CHAIRMAN, GRID CORPORATION OF ORISSA LTD. (GRIDCO) AND ORS.versusSMT. SUKAMANI DAS AND ANR. ETC.

A      CHAIRMAN, GRID CORPORATION OF ORISSA LTD. (GRIDCO)
                           AND ORS.
                                                                                      ...
                                           v.
                    SMT. SUKAMANI DAS AND ANR. ETC.

                               SEPTEMBER 15, 1999
B
                   [G.T. NANAVATI AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.]


         Constitution of India, 1950: Article 226-Death due to electrocution-
  Snapped electric wires of electric transmission owned by Corporation lying
C on the ground-Deceased while walking along the road, coming into contact
  with the snapped wire, causing death-Compensation claim by widow of
  deceased against corporation-Denial of liability by Corporation on the
  ground that death has not occurred due to their negligence but because of
  thunderbolt and lightening-High Court allowed the claim and awarded
  compensation-On appeal, held where disputed question of facts involved,
D writ petition under Article 226 not proper remedy-Mere ownership ofelectric
  transmission line by Corporation not sufficient for awarding compensation-
  Actions in tort and negligence required to be established by claimants jirst-
  Corporation not granted opportunity to prove that proper care and
  precautions were taken by them-High Court erred in entertaining the writ
E petition in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the ConstitUtion.
          On a rainy day P while wal"-ing along the road came in contact with
    an electric wire lying across the road and died due to electrocution. The
    widow of the deceased filed a writ petition against the appellant - Corporation
    claiming compensation on the ground that the electric wire had snapped
p    because of the negligence of the Corporation. However, the appellant -
    Corporation denied their liability on the ground that death has not occurred
    as a result of their negligence but because of the act of God. The wire had
    snapped because of thunderbolt and lightening and immediately on getting
    information the power was disconnected. The High Court while allowing the
    writ petition awarded a compensation of Rs. 1,00,000. Aggrieved the appellant-
G   Corporation has filed the present appeal.
          The contention of the appellant - Corporation was that it was highly
    improper on the part ()f the High Court to have entertained the writ petitions
    in view of the specific defences raised by them and to arrive at the conclusion
    of negligence on the basis of the scanty material placed before the High
H                                        ~8
              CHAIRMAN, GRID CORP. OF ORISSA v. SUKAMANI DAS              459

Court by the respondent-claimants and which was not subjected to cross           A
examination; that apart from establishing that the deaths had occurred because
of electrocution it was also required to be established by the respondent-
claimants under what circumstance electrocution had taken place and that
the deaths had taken place not because of any negligence of the deceased.

      Dismissing the appeals, the Court                                          B
      HELD: 1.1. The High Court committed an error in entertaining the
writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under
Article 226 of the Constitution. It is the settled legal position that where
disputed question of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not a proper remedy. [463-B-E]                                   C
       1.2. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the
deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased
coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission
lines of the appellants that "admittedly primafacie amounted to negligence       D
on the part of the appellants". The High Court failed to appreciate that all
these cases were actions in tort and negligence was required to be established
firstly by the claimants. Mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission
line belonging to appellant No. 1 had snapped and the deceased had come into
contact with it and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding
compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped       E
as a result of any negligence of the appellants and under which circumstances
the deceased had come into contact with the wire. In view of the specific
defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases they deserved an
opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in
maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because
of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorised intervention of third      F
parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the
petitioners. These questions could not have been decided properly on the
basis of affidavits only. The High Court should have directed the writ
petitioners to approach the Civil Court. [463-B-C-D-E-F]
                                                                                 G
      Shankuntala Devi v. Delhi Electric Supply, [1995) 2 SCC 369, held
inapplicable.

     Sanchalakshri & Anr. v. Vijayakumar Raghuvir Prasad Mehta & Anr.,
JT (1998) 8 SC 55, referred to.
                                                                                 H
                                           {
    460                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A        2. However, in view of the fair stand taken by the appellants that these
    appeals have been filed as test cases only and in view of long lapse of time
    they will not recover the amounts already paid to the respondents, the
                                                                                       -
    impugned judgments of High Court are not set aside. [464-B-C]

           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5074of1999
B   Etc.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.97 of the Orissa High Court
    in O.J.C. No. 3351 ofl997.

           G.L. Sanghi and R.K. Mehta for the Appellants.
c
         A.K. Panda, Ms. K. Sarada Devi, Amarendra Bal and V .K. Monga for the
    Respond ens.

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D          G.T. NANAVATI, J. Leave granted. Heard learned counsel forrhe parties.

          In this batch of 10 appeals the question which arises for consideration
    is whether the High Court was justified in exercising its power under Article
    226 of ·the Constitution and awarding compensation to the writ petitioners
    even though the appellants-who were the respondents in the said writ
E   petitions-had denied their liability on the ground that the deaths had not
    occurred as a result of their negligence, but because of an act of God or of
    acts of some other persons.

          In view of the final order that we propose to pass it is not necessary
    to state the facts of all these cases. We shall, therefore, narrate the facts of
F   only one case - the Civil Appeal arising out ofSLP (C) No. 5909of1998. A
    write petition being O.J.C. No. 3351 of 1997 was filed by one Sukamani Das
    claiming to be the widow of Pratap Chandra Das of village Odangi seeking
    compensation for the death of her husband due to electrocution. It was
    averred in the writ petition that on 4.8.1996 Pratap Chandra Das, while he was
G   proceeding from his village to another place for marketing, decided to return
    to his village as dark clouds gathered in the sky and, there were thunderbolts
    also. While he was returning it had started raining and when he was walking
    along the Gosipatna-Amara road he came in contact with an electric wire
    which was lying across the road after getting snapped from the overhead
    electric line. It was further averred that the electric wire had snapped because
H    of the negligence of the GRIDCO and its officers (the appellants) in not
      CHAIRMAN, GRID CORP. OFORISSA v. SUKAMANIDAS [G.T. NANAVATI,J.j         461

 properly maintaining the electricity transmission line and, therefore, they were    A
 liable to pay damages for their negligent act. In support of her claim the
petitioner had produced a copy of the F.l.R., the inquest report and the post-
 mortem notes. It was further stated that even though she had made
 representations to the GRIDCO for payment of compensation it had disputed
 its liability and refused to pay any compensation. She claimed compensation         B
 of Rs. 3,00,000 for the death of her husband, as her husband was 53 years
 old when he died, was running a grocery shop and earning Rs. 3,000 per
month. In their counter-affidavit the appellants stated that because of the
thunder bolt and lightening one of the conductors of the 12W L.T. line had
snapped even though proper guarding was provided. As soon as the
 information regarding the snapping of line was received from the Line-helper        C
residing at village Amara the power was disconnected. The officers of the
appellant had thereafter rushed to that spot and had noticed that one shackle
insulator had broken due to lightening and the conductor had also snapped
from that shackle insulator along with the guarding and the sub-station fuse
had also blown out. It was further stated in their counter-affidavit that on
inquiry the officers had learnt that Pratap Chandra Das had died due to              D
lightening and not because he had come in contact with the snapped live
wire. It was stated by way of defence that the 12W L.T. line had snapped
 because of an act of God and not because of any negligence of the part of
 the appellant and its officers. Thus, the appellants had denied the fact that
Pratap Chandra Das had died as a result of coming into contact with the live         E
electric wire and also raised a defence that even if Pratap Chandra Das had
died as a result of coming into contract with the live electric wire it was a pure
case of accident arising out of an act of God and his death was not because
of any negligence on the part of the appellant and its officers in maintaining
the transmission line. It was also contended before the High court on behalf
of the appellants that the writ petition was not a proper remedy as the facts        F
stated by the writ petitioner were disputed by them and the dispute between
the parties could not be decided without evidence being led by both the
sides. The High Court, however, decided to proceed with the matter on its
merits and awarded compensation of Rs. 1,00,000 for the following reasons:
                                                                                     G
        "Patiently, we have considered the submissions made by the respective
        parties. On perusal of the record, Police report and the postmortem
        report out clear finding is that death of the deceased was due to
        coming in contact with a charged electric wire which was lying-across
        the village path after being snapped off, without being attended and
        thus the Grid Corporation was negligent. The petitioner is legally           H
     462                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A            entitled to the compensation due to death of her husband. From the
             averments in the writ petition, which do not appear to be controverted,
             it transpires that the deceased was the only bread-earner of the family
             aitd he died leaving behind the petitioner. Regard being had to the
             social status including potentiality, dependency of the family and the
             quantum of compensation claimed we are of the view that a consolidated
B            compensation of rupees one lakh will be the appropriate amount."

           In the other writ petitions also compensation was claimed for the deaths
     alleging negligence on the part of the appellants. In those cases also the
    appellants had denied any negligence on their part and had pleaded that the
C   concerned electric lines had snapped in spite of their taking proper care and
    because of circumstances beyond their control. In two cases it was specifically
    pleaded that it was because of the acts of unauthorised persons that the
    deaths had taken place. In one case a person had tried to hook the line for
    committing theft of electricity and in the other some persons had entered the
    sub-station.after breaking open the lock and had switched on the power of
D   that particular line. The High Court mainly relying on the fact that the deaths
    had taken place because of the electrocution· held th_at negligence was thus
    proved and then granted compensation. In the Civil Appeal arising out of
    S.L.P. (C) No. 19651 of 1998, another Division Bench of the High Court (P.C.
    Naik and P.K. Mohanty, JJ), while appreciating that a writ petition is not a
E   proper remedy in such cases and that an opportunity has to be given to the
    appellants to discharge their burden of proving that they had taken all
    precautionary measures in accordance with rules and that the death was not
    due to the sole negligence of the appellants, granted an interim relief of Rs.
    30,000 and directed the writ petitioners to approach the Civil Court for
    establishing their case for compensation.
F
           It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that it was
    highly improper on the part of the High Court to have entertained the writ
    petitions in view of the specific defences raised by the appellants and to
    arrive at the conclusion of negligence on the basis of the scanty material
G   placed before the High Court by the writ petitioners and which was not
    subjected to cross-examination. He submitted that apart from establishing that
    the deaths had occurred because of electrocution it was also required to be
    established by the writ petitioners/claimants under what circumstances
    electrocution had taken place and that the deaths had taken place not because
    of any negligence of the deceased. He further submitted that it could not be
H   said in these cases that the facts stated by the writ petitioners were disputed




                         \
      CHAIRMAN, GRID CORP. OFORISSA v. SUKAMANI DAS [G.T. NANA VATl, J.]     463

. by the appellants just for the sake of disputing them and that there was not       A
  substance in the defence raised on behalf of the appellants. The learned
  counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, tried to support the judgments
  of the High Court for the reasons stated therein.

        In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the
 writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under       B
 Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on
 the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a
 result .of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the
 electric transmission lines of the appellants, that "admittedly prima facie
 amounted to negligence on the part of the appellants". The High Court failed        C
 to appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and negligence was
 required to be established firstly by the claimants. Mere fact that the wire of
 the electric transmission line belonging to the appellant No. l had snapped
 and the deceased had come into contact with it and had died was-not by itself
 sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether
 the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the appellants and            D
 under which circumstances the deceased had come into contact with the wire.
 In view of the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these
 cases they deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions
  were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped
  because of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorised intervention         E
 of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the
 petitioner. These questions could not have been decided properly on .the
 basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that where disputed
  questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
  is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not and could not have held that
 the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that       F
 there was no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ
 petitioners to approach the Civil Court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995.

       Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the
 decision of this Court in Shakuntala Devi v. Delhi Electric Supply                  G
 Undertaking, [1995] 2 SCC 369 is really of no avail to the respondents. Even
 while entertaining a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, in view
 of the peculiar facts of that case, this Court observed in clear terms that "the
 question of negligence of officials of Respondent 1 can be properly examined
 in a suit where correct facts can be established." In that case, respondent No.
 1 was directed to make payment of reasonable amount ex - gratia in exercise         H
    464                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution and that too becasuse
    respondent No. I had agreed to that course being adopted. The power which
    is available to this Court under Article 142 is not available to the High Courts,
    as observed by this Court in Sanchalakshri & Anr. v. Vijayakumar
    Raghuvirprasad Mehta & Anr., JT (1998) 8 SC 55.

B       As the High Court did not exercise its power under Article 226 of the
  Constitution without properly appreciating the nature of its jurisdiction, the
  impugned judgments deserve to be set aside. However, in view of the fair
  stand taken by the appellants that these appeals have been filed as test cases
  only and in view of long lapse of time they will not recover the amounts
C already paid to the respon~ents, we do not think it necessary to set aside the .
  impugned judgments because that may again expose the appellants to actions
  in Civil Courts by the persons claiming to be the heirs and legal representatives
  of the deceased. With the observations made above, we dismiss all these
  appeals.

D   S.VKI.                                                      Appeals dismissed.