Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the convictions and life sentences of Accused Nos.1, 2 and 5, finding that the admissible disclosures and the totality of circumstantial evidence established the conspiracy and murder beyond reasonable doubt.

Summary

The case concerns the murder of Gadadharanandji, the newly elected Chairman of the Vadtal Temple Board of Trustees, who was allegedly kidnapped, strangled and his body burnt and dumped in Rajasthan by a group of temple functionaries. The prosecution proved the accused's motive—fear of losing control over temple finances—and relied on the "last seen" theory, the recovery of the burnt body, and disclosures made by Accused No.3 and No.5 under Section 27 of the Evidence Act to establish a chain of events. The Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence, together with the admissible disclosures, proved the conspiracy and participation of Accused Nos.1, 2 and 5 beyond reasonable doubt. It affirmed the High Court's decision to uphold the convictions and the commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Court also clarified the scope of Section 27, stating that only information directly leading to the discovery of a fact is admissible, and reiterated that conspiracy can be inferred from indirect evidence.

Issues considered

The admissibility of the disclosures made by Accused No.3 and Accused No.5 under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
Whether the circumstantial evidence, including the "last seen" theory, is sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether a criminal conspiracy can be proved without direct evidence of an agreement.
The propriety of upholding the life sentence in place of the death penalty.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 27
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 301, s. 302, s. 364

Subjects

murderconspiracycircumstantial evidenceSection 27 Evidence Actmotivedeath penaltylife imprisonmenttemple trusteeskidnappingbody disposal

Judgment

[2017] 3 S.C.R. 96

A CHARANDAS SWAMI
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1549 of2007)
B APRIL 10, 2017
[KURIAN JOSEPH AND.A.M. KIIANWILKAR, JJ.)
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 r!ir ss. 120-B. 364 and 301 -
Murder - Prosecution case that Chairman of Board of Trustee of
the temple proposed to transfer Kotharis fi'om the temple on account
c of misappropriation of.funds from the temple by them - Kotharis
and their henchmen-uppellanl nos. 1-5. entered into conspiracy,
kidnapped the ,Chairman and killed him - Thereafte1; accused
transferred the body of the deceased lo the neighbouring State where
they burned it to destroy the evidence - Conviction of accused no.
D 1, 2, 3 and 5 u/s. 302 rlw ss. 120-B, 364 and 301 by courts below -
Howeve1; High Court acquilled accused no. 4 and co111111uted the
death sentence awarded by trial court to life i111priso11111ent - On
appeal held: Courts below rightly proved the guilt of the accused
on the basis of motive. 'last-seen' theory. place o] murder and
disposal of the body, panc/111ama at instance of accused no. 5,
E
recove1y of the body of the deceased and the conduct of accused
no. 3 - These circumstances complete the chain of events indicative
of involvement of appellants in the commission of the crime and
excluding any possibility of their innocence - It is not a case of
. finding of guilt recorded in absence of any legal evidence or contrmy
F to the evidence available - Thus, inlelference with the co11clusio11
reached by the courts below not called for - Evidence.
s. 1208 - Conspiracy - Finding of conspiracy - Tenability of
- Held: Compiracy is rarely hatched in the open - There need not
be any direct evidence to establish the same - It can be a mat/er of
G inference drawn by the Court ajier considering whether the basic
facts and circumstances on thi! basis of which il~ference is drawn
have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts and that no other
conclusion except that <if the complicity <if accused to have agreed
to commit an offence is evident.

H
96
CI-IARAND/\S SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 97

Evidence Act. 1872 - s. 27 - How much of ii1for111ation received A
fi·om accused may be proved - Admissibility of the disclosure made
by accused no. 3 to the investigating officer about the location
1vhere the dead body of deceased was dumped by him - When dead
body was already recovered ji·om the same place and noted in the
public records in the State - Held: Disclosure made by accused no.
B
3 about the location where the dead body of the deceased was
du111ped by him, was ad111issible u/s. 27 4 the Act.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
· HELD: 1. On analyzing the evidence and the judgments
including the findings and conclusion recorded by both the Courts, c
there is no hesitation in upholding the order of conviction against
accused Nos. 1, 2 and 5 (appellants), by the High Court. }'or, the
presence of 'G' in 'V' Temple complex on the day of incident, the
evidence that he was last seen together with accused nu. 3 going
from the Temple complex in a car, the recovery of a dead body in
village 'B' in the neighboring State on the next day of D
disappearance of 'G', the disclosure made by accused no. 3 about
the location as to where the dead body of 'G' was dumped by him
in a village at 'B', discovery of the fact after subsequent medical
examination that the dead body so recovered was of none other
than that of 'G', the disclosure made by accused no. 5 of the E
location where 'G' was strangled at 'N' Temple complex, the
conduct of accused no. 3 in misleading the investigating agencies,
the burning of the vehicle used in the commission of the crime
and then filing of a false insurance claim which was rejected by
the insurance company, the strong motive for committing the
murder of 'G' and the criminal conspiracy hatched in that behalf F
and executed, leave no manner of doubt about the involvement
of the appellants in the commission of the crime. The opinion
recorded by the courts below is accepted. It is not a case of finding
of guilt recorded in absence of any legal evidence or contrary to
the evidence available. The finding of guilt against the appellants G
is inescapable. Hence, there is no t:uigiblc reason to interfere
with the final conclusion reached by the courts below. [Para
6511151-1<'-U; 152-A-Cl
2.1 Both the courts have concurrently found that the
prosecution succeeded in establishing the fact that 'G' returned H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A to the Temple at around 12:30 - 12:45 P,.M. :From the evidence
of PW3, PW8, PW33, PW16, the presence of 'G' at 'V' Temple
complex on 03.05.1998 between 12:00 - 1:30 P.M. is indisputable.
[Para 43Jll28-G-ll; 129-DJ
2.2 :For, the prosecution has not produced any direct
B evidence regarding the manner of disappearance of 'G' from 'V'
Temple, as to whether he was forcibly kidnapped from his room
or coaxed to go to 'N' Tcnl(Jle complex by the accused. However,
the prosecution certainly produced evidence to establish the fact
that 'G' was seen along with accused no.3 in a car, leaving 'V'
T1m1ple. The courts below after analyzing the evidence, recorded
c a concurrent finding including by weighing the admissible part of
the evidence of hostile witnesses-PW14 and PW15, and of PW16.
The view so taken cannot be said to be perverse. Both the courts
analysed the evidence and after sifting the irrelevant or
inadmissible part therefrom, found lhat the evidence was sufficient
D to answer the circumstance against the appellants. The two courts
held that 'G' was last seen together with accused no.3 leaving
'V' Temple complex in a blue car· and that he was not seen
thereafter, until his dead body was found on 4th May, 1998 (i.e.
next day of disappearance) at 'B' village in the neighbouring state.
This finding arrived at by the courts below is unassailable. H is
E
neither perverse nor warrants interference by this Court. [Para
4411129-E-G; 130-F-G, II; 131-A-ll]
2.3 The fact that the dead body recovered from B village
on 4th May, 1998 was that of'G' could be known only after accused
no.3, during the course of investigation, made a disclosure about
F the location where he had dis1Josed of the dead body of 'G'. The
fact that the dead body recovered on 4th May 1998 was of 'G'
was unraveled and discovered only after the results of its medical
examination became ava_ilable to the investigating agency. Till
the said disclosure was made, in lhe records of the Ra,jasthan
G police, the dead body was noted as that of an unknown person.
The fact that the dead body was already recovered from the same
place on 4th May, 1998 and so noted ih the public records in the
Stale of Rajasthan docs nul undermine the admissibility of the
disclosure made by accused no. 3 to the investigating officer about
the location where the dead lJOdy of 'G' was dumped by him, which
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 99

information was exclusively within the personal knowledge of A
accused no. 3. The courts below have accepted the case of the
prosecution that the disclosure made by accused no. 3 about the
-location where the dead body of 'G' was dumped by him, was
admissible u/s. 27 of the Evidence Act. [Para 45](131-B-G; 132-
A)
B
2.4 The courts below rightly placed reliance on the fact
discovered by the Investigating Officer (PW64) on the basis of
the disclosure made by the accused no. 3. The panehanama was
proved by pancha witness PW30. The fact that PW30 was not on
good terms with the accused cannot be the basis to discard his
evidence. The High Court rightly considered this aspect. The
c
view taken by the courts below about the admissibility of
disclosure of the spot where the dead body of 'G' was disposed
of by accused no. 3, is affirmed. The same stood corroborated
from the recovery of a dead body of an unknown person from the
same spot by the Police on the information provided by PW50. D
That dead body, on subsequent medical examination was found
to be of none other than that of 'G'. [Para 48][143-D-G]
2.5 As regards the identity of the dead body, the courts
below took note of the evidence of PW57 and PW50. PW50 had
informed the local police of place 'B' on 4th May, 1998 about the E
dead body of an unknown person lying at the same spot, later on
discovered to be that of 'G' due to the disclosure made by accused
no. 3. PW57 conducted the post-mortem of the burnt dead body
found at 'B' village. He deposed that the death was homicide. lie
also deposed about the golden teeth and a key found near the
dead body, which were proved to be of the deceased. Appellants F
contended that the medical records are fabricated because of the -
discrepancies therein. However, the said discrepancies would
--· "
not discredit the other evidence regarding the identity of the
dead body which has been duly corroborated. This view taken by
the High Court, is a JIOSsible view. It is certainly not a perverse G
view. As the identity of the dead body of deceased 'G' is
established, it is a strong circumstance to link it to accused No.3
who had voluntarily disclosed to the investigating agency about
the spot/location where the dead body of the deceased was
dumped by him and that being the same place in 'B' village from
H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.CR.

A where the dead body of an unknown person was recovered earlier
by the local police. [Para 491[143-G-H; 144-A-E)
2.6 The courts below held the disclosure by accused no.5
about the place where 'G' was brought at 'N' Temple complex,
as admissible. The view is affirmed for the reasons noted while
B considering the_ efficacy of disclosure of accused no.3 ..From this
evidence, it is obvious that 'G' was taken away by accused no.3
in a car from VTemple complex and brought to N Temple complex
on 3rd May, 1998 itself. His dead body was dumped in a ditch in
village (another Stale) which was traced on 4th May, 1998 as a
consequence of the information given by PW50. [Para 501[144-
c J<'-ll; 145-A]
2.7 To show the presence of the accused at 'N' Temple
complex on the day of the incident, the courts below took into
account the circumstantial evidence i1s well as the ocular evidence
to the extent it is admissible. The evidence of PW25 and PW49
D at 'N' Temple throws light on the said issue. Acconling to the
prosecution, prior to the incident, accused no. 2 was in touch
with ·PW25 to arrange for a call girl for the pleasure of 'G'. PW 48
has deposed that his company had allocated cell phone number
'9825017197' to accused no.2. It is established that accused no.2
E was using the said number. The evidence on record clearly
establishes that accused no. 2 was in constant contact with PW25.
The courts below rightly held that the subsequent stance taken
by PW25 that he did not. know accused no.2, was patently incorrect
and that there was enough evidence on record to show otherwise.
J<'rom the evidence on hand, it is a11parent that PW25 knew
F accused no. 2 and there is no other evidence on record to
disprove the theory that l'W25 had gone to place 'N' with PW49
on the instructions of accused no.2. [Para 51, 52][145-A-D, G-11;
146-A]
2.8 The finding given by the courts below that the evidence
G given by PW32 and the investigating ofticer-PW64, that PW49,
the call girl was taken to 'N' Te11111le complex by PW25, where
accused no. 2 and 'G' were present and that PW49 identified 'G'
as the man with whom she had physical relations at 'N' Temple
complex cannot be discredited, is accepted. [Para 53)(146-F-G]
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 10 I

2.9 The presence or accused no. 2 at 'N' Temple on 3rd A
May, 1998 can also be deciphered from the evidence of PW42,
though he turned hostile. The reasoning of the courts below that
even if the denial of PW42 on other facts is accepted, his presence
at 'N' Temple on the day of the incident and at the relevant time
is proved, is accepted. His hostility d(1es not destroy the evidence
B
led by the prosecution to show that the accused no. 2 had come
to the Temple complex on 3rd May 1998. The presence of PW42
at 'N' Temple complex has been corroborated by the evidence of
PW43, wherein although PW43 turned hostile. Thus, there is
evidence to show that accused no. 2 was spotted in 'N' Temple
complex. Additionally, no evidence has been led to show the c
whereabouts of both accused nos. 2 and 4 after leaving from N
place until their arrival at 'V' Temple complex. [Para 54, 55)(146-
11; 147-A-B, I<']
2.lO As set out by the prosecution, once the murder was
committed, ace-used no.3 along with accused no. 5 carried his 0
body to' B' village where it was dumped in a ditch and set on fire.
After that, the accused no. 3 set the car on fire and took it to the
garage of PW13. Therearter, insurance claim was filed in the name
of the car owner (PWll) under the signature of accused no. 3 as
an accident case and the same wa.s rejected. PW6, surveyor of
the ins'.irance company who examined the said car, deposed that E
the ca.1· did not get burned due to any accident or internal
malfunction. [Para 56Jll48-B-CJ
2.11 It was only on the basis of the disclosure made by
accused no.5' as to the place where the murder was committed,
that the investigating agency was able to take the investigation F
forward and then interrogate PW25, PW 42, PW 43 and PW49. Only
a person who was present at the time of commission of the offence
could have known about the location or the offence and accused
no. 5 undoubtedly had exclusive knowledge about the place where
the crime was commitlcd, a fact which was affirmed by both the G
courts. The panchnama drawn on the basis of this disclosure has
been corroborated by independent paucha witness PW31. The
courts below, on analyzing the relevant evidence, held that the
inescapable conclusion is that the deceased was taken to place
'N'. This finding is accepte '. as the evidence on record supports
H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A that conclusion. On the basis of the mentioned circumstances,
the courts below ~iave held that the link connecting the chain of
·events and the link between accused nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 was
complete in all respects, pointing to the guilt only of the said
accused. [Para 57, 58]1148-D-l<']
B 2.12 The courts below adverted to the evidence of PW3,
· PW5, PW33, PW37 and PW39 and after analyzing the same, took
the view that there was strong motive fur accused 110.l and 2 to
murder 'G' as they felt threatened about their current position
and of losing control over the affairs of the Temple, owing to the
financial irregularities committed by them. Resultantly, the
c accused nos. 1 and 2 hatched a conspiracy to commit the offence
in question and took the assistance of Accused Nos.3 aud 5 who
were co-conspirators along with them. This finding was assailed
by the appellants mainly on the ground that such a case was a
figment of imagination of the prosecution; and in fact, there were
D other persons who were inimical to 'G' after he was elected as
Chairman of the Tem1>le. The courts below rejected that argument,
holding that the mere unhappiness of those persons could not
have been a gro_und to take such an extreme step. The fact that
the names of other persons were mentioned in the ·F.I.R. but
were dropped in the eventual chargesheet filed by the
E investigating agency does not diminish the credibility and the
q1rnlity of evidence adduced by the prosecution about the
involvement of the appellants in the commission of crime. As far
as accused nos.I and 2 are concerned, the courts below held that
they were in complete control of the affairs of'V' Temr.le complex•.
F It is these accused who were. entertaining apprehension that their
financial irregularities would also be exposed, in. the event of
their transfer. The prosecution case against accused nos. 1 and 2
was not one of having amassed disproportionate assets but was
only of unex1>lained high-value cash amounts and other
investments recovered during the search of their residence. (Para
G 59]1148-H; 149-A-l<'J

2.13 The courts below after due analysis of the legal
evidence and the proved circumstances 11m1111l>iguously found that
the accused no. 1 was the mastermind of the conspiracy to murder
'G'. There is no reason to take a different view. It has been
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 103

concurrently found that accused nos. 3 and 5 arc the henchmen A
of accused nos. 1 and 2, a fact which .bas· not been challenged by
the ap(JCllants. In other words, the future prospect of accused
Nos. 3 to 5 was fully dependent upon the existence and
continuation of the accused Nos. 1 and 2 in the Temple complex.
Both the courts below analysed 'these aspects and came to the
B
conclusion that there were strong circumstances indicating the
involvcrnent of the appellants in the commission of the crime
and excluding any possibility of their innocenc&. [Para 601[149-
ll; 150-A-B)
2.14 It is well settled that such a conspiracy is rarely hatched
in the open. There need not be any direct evidence to establish
c
the same. It can be a matter of inference drawn by the Court
after considering whether the basic facts and circumstances on
the basis of which inference is drawn have been proved beyond
all reasonable doubts and that no ol.her conclusion except that of
the complicity of accused to have agreed to commit an offence is D
evident. That is precisely what has been done by the courts below.
There is no legal evidence to give benefit of any doubt to the
'appellants. There is no hesitation in affirming the view taken by
the courts below in this regard. [Para 62][150-1•'-G)
2.15 The appellants made fervent effort to persuade the E
court about the several other discre11ancies, however, does not
discredit the other clinching circumstances established by the
prosecution, which completes the chain of events indicative of
the involvement of the appellants in commission of the crime.
The circumstances taken into account by both the courts and as
adverted to, leave no manner of doubt about the complicity of F
the appellants in commission of the crime. [Para 63J1150-ll; 151-
A-BJ
2.16 In so far as accused no. 5, there is ample evidence
about his involvement in commission of the crime. The courts
below rightly noticed that he was involved, right from the G
disap11carance of 'G' from 'V' Temple complex till the disposal of
his dead body. The conclusion reached by the courts below that
there is sufficient evidence to indicate the complicity of accused
No. 5 in commission of the crime in question is accepted. The
circumstances established mdicating the complicity of accused H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A no. 5 cannot be compared with the role of accused no. 4, so as to
give the same benefit to him. [Para 64][151-C-E]
Subbaiah Ambalam v State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1977
SC 2046 : (1997] 2 SCR 923; Stale of Karnatuka v
David Rozari (2002) 7 SCC 728: (2002] 2 Suppl. SCR
8 419; Nizam v Slate of Rajas1ha11 (2016) 1 SCC 550 :
(2015] 10 SCR 786; Dau/at Ram v S1a1e of Harya11a
(2015) 11 SCC 378 : [2015] 2 SCR 1001; Dhanraj@
Dhand v State. of Harya11a (2014) 6 SCC 745 : [2014]
7 SCR 476; Kirli Pal v Stale of West Bengal (2015) 11
SCC 178 : [2015] 4 SCR 726; Stale of UP through
c Central Bureau of Investigation v DI'. Sanjay Singh &
Anr. 1994 Supp(2) SCC 707; Slate of Haryana v
Sate11der (2014) 7 SCC 291; PK Naraya11w1 v Sw1e of
Kera/a (1995) 1 SCC 142; Baliyu alias Bal Kishan v
Slate of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 9 SCC 696 : [2012] 8
D SCR 1154; Pulukuri Ko/faya and a/hers v. Emperor AlR
(1934) 1947 Privy Council 67; Mohmed /11ayalu!lah v.
The State of Maharashlra 1976 (1) SCC 828 : [1976] 1
SCR 715; Stale of Himachal Pradesh v. Jee/ Si11gh 1999
(4) sec 370 : (1999] 1 SCR 1033; H.D. Sika11d {DJ
Through L.R.S. v. Ce11/rul Bureau of /11vestigatio11 and
E Anr. 2016 (12) Scale 892; Pmran Kumar v. State of
Haryana (2003) 11 SCC 241 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR
710; Pa11dura11g Kah1 Patil and Another v. State of
Maharashtra 2002 (2) SCC 490 : (2002] 1 SCR 338;
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsm; 'Juru
F 2005 (11) SCC 600 : (2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79; Udai
Bhan v. State of U.P. [1962] Supp 2 SCR 830; Stale of
Maharashtra v. Da11iu 2000 (6) SCC 269 : (2000] 3
SCR 880; H.P. Adm11. v. Om Prakash 1972 (1) SCC
249 : (1972] 2 SCR 765; Vasanta Sampat Dupare v.
Slate of Maharashtra (2015) 1 SCC 253; Sharad
G Birdhichand Sarda v. Slate of Maharashtra (1984) 4
SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88 - referred to.
Hodge~· Case English Reports 168 Crown Cases,
Liverpool Summer Assizes, 1838 - referred to.

H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 105

Case Law Reference A
[1997) 2 SCR 923 referred to Para 18
[2002] 2 Su1>pl. SCR 419 , referred to Para 21
(2015) 10 SCR 786 ... referred to Para 22
(2015] 2 SCR 1001 referred to Para 22
B
(2014) 1 SCR 476. referred to Para 22
(2015) 4 SCR 726 referred to Para 22
1994 Supp. (2) sec 707 referred to Para 22
(2014) 1 sec 291 referred to Para 22
(1995) 1 sec 142 referred to Para 22 c
(2012] 8 SCR 1154 referred to Para 22
AIR (1934) 1947 PC 67 referred to Para 28
[1976] 1 SCR 715 referred to Para 28
119991 1 SCR 1033 referred to Para28
D
2016 (12) Scale 892 referred to Para 32
12003] 1 Suppl. SCR 710 referred to . Para 32
120021 1 SCR 338 referred to Pai-a 39
[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79 rCferred to Para 39
[1962] Supp 2 SCR 830 referred to Para 39 E
12000] 3 SCR 880 referred to Para 39
11972) 2 SCR 765 referred to Para39
(2015) 1 sec 253 referred to Para 39
(1985] 1 SCR 88 referred to Para 42
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. F
1549 of2007.
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2006 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No. I 005 of2004
WITH
G
Criminal Appeal No. 1550 of2007 and
Criminal Appeal No. 1586 of2008.
Huzefa Ahmadi, K. T. S. Tulsi, Sr. Advs., Pradhuman Gohil,
Ms. Taruna Singh Gohil, Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, Rohan Sharma, Raj Kamal,
Ms. Pallavi Malhotra, Ms. Suchi Sharma, D. N. Ray, Vikas Singh,
H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A Himanshu Chau bey, Ad vs., for the Appellant.
Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr. Adv., P. K. Dey, Raj iv Nanda, T. A. Khan,
Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Krishna
Kumar, Ms. Puja Singh, Ms. Mamta Singh, P. Parmeswaran, Advs., for
the Resp911dent.
B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. M. KIIANWJLKAR, J. l. These appeals have been filed
by the Accused No. l (Criininal Appeal No.1586 of2008), Accused No.
2 (Criminal Appeal No.1549 of2007) and Accused No. 5 (Criminal Appeal
No. I 550 of2007) against the judgme11t and final order of the High Court
of Gujarat dated l" September, 2006. The High Court has upheld the
c
decision of the Sessions Court, convicting Accused Nos. l, 2, 3 and 5 for
offences under Sections 302 r/v./ 120-B, 364 and 20 l of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 ('IPC') and for the murder of one Gadadharanandj i. The
High Court, however, has acquitted Accused No.4 of the said offences.
The High Court commuted the death sentence awarded by the Sessions·
D Court to a sentence of life imprisonment for the aforementio11ed four
accused. Accused No.3 has not filed any appeal before this Court against
'the impugned judgment.
2. The factual matrix of the case in hand, as gleaned from the
pleadings and submissions of the parties as also the record, is as under:
E. (a) The Board of Trustees of the Swami Narayan sect ofVadtal
Gadi Temple comprises of8 members, including the Chairman
and Chief Kothari, who handle the administration and financial
management of the temples run by the sect.
(b) One Gadadharanandji was elected as the Chairman of the
F Board of Trustees on 11 '"April 1998. At that point in time, one
Bhakti Dasji was the Chief Kothari and Narayan Shastri
(Accused No. I) was the Assistant Kothari. Charandas Swami
(Accused No.2) was informally working as an assistant to
Accused No. l, while Madhav Prasad (Accused No.3),
Ghanshyam (Accused No.4, now acq4itted) and Yijay Bhagat
G (Accused No.5) were henchmen of Accused Nos. I and 2.
(c) On 16'" April, 1998,an agenda was circulated for a meeting of
the Board of Trustees to be held on 22"a April, 1998, wherein
the Chairman, Gadadharanandj i, proposed to transfer the
Kotharis away from the Vadtal Temple. That move was not
H approved by the rival camp. They also feared of being exposed
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 107
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

of their misdeeds and maladministration. A
(d) On Jrd May, I998, uadadharanandji went missing from the
tempi~ premises. The next day i.e. 4th May, I 998, a burnt body
was found in a ditch at Barothi Village, in the neighbouring
State of Rajasthan which was subsequently identified as that
ofGadadharanandji. A post mortem of the body revealed that B
the cause of death was asphyxia.by strangulation.
(e) Meanwhile, one of the deceased's disciples, Jatin Bhagat(PW3)
filed a missing person complaint about the sudden disappearance
ofGadadharanandji with the local police on 5'11 May, 1998. This
complaint was transferred to the local crime branch and then c
the state crime branch. PW3 subsequently filed a petition before
the High Court of Gujarat, which transferred the investigation
of the case to tlie CBI on 5t1i October I 998.
(f) The CBI eventually on 29th October, I998 registered a new .
FIR against some persons, including the Appellants, for D
kidnapping Gadadharanandji. During the course ofinvestigation,
all the five accused were arrested in connection with the
disappearance ofGadadhara11a11dji ..
(g) The investigation established the chaii1 of events leading to
the disappearance of Gadadharanandji. According to the
E
prosecution, the accused kidnapped Gadadharanandji from the
Vadtal Temple complex, took him in a blue car/van.to the Navli
Temple complex where they procured a call girl for him, after
which they sedated and then strangled him. However, this chain
of events was at odds with the panchnama drawn at the behest
of Accused No. 3 wherein he is stated to have confessed that F
he himself kidnapped Gadadharanandj i from the temple, drove
him to his (Accused No. 3) house in Vadtal and then strangled
him there using the deceased's 'khcsiya' (cloth usually placed
around the neck). Accused No.3 also claimed that he returned
with the deceased's body in Iris car to Vadtal, informed Accused
G
No. I about the deed and then too~ Accused No:S along witli
him to Rajasthan where they disposed of the dead body of
deceased by throwing it in a ditch and lighting it on tire.
(h) Post-investigation, the Chief Judicial Magistrate vide his order
dated I Ot" August, 1999 remitted the case against all the five
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108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A accused. The trial proceeded before the District and Sessions
Court at Kheda at Hadiat, being Sessions Case No. 369 of
1999. Various charges including those under u/S. 120-B, 364,
302 and 201 of the IPC were framed against the Accused.
(i) On l J1h June, 2004, the Sessions Court, Nadiad convicted all
B the five accused for offence under Section 302 r/w 120-B of
the IPC and sentenced them to death. The Accused were also
convicted u/S. 364 r/w 120-B of the !PC and sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for life. Accused Nos. 2 and 5 were
further convicted under S. 20 I r/w S. 120-B and sentenced to
5 years' imprisonment.
c
U) The accused preferred an appeal to the High Court of Gujarat
which was heard alongwith the confirmation reference. The
· High Cou11 confirmed the conviction against Accused Nos. I,
2, 3 and 5, but .acquitted Accused No.4. The High Court,
however, commuted the death sentence to a sentence of life
D imprisonment.
· 3. The case of the prosecution is that the accused were
misappropriating funds from the temple in which they were functionaries.
Gadadharanandji, being the newly elected Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the temple, intended to transfer the accused from the Vadtal
E Temple. This proposal bewildered and irked the accused. They conspired
to and subsequently murdered Gadadharanandj i to put an end to his plan
to transfer them. After the murder, the accused transpo11ed the body of
the deceased to Rajas than where they burned it to destroy the evidence.
4. We shall briefly advert to the approach of the Sessions Court
F and that of the High Court. The trial court proceeded to answer the
charges against the appellants broadly on the following basis. Firstly, it
has dealt with the circumstance of motive to kidnap the deceased with a
common intention to murder. It has noted that in April 1998, the deceased
was elected as the chairman of the Swaminarayan Temple at Vadtal.
·G The Chief Kothari was in charge of administration of the temple and
Accused No. I was the assistant Kothari, helping him in administering
the temple. Accused No.2, while not holding any official post, also worked
in the temple, as did Accused Nos. 3 to 5. The Chief Kothari was the
cashierofthe temple and Accused No. I, by virtut: of his position, assisted
him as a cashier. Accused No.2 was also assisting Accused No. I. Fu11her,
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 109
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the income generated by the temple was substantial and Accused Nos. A
1 and 2 were involved in financial irregularities. Since the Chief Kothari
was very old, Accused No. I was doing all the financial deals on his
behalf. Evidence of PW39, a grocer who supplied goods to the temple,
reveals that he used to supply goods to the temple. These transactions
would obviously have been possible only with the knowledge and approval
B
of Accused No. I, who was in control of the administration and financial
transactions of the temple at the relevant time. Further, PW39 gave
huge amounts of c.ash to Accused Nos. 1 and 2, which was corroborated
in the form of bills, and credit memos recovered from the house of
Accused No. I . There was also a large amount of unaccounted cash
· recovered from the house of Accused No.2. Neither of the accused c
could explain the source of such cash. The evidence brings to light that
Accused Nos. I and 2 used to get kickbacks from purchase of goods
supplied to the temple.
5. The trial court then found that the deceased, by virtue of being
the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, was in a position to influence the D
transler of the Kotharis and had even discussed the same with the Board.
The transferofthe Chief Kothari would obviously have implications for
the assistant Kothari i.e. Accused No. I and by extension, Accused No.2.
Accused Nos. I and 2 were aware of such a proposal to transfer the
Kothari and had interacted with the deceased about the same. Accused
No. I had gone to the extent of telling the deceased that ifhe was E
transferred, he would rebel against that move. While the accused
suggested that there were other persons who bore enmity towards the
deceased and wanted him killed, no evidence was brought on record to
substantiate the same by the defence. The prosecution case about motive
of the accused to commit crime was corroborated by the evidence of F
PW3, PW4, PW5, PW21, PW22, PW33 and PW35. The motive of the
accused to commit the crime has thus been proved.
6. The trial court then dealt with the factum of disappearance of
deceased and last seen theory. The fact that the deceased disappeared
on the afternoon of 3•ct May, 1998, is indisputable. This is corroborated G
by the evidence of PW8 and PW3. The evidence of PWl 6 in fact reveals
that he had seen Accused No.3 sitting in a blue car at the steps of the
Vadtal Temple around the time the deceased went missing. PW15 has
also stated that he saw Accused No.3 driving away from the Vadtal
Temple with the. deceased in a blue coloured car. PWl 4 also turned
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110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 3 S.C.R.

A hostile. The court noted that even if PW 14 and PW 15 had turned hostile,
the totality of the evidence including of PW64 established the fact that
Accused Nos. 3 and 4 were seen lastly with the deceased on the day of
the disappearance. That was found crucial.
7. With regard to the presence of the accused at Navli, the trial
B couit, relying on the evidence of PW! 7, found that Accused No.2 bought
7 cans of cold drinks from a shop outside the Vadtal Temple at around 2-
2:30PM.The evidence of PW25, though he turned hostile, shows that
he brought along a call girl-PW49 to the Navli Temple at around 2:30
PM on 3rd May, 1998; Accused No.2 met him there at around 3 :00 PM.
PW48 has deposed that a call was made by Accused No.2 to PW25 at
c around the same time. As the ciistance between the Vadtal and Navli
Temples could be covered within 30-45 minutes, the presence ofAccused
No.2 atNavli is likely.
8. The trial court noticed that although PW49 has been declared
hostile, she admitted to have given her statement to the irivestigating
D agency. wherein she identified the deceased and of having physical
relations with him on the day of the murder. This has been corroborated
by an independent pancha witness.
9. The trial court has found that PW31 deposed that Accused
No.5 had taken him to Navli and shown him where the alleged murder
E was committed. There, PWJ I found tablets which were used to drug
the deceased. PW28, who took videos of the same also deposed to the
correctness of the video. PW20 deposed that he had supplied the said
tablets to. the accused. This evidence has been accepted as reliable.
I0. The trial court then held thatthe motive behind the murder of
F the deceased was that he was going to transfer Accused No. I away
from the Vadtal Temple and, therefore, Accused No. I feared losing his
control over financial matters of the temple and also of being exposed of
the financial irregularities committed by him in the past in relation to
temple finances. The said accused, therefore, hatched a conspiracy to
G kidnap the deceased with an intention to murder him. The deceased was
last seen in the company of Accused Nos.3 and 4 before he went missing
from Vadtal. Accused No.5 showed the spot where the offence was
committed. The conspiracy to commit the murder, while not proved
through ocular evidence, could be established through circumstantial
evidence. While Accused No. I was not personally in the forefront, he is
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 11 l
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

responsible for criminal conspiracy. A
11. The trial court also dealt with the evidence regarding recove1y
of dead body of the deceased. It has noted that PW50 deposed that he
found a burnt body in a ditch behind his house in Barothi village and
informed the police about the same. A video of the body was also taken
by the police. The body was examined by PW57 who inter alia noted 8
three golden teeth and a key. Blood and skin samples of the body were
taken and subsequently identified as that of the deceased after performing ·
a DNA test with blood samples of his sister. The key found on the body
was similar to the one possessed by PW3. The said key opened the lock
to the room of the deceased. The investigating agency was informed
about the spot of disposal of the dead body by Accused No. 3 and that c
was corroborated by independent witnesses. The trial court rejected the
argument that the investigating agency used witnesses who were already
pre-disposed against the accused.
12. The trial court then found that the evidence of PW57 clearly
showed that the death of the deceased was not accidental but homicidal. D
The deceased had been strangulated. The argument that since the body
had suffered certain bone fractures, therefore strangulation could not
have been the method of murder, was rejected. The Court found that
any fractures on the body would have probably occurred as a result of it
being burned and also because of the advanced age of the deceased.· E
13. The trial court held that the fact that the location of disposal of
the dead body was shown by Accused No.J and that the nature of crime
was such that it involved pre-planning, indicative of conspiracy among
the accus.ed to commit the murder.
14. The trial court then took notice of the evidence regarding F
attempted disappearance of the evidence. In that, after the incident, the
accused tried to destroy the evidence by setting the car on fire in which
they had transported the deceased and then claiming insurance for the
same as an accident case. The insurance company rejected the said
claim. The Court found that the evidence of PW6 clearly showed that G
the car did not get burned due to any accident or internal malfunction.
15. The trial court adve11ed to the evidence of attempt of the
Accused No.5 to dispose of a chain and pendant worn by the deceased
by approaching a goldsmith, one J ignesh Soni (PW! 9). In his evidence,
PW 19 identified the chain and pendant and stated that hi': exchanged the
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112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A same with gold.
16. The trial couit, on the above analysis, recorded finding of guilt
against all the five accused and was of the opinion that the offence
committed by them was not only heinous but also a rarest of rare case
warranting the death penalty. Accordingly, a death reference was
B forwarded by the trial court to the High Court for confirmation.
17. Before the High Couit, besides the confirmation case, appeals
filed by the accused assailing the order of conviction and sentence
proceeded together for hearing. The High Court re-assessed and
appraised the entire evidence afresh and recorded an independent finding
c of guilt against Accused Nos. I, 2, 3, and 5. The High Court at the outset
noted that the prosecution was l}Ot supporting the view taken by the trial
court that the case would fall into the category of rarest of rare cases
warranting death penalty. After taking note of that contention, the High
Couit proceeded to examine as to whether the prosecution had proved
the charges against the Appellants beyond any reasonable doubt.
D
18. The High Cou1t's decision proceeds in the following manner:
a) In light of the judgment in Subbaialr Ambalam v State of Tamil
Nadu 1, the High Comt decided to examine the entire evidence
before it, independent of the findings and conclusions of the
E trial Court. It noted that the jurisdiction of the High Court was
co-extensive with that of the trial court in assessing, appraising
and appreciating evidence.
b) Then, adverting to the evidence of PW57 who conducted the
autopsy' of the burnt body found at Barothi, the High Court
F opined that the burns were post-mortem and not ante-mortem.
The fracture found on the body was probably caused as the
deceased struggled while being strangulated or due to
mishandling of the dead body. The presence ofa fracture does
not indicate that there was any other cause of deatli. Death
was due to asphyxia by strangulation. The burning of the body
G was an attempt to destroy the evidence. The condition of the
heart of the deceased. though disputed by the counsel for the
accused, could not rule out the possibility that death was caused
by strangulation.

1-1 . I AIR 1977 SC 2046
CHARAN DAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 113
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

c) As regards the identity of the dead body, the High Court took A
note of the following: ·
i) PW57, who coi1ducted the autopsy of the dead body found
at Barothi, deposed that a key tied with cotton thread was
recovered from near the dead body. This key opened the
lock to the room of the deceased at the Vadtal Temple. B
ii) Skin samples and teeth extracts of the deceased were
obtained and matched with blood samples of the sister of
the deceased. DNA testing showed a biological relation
between the dead person and his sister.
iii) Three teeth of the dead body had gold caps ..PW I deposed c
that 11e had treated the deceased in 1993 and that he had
put the said gold caps onthe teeth of the deceased during·
treatment. This is corroborated by receipts and diary entries
of PW!. Certain documentary evidence produced by the
· prosecution vis-a-vis photocopies of the case papers seemed D
to be exaggerated with regard to the number of teeth treated
by PWl. Still, the deposition of .PW! was found to be
reliable.
iv) PW20 had taken a video of the post mortem carried out at
.the spot which corroborated the items found on the body/ E
samples taken from the body.
d) While considering the evidence regarding the circumstance of
last seen together, the High Court broadly noted thus:
i) The evidence of PW3 and PW8 corroborates the fact that
the deceased was present in the Vadtal Temple on the day- F
of his disappearance i.e. on )'d May, 1998, at around
12:30PM. The witnesses further stated that they had left
the deceased in his room while they went to get chappals
but by the time they returned at around 2:30PM, he had
gone from the room,. ·
G
ii) PW15 deposed that around the same time, he saw the
deceased sitting with Accused No.3 in a blue car and also
that he saw the deceased leaving with Accused No.3 in the
said blue car between 1:SOPM to 2:05PM. Even though
PW! 5 had turned hostile, his evidence could not be wholly
H
114 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 3 S.C.R .

A disregarded. .
iii) PW16 also deposed that he saw a blue car at the steps of
the Vadtal Temple around the same time. Thus, an inference
could be drawn against the accused in whose company the
deceased was last seen and Accused No.3 failed to rebut
B the same.
e) The High Court then considered the evidence regarding the
disclosure made by Accused No.3 during interrogation. That
revealed to the pol ice that rhe body of the deceased had been
dumped in a spot at Barothi village (Exh.188). This disclosure
c was considered admissible u/S.27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
f) The High Court then considered the criticism of the defence
that some of the panchas chosen by the prosecution were hostile
towards the accused owing to prior disputes between the
parties. It held that the investigating authorities ought to have
D been more careful before calling upon such persons who had
a prior history of dispute with the accused. However, the High
· Court opined that the fact remains that the panchas were called
merely to complete the formalities of preparing the panchnama.
Hence, this lack of due diligence by itself would not render
their evidence inadmissible.
E
g) The High Court also considered the argument of the defence
that the case of the prosecution that they found various items
such as pieces of cotton and tablet wrappers at the place of
the alleged offence, seems highly unlikely given the time lapse
between the time of the offence and the time when the officials
F actually rea'ched that place. The High Court noted that there
was no evidence on record to prove how such lapse of time
and weather conditions would not lead to contamination of such
articles alleged to have been found.
h) The High Court then dealt with the evidence.regarding the blue
G car in which the deceased was allegedly transported to Navli
!!nd then subsequently fo Barothivillage, where his dead body
was found burned. The High Court held that the prosecution
has proved that the car did not catch tire by accident but rather
was intentionally burned by the accused to destroy traces of
evidence. This has been corroborated by the evidence of the
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 115
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

official of the insurance company which insured the said vehicle. · A
i) With reference to the evidence of procuring a cal I girl for the
deceased, the High Court held that the evidence of the cellphone
records clearly shows that Accused No.2 was in contact with
PW25, who allegedly procured the call girl for the deceased.
A telephone call was made around the time of the incident, . B
most presumably summoning PW25 and the call girl to the
Navli Temple. Additionally, the call girl herself PW49, identified
the picture of the deceased as the man she had been with at
the time of the incident. This fact is corroborated by PW32.
Although both PW25 and PW49 have turned hostile, the totality
of prosecution evidence corroborates the fact that PW 49 was c
taken to Navli by PW25.
j) The High Court also considered the argument of the defence
about the possibility of involvement of other persons who were
inimical towards the deceased and were also named as suspects
in the FIR. This argu1nent has been rejected owing to lack of D
any evide1we in support of the same. The High Court held
that mere ill-will of the persons towards the deceased cannot
be~ reason to commit murder.

k) The High Court, however, held that the prosecution failed to
conclusively prove that the accused procured specific kind of E
tablets for drugging the deceased.
I) The High Court also did not accept the prosecution evidence of ·
Accused No.5 having approached PW 19 to exchange the gold
chain and amulet of the deceased, as conclusively proved.
F
m) The High Court held that the documents/receipts found in the
house of Accused No. I proving large aniounts of financial
transactions conducted on behalf of the Vadtal Temple and
purportedly bearing his signature, have been proved. The
handwriting on the documents seemed to tally with the
handwriting of Accused No. I. G
n) The High Cou11 then examined the circumstance of criminal
conspiracy hatched by the accused. It held that Accused No. I
was a managing trustee of the Navli Temple Gurukul, while
Accused No.2 was a trustee. Accused No.5 was a disciple of
H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A Accused No.2, while Accused Nos. I and 3 were related by
virtue of being disciples of one guru. It held that while the level
of intiinacy between the accused by itself cannot prove much,
it must be seen in the context of the fact that the accused have
been charged with conspiracy to commit murder.·
B o) The High Court then found that atter the deceased proposed
the transfer of the Chief Kothari, it is Accused No.2 who
conveyed the message of the head of the temple, one Acharya
Maharaj, to the deceased. Further, on the day of the alleged
incident, Accused No. 2 purµosely took PW3 and PW33 out
from the Vadtal Temple to an event. after the crime had been
c committed, to allay their suspicion as to the whereabouts of
the deceased. Additionally, Accused Nos. 2 and 4 Jett ·after
attending an event at Nadiad in the evening while telling PW3
and PW33 that they would be going to Ahmedabad/Zui1dal.
This was presumably to mislead them. Later, both the accused
D surfaced at the Vadtal Temple.
p) The High Court found that there was clear evidence warranting
inference of conspiracy hatched among the accused to commit
the murder of the dec~ased. Further, considering the
circumstances surrounding the incident, it is clear that more
E than two persons were required to carry out the crime. Th~
fact that the Accused No.3 led the µolice to the place wher~"
the body was disposed of, links him to Accused Nos. I and 2.
PW 15 had also seen the deceased leaving from Vadtal with
Accused No.3.
'
F q) Tb.e High Cou11 then noticed that the prosecution conceded
that the evidence to link Accused No.4 to the incident was
· inadequate, as the material witnesses had turned hostile. At
the most, the court could infer that Accused No.4 may have
been present at Navli when the incident occurred but this would
not be sufficient to convict him. However, while dealing with
G the presence of Accused No.5 at Navli, the High Court noted
that he was present from the very beginning of the incident.
Moreover, Accused No. 5 is the disciple of Accused No.2 and·
was even present with him on the day of the incident. Accused
No.5 even led the investigating officials to the alleged room
H
where the crime was executed in Navli. There is no reason to
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 117
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

disbelieve that evidence. The High Court held that the disclosure A
made by Accused No.5 was crucial in discovering the place of
· murder.
r) The High Cou1t noted that Accused No.5 was not present at
Vadtal on the i1ight of the incident, indicating that he was
involved in disposing of the body of the deceased. His presence B
with Accused No.2, his knowledge of the murder and his
conduct clearly marked him out as a co-conspirator.
s) The High Comt while considering the evidence regarding the
circumstance of motive, noted the following aspects:
O The seizure of large amounts of unaccounted cash as c
well as the presence of large amounts of investments f~om
Accused Nos. I and 2 goes to show the level of financial
dealings of the said accused. No explanation has been
offered by the said accused in that regard. Obviously, the
said cash was illegally obtained. This goes to explain the D
common motive behind the actions of the accused, namely
that they perceived a threat to their finances and control
over the administration ofVadtal Temple.
ii) The evidence adduced by the prosecution with regard to
"last seen" theory, is such that even if there was a failure E
to lead evidence as to· the motive of the accused, the fact
that Accused Nci.3 pointed out the place where the body of
the deceased was dumped goes to show that the crime
was committed by them.
iii) The fact that the deceased was intending to transfer the F
Chief Kothari and that the issue was discussed between
the Board members, is clearly established.
iv) The evidence of PWS shows that the Chief Kothari had no
fixed term and enjoyed the benefit of his office until and
unless the Board decided otherwise. The Board ofTrustees
G
had discussed the proposal of the deceased with regard to
transfer of the Chief Kothari. This was a huge concern to
Accused Nos. I and 2, especially since they were dealing
with the finances of the Va<ltal Temple and their position
was put under threat.
H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A t)After analyzing the relevant circumstances and the evidence on
record, the High Court found that the prosecution had proved
that the accused were amongst the inner group which had a
direct say in the financial and administrative matters of the
Board. Apprehending their transfer, a conspiracy was hatched.
Thus, there w·as· strong motive for the Accused No. I and 2 in
B
particular to commit the crime. Jn furtherance of that criminal
conspiracy, the deceased was taken away by Accused No. 3
in his Maruti van from Vadtal Temple. He was taken to Navli
Complex where he was done to death and his dead body was
then disposed of in Rajasthan. After disposing of the .dead
c body, the car used in the commission of offence by the Accused
No. 3 was set on fire to destroy the evidence. This was
obviously done to mislead the investigating agency. The fact
that large amounts were seized from the house of Accused
Nos. I and 2, was sufficient to draw an inference that they
had abused their position while dealing with financial matters
D
at Vadtal Temple.
u) The High Court accordingly recorded a finding of guilt against
Accused Nos. I, 2, 3 and 5 for having murdered
Gadadharanandji. This conclusion has been recorded even
after noticing ee11ain lacunae in the investigation, but the High
E Court found that the same did not impact the credibility of the
prosecution case about the involvement of the Accused Nos. I
to 3 and 5, who have been found guilty of the murder of
deceased Gadadharanandji.
19. These appeals were heard together. The arguments were
F opened by the counsel for Accused No.2,. followed by Accused No. I
and Accused No.5. Mr KTS Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for
Accused No. I, submitted that there is no evidence to show either meeting
of minds by the accused or intention to commit criminal conspiracy. The
prosecution's case thatthe accused were irked by the deceased's proposal
G to transfer them is imaginary beciwse admittedly, the actual decision for
transfer could be taken only by the entire Board, comprising of7 (seven)
other members. Eliminating a single person i.e. the deceased, would not
have helped the accused in any way. This is further substantiated by the
fact that Accused Nos. 4 and 5 were not even Kotharis and eliminating
the deceased would have served no purpose to them. Further, there is
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 119
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

no evidence to prove that the deceased even proposed the transfer of A
the accused. The prosecution has failed to consider the possible
involvement of one Navatam/Nautam/Nutan Swami and Premswarup
Swami who were inimical towards the deceased. These two persons
were named in the FIR but their names were dropped in the eventual
chargesheet filed by CBI. Their hostile attitude towards the deceased
B
was even recorded in the evidence of PW3 and corroborated by PW33.
The impugned judgment also records that Navatam/Nautam/Nutan
Swami failed a lie detector test. The real perpetrators were removed
from the chargesheet but the innocent accused was charged. The alleged
motive attributed to the accused is unfounded and unsubstantiated. ·
20. Mr. Tulsi further submits that certain witnesses, like PW! 5, c
.who imer a/ia claimed to have last seen the deceased leaving the temple
with some of the accused on the day of the alleged incident, have turned
hostile and their evidence has to be disregarded. Despite PW 15 turning
hostile, part of his evidence was considered while convicting the accused.
Infact, evidence of PWI I reveals that Accused No.3 was at home for D
the entire duration of the day on which the alleged incident took place.
PW! I even stated thatit was not true that Accused No.3 had taken the
car out (in which the body of the deceased was allegedly transported) in
the after math of the alleged incident or that he even returned with the
car. Evidence of PW 14 shows that he was present at the gate of the
Vadtal Temple but did not see any car/van going past of the make and E
model as the one ascribed to the accused. Further, even PWl4 has
deposed that the deceased was in the temple on the day of the incident.
Thus, the "last seen theory" falls flat.
21. Mr. Tulsi then submits that the chain of circumstances in the
present case has been broken at several places, ii1cluding: F

(a) The circumstances surrounding the actual kidnapping of the
deceased and the place of crime being Navli, has not been substantiated
by any evidence. lnfact, PW3 states that on the day of the alleged incident,
he along with Accused Nos.2 and 4 and PW33 had gone to Nadiad by
car and stayed there till 6PM. In the evidence of PW I I and PW35, it is G
stated that all the accused were in Vadtal on the day of the alleged
incident. Thus, the allegation of any of the accused kidnapping the
deceased on the day of the incident has been disproved;
(b) The evidence of PW25 who allegedly brought a call girl for
H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 3 S.C.R.

A the dee.eased at the behest of the accused, sets out that he did not even
know the Accused nor had he been given any message to bring any girl
for the deceased. Further, the evidence of the so called call girl PW49
sets out that she did not even know PW25 and that she had never even
been to the temple where the alleged incident occurred. She also states
that she had not met any sadhu or maharaj at the temple.
B
(c) PW57, the doctor who conducted the autopsy of the burnt
body, failed to establish that the cause of death was by strangulation and
further failed to clarify whether the burns on the body were inflicted
pre-mo11em or post-mortem. lnfact, the finding of the post mo11em report
shows that the burns were pre-mortem, thus completely destroyi11g the
c prosecution's case that the deceased died by strangulation. Further,
evidence of PW 57. reveals that the right chamber of the heai1 was
empty and the left chamber had clotted blood whereas medical
jurisprudence dictates that in cases of asphyxia by strangulation, the
right chamber should be full of clotted blood and the left chamber should
D be empty.
(d) The panchnama at the instance of Accused No.3, wherein he
inter a/ia disclosed the place where the body of the deceased was burnt
and dumped, is inadmissible under S. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The
body had already been discovered at the said place and was a matter of
E public record. Accused No. 3 did not reveal any exclusive information
and thus the information in the panchnama was inconsequential. Further,
the teeth and DNA samples of the body were not proved without
reasonable doubt. Mr. Tulsi relies upon the judgment in State"/
Kar1U1tllkll v Davit/ RowrP to challenge the admissibility of the
evidence on record.
F
22. Mr. Tulsi submits that the courts below ignored the well-
established principle that in a case of circumstantial evidence, each and
every circumstance has to be proved by independent, cogent evidence
and each circumstance must be connected to each other as to complete
the chain of circumstances. According to him, none of the circumstances
G in the present matter have been independently proved and there is a
failure to complete the chain of circumstances. Mr. Tulsi has also relied
on the followingjudgments to bultress his argument: Nizllm v Stute of
Raj11stlu111·1, Da11/11t Ram v State of J/11r}·111111 4 , /)/11111raj@ Dl1111u/ v
2
<2002 l 1 sec ns
'(2016) I SCC550
H ' (2015) 11sec378
CHARANQAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 121
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Slate of llarytuw·', Kirti Pal v Stale o.f Wes/ Be111:al 6, State of UP A
through Central Bureau of Investigation v Dr. Sanjay Singh &
Anr. 7 , State of Haryana v Satender8, PK Narayanan v State of
Kerala 9 and Baliya alias Bal Kishan v/s State of Madhya Pradesh 10•
23. Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned Senior Counsel, appeared for
the Accused No.2. He had opened the arguments for the appellants and· B
raised points some of which have already been noted earlier. He submitted
that the complete chain of events has not been established by the
prosecution. According to him, the deceased's proposal to transfer the
Kotharis was dropped by the deceased himself. Reliance has been placed
in this regard on the application made by PW3 to the High Court of
Gujarat, wherein it is stated that the deceased deferred his decision to c
effectuate the transfers by" 6 (six) months. lnfact, Navatam/Nautam/
Nutan Swami and Premswarup Swami held a grudge against the
deceased owing to the deferment as they wished to become the Kotharis
in place of the incumbents. Their names were removed from the
chargesheet without any explanation offered by the investigating agency. D
Additionally, the Sessions Court in its judgment has held that evidence of
PW3 could not be considered for the purpose of establishing motive as
he did not have any personal knowledge oft11e transfer of the Kotharis.
Thus, no intent or motive of the accused to commit the crime was proved.
24. With regard to the allegation that the accused were E
misappropriating temple funds, Mr. Ahmadi submits that while the
prosecution relied on money seized from the houses of the accused,
however, no documentary evidence has been adduced to show that
Accused No.2 had assets disproportionate to his income. Mr. Ahmadi
submits that the prosecution did not ask any questions with respect to
the alleged disproportionate income of Accused No.2 in his statement F
under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and hence cannot use that fact against
him.Additionally, all the witnesses who testified regarding Accused No.2's
alleged disproportionate income have turned hostile. Thus, the prosecution
has miserably failed to show that Accused No.2 was misappropriating
temple funds. G
' (2014) 6 sec 745
'' (2015) 11sec11s
7
1994 Supp (2) SCC 707 (Paras 15 to 19)
' (2014)7 SCC 291(Paras25. 29)
'(1995) I sec 142 (Paras6, 7, 9)
"' (2012) 9 sec 696 (Paras 15 to 17)
H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A 25. Mr. Ahmadi then submits that as regards the disappearance
of the deceased from the Vadtal Temple premises, the two witnesses
who claimed that they saw the deceased leaving with the accused, i.e.
PW14 and PW! 5 have turned hostile. The evidence ofother witnesses
in connection with the disappearance viz of PW3, PW8 and PW! 6, are
contradictory. The evidence of PWl 7 shows that Accused No.2 was
B.
with him during his absence from the Ashram for one hour. None of
them have implicated Accused No.2 in any way nor was it possible for
.Accused No.2 to be at Navli complex when the alleged murder took
place. Further, the evidence of PW64 investigating officer reveals that
he attempted to falsely implicate two persons at the same time by
c recording statements under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. Mr. Ahmadi also
invited ourattention to the discrepancy about the age of the deceased in
Exhibits 98 and 95 and contended that the record was fabricated.
26. Mr Ahmadi further submits that with reference to the allegation
that the Accused killed the deceased, several factors belie the prosecution
D case. The panchnama drawn at the instance of Accused No.3 clearly
sets out that Accused No.3 himself took the deceased to.his house in
Vadtal and strangled him there. No panchnama of house of Accused
No.3 was recorded. Certain other factors, such as the fact that the
deceased left behind his walking stick at Vadtal Temple which was
regularly used by him and without which he could not walk on his own,
E discrepancies in the witness statements regarding the time of the alleged
kidnapping, that the deceased could not have physically picked up the
call girl in his room owing to his advanced age etc., all go to show that
the prosecution's case is replete with figment of imagination. The Sessions
Cou1t clearly records that Accused No.2 was not present at the time
F when the alleged kidnapping took place. Further, the panchnama does
not even make a mention of the alleged call girl who was present in the
deceased's room. Thus, the allegation that Accused Nos. 2 to 5 took the
deceased to the Navli Temple complex and murdered him there, is
completely false and not borne out by the evidence on record.

G 27. Mr. Ahmadi submits that the prosecution's case about disposal
of the deceased's body is also riddled with inaccuracies and errors. The
panchnama drawn at the instance of Accused No.3, wherein he revealed
about the commission of crime and the disposal oftbe deceased's body,
is inadmissible and in any case cannot be used against other accused.
Further, the panchnama suffers from factual and procedural inaccuracies,
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 123
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

a fact noticed in the impugned judgment by the High Court for A
disregarding part one and part three of the same as inadmissible. As
regards the identification of the deceased's body is concerned, Mr.
Ahmadi submits that the evidence on record and the deposition by the
doctor PWl clearly show that the prosecution has fabricated the dental
records of the deceased in an attempt to establish that the burnt body
B
found in Rajasthan was that of the deceased. The High Court took note
thereof in the impugned Judgment, but disregarded the same as immaterial.
28. Mr. Ahmadi finally submits that Accused No.2 has no links
with the criminal conspiracy to murder the deceased. The panchnama
prepared at the instance of Accused No. 3 does not even mention the
role or involvement of Accused No.2. The panchnama prepar;d at the
c
instance of Accused No.5 deserved to be disregarded owing to
contradictory statements therein. The Sessions Court has recorded that
Accused No.2 did not even hold an oflicial post at the temple. Further,
Accused No.2 was arrested without there being any sufficient proof
against him and the prosecution went to the extent of fabricating D
documents to implicate him, as recorded in the impugned judgment. For
the aforesaid reasons, tlie prosecution's case against Accused No.2 has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He pointed out that material
facts were not put to the accused whilst recording his statement under
Section 313 and, therefore, these facts cannot be made the basis for
recording a finding of guilt against the accused. He has also produced a E
table in his written submissions, pointing out the discrepancies in the
judgment of the trial co mt and the impugned judgment of the High Court.
Mr. Ahmadi has filed elaborate written submissions. We treat the same
as his argument. Mr. Ahmadi has relied upon the decisions in the cases
of Pulukuri Kottaya and others v. Emperor 11 , Mohmed lnayatullab F
v. The State of Maharashtra 12 , and Stale of Himachid Pradesh v.
Jeet Singh 13 •
29. Mr. D.N. Ray, appeared for Accused No.5. He submits that
the impugned Judgment is perverse as some of the primary findings
recorded therein are diametrically opposite to the case set out by the G
prosecution and the findings recorded by the Sessions Court. Mr. Ray
submits that the time of death of the deceased, as set out by the
11
AIR (1934) 1947 Privy Council 67 (Paras 10 & 11)
"1976(1)SCC828(Paras 12to 16)
13
1999 (4) SCC 370 (Para 27)
H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A . prosecution and as accepted by the Sessions Court, was between 3 PM
to 4:30 PM whereas the High Court has assumed the time of death to be
between 5 PM to 7 PM. This discrepancy arises out of the prosecution's
failure to establish the time of death of the deceased.
30. Mr. Ray then submits that the prosecution's case, as accepted
B by the trial Cou1i, is that the deceased was administered sleeping pills to
render him unconscious after which Accused Nos. 3 to 5 strangulated
him while Accused No.2 was guarding the room from outside. The High
Court, however, has recorded that the prosecution fabricated evidence
and planted the sleeping pills. More importantly, the High Court has
changed the narrative of the prosecution and recorded that the deceased
c was smothered by a pillow, not strangulated. No basis for such change
in narrative is fo1ihcoming. Fui1her, the prosecution's case draws support
from two different panchnamas drawn by Accused No.3 and Accused ·
No. 5, both of which are contradictory to each other. Infact, panchnama
drawn at the instance of Accused No.3 does not eve11 set out a case
D against Accused No.5. Finally, the entire case against Accused No.3
rests on the link that he was seen along with the deceased while leaving
the Vadtal Temple complex in the car/van. This link is propagated by a
sole witness, PW 15 who claims to have seen Accused No.3. PW 15,
however, has been declared hostile.Jn his cross exarnination, he stated
that he had only seen a white car and could not see who was sitting
E therein. The above discrep'ancies are fatal to the prosecution casl.l as it
· puts fo1ih a new case without affording the accused an opportunity to
counter the same.
31. Mr. Ray also submits that the innocence of Accused No.5
can be inferred from the fact that no charges were levelled against him
F at the initial stages. Even the FIR tiled by the CBI did not contain his
name. Accused No.5 was far removed from the main accused and was
a stranger to the criminal conspiracy aUeged by the.prosecution.
32. Finally, Mr. Ray submits that the presence of Accused No.5
at the stated place of offence at Navli, was spoken by PW! 7. But he
G was contradicted in cross examination. The evidence of PW35 infact
mentions that Accused No.5 was at Vadtal at the time when the offence
was committed at Navli. Further, the High Court has contradicted itself
by first inferring from a panchnama that Accused No.5 was present at
the place of the offence only to subsequently state that the panchnama
H could only be accepted in pa11 and was only true to the extent that it
CHARAN DAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 125
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

proved that the deceased was taken from Vadtal to Navli. The only way A
that the High Court inferred the involvement of Accused No.5 was his
alleged presence at Navli because he was not seen at Vadtal. This
reasoning is a case of gross perversity. The contradictory finding recorded
by the High Court has ~eriously affected the admissibility of the
panchnama. At the most, contends learned counsel, the Accused No.5
B
can be proceeded against for disposing of the deceased's body and not
for murdering him. Mr. Ray has relied on the_ decisions in the cases of
II.D. Sikand (D) Through L.R.S. vis Central Bureau of
Investigation and Anr. 14 , Hodge's Case 15 and Pawan Kumar Vs.
State of Haryana' 6• • ·

33. In reply, Ms. Kiran Suri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for c
the prosecution, first submits that the accused had conspired With each
other to murder the deceased and that their conviction by the lower
Courts is based on the evidence available on record. Ms. Suri also submits
· that the chain of circumstances proving the guilt of the accused has
been established and proved through the various witnesses. D
34. With regard to the guilt of the accused in appeal, Ms. Suri
submits that there cannot be direct evidence of hatching a criminal
conspiracy and the same has to be reasonably inferred from the evidence.
In the present case, the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused
on the basis of motive, 'last-seen' theory, place of murder and disposal E
of body, panchnama at the instance of Accused No.5, recovery of the
body of the deceased and conduct of Accused No.3.
35. Ms. Suri submits that it is indisputable that Accused No, I was
the Assistant Kothari of the temple and Accused No.2 was assisting
him. From the circumstantial evidence and considering the unaccounted F
money found at their house/in their bank accounts, it is apparent that
Accused Nos. I and 2 were involved in financial irregularities of the
temple funds and that their continuation at Vadtal was threatened by the
deceased's proposal to transfer the Kotharis out of the Vacftal Temple.
Thus, there was clear apprehension in the minds of Accused Nos. I and
2 that they would be replaced. Ms. Suri in support of this argument has G
relied on the evidence of PW3, PW5, PW2 I, PW22, PW33, PW35,
PW36, PW37, PW39, PW40 and PW41. Further, contends Ms. Suri
"2016(12)Scale892(Paras 15, 18)
" English Reports 168 Crown Cases, Liverpool Sununcr Assizes, 1838
"' (2003J 1 f sec 241
H
126 . ~suPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A that the accused have not been able to give any explanation for the huge
amounts of money found in their accounts and at their houses. In this
regard, Ms. Suri relies upon the evidence of PW22, PW35 and PW39.
36. On the issue of the 'last-seen' theory, Ms. Suri submits that
the evidence of PW 16 clearly establishes that he saw Accused No.3
B near the room of the deceased on the day and at the time he went
missing. Further, PW 16 states that he initially saw the blue car (in which .
the deceased was taken away) near the temple steps and later, tlv~ said
blue car, along with Accused No.3, had disappeared. This has been
substantiated by the evidence of PW 1S wherein he claims that he saw
Accused No.3 with the deceased at the relevant time, even though PW IS
c has turned hostile. Further, the car used to take away the deceased was
subsequently put on fire to mislead the investigating agency. Ms. Suri
also relies upon the evidence of PW3, PW8, PW14 and PW48 in this
regard.
37. With regard to the actual murder of the deceased, Ms. Suri
D submits that the crucial evidence is panchnama (Exh. 198) prepared at
the instance of Accused No.S. He has admitted to the place of the .
crime and Accused No.3 showed the police where the body of the
·deceased had been disposed of. Further, the evidence of PW25 who
brought the call girl and the evidence of PW49 the call girl summoned by
E the accused for the deceased, also establishes the pre·sence cf the
accused at the place and time of the crime. PW49 has stated that she
saw Accused No.2 at the Navli Temple complex when she was summoned
there and that she had physical relations with the deceased after that.
Again, while both PW25 and PW49 have turned hostile, their evidence
clearly establishes the presence of the various accused at the place and
F time of the alleged murder. Further, panchnama clearly establishes that
the deceased was strangulated in a roo1n at Navli while Accused No.2
waited outside the room. Additionally, the statement made by PW20 that
Accused No.2 bought tablets from him, which were then used to sedate
the deceased before the murder, is also established by the prosecution.
G 38. Ms. Suri then submits that panchnama drawn at the instance
of Accused No.3 and the statement given to the police was an attempt
to mislead the prosecution from the real events that unfolded. The
panclmama sets out the real incident wherein the deceased was mudered
at.Navli and not at Vadtal as claimed by Accused No.3. Accused No.3
H possessed the car/van which was subsequently found In a burnt state in
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 127
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the garage of PW 13. A false insurance claim was lodged regarding the A
accident to the car, which was rejected. Pertinently, Accused No.3 has
not been able to explain what happened to the car.
39. Ms. Suri finally submits that the prosecution has clearly proved
the recovery of the deceased~s body and its identification .. PWSO has
deposed that he found the burnt body in a ditch at Barothi Village, B
Rajasthan. It has been proved that the said body was of the deceased
through DNA testing and by the presence of gold caps on the teeth of
the body. This has been corroborated by PW 1, the doctor who put the
caps on the teeth of the accused. Thus, the chain of events is complete
in the present case so as to leave no manner of doubt regarding the guilt
of the accused. She submits that this Cou1t should be loath to interfere
c
with the concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the two Couits against
the appellants herein. Ms. Suri has relied upon the reported decisions in
the cases of Pandurang Kain Patil and Another v. State of
Maharashtra 1', State (NCT of Delhi) v.Navjot Sandhu alias Afs:an
Guru 18 , Udai Bhan v. State of U.P.19, State of Maharashtra v. D
Damu 20 , H.P. Adorn. v. Om Prakash 21 and Vasanta Sampat Dupare
v. State of Maharashtra 22 •
40. We. have thus heard the learned counsel appearing for the
respective parties at length. With their able assistance we have also
examined the relevant record, the judgments rendered by the two Courts E
and the reported decisions cited by them during arguments. The
prosecution case hinges on circumstantial evidence. The following
circumstances have been pressed into service by the prosecution:
(i)Motive;
(ii) "Last seen" in the company of Accused No. 3; F
(iii) Murder of deceased at Navli complex and disposal of the
dead body in Rajasthan;
(iv) panchnamadrawn on the basis of disclosure made by Accused
No. 5;
G
17
2002 (2) SCC 490 (Paras 14 & 15)
"2005 (11) SCC 600 (Paras 114. 115 to 118. and 120 to 144)
19
1962 Supp (2) SCR 830
'" 2000 <6) sec 269 (Para 37)
21
1972 <ll sec 249
22 (2015) I SCC 253 (Paras 23 to 29)
H
128 SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS [2017) 3 S.C.R.

A (v) The recovery of dead body and its identification;
(vi) The discovery of location, on the basis of disclosure made by
Accused No.3, where the dead body was dumped;
(vii) Conduct of Accused No. 3 to mislead the investigation;
B (viii) Criminal conspiracy to commit the crime.
41. ln all, five accused were put on trial. Accused No. 4 has been
acquitted by the High Court. The prosecution has not challenged the
acquittal of Accused No. 4. In fact, from the judgment of the High Court
it is evident that the prosecution in all fairness conceded that the evidence
C against Accused No. 4 was insufficient.- As regards Accused No. 3,
both the courts have found that the prosecution succeeded in establishing
the guilt of Accused No. 3. As a result, he has been convicted by the
trial couitand the finding of guilt against him has been affirmed by the
High Court. Accused No. 3 has not tiled any appeal against his conviction,
That leaves us to consider the case against Accused Nos . .I, 2 and 5 in
D . the present appeals.
42. Before we embark upon the points urged by the counsels
appearing for the respective appellants, it may be apposite to bear in
mind the settled legal position about the quality of evidence required for
.recording a finding of guilt against the accused in respect of circumstantial
E evidence. (See decisions relied by the Appellants, Paras 15 to 19 of Dr.
Sanjay Singh (supra), Para l 8 of 11.D. Sikand (supra); and Sharad
Binlhichand Sarda v. State ofMaharashtra23 ). At the same time, we
must remind ourselves of the settled legal position that this Court should
be loath to ove1turn the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two
Courts unless the same are found to be palpably untenable or perverse.
F
43. In this backdrop, we shall now examine the findings recorded
by the two Courts with reference to the relevant circumstances on the
basis of which finding of guilt has been recorded against the appellants.
The first such circumstance is about the presence of Gadadharanandji
atthe Vadtal Temple complex at around 12:30- 12:45 P.M. on 03.05.1998.
G
Both the Courts have concurrently found that the prosecution has
succeeded in establishing the fact that Gadadharanandji returned to the
Vadtal Temple at around 12:30 - 12:45 P.M. This has been stated by
PW3 who was present in the room ofGadadharanandji at the relevant
" (1984) 4 sec 166
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI 1. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 129
[A. M. KHANWlLKAR, J.]

time. After Gadadharanandji returned. PW3 pressed his legs for about A
half an hour and left the room at around I :00 P.M. PW3 returned to the
room at around 2:00-2:30 P.M. and noticed that the turban and walking
stick of Gadadharanandji were left behind in the room but Gadadharanandj i
himself was not seen around. PW 8 has also deposed that on the day of
the incident, he had reached the Vadtal Temple complex/residence of
B
Gadadharanandji at around 11 :00 A.M. At that time, PW3 and l'W33
were also present. PW8 has also staled that Gadadharanandji arrived at
the Vadtal Temple in a vehicle about half an hour later, after which l'W3
and he went inside the room ofGadadharanandji and PW3 pressed his
legs. At that time he (PW8) sat on the sofa and read some paper. PW33
has also deposed that on the day of incident, he was at the Vadtal Temple c
complex when Gadadharanandji left for 'Khandli' (Khanjali) village at
around 8:00 A.M. and returned to the temple at 12:00- 12:30 P.M. PWI 6
has also deposed that on the day of incident at around I :00 - 1: 15 P.M.,
he entered the room of Gadadharanandji along with one Gandalal and
served him for five minutes before leaving the room. Fi-om the evidence
D
of these witnesses, the presence of Gadadharanandji at Vadtal Temple
complex on 03.05.1998 between 12:00 - l :30 P.M. is indisputable. No
serious argument has been advanced to cha Ilenge this factual position.
44. The argument of the appellants, however, is that there is no
credible evidence regarding the manner of disappearance of
Gadadharanandji on 03.05.1998 atler I :30 P.M. For, the prosecution has E
not produced any direct evidence regarding the manner of disappearance
ofGadadharanandji from the Vadtal Temple, as to whether he waB forcibly
kidnapped from his room or coaxed to go to the Navli Temple complex
by the accused. However, the prosecution has certainly produced
evidence to establish the fact that Gadadharanandji was seen along with F
Accused No.3 in a car, leaving the Vadtal Temple. The Trial Court as
we!I as the Appellate Court have relied upon the evidence of PW I 5 and
16, for having established the aforesaid fact. The prosecution has also
relied on the evidence of PW3 and PW 14. But PW3 does not claim to
have personally seen Gadadharanandj i leaving the room along with any
person, much less Accused No.3. He could not have witnessed that G
event as he had gone out to fetch chappals and by the time he returned
at 2:00 - 2:30 P.M., Gadadharanandji was not seen in his room. PWl4
was examined to establish the fact under consideration. However, he
turned hostile. In his statement given to the investigating agency, he
H
130 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A claimed to.have seen the deceased leaving the Vadtal Temple in a blue
car but in his evidence before_the Court later changed his stance by
saying that he never saw such a car. However, the prosecution has been
able to establish from the totality of the evidence that Gadadharanandji
was seen going in a car from Vadtal Temple. PW 15, who also turned ·
hostile, initially deposed that he saw the deceased leaving the Vadtal
B
Temple with Accused No.3 in a blue car but subsequently stated that he
had seen a white colour Maruti car coming out of the temple gate with
"Swami" sitting in the front. Be it noted that Accused No.3 did not
cross examine PW 15 or challenged the version of his presence at the
spot spokeil by this witness in any manner. 'fhe Com1s below have
c accepted the version of PW! 5 to the limited extent of having seen the ·
deceased going out of the Vadtal Temple in a car along with Accused
No.3. The fact that Accused No.3 was sitting in the blue colour car
parked.near the steps of Sabha Mandap at the relevant time has been
corroborated by the evidence of PW 16. The courts below have accepted
the evidence of PW 16 as truthful and reliable. The criticism by the
D
appellants, however, is that the presence of PW 16 has not been spoken
either by PW3 or by PW8. From the evidence of PW 16, however; it is
seen that PW 16 arrived at the room ofGadadharanandji at around 1:00
P.M. - 1:15 P.M. when PW3 and PW8 had already left PWl6 along
with one Gandalal remained inside the room of Gadadharanandji for
E some time and he (PW 16) served him for around five minutes before
leaving the room. PW 16 thereafter went to the nearby machine room
from where he saw a blue colour car parked nearthe steps of the temple,
in which Accused No.3 was sitting. He then went to sleep and when he
woke up arounµ 2:00 - 2:20 P.M., the said blue car and Accused No.3
was not seen. The Cou11s belo\V after analyzing this evidence, have
F recorded a concurrent finding including by weighing the admissible part
of the evidence of hostile witnesses and of PW 16. The view so taken
cannot be said to be perverse. The Trial Court found that the evidence
given by the above named witnesses was reliable atleast with regard to
the manner of disappearance ofGadadharanandji from Vadtal Temple.
G The discrepancy in the evidence of these witnesses has been considered
by the Trial court before it recorded the findii1g on the circumstance
under consideration. Even the Appellate Court reached at the same
conclusion independently. 89th the Courts have analysed the evidence
and after sifting the irrelevant or inadmissible part therefrom, found that
the evidence was sufficient to answer the circumstance against the
H
CHARAN DAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR .. 131
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

appellants. The two Courts have held that Gadadharanandji was last A
seen together with Accused No.3 leaving the Vadtal Temple complex in
a blue car and that he was not seen thereafter until his dead body was
found on 41h May, 1998 (i.e. next day of disappearance) at Barothi village
in the neighbouring state of Rajasthan. This finding arrived at by the
Courts below is unassai.lable. It is neither perverse hor warrants
B
interference by this Court.
45. The dead body of deceased Gadadharanandji was fourid on
4th May, 1998 in a burnt condition in a ditch behind the house of PWSO
in Barothi village in Rajasthan. How the dead body ofGadadharanandji
reached that spot was revealed by none other than Accused No.3. In
what circumstances burnt injuries were caused on the dead body of
c
Gadadharanandji, no prosecution witness has spoken about that. Be that
as it may, the fact that the dead body recovered from Barothi village on
41h May, 1998 was that of Gadadharanandji could be known..only after
Accused No.3, during the course of investigation, made a disclosure
about the location where he had disposed of the dead body of D
Gadadharanandji. Till the aforesaid disclosure was made, in the records .
of the Rajasthan police, the dead body was noted as that of an unknown
person. If, the Accused No.3 had not disclosed to the Investigating Officer
about the location where the dead body was dumped by him - which
information was personally known to him and at best Accused No.5 and
none else, then the investigation would not have made any headway. E
The disclosure made by Accused No.Jto the investigating officer was
recorded in the panchanama Exh. 188, when he had led the police party
to the spot where the dead body was dumped by him. That location
matched with the location from where the dead body of an unknown
person was recovered on 41h May, 1998 on the information given by F
PWSO to the local police at Barothi. The fact that the dead body was
already recovered from the same place on 41h May, 1998 and so noted in
the public records in the State of Rajasthan does i10t undermine the
admissibility of the disclosure made by Accused No.3 to the investigating
officer about the location where the dead body of Gadadharanandj i was
dumped by him, which information was exclusively within the personal G
knowledge of Accused No. 3. The fact that the dead body recovered on
41h May 1998 was of Gadadharanandj i, was unraveled and discovered
only after the results of its medical examinariori became available to the
investigating agency. Till then, it was considered to be of an unknown
H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 3 S C.R.

A person. The Courts below have accepted the case of the prosecution
that the disclosure made by Accused No.3 about the location where the
dead body ofGadadharanandji was dumped by him, was admissible under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The appellants, however, take exception
to that by relying on the reported decisions. In our view, the decision in
the case of Navjot Sandhu (Supra) has adverted to all the previous
B
decisions and restated the legal position. In paragraph 114, while
considering the arguments advanced by the parties regarding the sweep
of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the-Court formulated two questions
which read thus:
"(i) Whether the discovery of.fact referred to in Section 27
c .should be c01ifined only to lhe discove1y of a maleriul (lbject
and the knowledge of the accused in relation thereto or the
discove1y could be in respect of his mental state or knowledge
in relation lo certain things - concrete or non-concrete.
(ii) Whether it is necessary that the discove1y of fuel should
D be by the person making the disclosure or directly at his
instance. The subsequent event of discovery by the police
with the aid of i11for111ulion .fi1rnished by the an used -
whether can be put against him under Section 2 7. "
In the context of these questions, the argument of the counsel for
E the State in that case has been adverted to in paragraphs 115 to 118.
The Court then after analyzing Section 27 of the Evidence Act, in
paragraphs 120 to 144 adverted to the relevant decisions on the point. In
paragraphs 120 and 121, the Court noted thus:
· "J20. The histo1y of case-law on the siibject of confessions
F under Section 27 unfolds diverge11t views and approaches.
The divergence was 111ainly on twin aspects: (i) Whether the
facts contempluted by Section 27 are physical, material objecl:v
or the mental .facts.of which the accused giving the iliformation
could be said to be aware of Some Judges have gone to the
G extent of holding that the discove1y of concrete .fc1cls, that is
to say 111ateriul objects, which can be exhibited in the Court
are alone covered by Section 27. (ii) The other controversy
was on the point regarding the extent of admissibility of a
disclosure statement. In some cases a view was taken that
any iliformation. which serl'ed lo connect the object with the
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 133
•. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

offence charged, was admissible under Section 27. The A
decision of the Privy Council in Kottaya case which has been
described as a locus clussicus. hud set al resf much of the
co11t1~01'ersy thul cenlred round lhe i11/erprelation of Section
27. To a great extent the legal position has got cryslallised
wilh the rendering of this decision. The auihority of the Prhy
B
Councils decision has not been questioned in any of the
decisions of the highest court either in the pre-or post-
independence era. Right .from the 1950s, till the advent of the
new cenlwy and till dale. the passages in this famous decision
are being approvingly quoted and reil<p·ated by !he Judges
of this Apex Court. let, there remain certain grey areas as c
de111onstra1ed by lhe argumen/s adranced on behalf of lhe
Slate.
121. The jir.\'f requisite coiidilion jur utilising Sec/ion 27 in
supporl of the proseculion case is that !he investiguling police
ojjicer should depose lhat he discovered a fact in D
consequence of the i1!for111alio11 received ji-0111 an accused
person in police cus/01~)'. 1hus, there mus/ be a discovery of
fact not within the knowledge of police o.fficer us a
consequence of il!fim11ation receired. ()(course, ii is axiomatic
that the iliformalion or disclosure should be free from any
element of compul.~ion. The next component of Section 27 E
relates to !he nature and extent of il!formalion !hat can be
proved. It is only so much of !he information as relates
distinctlv 10 th_eJJ!si.ihere]2y_ 1liscovered that Cf/11 be proved
and nothiJJlLJ!_l.Qre. It is e.Y.JJlJ.f;iJ.}y_ clarified in the sec/ion that
there is 1/0 tahoo against receivi11'.!,.2J!Ch information in F
ev id<! 11 c e 111 ere.fy_ be Cf!J.I~~e i U!!!!.P u!l!!i..J.!!....!Lt:;o 11kssio11.,.A.1.JfJ.g_
same ti111e. the last clause makes it clear that it is not the
corlf_es.~.ional_part that is ad111issible but it is onlv such
!JJ.formati.f!IL.Q!_..f!.Y!lJJi.JL which relates distinctly lo the fact
discovered by means of !he informal ion furnished. Thus, the
infor111ation conveyed in the statement lo the police ought lo G
be dissected if necessmy so as to admit only the injimnation
of the 11a1ure 111enliomd in the section. The rationale behind
LbiLJZEO 1' f§i o n_js_J!JJ.1 t .. .if..JL]gs.l_j!i...J!fL!!.?J]jy dis~: o v ere d in
conse11ue11ce o( the ir/iJr111al_io11 supplied. it a{[ords so111e
H
)34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A guarantee that the information is true and can therefore be
safelv allowed to be admitted in evidence as an incriminating
factor against the accused. As poillfed out by the Privy Council
in Kottaya case64: (AIR p. 70, pai·a JO)
"clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend
B on the exact nature of the fact ·discovered"
and the information must distinc(ly relate to that fact.
Elucidating the scope of this section, .the Privy Council
5peaking through Sir John Beaumont said: (AIR p. 70, para
10)
c
"'Normally the section is brought into operation when a person
il.1 police custody produces .fi"om some place of concealment
some object, such as a dead body, a weapon, or ornaments,
said to be connected wilh the .crime of which the informant is
accused."
D
We have emphasised the word "normally" because the
illustrations given by 1he leai·ned Judge are not exhaustive.
The next point to be noted is thal the Privy Council rejected
the argument of the counsel appearing for the Crown that the
fact discovered is the physical object produced and that any
E . and every information which relates distinctly to that object
can be proved. Upon this view, the information given by a
person that the weapon produced is the one used by him in
the commission of the murder will be admissible in its entirety.
Such contention of the Crown ;y counsel was emphatically
rejected with the following words: (AIR p. 70, para I 0)
F
)

"If this be the effect of Section 27, little substance would
remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding sections 011
confessions made lo lhe police, or by persons in police custody.
That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the legislature
that a person under police influence might be induced to
G
confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is
required to lifl the ban be the inclusion in 1he confession of
information relating to an object subsequently produced, it
seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of
the police will prove equal lo lhe occasion, and that in practice
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 135
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the ban will lose its effect. " A
Then, Their Lordships proceeded to give a lucid exposition
of the expression 'fact discovered" in the following passage,
which is quoted (ime and again by this Court: (AIR p. 70,
para JO)
"Jn Their Lordships' view it is fallacious to :treat the 'fact B
discovered' within the section as equivalent to the object
produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which
the object is produced and the knowledge of ihe accused as
to this. and the in/(mnation given must relate distinctly to this
fact. Information as to past user, or the past 'history, of the c
object produced is not relu!ed to its discovery in the setting in
which it is discovered. Jnformalion supplied by a person in
custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of
111y house' does not lead to the discove1y of a knife; knives
were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of
the fact that a knife is,concealed in !he house of the informant D
to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been
used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is
very relevant. But if to the s/atement the }i1ords be added 'with
which I stabbed A' these words are inadmissible since they do
not re/ale to the discovery of the knife in the house of the E
informant. "
(emphasis supplied)
46. This Court has restated the legal position that the facts need
not be self-probatory and the word "fact" as contemplated by Section
27 is not limited to "actual physical material object". It further noted F
that the discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information
given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness
of the informant as to its existence at a particular place. In paragraph
128, the Court noted the statement oflaw in Udai Bhan (Supra) that, "A
discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place from which G
it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence."
The Court then posed a question as to what would be the position ifthe
physical object was not recovered at the instance of the. accus;;:d .. That
issue has been answered on the basis of precedents, as can be discerned
from Paragraphs 129 to 132 of'.he reported judgment. In paragraph 139,
H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 3 S.C.R.

A the Court noticed the decision in the case of Damu (Supra) which had
dealt with the case where broken glass piece was recovered from the
spot matched with broken tail lamp and in paragraph 37 of that decision,
the Court observed thus:
"37. How did the particular information lead to the discovery of
B the fact? No doubt, recovc1y of dead body of Dipak from the
same canal was antecedent to the information which PW 44
obtained. If nothing more was recovered pursuant to and
subsequent to obtaining the i11for111ation from the accused,
there would 1101 have been any discove1y of any fact c.t all.
But when the broken glass piece was recovered ji-0111 that spot
c and thut piece was found to be part of the tail lump of the
motorcycle of A-2 Guruji, it can safely be held that the
investigating officer discovered 1he fact that A-2 Gunlji had
carried the dead body 011 that parliculur motorcycle up to the
spot."
D (emphasis supplied).
The Cou1t th.:11 noted that the above view taken in Damu's case
does not make it a dent on the observations made and the legal position
spelt out in Om l'rakash (supra) which distinguishes Damu's case
because there was discovery ofa related physical object at least in part.
E We may usefully reproduce paragraph No.142 to 144 of the same
repo1tcd decision, wherein the Cou1t observed thus:
"142. There is one more poi11t which we would like to disrnss
i.e. whether pointing 0111 a material object bv thf..J!.f.Cused
fltrnishing_Jhe i11(or111atio11 is a necessarv concomitant of
F Section 27. We think tlwt the a11swer should be in lhe negative.
Though in most of the cases the person who makes the
disclosure himself leads the police <![ficer lo lhe place where
an object is concealed and points out 1he same to him,
however, it is not esse11Jial that there should be such pointing
G out in order to make the in.formation admissible wuler Section
27. it could very well be that on the basis of in.formation
fi1rnished by the accused, tl1e inves1iguling <~fficer may go to
the spot in the co111pw1y of other witnesses and recover the
material object. !}y_Jloj_1J...'S..EJ, tl11tJ!!!'f§JjgQti11g oll/cer will be
discovering a fact viz. the co11ceu/111e11t of an incriminating
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 137
[A. M. Kl-IANWJLKAR, J.]

article and the knowledge of the accused furnishing the A
information about ii. In olhif.r.JJ:.(J.J:.@., where the information
fiwnished by the person in custod11 is verified bv the police
o[ficer by going to the spot mentioned by the informcmt alllf
fJ.nds it to be correct. thCJL!!!/l!!lll7ih" to discovery_gf_Jgcf within
the meau}J.ll! o{Secti911 27~ Q[course. it is subject to :he rider
B
(jlll t {he i!![Qrll!QI io l~_!i2_}jtr n i!f.f}_(!_d__]J.gjj_Jh e iJ.!J. 111 eJ}j_a Ie a II d
proximate cause of discoverv. If the police officer chooses
not to take the i11jim11mit accused to the spot. it will have no
bearing 011 the poil/f of admissibility under Section 27, though
ii may be one of the aspects that goes into evaluation of that
particular piece of evide11ce. " c
"143. How the clause "as relates distinctly to the fi1c1 thereby
discovered" has to be understood is the next point that
deserves consideration. 711e interpretation of this clause is
not in doubt. Apart from Kottaya case various decisions of
this Court have elucidated am/ c/arUied the scope a11d D
111ea11ing of the said portion ()f Section 27. The law has been
succi11ctly staled in l11ayatullah case. Sarkaria. .!. analysed
the ingredients of the section and explained the a1abit and
nuances of this particular clause in the ji1llowi11g words: (SCC
p. 832, para 12)
E
"The l<I.,'!L bi1Ube !ll!J.lL.i!..1JJZS!rlc1Jl_/_.i-.'f!!J..d.l{j!!JLlS thqj__onlv 'so
much o[the infim110/io11 'as re/ales d~~lincth- to the fact therebv
discovered_ is ad111issible. The rest <~l the information has to
be excluded. The word 'dis/i/l(:/ly' means 'directly',
'indubitably', 'strictly', 'u11111istakobly '. The word has been
advisedly used lo limit and define the scope of the provable F
iliformalio11. If1e phrase 'disti11c1/v relates lo the fr.1c1 thereb)I
discovered' is the li11chpi11 of the fJrllVision. This phrase refers
to lhaLpart of the in(imualion sypplied bv the accused whicfJ.
is the direct and immediate cause o{lhe discnverv. The reason
behind this partial lijiing of the ban against confessions and G
stale111e111s made to the police, is that if" a fact is auually
discovered in consequence ()f i11foi·111ation given by the
accused, ii l{ffords some guara111ee of truth of that part, and
that part only, of the i11for111alio11 which was !he elem~
immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No such
1-1
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 3 S.C.R.

A guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement
which may be indirectly or remotely related to the fact
discovered. "
In the light of the legal position thus clarified, this Cdiirr
excluded a part of the disclosure statement to which we have
B already adverted.
144. In Bodhraj v. State of J&K this Court after referring to
the decisions on the subject observed thus: (SCC p. 58, para
18)
"The.words 'so much of such information' as relates distinctly
c to the/act thereby discovered, are ve1y important and the
whole force of the section concentrates on them. Clearly the
extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact
nature of the fact discovered to which such information is
required to relate. " ·
D (emphasis supplied)
47. Reliance was also placed on the recent decision of this Court
in the case of Dupure (supra). The Court adverted to the relevant
precedents and observed thus, in paragraphs 23 to 29:-
"23. While accepting or .rejecting the factors of discovery,
E
certain principles are lo be kept in mind. The Privy Council
in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor has held thus: (IA p. 77)
" ... it is fallacious lo treat the 'fact discovered' within the
section us equivalent to the object produced; the fact
discovered embraces the place from which the object is
F
produced and the knowledge of the accziyed as to this,
and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact.·
information as to past user, or the past history, of the object
·produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in
which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person
G in custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed in the
roof of my house' does not lead to the discovery of a knife;
knives were discovered many years ago. It leads t~ the
discove1y of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house
of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved
to have bee1i used in the co111111issio11 of the offence, the
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 139
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

fact discovered is ve1y relevant. But if to the statement the A
words be added 'with which I stabbed A ', these words are
inadmissible sil1ce they do not relate to the discove1y of
the knife in the house of the informant.
24. In Mohmed Inayatullah v. The State of Maharashtra,
while dealing with the ambit and scope of Section 27 of the B
Evidence Act, the Court held that:
·.• 11. Although the interpretation and scope of
Section 27 has been the subject of several authoritative
pronouncements, its application to concrete cases is not
always free from difficulty. It will therefore be worlhwhile C
al tbe outset, to have a short and swift glance at the secli01i
and be reminded of its requiremenls. The section says:
27, How much of information received fi'0/11 accused may
be proved.- Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as
discovered in consequence of information received fi'om a o
person accused of any offence, in 1he custody of a police
officer, so much of such injimuation, whelher it amounts
to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact
thereby discovered may be proved.
I 2. The expression "provided Iha!" loge Iher wilh lht! phrase E
"whelher it amounts lo a confession or 110/'' show that the
section is in the nature of an exception to !he preceding ·
provisions particularly Sections 25 and 26. It is not
necesswy in this case lo consider if this sec/ion qualifies,
tO any extent, Section 24, also. It will be seen that
!he first condition necessmy for bringing this section into F
operation is the discovery of a fact, albeil a relevant fact.
in consequei1ce .of the information received from a person
accused of an offence: The second is Iha! the discovery of
such fact must be deposed to. The lhird i~ that at the time
of the receipt of the information !he accused must be in . G
police custody. The last but the most important condition
is that only · "so much of the information" as
relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is
admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded.
· The word "distinctly" means "directly", "indubitably",
H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A "stric1ly ". "1111111istakably ". The word hus been advisedly
used to limil a11d define the scope of the prowble
information. The phrase '·distinc1ly relates to the fact
thereby discovered" is the linchpin of !he provision. This
phrase refers to !hat part of the information supplied by
the accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the
B
discovery. The reason behind this pdrtial lifting of the ban
against confessions and sta1eme111s made to !he police. is
. that if a fact is actually discovered in conseqiienr:e of
informa1io11 given by the accused, it u.ffords some guara/1fee
of truth of that part. and that purl only, o.f !he il?fiirmation
C· which was the clew; immediate and proximate cause of the
discovery. No such guarantee or asrnrance al/aches to
the rest ofthe slalement which' may be indireclly or remotely
relaled lo lhe fact discovered
13. d.I ong_J.l!.1ie_£! iras__ helJ-1.lwt !he expression :lac..1
D discover<A" in the secti<ln is reslricled 10 a phvsical or
material fact which can be_JJerceived bv the .~enses, and
that it does not include a mental (act
(!j_ee Suklwn v. E111pero1: Ganu Chandra Kashid 1: Empror).
NqJJ:..il iLJ'g_id\l..!iJ!.flle_d 1hat thf__Q/2re.~si01 "fact discovered"
includes not onlv the phvsicl!_/_Q/JJ.!LL:.!...JZ.roduced, b111 also
E the place {i-0111 which it is prod11ce,I and the k11owleggg__2[
[_}Jg_ __ acqg<_!__d__ as to t/]is (see Palukuri
Kotayya v. E111per01; Udai Bhan v. State of UP).
(emphasis in origi11al)
25. !11 Ajiab Ahmad Anusuri v. State <~( Uttaranclwl after
F referring to the decision in Palukuri Kotayya, the Court
adverted to seizure <~(clothes of the deceased which were
C<mcealed by the accused. In !hat co111exi, the Court opined
thut: (Aftab Ahmad Anasari Case, SCC p. 596, para 40)
"40.... the part of !he disclosure statement, 11a111ely, that
G the Appellant was ready to show the place where he had
concealed the clothes of the deceased is clearly admissible
Under Section 27 of the Evide11ce Ac1 because the same
relates distinctly to the discovery of !he clothes of the
deceased ji·om that ve1)' place. The co111e11tio11 that e'.•en if
ii is ussumed jiir the sake of argu111e11t that the clothes of
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 141
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the deceased were recovered ji·om the house of the sister A
of the Appellant pursuant to the voluntary disclosure
state111e11t 111ade by the Appellant, the prosecution has failed
to prove that the clothes so recovered belo11ged to the
deceased and therefore, the recove1y of the clothes should
not be treated as an i11cri111inating circu111stance, is devoid
B
of merils. "
26. In State of Maharashtra v. Damu it has been held as
follows:
"35 ... .ft is now well sealed that recovery of an abject is
not discovery of a fact as envisaged in [Sectio11 27 of the c
Evidence Act, 1872). The decision of the Privy Council
in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor is the most quoted
authority for supporting the interpretation that the 'fact
discovered' envisaged in the section embraces the place
from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the
accused as to it, but the i11for111ation given must relate D
disti11ctly to that effect. "
The similar principle has been laid down in State of
Maharashtra v. Suresh, State of Punjab v. Gurnam
Kall/; Ajiab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Ul/aranchal, Bhagwan
Dass 1' State (NCT of Delhi) . Ma11u Sharma v. State (NCT of E
Delhi) and Ru111i Bora Dutta v. State of Assam.
27. In the case at hand, as is perceptible. the recovery had
taken place when the Appellant was accused of an offence,
he was in custody of a police ofjice1; the recove1y had taken
place in consequence of i11for111ation furnished by him and F
the panch wit11esses have supported the seizure and nothing
has been brought on record to discredit their testimony.
28. Additionally, another aspect can also be taken note of
The fact that the Appellant had led the police omcer lo find
out the wot where the crime iras co111111i11ed, a11d the tap where G
he washed the clothes eloyuenily speak of his conduct as the
same is ad111issible in evidence lo establish his conduct. In
this context we may refer wilh projit to the authority
in Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Ad11111.) wherein the Court
after referring to the decision in H.P. Ad11111. v. Om
H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 I 7) 3 $.C.R.

A Prakash held thus: (Prakash Chand Case, SCC p.95. para
8)
''8 . ... There is a clear distinction be/ween the conduct of a
person against whom an offence is alleged, which is
admissible Under Section ~of the Evide11ce Act. if :rnch
B conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact
and the statement made ta a Police Officer in the course
of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 of !he Code
of Criminal Procedure. What is excluded by Section 162,
Code of Criminal Procedure is the statement made lo a
Police Officer in the course of i11vestigation mid not the
c evidence relating ta the conduct of an accused person (not
amounting to a state111e11t) whe11 confronted or questioned
by a Police Officer during the course of an i11vestiga1io11.
For example, the evidence of the circumstance, si111p/ici1e1;
that a11 accused perso11 led a Police Officer a11d poi111ed
D out the place where stolen articles or weapo11s which 111i!f.hl
have been used in the commission of the a.ff'e11ce were
found hidden, would be admissible as conduct. Under
Section~ of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether w1y
statement by the accused contemporaneously with iJr
antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview <!f
E Section 27 of the Evide11ce Act."
29. 111 A.N. Vekatesh and Anr. v. State of Karnataka it has
been ruled that: (SCC p. 721, para 9)
"9. By virtue of Sec/ion 8 of the Evide11ce Act, the conduct
F of the accused person is relevant, if such co11duct
influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant
fact. The evide11ce of the circu111sta11ce. simpliciter. that the
accused pointed out to the police officer. the place where
the dead body of the kidnapped bov was found and 011
their pointi11g out the body was exhumed. would be
G admissible as conduct Under Section 8 irre.1pec1ire of the
fact whether !he sta/e111e111 made bv the accused
conte111porang_Quslv with or antecedent to such co11duct
falls within the purFiew of Sec{ion 27 or 11ot as held by
this Court in Prakash Cha11d v. S1a1e (Delhi Ad11111.). Even
H if we hold that the disclosure statement made by the
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 143
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

accused-Appellants (Exts. P-15 and P-16) is not admissible A
Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant
Under Section 8. The evidence of the investigating officer
and PWs 1. 2, 7 and PW 4 the spot mahazar witness .that
the accused had taken them to the spot and pointed out
the place where the dead body was buried, isan adniissible
B
piece of evidence Under Section 8 as the conduct of the
accused. Presence of A-1 and A-2 at a place where ransom
demand 11ias to be fulfilled and their action of fleeing on
spotting the police parly is a relevant circumstance and
are admissible Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. "
(emphasis supplied) c
The other decision relied upon is the case of Pandurang Kalu
Patil (supra).
48. It is not necessary to multiply the authorities on this aspect. In
our opinion, the Courts below have rightly placed reliance on the fact D
discovered by the Investigating Officer (PW64) on the basis of the
disclosure made by the Accused No.3 on 2"d April 1999, after his arrest
on 29th March, 1999, as recorded in Exh. 188. The panchanama Exh. 188
was proved by pancha witness PW30. The fact that PW30 was not on
good terms with the accused cannot be the basis to discard his evidence.
This aspect has been consid'ered by the High Court and in our opinion, E
rightly, that the evidence of PW30 was relied upon forthe limited purpose
to prove the panchanama and not for any other relevant fact. We affirm
the view taken by the courts below about the admissibility of disclosure
of the spot where the dead body ofGadadharanandji was disposed ofby .
Accused No.3. The same stood corroborated from the recovery of a F
dead body of an unknown person from the same spot by the Rajasthan
Police on 4'" May, 1998 on the information provided by PWSO. That
dead body, on subsequent medical examination was found to be of none.
other than that ofGadadharanandji.
49. As regards the identity of the dead bocjy, the Courts below G
took note of the evidence of PW57 and PWSO. PWSO had informed the
local police of Barothi on 4'" May, 1998 about the dead body of an
unknown person lying at the same spot, later on discovered to be that of
Gadadliaranandji due to the disclosure made by Accused No. 3. PW57
conducted the post-mortem of the burnt dead body found at Barothi
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144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A village in Rajasthan. He deposed that the death was homicide. He also
deposed about the golden teeth and a key found near the dead body.
During the course of investigation, it was revealed that the said key
could open the lock put up on the room of the deceased in the Vadtal
Temple complex. PW3 corroborated that fact. Further, the identity of
the dead body was conclusively established from the DNA testing r~sults
B
of the skin sample of the body which matched with the blood samples of
the biological sister of the deceased. Additionally, PW I also confirmed
that he had treated the deceased in 1993 by implanting gold caps on his
teeth. That statement was corroborated by the receipts and diary entries
of PW 1. Indeed, the Appellants have vehemently contended that the
c said medical records are fabricated because of the discrepancies therein.
However, the said discrepancies would not discredit the other evirlence
regarding the identity of the dead body which has been duly corroborated.
This view taken by the High Court, in our opinion, is a possible view. It is
certainly not a perverse view. As the identity of the dead body of deceased
Gadadharanandji is established, it is a strong circumstance to link it to
D
Accused No.3 who had voluntarily disclosed to the investigating agency
about the spot/location where the dead body of the deceased was dumped
by him and that being the same place in Barothi vii Iage in Rajasthan
from where the dead body of an unknown person was recovered earlier
by the local police.
E 50. That brings usrto the efficacy of the disclosure made by
Accused No.S to the investigating agency - the place where
Gadadharanandj i was brought from Va<ltal Temple and the crime of
murder was finally executed. The disclosure so made by Accused No. 5
on 18'11 Apri 1, 1999, after his arrest, has been corroborated by the
F panchanama Ex.198 proved by pancha PW31. The Accused No.5
diselosed the room number in Navli Temple complex where
Gada<lharanandji had stayed on the day of incident. The Cou11s below
have held the disclosure by Accused No.5 about the place where
Gadadharanandji was brought at Navli Temple complex, as admissible.
We affirm that view for the reasons noted while considering the efficacy
G of disclosure of Accused No.3. From this evidence, it is obviou5 that
Gadadharanandji was taken away by Accused No.3 in a car from Vadtal
Temple complex and brought to Navli Temple complex on 3'd May, 1998
itself.His dead body was dumped in a ditch in village Barothi in Rajasthan
(another State) which was traced on 4'11 May, 1998 as a consequence of
H

H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 145
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

ti1e information given by PW50. A
51. We shall now deal "ith that aspect of evidence which shows
the presence of the accused at the Navli Temple complex on the day of
the incident. For that, the Courts below have taken into account the
circumst1rntial evidence as well as the ocular evidence to the extent it is
admissible. The evidence of PW25 and PW49 atthe Navli TenJple throws B
light on the said issue. According to the prosecution, prior to the incident,
Accused No.2 was in touch with PW25 to arrange for a call girl for the
pleasure ofGadadharanandji.PW48 has deposed that his company had
allocated cellphone number '9825017197' to Accused No.2. The form
for allocating the said number to Accused No.2 is Exh. 241. The mobile
bills of Accused No.2 concerning the aforesaid number 9825017197 for
c
the months of January-April 1998 and April-May 1998 are produced at
Exh. 242. PW48 had stored the information concerning the details of the
aforesaid number 9825017197 on his computer and a print out of the
said infonnation has also been produced at Exh. 242, while receipt qf
such information is produced at Ex. 243. The defence has chosen not to D
cross· examine PW48, thus accepting that the number 9825017197
belonged to Accused No.2 and about the calls made from and received
on .that numbers. Hence, it is established that Accused No.2 was using
number9825017197.
52. Further, PW25 has deposed that he had a telephone at his E
residence bearing number 32670. Exhs. 242 and 243 reveal that several
calls were made from the number 9825017197 (belonging to Accused
No.2), to the number '02692-32670', between l 81h April 1998 to 2o•h
May 1998. The aforesaid exhibits also reveal that on 2"d May 1998,
there were calls made between the said numbers on two occasions. On
the day of the incident i.e. 3'd May 1998, the number 9825017197 used F
by Accused No.2 received six calls from the telephone number of PW25
between 5: lOPM and 6:55PM. On4•h May 1998, the number9825017197
used by Accused No.2 received a phone call after mid night, for a duration
of around '4:55' minutes. Exhs. 242 and 243 reveal that calls were
exchanged between the two numbers even in June-July 1998. It is safe G
to infer that Accused No.2 was not talking to anybody else but PW25,
on the land line number of PW25. No evidence has been adouced by
Accused No.2 to dispel the same. It is clear from the above conduct of
the parties that PW25 was well acquain,ted with Accused No.2. PW64
investigating officer has deposed that PW25 made a statemerit before
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146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A him that he knew Accused No.2 and that Accused No.2 had contacted
him for procuring a girl for Gadadharanandji. He (PW25) had also stated
to PW 64 that on 2"d May, 1998, he contacted Accused No.2, when
Accused No.2 asked him to bring a girl at Navli complex on the next day
i.e. Jrd May, 1998. On that day, PW25 received a call at his residence
from Accused No.2 at around 1:30PM, asking him to reach Navli. PW25
B
then stated thathe brought PW49 to Navli at around 2: I 5-2:30PM, after
which they had met Accused No.2 in the Navli Temple complex. During
examination, though PW25 turned hostile and denied that Accused No.2
contacted him for the purpose of arranging a girl, the evidence on record,
as set out hercinabove, clearly establishes that Accused No.2 was in
c constant contact with PW25. The Courts below have rightly held in our
opinion, that the subsequent stance taken by PW25 that he did not know
Accused No.2, was patently incorrect and that there was enough
evidence on record to show otherwise. Thus, from the evidence on hand,
it is apparent that PW25 knew· Accused No.2 and there is no other
evidence on record to disprove the theory that PW25 had gone to Navli
D
with PW49 on the instructions of Accused No.2.
53. With regard to the evidence of PW49, the call girl procured by
PW25, she had appeared before the investigating officer (PW~4) to
give her statement on 2nd May, 1999, during the course of the investigation.
PW64 has deposed that when PW49 was called for.investigation, she
E was shown photographs of the deceased Gadadharanandji and she had
identified him as the man she had physical relations with at the Navli
Temple complex. She also identified Accused No.2 as one of the persons
she met at the Navli Temple complex on the day of the incident. These
statements were given in the presence of PW32. PW32 is an independent
F witness. His evidence has been accepted by both the Trial Court and the
High Court as independent and truthful. We see no reason to conclude
otherwise. We are also .in agreement with the finding given by the Courts
below that the evidence given by. PW32 and the investigating officer
(PW64) in this regard cannot be discredited. Thus, it can be inferred
that PW49 was taken to the Navli Temple complex by PW25 on 3rd
G May, 1998, where Accused No.2 and Gadadharanandji were present.
54. The presence of Accused No.2 at the Navli Temple on 3rd
May, 1998 can also be deciphered from the evidence of PW42. PW42
has turned hostile. However, in his evidence, he has admitted that in
1998, Accused No.2 was running.the Navli Temple. Fut1her, on Jrd May,
H.
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 147
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

1998 as he was leaving the Navli Temple complex, Accused No.2 reached A
with another person, whose identity could not be ascertained by him.
We agree with the reasoning of the Courts below that even ifthe denial
of PW42 on other facts is accepted, his presence at the Navli Temple on
the day of the incident and at the relevant time is proved. His hostility
does not destroy the evidence led by the prosecution to show that the
8
Accused No. 2 had come to the Navli Temple complex on J'd May 1998.
The presence of PW42 at the Navli Temple complex has been
corroborated by the evidence of PW43, wherein although he (PW43)
has turned hostile, has admitted that PW42 "hadn't gone anywhere" on
the day of the incident. Thus, indicating that PW-42 was at the Navli
Temple on the day of the Incident. c
55. It is significant to also note the conduct of Accused No.2 in
light of the evidence which we have analysed above. On the day of the
incident, Accused Nos.2 and 4 took PW3 and PW33 along with them to
Nadiad for an event at around 4-4: I 5PM. The prosecution has argued
that Accused No.2 purposely did this so as to not arouse any suspicion D
of PW3 and PW33 as to the whereabouts of Gadadharanandji and to
hide his real intentions. PW36 deposed that Accused No. 2 along with
another person (described as "sant") and two disciples had reached the
event at Nadiad around 5-5:30PM and stayed for around I 0-15 minutes.
PW3 has deposed that at the time of leaving from Nadiad, the accused
E·
received a call from Accused No. I after which Accused No. 2 told
PW3 and PW33 to go to Vadtal by themselves in an auto as they (Accused
Nos. 2 and 4) were going toAhmedabad, whereas Accused No.4 told
them that they were going to Zundal village. This was presumably an
attempt by the said accused to create confusion in the minds of PW3
and PW33. There is evidence to show that Accused No.2 was spotted F
in the Navli Temple.complex on 3n1 May, 1998. Additionally, no evidence
has been led to show the whereabouts of both Accused Nos. 2 and 4
after leaving from Nadiad until their arrival at Vadtal Temple e,;omplex.
PW3 deposed that Accused Nos.2 and 4 were with him from afternoon
till around 6PM on the day of the incident. The period from 2:30 PM till
the Accused No. 2 left for Nadiad with PW3 at around 4-4: 1SPM; has G
not been explained by the said accused. The Courts below have rightly
inferred on the basis of the evidence adverted to hereinabove that Accused
No.2 had picked up soft drinks at around 2:30PM from the shop of
PWI 7 at Vadtal, gone to Navli at around 3:00PM and remair.ed there
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148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 3 S.C.R.

A until he returned to the Vadtal Temple complex, after which he left with
PW3 and PW33 for Nadiad.
56. In addition to the above, we must also point out here the
conduct of Accused No.3 post the murder of Gadadharanandji. As set
out by the prosecution, once the murder was committed, Accused No.3
B along with Accused No.5 carried his body to Barothi village in Rajasthan
where it was dumped in a ditch and set on fire. After that, the Accused
No.3 set the car on fire and took it to the garage of PW 13. Thereafter
insurance claim was filed on 61h May, 1998 (Ex.129) in the name of the
car owner (PW! I) under the signature of Accused No.3 as an accident
case. However, the insurance company rejected the claim. PW6, surveyor
c of the insurance company who had examined the said car, deposed that
the car did not get burned due to any accident or internal malfunction.
57. As noted earlier, it was only on the basis of the disclosure
made by Accused No.5 as to the place where the murder was committed,
that the investigating agency was able to take the investigation forward
D and then interrogate the aforesaid witnesses i.e. PW25, PW42, PW43
and PW49. Only a person who was present at the time of commission
of the offence could have known about the location of the offence and
Accused No.5 undoubtedly had exclusive knowledge about the place
where the crime was committed, a fact which has been affirmed by
E both the courts. The panchnama drawn on the basis of this disclosure
has been corroborated by independent pancha witness PW3 I.The Courts
below, on analyzing the relevant evidence, have held that the inescapable
conclusion is that the deceased was taken to Navli. We are in agreement
with this finding, as the evidence on record supports that conclusion.

F 58. On the basis of the aforementioned circumstances, the Courts
below have held that the link connecting the chain of events and the link
between Accused Nos. I, 2, 3 and 5 was complete in all respects, pointing
to the guilt only of the said accused.·
59. The moot question is as to why the appellants should have
G thought of committing the crime. The motive behind the crime according
to the prosecution was that Accused Nos. I and 2 were irked by the
proposal of the deceased Gadadharai1andji to transfer them immediately
after taking over as the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Vadtal
Temple on 11th April, 1998. The Courts below have adverted to the
evidence of PW3, PW5, PW33, PW3 7 and PW39 and after analyzing
1-1
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 149
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the same, took the view thatthere was strong motiveTor Accused No. I A
and 2 to murder Gadadharanandji as they felt threatened about their
current position and oflosingcontrol over the affairs of the Vadtal Temple.
Resultantly, the Accused Nos. I and 2 hatched a conspiracy to commit
the offence in question and took the assistance of Accused Nos.3 and 5
who were_ co-conspirators along with them. This finding was assailed by
B
the app~llants mainly on the ground that such a case was a figment of
imagination of the prosecution. In fact, there were other persons who
were inimical to Gadadharanandji after he was elected as Chairman of
the Vadtal Temple. The Courts below have analysed this aspect and
have rejected that argument. Both the Courts have held that mere
unhappiness of those persons could not have been a ground to take such c
an extreme step. The fact that the names of other persons were
mentioned in the F.J.R. but were dropped in the eventual chargeshcet
filed by the investigating agency docs not diminish the credibility and the
quality of evidence adduced by the prosecution about the involvement of
the appellants in the commission of crime. As far as Accused Nos. l
D
and 2 are concerned, the Courts below have held that they were in
complete control of the affairs of the Vadtal Temple complex. It is these
Accused who were entertaining apprehension that their financial
irregularities would also be exposed, in the event of their transfer. The
fact that financial irregularities were committed by Accused Nos. I and
2 and that they were getting kickbacks from PW39, has come on record. E
The argument of the appellants, however, is that the prosecution has
neither produced any evidence about the disproportionate assets of these
appellants nor put any specific question to them during their exa.nination
under Section 313 of the Code. This argument needs only to be rejected,
in that the prosecution case against Accused Nos. I and 2 was not one
F
of having amassed disproportionate assets but was only of unexplained
high-value cash amounts and other investments recovered during the
search of their residence.
60. The Counsel for the Appellant (Accused No. I) had contended
that there was no evidence against Accused No. 1 and he has been
falsely implicated. He had placed reliance on Satender's Case (Supra). G
ln that case, the High Court had acquitted the accused on recording a
finding (see Para 29) - that there was no evidence of any overt act
attributed to the accused. In the present case, however, the Courts
below have after due analysis of the legal evidence and the proved
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150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A circumstances has unambiguously found that the Accused No. I was
the mastermind of the conspiracy to murder Gadadharanandji. We see
no reason to take a different view. Similarly, it has been concurrently
found that Accused Nos.3 and 5 are the henchmen of Accused Nos. I
and 2, a fact which has not been challenged by the said appellants. In
other words, the future prospect of Accused Nos.3 to 5 was fully
B
dependent upon the existence and continuation of the Accu~ed Nos. I
and 2 at Vadtal Temple complex. Both the Courts below have analysed
these aspects and come to the conclusion that there were strong
circumstances indicating the involvemerit of the appellants in the
commission of the crime and excluding any possibility of their innocence.
c 61. Relying upon paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of the decision in PK
Narayanan (Supra), it was argued that mere evidence regarding motive
and preparation for commission of the offence is not enough to
substantiate the charge of conspiracy to commit offence. In our view,
the conclusion reached in that case was on the facts of that case. In the
D present case, we find that the Courts below have analysed the evidence
on record and correctly answered the issue under consideration on the
basis of circumstances proved before, during a1id after the occurrence
indicating complicity of the Appellants. These circumstances were not
compatible with the possibility of innocence of the Appellants; and 111oreso
because of absence of any explanation from them. We are in agreement
E
with .the view so taken by the two Courts, about the involvement of
Accused Nos. I, 2, 3 and 5 in the commission of the offence in question.
62. Relying upo1i Paragraphs 13 to 15 of the decision in Baliya
@ Bal Kishan (supra), it was argued that the finding of conspiracy
recorded by the Courts below is untenable. We are not impressed with
F this argument. It is well settled that such a conspiracy is rarely hatched
in the open. There need not be any direct evidence to establish the
same. It can be a matter of inference drawn by the Court after considering
whether the basic facts and circumstances on the basis of which inference
is drawn have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts and that no
other conclusion except that of the complicity of accused to have agreed
G to commit an offence is evident. That is precisely what has been done
by the Courts below in the present case. There is no legal evidence to
give benefit of any doubt to the Appellants. We have no hesitation in
affirming the view taken by the Courts below in this regard.
63. The Appellants have made fervent effo11 to persuade the Court
H
CHARANDAS SWAMI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. 151
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

about the several other discrepancies - such as about the age of the A
deceased in Exhibits 95 and 98 or that the High Court having discarded
the circumstance of wrappers of sleeping pills found at the Navli Temple.
That, however, does not discredit the other clinching circumstances
established by the prosecution, which completes the chain of everits
indicative of the involvement of the Appellants in commission of the B .
crime. The circumstances taken into account by both the Courts an\! as
adverted to herein before, leave no manner of doubt about the complicity
of the appellants in commission of the crime in question. It is, therefore,
not necessary for us to dilate on those contentions. _ ·
64. We are also not impressed by the argument of Accused No. 5
that he should be given the same benefit as given to Accused No. 4 by
c
the High Court. In so far as Accused No. 5, there is ample evidence
about his involvement in commission qf the crime. The Courts below
have rightly noticed that he was involved, right from the disappearance
ofGadadharanandji from Vadtal Temple complex till the disposal of his
dead body at Barothi. Those aspects have been considered while D
discussing the relevant circumstances. We are, therefore, in ag(eement
with the conclusion reached by the Courts below that there is sufficient
evidence to indicate the cor~plicity of Accused No. 5 in commission of
the crime in question. Suffice it to observe that the circumstances
established indicating the complicity of Accused No. 5 cannot be
compared with the role of Accused No. 4, so as to give the same benefit · E
to him.
65. On analyzing the evidence and the judgments including the
findings and conclusion recorded by both the Courts, we have no hesitation
in upholding the order of conviction against Accused Nos. I, 2 and 5
(appellants herein). For, the prese1ice of Gadadharanandji at Vadtal F
_,Temple complex on the day of incident, the evidence that he was last
seentogether with Accused No.3 going from Vadtal Temple complex in
a car,.the recovery of a dead body in village Barothi in the neighboring
state ofRajasthan onthe next day ofdisappearance ofGadadharanandji,
the disclosure made by Accused No.3 about the location as to where the G
dead body ofGadadharanandji was dumped by him in a village at Barothi,
the discovery of the fact after subsequent medical examination that the
dead body so recovered was ofnone other than that of Gadadharanandj i,
the disclosure made by Accused No.5 of the location where
Gadadharanandji was strangleJ at Navtl Temple complex, the conduct
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152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 3 S.C.R.

A ofAccused No.3 in misleading the investigating agencies, the burning of
the vehicle used in the commission of the crime and then filing of a false
insurance claim which was rejected by the insurance company, the strong
motive for committing the murder ofGadadharanandji and the criminal
conspiracy hatched in that behalf and executed, leave no manner of
doubt about the involvement of the appellants in the commission of the
B
crime. We fully agree with the opii1ion recorded by the Cowts below in
that regard. It is not a case of finding of guilt recorded in absence of any
legal evidence or contrary to the evidence_ available on record. We find
that the finding of guilt against the appellants is inescapable. Hence, we
see no tangible reason to interfere with the final conclusion so reached
c by both the Courts.
66. Accordingly, we dismiss all the three appeals filed by the original
Accused Nos. I, 2 and 5 respectively and uphold the order of conviction
and sentence passed by the High Court, which is impugned in these
three appeals. The Accused on bail shall surrender forthwith.
D
Nidhi Jain Appeals dismissed.