Holding

The conviction is upheld because the extra‑judicial confessions were voluntary and credible, and the circumstantial evidence satisfied all the legal requirements, though the father‑in‑law's sentence is reduced to the period already served.

Summary

Chattar Singh (husband) and his father‑in‑law Mange Ram were convicted for the murder of Guddi and her infant daughter Poonam, whose bodies were found in a well. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, the "last seen" theory, post‑mortem findings of smothering, and extra‑judicial confessions in which the accused admitted killing the victims over alleged infidelity. The Supreme Court examined whether such confessions, if voluntary and credible under Sections 24 and 30 of the Evidence Act, could form the basis of conviction, and whether the chain of circumstantial evidence satisfied the established tests. It held that the confessions were admissible and credible, the circumstantial evidence met all the required criteria, and therefore the convictions were justified. However, considering the advanced age of the father‑in‑law, his sentence was reduced to the time already served.

Issues considered

The admissibility and evidentiary value of extra‑judicial confessions under the Evidence Act.
Whether the circumstantial evidence, including the last‑seen theory, satisfies the legal tests for conviction.
Whether the convictions under IPC sections 302, 201 and 498A can be sustained on the basis of the evidence presented.
The appropriateness of the sentence imposed on the father‑in‑law in view of his age.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 164
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 24, s. 30
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 498A

Subjects

circumstantial evidenceextra‑judicial confessionIPC 302IPC 201IPC 498Adowry deathlast seen theoryEvidence Actconvictionsentence reduction

Judgment

'
[2008] 12 S.C.R. 765

- -.. CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR.
v.
STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal No. 180 of 2001)
A

AUGUST 26, 2008
8
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
_d. SHARMA, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302, 201 and 498-A - Death of
a woman within 7 years of marriage and also of her infant c
daughter - Circumstantial evidence - Extra-judicial
confessions of accused (husband and father-in-law) that they
had done the deceased to death suspecting her fidelity -
Complaint by father of the deceased that it was a dowry death
- Deceased last seen together with the accused - Prosecution
D
of husband u/ss. 302, 201 and 498A - Prosecution of father-
...
I' in-Jaw and other relatives u/s 498-A - Courts below convicting
the husband and father-in ...Jaw and acquitting other relatives -
On appeal; held: Conviction justified - Extra-judicial
confession can be accepted and form the basis for conviction
if passes the test of credibility - Sentence of father-in-law E
reduced to the period already undergone in view of his age -
Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 30.
Criminal Trial - Extra-judicial Confession - Reliance on
- Held: Can be relied on if voluntary, true and made in fit state F
of mind - Voluntariness thereof to be decided in the facts and
circumstances of each case - Evidence Act, .1872 - s. 24.
· Evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Reliance on -
Held: Conviction can be based on such evidence - Condition
precedent for reliance before conviction, discussed. G
1' Appellant-accused (husband) was prosecuted u/s
~)
302, 201 and 498-A IPC and appellan!-accused (father-in-
Law) was prosecuted u/s 498-A IPC. According to
765 H
.. ··?6.6 SlJPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A prosecution appellant-husband was married to the
deceased No. 1. A daughter (deceased No. 2) was born
..f' ..
out of the wedlock. PW 3 (father of deceased No. 1) filed
private complaint against seven accused including the
appellant-husband and appellant (father-in-law), alleging
B that the dispute which led to the death of the deceased ~

was demand of dowry. The police presented challan i
against the appellants-accused placing reliance on -the ~ (

extra-judicial confessions made· by the appellant- (father-
in-law) to PWs. 5, s· that they had done the deceased to I
c death, because of infidelity of deceased No. 1. Appellant ~
'o-

(father-in-law) made confession before PW-10 that his son
(appellant-husband) had done the deceased to death. The . ~-
challans of the complainant as well as the police w~re .
amalgamated and all the seven accused were tried. Trial r-
court fo_und the appEfllant•husband guilty of offences _'U/s ·'
D 302, 201 and 498-A. Appellant (father-in~law) was convicted
u/s 498-A. The rest of the accused were acquitted. High ..
'\

Court confirmed the conviction relying on extra-judicial.
confession. Hence the present ·appear. "
i
E Partly allowing the. app.eal; the Court ~

HELD: 1. The conviction recorded by the trial Court
and upheld by the High Court doe~ not suffer from any
infirmity to warrant interference. However, coosidering
the age of Appellant (father-in law), his sentence is reduced
F to the period already undergon~ which is nearty one year.
. [Para 19] [784-C".'D] \-
2.1 Where a case rests squarely .(.m circumstantla'
evidence, the inference of guilt can. be justified only when
G
all the incrimina!ing te1cts and ci_rcumstances .are found
to be incompatible with the innoc;ence ·of the accused or
the guilt of any other person ..There i~ no doubt -that -l-
\~
conviction-can be based solely on circumstantial evidence
but it should be tested by the tcuch•stone of law relating
-to circumstantial evidence. They are the circumstances
H
CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 767
HARYANA

from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be A
fully established. The circumstances c~:mcerned 'must' or
'should' and not 'may be' established; the facts so
established should be consistent only with _the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused B
,(
........ is guilty; the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency; they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved; and there must
be a chain of evidence so complete as not to Jeave any
reasonable ground forthe conclusion consistent with the c.
innocence of the accused and ..must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused.
[Paras 5, 10 and 12] [776-C 778-D 779 C-F]
Hukam Singh v. State·of Rajasthan AIR 1977 SC 1063;
Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1956 SC 316; D
1 Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka AIR 1983 SC 446; State
,j
·of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. Al~ 1985 SC 1224; Ba/winder
Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1·987 SC 350; Ashok Kumar
Chatterjee v. State of M.P. AIR 1989 SC 1890; Bhagat Ram
v. State of Punjilb AIR 1954 SC 621; C. Chenga Reddy and E
Ors. v. State of A.P. 1996 (10) SCC 193; Padala Veera Reddy
v. State of A.P. and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 79; State of UP. v.
Ashok 'Kumar Sriva.stava 1992 Crl.LJ 1104; Hanumant
Govind Nargundkar and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR
1952 SC 343; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.. State of F
f Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622; State of Rajasthan v. Raja
Ram-2003 (8) SCC 180; State of Haryana v. Jagbir Singh
and Anr. 2003 (11) SCC 261; Kusuma Ankama Rao v State
of A.P. 2008 (10) SCR 89 - relied on.

~t
"Wills' Circumstantial Evidence" (Chapter VI) by Sir G
~) Alfred Wills - referred to.
2.2 The last seen theory comes into play where the
time-gap between the point of time when the accused
ahd the deceased' were seen last alive and when the
H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.
.,_, ~
A deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any
person other than the accused being the author of the
. crime becomes impossible. [Para 14] [780-A-13]
Ramreddy Rajeshkhanna Reddy v. State of A.P. 2006
(10) SCC 172; Jaswant Gir V. State of Punjab 2005(12) SCC
B 438; Kusuma AnkamaRao v State of A.P. 2008 (10) SCR 89
)...
- relied on. ~-.:.

3.1 An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true ~

and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the
c .court. The confession will have to be proved like any
other fact. It is not open tO any court to start with a
presumption that extra-judicial confession is a weak type
of evidence. It. would depend on the nature of the
circumstances, the time when the confession was made
and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a
D
confession. ,A,,fter subjecting the evidence of the witness. t
to a ·rigorous test on-the touchstone of credibility, the,
i
extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the
basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility:
[Para 18] [783·0-F,H] ~

E
3.2 As to extra-judicial confessions, two questions
arise: (i) were. they made voluntarily? and (ii) are they
true? A confession wpuld be voluntarv if it is made by the
accused in a fit state of mind, and if it is not caused by
F any inducement, threat or promise which· has reference
to the charge against him, proceeding from a person ·in
authority. It would not be involuntary, if the inducement,
(a) does not' have reference to the ch~rge. against the
"
accused person; or (b) it does not proceed from a person
in authority; or (c) it is not sufficient, in the opiniQn of the
G
c~urt to give the ciccused person grounds which would ~~
.... 1--
appear to him reasonable for supposing that, by making.
it, he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a
temporal nature in reference to the proceedin~ against
him. Whether or not the confession was voluntary would
H
CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 769
HARYANA

depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, A
judged in the light of Section 24 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
(Para 17] [781-8,D,E & F]
3.3 A confession cannot be used against an accused
person unless the court is satisfied that it was voluntary
and at that stage the question whether it is true or false 8
does not arise. If the facts and circumstances surrounding
the making of a confession appear to cast a doubt on the
veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the court may
refuse to act upon the confession, even if it is admissible
in evidence. [Para 17] [781-G & H; 782-A] C
3.4 'every inducement, threat or promise does not
vitiate a confession. Since the object of the rule is to
exclude only tho.se confessions which are testimonially
untrustw'orthy, the inducement, threat or promise must
0
be such as is calculated to lead to an untrue ·confession.
,.. The· absence or presence of an inducement, promise etc.
or its sufficiency and how or in wf:lat measure it worked
on the mind of the accused. If the inducement, promise
or threat is sufficient in the opinion of the court, to give
the accused person grounds which would appear to him E
reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain
any advantage or avoid any evil, it is enough to exclude
th~ confession. The words "appear to him" in the last
part of the section refer to the !llentality of the
accused.[Para 17] [783-A,B & CJ F
3.5 So far as the extra judicial confession of Appellant-
accused (father-in-law) before PWs 5 and 6 is concerned
that actually is not of much relevance in view of Section 30
of Evidence Act. He was not t_ried for an offence under G
~··
. j Section 302 IPC. Therefore, his confession if any is of no
consequence. But the extra judicia.1 confession before PW-
10 which ha$ been relied upon by both the trial Court and
the High Court cannot be lost sight of. [Para 18] [784-A-B]
R. v. Warickshal (1783) 1 Leach 263 - referred to. H
770 SUPREME COURT RE;PORTS . [2008] 12 S.C.R
¥-
~
A Woodroffe's Evidence, 9th Edn., p. 284 - referred to ..
·Case Law Ref~rence
AIR 1977 SC 1063 Relied on. Paras
AIR 1956 SC 316 Reliett on. Para 5
B AIR 1983 SC 446 Relied on. Para· 5
~
AIR 1985 SC 1224 Relied on. Para 5
AIR 1987 SC 350 Relied o.n. Para 5.
AIR 1989 SC 1890 Relied on. Para_.~-;.
c
AIR 1954 SC 621 Relied on. Para· 5·
1996 «tO) sec 193 Relied on.· Para 6
AIR 1990 SC 79 . Relied o.n. Para·1

D 1992 Crl.LJ 1104 Relied .on. Par~~-
t
AIR 1952 SC 343 Relied on.· Para 11
'1(
_,
AIR 1984 SC 1622 Relied .on~ Pafa
. 1·2
.. ";'

.2003 -(8) · sec 180 Relied on •. Para 13
E 2003 (11) sec 2s1 Relied on. Para 13·
2008 (10) SCR 89 . Relied on.: Pa·ra·13
2005 (3) sec 114 Relied on Para·-14
2oos (10) sc~~112- Relied on. Para 15
F 2005(12) sec~ 438 Relied on. ·-Para'.16
_(1783) 1 Leach 263 Referred
... to Para 17
.....
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JU.RISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 180 of 2001
G From the final Judgment and O~~er dated 5.09.2000 o~
.)-

the High .Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh .in Criminal '~·
Appeal No. ~99 DB of 1997
Sus.hi! Kumar, Ajai Bhalla, Shefali Jain, Abhinav Jain and
H Abha R. Sharma for the AppellaRts.
-CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF ' 771
HARYANA

Rajeev Gaur 'Naseem' and' T.V. George for the A
_Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1.Chailenge in this appeal is.to
the judgment of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana B.
High Court upholding the conviction of appellant No.1 ~chattar
Singh (hereinafter referred to as 'A-1 ') for offence punishable
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. He was
also convicted for offence punishable un.der Section 201 and
Section 498A IPC. Different sentences were imposed for the c
said offences. Appellant-Mange Ram (hereinafter referred to
as 'A-2') was convicted for off~nce punishable under Section
498A IPC and was sentenced to undergo RI for two years and
to pay· a fine of Rs.2,000/-. The conviction recorded by learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak, was confirmed by Division
0
Bench of the High Court as also the sentences for botti the · •
appellants. · · ·

2. Background facts giving rise to the prosecution are as
follows:
A young girl, namely, Guddi (hereinafter referred to as the E
'deceased') aged about 26 years, belonged to village Nimly in
district Bhiwani in Haryana. Her marriage was performed with
Chattar Singh, A-1, son of Mange Ram, A-2 of village Sahlawas,
in district Rohtak, in the year 1990. Both the families are
agriculturists. A daughter, namely, Poonam (dece~s~d no.2) F
was born from this wedlock. · ·
Dead bodies of Guddi and that of the infant daughter.
Poonam in the posture that the latter was in the armpit of Guddi
tJ, were found in a well of village Sahalwas on the morning of G
~- .\ 17.2.1993. Jeet Singh, father of the deceased mad_e an
application Ex.PO on 16.2.1993, a day earlier that his daughter
was missing, before SI Ashok Kumar, PW-12, the then Station·
House Officer, Pplice Station, Sahlawas and on its basis formal
FIR Ex.PN was recorded. On 17.2.1993 he inspected the spot H
772 SUPREME COURT Re:PORTS [2008] ·12 S.C.R.

A and prepared rot.Jgh site plan Ex.PCQ. He got the dead bodies
of th~ deceased photographed by Va rin.'der Singh,
Photographer, PW.14. Ex.PJJ/I to 8 are th~ photographs and
Ex.PJJ/9 to 14 and Ex.PZ/7 and 8 are their negatives. ~ile
Singh, PW.9, also took photographs ExPZ/7 to 12 ?ind the
B negatives.are Ex.PZ/1 to 6. The Investigating Officer prepared
inquest reports Ex.PB and PD. He also prepared tough ~ite
plan of the place of recovery of· dead ~odies Ex.POD. _The
dead bodies were taken out from the well arid were despatched
for post mort~m. On 28.2.1993, Chattar Singh and Ma~ge Ram
0 accused w~re produced by Babu Lal, Sarpanch of the yillag~
before the Investigating officer who were arrested. On
interrogafjon by the Investigating Officer on 1~3.1993,· Chattar
Singh accused made a disclosure statement Ex.PFF and in
pursuance thereof got r~covered Chuni ·(Sc;:arf) from· the
specified place which were ta~en into possession vide m~_mo
0
Ex.PFF/1. He also prepared rough site plan Ex.Pf.F/2 of ttie
place of recovery. However, the statement made by Jeet Singh, ·;K
PW.3, the father of the deceased Gontained the allegation$ that
Ch attar Singh (husband) and Mange Ram· (father~in-law) of the
deceased as well as Rajesh and Vijay Singh along· with their
f; wives Simla and Bala respectively who were maltreating his
daughter were.demanding Rs.50,000/- as a part of dowry and
only qn fulfilment of that condition the daughter could remain in
peace.· He allegedly borrowed a sum of Rs.50,000/~ from' one
Sadan Singh, ·PW.8, and paid the amount to the. accused
F persons. He also claimed that he.gave various other amounts,
valuables and ~rticles on v~rious occasions and it was, therefore, ·.
that since 'this a.mount was given at least 25 days earlier to·the
occ1,Jrrence, after the birth of the child when ·Guddi had stayed
only for a short period prior to the occurrence at the place of her
· G 'in-laws. So, there was one version of the compl~inant, father of
.the deceased, that the dispute which led fo the death of the
d~ceased was the demand of dowry. However, during further
investigation of the case, it. transpired that extra judicial
confession w~s allegedly made by Chattar Singh and Mange
H. Ram accused that they were suspecting illicit relation of the
CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 773
HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.J

deceased Guddi with some person and that she had conceived A
a child from that person and the child was delivered at her
parents' place. Therefore, on account of that stigma being cast
on the family of the accused, they did notthin.k that it was befitting
their prestige that Guddi should be allowed to stay with them

..
J
and they have done her and the infant child to death and asked B
the Sarpanch Babu Lal to help them in the matter. A similar
extra judicial confession was allegedly made before Dial Singh,
PW.5, Om Singh, PW.6 and Ms.Viney Bhardwaj, P.W.10, a
Reader in the Department of History who was the Secretary of
one Mahila Dakshita Samiti and the Samiti had approached c
the accused persons in the village where Mange Ram made an
extra judicial confession that his son Chattar Singh had done
the deceased to death, because of infidelity of the deceased.
The post-mortem on the dead body of Guddi was
performed by Or. Vijay Pal Khanagwal, PW.1, on 19.2.1993 at D
9.00A.M. and he found the following injuries on the dead body:
(1) There was a contusion present over the tip and alae
of nose, 3 cm in diameter. On dissection the sub
cutaneous and deeper structures showed
acchymosed. ~
(2) There were multiple contusions present over both
· the lips and in an area of 3 to 4 ems around the lips.
Size varying from 1 x 0.5 to 2.5 x 1.5 cm. On
dissection, the underlying tissues were ecchymosed. F
(3) A contusion present over right side of face 1 cm from
mid line, situated 2 cm above lower border of
mendible measuring 3.2 cm placed transversely. On
dissection, the deeper tissues showed
ecchymosis. G
In the opinion of the doctor the dead body was in moderate
stage of decomposition and that the cause of death was
smothering.
On the same day at 11.00 AM. the aforesaid doctor H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A conducted-post mortem on the dead body of infant child Poonam
and he found the following injuries on the dead body:
(1) There was a contusion over the nose along its tip
and alae measuring 3 x 2 cm in size. On dissection
the underlying tissues showed ecchymosis. .
B
· (2) There were multiple contusion present over the lips,
chin and the area around It in an area of 4 x 5 ems
size varying from 1 x 0.5 cm to,2x1 cm. On dissection
the sub cutaneous and deeper structure were
c ecchymosed.
In the opinion of the doctor the dead body was in moderate
sta_ge·of decomposition and the cause of death was smothering.
Clothes of the deceased were sent to the Forensic Science
Laboratory and they were found to be stained with human blood
0
as per report Ex.PQ/1.
Investigation was conducted by Inspector Sumer Singh
Malik, PW.13 who recorded the statements of Raghbir Singh,
Ramesh and. one more witness on 5.4.l993. As per order of
E Shri R.S. Yadav, Additional Superintendent· of Police, who
supervised the investigation, he arrested Mange Ram, Chattar
Singh and Bhalliyan, accused.On completion of investigation,
charge sheet was filed.
It is to be noted that Jeet Singh (PW-3), father of the·
F deceased had brought a private complaint in which he had
named seven accused perspns. The police presented challan
against two persons i.e. the present appellants and the names
of rest of the accused persons were kept in column No. II.
However, the trial Court ordered challan of the complaint to be
G · amalgamatectand, therefore, all the seven persons were tried.
Butthe trial Court directed acquittal of five co-accused persons
while finding the appellants guilty.
The trial Courtfound th~t the prosecution case rested or(·'·"·~··;.,,,,
H circumstantial evidence. Two of the major circumstances were
CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 775
HARYANA [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
..,. the alleged extra judicial confession and that the accused and A
'"the 9eceased were last seen together. The trial Courtfound the
prosecution version to be cogent and credible. It is to be noted
that 14 witnesses were examined to further the prosecution
version. The complainant was examined as PW-3. The present
appellants pleaded-innocence though they admitted relationship B
inter se with the deceased Guddi and the factum that she has
~ delivered a child. Though a plea was taken that the deceased
had accidentally fallen in the well or had committed suicide, the
same was discarded. The trial Court primarily relied on the
evidence of Dr. Vijay Pal Kangwal to rule out the death by c
drowning and that death had occurred earlier and dead bodies
Were thrown in the well. According to him, death was caused by
closing the nostrils and mouth of the deceasHd with hands or
other means. Accordingly, the convictions were recorded and
sentences were imposed.
D
;1 3. The primary stand in appeal was that the circumstances
)
do not present a complete chain. The High Court noted that the
y
trial Judge believed the evidence of extra judicial confession
against appellant No.1 that he had smothered his wife and
child and managed to throw the dead bodies in the well and E
came to the conclusion that he alongwith father Mange Ram
also maltreated and harassed the deceased with cruelty. The
_trial Judge had, therefore, rightly recorded conviction. It was
also averred before the High Court that Guddi was missing
from the house since morning of 16.2.1993 and on making F
report to that effect, her dead body alqngwith the dead body of
_-{
child were found in the well. It was also submitted that it was not
a case _of smothering and death was due to asphyxia as stated
by PW·-1, the doctor and the injury on the person of the deceased
could be the result of the deceased having fallen in the well. The
G
version of the accused persons that the deceased left the house
w,
-~ > around 6.00 a.m. was also falsified by the fact that semi
digested food was found in her intestine. It was also pleaded
that one of. the witnesses to the alleged extra judicial confession
supported the case of the defence and not the prosecution. The
H
776 SUPREME COURTREPORTS (2008] 12 S.C.R

A High Court noticed that the extra judicial confession before ~
PW-10 was most relevant. She had no animus against anyone
whatsoever. The evidence of PWs 5 and 6 was also believed
so far as extra judicial confession is concerned. The High Court
did not find any substance· in the appeal and dismisse~ the
B' same.
4. The stand taken before the High Court was re-iterated
by !earned counsel for,the appellants and the State.
5. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that
0 where acase rests squ·arely on circumstantial evidence, the
inference of guilt can be justified only wt1en all the incriminating
facts and circi.Jhlstance$ are found to be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused·or the guilt of any other person. (See·
Hukam Singh v. State ofRajasthanAIR (1977 SC 1063); Eradu
and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad (Al R 1956 SC 316) ;·
D Earabhadrappa v. Sfate'of Karnataka (AIR 1983 SC 446);
State of UP V .Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 1224);
Ba/winder Singh V. State ofPunjab (AIR 1987 SC 350); Ashok
· Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P (AIR 1989 SC 1890). The
E' circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the
accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
and have to be shown to be closely c;:onnected with the principal
fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat
Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR 1954 SC 621 ), it was laid down
that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from
F circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must
be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring
the offences home beyond any reasonable doubt.
6. We may also. make a reference to a decision of this ..
G Court. in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P (1996) 10
SCC 193, Wherein ithas been observed thus:
."In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled
law is'that the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt .is drawn should be fully proved and such
H circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all
CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 777
HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

the circumstances should be complete and there should A
be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved
circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his
innocence .... ".
7. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P and Ors. (AIR 8
1990 SC 79), it was laid down that when a case rests upon
circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following
tests:
"(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is c
sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly
established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency
unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
.D
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a
chain so complete that there is no escape from the
l
conclusion that within all human probability the crime
-1,.i was committed by the accused and nnne else; and
(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain E
conviction must be complete and incapable of
explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the
guilt of the accused and such evidence should not
only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but
should be inconsistent with his innocence." F
8. In State of UP v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992 CrLLJ
~
1104), it was pointed out that great care must be taken in
evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied
or'lis reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour
of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that G
the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully
~ established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so
-~ ),
established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.

9. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book "Wills'
H
77a··- SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A CircumstantiFtl Evidence" (Chapter VI) lays down the following
rules s·pecially to be observed in the case of circumstantial
evidenc~; ( 1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference
must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected
with the factum probandum; (2)the burden of proof is always oh
1i' the party who asserts the' .existence ·o'f any fact, which infers
legal accountability; (3)' in all. cases, whether of direct or
circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced.
which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the
inference .Qfguilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible
c with ft)e innocence of the accused and incapable ofexplariation,
..>

upon: any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5)
if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he
is -entitled as of right to be . acquitted".
. .

. 10 ...There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely
D. on circumstantial evidence but itshould be tested by the touch-
stone of law ·relating to .circumstantial evidence laid down ·by
· · . the this Court as far back as in 1952.
11. In Hant.imant GovincJ Nargundkar and Ani. v.
State of
"' Madhya Pradesh/ (AIR 1952 SC 343), wherein it was obserVed
E thus:

"It is well: to remember that in cases where the evidence
is ofa circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first
instance be fully established and al,I. the facts so
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis
6f the guilt ofthe accused. Again, the circumstances sh~uld
be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they shoLJld
be such as to exclude every hypothesis- but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a
G.
chain' of evidence so far ·complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the
.·innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show
.fhat within all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused."
H
CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 779
. HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
r
12. A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad A
Birdhichand Sa rda v. Sta,te of Maharashtra, (Al R 1984 SC 1622).
Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been
held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is
complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution cannot be
cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the 8
_.J
words of this Court, before conviction could be based on
circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be fully established. The
circumstances concerned 'must' or 'should' and not c
'may be' established;
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is
to say, they should not be explainable on any other
D
1 hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;
l:,.
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency;
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved; and ·· E

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and
must show that in all human probability the act must F
have been done by the accused.

13. These aspects were highlighted in State of Ra1asthan
v. Raja Ram (2003 (8) SCC 180), State of Haryana v. Jagbir
Singh and Anr. (2003 (11) SCC 261) and Kusuma Ankama
Rao v State of A. P. (Criminal Appeal No.185/2005 disposed of .G
on 7.7.2008)

14. So far as the last seen aspect is concerned it is
necessary to take note of two decisions of this court. In State
of UP v. Satish [2005 (3) sec 114] it was noted as follows; H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A "22. The last seen theory comes into play where the time-
gap between the point of time when the accused and the
deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is
found dead is so small that possibility of any person other
than the accused being the auth0r of the crime becomes
B impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively
establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused
when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons
·"+
coming in between exists. In the absence of any other
positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the
c deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous
to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this
case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the
accused were seen together by witnesses PWs. 3 and 5,
in addition to the evidence of PW-2."
D 15. In Ramreddy Rajeshkhanna Reddy v. State of A.P.
[2006 (1 O) sec 172] it was noted as follows:
"27. The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes into play
'
- ::_

where the time gap between the point of :time when the
accused and the deceased were last seen alive and the
E deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any
person other than the accused being the author of the
crime becomes impossible. Even in such a case the courts
should look for some corroboration".

F (See also Bodh Raj v. State of J&K (2002(8) SCC 45).)"
~i
16. A similar view was also taken in Jaswant Gir v. State
of Punjab [2005(12) SCC 438] and Kusuma Ankama Rao's
case (supra).
17. Confessions may be divided into two classes i.e.
G
judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those which ..~
are made before a Magistrate or a court in the course of judicial
proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are
made by the party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or court.
Extra-judicial confessions are generally those that are made by
H
CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 781
HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

a party to or before a private individual which includes even a A
judicial officer in his private capacity. It also includes a Magistrate
who is not especially empowered to record confessions under
Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short
the 'Code') or a Magistrate so empowered but receiving the
confession at a stage when Section 164 of the Code does not B

~
apply. As to extra-judicial confessions, two questions arise: (1)
were they made voluntarily? and (ii) are they true? As the section
enacts, a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant
in criminal proceedings, if the making of the confession appears
to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or c
promise, ( 1) having reference to the charge against the accused
person, (2) proceeding from a person in authority, and (3)
sufficient, in the opinion of the court to give the accused person

,, -¥
grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing
that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil
of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against
him. It follows that a confession would be voluntary if it is made
D

by the accused in a fit state of mind, and if it is not caused by
any inducement, threat or promise whrch has reference to the
charge against him, proceeding from a person in authority. It
would not be involuntary, if the inducement, (a) does not have E
reference to the charge against the accused person; or (b) it
does not proceed from a person in authority; or (c) it is not
sufficient, in the opinion of the court to give the accused person
grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing
~ that, by making it, he would gain any advantage or avoid any F
evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against
him. Whether or not the confession was voluntary would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case, judged in the
light of Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short
~-J._),
'Evidence Act'). The law is clear that a confession cannot be G
used against an accused person unless the court is satisfied
that it was voluntary and at that stage the question whether it is
true or false does not arise. If the facts and circumstances-
surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a doubt
on the veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the court may H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

' ' A' ref~se to acl upon the confession, even if it is admissible in
evidence. O,ne important question, in regard to which the court
has to be satisfied With is, whether when the accused made the
confession, he was a free man or his movements were controlled
by the police either by themselves or through some other agency
B .~mployed by them for the purpose of securing such a-confession.
1
\f"he questiqn whether a confession .is voluntary or not is always
a question of facLAll the factors andall the circumstances of
~he- case, including the important factors of the time given for
reflection, scope of the accused getting a feeling of ·threat,
c inducement or pro,mise, must be col"!sidered before deciding
whether the co.urt ts ~ati.sfied that in its opinion the impression
caused.by the inducement.threat or·promise, if any;·has been
fully.removed, Afree.and voluntary confession is deserving of
ttie highest credit, beGause it Js presumed to' flow· from the
highest..sense of guilt. (See R. v. Warickshall) H is not to 'Qe .
0
~
_conceived.that
. . .
a .man-would . be
.
induced to make a tree and
voluntary confession o_f .guilt, so. contrary to 'the feelings and
r principle~ of h~11J~n nature, if~he facts-coritessed were not true. · ·
Deliberate and voluntary confessions of guilt, if clearly proved,
. are· among' the most effectual proofs in law. ·An involuntary
.. E. 'confes~ion is one which is not the result of the· free will of the
maker of it. so· where the statement is made as a result of
\ harassmentand continuous interrogation for several hours after
th~ person ,is tre~ted as an offender and. accus~d, such,.
.· stat~ment;.must be regarded as .involuntary. The- inducement
· F ' ·may. take the form of a p~omise or of a threat, and often the
inducem~nt involves bot.h promise ar.id threat, a promise of
forgiveness-if disclosur:~· is made and threat of prosecution if it
is not. (See l(tloodroffe's.Evidence, 9th Ed_n., p. 284.)A promise
a
is always attached,to the confession alternative while threat
G is always !:ittached to the si1ence alternative; thus, in one case I...

,I .. the prisoner. is measuring 'the net advantage of the promise, l'· \.jj
minus the general undesirability of a false confession, as against
·.,i the.present unsatisfactory situation; while in the other case he
.is measuring th_e net advantages of the present satisfactory
', '}.
· H situation, minus the general undesirability of the confession
_..,

CHATTAR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF 783
HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT;·J.]

against the threatened harm. It must be borne in mind that every A
inducement, threat or promise does not vitiate a confession.
Since the object of the rule is to exclude only those confessions
which are testimonially untrustworthy, the inducement, threat or
"') promise must be such as is calculated to lead to an untrue
confession. On the aforesaid analysis the court is to determine B
the absence or presence of an inducement, promise etc. or its
.)
--iJ sufficiency and how or in what measure it worked on the mind
of the accused. If the inducement, promise or threat is sufficient
in the opinion of the court, to give the accused person grounds
which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by c
making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil, it is
enough to exclude the confession. The words "appear to him"
in the last part of the section refer to the mentaltty of the accused.
-
18. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and
made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The D
;r confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value
of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence,
.;i;..-
depends upon the veracity of the witness to wh9m it has been
made. The ttalue of the evidence as to the confession depends
on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not E
open to any court to start with a presumption that extra-judicial
confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the
nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession was
made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a
confession. Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction F
-(
can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession
cqmes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased,
not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of
whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he
may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the
G
accused, the words spoken to by the witness are clear,
-;/_;. unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the
perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness
which may milltate against it. After subjecting the evidence of
the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility,
H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 12 S.C.R.

A the ex~ra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the
basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility.
18. So far as the extra judicial confession of A-2 before
PWs 5 and 6 is concerned that actually is not of much relevance
in view of Section 30 of Evidence Act. The stress in the said
8 provision is on the joint trial for the same offence. In the instant
case A-2 was not tried for Section 302 IPC. Therefore, his
confession if any is of no consequence. But the extra judicial ~ ,,..
confession before PW-10 which has been relied upon by both
the trial Court and the High Court cannot be lost sight of.
c
19. In view of the evidence led, the inevitable conclusion
is that the conviction recorded by the trial Court and upheld by
the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant
interference. However, considering the age of A-2 the sentence
is reduced to the period already undergone which is nearly one
0
year so far as A-2 is concerned. Except the modification of
sentence so far as A-2 is concerned the appeal is dismissed.
The bail bonds executed so far as A-2 is concerned shall stand
discharged. So far as A-1 is concerned he shall surrender to
E custody forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence.
K.K.T. Appeal partly allowed.