JT 2008 (2) SC 253 relied on para 8
AIR 1966 SC 671 relied on para 8 c
AIR 1976 SC 1785 relied on para 8
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1921 of 2009.
D
From the Judgment & Order dated 13.03.07 of the High
- .. Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition
No.2868/2004.
Dhruv Mehta, T.S. Sabasish for (K.L. Mehta) for the E
Appellant.
Ajay Veer Singh (for Dr. Vipin Gupta) for the Respondent.
The Order of the Court was delivered:
ORDER F
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This Appeal has been filed against the judgment and
order dated 13.3.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature G
at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.2868 of 2004,
whereby and whereunder the High Court has allowed the writ
petition and quashed the order dated 23.4.2003 passed by the
Disciplinary Authority and the resolution of the Board of
Directors dated 4.9.2003 as communicated by Board's letter H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.
A dated 3.10.2003.
3. It appears that there was some allegation against
respondent No.1 on the basis of which he was charge-sheeted;
an enquiry was held and he was found guilty and he was given
B the punishment of fixing his pay scale at Rs. 7780/- by reducing
the increment of time scale by 15 under regulation 38(1) (Kha-
11) of Chapter IV of the Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank
-
4 .
Officers and Employees Service Rules, 2000 (for short 'the .
Rules').
C 4. Aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order of the
Disciplinary Authority dated 23.4.2003, respondent No.1 filed
an appeal before the appellate authority (Board of Directors)
on 13.6.2003 which was dismissed by the appellate authority
on 4.9.2003 without giving any reasons whatsoever.
D
5. Aggrieved against the order of the appellate authority
dated 4.9.2003, respondent No.1 filed a writ petition in the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
6. The High Court by the impugned order has allowed the
--
E writ petition filed by respondent No.1 and set aside the orders
of the appellate authority and disciplinary authority on the
ground that the order of the appellate authority dated 4.9.2003
did not contain any reasons.
F .7. Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant relied on a decision of this Court in the case of State "# '
Bank of Bikaner & Haipur & Others vs. Prabhu Dayal Grover
reported in (1995) 6 sec 279 and contended that an order of
affirmation does not require any reasons.
G 8. In our opinion, an order of affirmation need not contain
a.; elaborate reasons as an order of reversal, but that does not
mean that the order of affirmation need not contain any reasons
whatsoever. In fact, the said decision in Prabhu Dayal Grover's
case(supra) has itself stated that the appellate order should
H
CHAIRMAN, D.A., RANI LAKSHMI BAI K.G.BANK v. 329
JAGDISH SHARAN VARSHNEY AND ORS.
' disclose application of mind. Whether there was an A
application of mind or not can only be disclosed by some
reasons, at least in brief, mentioned in the order of the appellate
authority. Hence, we cannot accept the proposition that an order
of affirmation need not contain any reasons at all. That order
'
" must contain some reasons, at least in brief, so that one can B
know whether the appellate authority has applied its mind while
affirming the order of the disciplinary authority. The view we are
taking was also taken by this Court in Divisional Forest Officer
vs. Madhusudan Rao, JT 2008 (2) SC 253 (vide para 19), and.
in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR c
1966 SC 671, siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. Ltd~
vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 (vide para 6), etc.
9. In the present case, since the appellate authority's order
.• • does not contain any reaons, it does not show a.oy application
of mind .
10. The purpose of disclosure of reasons, as held by a
D
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of S.N.Mukherjee
vs. Union of India reported in (1990) 4 SCC p94, is that people
must have confidence in the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. E
Unless reasons are disclosed, how can a person know whether
the authority has applied its mind or not? Also, giving of reasons
minimizes chances of arbitrariness. Hence, it is an essential
requirement of the rule of law that some reasons, at least in
/ brief, must be disclosed in a judicial or quasi-judicial order, even F
if it is an order of affirmation.
11. No doubt, in S.N.Mukherjee's cas~(supra), it has been
observed (vide para 36) that:
".. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an G
order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or
revisional authority agrees with..the reasons contained in
the order under challenge."
12. The above observation, in our opinion, really means H
.~
A
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.
that the order of affirmance need not contain an elaborate
.,
reasoning as contained in the order of the original authority, but
it cannot be understood to mean that even brief reasons need
not be given in an order of affirmance. To take a contrary view
would mean that appellate authorities can simply dismiss
B appeals by one line orders stating that they agree with the view
of the lower authority. •
13.For the same reason, the decision of this Court in State
of Madras vs. Srinivasan, AIR 1966 SC 1827 (vide para 15)
has also to be understood as explained by us above.
c
16. Hence, we agree with the High Court that reasons
should have been contained in the appellate authority's order,
but we cannot understand why the High Court has set aside the
order of the disciplinary authority, in addition to setting aside
D the appellate order. ,,,
•
17. Hence, this appeal is partly allowed and the impugned
judgment of the High Court to the extent that it has set aside
the order of the disciplinary authority is set aside, and the
E matter is remanded to the appellate authority to decide the
appeal filed by respondent No.1 afresh in accordance with law
after affording an opportunity of being heard to respondent No.1
and also by passing a speaking order. The said appeal shall
be decided very expeditiously. No order as to costs.
R.P. Appeal partly allowed.
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